[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4112 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4112
To address issues involving the economic statecraft of the United
States, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
April 28, 2022
Mr. Menendez introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To address issues involving the economic statecraft of the United
States, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Economic
Statecraft for the Twenty-First Century Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Findings.
TITLE I--CONFRONT
Subtitle A--Economic Coercion
Sec. 101. Mandatory disclosure of Chinese debt in aid-related
applications.
Sec. 102. Coordination with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development on Chinese engagement.
Sec. 103. Countering Chinese Economic Coercion Task Force.
Sec. 104. Strategy to counter Chinese economic coercion on countries
and entities that support Taiwan.
Subtitle B--Investment Security
Sec. 111. Provision of assistance to allies and partners with respect
to reviewing foreign investment.
Subtitle C--Anti-competition
Sec. 121. Improvement of anti-counterfeiting measures.
Sec. 122. Intellectual property violators list.
Sec. 123. Report on subsidies provided by Government of People's
Republic of China.
Subtitle D--Supply Chains
Sec. 131. Definitions.
Sec. 132. Department of State diplomatic strategy on semiconductor
manufacturing equipment export controls.
Sec. 133. Prohibition on commercial export of semiconductor
manufacturing equipment to People's
Republic of China.
Sec. 134. Annual semiconductor industry monitoring report on the
People's Republic of China.
Sec. 135. Supply chain coordination.
Sec. 136. Statement of policy on international cooperation to secure
critical mineral supply chains.
Sec. 137. Prioritization of efforts and assistance to secure critical
mineral supply chains.
Sec. 138. Leveraging international support.
TITLE II--COMPETE
Subtitle A--Infrastructure
Sec. 201. Sense of Congress on the Build Back Better World initiative.
Sec. 202. Office of Strategic Investments in United States
International Development Finance
Corporation.
Sec. 203. Prohibition on transfer of sovereign loan guarantees to
United States International Development
Finance Corporation.
Sec. 204. Strategy for promoting and strengthening nearshoring.
Sec. 205. Sense of Congress on the Blue Dot Initiative.
Sec. 206. Sense of Congress on the Three Seas Initiative.
Subtitle B--Energy
Sec. 211. Sense of Congress regarding United States engagement at the
World Economic Forum.
Sec. 212. Clean energy efforts of the United States International
Development Finance Corporation.
Sec. 213. Consistency in United States policy on development finance
and climate change.
Sec. 214. Energy diplomacy and security within the Department of State.
Sec. 215. United States and European Union cooperation on climate
finance for developing countries.
Subtitle C--Technology
Sec. 221. United States leadership and representation in standards-
setting bodies.
Sec. 222. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the G20 Digital Economy
Working Group.
Sec. 223. Statement of policy on artificial intelligence and the global
economy.
Sec. 224. Diplomatic strategy for artificial intelligence.
Sec. 225. International collaboration on research and development.
Subtitle D--International Financial Institutions and Multilateral
Economic Organizations
Sec. 231. Statement of policy on United States leadership at
international financial institutions.
Sec. 232. Loans to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust of the
International Monetary Fund.
Sec. 233. Clearing World Bank Group arrears.
Sec. 234. 10th general capital increase for the Inter-American
Development Bank.
Sec. 235. Participation of Taiwan in Inter-American Development Bank.
Sec. 236. Increased United States cooperation with Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation.
Subtitle E--Resilience
Sec. 241. Sense of Congress regarding United States leadership in
recovery and resiliency.
Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding improving resilience capacities
through foreign assistance.
Sec. 243. Office of Economic Resiliency.
Sec. 244. Establishment of Resilience Trust Fund at the World Bank.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) As of 2020, the United States accounts for nearly 25
percent of the world's gross domestic product, amounting to
approximately $20,953,000,000,000. The United States has major
business dealings on almost every continent with involvement in
multilateral financial systems, bilateral and multilateral
economic partnerships, and a robust economy that held nearly 30
percent of the world's share of research and development in
2019.
(2) Since World War II, the United States has been a leader
in the global economy, as demonstrated by its membership in
economic-focused multilateral organizations such as the World
Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the International
Labour Organization, and the Group of Twenty (G20). The United
States has leveraged its economic advantage to ensure its
national security in countless instances, such as through the
investment of billions of dollars used to rebuild Europe and
restore world order following World War II.
(3) The robust economy of the United States is directly
tied to its ability to engage economically, diplomatically, and
militarily with allies and adversaries. In a 2019 Pew Research
study, of the countries surveyed, 46 percent of Asia-Pacific
countries, 37 percent of European countries, and 47 percent of
Middle Eastern countries view the United States as the world's
leading economic power. African countries that had an overall
more favorable impression of the People's Republic of China
have consequently been engaging in greater economic
partnerships with the People's Republic of China, amounting to
approximately $2,960,000,000 in 2020.
(4) According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, about 70 percent of global economic activity
occurs through global value chains. Driven by a greater
outsourcing of service industry work and greater financial and
business service linkages with Europe, the United States has
increased its engagement with global value chains in both the
manufacturing and services industries. Although the United
States has attempted to encourage value-based practices in
international business through business advisories, public
diplomacy, and other economic tools, countries like the
People's Republic of China do not operate with such value-
oriented business operations.
(5) In 2020, exports made up 10 percent of the United
States economy, and the United States utilizes export controls
to safeguard its economic edge and national security interests.
As has been seen in the case of export controls imposed through
the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and
Security of the Department of Commerce to restrict dual-use
trade with the People's Republic of China, such controls
curtail potential militant activity by the People's Liberation
Army in the South China Sea, human rights abuses, and the use
of semiconductor technology for military purposes. The expanded
usage of export controls can continue to benefit United States
economic security.
(6) International financial institutions such as the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and the African Development Bank have key
roles in encouraging regional cooperation, sustaining economic
development, reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, and
reducing global poverty. Those values are in line with United
States international development practices, a commonality that
can be leveraged for greater coordinated cooperation in the
future, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic,
including as follows:
(A) To meet the needs of developing countries that
need to repay debt amounting to approximately
$860,000,000,000 in 2020, United States cooperation
with key multilateral organizations in the smooth
rollout of the Debt Service Suspension Initiative
Refresher can ensure global economic recovery from the
pandemic while mitigating the risk of loan default.
(B) The rise in debt transparency has become a
critical issue as more countries become unaware of the
full extent of their sovereign debt as a result of
predatory lending and poor debt management. The
continued support by the United States of international
financial institutions can facilitate reforms that go
beyond the 2003 proposal of the International Monetary
Fund for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism.
(7) Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has
had devastating effects on global supply chains and economic
productivity, the economy of the People's Republic of China
continues to grow. As a result, global investors are looking
more toward the People's Republic of China, instead of the
United States, for potential economic activity and are willing
to turn a blind eye to the People's Republic of China's human
rights violations, including its use of forced labor in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
(8) The United States, as a major economic leader, has a
role in preventing predatory economic practices, such as loans
to developing countries from the Government of the People's
Republic of China through the Belt and Road Initiative. As the
People's Republic of China has come to fill the role of an
economic leader to many developing countries with its lending,
the United States stands to lose economically from its trading
partners being stuck in billion dollar debt traps. Furthermore,
such predatory practices have come to the United States with
the increase of foreign investment in the United States from
$4,400,000,000,000 to $4,630,000,000,000 over the course of
2020.
TITLE I--CONFRONT
Subtitle A--Economic Coercion
SEC. 101. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF CHINESE DEBT IN AID-RELATED
APPLICATIONS.
(a) In General.--The United States International Development
Finance Corporation, the United States Agency for International
Development, the Trade and Development Agency, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation, and other independent and executive branch agencies
responsible for disbursing foreign aid and development assistance shall
require all applicants for United States aid to disclose any debt the
applicant may owe to any entity known to be owned or controlled by the
Government of the People's Republic of China, including loan amounts,
duration, rates, and contractual provisions.
(b) Limitation.--United States foreign aid and development
assistance may not be used to amortize any loan principal owed to any
entity known to be owned or controlled by the Government of the
People's Republic of China.
SEC. 102. COORDINATION WITH THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT ON CHINESE ENGAGEMENT.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall coordinate with
willing Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member
countries--
(1) to study the effects of the People's Republic of
China's Belt and Road Initiative and other predatory economic
practices;
(2) to create a shared set of facts and promote more
transparency with respect to such practices, including a joint
stocktaking of the People's Republic of China's distortive
economic practices, such as subsidies and other forms of
market-distorting state intervention in the People's Republic
of China's economy, and the negative global spillovers from
such practices;
(3) to establish a solid definitional foundation for future
dialogues on the People's Republic of China's unfair economic
practices and a clear understanding of common concerns and
priorities among member countries; and
(4) to issue joint informational reports that contain the
results of such data gathering efforts.
SEC. 103. COUNTERING CHINESE ECONOMIC COERCION TASK FORCE.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency
task force, which shall be known as the ``Countering Economic Coercion
Task Force'' (referred to in this section as the ``Task Force'').
(b) Duties.--
(1) In general.--The Task Force shall--
(A) oversee the development and implementation of
an integrated United States Government strategy to
respond to coercive economic practices of the People's
Republic of China that are abusive, arbitrary,
pretextual, and contrary to international rules, which
shall include--
(i) systematically monitoring and
evaluating--
(I) the costs of such practices on
United States businesses and overall
United States economic performance;
(II) instances in which such
practices taken against a non-Chinese
entity have benefitted United States
parties; and
(III) the impacts such practices
have had on United States national
interests;
(ii) facilitating coordination among
Federal departments and agencies when
responding to such practices; and
(iii) proactively deterring such economic
coercion;
(B) consult with United States allies and partners
regarding--
(i) the feasibility and desirability of
collectively identifying, assessing, and
responding to the People's Republic of China's
coercive economic practices;
(ii) actions that could be taken to expand
international coordination; and
(iii) establishing a consistent, coherent,
and collective international response to such
coercive practices, including a long-term
deterrence to such practices;
(C) effectively engage the United States private
sector, particularly sectors, groups, or other entities
that are susceptible to such coercive economic
practices, to identify their concerns regarding such
practices; and
(D) develop and implement a process for regularly
sharing relevant information, including classified
information, to the extent appropriate and practicable,
on such coercive economic practices with United States
allies, partners, and the private sector.
