[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2606 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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117th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2606
To require an unclassified interagency report on the political
influence operations of the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the Chinese Communist Party with respect to the United
States, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
August 4, 2021
Mr. Rubio (for himself and Ms. Cortez Masto) introduced the following
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require an unclassified interagency report on the political
influence operations of the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the Chinese Communist Party with respect to the United
States, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Countering the Chinese Government
and Communist Party's Political Influence Operations Act''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(D) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions of the Senate;
(E) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
(F) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate;
(G) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate;
(H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives;
(I) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives;
(J) the Committee on Education and Labor of the
House of Representatives;
(K) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives;
(L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives;
(M) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives; and
(N) the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Political influence operations.--The term ``political
influence operations'' means the coordinated and often
concealed application of disinformation, press manipulation,
economic coercion, targeted investments, corruption, or
academic censorship, which are often intended--
(A) to coerce and corrupt United States interests,
values, institutions, or individuals; and
(B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or
outcomes in the United States that support the
interests of the Government of the People's Republic of
China or the Chinese Communist Party.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Government of the People's Republic of China and
the Chinese Communist Party employ a wide range of political,
informational, and economic measures to influence, coerce,
intimidate, and undermine the United States interests and the
interests of United States partners and allies.
(2) The December 2017 National Security Strategy of the
United States of America states, ``Although the United States
seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using
economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and
implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its
political and security agenda.''
(3) Given the economic strength of the People's Republic of
China and the growing apparatus being used to spread its
influence globally, efforts to promote its authoritarian ideal
pose significant and consequential long-term challenges to
United States interests and values.
(4) The Government of the People's Republic of China and
the Chinese Communist Party use overt and covert means to
target the political and economic elite, the media and public
opinion, civil society and academia, and members of the Chinese
diaspora.
(5) The Government of the People's Republic of China and
the Chinese Communist Party employ an array of government
entities, friendship and exchange organizations, private
entities and businesspeople, and government-funded foundations,
think tanks, educational and other projects to carry out
political influence operations, which is often referred to as
``United Front work.''
(6) According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, ``China uses what it calls `United Front'
work to co-opt and neutralize sources of potential opposition
to the policies and authority of its ruling Chinese Communist
Party. . . To carry out its influence activities abroad, the
[United Front Work Department] directs `overseas Chinese work,'
which seeks to co-opt ethnic Chinese individuals and
communities living outside China, while a number of other key
affiliated organizations guided by China's broader United Front
strategy conduct influence operations targeting foreign actors
and states.''
(7) These political influence operations violate national
sovereignty, and as such, are fundamentally different from
traditional efforts by countries to shape international policy
debates and improve their public image through public diplomacy
and strategic communications campaigns.
(8) The aims of the political influence operations of the
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese
Communist Party are--
(A) to protect the political security of the
Chinese Communist Party, or its ability to exercise an
absolute monopoly on political power within the
People's Republic of China and to increasingly to
dominate international politics regarding issues that
the Chinese Communist Party deems important;
(B) to domestically and globally promote the idea
that the Chinese Communist Party's political and
economic model is superior to that of democracies;
(C) to spread its governance model to other
countries and to undermine democracy and free-market
economies;
(D) to promote the interests of the regime
globally;
(E) to weaken American alliances and partnerships
by creating new divisions between them, or by
exacerbating existing ones; and
(F) to foment domestic social and political
divisions, and to exacerbate existing ones, within
democratic countries, including by undermining popular
confidence in democracy and its essential institutions.
(9) The political influence operations of the Government of
the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party
take advantage of the open and democratic nature of the United
States, including--
(A) constitutional protections for free speech and
a free press; and
(B) the desire of some companies or institutions to
attract Chinese investment, gain access to Chinese
markets, or attain greater global influence.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the political influence operations of the Government of
the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party
are not ``soft power'' intended to persuade, but ``sharp
power'' intended--
(A) to penetrate or corrupt democratic countries
and undermine democratic institutions and freedoms;
(B) to foster attitudes, behavior, laws, and
policies favorable to the Government of the People's
Republic of China's interest through disinformation,
coercion, corruption, and other means;
(C) to widen the scope of Chinese authoritarian
influence around the world, including--
(i) to suppress political opposition to the
Chinese Communist Party; and
(ii) to violate the internationally
recognized human and civil rights of both
Chinese and foreign citizens living in
countries around the world; and
(D) to undermine the strength of American alliances
around the world; and
(2) the people of the United States need reliable and
current information--
(A) to identify the key institutions, individuals,
entities, and ministries that carry out such
operations; and
(B) to distinguish between malign political
influence operations intended to undermine core
American freedoms and democratic institutions, as
opposed to legitimate cultural, educational, business,
and people-to-people exchanges that may benefit the
United States and China.
