[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6452 Introduced in House (IH)]
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117th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 6452
To require the Director of National Intelligence to produce a National
Intelligence Estimate on escalation and de-escalation of gray zone
activities in great power competition, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
January 20, 2022
Mr. Krishnamoorthi introduced the following bill; which was referred to
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require the Director of National Intelligence to produce a National
Intelligence Estimate on escalation and de-escalation of gray zone
activities in great power competition, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Gathering and Reporting Assessments
Yielding Zero Overlooked Nefarious Efforts Act''.
SEC. 2. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION
OF GRAY ZONE ACTIVITIES IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The conventional power of the United States has driven
foreign adversaries to a level of competition that does not
always depend on military confrontation with the United States.
(2) Rather than challenging the United States in a manner
that could provoke a kinetic military response, foreign
adversaries of the United States have turned to carrying out
gray zone activities to advance the interests of such
adversaries, weaken the power of the United States, and erode
the norms that underpin the United States-led international
order.
(3) Gray zone activity falls on a spectrum of attribution
and deniability that ranges from covert adversary operations,
to detectible covert adversary operations, to unattributable
adversary operations, to deniable adversary operations, to open
adversary operations.
(4) To adequately address such a shift to gray zone
activity, the United States must understand what actions tend
to either escalate or de-escalate such activity by our
adversaries.
(5) The laws, principles, and values of the United States
are strategic advantages in great power competition with
authoritarian foreign adversaries that carry out gray zone
activities, because such laws, principles, and values increase
the appeal of the governance model of the United States, and
the United States-led international order, to states and
peoples around the world.
(6) The international security environment has demonstrated
numerous examples of gray zone activities carried out by
foreign adversaries, including the following activities of
foreign adversaries:
(A) Information operations, such as efforts by
Russia to influence the 2020 United States Federal
elections (as described in the March 15, 2021,
intelligence community assessment of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence made publicly
available on March 15, 2021).
(B) Adversary political coercion operations, such
as the wielding of energy by Russia, particularly in
the context of Ukrainian gas pipelines, to coerce its
neighbors into compliance with its policies.
(C) Cyber operations, such as the use by China of
cyber tools to conduct industrial espionage.
(D) Provision of support to proxy forces, such as
the support provided by Iran to Hezbollah and Shia
militia groups.
(E) Provocation by armed forces controlled by the
government of the foreign adversary through measures
that do not rise to the level of an armed attack, such
as the use of the China Coast Guard and maritime
militia by China to harass the fishing vessels of other
countries in the South China Sea.
(F) Alleged uses of lethal force on foreign soil,
such as the 2018 attempts by Russia to poison Sergei
Skripal in London.
(G) The potential use by an adversary of technology
that causes anomalous health incidents among United
States Government personnel.
(b) National Intelligence Estimate.--
(1) Requirement.--The Director of National Intelligence,
acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce
a National Intelligence Estimate on how foreign adversaries use
gray zone activities to advance interests, what responses by
the United States (or the allies or partners of the United
States) would tend to result in the escalation or de-escalation
of such gray zone activities by foreign adversaries, and any
opportunities for the United States to minimize the extent to
which foreign adversaries use gray zone activities in
furtherance of great power competition.
(2) Matters included.--To the extent determined appropriate
by the National Intelligence Council, the National Intelligence
Estimate produced under paragraph (1) may include an assessment
of the following topics:
(A) Any potential or actual lethal or harmful gray
zone activities carried out against the United States
by foreign adversaries, including against United States
Government employees and United States persons, whether
located within or outside of the United States.
(B) To the extent such activities have occurred, or
are predicted to occur--
(i) opportunities to reduce or deter any
such activities; and
(ii) any actions of the United States
Government that would tend to result in the
escalation or de-escalation of such activities.
(C) Any incidents in which foreign adversaries
could have used, but ultimately did not use, gray zone
activities to advance the interests of such
adversaries, including an assessment as to why the
foreign adversary ultimately did not use gray zone
activities.
(D) The effect of lowering the United States
Government threshold for the public attribution of
detectible covert adversary operations, unattributable
adversary operations, and deniable adversary
operations.
