

117TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# H. RES. 503

Establishing the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack  
on the United States Capitol.

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IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 28, 2021

Ms. PELOSI submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the  
Committee on Rules

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## RESOLUTION

Establishing the Select Committee to Investigate the January  
6th Attack on the United States Capitol.

Whereas January 6, 2021, was one of the darkest days of our democracy, during which insurrectionists attempted to impede Congress’s Constitutional mandate to validate the presidential election and launched an assault on the United States Capitol Complex that resulted in multiple deaths, physical harm to over 140 members of law enforcement, and terror and trauma among staff, institutional employees, press, and Members;

Whereas, on January 27, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin that due to the “heightened threat environment across the United States,” in which “[S]ome ideologically-motivated violent extremists with objections to the

exercise of governmental authority and the presidential transition, as well as other perceived grievances fueled by false narratives, could continue to mobilize to incite or commit violence.” The Bulletin also stated that—

(1) “DHS is concerned these same drivers to violence will remain through early 2021 and some DVEs [domestic violent extremists] may be emboldened by the January 6, 2021 breach of the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, D.C. to target elected officials and government facilities.”; and

(2) “Threats of violence against critical infrastructure, including the electric, telecommunications and healthcare sectors, increased in 2020 with violent extremists citing misinformation and conspiracy theories about COVID–19 for their actions”;

Whereas, on September 24, 2020, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Christopher Wray testified before the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives that—

(1) “[T]he underlying drivers for domestic violent extremism – such as perceptions of government or law enforcement overreach, sociopolitical conditions, racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, misogyny, and reactions to legislative actions – remain constant.”;

(2) “[W]ithin the domestic terrorism bucket category as a whole, racially-motivated violent extremism is, I think, the biggest bucket within the larger group. And within the racially-motivated violent extremists bucket, people subscribing to some kind of white supremacist-type ideology is certainly the biggest chunk of that.”; and

(3) “More deaths were caused by DVEs than international terrorists in recent years. In fact, 2019 was the

deadliest year for domestic extremist violence since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995”;

Whereas, on April 15, 2021, Michael Bolton, the Inspector General for the United States Capitol Police, testified to the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives that—

(1) “The Department lacked adequate guidance for operational planning. USCP did not have policy and procedures in place that communicated which personnel were responsible for operational planning, what type of operational planning documents its personnel should prepare, nor when its personnel should prepare operational planning documents.”; and

(2) “USCP failed to disseminate relevant information obtained from outside sources, lacked consensus on interpretation of threat analyses, and disseminated conflicting intelligence information regarding planned events for January 6, 2021.”; and

Whereas the security leadership of the Congress under-prepared for the events of January 6th, with United States Capitol Police Inspector General Michael Bolton testifying again on June 15, 2021, that—

(1) “USCP did not have adequate policies and procedures for FRU (First Responder Unit) defining its overall operations. Additionally, FRU lacked resources and training for properly completing its mission.”;

(2) “The Department did not have adequate policies and procedures for securing ballistic helmets and vests strategically stored around the Capitol Complex.”; and

(3) “FRU did not have the proper resources to complete its mission.”: Now, therefore, be it

1        *Resolved,*

1 **SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT.**

2       There is hereby established the Select Committee to  
3 Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States  
4 Capitol (hereinafter referred to as the “Select Com-  
5 mittee”).

6 **SEC. 2. COMPOSITION.**

7       (a) APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS.—The Speaker shall  
8 appoint 13 Members to the Select Committee, 5 of whom  
9 shall be appointed after consultation with the minority  
10 leader.

11       (b) DESIGNATION OF CHAIR.—The Speaker shall  
12 designate one Member to serve as chair of the Select Com-  
13 mittee.

14       (c) VACANCIES.—Any vacancy in the Select Com-  
15 mittee shall be filled in the same manner as the original  
16 appointment.

