[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1091 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 1091
To create a task force within the Department of Education to address
the threat of foreign government influence and threats to academic
research integrity on college campuses, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
February 18, 2021
Mr. Banks introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Education and Labor, and in addition to the Committees on
Intelligence (Permanent Select), Armed Services, and Science, Space,
and Technology, for a period to be subsequently determined by the
Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall
within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To create a task force within the Department of Education to address
the threat of foreign government influence and threats to academic
research integrity on college campuses, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Protect Our Universities Act of
2021''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Adversaries of the United States take advantage of a
largely vulnerable academic system. Academia is a place of
uniquely free thought; however, adversaries take advantage of
access to federally funded sensitive research that takes place
on the campuses of institutions of higher education.
(2) As stated in a 2018 report by the White House Office of
Trade and Manufacturing Policy, ``More than 300,000 Chinese
nationals annually attend U.S. universities or find employment
at U.S. national laboratories, innovation centers, incubators,
and think tanks. Chinese nationals now account for
approximately one third of foreign university and college
students in the United States and about 25 percent of graduate
students specializing in science, technology, engineering, or
math (STEM).''.
(3) International students from nations that are
adversarial to the United States could face undue pressure or
incentives to divulge technology to their home nation or to use
sensitive information to negatively impact the United States.
According to the same 2018 White House Report, ``The national
and economic security risks are that the Chinese State may seek
to manipulate or pressure even unwitting or unwilling Chinese
nationals into becoming non-traditional information collectors
that serve Beijing's military and strategic ambitions.''.
(4) Technology and information that could be deemed
sensitive to the national security interests of the United
States should be given increased scrutiny to determine if
access should be restricted in a research environment.
(5) An open federally funded research environment exposes
the United States to the possibility of exchanging research
affiliated with current or future critical military
technological systems.
(6) In Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director
Wray's view, Chinese non-traditional intelligence collectors
``are exploiting the very open research and development
environment that we have, which we all revere. But they're
taking advantage of it, so one of the things we're trying to do
is view the China threat as not just the whole-of-government
threat, but a whole-of-society threat on their end, and I think
it's going to take a whole-of-society response by us.''.
(7) As stated in the January 2018 China's Technology
Transfer Strategy report by the Defense Innovation Unit,
``Academia is an opportune environment for learning about
science and technology since the cultural values of U.S.
educational institutions reflect an open and free exchange of
ideas. As a result, Chinese science and engineering students
frequently master technologies that later become critical to
key military systems, amounting over time to unintentional
violations of U.S. export control laws.''.
(8) In 2020, Bill Evanina, the senior counterintelligence
official in the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, stated ``. . . our ideas, technology, research,
innovation is incubated on those university campuses. That's
where the science and technology originates--and that's why
it's the most prime place to steal.''.
(9) David Bowdich, Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, stated at the March 2020 Academic Security and
Counter Exploitation Annual Seminar that [China] is ``taking
advantage of non-traditional collectors to work on their
behalf, like ostensibly private companies or some graduate
students and researchers. . . . And they are targeting cutting-
edge research at our universities.''.
(10) The 2020 House of Representatives China Task Force
Report states, ``Research programs at U.S. colleges and
universities are increasingly targeted by students and
researchers acting as `non-traditional collectors'. These
students, ranging from undergraduates to postdoctoral
researchers, are generally untrained in espionage techniques
but are asked to actively target sensitive dual-use
technologies and other emerging research during their time in
the U.S. The stated goal for these operations is to exfiltrate
research data from the U.S. to the PRC.''.
SEC. 3. TASK FORCE.
(a) Task Force Established.--Not later than one year after the date
of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Education, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence, shall establish the National Security Technology Task
Force (hereinafter referred to as the ``Task Force'') within the
Department of Education to address the threat of espionage at
institutions of higher education.
(b) Membership.--
(1) Designation.--The Task Force shall include not more
than 30 members, of which--
(A) at least 1 representative shall be from the
Department of Defense, designated by the Secretary of
Defense;
(B) at least 1 representative shall be from the
intelligence community, designated by the Director of
National Intelligence;
(C) at least 1 representative shall be from the
Department of Justice, designated by the United States
Attorney General;
(D) at least 1 representative shall be from the
Department of Energy, designated by the Secretary of
Energy; and
(E) at least 1 representative shall be from each of
the following offices of the Department of Education,
as appointed and named by the Secretary of Education:
(i) Office of Postsecondary Education.
(ii) Office of Planning, Evaluation, and
Policy Development.
(iii) Office of the General Counsel.
(iv) Any other office the Secretary of
Education determines to be appropriate.
(2) Membership list.--Not later than 10 days after the
first meeting of the Task Force, the Task Force shall submit to
Congress a list identifying each member of the Task Force.
(c) Sensitive Research Project List.--The Task Force shall, in
consultation with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
actively maintain a list of sensitive research projects. Such list
shall--
(1) be referred to as the Sensitive Research Projects List;
and
(2) for each project included on the list, indicate--
(A) the qualified funding agency that is funding
the project;
(B) whether the project is open to student
participation; and
(C) whether the project is related to--
(i) an item listed on the Commerce Control
List (CCL) maintained by the Department of
Commerce;
(ii) an item listed on the United States
Munitions List maintained by the Department of
State; or
(iii) technology designated by the
Secretary of Defense as having a technology
readiness level of 1, 2, or 3.
(d) Consultation With OIG.--The Task Force shall periodically, but
no less than annually, consult with the Office of the Inspector General
of the Department of Education, which shall include annual reports to
the Office of the Inspector General on the activities of the Task
Force, with an opportunity for the Office of the Inspector General to
provide active feedback related to such activities.
