[Pages S6708-S6710]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

  Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control 
Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain 
proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, 
the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be 
reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the 
notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
  In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant 
information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to 
have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. 
If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is 
available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, room SD-423.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  Defense Security


                                           Cooperation Agency,

                                 Arlington, VA, November 19, 2019.
     Hon. James E. Risch,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Pursuant to the reporting requirements 
     of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
     amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19-63 
     concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and 
     Acceptance to the Government of Morocco for defense articles 
     and services estimated to cost $4.25 billion. After this 
     letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news 
     release to notify the public of this proposed sale.
           Sincerely,

                                            Charles W. Hooper,

                                          Lieutenant General, USA,
                                                         Director.
       Enclosures.


                         Transmittal No. 19-63

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
         amended
       (i) Prospective Purchaser: Kingdom of Morocco.
       (ii) Total Estimated Value:
       Major Defense Equipment* $3.00 billion.
       Other $1.25 billion.
       Total $4.25 billion.
       (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
     Services under Consideration for Purchase:
       Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
       Thirty-six (36) AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters (24 new, 
     12 optional).
       Seventy-nine (79) T700-GE-701 D Engines (72 installed, 6 
     spares).
       Thirty-six (36) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition 
     and Designation Sight/AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision 
     Sensors (M-TADS/PNVS).
       Eighteen (18) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with 
     Radar Electronic Units (REU).
       Eighteen (18) AN/APR-48B Modernized-Radar Frequency 
     Interferometers (MRFI).
       Five hundred fifty-one (551) AGM-114R Hellfire Missiles 
     (441 new, 110 optional).
       Sixty (60) AGM-114L Hellfire Missiles.
       Seventy-two (72) M36E9 Hellfire Captive Air Training 
     Missiles (CATM).
       Five hundred eighty-eight (588) Advanced Precision Kill 
     Weapon System (APKWS) Kits (478 installed, 110 optional).
       Seventy-eight (78) Embedded Global Positioning Systems with 
     Inertial Navigation (EGIs) (72 installed, 6 spares).
       Thirty-nine (39) AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems 
     (CMWS) (36 installed, 3 spares).
       Two hundred (200) AIM-92H Stinger Missiles.
       Non-MDE: Also included are twenty-one
       (21) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2) video receivers (18 
     installed, 3

[[Page S6709]]

     spares); thirty-nine (39) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2) 
     air-air-ground kits (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine 
     (39) AN/APR-39D(V)2 radar signal detecting sets (36 
     installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/AVR-2B laser 
     detecting sets (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/
     APX-123 or AN/APX-123A common transponders (36 installed, 3 
     spares); thirty-nine (39) IDM-401 Improved Data Modems (36 
     new, 3 spares); six (6) Link-16 terminals; thirty-nine (39) 
     Improved Countermeasure Dispensing System (ICMD) (36 
     installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/ARN-149 (V)3 
     automatic direction finders (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-
     nine (39) Doppler ASN-157 Doppler radar velocity sensors (36 
     installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/APN-209 radar 
     altimeters (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/ARN-
     153 Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) sets (36 installed, 3 
     spares); four (4) TACAN ground stations; thirty-six (36) Very 
     High Frequency Omni-Directional Range/Instrument Landing 
     Systems (VOR/ILS) (36 installed, 3 new); twelve (12) AN/PYQ-
     l0(C) simple key loader (12 new); thirty-six (36) M230E1 + 
     M139 AWS automatic gun (36 new); eighty-one (81) M261 rocket 
     launchers (72 new, 9 spares); seventy-eight (78) M299 missile 
     launchers (72 new, 6 spares); fifty-three (53) Stinger Air-
     to-Air launchers (53 new); twenty-nine (29) Stinger Captive 
     Flight Trainers (CFT) (29 new); eight (8) Stinger Aerial 
     Handling Trainers (AHT) (8 new); five thousand two hundred 
     sixteen (5,216) 2.75-inch rockets (3,896 new, 1,320 
     optional); ninety-three thousand (93,000) 30mm rounds (65,500 
     new, 27,500 optional); secure voice radios; training devices; 
     communication systems; helmets; simulators; generators; 
     transportation and organization equipment; spare and repair 
     parts; support equipment; tools and test equipment; technical 
     data and publications; personnel training and training 
     equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical 
     assistance, technical and logistics support services; and 
     other related elements of logistics support.
       (iv) Military Department: Army.
       (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: MO-B-UTN.
       (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed 
     to be Paid: None.
       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense 
     Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached 
     Annex.
       (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: November 19, 
     2019.
  *As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.