17 **SEC. 3. PURPOSES.**

18       Consistent with the functions described in section 4,  
19 the purposes of the Select Committee are the following:

20           (1) To investigate and report upon the facts,  
21       circumstances, and causes relating to the January 6,  
22       2021, domestic terrorist attack upon the United  
23       States Capitol Complex (hereafter referred to as the  
24       “domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol”) and re-  
25       lating to the interference with the peaceful transfer  
26       of power, including facts and causes relating to the

1 preparedness and response of the United States  
2 Capitol Police and other Federal, State, and local  
3 law enforcement agencies in the National Capital  
4 Region and other instrumentalities of government,  
5 as well as the influencing factors that fomented such  
6 an attack on American representative democracy  
7 while engaged in a constitutional process.

8 (2) To examine and evaluate evidence developed  
9 by relevant Federal, State, and local governmental  
10 agencies regarding the facts and circumstances sur-  
11 rounding the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol  
12 and targeted violence and domestic terrorism rel-  
13 evant to such terrorist attack.

14 (3) To build upon the investigations of other  
15 entities and avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts  
16 by reviewing the investigations, findings, conclu-  
17 sions, and recommendations of other executive  
18 branch, congressional, or independent bipartisan or  
19 nonpartisan commission investigations into the do-  
20 mestic terrorist attack on the Capitol, including in-  
21 vestigations into influencing factors related to such  
22 attack.

23 **SEC. 4. FUNCTIONS.**

24 (a) FUNCTIONS.—The functions of the Select Com-  
25 mittee are to—

1           (1) investigate the facts, circumstances, and  
2 causes relating to the domestic terrorist attack on  
3 the Capitol, including facts and circumstances relat-  
4 ing to—

5           (A) activities of intelligence agencies, law  
6 enforcement agencies, and the Armed Forces,  
7 including with respect to intelligence collection,  
8 analysis, and dissemination and information  
9 sharing among the branches and other instru-  
10 mentalities of government;

11           (B) influencing factors that contributed to  
12 the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol and  
13 how technology, including online platforms, fi-  
14 nancing, and malign foreign influence oper-  
15 ations and campaigns may have factored into  
16 the motivation, organization, and execution of  
17 the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol;  
18 and

19           (C) other entities of the public and private  
20 sector as determined relevant by the Select  
21 Committee for such investigation;

22           (2) identify, review, and evaluate the causes of  
23 and the lessons learned from the domestic terrorist  
24 attack on the Capitol regarding—

1 (A) the command, control, and commu-  
2 nications of the United States Capitol Police,  
3 the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the  
4 Metropolitan Police Department of the District  
5 of Columbia, and other Federal, State, and  
6 local law enforcement agencies in the National  
7 Capital Region on or before January 6, 2021;

8 (B) the structure, coordination, operational  
9 plans, policies, and procedures of the Federal  
10 Government, including as such relate to State  
11 and local governments and nongovernmental en-  
12 tities, and particularly with respect to detecting,  
13 preventing, preparing for, and responding to  
14 targeted violence and domestic terrorism;

15 (C) the structure, authorities, training,  
16 manpower utilization, equipment, operational  
17 planning, and use of force policies of the United  
18 States Capitol Police;

19 (D) the policies, protocols, processes, pro-  
20 cedures, and systems for the sharing of intel-  
21 ligence and other information by Federal, State,  
22 and local agencies with the United States Cap-  
23 itol Police, the Sergeants at Arms of the House  
24 of Representatives and Senate, the Government  
25 of the District of Columbia, including the Met-

1           ropolitan Police Department of the District of  
2           Columbia, the National Guard, and other Fed-  
3           eral, State, and local law enforcement agencies  
4           in the National Capital Region on or before  
5           January 6, 2021, and the related policies, pro-  
6           tocols, processes, procedures, and systems for  
7           monitoring, assessing, disseminating, and act-  
8           ing on intelligence and other information, in-  
9           cluding elevating the security posture of the  
10          United States Capitol Complex, derived from  
11          instrumentalities of government, open sources,  
12          and online platforms; and

13                 (E) the policies, protocols, processes, pro-  
14                 cedures, and systems for interoperability be-  
15                 tween the United States Capitol Police and the  
16                 National Guard, the Metropolitan Police De-  
17                 partment of the District of Columbia, and other  
18                 Federal, State, and local law enforcement agen-  
19                 cies in the National Capital Region on or before  
20                 January 6, 2021; and

21                 (3) issue a final report to the House containing  
22                 such findings, conclusions, and recommendations for  
23                 corrective measures described in subsection (c) as it  
24                 may deem necessary.