(2) Consultation.--In carrying out its duties under this
subsection, the Task Force should regularly consult, to the
extent necessary and appropriate, with--
(A) relevant stakeholders in the private sector;
(B) Federal departments and agencies that are not
represented on the Task Force; and
(C) United States allies and partners.
(c) Membership.--The President shall--
(1) appoint the Chair of the Task Force from among the
staff of the National Security Council;
(2) appoint the Vice Chair of the Task Force from among the
staff of the National Economic Council; and
(3) direct the head of each of the following Federal
departments and agencies to appoint personnel, at the level of
Assistant Secretary or higher, to participate in the Task
Force:
(A) The Department of State.
(B) The Department of Commerce.
(C) The Department of the Treasury.
(D) The Department of Justice.
(E) The Office of the United States Trade
Representative.
(F) The Department of Agriculture.
(G) The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and other appropriate elements of the
intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
(H) The Securities and Exchange Commission.
(I) The United States International Development
Finance Corporation.
(J) Any other department or agency designated by
the President.
(d) Reports.--
(1) Initial report.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit a
report to the appropriate congressional committees that
includes--
(A) a comprehensive review of the array of economic
tools the Government of the People's Republic of China
employs or could employ to coerce other governments,
non-Chinese companies (including United States
companies), and multilateral institutions and
organizations, including the Government of the People's
Republic of China's continued efforts to codify
informal practices into its domestic law;
(B) the strategy developed pursuant to subsection
(b)(1)(A);
(C) an interagency definition of the People's
Republic of China's coercive economic practices that
captures--
(i) the use of informal or extralegal
coercive economic practices; and
(ii) the illegitimate use of formal
economic tools;
(D) a comprehensive review of the array of economic
and diplomatic tools that the United States Government
employs or could employ to respond to economic coercion
against the United States and United States allies and
partners;
(E) a list of unilateral or multilateral--
(i) proactive measures to defend or deter
against the People's Republic of China's
coercive economic practices; and
(ii) actions taken in response to the
Government of the People's Republic of China's
general use of coercive economic practices;
(F) an assessment of areas in which United States
allies and partners are vulnerable to the People's
Republic of China's coercive economic practices; and
(G) a description of the gaps in existing resources
or capabilities of Federal departments and agencies--
(i) to respond effectively to the People's
Republic of China's coercive economic practices
directed at United States entities; and
(ii) to assist United States allies and
partners in their responses to such practices.
(2) Interim reports.--
(A) First interim report.--Not later than 1 year
after the date on which the report is submitted
pursuant to paragraph (1), the Task Force shall submit
a report to the appropriate congressional committees
that includes--
(i) updates to the information required
under subparagraphs (A) through (G) of
paragraph (1); and
(ii) a description of the activities
conducted by the Task Force to implement the
strategy required under subsection (b)(1)(A).
(B) Second interim report.--Not later than 1 year
after the date on which the report is submitted
pursuant to subparagraph (A), the Task Force shall
submit a report to the appropriate congressional
committees that includes an update to the elements
required under the previously submitted report.
(3) Final report.--Not later than 30 days after the date on
which the report required under paragraph (2)(B) is submitted
to the appropriate congressional committees, the Task Force
shall submit a final report to the appropriate congressional
committees and make such report available to the public on the
website of the Executive Office of the President. The final
report shall include--
(A) an analysis of the Government of the People's
Republic of China's coercive economic practices,
including the cost of such practices to United States
businesses;
(B) a description of areas of particular
vulnerability for United States businesses and the
businesses of United States partners and allies;
(C) recommendations on the best means for
continuing the effort to counter such coercive
practices; and
(D) a list of the cases that have been made public
pursuant to subsection (e).
(4) Form.--
(A) Initial and interim reports.--The reports
required under paragraphs (1), (2)(A), and (2)(B) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
classified annexes.
(B) Final report.--The report required under
paragraph (3) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may include a classified annex.
(e) Publicly Available List.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter until
its termination pursuant to subsection (f), the Task Force, to
the extent practicable, shall make available to the public on
the website of the Executive Office of the President a list of
instances during the most recent 6-month period that the
Government of the People's Republic of China has directed
coercive economic practices against a non-Chinese entity.
(2) Updates.--The list required under paragraph (1)--
(A) shall be updated every 180 days; and
(B) shall be managed by the Secretary of State
after the Task Force is terminated pursuant to
subsection (f).
(f) Sunset.--
(1) In general.--The Task Force shall be terminated at the
end of the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the
final report required under subsection (d)(3) is submitted to
the appropriate congressional committees and made publicly
available.
(2) Additional actions.--During the 60-day period referred
to in paragraph (1), the Task Force may conclude its
activities, including providing testimony to Congress
concerning its final report.
SEC. 104. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE ECONOMIC COERCION ON COUNTRIES
AND ENTITIES THAT SUPPORT TAIWAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for the following
5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a description
of the strategy being used by the Department of State to respond to the
Government of the People's Republic of China's increased economic
coercion against countries who have strengthened their ties with, or
support for, Taiwan.
(b) Assistance for Lithuania.--The Secretary of State shall provide
assistance to Lithuania to support its supply chain resilience efforts.
Subtitle B--Investment Security
SEC. 111. PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO ALLIES AND PARTNERS WITH RESPECT
TO REVIEWING FOREIGN INVESTMENT.
The Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, in
consultation with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States and the Office of Technical Assistance of the Department of the
Treasury, shall, to protect the national security of the United States
and countries that are allies or partners of the United States,
establish a formal process for--
(1) the exchange of information relating to foreign
investment with the governments of such countries; and
(2) the provision of assistance to those countries with
respect to--
(A) reviewing foreign investment transactions in
such countries;
(B) determining the beneficial ownership of parties
to such transactions; and
(C) identifying trends in investment and technology
that could pose risks to the national security of the
United States and such countries.
Subtitle C--Anti-competition
SEC. 121. IMPROVEMENT OF ANTI-COUNTERFEITING MEASURES.
(a) Increased Inspections.--
(1) Report on seizures of counterfeit goods.--Not later
than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
annually thereafter, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection shall submit to the Committee on Finance of
the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives a report on seizures by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection of counterfeit goods during the one-year period
preceding submission of the report, including the number of
such seizures disaggregated by category of good, source
country, and mode of transport.
(2) Increased inspections of goods from certain
countries.--The Commissioner shall increase inspections of
imports of goods from each source country identified in the
report required by subsection (a) as one of the top source
countries of counterfeit goods, as determined by the
Commissioner.
(b) Publication of Criteria for Notorious Markets List.--Not later
than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less
frequently than every 5 years thereafter, the United States Trade
Representative shall publish in the Federal Register criteria for
determining that a market is a notorious market for purposes of
inclusion of that market in the list developed by the Trade
Representative pursuant to section 182(e) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19
U.S.C. 2242(e)) (commonly known as the ``Notorious Markets List'').
SEC. 122. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.
(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter
for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary
of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade
Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall create
a list (referred to in this section as the ``intellectual property
violators list'') that identifies--
(1) all centrally administered state-owned enterprises
incorporated in the People's Republic of China that have
benefitted from--
(A) a significant act or series of acts of
intellectual property theft that subjected an economic
sector of the United States or a company incorporated
in the United States to harm; or
(B) an act or government policy of involuntary or
coerced technology transfer of intellectual property
ultimately owned by a company incorporated in the
United States; and
(2) any corporate officer of, or principal shareholder with
controlling interests in, an entity described in paragraph (1).
(b) Rules for Identification.--To determine whether there is a
credible basis for determining that an entity should be included on the
intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade
Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall
consider--
(1) any finding by a court in the United States that the
entity has violated relevant United States laws intended to
protect intellectual property rights; or
(2) substantial and credible information received from any
entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons.
(c) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United
States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence,
may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with--
(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
(2) entities in the private sector;
(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise;
and
(4) the Governments of Australia, Canada, countries in the
European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United
Kingdom.
(d) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years,
the Secretary of State shall publish in the Federal Register a
report that--
(A) lists the entities described in subsection
(a)(1);
(B) describes the circumstances surrounding acts or
policies described in subsection (a)(1)(B), including
any role of the Government of the People's Republic of
China;
(C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the
economic advantage derived by entities described in
subsection (a)(1); and
(D) assesses whether each entity described in
subsection (a)(1) is using or has used stolen
intellectual property in commercial activity in
Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New
Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, or the United
States.
(2) Form.--The report published under paragraph (1) shall
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
(3) Declassification and release.--The Director of National
Intelligence may authorize the declassification of information,
as appropriate, to inform the contents of the report published
under paragraph (1).
(e) Requirement To Protect Confidential Business Information.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State and the head of any
other Federal agency involved in the production of the
intellectual property violators list shall protect from
disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private
sector party and marked as confidential business information,
unless the party submitting the information--
(A) had notice, at the time of submission, that
such information would be disclosed by the Secretary;
or
(B) subsequently consents to the disclosure of such
information.
(2) Nonconfidential version of report.--If confidential
business information is provided by a private sector party in
connection with the production of the intellectual property
violators list, the Secretary of State shall publish a
nonconfidential version of the report under subsection (d) in
the Federal Register that summarizes or deletes, if necessary,
the confidential business information.
(3) Treatment as trade secrets.--Proprietary information
submitted by a private sector party under this section--
(A) shall be considered to be trade secrets and
commercial or financial information exempt under
subsection (b)(4) of section 552 of title 5, United
States Code, from being made available to the public
under subsection (a) of that section; and
(B) shall be exempt from disclosure without the
express approval of the party.
