[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4824 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4824
To provide for proper oversight of North Korea policy, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
September 13, 2022
Mr. Menendez (for himself and Mr. Hagerty) introduced the following
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To provide for proper oversight of North Korea policy, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``North Korea Policy Oversight Act of
2022''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Nuclear nonproliferation treaty.--The term ``nuclear
nonproliferation treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London,
and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483).
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The world faces a greater risk of nuclear conflict
today than at any time since the height of the Cold War, due to
Russia's threatened use of nuclear weapons during its invasion
of Ukraine, China's pursuing a rapid expansion of its nuclear
arsenal, Iran's continued efforts to pursue nuclear weapons,
and Kim Jong-un's relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles in the face of global condemnation and
severe economic sanctions by the international community.
(2) The North Korean nuclear program did not arise
instantaneously, but is the culmination of the rogue regime's
illegal efforts over 7 decades to acquire a viable deterrent
that threatens both the United States and our critical allies
in the Indo-Pacific region.
(3) North Korea has conducted 6 nuclear tests since 2006,
with each test increasing in explosive strength and
sophistication.
(4) North Korea's last nuclear test, occurring on September
3, 2017, was its largest nuclear explosion to date, registering
a 6.3 magnitude earthquake according to the United States
Geological Survey with an estimated yield of 140 kilotons.
(5) According to open source analysis, North Korea has
produced enough fissile material for at least 30 to 60 nuclear
weapons.
(6) North Korea maintains a robust ballistic missile
portfolio that includes a diverse array of delivery systems
capable of striking targets throughout the region, including
short-range Scuds, medium-range No-Dong missiles, an
increasingly capable cruise missile program, and
intercontinental ballistic missiles that are potentially
capable of targeting the United States homeland.
(7) The Department of Defense estimates that North Korea
currently wields approximately 200 launchers capable of firing
short and medium range ballistic missiles.
(8) Since January 2022, North Korea has conducted 13
ballistic missile tests, including at least three assessed in
open source analysis to be intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(9) Rigorous international economic sanctions applied since
the passage of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement
Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-122), including by the United
States and the United Nations Security Council, intensified
pressure on the regime and focused international attention on
the urgency of the challenge posed by the Kim regime in
Pyongyang.
(10) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea has flagrantly defied the international community by
illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile
programs, in violation of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013),
2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397
(2017).
(11) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its own
people and citizens of other countries, including the United
States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.
(12) In 2018 and 2019, the United States and North Korea
engaged in intensive diplomacy, including three leader-level
summits between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-Un, resulting in the
first leader-level commitment from North Korea to denuclearize,
as stated in the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement.
(13) The stakes for the security of the United States and
United States allies are such that all credible diplomatic
options must be prioritized, resourced, and fully pursued, in
addition to maintaining robust and credible deterrence.
(14) Economic pressure and sanctions provide critical
leverage in any such diplomatic negotiations and must be
maintained and strengthened until the North Korean regime takes
meaningful and verifiable actions toward denuclearization.
(15) The North Korean regime has a record of failing to
live up to its diplomatic commitments, rejecting good faith
efforts by United States and international negotiators, and
leveraging talks to extract concessions such as sanctions
relief.
(16) In order to prevent the North Korean regime from
further developing, using, or disseminating nuclear or
ballistic weapons, technology, and related material, the United
States Government should continue a campaign of economic
pressure and sanctions, counter-proliferation, containment, and
deterrence until North Korea completely, verifiably, and
irreversibly denuclearizes.
(17) The North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act
of 2016 states that there can be no sanctions relief unless
North Korea has ``made significant progress toward completely,
verifiably, and irreversibly dismantling all of its nuclear,
chemical, biological, and radiological weapons programs,
including all programs for the development of systems designed
in whole or in part for the delivery of such weapons''.
(18) The United States Government has successfully pursued
a policy of deterrence, which has kept the American people safe
from a nuclear attack from the Russian Federation, China, and
other states with nuclear weapons, which have a combined
nuclear arsenal of more than 7,000 warheads.
