[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2297 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2297
To improve global health, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 24, 2021
Mr. Risch (for himself and Mr. Menendez) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To improve global health, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``International
Pandemic Preparedness and COVID-19 Response Act of 2021''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Purpose.
TITLE I--ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO COVID-19
AND FUTURE PANDEMICS
Sec. 101. Statement of policy regarding international cooperation to
end the COVID-19 pandemic.
Sec. 102. Oversight of United States foreign assistance to end the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Sec. 103. United States contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria COVID-19 response
mechanism.
Sec. 104. Global COVID-19 vaccine distribution and delivery.
Sec. 105. Leveraging United States bilateral global health programs for
the international COVID-19 response.
Sec. 106. Report on humanitarian response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Sec. 107. Safeguarding democracy and human rights during the COVID-19
pandemic.
Sec. 108. Public diplomacy and combating disinformation and
misinformation about COVID-19.
Sec. 109. Findings and sense of Congress regarding the United States
International Development Finance
Corporation.
Sec. 110. Sense of Congress regarding international cooperation to
prevent and respond to future pandemics.
Sec. 111. Roles of the Department of State, the United States Agency
for International Development, and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
in pandemic response.
Sec. 112. USAID disaster surge capacity.
Sec. 113. Statement of policy on humanitarian assistance to countries
affected by pandemics.
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL PANDEMIC PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS
Sec. 201. Partner country defined.
Sec. 202. Global health security strategy and report.
Sec. 203. Committee on Global Health Security and Pandemic and
Biological Threats.
Sec. 204. United States overseas global health security and diplomacy
coordination and strategy.
Sec. 205. Resilience.
Sec. 206. Strengthening health systems.
Sec. 207. Additional authorities.
Sec. 208. Authorization for United States participation in the
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness
Innovations.
Sec. 209. National intelligence estimate and briefing regarding novel
diseases and pandemic threats.
Sec. 210. Pandemic early warning network.
Sec. 211. International emergency operations.
TITLE III--FINANCING MECHANISM FOR GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AND PANDEMIC
PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS
Sec. 301. Eligible partner country defined.
Sec. 302. Establishment of Fund for Global Health Security and Pandemic
Prevention and Preparedness.
Sec. 303. Authorities.
Sec. 304. Administration.
Sec. 305. Advisory Board.
Sec. 306. Reports to Congress.
Sec. 307. United States contributions.
Sec. 308. Compliance with the Foreign Aid Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2016.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Global health security agenda; ghsa.--The terms
``Global Health Security Agenda'' and ``GHSA'' mean the multi-
sectoral initiative launched in 2014 and renewed in 2017 that
brings together countries, regions, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private
sector to elevate global health security as a national-level
priority, to share best practices, and to facilitate national
capacity to comply with and adhere to--
(A) the International Health Regulations (2005);
(B) the World Organisation for Animal Health
international standards and guidelines;
(C) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
(2004);
(D) the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, done at Washington, London, and Moscow,
April 10, 1972 (commonly referred to as the
``Biological Weapons Convention'');
(E) the Global Health Security Agenda 2024
Framework; and
(F) other relevant frameworks that contribute to
global health security.
(3) Global health security index.--The term ``Global Health
Security Index'' means the comprehensive assessment and
benchmarking of health security and related capabilities across
the countries that make up the States Parties to the
International Health Regulations (2005).
(4) Global health security initiative.--The term ``Global
Health Security Initiative'' means the informal network of
countries and organizations that came together in 2001 to
undertake concerted global action to strengthen public health
preparedness and response to chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats, as well as pandemic
influenza.
(5) Joint external evaluation.--The term ``Joint External
Evaluation'' means the World Health Organization-facilitated,
voluntary, collaborative, multi-sectoral process to assess
country capacity to prevent, detect, and rapidly respond to
public health risks occurring naturally or due to deliberate or
accidental events, assess progress in achieving the targets
under the International Health Regulations (2005), and
recommend priority actions.
(6) Key stakeholders.--The term ``key stakeholders'' means
actors engaged in efforts to advance global health security
programs and objectives, including--
(A) national and local governments in partner
countries;
(B) other bilateral donors;
(C) international, regional, and local
organizations, including private, voluntary,
nongovernmental, and civil society organizations;
(D) international, regional, and local financial
institutions;
(E) representatives of historically marginalized
groups, including women, youth, and indigenous peoples;
(F) the private sector, including medical device,
technology, pharmaceutical, manufacturing, logistics,
and other relevant companies; and
(G) public and private research and academic
institutions.
(7) One health approach.--The term ``One Health approach''
means the collaborative, multi-sectoral, and transdisciplinary
approach toward achieving optimal health outcomes in a manner
that recognizes the interconnection between people, animals,
plants, and their shared environment.
(8) Relevant federal departments and agencies.--The term
``relevant Federal departments and agencies'' means any Federal
department or agency implementing United States policies and
programs relevant to the advancement of United States global
health security and diplomacy overseas, which may include--
(A) the Department of State;
(B) the United States Agency for International
Development;
(C) the Department of Health and Human Services;
(D) the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
(E) the National Institutes of Health;
(F) the Department of the Treasury;
(G) the Department of Agriculture;
(H) the Department of Defense;
(I) the Defense Threat Reduction Agency;
(J) the Millennium Challenge Corporation;
(K) the Development Finance Corporation;
(L) the Peace Corps; and
(M) any other department or agency that the
President determines to be relevant for these purposes.
(9) Resilience.--The term ``resilience'' means the ability
of people, households, communities, systems, institutions,
countries, and regions to reduce, mitigate, withstand, adapt
to, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks in a manner
that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive
growth.
SEC. 3. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this Act is to accelerate and enhance the United
States international response to pandemics, including the COVID-19
pandemic, and to operationalize lessons learned from current and prior
emergency responses in a manner that--
(1) advances the global health security and diplomacy
objectives of the United States;
(2) improves coordination among the relevant Federal
departments and agencies implementing United States foreign
assistance for global health security; and
(3) more effectively enables partner countries to
strengthen and sustain resilient health systems and supply
chains with the resources, capacity, and personnel required to
prevent, prepare for, detect, and respond to infectious disease
threats before they become pandemics.
TITLE I--ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO COVID-19
AND FUTURE PANDEMICS
SEC. 101. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO
END THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.
It shall be the policy of the United States to lead and implement a
comprehensive and coordinated international response to end the COVID-
19 pandemic in a manner that recognizes the critical role that
multilateral and regional organizations can and should play in pandemic
response, including by--
(1) seeking adoption of a United Nations Security Council
resolution that--
(A) declares pandemics, including the COVID-19
pandemic, to be a threat to international peace and
security; and
(B) urges member states to address this threat by
aligning their health preparedness plans with
international best practices and those established by
the Global Health Security Agenda to improve country
capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious
disease threats;
(2) advancing efforts to reform the World Health
Organization so that it serves as an effective normative and
capable coordinating body empowered to align member countries
around a single strategic operating plan to detect, contain,
treat, and deter the further spread of COVID-19;
(3) providing timely, appropriate levels of financial
support to United Nations agencies responding to the COVID-19
pandemic;
(4) prioritizing United States foreign assistance for the
COVID-19 response in the most vulnerable countries and regions;
(5) encouraging other donor governments to similarly
increase contributions to the United Nations agencies
responding to the COVID-19 pandemic in the world's poorest and
most vulnerable countries;
(6) working with key stakeholders to accelerate progress
toward meeting and exceeding, as practicable, the global COVID-
19 vaccination goals jointly proposed by the International
Monetary Fund, the World Health Organization, the World Bank,
and the World Trade Organization, whereby--
(A) at least 40 percent of the population in all
countries is vaccinated by the end of 2021; and
(B) at least 60 percent of the population in all
countries is vaccinated by the first half of 2022;
(7) engaging with key stakeholders, including through
multilateral facilities such as the COVID-19 Vaccines Global
Access initiative (referred to in this title as ``COVAX'') and
the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator initiative, and
expanding bilateral efforts, including through the
International Development Finance Corporation, to accelerate
the development, manufacturing, local production, and efficient
and equitable distribution of--
(A) vaccines and related raw materials to meet or
exceed the vaccination goals under paragraph (6); and
(B) global health commodities, including personal
protective equipment, test kits, medicines and
therapeutics, and other essential supplies to combat
COVID-19;
(8) supporting global COVID-19 vaccine distribution
strategies that strengthen underlying health systems and ensure
that people living in vulnerable and marginalized communities,
including women, do not face undue barriers to vaccination;
(9) working with key stakeholders, including through the
World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, the World
Trade Organization, the International Finance Corporation, and
other relevant regional and bilateral financial institutions,
to address the economic and financial implications of the
COVID-19 pandemic, while taking into account the differentiated
needs of disproportionately affected, vulnerable, and
marginalized populations;
(10) establishing clear timelines, benchmarks, and goals
for COVID-19 response strategies and activities under this
section; and
(11) generating commitments of resources in support of the
goals referred to in paragraph (10).
SEC. 102. OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO END THE
COVID-19 PANDEMIC.
(a) Reporting Requirements.--Not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the
Administrator for the United States Agency for International
Development shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional
committees--
(1) an unclassified report containing a description of
funds already obligated and expended under title X of the
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Public Law 117-2); and
(2) a plan that describes the objectives and timeline for
the obligation and expenditure of all remaining funds
appropriated under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, which
shall be submitted in an unclassified form, and should include
a description of steps taken pursuant to each objective
specified in the plan.
(b) Congressional Consultation.--Not less frequently than once
every 60 days, until the completion or termination of the
implementation plan required under subsection (a)(2), and upon the
request from one or more of the appropriate congressional committees,
the Secretary of State and the Administrator for the United States
Agency for International Development shall provide a briefing to the
appropriate congressional committees regarding the report required
under subsection (a)(1) and the status of the implementation of the
plan required under subsection (a)(2).
(c) Branding.--In providing assistance under this title, the
Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development, with due consideration for the safety
and security of implementing partners and beneficiaries, and pursuant
to current branding and marking regulations and procedures shall
prescribe the use of logos or other insignia, which may include the
flag of the United States, to appropriately identify such assistance as
being from the people of the United States.
SEC. 103. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS,
TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA COVID-19 RESPONSE MECHANISM.