SEC. 123. REPORT ON SUBSIDIES PROVIDED BY GOVERNMENT OF PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade
Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that identifies--
(1) subsidies provided by the central government of the
People's Republic of China to enterprises in the People's
Republic of China; and
(2) discriminatory treatment favoring enterprises in the
People's Republic of China over foreign market participants.
(b) Elements of Report.--In compiling each report under subsection
(a), the Secretary of State shall consider--
(1) regulatory and other policies enacted or promoted by
the central government of the People's Republic of China that--
(A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in the
People's Republic of China at the expense of foreign
market participants;
(B) shield centrally administered, state-owned
enterprises from competition; or
(C) otherwise suppress market-based competition;
(2) financial subsidies, including favorable lending terms,
from or promoted by the central government of the People's
Republic of China or centrally administered, state-owned
enterprises in the People's Republic of China that materially
benefit enterprises in the People's Republic of China over
foreign market participants in contravention of generally
accepted market principles; and
(3) any subsidy that meets the definition of subsidy under
article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures referred to in section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)).
(c) Form of Report.--Each report required by subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form.
(d) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the United
States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and appropriate, consult
with--
(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
(2) the private sector; and
(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.
(e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.
Subtitle D--Supply Chains
SEC. 131. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle:
(1) Covered item.--The term ``covered item'' includes
semiconductor manufacturing equipment, including extreme
ultraviolet photolithography equipment and argon fluoride
immersion photolithography equipment.
(2) Critical mineral.--The term ``critical mineral'' has
the meaning given the term in section 7002(a) of the Energy Act
of 2020 (30 U.S.C. 1606(a)).
(3) Export; in-country transfer; reexport.--The terms
``export'', ``in-country transfer'', and ``reexport'' have the
meanings given those terms in section 1742 of the Export
Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801).
SEC. 132. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY ON SEMICONDUCTOR
MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT EXPORT CONTROLS.
(a) Required Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Secretary of Commerce, the heads of other relevant Federal
agencies, and private sector entities, shall develop a strategy to
diplomatically engage the governments of the Netherlands, Japan, and
other appropriate countries for the purposes of coordinating,
developing, and instituting controls on the export of covered items to
the People's Republic of China.
(b) Aspects of the Strategy.--The diplomatic strategy required by
subsection (a) shall include--
(1) a review of United States technological assets and
capabilities in semiconductor manufacturing equipment,
including photolithography;
(2) an assessment of how export controls on semiconductor
manufacturing equipment can be integrated into a broader United
States technology strategy that includes support for--
(A) research and development;
(B) investment screening;
(C) talent recruitment and retention;
(D) standard setting;
(E) international partnerships; and
(F) supply chain security;
(3) a plan of action to guide relevant United States
engagement with the Netherlands, Japan, and other appropriate
countries, including conducting bilateral and multilateral
engagements to formulate export controls on semiconductor
manufacturing equipment;
(4) a plan of action to guide United States engagement with
foreign entities that develop, construct, and export
semiconductor manufacturing equipment;
(5) a review of the potential diplomatic, economic, and
security effects of implementing export controls on
semiconductor manufacturing equipment;
(6) an analysis of the impact of export controls on
semiconductor manufacturing equipment on the semiconductor
manufacturing industry and artificial intelligence chipmaking
capabilities of the People's Republic of China;
(7) a review of the potential economic impacts on United
States entities if export controls on semiconductor
manufacturing equipment are implemented; and
(8) specific, measurable metrics of success for United
States diplomatic activities related to semiconductor
manufacturing equipment.
(c) Objectives of the Strategy.--The objectives of the diplomatic
strategy required by subsection (a) are--
(1) to formulate a political arrangement among the United
States, Japan, the Netherlands, and other appropriate countries
for the control of exports of covered items to the People's
Republic of China;
(2) to maintain United States and allied technological
advantages in semiconductor manufacturing equipment;
(3) to protect the interests of United States and allied
companies operating in the field of semiconductor manufacturing
and semiconductor manufacturing equipment; and
(4) to ensure the United States continues to engage with
allies on efforts involving the development and protection of a
free, equitable, open, secure, and stable digital domain.
(d) Form.--The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted to the appropriate congressional committees in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex.
(e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Energy and Commerce.
SEC. 133. PROHIBITION ON COMMERCIAL EXPORT OF SEMICONDUCTOR
MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT TO PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) In General.--Following the completion of the strategy required
by section 132, the President shall prohibit the export, reexport, and
in-country transfer of covered items to the People's Republic of China.
(b) Additional Controls.--The President may prescribe such
additional regulations and export controls as are necessary to carry
out the strategy required by section 132.
(c) Waivers.--The President may waive the application of controls
under subsection (a) or (b) with respect to a covered item if the
President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that
the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of the covered item is in
the national security interests of the United States.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on Financial Services of
the House of Representatives.
SEC. 134. ANNUAL SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY MONITORING REPORT ON THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Report Required.--Not later than May 1, 2023, and annually
thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce, in
concurrence with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the semiconductor manufacturing
capabilities of the People's Republic of China.
(b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) a detailed assessment of the domestic semiconductor
manufacturing capabilities of the People's Republic of China;
(2) a detailed assessment of year-by-year technological
development efforts by the People's Republic of China in the
fields of semiconductor manufacturing and artificial
intelligence chipmaking, including relevant government plans
and initiatives;
(3) a detailed assessment of engagement between the
People's Republic of China and other foreign countries with
respect to semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabilities;
(4) an analysis of the impact of United States and allied
export controls on covered items on development of
semiconductor manufacturing in the People's Republic of China;
and
(5) an assessment of whether such export controls remain
effective in curbing the development of semiconductor
manufacturing equipment capabilities in the People's Republic
of China.
(c) Form.--
(1) In general.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(2) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the
report required by subsection (a) shall be made available on a
publicly accessible internet website of the Federal Government.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 135. SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION.
(a) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Commerce, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on how the United States is coordinating with its partners and
allies--
(1) to secure global supply chains, including supply chains
for--
(A) semiconductor manufacturing and advanced
packaging;
(B) large capacity batteries, including batteries
for electric vehicles;
(C) critical minerals; and
(D) pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical
ingredients;
(2) to develop common standards for transparent, trusted,
and sustainable supply chains; and
(3) to end reliance on the People's Republic of China for
such supply chains.
(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 136. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO SECURE
CRITICAL MINERAL SUPPLY CHAINS.
It is the policy of the United States to partner, consult, and
coordinate with foreign governments (at the national and subnational
levels), civil society, international organizations, international
financial institutions, subnational communities, commercial and
recreational mining industry leaders, and the private sector, in a
concerted effort--
(1) to increase knowledge and raise awareness of the links
between mining and refining of critical minerals, national
security, climate change, and clean energy development;
(2) to improve, in countries in which such mining and
refining is conducted, resource mobilization and processing,
transport, and mineral refining capacity;
(3) to develop other strategies to maximize economic
benefits from critical mineral resource development for the
countries and communities in which such development takes
place;
(4) to promote transparency and combat--
(A) human rights abuses, exploitive labor
practices, and corruption within the critical mineral
extraction industry; and
(B) the influence the industry has on poor
governance, democratic backsliding, and declines in the
rule of law;
(5) to support--
(A) strengthening systems and bilateral and
multilateral partnerships for reducing the
monopolization of critical minerals and the
exploitation of workers in the critical mineral
extraction industry and reducing corruption as a
means--
(i) to ensure the availability of critical
minerals at competitive market-rate costs;
(ii) to uphold adequate labor standards to
ensure critical minerals are not produced at
the expense of the lives and livelihoods of
workers in the critical mineral extraction
industry; and
(iii) to maintain the integrity of
institutions governing the extraction and
refinement of critical minerals;
(B) deployment of and access to advanced
technologies to recycle critical minerals to extend use
and application beyond a single use; and
(C) implementation of management measures to track
and report instances of corruption and exploitation in
the critical mineral extraction industry; and
(6) to work cooperatively with international partners--
(A) to ensure that the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative has full unimpeded and
uninfluenced access to global critical mineral
industrial operations;
(B) to establish--
(i) an alliance to counter any state or
private monopolization on the control, supply
chains, or industrial processing and extraction
of critical mineral resources;
(ii) measurable targets for reducing
corruption and exploitation of workers in the
critical mineral extraction industry; and
(iii) action plans to achieve such targets
and a mechanism to provide regular reporting;
(C) to promote consumer education, awareness, and
outreach on exploitation of workers in the critical
mineral extraction industry; and
(D) to share best practices in materials management
and industrial systems operations to maximize the
benefit of critical mineral resources.
SEC. 137. PRIORITIZATION OF EFFORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO SECURE CRITICAL
MINERAL SUPPLY CHAINS.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall, in coordination with
the heads of other relevant Federal agencies--
(1) lead and coordinate efforts to implement the policy
described in section 136; and
(2) develop strategies and implement programs that
prioritize engagement and cooperation with foreign governments,
subnational, national, and local stakeholders and the private
sector to expedite efforts and assistance in foreign
countries--
(A) to partner with, encourage, and advise national
and subnational governments on the development and
execution, where practicable, of projects, programs,
and initiatives--
(i) to improve the capacity, security, and
standards of operations of critical minerals
supply chains;
(ii) to monitor and track how well critical
minerals supply chains are functioning
internationally, based on uniform and
transparent standards developed in cooperation
with municipal, industrial, and civil society
stakeholders; and
(iii) to conduct outreach campaigns to
raise public awareness of the importance of
proper management and oversight of critical
mineral supply chains;
(B) to partner with and provide technical
assistance to investors and national and international
institutions, including private sector actors, to
develop new business opportunities and solutions to
uphold the highest standards in critical mineral supply
chains and implement best practices in foreign
countries by--
(i) improving and expanding the capacity of
foreign industries to responsibly employ
extractive industry management practices;
(ii) improving and expanding the capacity
and transparency of tracking mechanisms for
critical minerals to reduce exploitation and
corruption;
(iii) eliminating incentives that undermine
responsible supply chain management; and
(iv) building the capacity of countries--
(I) to reduce, monitor, regulate,
and manage the extraction, refinement,
and transport of critical minerals
appropriately and transparently; and
(II) to encourage private
investment in critical mineral
extraction and refinement.
