[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6443 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 6443
To accelerate deployment by Taiwan of the asymmetric defense
capabilities required to deter or, if necessary, defeat an invasion of
Taiwan by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
January 20, 2022
Mr. Gallagher introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed
Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in
each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the
jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To accelerate deployment by Taiwan of the asymmetric defense
capabilities required to deter or, if necessary, defeat an invasion of
Taiwan by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Arm Taiwan Act of 2022''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Department of Defense has warned that the
Government of the People's Republic of China may conclude that
it can successfully invade and seize control of Taiwan in the
latter half of the 2020s.
(2) In October 2021, the Minister of National Defense of
Taiwan, Chiu Kuo-cheng, echoed these warnings when he stated
that the People's Republic of China--
(A) ``is capable now'' of invading Taiwan; and
(B) will have ``lowered the costs and losses''
associated with invading Taiwan ``to a minimum'' after
2025.
(3) If the People's Republic of China were to invade and
seize control of Taiwan, it would deal a severe blow to United
States interests by--
(A) destroying one of the world's leading
democracies;
(B) casting doubt on the ability and resolve of the
United States to uphold its security commitments;
(C) incentivizing other countries in the Indo-
Pacific region to bandwagon with the People's Republic
of China; and
(D) facilitating the formation of a regional order
dominated by the People's Republic of China in which
the Government of the People's Republic of China may--
(i) regulate or otherwise limit the ability
of individuals in the United States to trade in
the Indo-Pacific region, which would have dire
effects on the livelihoods and freedoms of such
individuals; and
(ii) use the Indo-Pacific region as a
secure base from which to project military
power into other regions, including the Western
Hemisphere.
(4) Taiwan's proximity to the People's Republic of China,
coupled with investments by the People's Republic of China in
capabilities designed to delay intervention by the United
States Armed Forces in support of Taiwan, means that Taiwan may
be forced to delay, degrade, and deny an invasion by the
People's Republic of China with limited support from the United
States Armed Forces for the initial days, weeks, or months of
such an invasion.
(5) If Taiwan is unable to delay, degrade, and deny an
invasion by the People's Republic of China with limited support
from the United States Armed Forces, especially in the initial
period of war, then the People's Republic of China may conclude
that it is, or may actually be, capable of--
(A) invading and seizing control of Taiwan before
the United States or any other partner country of
Taiwan is able to respond effectively, thereby
achieving a fait accompli; and
(B) potentially rendering any attempt by the United
States or any other partner country of Taiwan to
reverse territorial gains by the People's Republic of
China prohibitively difficult, costly, or both.
(6) To defend itself effectively, especially in the initial
period of war, it is imperative that Taiwan accelerate
deployment of cost-effective and resilient asymmetric defense
capabilities, including mobile coastal and air defenses, naval
mines, missile boats, man-portable anti-armor weapons, civil
defense forces, and their enablers.
(7) The deployment of such asymmetric defense capabilities
by Taiwan would not only improve the ability of Taiwan to
defend itself, but also reduce operational risk to members of
the United States Armed Forces under a Taiwan contingency.
(8) The President of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-Wen, has--
(A) vowed to bolster the national defense of Taiwan
and demonstrate Taiwan's determination to defend itself
so as to ensure that Taiwan will not be forced to take
the path that the People's Republic of China has laid
out for Taiwan; and
(B) advocated the deployment of asymmetric defense
capabilities.
(9) The Government of Taiwan has begun taking steps to
improve Taiwan's defenses, including by increasing Taiwan's
defense budget and through Taiwan's new proposed special
defense budget, but far more is needed, and quickly, to ensure
that Taiwan is able to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the threat of an invasion of Taiwan by the People's
Republic of China is increasing rapidly and expected to reach
especially dangerous levels by the latter half of the 2020s;
(2) the United States has a strong interest in preventing
the People's Republic of China from invading and seizing
control of Taiwan, especially by ensuring that Taiwan is able
to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
(3) the United States should establish a security
assistance initiative so as to accelerate, to the greatest
extent possible, Taiwan's deployment of cost-effective and
resilient asymmetric defense capabilities;
(4) the United States should provide such assistance on the
condition that Taiwan--
(A) matches investments by the United States in its
asymmetric defense capabilities;
(B) increases its defense spending to a level
commensurate with the threat it faces;
(C) prioritizes acquiring cost-effective and
resilient asymmetric defense capabilities as rapidly as
possible, including from foreign suppliers, if
necessary; and
(D) demonstrates progress on defense reforms
required to maximize the effectiveness of its
asymmetric defenses, with special regard to Taiwan's
reserve forces; and
(5) in the course of executing such a security assistance
initiative, the United States should--
(A) seek to co-produce or co-develop cost-effective
and resilient asymmetric defense capabilities with
suppliers in Taiwan, including by providing incentives
to that effect, so long as those suppliers can produce
such capabilities at a reasonable cost, in the
quantities required, as rapidly, and to the same
quality and technical standards as suppliers in the
United States or other countries; and
(B) encourage other countries, particularly United
States allies and partners, to sell, lease, or
otherwise provide appropriate asymmetric defense
capabilities to Taiwan so as to facilitate Taiwan's
rapid deployment of the asymmetric defense capabilities
required to deter or, if necessary, defeat an invasion
by the People's Republic of China.
