[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3463 Placed on Calendar Senate (PCS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 243
117th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3463
To impose sanctions and other measures in response to the failure of
the Government of the People's Republic of China to allow an
investigation into the origins of COVID-19 at suspect laboratories in
Wuhan.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
January 10, 2022
Mr. Rubio (for himself, Mr. Scott of South Carolina, Mr. Cornyn, Mr.
Scott of Florida, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Marshall, Mr. Daines, Mr. Grassley,
Mr. Lankford, Mr. Sasse, Mr. Tuberville, Mrs. Hyde-Smith, Mr. Braun,
Mrs. Blackburn, Mr. Hagerty, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Tillis, Ms. Lummis, Mr.
Hoeven, and Mr. Wicker) introduced the following bill; which was read
the first time
January 18, 2022
Read the second time and placed on the calendar
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To impose sanctions and other measures in response to the failure of
the Government of the People's Republic of China to allow an
investigation into the origins of COVID-19 at suspect laboratories in
Wuhan.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Coronavirus Origin Validation,
Investigation, and Determination Act of 2022'' or the ``COVID Act of
2022''.
SEC. 2. MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO ALLOW AN INVESTIGATION OF
SUSPECT LABORATORIES IN WUHAN.
(a) In General.--If, by not later than the date that is 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President is unable to
certify that the Government of the People's Republic of China has
allowed a transparent international forensic investigation of suspect
laboratories in Wuhan to commence, including of the Wuhan Institute of
Virology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (in this section referred
to as ``CAS''), the President shall--
(1) impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with
respect to--
(A) individuals who hold positions of leadership in
the state-run CAS, including its affiliated institutes
and laboratories, local branches, and universities; and
(B) individuals who--
(i) are officials of the Chinese Communist
Party, the People's Liberation Army, or the
State Council of the People's Republic of
China, including its subordinate agencies, such
as the Ministry of Science and Technology, the
National Health Commission, the Chinese Center
for Disease Control and Prevention, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of
Emergency Management, and the Ministry of
Public Security; and
(ii) were involved in concealing the
initial outbreak of COVID-19 in the People's
Republic of China from the international
community, restricting the release of
information related to the outbreak,
understating the severity of the outbreak, or
obstructing an international investigation into
the origin of the outbreak;
(2) prohibit Federal funding for any joint research or
other collaborative projects between United States-based
researchers and CAS researchers across all academic fields,
including those employed by the affiliated institutes and
laboratories of CAS, its local branches or universities, or the
science and technology enterprises based in the People's
Republic of China that were created by CAS or founded with CAS
investment; and
(3) prohibit United States-based researchers and
institutions that receive Federal funding from engaging in
collaborative projects involving gain-of-function research of
concern on viruses with individuals or institutions based in
the People's Republic of China.
(b) Termination.--The requirements of subsection (a) shall
terminate on the date on which the Government of the People's Republic
of China allows the transparent international forensic investigation
described in that subsection to be conducted and concluded without--
(1) imposition of restrictions on the scope or subject
matter of the investigation; or
(2) limitations on the access of investigators to physical
sites, persons of interest, information on laboratory biosafety
incidents, or relevant molecular, genetic, epidemiological,
serological, and virological data.
(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions to be imposed under
subsection (a)(1) are the following:
(1) Asset blocking.--
(A) In general.--The President shall exercise all
of the powers granted to the President under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and
prohibit all transactions in property and interests in
property described in subparagraph (B) if such property
and interests in property are in the United States,
come within the United States, or are or come within
the possession or control of a United States person.
(B) Property and interests in property described.--
The property and interests in property described in
this subparagraph are property or interests in property
of--
(i) an individual described in subsection
(a)(1); or
(ii) any family member or associate acting
for or on behalf of an individual described in
subsection (a)(1) and to whom that individual
transfers such property or interests in
property after the date on which the President
designates the individual for the imposition of
sanctions under that subsection.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Visas, admission, or parole.--An alien
described in subsection (a)(1) is--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
documentation to enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
or paroled into the United States or to receive
any other benefit under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--An alien described in
subsection (a)(1) is subject to revocation of
any visa or other entry documentation
regardless of when the visa or other entry
documentation is or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect.--A revocation under
clause (i) shall--
(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) automatically cancel any other
valid visa or entry documentation that
is in the alien's possession.
(d) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise the
authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and
205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this
section.
(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (c)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued
to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties
set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to
the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of that section.
(e) Exceptions.--
(1) Exception for intelligence activities.--Sanctions under
this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the
reporting requirements under title V of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized
intelligence activities of the United States.
(2) Exception to comply with international obligations and
for law enforcement activities.--Sanctions under subsection
(c)(2) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or
paroling the alien into the United States is necessary--
(A) to permit the United States to comply with the
Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and
entered into force November 21, 1947, between the
United Nations and the United States, or other
applicable international obligations; or
(B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity
in the United States.
(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--The authorities and requirements
to impose sanctions authorized under this section shall
not include the authority or a requirement to impose
sanctions on the importation of goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term
``good'' means any article, natural or manmade
substance, material, supply, or manufactured product,
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
technical data.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien.--The terms ``admission'',
``admitted'', and ``alien'' have the meanings given those terms
in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101).