(b) Prioritization.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary
of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal
agencies, shall prioritize assistance to countries and regional
organizations in regions with--
(1) rapidly developing economies; and
(2) past instances of human rights abuses, exploitation,
and corruption.
(c) Effectiveness Measurement.--In prioritizing and expediting
efforts and assistance under this section, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall
use clear, accountable, and metric-based targets to measure the
effectiveness of assistance in achieving the policy described in
section 136.
SEC. 138. LEVERAGING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.
In implementing the policy described in section 136, the President
shall direct the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant
Federal agencies, to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
States, consistent with the broad development goals of the United
States--
(1) to work with countries and the private sector to break
up the monopolization of critical mineral industries;
(2) to commit to promoting transparent private sector
development in the critical minerals sector;
(3) to enhance coordination with the private sector to
increase access to critical minerals;
(4) to provide technical assistance to the regulatory
authorities of countries that are members of the body to remove
unnecessary barriers to investment; and
(5) to utilize clear, accountable, and metric-based targets
to measure the effectiveness of such actions.
TITLE II--COMPETE
Subtitle A--Infrastructure
SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE BUILD BACK BETTER WORLD INITIATIVE.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should exercise leadership in the
Build Back Better World initiative of the Group of Seven (G7)
to mobilize public and private sector capital and expertise
toward meeting the infrastructure needs of low- and middle-
income countries, estimated to exceed $40,000,000,000,000, over
the next two decades;
(2) the initiative should also advance strategic
objectives, including--
(A) strengthening partnerships with emerging market
and developing countries to promote quality,
transparent infrastructure investment that also
supports good governance and the rule of law;
(B) combating climate change through sustainable
infrastructure projects that aid partner countries in
the transition to net zero emissions, reduce their
vulnerabilities to climate change, and improve their
resilience;
(C) promoting public health and health security
through infrastructure projects that increase the
availability, accessibility, and affordability of
health care in partner countries;
(D) increasing internal and external connections in
digital, transportation, and energy infrastructure in
partner countries;
(E) improving education, economic opportunities,
and standards of living in marginalized communities in
partner countries, including for women and girls,
racial and ethnic minorities, individuals with
disabilities, individuals who are lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, or queer (commonly referred to
as ``LGBTQ+''), and individuals with low incomes; and
(F) providing partners a principled, sustainable
alternative to exploitative, coercive, and harmful
infrastructure investments; and
(3) the United States should establish a Build Back Better
World Task Force--
(A) to coordinate its development finance agencies,
such as the United States International Development
Finance Corporation, Export-Import Bank of the United
States, the Trade and Development Agency, the
Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the United States
Agency for International Development;
(B) to engage international partners such as the
G7, multilateral development banks, international
financial institutions, multinational corporations and
banks, non-governmental organizations, and other
industrial-country partners;
(C) to leverage other development finance
institutions, such as the Blue Dot Network, the
Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, and
the Transaction Advisory Fund; and
(D) to produce strategic guidance that identifies
international infrastructure projects and details
implementation plans, including--
(i) an explanation of how each
infrastructure project advances the strategic
objectives described in paragraph (2);
(ii) a description of consultations,
criteria, and justification for such projects;
(iii) distribution of such projects across
economic sectors and geographical regions;
(iv) budget estimates, proposed sources of
financing, and required appropriations for such
projects;
(v) lists of timelines and contractual
parties and their respective rights and
responsibilities with respect to such projects;
and
(vi) certification that such projects--
(I) meet specified standards, such
as those of the Blue Dot Network; and
(II) will not have negative impacts
on the environment, local communities,
national sovereignty, or economic
growth.
SEC. 202. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INVESTMENTS IN UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION.
The BUILD Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 1413 (22 U.S.C. 9613)--
(A) in subsection (a), by inserting ``a Strategic
Investments Officer,'' after ``Development Officer,'';
(B) in subsection (g)(2)(F), by striking
``subsection (i)'' and inserting ``subsection (j)'';
(C) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as
subsections (i) and (j), respectively;
(D) by inserting after subsection (g) the following
new subsection:
``(h) Strategic Investments Officer.--
``(1) Appointment.--Subject to the approval of the Board,
the Chief Executive Officer shall appoint a Strategic
Investments Officer from among individuals with experience in
international economic policy, who--
``(A) shall report directly to the Board; and
``(B) shall be removable only by a majority vote of
the Board.
``(2) Duties.--The Strategic Investments Officer shall--
``(A) coordinate efforts to develop the
Corporation's initiatives--
``(i) to counter predatory state-directed
investment and coercive economic practices of
adversaries of the United States; and
``(ii) to preserve the sovereignty of
partner countries;
``(B) coordinate the Corporation's strategic
investment policies and implementation efforts with the
Department of State, the Export-Import Bank of the
United States, the Trade and Development Agency, and
other relevant United States Government departments and
agencies, including by directly liaising with missions
of the Department of State to ensure that departments,
agencies, and missions have training, awareness, and
access to the Corporation's tools with respect to
strategic investment policy and projects;
``(C) manage the responsibilities of the
Corporation under section 1442(b)(5) and paragraphs
(1)(C) and (3)(C) of section 1443(b);
``(D) support the Chief Development Officer in
coordinating and implementing the activities of the
Corporation under section 1445; and
``(E) be an ex officio member of the Development
Advisory Council established under subsection (j), and
attend each meeting of the Council.'';
(E) in subsection (i)(3)(C), as so redesignated, by
striking ``subsection (i)'' and inserting ``subsection
(j)''; and
(F) by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(k) Strategic Investments Advisory Council.--
``(1) In general.--There is established a Strategic
Investments Advisory Council (in this subsection referred to as
the `Council') to advise the Board on strategic investment
objectives of the Corporation.
``(2) Membership.--Members of the Council shall be
appointed by the Board, on the recommendation of the Chief
Executive Officer and the Strategic Investment Officer, and
shall be composed of not more than 9 members from the
Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Department
of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of
Energy, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
``(3) Functions.--The Board shall call upon members of the
Council, either collectively or individually, to advise the
Board regarding the extent to which the Corporation is meeting
the strategic investment goals of the United States and any
suggestions for improvements with respect to such goals,
including opportunities in countries and project development
and implementation challenges and opportunities.
``(4) Federal advisory committee act.--The Council shall
not be subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C.
App.).'';
(2) in section 1442 (22 U.S.C. 9652)--
(A) in subsection (b)--
(i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and''
and inserting a semicolon;
(ii) in paragraph (4)(B), by striking the
period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(5) develop standards for, and a method for ensuring,
appropriate strategic investment metrics of the Corporation's
portfolio.''; and
(B) in subsection (d), by striking ``1413(i)'' and
inserting ``1413(j)''; and
(3) in section 1443 (22 U.S.C. 9653)--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and''
and inserting a semicolon;
(ii) in paragraph (4), by striking the
period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(5) the impact of the strategic investments made by the
Corporation, which shall be included in a classified annex.'';
and
(B) in subsection (b)--
(i) in paragraph (1)--
(I) in subparagraph (A), by
striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(II) in subparagraph (B), by adding
``and'' at the end; and
(III) by adding at the end the
following new subparagraph:
``(C) the impact of the Corporation's strategic
investment efforts on United States foreign policy
goals;''; and
(ii) in paragraph (3)--
(I) in subparagraph (A), by
striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon; and
(II) by adding at the end the
following new subparagraph:
``(C) outcomes of the strategic investments
portfolio, and whether or not such investments are
meeting the foreign policy objectives of the United
States; and''.
SEC. 203. PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGN LOAN GUARANTEES TO
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
CORPORATION.
(a) In General.--Section 1463(c)(1) of the Better Utilization of
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9683(c)(1))
is amended by striking ``the Corporation or any other appropriate
department or agency of the United States Government'' and inserting
``any appropriate department or agency of the United States Government
(other than the Corporation)''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall
take effect as if included in the enactment of the Better Utilization
of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9601 et
seq.).
SEC. 204. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING AND STRENGTHENING NEARSHORING.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In 2019, the People's Republic of China was the top
supplier of goods imported into the United States, providing
significant quantities of rare earth minerals, pharmaceutical
ingredients, medical equipment, and other goods vital to the
economic prosperity and national security of the United States.
(2) The COVID-19 pandemic and production outages and
shipping disruptions in the People's Republic of China have
jeopardized worldwide access to critical goods, contributing to
an unprecedented, ongoing supply chain crisis that has exposed
the severe risks of concentrating global supply chains in the
People's Republic of China and demonstrated the need for the
United States to increase supply chain resiliency and diversity
through reshoring and nearshoring initiatives.
(3) Relocating supply chains from the People's Republic of
China to Latin America and the Caribbean is in the commercial
and security interests of the United States and offers several
significant advantages for the United States Government and
United States entities, including--
(A) reduced transit times to markets in the United
States, which will lower freight costs, enable quicker
adaptability to fluctuating consumer demand, and lessen
the large carbon footprint of current supply chains;
(B) having supply chains located in countries with
which the United States has longstanding bilateral ties
and shared democratic values, lessening the risk of
geopolitical disruptions to supply chains; and
(C) having supply chains located in countries with
existing comparative advantages for sourcing and
manufacturing key critical goods that cannot be
entirely sourced from or manufactured in the United
States, including rare earth minerals, pharmaceuticals,
medical goods, and semiconductors.
