[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6114 Introduced in House (IH)]
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117th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 6114
To promote United States trade leadership in the Indo-Pacific region
and to require a report on the long-term economic and trade
relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of
China.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
December 1, 2021
Mrs. Miller of West Virginia (for herself and Mr. LaHood) introduced
the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and
Means
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To promote United States trade leadership in the Indo-Pacific region
and to require a report on the long-term economic and trade
relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of
China.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``U.S. Trade Leadership in the Indo-
Pacific and China Act''.
TITLE I--UNITED STATES TRADE LEADERSHIP IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Rising authoritarian powers that adhere to non-market
principles for managing their economies are challenging the
United States strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
These mercantilist policies, which include predatory industrial
planning to subsidize exports and support national champions at
the expense of foreign competitors, conditioning market access
on both forced and voluntary technology transfers, and
intellectual property theft, among other unfair policies, are
contrary to the interests and values of the United States and
its Indo-Pacific allies and directly challenge the United
States economic and trade interests in the region.
(2) The United States was a leader during negotiations for
the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and joined eleven
other nations in the Asia-Pacific in signing the agreement on
February 4, 2016.
(3) In January 2017, the United States notified the other
11 signatories to the TPP that it did not intend to become a
party to the Agreement. The notification letter to the 11 other
TPP signatories affirmed that ``[t]he United States remains
committed to taking measures designed to promote more efficient
markets and higher levels of economic growth, both in our
country and around the world.''.
(4) Following the United States formal withdrawal from the
TPP, the 11 remaining signatories (Australia; Brunei; Canada;
Chile; Japan; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Peru; Singapore;
and Vietnam) renegotiated and signed a new Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) on
March 8, 2018. Like the TPP, the CPTPP includes high-standard
provisions to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers in key
sectors such as agriculture, autos, currency, e-commerce/
digital trade, government procurement, goods tariffs,
intellectual property rights (IPR), investment, worker rights,
environment, rules of origin (ROO), services, and state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). However, the CPTPP suspended certain high-
standard provisions which the United States had proposed or
supported. United States engagement in TPP negotiations helped
shape many of the provisions of the existing CPTPP. Similar,
and updated versions of many of these provisions are included
in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), including
in the chapter on technical barriers to trade (TBT).
(5) United States withdrawal from the TPP has undermined
its ability to promote United States-led rules, norms, and
standards, and has paved the way for increased non-democratic
state-driven economic and political presence in the Indo-
Pacific region.
SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) In General.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuing
trade leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, to proactively promote and
defend fair and open trade practices and to counter the use of
mercantilist, distorting, and coercive trade measures by actors in the
region, including by pursuing objectives described in subsection (b).
(b) Objectives Described.--The objectives described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) The United States will play a sustained and long-term
leadership role in establishing and ensuring an open, rules-
based trading system in the Indo-Pacific region, including
through the following:
(A) The United States should urgently consider the
merits of negotiating entry into the CPTPP with
improved standards or a similar plurilateral trade
agreement.
(B) The United States should urgently consider the
merits of negotiating new, high-standard bilateral
trade agreements in the region.
(C) The United States should urgently consider
modernizing and updating existing trade agreements in
the region.
(2) The United States and its allies should utilize new or
updated, high-standard trade agreements to maintain rules-based
and market-based policies in the Indo-Pacific region to ensure,
among other areas--
(A) free flow of commerce;
(B) enhanced market access;
(C) elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers
on goods, services, agriculture, and energy;
(D) high-standard provisions to protect
intellectual property, investment, worker rights, the
environment, e-commerce and digital trade, and autos;
and
(E) transparency on rules of origin, state-owned
enterprises, and government procurement.
(3) The United States membership and leadership in
negotiating new or updated, high-standard trade agreements will
ensure its economic, technological, scientific, and regulatory
leadership in the Indo-Pacific region and ensure a
comprehensive, rules-based platform throughout the region well
into the 21st century.