(19) Over time, the United States policy of deterrence,
containment, and diplomacy to reduce nuclear weapons risks
protected the American people and contributed to the peaceful
dissolution of the Soviet Union.
(20) The United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan
are all free societies that are committed to the principles of
inclusive democracy, respect for human potential and individual
freedom, and the belief that the peaceful spread of these
principles will result in a safer and brighter future for all
of mankind.
(21) The Governments and people of the United States, the
Republic of Korea, and Japan can help realize this future
through further strengthening their economic, political,
social, cultural, and security relationships.
(22) The Governments and people of the United States, the
Republic of Korea, and Japan share a commitment to free and
open markets, high standards for the free flow of commerce and
trade, and the establishment of an inclusive architecture for
regional and global trade and development.
(23) The United States-Japan and United States-Republic of
Korea security alliances have evolved considerably over many
decades and will continue to share greater responsibilities and
dedicate themselves to a secure and prosperous region and
world.
(24) Robust military posture, including regular training
and exercises, by the United States, the Republic of Korea, and
Japan, is critical to ensuring peace and stability in Northeast
Asia.
(25) In the absence of an imminent threat to the United
States or its allies, a preventive war against North Korea
would pose extraordinary risks to the United States and
security in Northeast Asia and would require consent of
Congress under article I of the Constitution.
(26) With China engaging in a ``strategic breakout'', as
noted by United States Strategic Commander Admiral Charles
Richard in August 2021, the United States faces an
unprecedented strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region as
China's nuclear weapons program will alter the nuclear balance
in the Indo-Pacific, including Northeast Asia.
(27) An effective policy of deterrence requires--
(A) clear, consistent, and credible messaging of
costs to an adversary such that it recognizes that its
use of nuclear weapons would result in massive
retaliation; and
(B) the vigorous use of diplomatic, economic,
military, and other coercive tools to ensure stable
deterrence and prevent an adversary from proliferating
material or technology.
(28) The United States requires a comprehensive diplomatic
strategy that outlines the fundamental principles, actions, and
verification and compliance mechanisms necessary to properly
engage the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea on the full denuclearization of North Korea.
SEC. 4. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.
(a) In General.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to pursue all credible diplomatic means to achieve the
complete and verifiable dismantlement of North Korean nuclear
weapons and ballistic and cruise missile programs;
(2) until such time as denuclearization is achieved--
(A) to deter North Korea from using weapons of mass
destruction or leveraging those weapons to coerce
United States allies;
(B) to contain attempts by North Korea to
proliferate such weapons and technologies;
(C) to ensure that the United States and allies
maintain credible deterrence against North Korea,
including the presence of United States military troops
in the Korean Peninsula and Japan, as well as the
development and deployment of new military
capabilities; and
(D) to continue the maximum pressure campaign
against North Korea and its enablers, in cooperation
with the United Nations and the international
community;
(3) should diplomacy and deterrence fail to result in the
complete, verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, to
reserve the right to utilize all available options to protect
and defend United States national security interests and meet
United States treaty obligations; and
(4) to uphold the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and not
recognize North Korea as a legitimate nuclear weapons state.