(4) Switching 15 percent of United States imports from its
top 10 source countries outside of the Western Hemisphere to
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean would increase the
exports of the region by approximately $72,000,000,000
annually, helping the region recover from the effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic while also reducing pressures encouraging
migration to the United States.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United
States--
(1) to work with allies and partners of the United States
in the Western Hemisphere to achieve more resilient, diverse,
and secure supply chains;
(2) to pursue nearshoring initiatives to relocate supply
chains to Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly for
products unlikely to be sourced or manufactured in the United
States, while simultaneously pursuing reshoring initiatives to
increase domestic production in the United States; and
(3) to engage with regional governments, multilateral
development banks, and the private sector to develop and
advance joint efforts to incentivize entities to relocate
supply chains to, and strengthen supply chains within, the
Western Hemisphere.
(c) Strategy.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as determined by the
Secretary, shall develop and implement a strategy to increase supply
chain resiliency and security by promoting and strengthening
nearshoring efforts to relocate supply chains from the People's
Republic of China to the Western Hemisphere.
(d) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (c) shall--
(1) be informed by consultations with the governments of
allies and partners of the United States in the Western
Hemisphere and labor organizations and trade unions in the
United States;
(2) provide a description of how reshoring and nearshoring
initiatives can be pursued in a complementary fashion to
strengthen the national interests of the United States;
(3) include an assessment of--
(A) the status and effectiveness of current efforts
by regional governments, multilateral development
banks, and the private sector to promote nearshoring to
the Western Hemisphere;
(B) major challenges hindering those efforts; and
(C) how the United States can strengthen the
effectiveness of those efforts;
(4) identify countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
with comparative advantages for sourcing and manufacturing
critical goods and countries with the greatest nearshoring
opportunities;
(5) identify how activities by the United States Agency for
International Development and the United States International
Development Finance Corporation can effectively be leveraged to
strengthen and promote nearshoring to Latin America and the
Caribbean;
(6) advance diplomatic initiatives to secure specific
national commitments by governments in Latin America and the
Caribbean to undertake efforts to create favorable conditions
for nearshoring in the region, including commitments--
(A) to develop formalized national nearshoring
strategies;
(B) to address corruption and rule of law concerns;
(C) to modernize digital and physical
infrastructure;
(D) to lower trade barriers;
(E) to improve ease of doing business; and
(F) to finance and incentivize nearshoring
initiatives;
(7) advance diplomatic initiatives to harmonize standards
and regulations, expedite customs operations, and facilitate
economic integration in Latin America and the Caribbean; and
(8) develop and implement programs to finance, incentivize,
or otherwise promote nearshoring to the Western Hemisphere in
accordance with the assessments and identifications made
pursuant to paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), including, at
minimum, programs--
(A) to develop physical and digital infrastructure;
(B) to promote transparency in procurement
processes;
(C) to provide technical assistance in implementing
national nearshoring strategies;
(D) to mobilize private investment; and
(E) to secure commitments by private sector
entities to relocate supply chains from the People's
Republic of China to the Western Hemisphere.
(e) Coordination With Multilateral Development Banks.--In
implementing the strategy required under subsection (c), the Secretary
of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as
determined by the Secretary, shall coordinate with the United States
Executive Director to the Inter-American Development Bank and the
United States Executive Director to the World Bank.
(f) Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the
Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives the strategy required under subsection (c) and a
description of progress made in the implementation of that strategy.
SEC. 205. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE BLUE DOT INITIATIVE.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Blue Dot Network helps public and private investors
finance infrastructure projects that are inclusive,
transparent, sustainable, environmentally and socially
responsible, and compliant with international standards, laws,
and regulations;
(2) the Blue Dot Network helps mitigate threats such as the
predatory infrastructure investment practices of the People's
Republic of China and critical shortfalls in global
infrastructure financing;
(3) the Blue Dot Network advances the interests of the
United States through setting principal international
standards, but also requires sufficient investments in other
tools of economic statecraft such as the United States
International Development Finance Corporation and the
Millennium Challenge Corporation to be effective;
(4) the United States International Development Finance
Corporation should deepen its cooperation with Japan Bank for
International Cooperation and the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade of Australia to promote the Blue Dot Network and
finance certified projects;
(5) the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development must continue to update and refine its
methodologies and metrics for infrastructure project
certification based on guidelines such as the Group of Twenty
(G20) Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment;
(6) the Blue Dot Network must complement other principled
development finance initiatives such as the Infrastructure
Technology and Assistance Network and the Transaction Advisory
Fund of the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network;
(7) future development finance initiatives should build on
the foundations of the initiatives described in paragraph (6);
and
(8) the governments of other countries committed to good
governance, international law, and infrastructure investment
should work with the Blue Dot Network to certify infrastructure
projects and attract public and private sector investments.
SEC. 206. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Three Seas Initiative promotes security, economic
integration, modernization, and prosperity in Central and
Eastern Europe through critical investments energy,
transportation, and digital infrastructure;
(2) the United States International Development Finance
Corporation should finalize its approved investment of
$300,000,000 and approve an additional $700,000,000 investment
in the Three Seas Initiative to fulfill its 2020 commitments;
(3) Central and Eastern Europe must develop better north-
south infrastructure and economic integration to break the
dominance by the Russian Federation of east-west trade
corridors and regional energy supplies;
(4) in the wake of the premeditated, unprovoked, and
unjustified invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the
Three Seas Initiative has never been more important for the
security of its 12 participants: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia;
(5) the Three Seas Initiative should prioritize
construction of regional liquid natural gas terminals that can
help diversify the region's energy supplies and reduce the
malign influence of the Russian Federation;
(6) the People's Republic of China's $14,000,000,000 of
infrastructure investments in the region have degraded the
environment, eroded the rule of law, infringed upon state
sovereignty, and pose a national security threat;
(7) the Digital Economy Cooperation Initiative should
cooperate with the Three Seas Initiative to further modernize
the region's economy and develop the regions digital,
communications, and financial infrastructure;
(8) the European Union has made substantial contributions
to the objectives of the Three Seas Initiative and should
continue to do so through mechanisms such as the Connecting
Europe Facility; and
(9) the United States should encourage regional initiatives
such as the Three Seas Initiative to galvanize public and
private sector investments in regional infrastructure projects
that adhere to environmental, equitable, social, and
sustainable standards.
Subtitle B--Energy
SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT AT THE
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM.
It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, and the Chief Executive Officer
of the United States International Development Finance Corporation
should make climate finance commitments at the World Economic Forum.
SEC. 212. CLEAN ENERGY EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION.
(a) In General.--The Chief Executive Officer of the United States
International Development Finance Corporation shall strive to reduce
the net carbon footprint of the Corporation's entire investment
portfolio to zero by 2028.
(b) Priority.--In carrying out the goal described in subsection
(a), the Chief Executive Officer shall prioritize projects in countries
struggling with transitioning from carbon intensive electricity to
clean energy.
(c) Report.--The Chief Executive Officer shall submit a report to
Congress that describes the Corporation's efforts to meet the goals
described in subsections (a) and (b).
SEC. 213. CONSISTENCY IN UNITED STATES POLICY ON DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
AND CLIMATE CHANGE.
It is the policy of the United States to ensure that its engagement
with multilateral international financial institution's is consistent
with United States policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order
to achieve worldwide net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.
SEC. 214. ENERGY DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
Section 1(c) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956
(22 U.S.C. 2651a(c)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``24'' and inserting
``25'';
(2) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
``(5) Assistant secretary of state for energy resources.--
Subject to the numerical limitation specified in paragraph (1),
there is authorized to be established in the Department of
State an Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources who
shall be responsible to the Secretary of State for matters
pertaining to the formulation and implementation of
international policies--
``(A) to protect United States energy security
interests; and
``(B) to promote responsible global clean energy
production.''.
SEC. 215. UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION COOPERATION ON CLIMATE
FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should restore its historic alliance with countries of the
European Union regarding climate action by renewing the commitment to
advancing shared values, principles, goals, and global cooperation for
addressing climate change and achieving the goals of the decision of
the 21st Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change adopted in Paris December 12, 2015
(commonly known as the ``Paris Agreement'').
(b) Discretionary Clean Energy Development Finance Fund.--The Chief
Executive Officer of United States International Development Finance
Corporation shall partner with the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development to establish the Discretionary Clean Energy Development
Finance Fund.
(c) Energy Transition Assistance for Eastern Europe.--Title V of
the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C.
5451 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 504. ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TRANSITIONING
FROM FOSSIL FUELS TO CLEAN ENERGY.
``(a) Authorization of Assistance.--The Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of
Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to support workers and
communities in Eastern European countries that are struggling with the
transition from fossil fuel dependent economies to clean energy
economies.
``(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated, for each of the fiscal years 2023 through 2027, such sums
as may be necessary to carry out the program authorized under
subsection (a).''.
(d) United States-European Union Working Group.--The Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary
of Energy, shall seek to establish a formal United States-European
Union Working Group that will develop a strategy to respond to the
People's Republic of China's Belt and Road Initiative.
Subtitle C--Technology
SEC. 221. UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AND REPRESENTATION IN STANDARDS-
SETTING BODIES.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
ensure that the United States leads in the innovation of critical and
emerging technologies, such as next-generation telecommunications,
artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and
biotechnology, by--
(1) providing necessary investment and concrete incentives
for the private sector to accelerate development of such
technologies;
(2) modernizing export controls and investment screening
regimes and associated policies and regulations;
(3) enhancing United States leadership in technical
standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms
regarding the use of emerging critical technologies;
(4) reducing United States barriers and increasing
incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the
research and co-development of critical technologies;
(5) collaborating with allies and partners to protect
critical technologies by--
(A) crafting multilateral export control measures;
(B) building capacity for defense technology
security;
(C) safeguarding chokepoints in supply chains; and
(D) ensuring diversification; and
(6) designing major defense capabilities for export to
allies and partners.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States must lead in international bodies
that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally
enabled technologies in order to ensure that those technologies
operate within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable
digital domain;
(2) the United States, along with allies and partners,
should lead an international effort that utilizes all of the
economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the
expanding use of information and communications technology
products and services to surveil, repress, and manipulate
populations (also known as ``digital authoritarianism'');
(3) the United States should lead a global effort to ensure
that freedom of information, including the ability to safely
consume or publish information without fear of undue reprisals,
is maintained as the digital domain becomes an increasingly
integral mechanism for communication;
(4) the United States should lead a global effort to
develop and adopt a set of common principles and standards for
critical technologies to ensure that the use of such
technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether those
actors are governments or other entities, and that those actors
do not threaten democratic governance or human rights;
(5) the United States and its allies and partners should
maintain participation and leadership at international
standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure;
(6) the United States should work with its allies and
partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure
supply chains and networks for 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and
(7) the maintenance of a high standard of security in
telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and
its allies and partners is a national security interest of the
United States.