(a) United States Contributions to the Global Fund To Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria COVID-19 Response Mechanism.--United States
contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria COVID-19 Response Mechanism under section 10003(a)(2) of the
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Public Law 107-2)--
(1) shall be meaningfully leveraged in a manner that
incentivizes other public and private donor contributions; and
(2) shall be subject to the reporting and withholding
requirements under subsections (c), (d)(4)(A)(ii), (d)(4)(C),
(d)(5), (d)(6), (f), and (g) of section 202 of the United
States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7622).
SEC. 104. GLOBAL COVID-19 VACCINE DISTRIBUTION AND DELIVERY.
(a) Accelerating Global Vaccine Distribution Strategy.--The
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, the Chief Executive Officer of the United
States International Development Finance Corporation, and the heads of
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, as determined by the
President, shall develop a strategy to expand access to, and accelerate
the global distribution of, COVID-19 vaccines to other countries, which
shall--
(1) identify the countries that have the highest infection
and death rates due to COVID-19, the lowest COVID-19
vaccination rates, and face the most difficult, political,
logistical, and financial challenges to obtaining and
delivering COVID-19 vaccines, and describe the basis and
metrics used to make such determinations;
(2) identify which countries and regions will be
prioritized and targeted for COVID-19 vaccine delivery, and the
rationale for such prioritization;
(3) describe efforts that the United States is making to
increase COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing capacity, including
through the provision of development finance, and estimate
when, how many, and which types of vaccines will be provided by
the United States Government bilaterally and through COVAX;
(4) describe efforts to encourage international partners to
take actions similar to the efforts referred to in paragraph
(3);
(5) describe how the United States Government will ensure
efficient delivery of COVID-19 vaccines to intended recipients,
including United States citizens residing overseas, and
identify complementary United States foreign assistance that
will facilitate vaccine readiness, distribution, delivery,
monitoring, and administration activities;
(6) describe the roles, responsibilities, tasks, and, as
appropriate, the authorities of the Secretary of State, the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the
Chief Executive Officer of the United States International
Development Finance Corporation, and the heads of other
relevant Federal departments and agencies with respect to the
implementation of such strategy; and
(7) summarize the United States public diplomacy strategies
for branding and addressing vaccine misinformation and
hesitancy.
(b) Submission of Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit the
strategy described in subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional
committees.
SEC. 105. LEVERAGING UNITED STATES BILATERAL GLOBAL HEALTH PROGRAMS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL COVID-19 RESPONSE.
(a) Authorization for Leveraging Bilateral Program Activities.--
Amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to
carry out section 104 of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2151b)
may be used in countries receiving United States foreign assistance--
(1) to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, including through the
sharing of COVID-19 vaccines; and
(2) to support related activities, including--
(A) strengthening vaccine readiness;
(B) reducing vaccine hesitancy and misinformation;
(C) delivering and administering COVID-19 vaccines;
(D) strengthening health systems and supply chains;
(E) supporting health care workforce planning,
training, and management;
(F) enhancing transparency, quality, and
reliability of health data;
(G) increasing bidirectional testing; and
(H) building lab capacity.
(b) Adjustment of Targets and Goals.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and
agencies, shall submit an annual report to the appropriate
congressional committees that identifies--
(1) any adjustments to original program targets and goals
that result from the use of funds for the purposes authorized
under subsection (a); and
(2) the amounts needed in the following fiscal year to meet
the original program goals.
SEC. 106. REPORT ON HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.
(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development
and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall submit a report
to the appropriate congressional committees that--
(1) assesses the global humanitarian response to COVID-19;
and
(2) outlines specific elements of the United States
Government's country-level response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
(b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) for countries receiving United States assistance, a
description of humanitarian and health-worker access to crisis-
affected areas, including--
(A) legal and bureaucratic restrictions on the
entry of humanitarian workers from abroad, to include
visa authorizations that do not allow adequate time for
humanitarian workers to quarantine upon arrival in-line
with host country regulations, conduct needs
assessments, and subsequently implement multilateral
and United States-funded programming in an efficient,
effective, and unrestricted manner;
(B) restrictions on travel by humanitarian workers
within such country to reach the areas of operation
where vulnerable and marginalized populations reside;
(C) access to medical evacuation in the event of a
health emergency;
(D) access to personal protective equipment for
United States Government implementing partners; and
(E) efforts to support access to COVID-19 vaccines
for humanitarian and health-workers and crisis-affected
communities;
(2) an analysis and description of countries (regardless of
whether such countries have received direct United States
assistance) that have expressly prevented vulnerable
populations from accessing necessary assistance related to
COVID-19, including--
(A) the omission of vulnerable populations from
national response plans;
(B) laws, policies, or practices that restrict or
preclude treatment of vulnerable populations at public
hospitals and health facilities; and
(C) exclusion of, or discrimination against,
vulnerable populations in law, policy, or practice that
prevents equal access to food, shelter, and other basic
assistance;
(3) a description of United States Government efforts to
facilitate greater humanitarian access, including--
(A) advocacy and diplomatic efforts with relevant
foreign governments and multilateral institutions to
ensure that vulnerable and marginalized populations are
included in national response plans and other relevant
plans developed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic;
and
(B) advocacy and diplomatic efforts with relevant
foreign governments to ensure that appropriate visas,
work permits, and domestic travel exemptions are issued
for humanitarian and health workers responding to the
COVID-19 pandemic; and
(4) a description of United States Government plans and
efforts to address the second-order impacts of the COVID-19
pandemic and an assessment of the resources required to
implement such plans, including efforts to address--
(A) famine and acute food insecurity;
(B) gender-based violence;
(C) mental health and psychosocial support needs;
(D) child protection needs;
(E) health, education, and livelihoods;
(F) shelter; and
(G) attempts to close civil society space,
including through bureaucratic, administrative, and
health or security related impediments.
SEC. 107. SAFEGUARDING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS DURING THE COVID-19
PANDEMIC.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) governments may be required to take appropriate
extraordinary measures during public health emergencies to halt
the spread of disease, including closing businesses and public
events, limiting access to public spaces, and restricting the
movement of people;
(2) certain foreign governments have taken measures in
response to COVID-19 that violate the human rights of their
citizens without clear public health justification, oversight
measures, or sunset provisions;
(3) governments using the COVID-19 pandemic as a pretext
for repression have undermined democratic institutions,
debilitated institutions for transparency and public integrity,
quashed legitimate dissent, and attacked journalists, civil
society organizations, activists, independent voices, and
vulnerable and marginalized populations, including refugees and
migrants, with far-reaching consequences that will extend
beyond the current crisis;
(4) COVID-19 threatens to roll back decades of progress for
women and girls, disproportionately affecting women
economically, educationally, and with respect to health, while
also leading to alarming rises in gender based violence; and
(5) during and after the pandemic, the Department of State
and the United States Agency for International Development
should directly, and through nongovernmental organizations or
international organizations, provide assistance and implement
programs that support democratic institutions, civil society,
free media, and the advancement of internationally recognized
human rights.
(b) Funding for Civil Society and Human Rights Defenders.--
(1) Program priorities.--Amounts made available for each of
the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out the purposes of
sections 101 and 102 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2151 and 2151-1), including programs to support
democratic institutions, human rights defenders, civil society,
and freedom of the press, should be targeted, to the extent
feasible, toward civil society organizations in countries in
which emergency government measures taken in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic have violated internationally recognized
human rights.
(2) Eligible organizations.--Civil society organizations
operating in countries in which emergency government measures
taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic violated
internationally recognized human rights shall be eligible to
receive funds made available to carry out the purposes of
sections 101 and 102 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for
each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026, for--
(A) programs designed to strengthen and support
civil society, human rights defenders, freedom of
association, and the freedom of the press;
(B) programs to restore democratic institutions;
and
(C) peacebuilding and conflict prevention to
address the impacts of COVID-19 on social cohesion,
public trust, and conflict dynamics by adapting
existing programs or investing in new ones.
(3) Final report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees
that--
(A) lists the countries whose emergency measures
limiting internationally recognized human rights in a
manner inconsistent with the principles of limitation
and derogation remain in place;
(B) describes such countries' emergency measures,
including--
(i) how such procedures violate
internationally recognized human rights; and
(ii) an analysis of the impact of such
measures on access to health and efforts to
control the COVID-19 pandemic within the
country;
(C) describes--
(i) security and intelligence surveillance
measures implemented by countries during the
COVID-19 pandemic;
(ii) the extent to which such measures have
been, or have not been, rolled back; and
(iii) whether and how such measures impact
internationally recognized human rights; and
(D) includes a strategic plan by the Department of
State and the United States Agency for International
Development that addresses, through multilateral and
bilateral diplomacy and foreign assistance, the
persistent issues related to the restriction of
internationally recognized human rights in the COVID-19
response.
SEC. 108. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND COMBATING DISINFORMATION AND
MISINFORMATION ABOUT COVID-19.
(a) United States Agency for Global Media.--
(1) Finding.--Congress finds that the United States Agency
for Global Media (referred to in this section as ``USAGM'')
broadcasting entities and grantees have proven valuable in
providing timely and accurate information, particularly in
countries in which the free press is under threat.
(2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) accurate, investigative, and scientific
journalism is critical for societies to effectively
combat global health threats; and
(B) Congress supports--
(i) accurate and objective investigative
and scientific reporting by USAGM networks and
grantees regarding COVID-19; and
(ii) platforms that help dispel and combat
misinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic.
(3) Voice of america.--It is the sense of Congress that
amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available to Voice of America should be used--
(A) to expand programs such as POLYGRAPH.info;
(B) to provide critical tools for combating
propaganda associated with COVID-19; and
(C) to assist journalists in providing accurate
information to local media outlets.
(4) Office of cuba broadcasting.--It is the sense of
Congress that Radio Television Marti and Digital Marti should
continue to broadcast programs that detect, highlight, and
dispel disinformation.
(5) Radio free europe/radio liberty.--
(A) Finding.--Congress finds that Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (referred to in this section as
``RFE/RL'') operate in media markets in which
authoritarian state and nonstate actors, including
Russia, heavily invest in misinformation and
disinformation campaigns designed to promote confusion
and mistrust.
(B) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress
that RFE/RL should--
(i) increase investigative reporting
regarding the impacts of COVID-19, the
political and social responses governments are
taking in response to COVID-19, and the lasting
impacts such actions will have on key political
freedoms; and
(ii) expand its ``digital first'' strategy.