(b) Diplomacy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to pursue diplomatic engagement, as appropriate and
consistent with United States national security interests, with
the North Korean regime for the purposes of--
(A) advancing meaningful negotiations regarding
denuclearization, including the Government of North
Korea abandoning and dismantling its unlawful missile
and nuclear weapons programs, ceasing its proliferation
activities, and coming into compliance with all
relevant international agreements and United Nations
Security Council resolutions;
(B) reducing the risks of military miscalculation;
and
(C) creating opportunities for the development of
confidence building measures as part of a broader
effort to denuclearize North Korea;
(2) to formulate and carry out policy affecting the Korean
Peninsula in close cooperation with United States allies,
particularly the Republic of Korea;
(3) to encourage all nations to deny North Korea the
ability to maintain diplomatic missions on foreign soil until
such time as the Government of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea takes credible and verifiable steps toward
denuclearization;
(4) to encourage all nations to fully implement and enforce
United Nations sanctions with respect to North Korea, including
sanctions related to ending the practice of hosting overseas
North Korean workers;
(5) to increase the effectiveness of United States
sanctions by seeking to work through the United Nations and
with other like-minded countries to ensure a multilateral
approach to sanctions;
(6) to provide unmistakable assurance to Japan and the
Republic of Korea, including through extended deterrence
commitments and the presence of forward-deployed United States
military forces, that the United States is committed to
fulfilling its treaty obligations if they are attacked;
(7) to resist actions by the People's Republic of China
(PRC) to use North Korea issues as a way to draw the attention
of the United States Government away from other important
regional issues and challenges;
(8) to provide support for North Korean refugees and asylum
seekers in accordance with United States law;
(9) to promote the human rights and dignity of the North
Korean people, including through the United Nations and other
multilateral institutions; and
(10) to seek opportunities for humanitarian actions, such
as family reunification and the return of human remains.
(c) Economic Pressure.--It is the policy of the United States to
sustain and calibrate economic pressure on North Korea until the regime
undertakes meaningful and verifiable actions toward denuclearization,
including by--
(1) encouraging all nations to robustly implement and
enforce existing United Nations sanctions;
(2) leveraging the strength of the United States financial
system to deny access by the Government of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea and those with whom such government
facilitates illicit financial transactions to the United States
and global markets, including through the use of secondary
sanctions;
(3) encouraging all nations, consistent with United Nations
Security Council resolutions, to end the practice of hosting
North Korean citizens as guest workers, recognizing that such
workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit source of
revenue for the Kim regime and its nuclear ambitions;
(4) working with the international community on rigorous
interdiction of shipments to and from North Korea, including
ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United Nations Security
Council resolutions that have banned nearly every major export
from North Korea; and
(5) strictly implementing and enforcing United States laws
with respect to sanctioning entities, including Russian and
Chinese entities, that knowingly engage with sanctioned
entities from North Korea or trade in items prohibited under
United Nations Security Council resolutions.
(d) Proliferation of Nuclear and Missile Technology.--It is the
policy of the United States--
(1) to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons, missile
technology, or related material to or from North Korea and
other states or non-state actors;
(2) to support the efforts of the international community
to detect, interdict, and prevent the transfers of nuclear or
missile technology or related items to or from North Korea;
(3) to prioritize close coordination with global partners,
including through technical assistance and capacity building,
to enhance the ability of the global community to monitor,
interdict, and prosecute entities that engage in transfer of
nuclear weapons, missile technology, or related material to or
from North Korea; and
(4) consistent with United States obligations under the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to encourage all countries that
are party to such treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency
agreements to abide by their obligations and commitments.
(e) Alliances and Military Posture.--It is the policy of the United
States--
(1) to reaffirm the importance of the United States-Japan
and United States-Republic of Korea alliances for maintaining
peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;
(2) to reaffirm United States extended deterrence
commitments to Japan and the Republic of Korea, and to back up
such commitments with concrete actions such as prioritizing
nuclear modernization to sustain credible deterrence;
(3) to reaffirm the importance of the forward-deployed
presence of United States military forces in Japan and Korea,
and affirm close alliance coordination on any adjustment of
United States military posture in the region;
(4) to strengthen United States efforts to confront
emerging or asymmetric challenges, including cyber and space;
(5) to safeguard maritime security and ensure freedom of
navigation, commerce, and overflight in the Indo-Pacific
region; and
(6) to cooperate with allies and partners in the provision
of public goods to the region, including humanitarian relief
and disaster response.