25                 (b) REPORTS.—



1           (1) INTERIM REPORTS.—In addition to the final  
2 report addressing the matters in subsection (a) and  
3 section 3, the Select Committee may report to the  
4 House or any committee of the House from time to  
5 time the results of its investigations, together with  
6 such detailed findings and legislative recommenda-  
7 tions as it may deem advisable.

8           (2) TREATMENT OF CLASSIFIED OR LAW EN-  
9 FORCEMENT-SENSITIVE MATTER.—Any report issued  
10 by the Select Committee shall be issued in unclassi-  
11 fied form but may include a classified annex, a law  
12 enforcement-sensitive annex, or both.

13       (c) CORRECTIVE MEASURES DESCRIBED.—The cor-  
14 rective measures described in this subsection may include  
15 changes in law, policy, procedures, rules, or regulations  
16 that could be taken—

17           (1) to prevent future acts of violence, domestic  
18 terrorism, and domestic violent extremism, including  
19 acts targeted at American democratic institutions;

20           (2) to improve the security posture of the  
21 United States Capitol Complex while preserving ac-  
22 cessibility of the Capitol Complex for all Americans;  
23 and

24           (3) to strengthen the security and resilience of  
25 the United States and American democratic institu-

1 tions against violence, domestic terrorism, and do-  
2 mestic violent extremism.

3 (d) NO MARKUP OF LEGISLATION PERMITTED.—The  
4 Select Committee may not hold a markup of legislation.

5 **SEC. 5. PROCEDURE.**

6 (a) ACCESS TO INFORMATION FROM INTELLIGENCE  
7 COMMUNITY.—Notwithstanding clause 3(m) of rule X of  
8 the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Select  
9 Committee is authorized to study the sources and methods  
10 of entities described in clause 11(b)(1)(A) of rule X inso-  
11 far as such study is related to the matters described in  
12 sections 3 and 4.

13 (b) TREATMENT OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—  
14 Clause 11(b)(4), clause 11(e), and the first sentence of  
15 clause 11(f) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Rep-  
16 resentatives shall apply to the Select Committee.

17 (c) APPLICABILITY OF RULES GOVERNING PROCE-  
18 DURES OF COMMITTEES.—Rule XI of the Rules of the  
19 House of Representatives shall apply to the Select Com-  
20 mittee except as follows:

21 (1) Clause 2(a) of rule XI shall not apply to the  
22 Select Committee.

23 (2) Clause 2(g)(2)(D) of rule XI shall apply to  
24 the Select Committee in the same manner as it ap-

1 plies to the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-  
2 ligence.

3 (3) Pursuant to clause 2(h) of rule XI, two  
4 Members of the Select Committee shall constitute a  
5 quorum for taking testimony or receiving evidence  
6 and one-third of the Members of the Select Com-  
7 mittee shall constitute a quorum for taking any ac-  
8 tion other than one for which the presence of a ma-  
9 jority of the Select Committee is required.

10 (4) The chair of the Select Committee may au-  
11 thorize and issue subpoenas pursuant to clause 2(m)  
12 of rule XI in the investigation and study conducted  
13 pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of this resolution, in-  
14 cluding for the purpose of taking depositions.

15 (5) The chair of the Select Committee is au-  
16 thorized to compel by subpoena the furnishing of in-  
17 formation by interrogatory.