(6) Radio free asia.--
(A) Finding.--Congress finds that Radio Free Asia
(RFA) operates in a media market dominated by powerful
state-run media that have invested heavily in media
distortion and disinformation, including about COVID-
19.
(B) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress
that RFA should--
(i) commission technical experts to bolster
efforts to counter social media tools,
including bots used by some countries to
promote misinformation;
(ii) expand digital programming and local
coverage to expose China's media manipulation
techniques; and
(iii) increase English language content to
help counter China's propaganda directed toward
English-speaking audiences.
(7) Middle east broadcasting networks.--
(A) Finding.--Congress finds that the Middle East
Broadcasting Networks operate largely in closed media
markets in which malign state and nonstate actors
remain active.
(B) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress
that the Middle East Broadcasting Networks should--
(i) continue plans to expand an
investigative news unit; and
(ii) work to ensure that reporting
continues amidst operational challenges on the
ground.
(8) Open technology fund.--
(A) Finding.--Congress finds that the Open
Technology Fund works to advance internet freedom in
repressive environments by supporting technologies
that--
(i) provide secure and uncensored access to
USAGM's content and the broader internet; and
(ii) counter attempts by authoritarian
governments to control the internet and
restrict freedom online.
(B) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress
that the Open Technology Fund should--
(i) support a broad range of technologies
to respond to increasingly aggressive and
sophisticated censorship and surveillance
threats and provide more comprehensive and
tailored support to USAGM's networks; and
(ii) provide direct assistance to USAGM's
networks to improve the digital security of
reporting operations and journalists.
(b) Department of State Public Diplomacy Programs.--
(1) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(A) The Department of State's public diplomacy
programs build global networks that can address shared
challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, including
through exchanges of researchers, public health
experts, and scientists.
(B) The programs referred to in subparagraph (A)
play a critical role in creating open and resilient
information environments where democracies can thrive,
as articulated in the 2020 Public Diplomacy Strategic
Plan, including by--
(i) improving media quality with journalist
training and reporting tours;
(ii) conducting media literacy programs;
and
(iii) supporting media access activities.
(C) The International Visitor Leadership Program
and Digital Communications Network engaged journalists
around the world to combat COVID-19 disinformation,
promote unbiased reporting, and strengthen media
literacy.
(D) More than 12,000 physicians holding J-1 visas
from 130 countries--
(i) are engaged in residency or fellowship
training at approximately 750 hospitals
throughout the United States, the majority of
whom are serving in States that have been the
hardest hit by COVID-19; and
(ii) throughout the pandemic, have served
on the front lines of the medical workforce and
in United States university labs researching
ways to detect and treat the virus.
(2) Visa processing briefing.--Not later than 30 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary
for Consular Affairs shall brief the appropriate congressional
committees by providing--
(A) a timeline for increasing visa processing
capacities at embassies around the world, notably where
there are--
(i) many American citizens, including dual
nationals; and
(ii) many visa applicants for educational
and cultural exchange programs that promote
United States foreign policy objectives and
economic stability to small businesses,
universities, and communities across the United
States; and
(B) a detailed plan for using existing authorities
to waive in-person appointments and interviews.
(3) Global engagement center.--
(A) Finding.--Congress finds that since the
beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, publications,
websites, and platforms associated with China, Russia,
and Iran have sponsored disinformation campaigns
related to the COVID-19 pandemic, including falsely
blaming the United States for the disease.
(B) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress
that the Global Engagement Center should continue its
efforts to expose and counter state and non-state-
sponsored disinformation related to COVID-19, the
origins of COVID-19, and COVID-19 vaccinations.
SEC. 109. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The COVID-19 pandemic is causing a global economic
recession, as evidenced by the global economic indicators
described in paragraphs (2) through (4).
(2) The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
determined that the COVID-19 pandemic pushed the global economy
into recession in 2020 on a scale that has not been witnessed
since the 1930s.
(3) Developed countries are expected to experience a
relatively more significant rebound in gross domestic product
growth during 2021 than is expected to be experienced in
developing countries, leading to concerns about a further
expansion in the gap between rich and poor countries,
particularly if this trend continues into 2022.
(4) Global markets have suffered losses ranging between 5
percent and over 10 percent since the beginning of the
pandemic. While markets are recovering in 2021, global job
losses and unemployment rates remain high, with--
(A) approximately 33,000,000 labor hours have been
lost globally (13 per cent of the total hours lost) due
to outright unemployment; and
(B) an estimated additional 81,000,000 labor hours
have been lost due to inactivity or underemployment.
(5) Given the prolonged nature of the COVID-19 pandemic,
African finance ministers have requested continued efforts to
provide--
(A) additional liquidity;
(B) better market access;
(C) more concessional resources; and
(D) an extension in the Debt Service Suspension
Initiative established by the Group of 20.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) even when markets begin to recover in the future, it is
likely that access to capital will be especially challenging
for developing countries, which still will be struggling with
the containment of, and the recovery from, the COVID-19
pandemic;
(2) economic uncertainty and the inability of individuals
and households to generate income are major drivers of
political instability and social discord, which creates
conditions for insecurity;
(3) it is in the security and economic interests of the
United States to assist in the economic recovery of developing
countries that are made more vulnerable and unstable from the
public health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic;
(4) United States foreign assistance and development
finance institutions should seek to blunt the impacts of a
COVID-19 related economic recession by supporting investments
in sectors critical to maintaining economic stability and
resilience in low and middle income countries;
(5) the need for the United States International
Development Finance Corporation's support for advancing
development outcomes in less developed countries, as mandated
by the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development
Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.), is critical to ensuring
lasting and resilient economic growth in light of the COVID-19
pandemic's exacerbation of economic hardships and challenges;
(6) the United States International Development Finance
Corporation should adjust its view of risk versus return by
taking smart risks that may produce a lower rate of financial
return, but produce significant development outcomes in
responding to the economic effects of COVID-19; and
(7) to mitigate the economic impacts of the COVID-19
recession, the United States International Development Finance
Corporation should use its resources and authorities, among
other things--
(A) to ensure loan support for small- and medium-
sized enterprises;
(B) to offer local currency loans to borrowers for
working capital needs;
(C) to create dedicated financing opportunities for
new ``customers'' that are experiencing financial
hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic; and
(D) to work with other development finance
institutions to create co-financing facilities to
support customers experiencing hardship due to the
COVID-19 pandemic.
SEC. 110. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO
PREVENT AND RESPOND TO FUTURE PANDEMICS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) global pandemic preparedness and response requires
international and regional cooperation and action;
(2) the United States should lead efforts in multilateral
fora, such as the Group of 7, the Group of 20, and the United
Nations, by collaborating and cooperating with other countries
and international and regional organizations, including the
World Health Organization and other key stakeholders, to
implement international strategies, tools, and agreements to
better prevent, detect, and respond to future infectious
disease threats before they become pandemics; and
(3) the United States should enhance and expand
coordination and collaboration among the relevant Federal
departments and agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and the
World Organization for Animal Health, to advance a One Health
approach toward preventing, detecting, and responding to
zoonotic threats in the human-animal interface.
SEC. 111. ROLES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE UNITED STATES AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND THE CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION IN PANDEMIC RESPONSE.
(a) Designation of Lead Agencies for Coordination of the United
States Response to Infectious Disease Outbreaks With Severe or Pandemic
Potential.--In the event of an infectious disease outbreak outside of
the United States with pandemic potential, the President should
designate agencies to lead specific aspects of the response efforts,
including--
(1) designating the Department of State to serve as the
lead for diplomatic engagement, and related foreign policy
efforts, including--
(A) enhanced coordination of engagement with
multilateral organizations and countries, and
mobilization of donor contributions; and
(B) support for United States citizens abroad;
(2) designating the United States Agency for International
Development to serve as the key lead agency for design and
implementation of the United States international response,
relief, and recovery assistance associated with the potential
pandemic outbreak by leading programmatic activities, as
necessary and appropriate, including--
(A) immediate health, disaster assistance, and
humanitarian response needs and prevention and
preparedness activities in neighboring at-risk
countries;
(B) testing, treatment, and assistance with
preventative care units and community care facilities;
(C) surveillance, case investigation, and rapid
response capability;
(D) providing supplies, such as personal
protective, screening, and treatment equipment;
(E) conducting community outreach and communication
and mobilization efforts;
(F) logistics support; and
(G) serving as lead agency for disease outbreak
response abroad; and
(3) designating the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention to serve as the public health lead for the
international response to the potential pandemic outbreak by
conducting activities, such as--
(A) infection prevention and control, contact
tracing, and laboratory surveillance and training;
(B) building up, in coordination with the United
States Agency for International Development, emergency
operation centers;
(C) providing education and outreach; and
(D) assessing the safety and efficacy of vaccine
and treatment candidates in the conduct of clinical
trials in affected countries.
SEC. 112. USAID DISASTER SURGE CAPACITY.
(a) Surge Capacity.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated or
otherwise made available to carry out part I and chapter 4 of part II
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.),
including funds made available for ``Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and
Central Asia'', may be used, in addition to amounts otherwise made
available for such purposes, for the cost (including support costs) of
individuals detailed to or employed by the United States Agency for
International Development whose primary responsibility is to carry out
programs in response to global health emergencies and natural or man-
made disasters.
(b) Notification.--Not later than 15 days before making funds
available to address man-made disasters pursuant to subsection (a), the
Secretary of State or the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development shall notify the appropriate congressional
committees of such action.
SEC. 113. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES
AFFECTED BY PANDEMICS.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States--
(1) to ensure that United States assistance to address
pandemics, including the provision of vaccines, reaches
vulnerable and marginalized populations, including racial and
religious minorities, refugees, internally displaced persons,
migrants, stateless persons, women, children, the elderly, and
persons with disabilities;
(2) to ensure that United States assistance, including
development finance, addresses the second order effects of a
pandemic, including acute food insecurity; and
(3) to protect and support humanitarian actors who are
essential workers in preventing, mitigating and responding to
the spread of a pandemic among vulnerable and marginalized
groups described in paragraph (1), including ensuring that such
humanitarian actors--
(A) are exempted from unreasonable travel
restrictions to ensure that they can effectively
provide life-saving assistance; and
(B) are prioritized as frontline workers in country
vaccine distribution plans.