(2) Gain-of-function research of concern.--The term ``gain-
of-function research of concern'' means, with respect to the
study of viruses--
(A) the use of genetic engineering or nucleic acid
synthesis methods reasonably anticipated to increase a
pathogen's transmissibility, or pathogenicity to
humans, or to alter a pathogen's host tropism to
include humans;
(B) the use of serial passage methods in a
laboratory culture or in laboratory animals reasonably
anticipated to increase a pathogen's transmissibility,
or pathogenicity to humans, or to alter a pathogen's
host tropism to include humans; or
(C) any research conducted in a laboratory setting
less than Biosafety Level Three that involves pathogens
or potential pathogens known to be, or that can be
reasonably anticipated to be, infectious to humans
through the inhalation route of exposure, and known to
cause, or that can be reasonably anticipated to cause,
serious to fatal disease.
(3) Transparent international forensic investigation.--The
term ``transparent international forensic investigation'', with
respect to investigating the origin of SARS-CoV-2, means an
inquiry that is objective, data-driven, inclusive of broad
expertise, subject to independent oversight, and properly
managed to exclude individuals with conflicts of interest and
under which the following takes place:
(A) Relevant research funding agencies, funding
contractors, laboratories, and hospitals open their
records to examination by the investigative team and
grant the investigative team unfettered access to any
and all facilities, personnel, and other sites of
interest, and to any and all forms of epidemiological
or virological data of interest, including serological
records pertaining to the earliest confirmed or
suspected cases of COVID-19, or cases of similar
illnesses that may have been misdiagnosed, which
appeared in and around Wuhan in the fall and winter of
2019. Investigators document the veracity and source of
the data upon which their analysis is based in a manner
that allows independent experts to reproduce their
analysis and validate any conclusions they may draw.
(B) The international team is allowed to perform a
full forensic investigation of the Wuhan Institute of
Virology, the Wuhan Center for Disease Prevention and
Control, and the Wuhan Institute of Biological
Products, and all other laboratories in Wuhan that the
team might identify as warranting examination. The team
is allowed to review the biosafety level under which
bat coronavirus research was conducted, and to
interview any and all personnel currently or previously
employed at those laboratories, or related experts who
may have information pertinent to the investigation.
All laboratory logs and notebooks kept by Shi Zhengli
and other researchers at the Wuhan Institute of
Virology who have conducted gain-of-function
experiments between 2007 and the date of the enactment
of this Act, as well as their published and unpublished
work in Chinese and English, are presented in a full
and unaltered condition for examination by the team.
The team is given unlimited access to the full range of
virus cultures, isolates, genetic sequences, databases,
and patient specimens stored at these facilities as
well as all chimeric synthetic viruses grown in vitro
by cell culture passaging or engineered by genomic
editing between 2007 and the date of the enactment of
this Act. Such access must include the opportunity to
examine the Wuhan Institute of Virology's database of
approximately 22,000 samples and virus sequences,
including 15,000 taken from bats, which was previously
available to the public but taken offline in September
2019. The team is further allowed to examine in full
all training procedures in effect at the laboratory
prior to the pandemic, including those pertaining to
record-keeping and safety procedures and strategies to
prevent the accidental escape of potential pathogens.
(C) The investigative team analyzes in detail all
research related to the 293 bat coronaviruses
reportedly identified by Shi Zhengli and her team at
the Wuhan Institute of Virology between 2012 and 2015,
particularly RaTG13, RaBtCoV/4991, and all other
viruses from the abandoned copper mine in Mojiang Hani
Autonomous County in Yunnan province, where Wuhan
Institute of Virology researchers are known to have
collected bat virus specimens, including specimens of
RaTG13, during the decade preceding the date of the
enactment of this Act, including all virus isolates and
cultures. The Wuhan Institute of Virology discloses the
content of all classified and unpublished studies that
the Institute reportedly conducted with the People's
Liberation Army if such studies involved gain-of-
function research. The team is able to test all
laboratory personnel for antibodies and other
serological indicators of past infection of COVID-19.
The team is given access to all other records kept by
the Wuhan Institute of Virology, including security
logs, surveillance video footage, audio recordings, and
electronic logs of employees entering and leaving the
facility. The investigative team is permitted to take
samples and conduct testing of the physical facilities
where gain-of-function research has been conducted,
including, if necessary, sewer samples. Unfettered
access is also granted to the copper mine in Mojiang
Hani Autonomous County in Yunnan province referred to
in the first sentence of this subparagraph.
(D) The international team is comprised of members
chosen by the governments of the United States, Canada,
the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany,
Australia, Japan, and India. The team includes
molecular biologists, virologists, epidemiologists, and
experts in biosafety and biosecurity. Individuals who
have previously ruled out the possibility of either
zoonotic transmission or a laboratory leak are
disqualified from participation. The Government of the
People's Republic of China may appoint Chinese experts
to accompany and advise the team as it conducts its
work in the People's Republic of China, but the
Government of the People's Republic of China has no
authority to dictate the selection of team members and
cannot obstruct the participation of any individual
selected by the individual's government for the team.
The central, provincial, and municipal authorities of
the People's Republic of China facilitate the work of
the investigative team and refrain from imposing any
restrictions on the scope, scale, and duration of the
investigation.
(4) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) an individual who is a United States citizen or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or any jurisdiction within the United
States, including a foreign branch of such an entity;
or
(C) any person in the United States.
Calendar No. 243
117th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3463
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To impose sanctions and other measures in response to the failure of
the Government of the People's Republic of China to allow an
investigation into the origins of COVID-19 at suspect laboratories in
Wuhan.
_______________________________________________________________________
January 18, 2022
Read the second time and placed on the calendar