(c) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to clearly differentiate between the Chinese people and
culture and the Government of the People's Republic of China
and the Chinese Communist Party in official statements, media
messaging, and policy;
(2) to clearly differentiate between legal, internationally
accepted public diplomacy and strategic communications
campaigns and illicit activities to undermine democratic
institutions or freedoms;
(3) to protect United States citizens and legal residents
from malign or coercive political influence operations;
(4) to enhance cooperation and coordination with the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Taiwan,
Singapore, and the members of the European Union, whose
governments and institutions have faced acute pressure from the
political influence operations of the Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party, and
with other allies throughout the world;
(5) to create strategies to ensure that countries in
Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere
are aware of the People's Republic of China's ``sharp power''
tactics, including the Chinese Communist Party's party-to-party
training program, which is designed to instill admiration and
emulation of Beijing's governance model and weaken democracy in
these regions, and provide needed capacity to counter them
effectively;
(6) to implement more advanced transparency requirements
concerning collaboration with Chinese actors for media
agencies, universities, think tanks, and government officials;
(7) to use various forums to raise awareness about--
(A) the goals and methods of the political
influence operations of the Government of the People's
Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party; and
(B) common patterns and approaches used by Chinese
intelligence agencies or related actors;
(8) to require greater transparency for Confucius
Institutes, think tanks, academic programs, and nongovernmental
organizations funded primarily by the Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party, or
by individuals or public or private organizations with a
demonstrable affiliation with the Government of the People's
Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are
operating in the United States to register through the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) or a
comparable mechanism;
(9) to seek ways to increase Chinese language proficiency
among mid-career professionals that do not rely on funding
linked to the Government of the People's Republic of China;
(10) to ensure that existing tools are sufficiently
screening for the risk of Chinese influence operations; and
(11) to create more flexible tools, as needed, with the
goals of--
(A) screening investments from the Government of
the People's Republic of China or sources backed by
such government to protect against the takeover of
United States companies by Chinese state-owned or
state-driven entities; and
(B) protecting institutions or business sectors
critically important to United States national security
and the viability of democratic institutions.
SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ``SHARP POWER'' POLITICAL INFLUENCE
OPERATIONS AND TO PROTECT UNITED STATES CITIZENS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in coordination with all relevant Federal agencies,
shall develop a long-term strategy--
(1) to carry out the policy set forth in section 3(c);
(2) to effectively counter the ``sharp power'' political
influence operations of the Chinese Communist Party globally
and in the United States;
(3) to ensure that United States citizens, particularly
Chinese Americans and members of the Chinese, Uyghur,
Mongolian, Korean, Taiwanese, and Tibetan diaspora who are
often the victims and primary targets of malign political
influence operations, are protected;
(4) to ensure that--
(A) the United States Government strategy to
protect the communities described in paragraph (3) is
clearly communicated by relevant Federal officials; and
(B) secure outlets are created for reporting on
intimidation and surveillance;
(5) to ensure that Chinese nationals who are legally
studying, living, or working temporarily in the United States
know that intimidation or surveillance by the Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party is
an unacceptable invasion of their rights while they reside in
the United States;
(6) to provide secure outlets for reporting on intimidation
and surveillance; and
(7) to identify new tools or authorities necessary to
implement this strategy.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State,
or an appropriate high-ranking official, shall--
(1) submit an unclassified report, which may include a
classified annex, containing the strategy required under
subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional committees; or
(2) describe the strategy required under subsection (a)
through unclassified testimony before the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate or the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives.
SEC. 5. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF CHINA AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Because it is important for United States
policymakers and the American people to be informed about the influence
operations described in section 3, not later than 270 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence, and in consultation with the heads of relevant Federal
departments and agencies, shall submit an unclassified report, which
may include a classified annex, to the appropriate congressional
committees that describes the political influence operations of the
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist
Party affecting the United States and select allies and partners,
including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan,
and Japan, including efforts--
(1) to exert influence over United States governmental or
nongovernmental institutions or individuals, or government
officials among United States allies and partners;
(2) to coerce or threaten United States citizens or legal
permanent residents or their families and associates living in
China or elsewhere;
(3) to undermine democratic institutions and the freedoms
of speech, expression, the press, association, assembly,
religion, or academic thought;
(4) to otherwise suppress information in public fora, in
the United States and abroad; or
(5) to develop or obtain property, facilities,
infrastructure, business entities, or other assets for use in
facilitating the activities described in paragraphs (1) through
(4).
(b) Contents.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
include recommendations for the President and Congress relating to--
(1) the need for additional resources or authorities to
counter political influence operations in the United States
directed by the Government of the People's Republic of China
and the Chinese Communist Party, including operations carried
out in concert with allies;
(2) whether a permanent office to monitor and respond to
political influence operations of the Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party
should be established within the Department of State or within
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and
(3) whether regular public reports on the political
influence operations of the Government of the People's Republic
of China and the Chinese Communist Party are needed to inform
Congress and the American people of the scale and scope of such
operations.
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