(b) Facilitating Effective and Safe Humanitarian Assistance.--The
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development, should carry out
actions that accomplish the policies set forth in subsection (a),
including by--
(1) taking steps to ensure that travel restrictions
implemented to help contain the spread of a pandemic are not
applied to individuals authorized by the United States
Government to travel to, or reside in, a designated country to
provide assistance related to, or otherwise impacted by, an
outbreak;
(2) approving the usage of foreign assistance funding for
the procurement of personal protective equipment by United
States Government implementing partners from businesses within
or nearby the country receiving foreign assistance on an urgent
basis and in a manner consistent with efforts to respond to the
spread of a pandemic in the United States; and
(3) waiving certain travel restrictions implemented to help
contain the spread of a pandemic in order to facilitate the
medical evacuation of United States Government implementing
partners, regardless of nationality.
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL PANDEMIC PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS
SEC. 201. PARTNER COUNTRY DEFINED.
In this title, the term ``partner country'' means a foreign country
in which the relevant Federal departments and agencies are implementing
United States assistance for global health security and pandemic
prevention and preparedness under this Act.
SEC. 202. GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY STRATEGY AND REPORT.
(a) In General.--The President shall develop, update, maintain, and
advance a comprehensive strategy for improving global health security
and pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response that--
(1) clearly articulates the policy goals related to
pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response, and actions
necessary to elevate and strengthen United States diplomatic
leadership in global health security and pandemic preparedness,
including by building the expertise of the diplomatic corps;
(2) improves the effectiveness of United States foreign
assistance to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious
disease threats, through a One Health approach, including
through the advancement of the Global Health Security Agenda,
the International Health Regulations (2005), and other relevant
frameworks and programs that contribute to global health
security and pandemic preparedness;
(3) establishes specific and measurable goals, benchmarks,
timetables, performance metrics, and monitoring and evaluation
plans for United States foreign policy and assistance for
global health security that promote learning and adaptation and
reflect international best practices relating to global health
security, transparency, and accountability;
(4) establishes transparent means to improve coordination
and performance by the relevant Federal departments and
agencies and sets out clear roles and responsibilities that
reflect the unique capabilities and resources of each such
department and agency;
(5) establishes mechanisms to improve coordination and
avoid duplication of effort among the relevant Federal
departments and agencies, partner countries, donor countries,
the private sector, multilateral organizations, and other key
stakeholders, and ensures collaboration at the country level;
(6) supports, and is aligned with, partner country-led,
global health security policy and investment plans, developed
with input from key stakeholders, as appropriate;
(7) prioritizes working with partner countries with--
(A) demonstrated need, as identified through the
Joint External Evaluation process, the Global Health
Security Index classification of health systems,
national action plans for health security, Global
Health Security Agenda Action Packages, other risk-
based assessments, and other complementary or successor
indicators of global health security and pandemic
preparedness; and
(B) demonstrated commitment to transparency,
including budget and global health data transparency,
complying with the International Health Regulations
(2005), investing in domestic health systems, and
achieving measurable results;
(8) reduces long-term reliance upon United States foreign
assistance for global health security by--
(A) helping build and enhance community resilience
to infectious disease emergencies and threats, such as
COVID-19 and Ebola;
(B) ensuring that United States global health
assistance is strategically planned and coordinated in
a manner that contributes to the strengthening of
overall health systems and builds the capacity of local
organizations and institutions;
(C) promoting improved domestic resource
mobilization, co-financing, and appropriate national
budget allocations for strong health systems, global
health security, and pandemic preparedness and response
in partner countries; and
(D) ensuring partner country ownership of global
health security strategies, data, programs, and
outcomes;
(9) supports health budget and workforce planning in
partner countries, including training in public financial
management and budget data transparency;
(10) works to ensure that--
(A) partner countries have national action plans
for health security that are developed with input from
key stakeholders, including communities and the private
sector; and
(B) United States foreign assistance for global
health security is aligned with existing national
action plans for health security in partner countries,
developed with input from key stakeholders, including
communities and the private sector, to the greatest
extent practicable and appropriate;
(11) strengthens linkages between complementary bilateral
and multilateral foreign assistance programs, including efforts
of the World Bank, the World Health Organization, the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, Gavi, the
Vaccine Alliance, and regional health organizations, that
contribute to the development of more resilient health systems
and supply chains in partner countries with the capacity,
resources, and personnel required to prevent, detect, and
respond to infectious disease threats; and
(12) supports innovation and partnerships with the private
sector, health organizations, civil society, nongovernmental
organizations, and health research and academic institutions to
improve pandemic preparedness and response, including for the
prevention and detection of infectious disease, and the
development and deployment of effective, accessible, and
affordable infectious disease tracking tools, diagnostics,
therapeutics, and vaccines.
(b) Submission of Strategy.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit the strategy
required under subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional
committees.
(c) Annual Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the submission
of the strategy to the appropriate congressional committees
under subsection (b), and not later than October 1 of each year
thereafter for the following 4 fiscal years, the President
shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional
committees that describes--
(A) the status of the implementation of the
strategy required under subsection (a);
(B) any necessary updates to the strategy;
(C) the progress made in implementing the strategy,
with specific information related to the progress
toward improving countries' ability to detect, respond
and prevent the spread of infectious disease threats,
such as COVID-19 and Ebola; and
(D) details on the status of funds made available
to carry out the purposes of this title.
(2) Agency-specific plans.--The reports required under
paragraph (1) shall include specific implementation plans from
each relevant Federal department and agency that describe--
(A) how updates to the strategy may have impacted
the agency's plan during the preceding calendar year;
(B) the progress made in meeting the goals,
objectives, and benchmarks under implementation plans
during the preceding year;
(C) the anticipated staffing plans and
contributions of the department or agency, including
technical, financial, and in-kind contributions, to
implement the strategy;
(D) a transparent, open, and detailed accounting of
obligations by each of the relevant Federal departments
and agencies to implement the strategy, including--
(i) the statutory source of obligated
funds;
(ii) the amounts obligated;
(iii) implementing partners;
(iv) targeted beneficiaries; and
(v) activities supported;
(E) the efforts of the relevant Federal department
or agency to ensure that the activities and programs
carried out pursuant to the strategy are designed to
achieve maximum impact and enduring returns, including
through specific activities to strengthen health
systems, as appropriate; and
(F) a plan for regularly reviewing and updating
programs and partnerships, and for sharing lessons
learned with a wide range of stakeholders in an open,
transparent manner.
(3) Form.--The reports required under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.
SEC. 203. COMMITTEE ON GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AND PANDEMIC AND
BIOLOGICAL THREATS.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States--
(1) to promote global health security as a core national
and security interest; and
(2) to ensure effective coordination and collaboration
between the relevant Federal departments and agencies engaged
domestically and internationally in efforts to advance the
global health security of the United States, in accordance with
paragraph (1).
(b) Coordination.--
(1) Defined term.--In this subsection, the term ``pandemic
threat'' means any infectious disease that--
(A) has an aggregation of cases in a community that
rises above what is normally expected in that
population in that area;
(B) has the potential to spread over several
countries or continents; and
(C) could, if not addressed, threaten the national
security of the United States.
(2) Committee on global health security and pandemic and
biological threats.--There is authorized to be established,
within the National Security Council, the Committee on Global
Health Security and Pandemic and Biological Threats (referred
to in this subsection as the ``Committee''), whose day to day
operations should be led by the Special Advisor for Global
Health Security.
(3) Special advisor for global health security.--The
Special Advisor for Global Health Security referred to in
paragraph (2)--
(A) should serve as part of the staff of the
National Security Council; and
(B) may also be the Senior Director for a Global
Health Security and Biodefense Directorate within the
Executive Office of the President, who reports to the
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.
(4) Composition.--The Committee should include the
following members:
(A) The Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Secretary of State.
(C) The Secretary of Defense.
(D) The Secretary of Health and Human Services.
(E) The Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development.
(F) The Secretary of Agriculture.
(G) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(H) The Attorney General.
(I) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
(J) The Office of Management and Budget.
(K) The Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency.
(L) The Director of the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention.
(M) The Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy.
(N) The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, who should serve as the chairperson
of the Committee.
(O) Such other members as the President may
designate.
(5) Functions.--
(A) In general.--The functions of the Committee
should be--
(i) to provide strategic guidance for the
development of a policy framework for
activities of the United States Government
relating to global health security, including
pandemic prevention, preparedness and response;
and
(ii) to ensure policy coordination between
United States Government agencies, especially
coordination between--
(I) agencies with a primarily
domestic mandate; and
(II) agencies with an international
mandate relating to global health
security and pandemic threats.
(B) Activities.--In carrying out the functions
described in subparagraph (A), the Committee should--
(i) conduct, in coordination with the heads
of relevant Federal agencies, a review of
existing United States health security policies
and strategies and develop recommendations for
how the Federal Government may regularly update
and harmonize such policies and strategies to
ensure the timely development of a
comprehensive coordinated strategy to enable
the United States Government to respond to
pandemic threats and to monitor the
implementation of such strategies;
(ii) develop a plan for--
(I) establishing an interagency
National Center for Epidemic
Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics; and
(II) modernizing global early
warning and trigger systems for scaling
action to prevent, detect, respond to,
and recover from emerging biological
threats;
(iii) provide policy-level recommendations
to participating agencies regarding the Global
Health Security Agenda goals, objectives, and
implementation, and other international efforts
to strengthen pandemic prevention, preparedness
and response;
(iv) review the progress toward, and
working to resolve challenges in, achieving
United States commitments under the GHSA;
(v) develop protocols for coordinating and
deploying a global response to emerging high-
consequence infectious disease threats that
outline the respective roles for relevant
Federal agencies in facilitating and supporting
such response operations that should facilitate
the operational work of Federal agencies, and
of the Special Advisor for Global Health
Security;
(vi) make recommendations regarding
appropriate responses to specific pandemic
threats and ensure the coordination of domestic
and international agencies regarding the
Federal Government's efforts to prevent,
detect, respond to, and recover from biological
events; and
(vii) take steps to strengthen the global
pandemic supply chain and address any barriers
to the timely delivery of supplies in response
to a pandemic, including through engagement
with the private sector, as appropriate;
(C) develop policies and procedures to ensure the
effective sharing of information from domestic and
international sources about pandemic threats among the
relevant Federal departments and agencies, State and
local governments, and international partners and
organizations; and
(D) develop guidelines to enhance and improve the
operational coordination between State and local
governments and Federal agencies with respect to
pandemic threats.