(4) The United States membership and leadership in new or
updated, high-standard trade agreements will foster free and
reciprocal trade and open and integrated markets in the Indo-
Pacific region, including--
(A) strengthening, protecting, and diversifying
critical supply chains for batteries, critical
minerals, medicines, next-generation semiconductors,
telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum
computing, and biotechnology and medical supplies; and
(B) supporting the development and maintenance of
advanced manufacturing capacity among key regional
allies to maximize trade efficiency and supply chain
security.
(5) The United States leadership in new or updated, high-
standard trade agreements will inspire next-generation rules
and best practices for emerging and high-growth Indo-Pacific
countries that may not be members of the CPTPP.
SEC. 103. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that the implementation of the policy
described in section 102 requires the following actions:
(1) Long-term competition and strategic engagement in the
Indo-Pacific region will require the United States to deeply
engage with allies and partners on trade policy in the region,
including the consideration of joining new or updated, high-
standard trade agreements, to establish trade and economic
stability in the most vibrant economic region in the world. A
sense of urgency by the Administration, bipartisanship in
Congress, and whole-of-government approach will be required to
achieve this significant pivot in United States trade policy.
Immediate, intensive bipartisan engagement between the
Administration and Congress to develop and swiftly reauthorize
and update the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and
Accountability Act of 2015 is a critical step to provide the
Administration with tools to negotiate ambitious new trade
agreements.
(2) The United States, through the leadership of the Office
of the United States Trade Representative, must urgently
coordinate closely with like-minded countries throughout the
Indo-Pacific region to express immediate interest in new or
updated, high-standard trade agreements, including by hosting a
series of summits held throughout the region to discuss
outlaying issues that are reflective of a post-pandemic global
economy.
(3) The President must lead and direct the entire executive
branch, specifically the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, to make membership and leadership in new or
updated, high-standard trade agreements a priority and assure
the allocation of appropriate resources adequate to address
market-access barriers and trade distortions in the Indo-
Pacific region.
(4) The United States must ensure that key Federal
agencies, led by the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, advance accelerated, bipartisan, frequent,
sustained, and meaningful collaboration and consultation with
Congress regarding a robust United States trade strategy in the
Indo-Pacific region.
(5) The United States must ensure that key Federal
agencies, led by the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, conduct close and accelerated Indo-Pacific
trade strategy consultations with Congress, the private sector,
civil society, universities, and academic institutions, and
other relevant stakeholders.
(6) The President should direct the Office of the United
States Trade Representative, the White House National Security
Council, and all relevant Federal agencies to meet upon request
with any Member of Congress regarding the components of its
Indo-Pacific trade strategy, including the President's
intention to begin negotiations to implement that strategy, the
objectives for such negotiations, and any changes in the laws
of the United States or the administration of those laws that
may be recommended to Congress to implement that strategy. The
President should also direct the Office of the United States
Trade Representative, the White House National Security
Council, and all relevant Federal agencies to provide access to
pertinent documents relating to any such negotiation, including
classified materials.
TITLE II--REPORT ON THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
SEC. 201. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On January 15, 2020, the United States and the People's
Republic of China (PRC) signed a historic and enforceable
agreement, the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the United
States of America and the People's Republic of China, or the
``Phase One'' trade agreement. The Phase One trade agreement
went into effect on February 14, 2020, and requires the PRC to
undertake a wide range of reforms to facilitate a more
transparent and equal bilateral trading relationship in areas
such intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture,
financial services, and currency and foreign exchange.
(2) The Phase One trade agreement includes a chapter on
``Expanding Trade'', in which the PRC made specific commitments
to import a wide range of United States goods and services,
including manufactured goods, food and seafood, agriculture,
energy products, and services in a total amount that exceeds
the PRC's annual level of imports for those goods and services
in 2017 by no less than $200 billion for a two-year period from
January 1, 2020, through December 31, 2021. The United States
and the PRC also stated a shared expectation that ``the
trajectory of increases'' in China's purchases of United States
goods in each of these categories would continue in calendar
years 2022 through 2025.
(3) Publicly available trade data show that the PRC has
made significant progress in purchasing United States products
within the agriculture sector, but is far behind its agreed
upon year-end purchasing targets in energy, manufacturing, and
services.