(f) Military Measures.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to keep United States security commitments to United
States allies in the face of North Korea's continuing threat,
including taking necessary actions for United States self-
defense and the defense of United States allies, including
joint military exercises, modernization of weapons systems
deployed in the region, and robust counter-provocation planning
by the United States and Republic of Korea Combined Forces
Command;
(2) consistent with longstanding United States interests in
maintaining stability in Asia, to develop and deploy effective
and reliable anti-ballistic missile capabilities to defend the
United States homeland, United States forces in the region, and
United States allies Japan and South Korea;
(3) to formulate and carry out military planning and
operations impacting the Korean Peninsula in close cooperation
with United States allies, particularly the Republic of Korea
and Japan;
(4) to deter North Korea in a manner that bolsters the
force posture and military strength of our alliance and partner
networks in the broader Asia-Pacific region; and
(5) to maintain, as necessary and appropriate, credible and
overwhelming military options against the Government of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, consistent with efforts
to deter the regime from use of nuclear weapons, ballistic
missiles, and related technology.
(g) Human Rights.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to continue to make it a priority to improve
information access in North Korea by exploring the use of new
and emerging technologies and expanding nongovernmental radio
broadcasting to North Korea, including news and information, to
increase information dissemination in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (``DPRK'');
(2) to commit to exploring appropriate opportunities for
coordinating efforts to plan for humanitarian needs in the
DPRK;
(3) to press for non-choreographed access for the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights;
(4) to continue to seek cooperation from foreign
governments to allow the United States to process North Korean
refugees overseas for United States resettlement;
(5) to urge the Government of the People's Republic of
China to halt forcible repatriation of North Koreans;
(6) to promote democracy, human rights, and a market
economy in North Korea;
(7) to increase the availability of nongovernmental
controlled information inside North Korea; and
(8) to uphold the North Korean regime to resolve the issue
of Japanese citizens abducted by the North Korean regime and to
emphasize the need for their safe return.
(h) Information Dissemination Efforts.--It is the policy of the
United States--
(1) to increase the flow of information, news, and cultural
programming into North Korea, including through radio and
television broadcasts, digital media, and other means;
(2) to increase the flow of information to North Korean
citizens, including through radio and television broadcasts,
digital media, and other means; and
(3) to fulfill all requirements under United States law,
including the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act
of 2016, with regard to providing resources for freedom of
information efforts into North Korea, and to regularly consult
with Congress regarding such efforts.
(i) Strategy Required.--
(1) In general.--The President shall submit to the national
security committees a detailed strategy, which may include a
classified annex, for the implementation of policies outlined
in subsections (b) through (h), augmented by briefings to the
national security committees on a quarterly basis or as
requested.
(2) National security committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``national security committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select
Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 5. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.
(a) Diplomatic Strategy Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for a
period of two years, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that describes--
(A) how the diplomatic negotiations with the
Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
are expected to proceed; and
(B) actions taken by the United States Government
to address the threats posed by, and the capabilities
of, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(2) Elements.--Each report required under paragraph (1)
shall include--
(A) an overview of ongoing efforts by the United
States Government to develop diplomatic strategies to
ensure that North Korea returns to negotiations with
the United States, as well as a negotiation strategy
for the United States Government in the event that
North Korea returns to negotiations with the United
States, including an assessment of strategies--
(i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization of
North Korea;
(ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the
ballistic and cruise missile programs of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
(iii) to continue the maximum pressure
campaign, in coordination with United States
allies;
(B) an assessment of--
(i) the roadmap toward peaceful
denuclearization of North Korea and the
elimination of the nuclear, ballistic, and
cruise missile threats posed by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea;
(ii) specific actions that the Government
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
would need to take for such roadmap to become
viable;
(iii) specific actions that the United
States Government could possibly take for such
roadmap to become viable;
(iv) specific actions that other countries
in the Indo-Pacific, including the Republic of
Korea, Japan, China, and Russia, could possibly
take for such roadmap to become viable; and
(v) specific actions that international and
regional institutions could possibly take for
such roadmap to become viable; and
(C) a summary of the United States strategy to
increase international coordination and cooperation,
whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally,
including sanctions implementation, enforcement, and
interdiction--
(i) to encourage credible diplomatic
engagement by the DPRK; and
(ii) to address any threat posed by the
nuclear, ballistic, and cruise missile programs
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(3) Form.--Each report required under this subsection shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(4) Updates.--Should the United States and North Korea
engage in bilateral or multilateral diplomacy to achieve,
implement, or verify that North Korea's denuclearization is
ongoing, the President shall augment the first strategy report
submitted with written updates on the negotiation process, to
be submitted to the appropriate congressional committees every
45 days thereafter.