(6) Foreign affairs responsibilities.--The Committee should
not assume any foreign affairs responsibilities of the
Secretary of State, including the responsibility to oversee the
implementation of programs and policies that advance global
health security within foreign countries.
(7) Specific roles and responsibilities.--
(A) In general.--The heads of the agencies listed
in paragraph (4) should--
(i) make global health security and
pandemic threat reduction a high priority
within their respective agencies, and include
global health security and pandemic threat
reduction-related activities within their
respective agencies' strategic planning and
budget processes;
(ii) designate a senior-level official to
be responsible for global health security and
pandemic threat reduction at each of their
respective agencies;
(iii) designate, in accordance with
paragraph (4), an appropriate representative at
the Assistant Secretary level or higher to
participate on the Committee in instances where
the head of the agency cannot participate;
(iv) keep the Committee apprised of Global
Health Security and pandemic threat reduction-
related activities undertaken within their
respective agencies;
(v) ensure interagency cooperation and
collaboration and maintain responsibility for
agency-related programmatic functions
including, as applicable, in coordination with
host governments, country teams, and global
health security in-country teams; and
(vi) keep the Committee apprised of GHSA-
related activities undertaken within their
respective agencies.
(B) Additional roles and responsibilities.--In
addition to the roles and responsibilities described in
subparagraph (A), the heads of the agencies described
in paragraph (4) should carry out their respective
roles and responsibilities described in Executive Order
13747 (81 Fed. Reg. 78701; relating to Advancing the
Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe
and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats) and the
National Security Memorandum-1 on United States Global
Leadership to Strengthen the International COVID-19
Response and to Advance Global Health Security and
Biological Preparedness, as in effect on the day before
the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 204. UNITED STATES OVERSEAS GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AND DIPLOMACY
COORDINATION AND STRATEGY.
(a) Establishment.--There is established, within the Department of
State, a Special Representative for United States International
Activities to Advance Global Health Security and Diplomacy Overseas
(referred to in this section as the ``Special Representative'').
(b) Appointment; Qualifications.--The Special Representative--
(1) shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate;
(2) shall report to the Secretary of State; and
(3) shall have--
(A) demonstrated knowledge and experience in the
fields of development and public health, epidemiology,
or medicine; and
(B) relevant diplomatic, policy, and political
expertise.
(c) Authorities.--The Special Representative is authorized--
(1) to operate internationally to carry out the purposes of
this title;
(2) to lead in developing a global pandemic prevention,
preparedness and response framework to support global pandemic
prevention, preparedness, responses and recovery efforts,
including through--
(A) diplomatic engagement and related foreign
policy efforts, such as multilateral and bilateral
arrangements, enhanced coordination of engagement with
multilateral organizations and countries, and the
mobilization of donor contributions; and
(B) support for United States citizens living
abroad, including consular support;
(3) to serve as the representative of the Secretary of the
State on the Committee on Global Health Security and Pandemic
and Biological Threats under section 202;
(4) to represent the United States on the Fund for Global
Health Security and Pandemic Prevention and Preparedness
established pursuant to section 302(a);
(5) to transfer and allocate United States foreign
assistance funding authorized to be appropriated pursuant to
subsection (f) to the relevant Federal departments and agencies
implementing the strategy required under section 202, in
coordination with the Office of Management and Budget, the
United States Agency for International Development, the
Department of Health and Human Services, and the Office of
Foreign Assistance Resources in the Department of State;
(6) to utilize detailees, on a reimbursable or
nonreimbursable basis, from the relevant Federal departments
and agencies and hire personal service contractors, who may
operate domestically and internationally, to ensure that the
Office of the Special Representative has access to the highest
quality experts available to the United States Government to
carry out the functions under this Act; and
(7) to perform such other functions as the Secretary of
State may assign.
(d) Duties.--The Special Representative shall coordinate, manage,
and oversee United States foreign policy, diplomatic efforts, and
foreign assistance funded with amounts appropriated pursuant to
subsection (f) to advance the United States Global Health Security and
Diplomacy Strategy developed pursuant to section 202, including by--
(1) developing and coordinating a global pandemic
prevention, preparedness and response framework to support
pandemic preparedness, responses and recovery efforts, and
related foreign policy measures, such as multilateral and
bilateral arrangements;
(2) enhancing engagement with multilateral organizations
and partner countries, including through the mobilization of
donor support;
(3) enhancing coordination of consular services for United
States citizens abroad in the event of a global health
emergency;
(4) ensuring effective program coordination and
implementation by the relevant Federal departments and agencies
by--
(A) formulating, issuing, and updating related
policy guidance;
(B) establishing, in consultation with the United
States Agency for International Development and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, unified
auditing, monitoring, and evaluation plans;
(C) aligning, in coordination with United States
chiefs of mission and country teams in partner
countries--
(i) the foreign assistance resources funded
with amounts appropriated pursuant to
subsection (f); and
(ii) the implementation plans required
under section 202(c)(2) with the relevant
Federal departments and agencies in a manner
that--
(I) is consistent with Executive
Order 13747 (81 Fed. Reg. 78701;
relating to Advancing the Global Health
Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe
and Secure from Infectious Disease
Threats);
(II) is consistent with the
National Security Memorandum on United
States Global Leadership to Strengthen
the International COVID-19 Response and
to Advance Global Health Security and
Biological Preparedness, issued by
President Biden on January 21, 2021;
and
(III) reflects and leverages the
unique capabilities of each such
department and agency;
(D) convening, as appropriate, an interagency
working group on pandemic prevention and preparedness,
headed by the Special Representative and including
representatives from the relevant Federal departments
and agencies, to facilitate coordination of activities
relating to pandemic prevention and preparedness in
partner countries under this Act;
(E) working with, and leveraging the expertise and
activities of, the Office of the United States Global
AIDS Coordinator, the Office of the United States
Global Malaria Coordinator, and similar or successor
entities that are implementing United States global
health assistance overseas; and
(F) avoiding duplication of effort and working to
resolve policy, program, and funding disputes among the
relevant Federal departments and agencies;
(5) leading diplomatic efforts to identify and address
current and emerging threats to global health security;
(6) ensuring, in coordination with the Secretary of Health
and Human Services and the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, effective representation
of the United States in relevant international forums,
including at the World Health Organization, the World Health
Assembly, and meetings of the Global Health Security Agenda and
of the Global Health Security Initiative;
(7) working to enhance coordination with, and transparency
among, the governments of partner countries and key
stakeholders, including the private sector;
(8) promoting greater donor and national investment in
partner countries to build more resilient health systems and
supply chains, including through representation and
participation in a multilateral, catalytic financing mechanism
for global health security and pandemic prevention and
preparedness, consistent with title III;
(9) securing bilateral and multilateral financing
commitments to advance the Global Health Security Agenda,
including through funding for the financing mechanism described
in title III; and
(10) providing regular updates to the appropriate
congressional committees regarding the fulfillment of the
duties described in this subsection.
(e) Deputy Representative.--The Special Representative should be
supported by a deputy, who--
(1) should be an employee of the United States Agency for
International Development serving in a career or noncareer
position in the Senior Executive Service or at the level of a
Deputy Assistant Administrator or higher;
(2) should have demonstrated knowledge and experience in
the fields of development and public health, epidemiology, or
medicine; and
(3) serves concurrently as the deputy and performs the
functions described in section 3(h) of Executive Order 13747
(81 Fed. Reg. 78701).
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated
$3,000,000,000, for the 5-year period beginning on October 1,
2022, to carry out the purposes of this section and title III,
which, in consultation with the appropriate congressional
committees and subject to the requirements under chapters 1 and
10 of part I and section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), may include support for--
(A) enhancing preparedness in partner countries
through implementation of the Global Health Security
Strategy developed pursuant to section 202;
(B) replenishing the Emergency Reserve Fund at the
United States Agency for International Development,
established pursuant to section 7058(c)(1) of the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2017 (division J of Public
Law 115-31) to address new or emerging infectious
disease threats, as necessary and appropriate;
(C) United States contributions to the World Bank
Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Multi-Donor
Fund; and
(D) United States contributions to a multilateral,
catalytic financing mechanism for global health
security and pandemic prevention and preparedness
described in section 302.
(2) Exception.--Section 110 of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) shall not apply to
assistance made available pursuant to this subsection.
SEC. 205. RESILIENCE.
It shall be the policy of the United States to support the growth
of healthier, more stable societies, while advancing the global health
security interests of the United States by working with key
stakeholders--
(1) in developing countries that are highly vulnerable to
the emergence, reemergence, and spread of infectious diseases
with pandemic potential, including diseases resulting from
natural and manmade disasters, human displacement, loss of
natural habitat, poor access to water, sanitation, and hygiene,
and other political, security, economic, and climatic shocks
and stresses;
(2) to develop effective tools to identify, analyze,
forecast, and mitigate the risks that make such countries
vulnerable;
(3) to better integrate short-, medium-, and long-term
recovery efforts into global health emergency response and
disaster relief; and
(4) to ensure that international assistance and financing
tools are effectively designed, objectively informed,
strategically targeted, carefully coordinated, reasonably
adapted, and rigorously monitored and evaluated in a manner
that advances the policy objectives under this section.
SEC. 206. STRENGTHENING HEALTH SYSTEMS.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States to ensure that bilateral global health assistance programs are
effectively managed and coordinated to contribute to the strengthening
of health systems in each country in which such programs are carried
out, as necessary and appropriate.
(b) Coordination.--The Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development (referred to in this section as
``USAID'') shall work with the Director of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, the Global Malaria Coordinator, and the United
States Global AIDS Coordinator and Special Representative for Global
Health Diplomacy at the Department of State to identify areas of
collaboration and coordination in countries with global health programs
and activities undertaken by USAID pursuant to the United States
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003
(Public Law 108-25) and other relevant statutes to ensure that such
activities contribute to health systems strengthening.
(c) Pilot Program.--
(1) In general.--The Administrator of USAID should identify
not fewer than 5 countries in which the United States has
significant bilateral investments in global health to develop
an integrated approach toward health systems strengthening that
takes advantage of all sources of funding for global health in
such country, with the aim of establishing a model for
coordinating health systems strengthening activities in
additional countries in the future.