(e) Instruction to Institutions of Higher Education.--Not less than
once every six months, the Task Force shall provide relevant
instruction to institutions of higher education at which research
projects on the Sensitive Research Project List are being carried out.
Such instruction shall provide the institutions of higher education
with information related to the threat posed by espionage, best
practices identified by the Task Force, and, to the extent possible,
any specific risks that the intelligence community, the qualified
funding agency, or law enforcement entities determine appropriate to
share with the institutions.
(f) Report to Congress.--Not later than one year after the date of
enactment of this Act, and every six months thereafter, the Task Force
shall provide a report to the Committee on Education and Labor, the
Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and to the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the Committee on Armed
Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate,
regarding the threat of espionage at institutions of higher education.
In each such briefing, the Task Force shall identify actions that may
be taken to reduce espionage carried out through student participation
in sensitive research projects. The Task Force shall also include in
this report an assessment of whether the current licensing regulations
relating to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the
Export Administration Regulations are sufficient to protect the
security of the projects listed on the Sensitive Research Project List.
SEC. 4. FOREIGN STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN SENSITIVE RESEARCH PROJECTS.
(a) Approval of Foreign Student Participation Required.--Beginning
on the date that is one year after the date of enactment of this Act,
for each project on the Sensitive Research Project List that is open to
student participation, the head of such project at the institution of
higher education at which the project is being carried out shall ensure
that each student participating in such project shall be required to
provide proof of citizenship before the student is permitted to
participate in such project. A student who is a citizen of a country
identified in subsection (b) shall be permitted to participate in such
a project only if--
(1) the student applies for, and receives approval from,
the Director of National Intelligence to participate in such
project, based on a background check and any other information
the Director determines to be appropriate; and
(2) in the case of such a project that is related to an
item or technology described in subparagraph (C) of section
3(c)(2), the student applies for, and receives approval from,
the head of the qualified funding agency, to participate in
such project.
(b) List of Citizenship Requiring Approval.--Approval under
subsection (a) shall be required for any student who is a citizen of a
country that is one of the following:
(1) The People's Republic of China.
(2) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(3) The Russian Federation.
(4) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
(5) Any country identified by the head of the qualified
funding agency as requiring approval for the purposes of this
section.
SEC. 5. FOREIGN ENTITIES.
(a) List of Foreign Entities That Pose an Intelligence Threat.--Not
later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of National Intelligence shall identify foreign entities,
including governments, corporations, non-profit and for-profit
organizations, and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity, that
the Director determines pose a threat of espionage with respect to
sensitive research projects, and shall develop and maintain a list of
such entities. The Director may add or remove entities from such list
at any time. The initial list developed by the Director shall include
the following entities (including any subsidiary or affiliate):
(1) Huawei Technologies Company.
(2) ZTE Corporation.
(3) Hytera Communications Corporation.
(4) Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company.
(5) Dahua Technology Company.
(6) Kaspersky Lab.
(7) Any entity that is owned or controlled by, or otherwise
has demonstrated financial ties to, the government of a country
identified under section 4(b).
(b) Notice to Institutions of Higher Education.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall make the initial list required under
subsection (a), and any changes to such list, available to the
Secretary of Education, the Task Force, and the head of each qualified
funding agency as soon as practicable. The Secretary of Education shall
provide such initial list and subsequent amendments to each institution
of higher education at which a project on the Sensitive Research
Project List is being carried out.
(c) Prohibition on Use of Certain Technologies.--Beginning on the
date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
head of each sensitive research project shall, as a condition of
receipt of funds from a qualified funding agency, provide an assurance
to such qualified funding agency that, beginning on the date that is
two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, any technology
developed by an entity included on the list maintained under subsection
(a) shall not be utilized in carrying out the sensitive research
project.
SEC. 6. ENFORCEMENT.
The head of each qualified funding agency shall take such steps as
may be necessary to enforce the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of this
Act. Upon determination that the head of a sensitive research project
has failed to meet the requirements of either section 4 or section 5,
the head of a qualified funding agency may determine the appropriate
enforcement action, including--
(1) imposing a probationary period, not to exceed 6 months,
on the head of such project, or on the project;
(2) reducing or otherwise limiting the funding for such
project until the violation has been remedied;
(3) permanently cancelling the funding for such project; or
(4) any other action the head of the qualified funding
agency determines to be appropriate.
SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Citizen of a country.--The term ``citizen of a
country'', with respect to a student, includes all countries in
which the student has held or holds citizenship or holds
permanent residency.
(2) Institution of higher education.--The term
``institution of higher education'' means an institution
described in section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965
(20 U.S.C. 1002) that receives Federal funds in any amount and
for any purpose.
(3) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(4) Qualified funding agency.--The term ``qualified funding
agency'', with respect to a sensitive research project, means--
(A) the Department of Defense, if the sensitive
research project is funded in whole or in part by the
Department of Defense;
(B) the Department of Energy, if the sensitive
research project is funded in whole or in part by the
Department of Energy; or
(C) an element of the intelligence community, if
the sensitive research project is funded in whole or in
part by the element of the intelligence community.
(5) Sensitive research project.--The term ``sensitive
research project'' means a research project at an institution
of higher education that is funded by a qualified funding
agency, except that such term shall not include any research
project that is classified or that requires the participants in
such project to obtain a security clearance.
(6) Student participation.--The term ``student
participation'' shall not include student activity in--
(A) a research project that is required for
completion of a course in which the student is enrolled
at an institution of higher education; or
(B) a research project for which the student is
conducting unpaid research.
<all>