[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8560 Introduced in House (IH)]
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117th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 8560
To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a
report relating to analyses of the military will to fight and the
national will to fight with respect to the Governments of Ukraine,
Afghanistan, and Iraq, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
July 28, 2022
Mr. Crow (for himself and Mr. Meijer) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a
report relating to analyses of the military will to fight and the
national will to fight with respect to the Governments of Ukraine,
Afghanistan, and Iraq, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Will to Fight Act of 2022''.
SEC. 2. REPORT ON ASSESSING WILL TO FIGHT.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) According to a study by the RAND corporation, ``will to
fight'' is poorly analyzed and the least understood aspect of
war.
(2) In testimony before the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate in May 2022, top intelligence
officials of the United States indicated that although the
intelligence community accurately anticipated Russia's invasion
of Ukraine, the intelligence community did not accurately
assess the will of Ukrainian forces to fight in opposition to a
Russian invasion or that the Ukrainian forces would succeed in
averting a rapid Russian military occupation of Kyiv.
(3) According to the RAND corporation, the intelligence
community estimated that the Afghan government's forces could
hold out against the Taliban for as long as 2 years if all
ground forces of the United States were withdrawn. This
estimate was revised in June 2021 to reflect an intelligence
community view that Afghanistan's military collapse could come
in 6 to 12 months. In August 2021, the Afghan government fell
within days after the ground forces of the United States were
withdrawn.
(4) Similarly, the rapid advance of the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria and near-total collapse of the Iraqi Security
Forces in 2014 appeared to take the policymakers of the United
States by surprise.
(5) The apparent gaps in these analyses had important
implications for policy decisions of the United States toward
Russia and Afghanistan, and suggest a need for further
examination of how the intelligence community assesses a
foreign military's will to fight.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting
through the National Intelligence Council, and in coordination with the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community that the Director
determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report examining the extent to which analyses of the
military will to fight and the national will to fight informed the all-
source analyses of the intelligence community regarding how the armed
forces and Governments of Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Iraq would perform
at key junctures.
(c) Elements.--The report under subsection (b) shall include the
following:
(1) The methodology of the intelligence community for
measuring the military will to fight and the national will to
fight of a foreign country.
(2) The extent to which analysts of the intelligence
community applied such methodology when assessing the military
will to fight and the national will to fight of--
(A) Afghanistan following the April 2021
announcement of the full withdrawal of the United
States Armed Forces;
(B) Iraq in the face of the rapid emergence and
advancement in 2014 of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria;
and
(C) Ukraine and Russia during the initial phase of
the invasion and march toward Kyiv by Russia in
February 2022.
(3) The extent to which--
(A) the assessments described in paragraph (2)
depended on the observations of personnel of the United
States Armed Forces who had trained Afghan, Iraqi, and
Ukrainian armed forces; and
(B) such observations reflected any standardized,
objective methodology.
(4) Whether shortcomings in assessing the military will to
fight and the national will to fight may have affected the
capacity of the intelligence community to provide ``early
warning'' about the collapse of government forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
(5) The extent to which ``red teaming'' was used to test
the assessments described in paragraph (2).
(6) The extent to which dissenting opinions of intelligence
analysts were highlighted in final written products presented
to senior policymakers of the United States.
(7) The extent to which analysts and supervisors adhered to
the policies, procedures, directives, and best practices of the
intelligence community.
(8) Recommendations for analyses by the intelligence
community going forward to incorporate lessons learned and
enhance the quality of future analytical products to more
accurately reflect the military will to fight and the national
will to fight and improve the capacity of the intelligence
community to accurately predict the success or failure of the
armed forces of a foreign country.
(d) Annex.--In submitting the report under subsection (b) to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Director shall also include
an accompanying annex, which shall be classified, providing an
inventory of the following:
(1) Collection gaps and challenges that may have affected
the analysis of the collapse of government forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
(2) Actions that the Director of National Intelligence has
taken to mitigate such gaps and challenges.
(e) Form.--The report under subsection (b) may be submitted in
classified form, but if so submitted, shall include an unclassified
summary of key findings, consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
(A) The congressional intelligence committees (as
such term is defined in section 3 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
(B) The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
(C) The Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(3) Military will to fight.--The term ``military will to
fight'' means, with respect to the military of a country, the
disposition and decision to fight, act, or persevere as needed.
(4) National will to fight.--The term ``national will to
fight'' means, with respect to the government of a country, the
resolve to conduct sustained military and other operations for
an objective even when the expectation of success decreases or
the need for significant political, economic, and military
sacrifices increases.
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