(2) Assessment.--In the countries selected under paragraph
(1), USAID missions, in consultation with USAID's Office of
Health Systems Strengthening, should conduct an assessment
that--
(A) takes a comprehensive view of the constraints
in the country's health system that prevent the
achievement of desired outcomes of United States
Government-supported health programs;
(B) identifies the best opportunities for improving
health systems to achieve improved outcomes, including
obstacles to health service delivery;
(C) maps the resources of the country and other
donors in the health sector with a focus on investment
in health system strengthening; and
(D) develops and implements a new or revised 5-year
strategy for United States assistance, based on the
results of the assessment described in subparagraph
(A), to strengthen the country's health system that--
(i) provides a framework for implementing
such strategy;
(ii) identifies key areas for United States
Government investments to strengthen the health
system in alignment with other donors;
(iii) specifies the anticipated role of
health programs undertaken by each of the
relevant Federal departments and agencies
operating in the country in implementing such
strategy; and
(iv) includes clear goals, benchmarks,
outputs, desired outcomes, a means of measuring
progress and a cost analysis.
(3) Strategies to strengthen health systems.--USAID
missions in countries identified pursuant paragraph (1) should
develop a strategy to strengthen health systems based on the
assessment developed pursuant to paragraph (2) that--
(A) ensures complementarity with priorities
identified under any other action plan focused on
strengthening a country's health system, such as the
World Health Organization's Joint External Evaluation
and National Action Plans for Health Security;
(B) identifies bureaucratic barriers and
inefficiencies, including poor linkages between
government ministries and between ministries and donor
agencies and the extent of any corruption, and identify
actions to overcome such barriers;
(C) identifies potential obstacles to the
implementation of the strategy, such as issues relating
to lack of political will or poor governance of an
effective health system at all levels of the country's
public health systems, especially with respect to
governing bodies and councils at the provincial,
district, and community levels;
(D) includes proposals for mobilizing sufficient
and durable financing for health systems;
(E) identifies barriers to building and retaining
an effective frontline health workforce with key global
health security capacities, informed by the
International Health Regulations (2005), including--
(i) strengthened data collection and
analysis;
(ii) data driven decisionmaking capacity;
and
(iii) recommendations for partner country
actions to achieve a workforce that conforms
with the World Health Organization's
recommendation for at least 44.5 doctors,
nurses, and midwives for every 10,000 people;
(F) identifies deficiencies in information systems
and communication technologies that prevent linkages at
all levels of the health system delivery and medical
supply systems and promotes interoperability across
data systems with real time data, while protecting data
security;
(G) identifies weaknesses in supply chain and
procurement systems and practices, and recommends ways
to improve the efficiency, transparency, and
effectiveness of such systems and practices;
(H) identifies obstacles to health service access
and quality and improved health outcomes for women and
girls, and for the poorest and most vulnerable,
including a lack of social support and other underlying
causes, and recommendations for how to overcome such
obstacles;
(I) includes plans for integrating innovations in
health technologies, services, and systems;
(J) identifies barriers to health literacy,
community engagement, and patient empowerment, and
recommendations for overcoming such barriers;
(K) includes proposals for strengthening community
health systems and the community-based health workforce
informed by the World Health Organization guideline on
health policy and system support to optimize community
health worker programmes (2018), including the
professionalization of community health workers; and
(L) describes the role of the private sector and
nongovernmental health providers, including community
groups engaged in health promotion and mutual
assistance and other institutions engaged in health
delivery, including the extent to which the local
population utilizes such health services.
(4) Consultation.--In developing a strategy pursuant to
paragraph (3), each USAID mission should consult with a wide
variety of stakeholders, including--
(A) relevant partner government institutions;
(B) professional associations;
(C) patient groups;
(D) civil society organizations (including
international nongovernmental organizations with
relevant expertise in program implementation); and
(E) the private sector.
(d) International Efforts.--
(1) Coordination.--The Secretary of State, in coordination
with the Administrator of USAID, should work with the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, Gavi, the
Vaccine Alliance, bilateral donors, and other relevant
multilateral and international organizations and stakeholders
to develop--
(A) shared core indicators for strengthened health
systems;
(B) agreements among donors that reporting
requirements for health systems come from country
systems to reduce the burden placed on partner
countries;
(C) structures for joint assessments, plans,
auditing, and consultations; and
(D) a regularized approach to coordination on
health systems strengthening.
(e) Public Private Partnerships To Improve Health Systems
Strengthening.--
(1) Inclusion in country strategies.--The country
strategies developed under subsection (c)(3) should include a
section that--
(A) discusses the role of the private sector
(including corporate, local, and international
organizations with relevant expertise); and
(B) identifies relevant opportunities for the
private sector--
(i) to accelerate research and development
of innovative health and information
technology, and to offer training related to
its use;
(ii) to contribute to improvements in
health administration and management processes;
(iii) to improve system efficiency;
(iv) to develop training related to
clinical practice guidelines; and
(v) to help countries develop systems for
documenting outcomes and achievements related
to activities undertaken to strengthen the
health sector.
(f) Authorization for Use of Funds.--Amounts authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available to carry out section 104 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151b) may be made
available to carry out this section.
SEC. 207. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES.
(a) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.--Chapter 1 of part I of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 104(c)(1) (22 U.S.C. 2151b(c)(1)), by
inserting ``(emphasizing health systems strengthening, as
appropriate)'' after ``health services'';
(2) in section 104A (22 U.S.C. 2151b-2)--
(A) in subsection (b)(3)(D), by striking
``including health care systems, under other
international donor support'' and inserting ``including
through support for health systems strengthening, under
other donor support''; and
(B) in subsection (f)(3)(Q), by inserting ``the
Office of the United States Global AIDS Coordinator,
partner countries, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria to ensure that their actions
support the activities taken to strengthen the overall
health systems in recipient countries, and efforts by''
after ``efforts by''; and
(3) in section 104B(g)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2151b-3(g)(2)), by
inserting ``strengthening the health system of the country
and'' after ``contribute to''.
(b) United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria Act of 2003.--Section 204 of the United States Leadership
Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C.
7623) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (1)(A), by inserting ``in a manner
that is coordinated with, and contributes to, efforts
through other assistance activities being carried out
to strengthen national health systems and health
policies'' after ``systems''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in subparagraph (C), by inserting ``as
part of a strategy to improve overall health''
before the semicolon at the end;
(ii) in subparagraph (D), by striking
``and'' at the end;
(iii) in subparagraph (E), by striking the
period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
(iv) by adding at the end the following:
``(F) to contribute to efforts that build health
systems capable of preventing, detecting and responding
to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other infectious
diseases with pandemic potential.''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by striking ``receive funding to
carry out programs to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria'' and inserting ``more effectively budget for and
receive funding to carry out programs to strengthen health
systems such that countries are able to more effectively combat
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, to prevent, respond and
detect other diseases with pandemic potential,''.
SEC. 208. AUTHORIZATION FOR UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE
COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS.
(a) In General.--The United States is authorized to participate in
the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (referred to in
this section as ``CEPI'').
(b) Investors Council and Board of Directors.--
(1) Initial designation.--The President shall designate an
employee of the United States Agency for International
Development to serve on the Investors Council and, if
nominated, on the Board of Directors of CEPI, as a
representative of the United States during the period beginning
on the date of such designation and ending on September 30,
2022.
(2) Ongoing designations.--The President may designate an
employee of the relevant Federal department or agency with
fiduciary responsibility for United States contributions to
CEPI to serve on the Investors Council and, if nominated, on
the Board of Directors of CEPI, as a representative of the
United States.
(3) Qualifications.--Any employee designated pursuant to
paragraph (1) or (2) shall have demonstrated knowledge and
experience in the fields of development and public health,
epidemiology, or medicine, from the Federal department or
agency with primary fiduciary responsibility for United States
contributions pursuant to subsection (c).
(c) Consultation.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the employee designated pursuant to subsection
(b)(1) shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees
regarding--
(1) the manner and extent to which the United States plans
to participate in CEPI, including through the governance of
CEPI;
(2) any planned financial contributions from the United
States to CEPI; and
(3) how participation in CEPI is expected to support--
(A) the United States Global Health Security
Strategy required under this Act;
(B) the applicable revision of the National
Biodefense Strategy required under section 1086 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
(6 U.S.C. 104); and
(C) any other relevant programs relating to global
health security and biodefense.
(d) United States Contributions.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the President, consistent with the provisions under section
10003(a)(1) of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, should
make an immediate contribution to CEPI in the amount of
$300,000,000, to expand research and development of vaccines to
combat the spread of COVID-19 variants.
(2) Notification.--Not later than 15 days before a
contribution is made available pursuant to paragraph (1), the
President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees
of the details of the amount, purposes, and national interests
served by such contribution.
SEC. 209. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE AND BRIEFING REGARDING NOVEL
DISEASES AND PANDEMIC THREATS.
(a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(6) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives.
(b) National Intelligence Estimates.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the
following 4 years, the National Intelligence Council shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a National
Intelligence Estimate regarding the risks posed to the national
security interests of the United States by the emergence,
reemergence, and overseas transmission of pathogens with
pandemic potential.
(2) Elements.--The National Intelligence Estimate submitted
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall--
(A) identify the countries or regions most
vulnerable to the emergence or reemergence of a
pathogen with pandemic potential, including the most
likely sources and pathways of such emergence or
reemergence, whether naturally occurring, accidental,
or deliberate;
(B) assess the likelihood that a pathogen described
in subparagraph (A) will spread to the United States,
the United States Armed Forces, diplomatic or
development personnel of the United States stationed
abroad, or citizens of the United States living abroad
in a manner that could lead to an epidemic in the
United States or otherwise affect the national security
or economic prosperity of the United States;
(C) assess the preparedness of countries around the
world, particularly those identified pursuant to
subparagraph (A), to prevent, detect, and respond to
pandemic threats; and
(D) identify any scientific, capacity, or
governance gaps in the preparedness of countries
identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), including an
analysis of the capacity and performance of any country
or entity described in subparagraph (C) in complying
with biosecurity standards, as applicable.
(c) Congressional Briefings.--The National Intelligence Council
shall provide an annual briefing to the appropriate committees of
Congress regarding--
(1) the most recent National Intelligence Estimate
submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(1); and
(2) the emergence or reemergence of pathogens with pandemic
potential that could lead to an epidemic described in
subsection (b)(2)(B).
