

117TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 4554

To establish a task force to monitor the nuclear weapons and missile capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 19, 2022

Mr. GRAHAM (for himself and Mr. MENENDEZ) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To establish a task force to monitor the nuclear weapons and missile capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Iran Nuclear Weapons
5 Capability Monitoring Act of 2022”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) In the late 1980s, the Islamic Republic of
9 Iran established the AMAD Project with the intent

1 to manufacture 5 nuclear weapons and prepare an
2 underground nuclear test site.

3 (2) Since at least 2002, the Islamic Republic of
4 Iran has advanced its nuclear and ballistic missile
5 programs, posing serious threats to the security in-
6 terests of the United States, Israel, and other allies
7 and partners.

8 (3) In 2002, nuclear facilities in Natanz and
9 Arak, Iran, were revealed to the public by the Na-
10 tional Council of Resistance of Iran.

11 (4) On April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of
12 Iran announced that it had enriched uranium for the
13 first time to a level close to 3.5 percent at the
14 Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz, Iran.

15 (5) On December 23, 2006, the United Nations
16 Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 (2006),
17 which imposed sanctions with respect to the Islamic
18 Republic of Iran for its failure to suspend enrich-
19 ment activities.

20 (6) The United Nations Security Council subse-
21 quently adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803
22 (2008), and 1929 (2010), all of which targeted the
23 nuclear program of and imposed additional sanctions
24 with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

1 (7) On February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic
2 of Iran announced that it had launched its first sat-
3 ellite, which raised concern over the applicability of
4 the satellite to the ballistic missile program.

5 (8) In September 2009, the United States, the
6 United Kingdom, and France revealed the existence
7 of the clandestine Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in
8 Iran, years after construction started on the plant.

9 (9) In 2010, the Islamic Republic of Iran re-
10 portedly had enriched uranium to a level of 20 per-
11 cent.

12 (10) On March 9, 2016, the Islamic Republic of
13 Iran launched 2 variations of the Qadr medium-
14 range ballistic missile.

15 (11) On January 28, 2017, the Islamic Repub-
16 lic of Iran conducted a test of a medium-range bal-
17 listic missile, which traveled an estimated 600 miles
18 and provides the Islamic Republic of Iran the capa-
19 bility to threaten military installations of the United
20 States in the Middle East.

21 (12) In 2018, Israel seized a significant portion
22 of the nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of
23 Iran, which contained tens of thousands of files and
24 compact discs relating to past efforts at nuclear
25 weapon design, development, and manufacturing by

1 the Islamic Republic of Iran, including such efforts
2 occurring after 2003.

3 (13) On September 27, 2018, Israel revealed
4 the existence of a secret warehouse housing radio-
5 active material in the Turquz Abad district in
6 Tehran, and an inspection of the warehouse by the
7 International Atomic Energy Agency detected radio-
8 active particles, which the Government of the Is-
9 lamic Republic of Iran failed to adequately explain.

10 (14) On June 19, 2020, the International
11 Atomic Energy Agency adopted Resolution GOV/
12 2020/34 expressing “serious concern . . . that Iran
13 has not provided access to the Agency under the Ad-
14 ditional Protocol to two locations”.

15 (15) On January 8, 2020, an Iranian missile
16 struck an Iraqi military base where members of the
17 United States Armed Forces were stationed, result-
18 ing in 11 of such members being treated for injuries.

19 (16) On April 17, 2021, the International
20 Atomic Energy Agency verified that the Islamic Re-
21 public of Iran had begun to enrich uranium to 60
22 percent purity.

23 (17) On August 14, 2021, President of Iran
24 Hassan Rouhani stated that “Iran’s Atomic Energy
25 Organization can enrich uranium by 20 percent and

1 60 percent and if one day our reactors need it, it
2 can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity”.

3 (18) According to the International Institute
4 for Strategic Studies, the Islamic Republic of Iran
5 has “between six and eight liquid-fuel ballistic mis-
6 siles and up to 12 solid-fuel systems” as of 2021.

7 (19) On November 9, 2021, the Islamic Repub-
8 lic of Iran completed Zolfaghar-1400, a 3-day war
9 game that included conventional navy, army, air
10 force, and air defense forces testing cruise missiles,
11 torpedoes, and suicide drones in the Strait of
12 Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea, and the
13 Indian Ocean.

14 (20) On December 20, 2021, the Islamic Re-
15 public of Iran commenced a 5-day drill in which it
16 launched a number of short- and long-range ballistic
17 missiles that it claimed could destroy Israel, consti-
18 tuting an escalation in the already genocidal rhetoric
19 of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward Israel.