(4) The Phase One trade agreement features a chapter on
``Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution'' that
establishes a process to resolve disputes in a fair and prompt
manner and creates an avenue to conduct regular bilateral
meetings at the principal and working levels.
(5) The Phase One trade agreement represents an important
and concrete step toward a more balanced economic relationship
between the United States and the PRC but substantially more is
needed to address systemic problems in our bilateral trading
relationship. Important remaining issues include the PRC's
persistent theft of United States intellectual property rights,
its market access policies that depend on forced technology
transfers and discriminatory licensing practices, and its
support for state-owned enterprises with market-distorting and
World Trade Organization (WTO)-inconsistent subsidies.
SEC. 202. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should successfully and fully
implement the Phase One trade agreement, ensuring that the PRC
fully complies with its stated commitments both to make legal
and regulatory changes in various sectors and to purchase
additional United States goods and services;
(2) the Office of the United States Trade Representative
should take expedited and concrete steps toward thorough
consultation and coordination with Congress and key United
States private sector stakeholders wholly consistent with the
spirit and letter of the law as prescribed under the Bipartisan
Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015
regarding implementation of the Phase One trade agreement and
any further trade negotiations with China;
(3) the United States Government should analyze all
positive and negative effects on the United States economy of
the current tariffs in place against the PRC under section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974, including the effects on United
States workers, businesses, and consumers and an analysis of
the benefits of such tariffs providing sufficient trade
leverage on the PRC, in comparison to these tariffs' harm to
the United States economy;
(4) consistent with such analysis, the United States
Government should immediately modify such tariffs to ensure
that they meet the intent of the statute and provide leverage
on China without harming the United States economy;
(5) the Office of the United States Trade Representative
should articulate a long-term trade and economic plan with the
PRC, which may include proposed new enforcement tools to
address the PRC's ongoing economic and structural challenges,
including the PRC's use of massive industrial subsidies that
are inconsistent with WTO norms and rules and create global
price distortions in critical supply chains, bilateral
engagement with the PRC to obtain changes to the PRC's
policies, and working with allies to pressure the PRC on these
same issues;
(6) the Office of the United States Trade Representative
should take expedited and concrete steps toward better
consultation and coordination with Congress and key United
States private sector actors regarding the drafting of its
comprehensive report on the long-term economic and trade
relationship between the United States and the PRC; and
(7) efforts to enforce the Phase One trade agreement should
not delay initiatives to address other issues in the trade
relationship, especially longstanding, systemic issues that
disadvantage United States companies or injure United States
interests, that have been identified for negotiation by
previous administrations, but that were not addressed in the
Phase One trade agreement.
SEC. 203. REPORT.
(a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the United States Trade
Representative, in coordination with the heads of other relevant
Federal agencies, shall submit to Congress a report that--
(1) describes progress toward addressing the issues
identified in Trade Representative's report titled, ``Findings
of the Investigations into China's Acts, Policies, and
Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual
Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974'', dated March 22, 2018;
(2) comprehensively reviews current tariffs in place
against the PRC under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974--
(A) to assess whether such tariffs continue to meet
the requirements of such section and provide leverage
to encourage the PRC to change its unfair practices
without undue harm to the United States economy; and
(B) to recommend removal of such tariffs that harm
United States industry competitiveness in which data
does not clearly demonstrate that the tariffs have
substantially and directly alleviated discriminatory,
restrictive, or burdensome PRC trade practices, or
where any benefits that can be clearly linked to the
tariffs are less substantial than the costs the tariffs
have imposed on United States entities;
(3) evaluates the PRC's compliance with its Phase One trade
agreement commitments and identifies those provisions in the
agreement that have yet to be implemented;
(4) lists and explains proposed new enforcement tools that
will address and compel the PRC to complete structural reforms
to its economic and trade regimes;
(5) articulates new market access objectives with respect
to the PRC;
(6) identifies key United States goods and services that
have the ability to provide long-term benefits to the PRC's
economic growth, including energy, carbon capture, agricultural
goods and services among other sectors, without impeding United
States national security interests; and
(7) identifies key PRC goods and services that have the
ability to provide long-term benefits to the United States
economic growth, including tourism and education goods and
services among other sectors.
(b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
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