

COVID-19 Relief Program assistance and protecting consumers, and providing recommendations for improvement, including recommendations regarding whether any participants in the financial markets that are currently outside the regulatory system should become subject to the regulatory system, the rationale underlying such recommendation, and whether there are any gaps in existing consumer protections.

(c) MEMBERSHIP.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Oversight Panel shall consist of 5 members, as follows:

(A) 1 member appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(B) 1 member appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(C) 1 member appointed by the majority leader of the Senate.

(D) 1 member appointed by the minority leader of the Senate.

(E) 1 member appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the majority leader of the Senate, after consultation with the minority leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(2) PAY.—Each member of the Oversight Panel shall each be paid at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay for level I of the Executive Schedule for each day (including travel time) during which such member is engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission.

(3) PROHIBITION OF COMPENSATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.—Members of the Oversight Panel who are full-time officers or employees of the United States or Members of Congress may not receive additional pay, allowances, or benefits by reason of their service on the Oversight Panel.

(4) TRAVEL EXPENSES.—Each member shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.

(5) QUORUM.—Four members of the Oversight Panel shall constitute a quorum but a lesser number may hold hearings.

(6) VACANCIES.—A vacancy on the Oversight Panel shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment was made.

(7) MEETINGS.—The Oversight Panel shall meet at the call of the Chairperson or a majority of its members.

(d) STAFF.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Oversight Panel may appoint and fix the pay of any personnel as the Commission considers appropriate.

(2) EXPERTS AND CONSULTANTS.—The Oversight Panel may procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code.

(3) STAFF OF AGENCIES.—Upon request of the Oversight Panel, the head of any Federal department or agency may detail, on a reimbursable basis, any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Oversight Panel to assist it in carrying out its duties under this Act.

(e) POWERS.—

(1) HEARINGS AND SESSIONS.—The Oversight Panel may, for the purpose of carrying out this section, hold hearings, sit and act at times and places, take testimony, and receive evidence as the Panel considers appropriate and may administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses appearing before it.

(2) POWERS OF MEMBERS AND AGENTS.—Any member or agent of the Oversight Panel may, if authorized by the Oversight Panel, take any action which the Oversight Panel is authorized to take by this section.

(3) OBTAINING OFFICIAL DATA.—The Oversight Panel may secure directly from any department or agency of the United States information necessary to enable it to carry out

this section. Upon request of the Chairperson of the Oversight Panel, the head of that department or agency shall furnish that information to the Oversight Panel.

(4) REPORTS.—The Oversight Panel shall receive and consider all reports required to be submitted to the Oversight Panel under this Act.

(f) TERMINATION.—The Oversight Panel shall terminate on the date that is 180 days after the termination date described in section 4(h).

(g) FUNDING FOR EXPENSES.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Oversight Panel such sums as may be necessary for any fiscal year, half of which shall be derived from the applicable account of the House of Representatives, and half of which shall be derived from the contingent fund of the Senate.

(2) REIMBURSEMENT OF AMOUNTS.—An amount equal to the expenses of the Oversight Panel shall be promptly transferred by the Secretary of the Treasury, from time to time upon the presentment of a statement of such expenses by the Chairperson of the Oversight Panel, from funds made available to the Secretary of the Treasury under this Act to the applicable fund of the House of Representatives and the contingent fund of the Senate, as appropriate, as reimbursement for amounts expended from such account and fund under paragraph (1).

SEC. 10. COOPERATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FBI.

Any Federal financial regulatory agency shall cooperate with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies investigating fraud, misrepresentation, and malfeasance with respect to development, advertising, and sale of financial or other investment products.

SEC. 11. INFORMATION FOR CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT AGENCIES.

Upon request, and to the extent otherwise consistent with law, all information used by the Federal officials in connection with activities authorized under this Act (including the records to which the Comptroller General is entitled under this Act) shall be made available to congressional support agencies (in accordance with their obligations to support the Congress as set out in their authorizing statutes) for the purposes of assisting the committees of Congress with conducting oversight, monitoring, and analysis of the activities authorized under the COVID-19 Relief Program.

SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

SENATE RESOLUTION 551—PROVIDING THAT THE SALARIES OF SENATORS SHALL BE HELD IN ESCROW UNTIL THE SENATE HAS PASSED LEGISLATION THAT APPROPRIATELY ADDRESSES THE COVID-19 OUTBREAK

Ms. MCSALLY submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

S. RES. 551

Resolved,

SECTION 1. NO COVID-19 RELIEF, NO PAY.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

(1) the term “covered period” means the period beginning March 25, 2020, and ending on the earlier of—

(A) the date that the Senate passes COVID-19 relief legislation; or

(B) the last day of the One Hundred Sixteenth Congress;

(2) the term “COVID-19 relief legislation” means legislation that the Majority Leader of the Senate determines appropriately addresses the COVID-19 outbreak; and

(3) the term “Secretary of the Senate” means the Secretary of the Senate, or an employee of the Office of the Secretary of the Senate who is designated by the Secretary to carry out this resolution.