20 (21) On January 24, 2022, Houthi rebels,
21 backed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, fired 2 mis-
22 siles at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab
23 Emirates, which hosts around 2,000 members of the
24 Armed Forces of the United States.

1 (22) On January 31, 2022, surface-to-air inter-
2 ceptors of the United Arab Emirates shot down a
3 Houthi missile fired at the United Arab Emirates
4 during a visit by President of Israel Isaac Herzog,
5 the first-ever visit of an Israeli President to the
6 United Arab Emirates.

7 (23) On February 9, 2022, the Islamic Repub-
8 lic of Iran unveiled a new surface-to-surface missile,
9 named “Kheibar Shekan”, which has a reported
10 range of 900 miles (1450 kilometers) and is capable
11 of penetrating missile shields.

12 (24) On March 13, 2022, the Islamic Republic
13 of Iran launched 12 missiles into Erbil, Iraq, which
14 struck near a consulate building of the United
15 States.

16 (25) On April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of
17 Iran confirmed the relocation of a production facility
18 for advanced centrifuges from an aboveground facil-
19 ity at Karaj, Iran, to the fortified underground
20 Natanz Enrichment Complex.

21 (26) On April 19, 2022, the Department of
22 State released a report stating that there are “seri-
23 ous concerns” about “possible undeclared nuclear
24 material and activities in Iran”.

1 (27) On May 30, 2022, the International Atom-
2 ic Energy Agency reported that the Islamic Republic
3 of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms,
4 equivalent to 95.5 pounds, of 60 percent highly en-
5 riched uranium, roughly enough material for a nu-
6 clear weapon.

7 (28) On June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of
8 Iran turned off surveillance cameras installed by the
9 International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor ura-
10 nium enrichment activities at nuclear sites in the
11 country.

12 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

13 It is the sense of Congress that—

14 (1) the Department of State has used evidence
15 of the intent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ad-
16 vance a nuclear program to secure the support of
17 the international community in passing and imple-
18 menting United Nations Security Council Resolu-
19 tions on the Islamic Republic of Iran;

20 (2) intelligence agencies have compiled evidence
21 of the intent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ad-
22 vance a nuclear program, with direct evidence of an
23 active nuclear weapons program prior to 2003;

24 (3) an Islamic Republic of Iran that possesses
25 a nuclear weapons capability would be a serious

1 threat to the national security of the United States,
2 Israel, and other allies and partners;

3 (4) the Islamic Republic of Iran has been less
4 than cooperative with international inspectors from
5 the International Atomic Energy Agency and has ob-
6 structed their ability to inspect numerous nuclear fa-
7 cilities across Iran;

8 (5) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to
9 advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs,
10 which are a threat to the national security of the
11 United States, Israel, and other allies and partners;
12 and

13 (6) all possible action should be taken by the
14 United States—

15 (A) to ensure that the Islamic Republic of
16 Iran does not develop a nuclear weapons capa-
17 bility; and

18 (B) to protect against aggression from the
19 Islamic Republic of Iran manifested in its mis-
20 siles program.

21 **SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.**

22 In this Act:

23 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
24 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
25 mittees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.—The term “Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement” means the Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973.

(3) TASK FORCE.—The term “task force” means the task force established under section 5.

(4) UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM.—The term “unmanned aircraft system” has the meaning given the term in section 44801 of title 49, United States Code.

1 **SEC. 5. ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE**
2 **ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITY IN THE ISLAMIC RE-**
3 **PUBLIC OF IRAN.**

4 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall
5 establish a task force to consolidate and synthesize efforts
6 by the United States Government to monitor and assess
7 nuclear weapons activity being carried out by the Islamic
8 Republic of Iran or its proxies.

9 (b) COMPOSITION.—

10 (1) CHAIRPERSON.—The Secretary of State
11 shall be the Chairperson of the task force.

12 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—

13 (A) IN GENERAL.—The task force shall be
14 composed of individuals, each of whom shall be
15 an employee of and appointed to the task force
16 by the head of one of the following agencies:

17 (i) The Department of State.

18 (ii) The Office of the Director of Na-
19 tional Intelligence.

20 (iii) The Department of Defense.

21 (iv) The Department of Energy.

22 (v) The Central Intelligence Agency.

23 (B) ADDITIONAL MEMBERS.—The Chair-
24 person may appoint to the task force additional
25 individuals from other Federal agencies, as the
26 Chairperson considers necessary.