(E) The effect of lowering the United States
Government threshold for responding to detectible
covert adversary operations, unattributable adversary
operations, and deniable adversary operations.
(F) The extent to which the governments of foreign
adversaries exercise control over any proxies or
parastate actors used by such governments in carrying
out gray zone activities.
(G) The extent to which gray zone activities
carried out by foreign adversaries affect the private
sector of the United States.
(H) The international norms that provide the
greatest deterrence to gray zone activities carried out
by foreign adversaries, and opportunities for
strengthening those norms.
(I) The effect, if any, of the strengthening of
democratic governance abroad on the resilience of
United States allies and partners to gray zone
activities.
(J) Opportunities to strengthen the resilience of
United States allies and partners to gray zone
activities, and associated tactics, carried out by
foreign adversaries.
(K) Opportunities for the United States to improve
the detection of, and early warning for, such
activities and tactics.
(L) Opportunities for the United States to
galvanize international support in responding to such
activities and tactics.
(3) Submission to congress.--
(A) Submission.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall
submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives the
National Intelligence Estimate produced under paragraph
(1), including all intelligence reporting underlying
the Estimate.
(B) Notice regarding submission.--If at any time
before the deadline specified in subparagraph (A), the
Director determines that the National Intelligence
Estimate produced under paragraph (1) cannot be
submitted by such deadline, the Director shall (before
such deadline) submit to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives a report setting forth the reasons why
the National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted
by such deadline and an estimated date for the
submission of the National Intelligence Estimate.
(C) Form.--Any report under subparagraph (B) shall
be submitted in unclassified form.
(4) Public version.--Consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the
Director submits to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives the National Intelligence Estimate
under paragraph (1), the Director shall make publicly available
on the internet website of the Director an unclassified version
of the key findings of the National Intelligence Estimate.
(5) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) Gray zone activity.--The term ``gray zone
activity'' means an activity to advance the national
interests of a State that--
(i) falls between ordinary statecraft and
open warfare;
(ii) is carried out with an intent to
maximize the advancement of interests of the
state without provoking a kinetic military
response by the United States; and
(iii) falls on a spectrum that ranges from
covert adversary operations, to detectible
covert adversary operations, to unattributable
adversary operations, to deniable adversary
operations, to open adversary operations.
(B) Covert adversary operation.--The term ``covert
adversary operation'' means an operation by an
adversary that--
(i) the adversary intends to remain below
the threshold at which the United States
detects the operation; and
(ii) does stay below such threshold.
(C) Detectible covert adversary operation.--The
term ``detectible covert adversary operation'' means an
operation by an adversary that--
(i) the adversary intends to remain below
the threshold at which the United States
detects the operation; but
(ii) is ultimately detected by the United
States at a level below the level at which the
United States will publicly attribute the
operation to the adversary.
(D) Unattributable adversary operation.--The term
``unattributable adversary operation'' means an
operation by an adversary that the adversary intends to
be detected by the United States, but remain below the
threshold at which the United States will publicly
attribute the operation to the adversary.
(E) Deniable adversary operation.--The term
``deniable adversary operation'' means an operation by
an adversary that--
(i) the adversary intends to be detected
and publicly or privately attributed by the
United States; and
(ii) the adversary intends to deny, to
limit the response by the United States, and
any allies of the United States.
(F) Open adversary operation.--The term ``open
adversary operation'' means an operation by an
adversary that the adversary openly acknowledges as
attributable to the adversary.
(c) Requirement To Develop Lexicon.--
(1) Requirement.--The Director of National Intelligence,
acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall develop
a lexicon of common terms (and corresponding definitions for
such terms) for concepts associated with gray zone activities.
(2) Considerations.--In developing the lexicon under
paragraph (1), the National Intelligence Council shall include
in the lexicon each term (and the corresponding definition for
each term) specified in subsection (b)(5), unless the National
Intelligence Council determines that an alternative term (or
alternative definition)--
(A) more accurately describes a concept associated
with gray zone activities; or
(B) is preferable for any other reason.
(3) Report.--
(A) Publication.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall publish a report containing the
lexicon developed under paragraph (1).
(B) Form.--The report under subparagraph (A) shall
be published in unclassified form.
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