(b) IN GENERAL.—

(1) DEADLINE FOR PASSING COVID-19 RELIEF LEGISLATION.—If, by March 24, 2020, the Senate does not pass COVID-19 relief legislation, then, for the duration of the covered period, the Secretary of the Senate shall—

(A) deposit in an escrow account all payments otherwise required to be made during the covered period for the compensation of the Senators; and

(B) release amounts deposited in an escrow account under subparagraph (A) to the Senator only upon the expiration of the end of the covered period.

(2) WITHHOLDING AND REMITTANCE OF AMOUNTS FROM PAYMENTS HELD IN ESCROW.—The Secretary of the Senate shall provide for the same withholding and remittance with respect to a payment deposited in an escrow account under paragraph (1) that would apply to the payment if the payment were not subject to paragraph (1).

(3) RELEASE OF AMOUNTS AT END OF THE CONGRESS.—In order to ensure that this section is carried out in a manner that shall not vary the compensation of Senators in violation of the twenty-seventh article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the Secretary of the Senate shall release for payments to Senators any amounts remaining in any escrow account under this section on the last day of the One Hundred Sixteenth Congress.

(4) ROLE OF SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall provide the Secretary of the Senate with such assistance as may be necessary to enable the Secretary of the Senate to carry out this section.

(c) NOTIFICATION.—The Majority Leader of the Senate shall—

(1) upon the date of enactment of this resolution, inform the Secretary of the Senate that the provisions of subsection (b) are in effect; and

(2) notify the Secretary of the Senate when the Senate has passed COVID-19 relief legislation and the covered period has ended.

SENATE RESOLUTION 552—SUPPORTING AN INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE HANDLING BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OF COVID-19 AND THE IMPACT OF HANDLING COVID-19 IN THAT MANNER ON THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATIONS

Mr. HAWLEY (for himself, Ms. MCSALLY, Mr. CORNYN, and Mr. COTTON) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 552

Whereas the novel coronavirus (referred to in this resolution as “COVID-19”) emerged in the People’s Republic of China and began to spread as early as November 2019;

Whereas, by late December, dozens of citizens of the People’s Republic of China had fallen victim to COVID-19;

Whereas, on December 30, Wuhan, China health authorities identified, interrogated,

and reprimanded multiple doctors in response to their decisions to warn other Chinese citizens of the danger posed by that new disease;

Whereas, on January 1, 2020, the Wuhan Public Security Bureau questioned 8 Chinese doctors who had posted information about COVID-19 on WeChat;

Whereas, on January 1, the Hubei provincial health commission ordered laboratories to stop testing for COVID-19 and destroy samples of the same;

Whereas, on January 2, the Wuhan Institute of Virology mapped the genome of COVID-19 in order to inform development of public health interventions and medical treatments for COVID-19, but the Government of the People's Republic of China withheld genetic information on COVID-19 until January 9;

Whereas, on January 11, the Wuhan municipal health commission insisted that there were no new cases of infection by COVID-19;

Whereas, on January 13, the first COVID-19 case outside of the People's Republic of China was announced in Thailand;

Whereas, on January 14, the World Health Organization announced that the Government of the People's Republic of China had seen "no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel coronavirus";

Whereas, on January 23, the Government of the People's Republic of China began to implement quarantine measures to stem the spread of COVID-19 at the same time as the disease had already begun to proliferate throughout the world;

Whereas, on March 11, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic, with 118,000 persons infected and 4,291 dead in 114 different countries at the time of the announcement;

Whereas the Government of the People's Republic of China has argued recently that COVID-19 did not originate in the People's Republic of China;

Whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China has alleged that the United States Army may have delivered COVID-19 to the city of Wuhan in the People's Republic of China;

Whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China has said, "China's endeavor to combating [sic] the epidemic has bought time for [international] preparedness"; and

Whereas a University of Southampton study found that earlier intervention by the Government of the People's Republic of China could have "significantly" limited the geographic spread of COVID-19: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That the Senate—

(1) condemns the decision by the Government of the People's Republic of China to hide the emergence and spread of COVID-19 within its borders during the initial weeks of the outbreak;

(2) assesses that the decision by the Government of the People's Republic of China to hide the emergence and spread of COVID-19 during that period almost certainly contributed to the rapid spread of that disease throughout the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, and the rest of the world;

(3) finds that the Government of the People's Republic of China should be held accountable for the impact, of its decision to hide the emergence and spread of COVID-19, on the lives and livelihoods of the people of the United States and other nations;

(4) calls for an international investigation led by public health officials from the United States and other affected nations to determine how the handling by the Government of the People's Republic of China of the COVID-19 outbreak prior to March 11, 2020, contrib-

uted to the emergence of the COVID-19 global pandemic; and

(5) calls on the international community to—

(A) quantify the harm caused, by the handling of the COVID-19 outbreak by the Government of the People's Republic of China, to the health and economic well-being of the people of the United States and other nations; and

(B) design a mechanism for delivering compensation from the Government of the People's Republic of China to all affected nations for the harm caused by its decision to hide the emergence and spread of COVID-19 during the initial weeks of the outbreak.