1 **SEC. 6. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.**

2 (a) REPORT ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITY.—

3 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
4 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
5 every 120 days thereafter until December 31, 2028,
6 the Secretary of State, in consultation with the task
7 force, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
8 committees a report on nuclear activity in the Is-
9 lamic Republic of Iran.

10 (2) CONTENTS.—The report required by para-
11 graph (1) shall include—

12 (A) a description and location of current
13 fuel cycle activities for the production of fissile
14 material being undertaken by the Islamic Re-
15 public of Iran, including—

16 (i) research and development activities
17 to procure or construct additional ad-
18 vanced IR-2, IR-6, and other model cen-
19 trifuges and enrichment cascades, includ-
20 ing for stable isotopes;

21 (ii) research and development of re-
22 processing capabilities, including—

23 (I) reprocessing of spent fuel;
24 and

1 (II) extraction of medical iso-
2 topes from irradiated uranium tar-
3 gets;

4 (iii) activities with respect to design-
5 ing or constructing reactors, including—

6 (I) the construction of heavy
7 water reactors;

8 (II) the manufacture or procure-
9 ment of reactor components, including
10 the intended application of such com-
11 ponents; and

12 (III) efforts to rebuild the origi-
13 nal reactor at Arak;

14 (iv) uranium mining, concentration,
15 conversion, and fuel fabrication, includ-
16 ing—

17 (I) estimated uranium ore pro-
18 duction capacity and annual recovery;

19 (II) recovery processes and ore
20 concentrate production capacity and
21 annual recovery;

22 (III) research and development
23 with respect to, and the annual rate
24 of, conversion of uranium; and

1 (IV) research and development
2 with respect to the fabrication of reac-
3 tor fuels, including the use of de-
4 pleted, natural, and enriched uranium;
5 and

6 (v) activities with respect to—

7 (I) producing or acquiring pluto-
8 nium or uranium (or their alloys);

9 (II) conducting research and de-
10 velopment on plutonium or uranium
11 (or their alloys);

12 (III) uranium metal; or

13 (IV) casting, forming, or machin-
14 ing plutonium or uranium;

15 (B) with respect to any activity described
16 in subparagraph (A), a description, as applica-
17 ble, of—

18 (i) the number and type of centrifuges
19 used to enrich uranium and the operating
20 status of such centrifuges;

21 (ii) the number and location of any
22 enrichment or associated research and de-
23 velopment facility used to engage in such
24 activity;

1 (iii) the amount of heavy water, in
2 metric tons, produced by such activity and
3 the acquisition or manufacture of major
4 reactor components, including, for the sec-
5 ond and subsequent reports, the amount
6 produced since the last report;

7 (iv) the number and type of fuel as-
8 sembles produced by the Islamic Republic
9 of Iran, including failed or rejected assem-
10 bles; and

11 (v) the total amount of—

12 (I) uranium-235 enriched to not
13 greater than 5 percent purity;

14 (II) uranium-235 enriched to
15 greater than 5 percent purity and not
16 greater than 20 percent purity;

17 (III) uranium-235 enriched to
18 greater than 20 percent purity and
19 not greater than 60 percent purity;

20 (IV) uranium-235 enriched to
21 greater than 60 percent purity and
22 not greater than 90 percent purity;
23 and

24 (V) uranium-235 enriched great-
25 er than 90 percent purity;

1 (C) a description of weaponization plans
2 and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
3 including—

4 (i) plans and capabilities with respect
5 to—

6 (I) weapon design, including fis-
7 sion, warhead miniaturization, and
8 boosted and early thermonuclear
9 weapon design;

10 (II) high-yield fission develop-
11 ment;

12 (III) design, development, acqui-
13 sition, or use of computer models to
14 simulate nuclear explosive devices;
15 and

16 (IV) design, development, fabri-
17 cating, acquisition, or use of explo-
18 sively driven neutron sources or spe-
19 cialized materials for explosively driv-
20 en neutron sources;

21 (ii) the ability of the Islamic Republic
22 of Iran to deploy a working or reliable de-
23 livery vehicle capable of carrying a nuclear
24 warhead;

1 (iii) the estimated breakout time for
2 the Islamic Republic of Iran to develop and
3 deploy a nuclear weapon, including a crude
4 nuclear weapon;

5 (iv) the status and location of any re-
6 search and development work site related
7 to the preparation of an underground nu-
8 clear test; and

9 (v) any dual-use item (as defined
10 under section 730.3 of title 15, Code of
11 Federal Regulations or listed on the List
12 of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment,
13 Materials, Software, and Related Tech-
14 nology issued by the Nuclear Suppliers
15 Group or any successor list) the Islamic
16 Republic of Iran is using to further the nu-
17 clear weapon or missile program;