SEC. 3. TAIWAN SECURITY ASSISTANCE INITIATIVE.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish an
initiative, to be known as the ``Taiwan Security Assistance
Initiative'' (referred to in this Act as the ``Initiative''), to
accelerate Taiwan's deployment of asymmetric defense capabilities
required to deter or, if necessary, defeat an invasion by the People's
Republic of China.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $3,000,000,000 for the Department of Defense for each of
fiscal years 2023 through 2027 to provide assistance to the Government
of Taiwan under this section.
(c) Authority To Provide Assistance.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the Secretary of State, shall use the funds authorized to
be appropriated under subsection (b) to provide assistance to
the Government of Taiwan for the purpose described in
subsection (d).
(d) Purpose.--The purpose of the Initiative is to provide
assistance, including equipment, training, and other support, to the
Government of Taiwan so as to accelerate Taiwan's deployment of
asymmetric defense capabilities required to achieve, with limited
support from the United States Armed Forces for the initial days,
weeks, or months after the initiation of an invasion by the People's
Republic of China of Taiwan, the following objectives:
(1) To delay, degrade, and deny attempts by People's
Liberation Army forces to enter or transit the Taiwan Strait
and adjoining seas.
(2) To delay, degrade, and deny attempts by People's
Liberation Army forces to secure a lodgment on Taiwan and
expand or otherwise use that lodgment to seize control of a
population center or other key territory in Taiwan.
(3) To prevent the People's Republic of China from
decapitating, seizing control of, or otherwise neutralizing or
rendering ineffective the Government of Taiwan.
(e) Asymmetric Defense Capabilities.--In this section, the term
``asymmetric defense capabilities'' includes, in such quantities as the
Secretary of Defense determines to be necessary to achieve the purpose
specified in subsection (d), the following:
(1) Mobile, ground-based coastal defense cruise missiles
and launchers.
(2) Mobile, ground-based short-range and medium-range air
defense systems.
(3) Smart, self-propelled naval mines and coastal
minelaying platforms.
(4) Missile boats and fast-attack craft equipped with anti-
ship and anti-landing craft missiles.
(5) Unmanned aerial and other mobile, resilient
surveillance systems to support coastal and air defense
operations.
(6) Equipment to support target location, tracking,
identification, and targeting, especially at the local level,
in communications degraded or denied environments.
(7) Man-portable anti-armor weapons, mortars, and small
arms for ground combat operations.
(8) Equipment and technical assistance for the purpose of
developing civil defense forces, composed of civilian
volunteers and militia.
(9) Training and equipment, including appropriate war
reserves, required for Taiwan forces to independently maintain,
sustain, and employ capabilities described in paragraphs (1)
through (8).
(10) Concept development for coastal defense, air defense,
decentralized command and control, civil defense, logistics,
planning, and other critical military functions, with an
emphasis on operations in a communications degraded or denied
environment.
(11) Any other capability the Secretary of Defense
considers appropriate for the purpose described in subsection
(d).
(f) Availability of Funds.--
(1) Plan.--Not later than December 1, 2022, and annually
thereafter, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a plan for using funds authorized to be
appropriated under subsection (b) for the purpose specified in
subsection (d).
(2) Initial certification.--Amounts authorized to be
appropriated under subsection (b) for fiscal year 2023 may not
be obligated or expended until the date on which the Secretary
of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State,
certifies that the Government of Taiwan has committed--
(A) to spending an equivalent amount on asymmetric
defense capabilities in fiscal year 2023;
(B) to spending not less than two and a half
percent of Taiwan's national gross domestic product on
defense on an annual basis by the end of fiscal year
2025, and not less than three percent of Taiwan's
national gross domestic product on defense on an annual
basis by the end of fiscal year 2027, including
expenditures under the normal defense budget and any
supplemental or special defense budgets of Taiwan;
(C) to acquiring asymmetric defense capabilities as
rapidly as possible, including from suppliers in the
United States or other countries, if the Secretary of
Defense determines that such suppliers will be able to
provide such capabilities at a reasonable cost, in
sufficient quantities, of sufficient quality and
technical standards, and more rapidly than suppliers in
Taiwan; and
(D) to undertaking the defense reforms required to
maximize the effectiveness of an asymmetric defense
against an invasion by the People's Republic of China,
including by improving organization, mobilization, and
training of the reserve forces and other military
personnel of Taiwan.