18 (6)(A) The chair of the Select Committee, upon  
19 consultation with the ranking minority member, may  
20 order the taking of depositions, including pursuant  
21 to subpoena, by a Member or counsel of the Select  
22 Committee, in the same manner as a standing com-  
23 mittee pursuant to section 3(b)(1) of House Resolu-  
24 tion 8, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress.

1 (B) Depositions taken under the authority pre-  
2 scribed in this paragraph shall be governed by the  
3 procedures submitted by the chair of the Committee  
4 on Rules for printing in the Congressional Record on  
5 January 4, 2021.

6 (7) Subpoenas authorized pursuant to this reso-  
7 lution may be signed by the chair of the Select Com-  
8 mittee or a designee.

9 (8) The chair of the Select Committee may,  
10 after consultation with the ranking minority mem-  
11 ber, recognize—

12 (A) Members of the Select Committee to  
13 question a witness for periods longer than five  
14 minutes as though pursuant to clause  
15 2(j)(2)(B) of rule XI; and

16 (B) staff of the Select Committee to ques-  
17 tion a witness as though pursuant to clause  
18 2(j)(2)(C) of rule XI.

19 (9) The chair of the Select Committee may  
20 postpone further proceedings when a record vote is  
21 ordered on questions referenced in clause 2(h)(4) of  
22 rule XI, and may resume proceedings on such post-  
23 poned questions at any time after reasonable notice.  
24 Notwithstanding any intervening order for the pre-  
25 vious question, an underlying proposition shall re-

1 main subject to further debate or amendment to the  
2 same extent as when the question was postponed.

3 (10) The provisions of paragraphs (f)(1)  
4 through (f)(12) of clause 4 of rule XI shall apply to  
5 the Select Committee.

6 **SEC. 6. RECORDS; STAFF; TRAVEL; FUNDING.**

7 (a) SHARING RECORDS OF COMMITTEES.—Any com-  
8 mittee of the House of Representatives having custody of  
9 records in any form relating to the matters described in  
10 sections 3 and 4 shall provide copies of such records to  
11 the Select Committee not later than 14 days of the adop-  
12 tion of this resolution or receipt of such records. Such  
13 records shall become the records of the Select Committee.

14 (b) STAFF.—The appointment and the compensation  
15 of staff for the Select Committee shall be subject to regu-  
16 lations issued by the Committee on House Administration.

17 (c) DETAIL OF STAFF OF OTHER OFFICES.—Staff  
18 of employing entities of the House or a joint committee  
19 may be detailed to the Select Committee to carry out this  
20 resolution and shall be deemed to be staff of the Select  
21 Committee.

22 (d) USE OF CONSULTANTS PERMITTED.—Section  
23 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2  
24 U.S.C. 4301(i)) shall apply with respect to the Select  
25 Committee in the same manner as such section applies

1 with respect to a standing committee of the House of Rep-  
2 resentatives.

3 (e) TRAVEL.—Clauses 8(a), (b), and (c) of rule X of  
4 the Rules of the House of Representatives shall apply to  
5 the Select Committee.

6 (f) FUNDING; PAYMENTS.—There shall be paid out  
7 of the applicable accounts of the House of Representatives  
8 such sums as may be necessary for the expenses of the  
9 Select Committee. Such payments shall be made on vouch-  
10 ers signed by the chair of the Select Committee and ap-  
11 proved in the manner directed by the Committee on House  
12 Administration. Amounts made available under this sub-  
13 section shall be expended in accordance with regulations  
14 prescribed by the Committee on House Administration.

15 **SEC. 7. TERMINATION AND DISPOSITION OF RECORDS.**

16 (a) TERMINATION.—The Select Committee shall ter-  
17 minate 30 days after filing the final report under section  
18 4.

19 (b) DISPOSITION OF RECORDS.—Upon termination  
20 of the Select Committee—

21 (1) the records of the Select Committee shall  
22 become the records of such committee or committees  
23 designated by the Speaker; and

1           (2) the copies of records provided to the Select  
2           Committee by a committee of the House under sec-  
3           tion 6(a) shall be returned to the committee.

○