[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7148 Introduced in House (IH)]
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117th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 7148
To authorize the President to take actions to ensure Israel is prepared
for all contingencies if Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon, and
for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 18, 2022
Mr. Gottheimer (for himself and Mr. Mast) introduced the following
bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To authorize the President to take actions to ensure Israel is prepared
for all contingencies if Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Bunker Buster Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines
``high-enriched uranium'' as uranium enriched to at least 20
percent uranium-235.
(2) Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran
agreed to refrain from producing enriched uranium containing
more than 3.67 percent uranium-235 for 15 years.
(3) On January 13, 2019, the head of the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi, told the Fars News
Agency, ``If we want to come out of the nuclear deal and
produce, within four days we could start our 20 percent.''.
(4) On June 17, 2019, the spokesman for Iran's Atomic
Energy Organization, Behrouz Kamalvandi, suggested that Iran's
enrichment could reach up to 20 percent.
(5) On April 16, 2021, the head of the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi, told the state
television that Iran had begun enriching uranium to 60 percent.
(6) On July 14, 2021, the former President of Iran,
President Hassan Rouhani, says during a press conference that
Iran has the knowledge and ability to enrich weapons-grade
uranium at 90 percent.
(7) On September 7, 2021, the International Atomic Energy
Agency warned in their quarterly report of the knowledge gained
by Iran about advanced centrifuge performance and higher-level
enrichment that cannot be fully reversed. The report showed
that the stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium grew from 2.4
kilograms in May to 10 kilograms. It also indicated Iran
reconfigured its 60 percent production lines at Natanz and
appears to be enriching to that level more efficiently and
consistently.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States should--
(1) seek to extend the limitations on Iran's enriched
uranium, including through engagement in multilateral
diplomatic initiatives;
(2) ensure that Israel and other allies are prepared for
all contingencies if Iran pursues development of a nuclear
weapon;
(3) send a clear signal to Iran that development of a
nuclear weapon will never be tolerated; and
(4) reaffirm the United States commitment to deter Iranian
nuclear development with a credible military threat.
SEC. 4. STUDY AND REPORT.
(a) Study.--The President, acting through the Secretary of Defense,
shall seek to conduct a study with the Government of Israel on Israeli
military requirements to defend itself against a wide range of threats
to Israel's qualitative military edge (as such term is defined in
section 36(h)(3) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776(h)(3)))
and national security, including an Iranian nuclear weapon. Such study
shall include an analysis of gaps in Israel's security requirements,
including infrastructure, munitions, intelligence sharing, satellites,
and the extent to which the transfer of United States ordnance to
Israel would advance the national interests of both countries.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress a
report that contains the results of the study described in subsection
(a).
(c) Form.--The report referred to in subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 5. ACTIONS TO ENSURE ISRAEL IS PREPARED FOR ALL CONTINGENCIES IF
IRAN SEEKS TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON.
(a) In General.--Subject to the preliminary conditions described in
subsection (b), the President is authorized to take the actions
described in subsection (c), upon the request of the Government of
Israel, to ensure Israel is prepared for all contingencies if Iran
seeks to develop a nuclear weapon.
(b) Preliminary Conditions.--The President may exercise the
authority of subsection (a) only if the President first determines and
certifies to Congress that--
(1) it is consistent with the results of the study and
report required under section 4 to do so; and
(2) it is vital to the national security interests of the
United States to do so.
(c) Actions Described.--The actions described in this subsection
are the following:
(1) To provide for the construction of infrastructure in
Israel to accommodate large ordnance systems that are designed
to destroy underground nuclear infrastructure, including--
(A) construction of extended runways for aircraft
that carry the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP);
(B) basing options for such aircraft; and
(C) munition storage facilities.
(2)(A) To store in the territory of Israel the MOP or
related munitions described in paragraph (1), to be used by the
United States except as provided in subparagraph (B).
(B) To transfer the MOP or related munitions described in
paragraph (1) to Israeli custody if the President determines
and certifies to Congress that--
(i) Iran--
(I) is in noncompliance with the NPT
Safeguards Agreement;
(II) has modified its implementation of the
NPT Safeguards Agreement (including modified
Code 3.1); or
(III) as determined by the President, has
reduced access of inspectors of the Agency in
such a manner so as to be prejudicial to the
Agency's ability to provide confidence as to
the non-diversion of declared nuclear material
and absence of undeclared nuclear activities;
(ii) it is vital to the national security of the
United States to do so;
(iii) Israel has no other means to achieve a mutual
national security objective of destroying Iran's
underground nuclear infrastructure or facilities; and
(iv) a dual key control system is in place
requiring approval by the President, acting through the
Secretary of Defense (which may not be further
delegated) for deployment of the MOP or related
munitions described in paragraph (1) prior to Israeli
deployment of such munitions.
(3) To provide for training of Israeli personnel with
respect to the MOP or related munitions described in paragraph
(1).
(4) To conduct joint research and development with Israel
to--
(A) enhance United States ordnance; and
(B) develop Israeli capability for ordnance to
destroy underground infrastructure, including Hezbollah
rocket storage and manufacturing facilities and
underground Iranian nuclear facilities.
(d) NPT Safeguards Agreement Defined.--In this section, the term
``NPT Safeguards Agreement'' means the Agreement between Iran and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
which entered into force on May 15, 1974.
SEC. 6. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this Act may be construed to serve as an authorization
for the use of military force against Iran.
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