                          POLICY JUSTIFICATION

                      Morocco--AH-64E Helicopters

       The Government of Morocco has requested a possible sale of 
     thirty-six (36) AH-64E Apache attack helicopters (24 new, 12 
     optional); seventy-nine (79) T700-GE-701D engines (72 
     installed, 6 spares); thirty-six (36) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized 
     Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/AN/AAR-11 Modernized 
     Pilot Night Vision Sensors (M-TADS/PNVS); eighteen (18) AN/
     APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar Electronic Units 
     (REU); eighteen (18) AN/APR-48B Modernized-Radar Frequency 
     Interferometers (MRFI); five hundred fifty-one (551) AGM-114R 
     Hellfire missiles (441 new, 110 optional); sixty (60) AGM-1 
     14L Hellfire missiles; seventy-two (72) M36E9 Hellfire 
     Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); five hundred eighty-
     eight (588) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) 
     kits (478 installed, 110 optional); seventy-eight (78) 
     Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation 
     (EGIs) (72 installed, 6 spares); thirty-nine (39) AAR-57 
     Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (36 installed, 3 
     spares); and two hundred (200) AIM-92H Stinger missiles. Also 
     included are twenty-one (21) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-
     2) video receivers (18 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) 
     Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2) air-air-ground kits (36 
     installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/APR-39D(V)2 radar 
     signal detecting sets (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine 
     (39) AN/AVR-2B laser detecting sets (36 installed, 3 spares); 
     thirty-nine (39) AN/APX-123 or AN/APX-123A common 
     transponders (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) IDM-
     401 Improved Data Modems (36 new, 3 spares); six (6) Link-16 
     terminals; thirty-nine (39) Improved Countermeasure 
     Dispensing System (ICMD) (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-
     nine (39) AN/ARN-149 (V)3 automatic direction finders (36 
     installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) Doppler ASN-157 
     Doppler radar velocity sensors (36 installed, 3 spares); 
     thirty-nine (39) AN/APN-209 radar altimeters (36 installed, 3 
     spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/ARN-153 Tactical Air Navigation 
     (TACAN) sets (36 installed, 3 spares); four (4) TACAN ground 
     stations; thirty-six (36) Very High Frequency Omni-
     Directional Range/Instrument Landing Systems (VOR/ILS) (36 
     installed, 3 new); twelve (12) AN/PYQ-l0(C) simple key loader 
     (12 new); thirty-six (36) M230E1 + M139 AWS automatic gun (36 
     new); eighty-one (81) M261 rocket launchers (72 new, 9 
     spares); seventy-eight (78) M299 missile launchers (72 new, 6 
     spares); fifty-three (53) Stinger Air-to-Air launchers (53 
     new); twenty-nine (29) Stinger Captive Flight Trainers (CFT) 
     (29 new); eight (8) Stinger Aerial Handling Trainers (AHT) (8 
     new); five thousand two hundred sixteen (5,216) 2.75-inch 
     rockets (3,896 new, 1,320 optional); ninety-three thousand 
     (93,000) 30mm rounds (65,500 new, 27,500 optional); secure 
     voice radios; training devices; communication systems; 
     helmets; simulators; generators; transportation and 
     organization equipment; spare and repair parts; support 
     equipment; tools and test equipment; technical data and 
     publications; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. 
     Government and contractor technical assistance, technical and 
     logistics support services; and other related elements of 
     logistics support. The estimated cost is $4.25 billion.
       This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and 
     national security of the United States by helping to improve 
     the security of a major Non-NATO ally that is an important 
     force for political stability and economic progress in North 
     Africa.
       The proposed sale will improve Morocco's capability to meet 
     current and future threats, and will enhance interoperability 
     with U.S. forces and other allied forces. Morocco will use 
     the enhanced capability to strengthen its homeland defense 
     and provide close air support to its forces. Morocco will 
     have no difficulty absorbing the Apache aircraft into its 
     armed forces.
       The proposed sale of this equipment and services will not 
     alter the basic military balance in the region.
       The prime contractors involved in this program will be 
     Boeing Company, Mesa, AZ and Lockheed Martin, Orlando, FL. 
     There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection 
     with this potential sale. The purchaser typically requests 
     offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations 
     between the purchaser and the contractor(s).
       Implementation of this proposed sale will require the 
     assignment of eleven U.S. Government personnel and three 
     contractor representatives to Morocco as part of the 
     Technical Assistance Fielding Team and Field Service 
     Representatives.
       There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness 
     as a result of this proposed sale.


