[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 503 Engrossed in House (EH)]
<DOC>
H. Res. 503
In the House of Representatives, U. S.,
June 30, 2021.
Whereas January 6, 2021, was one of the darkest days of our democracy, during
which insurrectionists attempted to impede Congress's Constitutional
mandate to validate the presidential election and launched an assault on
the United States Capitol Complex that resulted in multiple deaths,
physical harm to over 140 members of law enforcement, and terror and
trauma among staff, institutional employees, press, and Members;
Whereas, on January 27, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a
National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin that due to the ``heightened
threat environment across the United States,'' in which ``[S]ome
ideologically-motivated violent extremists with objections to the
exercise of governmental authority and the presidential transition, as
well as other perceived grievances fueled by false narratives, could
continue to mobilize to incite or commit violence.'' The Bulletin also
stated that--
(1) ``DHS is concerned these same drivers to violence will remain
through early 2021 and some DVEs [domestic violent extremists] may be
emboldened by the January 6, 2021 breach of the U.S. Capitol Building in
Washington, D.C. to target elected officials and government facilities.'';
and
(2) ``Threats of violence against critical infrastructure, including
the electric, telecommunications and healthcare sectors, increased in 2020
with violent extremists citing misinformation and conspiracy theories about
COVID-19 for their actions'';
Whereas, on September 24, 2020, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Christopher Wray testified before the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives that--
(1) ``[T]he underlying drivers for domestic violent extremism - such as
perceptions of government or law enforcement overreach, sociopolitical
conditions, racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, misogyny, and reactions to
legislative actions - remain constant.'';
(2) ``[W]ithin the domestic terrorism bucket category as a whole,
racially-motivated violent extremism is, I think, the biggest bucket within
the larger group. And within the racially-motivated violent extremists
bucket, people subscribing to some kind of white supremacist-type ideology
is certainly the biggest chunk of that.''; and
(3) ``More deaths were caused by DVEs than international terrorists in
recent years. In fact, 2019 was the deadliest year for domestic extremist
violence since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995'';
Whereas, on April 15, 2021, Michael Bolton, the Inspector General for the United
States Capitol Police, testified to the Committee on House
Administration of the House of Representatives that--
(1) ``The Department lacked adequate guidance for operational planning.
USCP did not have policy and procedures in place that communicated which
personnel were responsible for operational planning, what type of
operational planning documents its personnel should prepare, nor when its
personnel should prepare operational planning documents.''; and
(2) ``USCP failed to disseminate relevant information obtained from
outside sources, lacked consensus on interpretation of threat analyses, and
disseminated conflicting intelligence information regarding planned events
for January 6, 2021.''; and
Whereas the security leadership of the Congress under-prepared for the events of
January 6th, with United States Capitol Police Inspector General Michael
Bolton testifying again on June 15, 2021, that--
(1) ``USCP did not have adequate policies and procedures for FRU (First
Responder Unit) defining its overall operations. Additionally, FRU lacked
resources and training for properly completing its mission.'';
(2) ``The Department did not have adequate policies and procedures for
securing ballistic helmets and vests strategically stored around the
Capitol Complex.''; and
(3) ``FRU did not have the proper resources to complete its mission.'':
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved,
SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT.
There is hereby established the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (hereinafter referred to as the ``Select
Committee'').
SEC. 2. COMPOSITION.
(a) Appointment of Members.--The Speaker shall appoint 13 Members to the
Select Committee, 5 of whom shall be appointed after consultation with the
minority leader.
(b) Designation of Chair.--The Speaker shall designate one Member to serve
as chair of the Select Committee.
(c) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the Select Committee shall be filled in the
same manner as the original appointment.
SEC. 3. PURPOSES.
Consistent with the functions described in section 4, the purposes of the
Select Committee are the following:
(1) To investigate and report upon the facts, circumstances, and
causes relating to the January 6, 2021, domestic terrorist attack upon
the United States Capitol Complex (hereafter referred to as the
``domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol'') and relating to the
interference with the peaceful transfer of power, including facts and
causes relating to the preparedness and response of the United States
Capitol Police and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies in the National Capital Region and other instrumentalities of
government, as well as the influencing factors that fomented such an
attack on American representative democracy while engaged in a
constitutional process.