(c) Enhancing Representation and Leadership of United States at
International Standards-Setting Bodies.--
(1) In general.--The President shall--
(A) establish an interagency working group to
provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance
the representation and leadership of the United States
at international bodies that set standards for
equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined
networks that support 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as
the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd
Generation Partnership Project; and
(B) work with allies, partners, and the private
sector to increase productive engagement with respect
to the standards described in subparagraph (A).
(2) Interagency working group.--The interagency working
group described in paragraph (1) shall--
(A) be chaired by the Secretary of State or a
designee of the Secretary of State; and
(B) consist of the head (or designee) of each
Federal department or agency the President determines
appropriate.
(3) Briefings.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and subsequently
thereafter as provided under subparagraph (B), the
interagency working group described in paragraph (1)
shall provide a strategy to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives that
addresses--
(i) promotion of United States leadership
at international standards-setting bodies for
equipment, systems, software, and virtually
defined networks relevant to 5th and future
generation mobile telecommunications systems
and infrastructure, taking into account the
different processes followed by the various
international standard-setting bodies;
(ii) diplomatic engagement with allies and
partners to share security risk information and
findings pertaining to equipment that supports
or is used in 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure
and cooperation on mitigating such risks;
(iii) China's presence and activities at
international standards-setting bodies relevant
to 5th and future generation mobile
telecommunications systems and infrastructure,
including information on the differences in the
scope and scale of China's engagement at such
bodies compared to engagement by the United
States or its allies and partners and the
security risks raised by Chinese proposals in
such standards-setting bodies; and
(iv) engagement with private sector
communications and information service
providers, equipment developers, academia,
federally funded research and development
centers, and other private sector stakeholders
to propose and develop secure standards for
equipment, systems, software, and virtually
defined networks that support 5th and future
generation mobile telecommunications systems
and infrastructure.
(B) Subsequent briefings.--Upon receiving a request
from the appropriate congressional committees, or as
determined appropriate by the chair of the interagency
working group described in paragraph (1), the
interagency working group shall provide such committees
an updated briefing that covers the matters described
in clauses (i) through (iv) of subparagraph (A).
SEC. 222. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH THE G20 DIGITAL ECONOMY
WORKING GROUP.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Group of Twenty (G20) Digital Economy Working Group
advances national and international interests through promoting
principled and practical standards; and
(2) the United States should continue to support, engage,
and exercise leadership in the working group--
(A) to maximize the benefits and minimize the harms
of the $70,000,000,000 and growing global digital
economy;
(B) to increase international digital connectivity
and trade;
(C) to modernize the global economy with new
technologies such as blockchain, artificial
intelligence, and machine learning;
(D) to protect cross border data flow and data free
flow with trust;
(E) to promote social inclusion through digital
quality control, consumer protection, child protection,
and equitable access to new technologies;
(F) to improve efficiency and interoperability for
technologies and regulations in the public sector;
(G) to advance the past initiatives of the working
group such Smart Cities, Digital Security, and the
Connecting Humanity 2030 Initiative; and
(H) to enable progress toward the United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals.
SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to prioritize diplomacy and international engagement in
the artificial intelligence strategies and policies of the
United States;
(2) to prioritize artificial intelligence issues in United
States diplomacy;
(3) to collaborate with allies and partners to--
(A) research, develop, produce, and invest in
artificial intelligence technologies that support
economic prosperity, collective security, democracy,
and human rights;
(B) promote commitments and international law
related to artificial intelligence that reflect shared
values;
(C) ensure that artificial intelligence
technologies are safe, secure, and trustworthy;
(D) create and maintain artificial intelligence-
related technical and institutional infrastructure;
(E) share artificial intelligence-related data,
technology, and knowledge, subject to appropriate
safeguards and restrictions;
(F) prevent the unwanted transfer of sensitive
artificial intelligence-related technical information;
(G) coordinate artificial intelligence-related
export controls and investment screening procedures;
and
(H) educate and train new cohorts of artificial
intelligence researchers, developers, and
practitioners;
(4) to incorporate perspectives and expertise from
industry, academia, and civil society into United States
diplomatic activities related to artificial intelligence;
(5) to engage with bilateral and multilateral organizations
active in artificial intelligence research, development, and
policy; and
(6) to use diplomacy and foreign assistance to support
activities for deploying artificial intelligence that create
broadly shared prosperity, account for relevant artificial
intelligence safety and security concerns, and uphold human
rights and democratic values.
SEC. 224. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the Secretary of
State shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a strategy for United States diplomacy related to artificial
intelligence.
(b) Contents.--Each strategy required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) A review of relevant prior and ongoing initiatives, the
outcomes of those initiatives, and key ongoing challenges to
those initiatives.
(2) The objectives and priorities that will be used to
guide the diplomacy of the United States Government related to
artificial intelligence, including objectives and priorities
related to each of the following:
(A) Promoting human rights and democratic values in
the development and deployment of artificial
intelligence technologies, including by advancing
relevant international law and principles.
(B) Deterring and disrupting malicious and
oppressive uses of artificial intelligence.
(C) Fostering United States collaboration with
allies and partners in artificial intelligence research
and development.
(D) Developing appropriate technical standards,
metrics, and measurement techniques for artificial
intelligence.
(E) Mitigating safety risks of artificial
intelligence.
(F) Maintaining secure supply chains for artificial
intelligence technology and its inputs, including
computing hardware.
(G) Ensuring the integrity of the artificial
intelligence research and development activities of the
United States and its allies and partners.
(H) Ensuring the equitable deployment and adoption
of artificial intelligence technology, including
through trade, foreign assistance, and development
finance.
(I) Involving the private sector and civil society.
(J) Responding to the artificial intelligence
activities and strategies of other countries, including
the People's Republic of China.
(3) Specific, measurable indicators of progress
corresponding to the objectives and priorities described in
paragraph (2).
(4) For each strategy other than the first strategy
required by subsection (a), an assessment of whether and how
progress with respect to each of the indicators identified in
the preceding strategy was realized.
(5) A detailed implementation plan, including timelines,
designations of lead and supporting implementing entities of
the United States Government, budgetary estimates (as
applicable), and descriptions of any additional budgetary
resources, technical expertise, legal authorities, or personnel
needed for implementation of the strategy.
(6) Any other matters the Secretary considers relevant.
(c) Consultation.--In preparing each strategy required by
subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult with--
(1) the Secretary of Defense;
(2) the Secretary of Homeland Security;
(3) the Secretary of Commerce;
(4) the Secretary of Energy;
(5) the Director of the National Science Foundation;
(6) the Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy;
(7) the heads of such other relevant Federal agencies and
departments as the Secretary of State considers appropriate;
and
(8) such nongovernmental partners as the Secretary
considers appropriate.
(d) Form.--Each strategy required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(e) Publication.--The Secretary of State shall make each strategy
required by subsection (a) (without its classified annex, if any)
available on a publicly accessible website.
(f) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 225. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Innovation in artificial intelligence and other
emerging technology domains has become increasingly global.
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, worldwide spending on research and development
more than tripled between 2000 and 2020. The United States
accounted for almost 70 percent of such spending in 1960, but
less than \1/3\ in 2018.
(2) Many allies and partners of the United States are
technological powers in their own right, with robust research
and development activities and world-leading capabilities in
fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors,
robotics, and biotechnology.
(3) Adversaries of the United States, including the
People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and Iran,
also emphasize technology and innovation in their geopolitical
strategies. In particular, the Chinese Communist Party believes
innovation is essential to its continued rule and is investing
heavily in research and development as part of a strategy to
``leapfrog'' the United States into global leadership.
(4) The United States and its allies and partners
collectively control a much larger share of research and
development activity than the People's Republic of China.
Together, the United States and 6 like-minded countries,
namely, Japan, Germany, South Korea, India, France, and the
United Kingdom, account for more than \1/2\ of global spending
on research and development, while the People's Republic of
China accounts for approximately \1/4\.
(5) The National Science Board's ``Vision 2030'' report,
issued in May 2020, states, ``Staying at the frontiers of
discovery requires leaning into internationalism, particularly
given the nation's falling share of global knowledge
production, paired with the rising importance and impact of
international collaboration and knowledge- and technology-
intensive industries.''.
(6) Previously, in 2008, the National Science Board
reported, ``The U.S. Government could play a more effective
role in supporting international S&E (science and engineering)
partnerships by developing a coherent international S&E
strategy to coordinate the activities and objectives of the
various Federal agencies that play a role in such partnerships.
. . . No single U.S. agency is responsible for coordinating or
supporting international S&E partnerships, and few U.S.
agencies that do S&E work have explicit missions in
international relations.''.
(7) As of March 2022, numerous Federal departments and
offices administer joint research and development activities
with international partners, including the Office of
International Science and Engineering within the National
Science Foundation, the Division of International Relations
within the National Institutes of Health, and the Office of
International Science & Technology Cooperation within the
Department of Energy.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) international collaboration on research and development
is critical to maintaining United States leadership in
artificial intelligence and other critical technologies; and
(2) Federal initiatives related to international
collaboration on research and development should be--
(A) consistently and adequately funded; and
(B) coordinated across agencies to increase impact,
minimize undue duplication, and ensure alignment with
policies and strategic objectives of the United States.