18 (D) an identification of clandestine nuclear
19 facilities, including nuclear facilities and activi-
20 ties discovered or reported by Israel or other al-
21 lies or partners of the United States;

22 (E) an assessment of whether the Islamic
23 Republic of Iran—

24 (i) is in compliance with the Com-
25 prehensive Safeguards Agreement and

1 modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Ar-
2 rangements to the Comprehensive Safe-
3 guards Agreement; and

4 (ii) has denied access to sites that the
5 International Atomic Energy Agency has
6 sought to inspect during the period covered
7 by the report;

8 (F) any diversion by the Islamic Republic
9 of Iran of uranium, carbon-fiber, or other mate-
10 rials for use in an undeclared or clandestine fa-
11 cility;

12 (G) an assessment of activities related to
13 nuclear weapons conducted at facilities con-
14 trolled by the Ministry of Defense and Armed
15 Forces Logistics of Iran, the Islamic Revolu-
16 tionary Guard Corps, and the Organization of
17 Defensive Innovation and Research, including
18 an analysis of gaps in knowledge due to the
19 lack of inspections and nontransparency of such
20 facilities;

21 (H) a description of activities between the
22 Islamic Republic of Iran and other countries,
23 including the Democratic People's Republic of
24 Korea, or persons with respect to sharing infor-

1 mation on nuclear weapons or activities related
2 to weaponization;

3 (I) with respect to any new ballistic, cruise,
4 or hypersonic missiles being designed and tested
5 by the Islamic Republic of Iran or any of its
6 proxies, a description of—

7 (i) the type of missile;

8 (ii) the range of such missiles;

9 (iii) the capability of such missiles to
10 deliver a nuclear warhead;

11 (iv) the number of such missiles; and

12 (v) any testing of such missiles;

13 (J) an assessment of whether the Islamic
14 Republic of Iran or any of its proxies possesses
15 an unmanned aircraft system or other military
16 equipment capable of delivering a nuclear weap-
17 on;

18 (K) an assessment of whether the Islamic
19 Republic of Iran or any of its proxies has en-
20 gaged in new or evolving nuclear weapons devel-
21 opment activities that would pose a threat to
22 the national security of the United States,
23 Israel, or other partners or allies; and

24 (L) any other information that the task
25 force determines is necessary to ensure a com-

plete understanding of the nuclear or other weapons activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

(3) FORM; PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—

(A) FORM.—Each report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex for information that, if released, would be detrimental to the national security of the United States.

(B) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion of a report required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the public on an internet website of the Department of State.

(b) IMMEDIATE REPORT REQUIRED.—If the task force receives credible intelligence of a significant development in the nuclear weapons capabilities or delivery systems capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which if not reported before the delivery of the next report under subsection (a)(1) would be detrimental to the national security of the United States, Israel, or other allies or partners, the task force shall, within 72 hours of the receipt of such intelligence, submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on such development.

1 **SEC. 7. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO ADDRESS IDENTIFIED**
2 **NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS**
3 **TO THE UNITED STATES.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the
5 submission of the initial report under section 6(a), and
6 annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit
7 to the appropriate congressional committees a diplomatic
8 strategy that outlines a comprehensive plan for engaging
9 with partners and allies of the United States regarding
10 the nuclear weapons and missile activities of the Islamic
11 Republic of Iran.

12 (b) CONTENTS.—The diplomatic strategy required by
13 subsection (a) shall include—

14 (1) a description of efforts of the United States
15 to counter efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran to
16 project political and military influence into the Mid-
17 dle East;

18 (2) a response by the Secretary of State to the
19 increased threat that new or evolving nuclear weap-
20 ons or missile development activities by the Islamic
21 Republic of Iran pose to United States citizens and
22 the diplomatic presence of the United States in the
23 Middle East;

24 (3) a description of a coordinated whole-of-gov-
25 ernment approach to use political, economic, and se-
26 curity related tools to address such activities; and

1 (4) a comprehensive plan for engaging with al-
2 lies and regional partners in all relevant multilateral
3 fora to address such activities.

4 (c) UPDATED STRATEGY RELATED TO IMMEDIATE
5 REPORTS.—Not later than 15 days after the submission
6 of report under section 6(b), the Secretary of State shall
7 submit to the appropriate congressional committees an up-
8 date to the most recent diplomatic strategy submitted
9 under subsection (a).

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