(d) Public Availability.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall make publicly available an unclassified version of each National
Intelligence Estimate submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(1).
SEC. 210. PANDEMIC EARLY WARNING NETWORK.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the heads
of the other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall work with
the World Health Organization and other key stakeholders to establish
or strengthen effective early warning systems, at the partner country,
regional, and international levels, that utilize innovative information
and analytical tools and robust review processes to track, document,
analyze, and forecast infectious disease threats with epidemic and
pandemic potential.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary
of Health and Human Services and the heads of the other relevant
Federal departments and agencies, shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees that describes United States
Government efforts and opportunities to establish or strengthen
effective early warning systems for infectious disease threats.
SEC. 211. INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that it is
essential to enhance the capacity of key stakeholders to effectively
operationalize early warning and execute multi-sectoral emergency
operations during an infectious disease outbreak, particularly in
countries and areas that deliberately withhold critical global health
data and delay access during an infectious disease outbreak in advance
of the next infectious disease outbreak with pandemic potential.
(b) Public Health Emergencies of International Concern.--The
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, should work with the World Health Organization and
like-minded member states to adopt an approach toward assessing
infectious disease threats under the International Health Regulations
(2005) for the World Health Organization to identify and transparently
communicate, on an ongoing basis, varying levels of risk leading up to
a declaration by the Director General of the World Health Organization
of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern for the duration
and in the aftermath of such declaration.
(c) Emergency Operations.--The Secretary of State, in coordination
with the United States Agency for International Development and other
relevant Federal departments and agencies and consistent with the
requirements under the International Health Regulations (2005) and the
objectives of the World Health Organization's Health Emergencies
Programme, the Global Health Security Agenda, and national actions
plans for health security, shall work, in coordination with the World
Health Organization, with partner countries and other key stakeholders
to support the establishment, strengthening, and rapid response
capacity of global health emergency operations centers, at the national
and international levels, including efforts--
(1) to collect and share data, assess risk, and
operationalize early warning;
(2) to secure, including through utilization of stand-by
arrangements and emergency funding mechanisms, the staff,
systems, and resources necessary to execute cross-sectoral
emergency operations during the 48-hour period immediately
following an infectious disease outbreak with pandemic
potential; and
(3) to organize and conduct emergency simulations.
TITLE III--FINANCING MECHANISM FOR GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AND PANDEMIC
PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS
SEC. 301. ELIGIBLE PARTNER COUNTRY DEFINED.
In this title, the term ``eligible partner country'' means a
country in which the Fund for Global Health Security and Pandemic
Prevention and Preparedness to be established under section 302 may
finance global health security and pandemic prevention and preparedness
assistance programs under this Act based on the country's
demonstrated--
(1) need, as identified through the Joint External
Evaluation process, the Global Health Security Index
classification of health systems, national action plans for
health security, and other complementary or successor
indicators of global health security and pandemic prevention
and preparedness; and
(2) commitment to transparency, including--
(A) budget and global health data transparency;
(B) complying with the International Health
Regulations (2005);
(C) investing in domestic health systems; and
(D) achieving measurable results.
SEC. 302. ESTABLISHMENT OF FUND FOR GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AND PANDEMIC
PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS.
(a) Negotiations for Establishment of Fund for Global Health
Security and Pandemic Prevention and Preparedness.--The Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the heads
of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, as necessary and
appropriate, should seek to enter into negotiations with donors,
relevant United Nations agencies, including the World Health
Organization, and other key multilateral stakeholders, to establish--
(1) a multilateral, catalytic financing mechanism for
global health security and pandemic prevention and
preparedness, which may be known as the Fund for Global Health
Security and Pandemic Prevention and Preparedness (in this
title referred to as ``the Fund''), to address the need for and
secure durable financing in accordance with the provisions of
this section; and
(2) an Advisory Board to the Fund in accordance with
section 305.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of the Fund should be--
(1) to close critical gaps in global health security and
pandemic prevention and preparedness; and
(2) to build capacity in eligible partner countries in the
areas of global health security, infectious disease control,
and pandemic prevention and preparedness, in a manner that--
(A) prioritizes capacity building and financing
availability in eligible partner countries;
(B) incentivizes countries to prioritize the use of
domestic resources for global health security and
pandemic prevention and preparedness;
(C) leverages government, nongovernment, and
private sector investments;
(D) regularly responds to and evaluates progress
based on clear metrics and benchmarks, such as the
Joint External Evaluation and the Global Health
Security Index;
(E) aligns with and complements ongoing bilateral
and multilateral efforts and financing, including
through the World Bank, the World Health Organization,
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness and
Innovation, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; and
(F) helps countries accelerate and achieve
compliance with the International Health Regulations
(2005) and the fulfillment of the Global Health
Security Agenda 2024 Framework not later than 5 years
after the date on which the Fund is established, in
coordination with the ongoing Joint External Evaluation
national action planning process.
(c) Executive Board.--
(1) In general.--The Fund should be governed by a
transparent and accountable body (referred to in this title as
the ``Executive Board''), which should be composed of not more
than 20 representatives of donor governments, foundations,
academic institutions, civil society, indigenous people, and
the private sector that meet a minimum threshold in annual
contributions and agree to uphold transparency measures.
(2) Duties.--The Executive Board should--
(A) be charged with approving strategies,
operations, and grant making authorities in order to
conduct effective fiduciary, monitoring, and evaluation
efforts, and other oversight functions;
(B) be comprised only of contributors to the Fund
at not less than the minimum threshold to be
established pursuant to paragraph (1);
(C) determine operational procedures such that the
Fund is able to effectively fulfill its mission;
(D) provide oversight and accountability for the
Fund in collaboration with the Inspector General to be
established pursuant to section 304(e)(1)(A); and
(E) develop and utilize a mechanism to obtain
formal input from partner countries relative to lessons
learned with regard to program implementation.
(3) Composition.--The Executive Board should include--
(A) representatives of the governments of founding
permanent member countries who, in addition to the
requirements under paragraph (1), qualify based upon
meeting an established initial contribution threshold,
which should be not less than 10 percent of total
initial contributions, and a demonstrated commitment to
supporting the International Health Regulations (2005);
(B) a geographically diverse group of term members
who--
(i) come from academic institutions, civil
society, including indigenous organizations,
and the private sector; and
(ii) are selected by the permanent members
on the basis of their experience and commitment
to innovation, best practices, and the
advancement of global health security
objectives;
(C) representatives of the World Health
Organization;
(D) the chair of the Global Health Security
Steering Group; and
(E) representatives from low- and middle-income
countries that are or will be implementing a national
pandemic prevention plan.
(4) Qualifications.--Individuals appointed to the Executive
Board should have demonstrated knowledge and experience across
a variety of sectors, including human and animal health,
agriculture, development, defense, finance, research, and
academia.
(5) Conflicts of interest.--
(A) Technical experts.--The Executive Board may
include independent technical experts who are not
affiliated with, or employed by, a recipient country or
organization.
(B) Multilateral bodies and institutions.--
Executive Board members appointed pursuant to paragraph
(3)(C) should recuse themselves from matters presenting
conflicts of interest, including financing decisions
relating to such bodies and institutions.
(6) United states representation.--
(A) Founding permanent member.--The Secretary of
State should seek--
(i) to establish the United States as a
founding permanent member of the Fund; and
(ii) to ensure that the United States is
represented on the Executive Board by an
officer or employee of the United States, who
shall be appointed by the President.
(B) Effective and termination dates.--
(i) Effective date.--This paragraph shall
take effect upon the date on which the
Secretary of State certifies and submits to
Congress an agreement establishing the Fund.
(ii) Termination date.--The membership
established pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall
terminate upon the date of termination of the
Fund.
(7) Removal procedures.--The Fund should establish
procedures for the removal of members of the Executive Board
who--
(A) engage in a consistent pattern of human rights
abuses;
(B) fail to uphold global health data transparency
requirements; or
(C) otherwise violate the established standards of
the Fund, including in relation to corruption.
SEC. 303. AUTHORITIES.
(a) Program Objectives.--
(1) In general.--In carrying out the purpose set forth in
section 302, the Fund, acting through the Executive Board,
should--
(A) provide grants, including challenge grants,
technical assistance, concessional lending, catalytic
investment funds, and other innovative funding
mechanisms, as appropriate--
(i) to help eligible partner countries
close critical gaps in health security, as
identified through the Joint External
Evaluation process, the Global Health Security
Index classification of health systems, and
national action plans for health security and
other complementary or successor indicators of
global health security and pandemic prevention
and preparedness; and
(ii) to support measures that enable such
countries, at the national and subnational
levels, and in partnership with civil society
and the private sector, to strengthen and
sustain resilient health systems and supply
chains with the resources, capacity, and
personnel required to prevent, detect,
mitigate, and respond to infectious disease
threats, including zoonotic spillover, before
they become pandemics; and
(B) develop recommendations for a mechanism for
assisting countries that are at high risk for zoonotic
spillover events with pandemic potential to participate
in the Global Health Security Agenda and the Joint
External Evaluations.