(c) Government Accountability Office Report.--Not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller
General of the United States shall prepare and release to the public a
report that--
(1) enumerates and describes all significant Federal
initiatives related to international collaboration on research
and development in emerging technologies in existence as of the
date on which the report is released;
(2) assesses whether those initiatives are equipped to
achieve their stated goals;
(3) assesses whether those initiatives are properly managed
and coordinated within and across Federal agencies; and
(4) recommends appropriate actions with respect to
paragraphs (1) through (3).
(d) Independent Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to
enter into a contract with an appropriately qualified
independent research entity, such as a federally funded
research and development center or other nonprofit
organization, to produce a report on Federal activities related
to international collaboration on research and development.
(2) Elements.--The report described in paragraph (1)
shall--
(A) assess the effectiveness of Federal activities
related to international collaboration conducted as of
the date on which the report is produced;
(B) identify key opportunities for enhanced
collaboration on research and development with allies
and partners of the United States;
(C) identify key challenges to United States
collaboration on research and development with allies
and partners;
(D) propose a Federal strategy and corresponding
implementation plan for future Federal activities
related to international collaboration on research and
development; and
(E) recommend other appropriate actions for the
Secretary of State, other officials of the Department
of State, Congress, and other relevant governmental and
nongovernmental actors, and identify any additional
resources or legal authorities necessary to carry out
such actions.
(3) Completion.--The contract described in paragraph (1)
shall require delivery of the report described in that
paragraph not later than 1 year after the date on which the
contract is executed.
(4) Publication.--The Secretary of State shall make the
report described in paragraph (1) available on a publicly
accessible website.
Subtitle D--International Financial Institutions and Multilateral
Economic Organizations
SEC. 231. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AT
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to recognize rising debt stock in emerging market and
developing countries as a national security and economic
security threat and raise its importance in multilateral fora;
(2) to leverage the voice and vote of the United States in
international financial institutions to prevent future
unsustainable debt stocks in emerging market and developing
countries;
(3) to promote rule-writing standards for transparency and
disclosure that hold both debtors and creditors accountable,
allow accurate debt sustainability assessments, and promote
better debt management;
(4) to lead the international community in translating the
G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt
Service Suspension Initiative (commonly known as the ``Common
Framework'') into tangible action, including effective
standstill for debt payments and credit revisions for
petitioner countries and finalizing the debt treatment for the
petitioner countries, beginning with Chad, Ethiopia, and
Zambia;
(5) to reduce timelines and increase confidence in outcomes
for the Common Framework so that private creditors continue to
provide sufficient finances to petitioner countries and other
countries witness the benefits of petitioning;
(6) to expand the Common Framework and offer its financial
assistance to other heavily indebted lower-middle-income
countries, beyond those currently covered;
(7) to cooperate with counterparts in the Group of Twenty
(G20), the International Monetary Fund, private credit rating
agencies, and regulators, to explore and develop new bond and
loan contract issuance standards that authorize temporary
suspensions of debt services to both private and public
creditors without triggering a default in crisis situations;
(8) to engage with petitioner countries, before those
countries exhaust their reserves, to strategize their ascension
into the Common Framework and prevent further economic costs;
(9) to leverage the voice and vote of the United States in
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank so that the
Fund and the Bank complete preliminary assessments of the debt
relief needed by each country eligible for Common Framework
treatment before such countries petition for debt relief;
(10) that assessments described in paragraph (9) should--
(A) include realistic growth and fiscal
projections;
(B) include implications of Common Framework debt
relief; and
(C) be based on accurate and comprehensive debt
data;
(11) to support the International Monetary Fund lending
into arrears for the Common Framework in the case that private
lenders fail to uphold their initial commitments;
(12) to leverage the voice and vote of the United States in
international financial intuitions to promote and finance
international initiatives to procure and deploy more affordable
and accessible COVID-19 vaccinations and treatments for
emerging market and developing countries;
(13) to address the near-term problems associated with the
pandemic-induced global recession and also longer term problems
of unsustainable credit lending and borrowing that victimizes
emerging market and developing countries; and
(14) to consider the impact of the monetary policies of the
United States and future increases in interest rates on
emerging market and developing countries and mitigate related
harms.
SEC. 232. LOANS TO THE POVERTY REDUCTION AND GROWTH TRUST OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the Secretary of the Treasury for fiscal year 2022
$102,000,000, for contribution to the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the
International Monetary Fund.
(2) Availability of amounts.--Amounts appropriated pursuant
to the authorization of appropriations under paragraph (1)
shall remain available until September 30, 2031.
(b) Use of Amounts.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the
authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) shall be
available--
(1) to cover the cost (as defined in section 502 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 661a)) of loans made
by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the
International Monetary Fund; and
(2) to subsidize gross obligations for the principal amount
of direct loans not to exceed 15,000,000,000 Special Drawing
Rights.
(c) Nonapplicability of Certain Limitation.--Section 5(f) of the
Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 286c(f)) shall not apply to any
loans made pursuant to this section to the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Trust or other special purpose vehicle of the International Monetary
Fund on or before September 30, 2031.
(d) Authorization of Certain Transactions.--The Exchange
Stabilization Fund and the financing account corresponding to
transactions with the International Monetary Fund are authorized to
enter into such transactions as are necessary to effectuate loans made
pursuant to this section and denominated in Special Drawing Rights to
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust or other special purpose vehicle
of the International Monetary Fund.
SEC. 233. CLEARING WORLD BANK GROUP ARREARS.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide the World Bank Group
with all necessary amounts to address the United States arrears in
contributions from fiscal years 2019 and 2020.
SEC. 234. 10TH GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-
19, has had a significant impact on economic, social, and
humanitarian conditions throughout Latin America and the
Caribbean;
(2) the Inter-American Development Bank is the preeminent
multilateral development bank dedicated to regional economic
and social development and the betterment of lives across Latin
America and the Caribbean;
(3) the Bank has played an integral role in supporting
member countries with the coordination and implementation of
policies to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Venezuelan refugee and migration crisis, and other crises in
the Western Hemisphere;
(4) a capital increase for the Bank would greatly increase
its capacity to provide financing, institutional knowledge, and
technical support to foster recovery and inclusion initiatives
between regional governments, private sector entities, and
international organizations; and
(5) the United States, as a founding member of the Bank,
should support a capital stock increase to ensure the Bank is
prepared to offer additional support to member countries
severely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises.
(b) Tenth General Capital Increase.--
(1) Support for a general capital increase.--The President
shall take steps to support a tenth general capital increase
for the Inter-American Development Bank.
(2) Diplomatic engagement.--The President shall advance
diplomatic engagement to build support among member countries
of the Bank for a tenth general capital increase for the Bank
in order to strengthen the capacity of the Bank--
(A) to support Latin American and Caribbean
countries in their efforts to address the COVID-19
pandemic and the related economic impact; and
(B) to advance inclusive economic and social
development in the Americas.
(3) Progress report.--Not later than 45 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
on Financial Services of the House of Representatives a report
detailing efforts to carry out paragraphs (1) and (2).
(4) Tenth capital increase.--The Inter-American Development
Bank Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) is amended by adding at the
end the following:
``SEC. 42. TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.
``(a) Vote Authorized.--The United States Governor of the Bank is
authorized to vote in favor of a resolution to increase the capital
stock of the Bank by $80,000,000,000 over a period not to exceed 5
years.
``(b) Subscription Authorized.--
``(1) In general.--The United States Governor of the Bank
may subscribe on behalf of the United States to 1,990,714
additional shares of the capital stock of the Bank.
``(2) Limitation.--Any subscription by the United States to
the capital stock of the Bank shall be effective only to such
extent and in such amounts as are provided in advance in
appropriations Acts.
``(c) Limitations on Authorization of Appropriations.--
``(1) In general.--In order to pay for the increase in the
United States subscription to the Bank under subsection (b),
there is authorized to be appropriated $24,014,857,191 for
payment by the Secretary of the Treasury.
``(2) Allocation of funds.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated under paragraph (1)--
``(A) $600,371,430 shall be for paid in shares of
the Bank; and
``(B) $23,414,485,761 shall be for callable shares
of the Bank.''.
(c) Support for Environmental Sustainability Initiatives of Inter-
American Development Bank.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the Inter-American Development Bank should--
(A) establish its own environmental grant-making
and financing facility in order to implement and expand
environmental policies, metrics, and standards, to
strengthen resilience and disaster preparedness, and to
improve sustainability and conservation; and
(B) continue to strengthen environmental safeguards
as an element of economic development in the Western
Hemisphere.
(2) Diplomatic engagement.--The President shall advance
diplomatic engagement to build support among member countries
of the Bank for the creation of an environmental fund and
financing facility as part of the tenth general capital
increase for the Bank.
SEC. 235. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Inter-American Development Bank was established in
1959 and--
(A) is the premier multilateral development bank in
the Western Hemisphere;
(B) is the largest source of development financing
for Latin America and the Caribbean; and
(C) issued more than $140,000,000,000 in loans and
grants between 2011 and 2021.
(2) The Inter-American Development Bank--
(A) has 48 member states, of which 26 are borrowing
members in the Latin America and the Caribbean region;
and
(B) constitutes a critical forum for fostering
collective action and meeting shared regional
challenges, including COVID-19 recovery and response.
(3) Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the People's Republic
of China are among the 22 non-borrowing, non-Western Hemisphere
members of the Inter-American Development Bank.
(4) Taiwan--
(A) has been an observer at the Inter-American
Development Bank since 1991;
(B) has contributed to a specialized financial
intermediary development fund at IDB Lab since 2006;
(C) has been a non-regional member of the Central
American Bank for Economic Integration since 1992;
(D) is a member of the Asian Development Bank, the
World Trade Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation, and the International Chamber of Commerce;
and
(E) is a participant of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development's Competition
Committee, its Steel Committee, and its Fisheries
Committee.