                         Transmittal No. 19-63

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
     Annex Item No. vii
       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
       1. The AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter weapon system 
     contains communications and target identification equipment, 
     navigation equipment, aircraft survivability equipment, 
     displays, and sensors. The airframe itself does not contain 
     sensitive technology; however, the pertinent equipment listed 
     below will be either installed on the aircraft or included in 
     the sale. The highest classification of the AH-64E Apache 
     Helicopter is CONFIDENTIAL, and the highest classification of 
     data and information is SECRET.
       a. The AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and 
     Designation Sight/ AN/AAQ-11 Pilot Night Vision Sensor 
     (MTADS/PNVS) provides day, night, and limited adverse weather 
     target information, as well as night navigation capabilities. 
     The PNVS provides thermal imaging that permits nap-of-the-
     earth flight to, from, and within the battle area, while TADS 
     provides the co-pilot gunner with search, detection, 
     recognition, and designation by means of Direct View Optics 
     (DVO), EI2 television, and Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) 
     sighting systems that may be used singularly or in 
     combinations. Hardware is UNCLASSIFIED. Technical manuals for 
     authorized maintenance levels are UNCLASSIFIED.
       b. The AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR) is an active, 
     low-probability of intercept, millimeter-wave radar, combined 
     with a passive AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency 
     Interferometer (M-RFI) mounted on top of the helicopter mast. 
     The FCR Ground Targeting Mode detects, locates, classifies 
     and prioritizes stationary or moving armored vehicles, tanks 
     and mobile air defense systems as well as hovering 
     helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft in normal flight. If 
     desired, the radar data can be used to refer targets to the 
     regular electro-optical Modernized Target Acquisition and 
     Designation Sight (MTADS). The content of these items is 
     classified SECRET. User Data Module (UDM) on the RFI 
     processor, contains the Radio Frequency threat library. The 
     UDM, which is a hardware assemblage, is classified 
     CONFIDENTIAL when programmed.
       c. The AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency Interferometer 
     (M-RFI) is an updated version of the passive radar detection 
     and direction finding system. It utilizes a detachable UDM on 
     the M-RFI processor, which contains the Radar Frequency (RF) 
     threat library. The UDM, which is a hardware assemblage item 
     is classified CONFIDENTIAL when programmed. Hardware becomes 
     CLASSIFIED when populated with threat parametric data. 
     Releasable technical manuals are UNCLASSIFIED/Restricted 
     distribution.
       d. The AGM-114R is used against heavy and light armored 
     targets, thin skinned vehicles, urban structures, bunkers, 
     caves and personnel. The missile is Inertial Measurement Unit 
     (IMU) based, with a variable delay fuse, improved safety and 
     reliability. The highest level for release of the AGM-114R is 
     SECRET. The highest level of classified information that 
     could be disclosed by a proposed sale or by testing of the 
     end item is up to and including SECRET. The highest level 
     that must be disclosed for production, maintenance, or 
     training is up to and including SECRET. Vulnerability data, 
     countermeasures, vulnerability/susceptibility analyses, and 
     threat definitions are classified SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL. 
     Reverse engineering could reveal SECRET information.
       e. The Hellfire M36E9 CATM is a flight-training missile 
     that consists of a functional