(2) Activities supported.--The activities to be supported
by the Fund should include efforts--
(A) to enable eligible partner countries to
formulate and implement national health security and
pandemic prevention and preparedness action plans,
advance action packages under the Global Health
Security Agenda, and adopt and uphold commitments under
the International Health Regulations (2005) and other
related international health agreements and
arrangements, as appropriate;
(B) to support health security budget planning in
eligible partner countries, including training in
public financial management and budget and health data
transparency;
(C) to strengthen the health workforce, including
hiring, training, and deploying experts to improve
frontline prevention of, and monitoring and
preparedness for, unknown, new, emerging, or reemerging
pathogens, epidemics, and pandemic threats;
(D) to improve infection prevention and control and
the protection of healthcare workers within healthcare
settings;
(E) to combat the threat of antimicrobial
resistance;
(F) to strengthen laboratory capacity and promote
biosafety and biosecurity through the provision of
material and technical assistance;
(G) to reduce the risk of bioterrorism, zoonotic
disease spillover, and accidental biological release;
(H) to build technical capacity to manage health
supply chains for commodities, equipment, and supplies,
including for personal protective equipment, testing
reagents, and other lifesaving supplies, through
effective forecasting, procurement, warehousing, and
delivery from central warehouses to points of service
in both the public and private sectors;
(I) to enable bilateral, regional, and
international partnerships and cooperation, including
through pandemic early warning systems and emergency
operations centers, to identify and address
transnational infectious disease threats exacerbated by
natural and man-made disasters, human displacement, and
zoonotic infection;
(J) to establish partnerships for the sharing of
best practices and enabling eligible countries to meet
targets and indicators under the Joint External
Evaluation process, the Global Health Security Index
classification of health systems, and national action
plans for health security relating to the prevention,
detection, and treatment of neglected tropical
diseases;
(K) to build the technical capacity of eligible
partner countries to prepare for and respond to second
order development impacts of infectious disease
outbreaks, while accounting for the differentiated
needs and vulnerabilities of marginalized populations;
(L) to develop and utilize metrics to monitor and
evaluate programmatic performance and identify best
practices, including in accordance with Joint External
Evaluation benchmarks, Global Health Security Agenda
targets, and Global Health Security Index indicators;
(M) to develop and deploy mechanisms to enhance the
transparency and accountability of global health
security and pandemic prevention and preparedness
programs and data, in compliance with the International
Health Regulations (2005), including through the
sharing of trends, risks, and lessons learned;
(N) to develop and implement simulation exercises,
produce and release after action reports, and address
related gaps;
(O) to support countries in conducting Joint
External Evaluations; and
(P) to improve surveillance capacity in partner
counties such that those countries are better able to
detect and respond to known and unknown pathogens and
zoonotic infectious diseases.
(3) Implementation of program objectives.--In carrying out
the objectives under paragraph (1), the Fund should work to
eliminate duplication and waste by upholding strict
transparency and accountability standards and coordinating its
programs and activities with key partners working to advance
global health security and pandemic prevention and
preparedness, including--
(A) governments, civil society, nongovernmental
organizations, research and academic institutions, and
private sector entities in eligible partner countries;
(B) the pandemic early warning systems and
international emergency operations centers to be
established under sections 210 and 211;
(C) the World Health Organization;
(D) the Global Health Security Agenda;
(E) the Global Health Security Initiative;
(F) the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria;
(G) the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs, UNICEF, and other relevant
funds, programs, and specialized agencies of the United
Nations;
(H) Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance;
(I) the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness
Innovations (CEPI); and
(J) the Global Polio Eradication Initiative.
(b) Priority.--In providing assistance under this section, the Fund
should give priority to low-and lower middle income countries with--
(1) low scores on the Global Health Security Index
classification of health systems;
(2) measurable gaps in global health security and pandemic
prevention and preparedness identified under Joint External
Evaluations and national action plans for health security;
(3) demonstrated political and financial commitment to
pandemic prevention and preparedness; and
(4) demonstrated commitment to upholding global health
budget and data transparency and accountability standards,
complying with the International Health Regulations (2005),
investing in domestic health systems, and achieving measurable
results.
(c) Eligible Grant Recipients.--Governments and nongovernmental
organizations should be eligible to receive grants as described in this
section.
SEC. 304. ADMINISTRATION.
(a) Appointment of Administrator.--The Executive Board should
appoint an Administrator, who should be responsible for managing the
day-to-day operations of the Fund.
(b) Authority To Accept and Solicit Contributions.--The Fund should
be authorized to solicit and accept contributions from governments, the
private sector, foundations, individuals, and nongovernmental entities.
(c) Accountability of Funds and Criteria for Programs.--As part of
the negotiations described in section 302(a), the Secretary of the
State, consistent with subsection (d), shall--
(1) take such actions as are necessary to ensure that the
Fund will have in effect adequate procedures and standards to
account for and monitor the use of funds contributed to the
Fund, including the cost of administering the Fund; and
(2) seek agreement on the criteria that should be used to
determine the programs and activities that should be assisted
by the Fund.
(d) Selection of Partner Countries, Projects, and Recipients.--The
Executive Board should establish--
(1) eligible partner country selection criteria, to include
transparent metrics to measure and assess global health
security and pandemic prevention and preparedness strengths and
vulnerabilities in countries seeking assistance;
(2) minimum standards for ensuring eligible partner country
ownership and commitment to long-term results, including
requirements for domestic budgeting, resource mobilization, and
co-investment;
(3) criteria for the selection of projects to receive
support from the Fund;
(4) standards and criteria regarding qualifications of
recipients of such support;
(5) such rules and procedures as may be necessary for cost-
effective management of the Fund; and
(6) such rules and procedures as may be necessary to ensure
transparency and accountability in the grant-making process.
(e) Additional Transparency and Accountability Requirements.--
(1) Inspector general.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall seek
to ensure that--
(i) the Fund maintains an independent
Office of the Inspector General; and
(ii) such office has the requisite
resources and capacity to regularly conduct and
publish, on a publicly accessible website,
rigorous financial, programmatic, and reporting
audits and investigations of the Fund and its
grantees.
(B) Sense of congress on corruption.--It is the
sense of Congress that--
(i) corruption within global health
programs contribute directly to the loss of
human life and cannot be tolerated; and
(ii) in making financial recoveries
relating to a corrupt act or criminal conduct
under a grant, as determined by the Inspector
General, the responsible grant recipient should
be assessed at a recovery rate of up to 150
percent of such loss.
(2) Administrative expenses.--The Secretary of State shall
seek to ensure the Fund establishes, maintains, and makes
publicly available a system to track the administrative and
management costs of the Fund on a quarterly basis.
(3) Financial tracking systems.--The Secretary of State
shall ensure that the Fund establishes, maintains, and makes
publicly available a system to track the amount of funds
disbursed to each grant recipient and sub-recipient during a
grant's fiscal cycle.
(4) Exemption from duties and taxes.--The Secretary should
ensure that the Fund adopts rules that condition grants upon
agreement by the relevant national authorities in an eligible
partner country to exempt from duties and taxes all products
financed by such grants, including procurements by any
principal or sub-recipient for the purpose of carrying out such
grants.
SEC. 305. ADVISORY BOARD.
(a) In General.--There should be an Advisory Board to the Fund.
(b) Appointments.--The members of the Advisory Board should be
composed of--
(1) a geographically diverse group of individuals that
includes representation from low- and middle-income countries;
(2) individuals with experience and leadership in the
fields of development, global health, epidemiology, medicine,
biomedical research, and social sciences; and
(3) representatives of relevant United Nations agencies,
including the World Health Organization, and nongovernmental
organizations with on-the-ground experience in implementing
global health programs in low and lower-middle income
countries.
(c) Responsibilities.--The Advisory Board should provide advice and
guidance to the Executive Board of the Fund on the development and
implementation of programs and projects to be assisted by the Fund and
on leveraging donations to the Fund.
(d) Prohibition on Payment of Compensation.--
(1) In general.--Except for travel expenses (including per
diem in lieu of subsistence), no member of the Advisory Board
should receive compensation for services performed as a member
of the Board.
(2) United states representative.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law (including an international agreement),
a representative of the United States on the Advisory Board may
not accept compensation for services performed as a member of
the Board, except that such representative may accept travel
expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, while away
from the representative's home or regular place of business in
the performance of services for the Board.
(e) Conflicts of Interest.--Members of the Advisory Board should be
required to disclose any potential conflicts of interest prior to
serving on the Advisory Board and, in the event of any conflicts of
interest, recuse themselves from such matters during their service on
the Advisory Board.
SEC. 306. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
(a) Status Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and
agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional
committees that describes the progress of international negotiations to
establish the Fund.
(b) Annual Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the establishment of the Fund, and annually thereafter for the
duration of the Fund, the Secretary of State, shall submit a
report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding
the administration of the Fund.
(2) Report elements.--The report required under paragraph
(1) shall describe--
(A) the goals of the Fund;
(B) the programs, projects, and activities
supported by the Fund;
(C) private and governmental contributions to the
Fund; and
(D) the criteria utilized to determine the programs
and activities that should be assisted by the Fund,
including baselines, targets, desired outcomes,
measurable goals, and extent to which those goals are
being achieved.
(c) GAO Report on Effectiveness.--Not later than 2 years after the
date on which the Fund is established, the Comptroller General of the
United States shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional
committees that evaluates the effectiveness of the Fund, including the
effectiveness of the programs, projects, and activities supported by
the Fund, as described in section 303(a).
SEC. 307. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.
(a) In General.--Subject to submission of the certification under
this section, the President is authorized to make available for United
States contributions to the Fund such funds as may be appropriated or
otherwise made available for such purpose.
(b) Notification.--The Secretary of State shall notify the
appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days in advance
of making a contribution to the Fund, including--
(1) the amount of the proposed contribution;
(2) the total of funds contributed by other donors; and
(3) the national interests served by United States
participation in the Fund.
(c) Limitation.--During the 5-year period beginning on the date of
the enactment of this Act, a United States contribution to the Fund may
not cause the cumulative total of United States contributions to the
Fund to exceed 33 percent of the total contributions to the Fund from
all sources.
(d) Withholdings.--
(1) Support for acts of international terrorism.--If the
Secretary of State determines that the Fund has provided
assistance to a country, the government of which the Secretary
of State has determined, for purposes of section 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism, the
United States shall withhold from its contribution to the Fund
for the next fiscal year an amount equal to the amount expended
by the Fund to the government of such country.
(2) Excessive salaries.--During the 5-year period beginning
on the date of the enactment of this Act, if the Secretary of
State determines that the salary of any individual employed by
the Fund exceeds the salary of the Vice President of the United
States for such fiscal year, the United States should withhold
from its contribution for the next fiscal year an amount equal
to the aggregate amount by which the salary of each such
individual exceeds the salary of the Vice President of the
United States.
(3) Accountability certification requirement.--The
Secretary of State may withhold not more than 20 percent of
planned United States contributions to the Fund until the
Secretary certifies to the appropriate congressional committees
that the Fund has established procedures to provide access by
the Office of Inspector General of the Department of State, as
cognizant Inspector General, the Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Inspector General
of the United States Agency for International Development, and
the Comptroller General of the United States to the Fund's
financial data and other information relevant to United States
contributions to the Fund (as determined by the Inspector
General of the Department of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of State).
SEC. 308. COMPLIANCE WITH THE FOREIGN AID TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2016.
Section 2(3) of the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act
of 2016 (Public Law 114-191; 22 U.S.C. 2394c note) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(F) the International Pandemic Preparedness and
COVID-19 Response Act of 2021.''.
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