(2) To examine and evaluate evidence developed by relevant Federal,
State, and local governmental agencies regarding the facts and
circumstances surrounding the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol
and targeted violence and domestic terrorism relevant to such terrorist
attack.
(3) To build upon the investigations of other entities and avoid
unnecessary duplication of efforts by reviewing the investigations,
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of other executive branch,
congressional, or independent bipartisan or nonpartisan commission
investigations into the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol,
including investigations into influencing factors related to such
attack.
SEC. 4. FUNCTIONS.
(a) Functions.--The functions of the Select Committee are to--
(1) investigate the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the
domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol, including facts and
circumstances relating to--
(A) activities of intelligence agencies, law enforcement
agencies, and the Armed Forces, including with respect to
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination and
information sharing among the branches and other
instrumentalities of government;
(B) influencing factors that contributed to the domestic
terrorist attack on the Capitol and how technology, including
online platforms, financing, and malign foreign influence
operations and campaigns may have factored into the motivation,
organization, and execution of the domestic terrorist attack on
the Capitol; and
(C) other entities of the public and private sector as
determined relevant by the Select Committee for such
investigation;
(2) identify, review, and evaluate the causes of and the lessons
learned from the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol regarding--
(A) the command, control, and communications of the United
States Capitol Police, the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the
Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, and
other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the
National Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021;
(B) the structure, coordination, operational plans,
policies, and procedures of the Federal Government, including as
such relate to State and local governments and nongovernmental
entities, and particularly with respect to detecting,
preventing, preparing for, and responding to targeted violence
and domestic terrorism;
(C) the structure, authorities, training, manpower
utilization, equipment, operational planning, and use of force
policies of the United States Capitol Police;
(D) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and
systems for the sharing of intelligence and other information by
Federal, State, and local agencies with the United States
Capitol Police, the Sergeants at Arms of the House of
Representatives and Senate, the Government of the District of
Columbia, including the Metropolitan Police Department of the
District of Columbia, the National Guard, and other Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agencies in the National
Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021, and the related
policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and systems for
monitoring, assessing, disseminating, and acting on intelligence
and other information, including elevating the security posture
of the United States Capitol Complex, derived from
instrumentalities of government, open sources, and online
platforms; and
(E) the policies, protocols, processes, procedures, and
systems for interoperability between the United States Capitol
Police and the National Guard, the Metropolitan Police
Department of the District of Columbia, and other Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agencies in the National
Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021; and
(3) issue a final report to the House containing such findings,
conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures described in
subsection (c) as it may deem necessary.
(b) Reports.--
(1) Interim reports.--In addition to the final report addressing the
matters in subsection (a) and section 3, the Select Committee may report
to the House or any committee of the House from time to time the results
of its investigations, together with such detailed findings and
legislative recommendations as it may deem advisable.
(2) Treatment of classified or law enforcement-sensitive matter.--
Any report issued by the Select Committee shall be issued in
unclassified form but may include a classified annex, a law enforcement-
sensitive annex, or both.
(c) Corrective Measures Described.--The corrective measures described in
this subsection may include changes in law, policy, procedures, rules, or
regulations that could be taken--
(1) to prevent future acts of violence, domestic terrorism, and
domestic violent extremism, including acts targeted at American
democratic institutions;
(2) to improve the security posture of the United States Capitol
Complex while preserving accessibility of the Capitol Complex for all
Americans; and
(3) to strengthen the security and resilience of the United States
and American democratic institutions against violence, domestic
terrorism, and domestic violent extremism.
(d) No Markup of Legislation Permitted.--The Select Committee may not hold a
markup of legislation.
SEC. 5. PROCEDURE.
(a) Access to Information From Intelligence Community.--Notwithstanding
clause 3(m) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Select
Committee is authorized to study the sources and methods of entities described
in clause 11(b)(1)(A) of rule X insofar as such study is related to the matters
described in sections 3 and 4.
(b) Treatment of Classified Information.--Clause 11(b)(4), clause 11(e), and
the first sentence of clause 11(f) of rule X of the Rules of the House of
Representatives shall apply to the Select Committee.