(3) Subsequent certifications.--Amounts authorized to be
appropriated under subsection (b) for each of fiscal years
2024, 2025, 2026, and 2027 may not be obligated or expended
until the date on which the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretary of State, certifies that the
Government of Taiwan has committed--
(A) to spending an equivalent amount on asymmetric
defense capabilities in the applicable fiscal year and
upheld its commitment to spend an equivalent amount as
the United States in the preceding fiscal year on
asymmetric defense capabilities to be deployed by
Taiwan;
(B) to spending not less than two and a half
percent of Taiwan's national gross domestic product on
defense on an annual basis by the end of fiscal year
2025, and not less than three percent of Taiwan's
national gross domestic product on defense on an annual
basis by the end of fiscal year 2027, including
expenditures under the normal defense budget and any
supplemental or special defense budgets of Taiwan, and
demonstrated progress toward these spending targets in
the preceding fiscal year;
(C) to acquiring asymmetric defense capabilities as
rapidly as possible, including from suppliers in the
United States or other countries, if the Secretary of
Defense determines that such suppliers will be able to
provide such capabilities at reasonable cost, in
sufficient quantities, of sufficient quality and
technical standards, and more rapidly than suppliers in
Taiwan, and upheld its commitment to acquire asymmetric
defense capabilities as rapidly as possible in the
preceding fiscal year; and
(D) to undertaking the defense reforms required to
maximize the effectiveness of an asymmetric defense
against an invasion by the People's Republic of China,
including by improving the organization, mobilization,
and training of the reserve forces and other military
personnel of Taiwan, and demonstrated progress on such
reforms in the preceding fiscal year.
(4) Notification to congress.--Not later than 30 days after
making a certification under paragraph (2) or (3), the
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a notice and explanation of such certification.
(5) Remaining funds.--
(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B),
amounts appropriated for a fiscal year pursuant to the
authorization of appropriations under subsection (b)
that are not obligated and expended during that fiscal
year shall be added to the amount that may be used for
the Initiative in the subsequent fiscal year.
(B) Rescission.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to
the authorization of appropriation under subsection (b)
that remain unobligated by the end of fiscal year 2027
shall be rescinded and deposited into the general fund
of the Treasury.
(g) Defense Articles and Services From United States Inventory and
Other Sources.--
(1) In general.--In addition to assistance provided
pursuant to subsection (c), the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretary of State, may make available to
the Government of Taiwan, in such quantities as the Secretary
of Defense considers appropriate for the purpose described in
subsection (d), the following:
(A) Weapons and other defense articles from the
United States inventory and other sources.
(B) Excess defense articles from the United States
inventory.
(C) Defense services.
(2) Replacement.--Amounts for the replacement of any item
provided to the Government of Taiwan under paragraph (1)(A) may
be made available from the amount authorized to be appropriated
under subsection (b).
(h) Termination of Authority.--Assistance may not be provided under
this section after September 30, 2027.
SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) historically, the Government of Taiwan has prioritized
the acquisition of conventional weapons that would be of
limited utility in deterring or defeating an invasion by the
People's Republic of China at the expense of the timely
acquisition of cost-effective and resilient asymmetric defense
capabilities;
(2) the United States Government has often shared
responsibility for the misguided prioritization of defense
acquisitions described in paragraph (1) by approving sales of
conventional weapons to Taiwan, despite knowledge that such
sales would do little to enhance, and may even undermine, the
ability of Taiwan to deter or defeat an invasion by the
People's Republic of China;
(3) the misguided prioritization of defense acquisitions
described in paragraph (1) has not only undermined the ability
of Taiwan to deter or defeat an invasion by the People's
Republic of China, but has also placed at greater risk of death
or injury members of the United States Armed Forces who may
come under attack or be asked to come to the aid of Taiwan to
repel such an invasion; and
(4) any future sales, leases, or other provision of
conventional weaponry to Taiwan by the United States should be
conditioned on meaningful progress by the Government of Taiwan
on the acquisition of appropriate asymmetric defense
capabilities.
(b) Statement of Policy.--For each of fiscal years 2023 through
2027, the United States Government shall not sell, lease, or otherwise
provide military capabilities to Taiwan other than asymmetric defense
capabilities described in subsection (e) of section 3 until the earlier
of--
(1) the date on which the Secretary of Defense has
submitted a notification under subsection (f)(4) of that
section for the fiscal year in which the Government of Taiwan
has requested the sale, lease, or other provision of military
capabilities other than such asymmetric defense capabilities;
or
(2) the date on which the Secretary of Defense certifies to
the appropriate committees of Congress that the sale, lease, or
other provision to Taiwan of military capabilities other than
such asymmetric defense capabilities--
(A) is necessary to enhance the ability of Taiwan
to deter or, if necessary, defeat an invasion by the
People's Republic of China; or
(B) will not slow, delay, limit, or otherwise
detract from or undermine the ability of Taiwan to
deploy such asymmetric defense capabilities.
SEC. 5. DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.
In this Act, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
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