[[Page S6710]]

     guidance section coupled to an inert missile bus. The M36E9 
     CATM does not have a functional rocket motor or warhead, and 
     cannot be launched. The missile has an operational semi-
     active laser seeker that can search for and lock-on to laser-
     designated targets. It functions like a tactical missile 
     (without launch capability) during captive carry on the 
     aircraft, making it suitable for training the aircrew in 
     simulated Hellfire missile target acquisition and lock. The 
     missile comes in a reusable aluminum container designed to 
     protect the missile from shock, vibration, and other 
     environmental conditions encountered during shipment, 
     handling, and storage. The highest level for release of the 
     CATM is SECRET, based upon the software. The highest level of 
     classified information that could be disclosed by a proposed 
     sale or by testing of the end item is SECRET; the highest 
     level that must be disclosed for production, maintenance, or 
     training is CONFIDENTIAL. Reverse engineering could reveal 
     confidential information. Vulnerability data, 
     countermeasures, vulnerability/susceptibility analyses, and 
     threat definitions are classified SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL.
       f. The Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial 
     Navigation System plus Multi Mode Receiver (EGl+MMR). The 
     aircraft has two EGIs which use internal accelerometers, rate 
     gyro measurements, and external sensor measurements to 
     estimate the aircraft state, provides aircraft flight and 
     position data to aircraft systems. The EGI is a velocity-
     aided, strap down, ring laser gyro based inertial unit. The 
     EGI unit houses a GPS receiver. The receiver is capable of 
     operating in either non-encrypted or encrypted. When keyed, 
     the GPS receiver will automatically use anti-spoof/jam 
     capabilities when they are in use. The EGI will retain the 
     key through power on/off/on cycles. Because of safeguards 
     built into the EGI, it is not considered classified when 
     keyed. Integrated within the EGI is an Inertial Measurement 
     Unit (IMU) for processing functions. Each EGI also houses a 
     Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR). The MMR is incorporated to provide 
     for reception of ground based NAVAID signals for instrument 
     aided flight. Provides IMC I IFR integration and 
     certification of improved Embedded Global Positioning System 
     and Inertial (EGI) unit, with attached MMR, with specific 
     cockpit instrumentation allows Apaches to operate within the 
     worldwide IFR route structure. Also includes integration of 
     the Common Army Aviation Map (CAAM), Area Navigation (RNAV), 
     Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File (DAFIF) and 
     Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) compliance.
       g. The AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) detects 
     energy emitted by threat missiles in-flight, evaluates 
     potential false alarm emitters in the environment, declares 
     validity of threat and selects appropriate countermeasures. 
     The CMWS consists of an Electronic Control Unit (ECU), 
     Electro-Optic Missile Sensors (EOMSs), and Sequencer and 
     Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD). The ECU hardware 
     is classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical manuals for 
     operation and maintenance are classified SECRET.
       h. The AN/APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Set is a system 
     that provides warnings of radar-directed air defense threats 
     and allows appropriate countermeasures. This is the 1553 
     databus compatible configuration. The hardware is classified 
     CONFIDENTIAL when programmed with threat data; releasable 
     technical manuals for operation and maintenance are 
     classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical data (technical 
     performance) is classified SECRET. The system can be 
     programmed with threat data provided by the purchasing 
     country.
       i. The Stinger RMP Block I Missile, hardware, embedded 
     software object code and operating documentation contain 
     sensitive technology and are classified CONFIDENTIAL. The 
     highest classification of the Stinger 92H Reprogrammable 
     Micro-Processor (RMP) Block I missile hardware is 
     CONFIDENTIAL, and the highest classification of data and 
     information is SECRET. The guidance section of the missile 
     and tracking head trainer contain highly sensitive technology 
     and are classified CONFIDENTIAL. Missile System hardware 
     components contain sensitive critical technologies. Stinger 
     Block I critical technology is primarily in the area of 
     design and production know-how and not end-items. Information 
     on countermeasures vulnerability to electronic 
     countermeasures, system performance capabilities and 
     effectiveness, simulation and test data and software source 
     code are classified up to SECRET.
       2. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain 
     knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the 
     information could be used to develop countermeasures that 
     might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the 
     development of a system with similar or advanced 
     capabilities.
       3. A determination has been made that Morocco can provide 
     substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive 
     technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale 
     is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and 
     national security objectives outlined in the Policy 
     Justification.
       4. All defense articles and services listed in this 
     transmittal are authorized for release and export to the 
     Government of Morocco.

                          ____________________