(c) Applicability of Rules Governing Procedures of Committees.--Rule XI of
the Rules of the House of Representatives shall apply to the Select Committee
except as follows:
(1) Clause 2(a) of rule XI shall not apply to the Select Committee.
(2) Clause 2(g)(2)(D) of rule XI shall apply to the Select Committee
in the same manner as it applies to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.
(3) Pursuant to clause 2(h) of rule XI, two Members of the Select
Committee shall constitute a quorum for taking testimony or receiving
evidence and one-third of the Members of the Select Committee shall
constitute a quorum for taking any action other than one for which the
presence of a majority of the Select Committee is required.
(4) The chair of the Select Committee may authorize and issue
subpoenas pursuant to clause 2(m) of rule XI in the investigation and
study conducted pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of this resolution,
including for the purpose of taking depositions.
(5) The chair of the Select Committee is authorized to compel by
subpoena the furnishing of information by interrogatory.
(6)(A) The chair of the Select Committee, upon consultation with the
ranking minority member, may order the taking of depositions, including
pursuant to subpoena, by a Member or counsel of the Select Committee, in
the same manner as a standing committee pursuant to section 3(b)(1) of
House Resolution 8, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress.
(B) Depositions taken under the authority prescribed in this
paragraph shall be governed by the procedures submitted by the chair of
the Committee on Rules for printing in the Congressional Record on
January 4, 2021.
(7) Subpoenas authorized pursuant to this resolution may be signed
by the chair of the Select Committee or a designee.
(8) The chair of the Select Committee may, after consultation with
the ranking minority member, recognize--
(A) Members of the Select Committee to question a witness
for periods longer than five minutes as though pursuant to
clause 2(j)(2)(B) of rule XI; and
(B) staff of the Select Committee to question a witness as
though pursuant to clause 2(j)(2)(C) of rule XI.
(9) The chair of the Select Committee may postpone further
proceedings when a record vote is ordered on questions referenced in
clause 2(h)(4) of rule XI, and may resume proceedings on such postponed
questions at any time after reasonable notice. Notwithstanding any
intervening order for the previous question, an underlying proposition
shall remain subject to further debate or amendment to the same extent
as when the question was postponed.
(10) The provisions of paragraphs (f)(1) through (f)(12) of clause 4
of rule XI shall apply to the Select Committee.
SEC. 6. RECORDS; STAFF; TRAVEL; FUNDING.
(a) Sharing Records of Committees.--Any committee of the House of
Representatives having custody of records in any form relating to the matters
described in sections 3 and 4 shall provide copies of such records to the Select
Committee not later than 14 days of the adoption of this resolution or receipt
of such records. Such records shall become the records of the Select Committee.
(b) Staff.--The appointment and the compensation of staff for the Select
Committee shall be subject to regulations issued by the Committee on House
Administration.
(c) Detail of Staff of Other Offices.--Staff of employing entities of the
House or a joint committee may be detailed to the Select Committee to carry out
this resolution and shall be deemed to be staff of the Select Committee.
(d) Use of Consultants Permitted.--Section 202(i) of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 4301(i)) shall apply with respect to the
Select Committee in the same manner as such section applies with respect to a
standing committee of the House of Representatives.
(e) Travel.--Clauses 8(a), (b), and (c) of rule X of the Rules of the House
of Representatives shall apply to the Select Committee.
(f) Funding; Payments.--There shall be paid out of the applicable accounts
of the House of Representatives such sums as may be necessary for the expenses
of the Select Committee. Such payments shall be made on vouchers signed by the
chair of the Select Committee and approved in the manner directed by the
Committee on House Administration. Amounts made available under this subsection
shall be expended in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Committee on
House Administration.
SEC. 7. TERMINATION AND DISPOSITION OF RECORDS.
(a) Termination.--The Select Committee shall terminate 30 days after filing
the final report under section 4.
(b) Disposition of Records.--Upon termination of the Select Committee--
(1) the records of the Select Committee shall become the records of
such committee or committees designated by the Speaker; and
(2) the copies of records provided to the Select Committee by a
committee of the House under section 6(a) shall be returned to the
committee.
Attest:
Clerk.