(5) Taiwan's economy is the 7th largest in Asia and the
20th largest in the world by purchasing power parity.
(6) Taiwan has been a model contributor of foreign aid in
Latin America and the Caribbean, allocating between 30 percent
and 50 percent of its foreign aid budget to Latin America and
the Caribbean.
(7) Since 2010, Taiwan's International Cooperation and
Development Fund has funded 95 projects in Central America, 64
projects in the Caribbean, and 21 projects in South America.
(8) Taiwan has been a firm supporter of Haiti as it
confronts multiple simultaneous crises--
(A) by providing more than $145,000,000 in
financing to modernize Haiti's electrical grid;
(B) by delivering 280,000 masks at the height of
the COVID-19 pandemic; and
(C) by pledging $500,000 in disaster relief
immediately after the August 14, 2021, earthquake in
Haiti.
(9) According to data from the Pan American Development
Foundation, communities receiving assistance from Taiwan
display increased--
(A) food security;
(B) income generation; and
(C) capacity to recover from natural disasters.
(10) Taiwan has placed special emphasis on fostering
development in Central America and in the Caribbean, including
by signing the Agreement on the Republic of China (Taiwan)--
Central America Economic Development Fund in 1998.
(11) Through its non-regional member status at the Central
American Bank for Economic Integration, Taiwan has provided
$266,700,000 in financial assistance to help Central American
countries respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 22, 2021,
the Central American Bank for Economic Integration announced
the opening of its Representative Office in Taiwan, deepening
investment ties between Taiwan and Central America.
(12) Nine countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and Taiwan has 8
representative offices in 7 other countries in the region.
(13) Since 2016, the Government of the People's Republic of
China has engaged in aggressive economic diplomacy to compel
the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition for Taiwan, most
notably in Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, all
of which have terminated longstanding and productive diplomatic
relationships with Taiwan and granted diplomatic recognition to
the People's Republic of China.
(14) The Government of the People's Republic of China--
(A) announced a $1,100,000,000 construction project
in Panama on the day that Panama switched from
recognizing Taiwan to recognizing the People's Republic
of China as the government of China; and
(B) similarly offered assistance packages to the
Dominican Republic and El Salvador in 2018 in exchange
for those countries ceasing their diplomatic
recognition of Taiwan.
(15) Taiwan's international engagement has faced increased
resistance from the Government of the People's Republic of
China, which has used its influence to deny Taiwan's
invitations to multilateral fora. For example, Taiwan was not
invited to the 2016 Assembly of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), despite participating as a guest
at ICAO's 2013 summit. Taiwan's requests to participate in the
General Assembly of the International Criminal Police
Organization (commonly known as ``INTERPOL'') were also
rejected.
(16) Taiwan's inclusion in multilateral organizations, such
as the Inter-American Development Bank, advances peace and
stability in the world and in the Western Hemisphere
specifically.
(17) Congress has demonstrated a longstanding policy of
supporting Taiwan's participation in international bodies that
address shared transnational challenges by--
(A) authorizing the Secretary of State, in Public
Law 106-137, Public Law 107-10, and Public Law 108-235,
to initiate a United States plan for supporting
Taiwan's participation as an observer in the activities
of the World Health Organization;
(B) directing the Secretary of State, in Public Law
113-17, to report on a strategy to obtain observer
status for Taiwan at the International Civil Aviation
Organization Assembly; and
(C) directing the Secretary of State, in Public Law
114-139, to develop a strategy to obtain observer
status for Taiwan at the INTERPOL Assembly.
(18) Despite these efforts, Taiwan has not received an
invitation to attend as an observer any of the events of the
international organizations referred to in paragraph (17) since
2016.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States fully supports Taiwan's participation
in, and contribution to, international organizations and
underscores the importance of the relationship between Taiwan
and the United States;
(2) diversifying the Inter-American Development Bank's
donor base and increasing ally engagement in the Western
Hemisphere reinforces United States national interests;
(3) Taiwan's significant contribution to the development
and economies of Latin America and the Caribbean demonstrate
that Taiwan's membership in the Inter-American Development Bank
as a non-borrowing member would benefit the Bank and the entire
Latin American and Caribbean region; and
(4) non-borrowing membership in the Inter-American
Development Bank would allow Taiwan to substantially leverage
and channel the immense resources Taiwan already provides to
Latin America and the Caribbean to reach a larger number of
beneficiaries.
(c) Plan for the Participation of Taiwan in the Inter-American
Development Bank.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretary of the Treasury, is authorized--
(1) to initiate a United States plan to endorse non-
borrowing membership in the Inter-American Development Bank for
Taiwan; and
(2) to instruct the United States Governor of the Bank to
work with the Board of Governors of the Bank to admit Taiwan as
a non-borrowing member of the Bank.
(d) Report Concerning Member State Status for Taiwan at the Inter-
American Development Bank.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and not later than April 1 of each year
thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary
of the Treasury, shall submit an unclassified report to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives that--
(1) describes the United States plan to endorse and obtain
non-borrowing membership status for Taiwan at the Inter-
American Development Bank;
(2) includes an account of the efforts that the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of the Treasury have made to
encourage member states of the Bank to promote Taiwan's bid to
obtain non-borrowing membership at the Bank; and
(3) identifies the steps that the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of the Treasury will take to endorse and obtain
non-borrowing membership status for Taiwan at the Bank in the
following year.
SEC. 236. INCREASED UNITED STATES COOPERATION WITH ASIA-PACIFIC
ECONOMIC COOPERATION.
The Secretary of State shall pursue the following objectives at the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum:
(1) Improving efficiency in supply chains, particularly
semi-conductor supply chains.
(2) Encouraging continued public-private dialogues with
policymakers and promoting a common set of technology
standards, including the possibility of a digital trade
agreement.
(3) Promoting the development and use of policy
recommendations for governments to support research and
development of clean energy (both renewable and non-renewable)
and adopting robust clean energy standards.
(4) Advancing cooperation that reduces barriers to cross-
border investment into emerging and growing markets.
(5) Improving cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific region and
developing tools for governments to combat cyber threats,
including ransomware, disinformation, and cyber hacks.
Subtitle E--Resilience
SEC. 241. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP IN
RECOVERY AND RESILIENCY.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States must exercise
leadership in the international community's response to the COVID-19
pandemic regarding public health and economic recovery and resiliency,
including by--
(1) leveraging multilateral fora, such as the Group of
Seven (G7) and the Group of Twenty (G20), which constitute more
than 30 percent and 70 percent of the global economy,
respectively, to coordinate an effective international response
to persistent economic issues related to supply chains,
inflation, and inequality;
(2) revitalizing the United Nations and its associated
institutions to coordinate and facilitate international
initiatives that--
(A) promote global health and economic security;
and
(B) build resilience to present and forecasted
shocks and stresses that impede economic growth or
trigger, contribute to, result in, or cause
backsliding;
(3) empowering like-minded allies and partners to leverage
their respective strengths and assume greater responsibilities
in such international fora and institutions;
(4) continuing to fund and finance international
initiatives, such as COVAX, to provide and distribute life-
saving vaccinations and medical treatments for COVID-19;
(5) promoting an equitable international economic recovery
that promotes building developing countries' resilience
capacities to address enduring disparities and challenges
facing lower and middle income countries in addition to more
recent challenges related to high-levels of global inflation
and market volatility; and
(6) supporting an impartial, independent, and international
investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic to
derive lessons learned and prevent similar international
disasters in the future.
SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING IMPROVING RESILIENCE CAPACITIES
THROUGH FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.
It is the sense of Congress that United States foreign assistance
and development finance must better suit its foreign assistance and
development finance institutions to improve global resilience
capacities and mitigate the harmful effects of international shocks and
stresses, including by--
(1) equipping people, institutions, and international
systems with the tools and resources necessary to avoid, cope
with, and recover from modern threats, such as pandemic
diseases, climate change, and extreme weather, cybersecurity
compromises, and supply chain disruptions;
(2) partnering with other countries to better assess their
vulnerabilities and risks to international shocks and
identifying sustainable strategies for mitigating risk and
improving resilience;
(3) prioritizing funding for foreign assistance and
development finance initiatives that seek to prevent, respond
and reduce risks of international shocks;
(4) expanding foreign capacity building initiatives in law
enforcement, public health, cybersecurity, food and energy
security;
(5) strengthening institutions that facilitate economic
cooperation and transparency in times of international crisis
and uncertainty; and
(6) providing support for countries to strengthen domestic
resource mobilization and access to effective and equitable
development finance in order to reduce dependence on foreign
assistance.
SEC. 243. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESILIENCY.
Section 1 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22
U.S.C. 2651a) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (h) (as added by section
361 of Public Law 116-260) as subsection (k); and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(l) Office of Economic Resiliency.--
``(1) In general.--There is established, within the Bureau
of Economic and Business Affairs of the Department of State,
the Office of Economic Resiliency (in this subsection referred
to as the `Office').
``(2) Function.--The Office, under the direction of the
Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Economic and Business
Affairs, shall lead United States' efforts to develop and
implement credible national action plans with partner countries
aimed at detecting, understanding, preventing impacts of, and
responding to present and forecasted shocks and stresses that
are destabilizing to countries' national security and economic
growth, including epidemics, pandemics, natural disasters, and
other destabilizing events.''.
SEC. 244. ESTABLISHMENT OF RESILIENCE TRUST FUND AT THE WORLD BANK.
The United States Executive Director to the World Bank shall use
the voice and vote of the United States to advocate for the
establishment of a multi-donor trust fund to incentivize countries to
develop and implement credible national action plans aimed at
preventing, detecting, and responding to epidemics, pandemics, and
other global destabilizing events.
<all>