SENATE RESOLUTION 553—EX-PRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MADE MULTIPLE SERIOUS MISTAKES IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE COVID-19 OUTBREAK THAT HEIGHTENED THE SEVERITY AND SPREAD OF THE ONGOING COVID-19 PANDEMIC, INCLUDING THE INTENTIONAL SPREAD OF MISINFORMATION TO DOWNPLAY THE RISKS OF COVID-19, A REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH INTERNATIONAL HEALTH AUTHORITIES, INTERNAL CENSORSHIP OF DOCTORS AND JOURNALISTS, AND A MALICIOUS DISREGARD FOR THE HEALTH OF ETHNIC MINORITIES

Mrs. BLACKBURN (for herself and Mr. COTTON) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 553

Whereas records of the Government of the People's Republic of China suggest that the first human became infected with COVID-19 on November 17, 2019, in the Hubei Province of China;

Whereas, on December 27, 2019, Zhang Jixian, a doctor from the Hubei Provincial Hospital of Chinese and Western Medicine, alerted health authorities in China that several individuals exhibiting mysterious, flu-like symptoms, were infected with a novel strain of coronavirus;

Whereas Dr. Yu Wenbin and a team of researchers from Xishuangbanna Tropical Botanical Garden reported that the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market greatly contributed to the spread of COVID-19 throughout the city of Wuhan;

Whereas, after being informed of cases of a dangerous new strain of coronavirus concentrated around the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan, the Government of the People's Republic of China waited 5 days to shut down the market;

Whereas Zhou Xianwang, the mayor of Wuhan, stated that 5,000,000 of the 14,000,000 residents of Wuhan left Wuhan before the Government of the People's Republic of China imposed a lockdown;

Whereas, on December 30, 2019, Ai Fen, the director of the emergency department of Wuhan Central Hospital, shared a diagnostic report on the then unknown COVID-19 virus with a group of doctors through the social media application WeChat;

Whereas, on December 30, 2019, Dr. Li Wenliang, warned his medical school classmates of an outbreak of an unknown SARS-like virus through WeChat;

Whereas, on December 31, 2019, Wuhan Central Hospital authorities formally reprimanded Ai Fen for "spreading rumors" about the virus;

Whereas, on January 1, 2020, an official at the Hubei Provincial Health Commission ordered at least 1 private genomics testing company to cease testing samples of a SARS-like virus from Wuhan and to destroy all existing samples of the virus;

Whereas, on January 3, 2020, the Public Security Bureau of Wuhan detained, questioned, and forced Dr. Li Wenliang and 7 other doctors to sign a letter confessing that Wenliang had made "false comments" that "severely disturbed the social order";

Whereas, on January 3, 2020, the leading public health authority in China, the National Health Commission, directed all research institutions in China to cease publicly publishing any information related to a then unknown SARS-like virus and ordered them to destroy existing samples of the virus or transfer them to approved testing sites;

Whereas the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention first asked permission to study COVID-19 in China on January 6, 2020, but was barred by the Government of the People's Republic of China from entering the country until mid-February;

Whereas authorities of the Government of the People's Republic of China first publicly confirmed the existence of COVID-19 on January 9, 2020, 14 days after the presence of a novel strain of coronavirus was internally confirmed;

Whereas the National Health Commission of China publicly denied that COVID-19 was transmissible through person-to-person contact until January 15, 2020, despite having uncovered contrary evidence in late December and having been alerted of the transmissibility of COVID-19 on January 1, 2020;

Whereas, on January 18, 2020, more than 10,000 families attended the annual Lunar New Year Banquet of Wuhan, which was organized and sponsored by the Wuhan city government;

Whereas the People's Daily, the largest newspaper in China, first reported on the coronavirus on January 21, 2020, nearly a month after the virus was internally confirmed;

Whereas, on February 7, 2020, 1 month after checking into Wuhan Central Hospital, Dr. Li Wenliang died of a severe case of COVID-19;

Whereas the COVID-19 outbreak has disproportionately harmed the persecuted Uyghur Muslim minority of China as a result of actions taken by the Government of the People's Republic of China;

Whereas the Government of the People's Republic of China detained more than 1,000,000 Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minorities in "re-education camps", where crowded and unsanitary conditions make the camps hotspots for viral disease and leave prisoners at an elevated risk of contracting COVID-19;

Whereas, as reported by the Uyghur Human Rights Project, and corroborated by video evidence and Radio Free Asia, an unannounced and strictly enforced quarantine of millions of residents of the predominantly Uyghur Muslim Xinjiang Province of China around January 24, 2020, resulted in mass starvation and shortages of basic medical supplies;

Whereas, on February 25, 2020, Xinhua News Service reported that the Government of the People's Republic of China had "re-located" 30,000 Uyghur laborers to temporarily shuttered factories in the Hotan prefecture, exposing them to health risks that the Government of the People's Republic of China determined were unacceptable for the ethnically Han majority;