(b) Policy of the United States With Respect to Sanctions Against
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--Not later than 30 days
after terminating any sanction with respect to the activities of the
Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a person
acting for or on behalf of that government, or any other person as
provided for in Executive Order 13687 or Executive Order 13722, to the
extent relevant, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report regarding the cessation of any
illicit activity, including any implicated by United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013),
2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017), by that
government or person.
(c) Alliances and Military Posture and Extended Deterrence.--
(1) Report on united states force posture in the united
states indo-pacific command area of responsibility.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
thereafter for a period of two years, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report providing an assessment of the
effect of any negotiations or agreements with the DPRK
on United States security interests and United States
military presence and alliance implications in the
United States Indo-Pacific Command area of
responsibility.
(B) Elements.--The report required under
subparagraph (A) shall include--
(i) a review of current and emerging United
States national security interests in the
United States Indo-Pacific Command area of
responsibility;
(ii) a review of current United States
military force posture and deployment plans of
the United States Indo-Pacific Command; and
(iii) the views of counterpart governments,
including military commanders in the region, of
the impact of negotiations or agreements with
the DPRK on United States extended deterrence
commitments to the Republic of Korea.
(2) Report on united states force posture in the united
states forces korea area of responsibility.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every year
thereafter for a period of two years, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report providing an assessment of the
effect of any negotiations or agreements with the DPRK
on United States security interests and United States
military presence and alliance implications in the
United States Forces Korea area of responsibility.
(B) Elements.--The report required under
subparagraph (A) shall include--
(i) a review of current and emerging United
States national security interests in the
United States Forces Korea area of
responsibility;
(ii) a review of current United States
military force posture and deployment plans of
the United States Forces Korea; and
(iii) the views of counterpart governments,
including military commanders in the region, of
the impact of negotiations or agreements with
the DPRK on United States extended deterrence
commitments to the Republic of Korea.
(3) Report on united states force posture in the united
states forces japan area of responsibility.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
thereafter for a period of two years, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report providing an assessment of the
effect of any negotiations or agreements with the DPRK
on United States security interests and United States
military presence and alliance implications in the
United States Forces Japan area of responsibility.
(B) Elements.--The report required under
subparagraph (A) shall include--
(i) a review of current and emerging United
States national security interests in the
United States Forces Japan area of
responsibility;
(ii) a review of current United States
military force posture and deployment plans of
the United States Forces Japan; and
(iii) the views of counterpart governments,
including military commanders in the region, of
the impact of negotiations or agreements with
the DPRK on United States extended deterrence
commitments to Japan.
(4) Authority to consolidate reports.--Any reports required
to be submitted under this subsection to the appropriate
congressional committees that are subject to a deadline for
submission consisting of the same unit of time may be
consolidated into a single report. The consolidated report
shall contain all information required under this Act with
respect to the reports comprising such consolidated report.
SEC. 6. BRIEFINGS.
(a) Member Briefings.--
(1) In general.--Following each round of diplomatic talks
between the United States and North Korea, the Secretary of
State and the Director of National Intelligence shall hold, for
the appropriate congressional committees and congressional
leaders, briefings on the negotiations.
(2) Classification.--The briefings required under paragraph
shall be held in a classified format.
(b) Staff Briefings.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, with the
concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, shall
hold monthly briefings for cleared national security staff
members of the appropriate congressional committees.
(2) Classification.--The briefings required under paragraph
(1) shall be held in a classified format.
SEC. 7. CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS.
During each quarterly period that diplomatic talks undertaken
between the United States and North Korea continue, the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives shall, as appropriate, hold hearings and
otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the negotiations.
SEC. 8. OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH NORTH KOREA.
(a) Transmission to Congress of Nuclear Agreements With North Korea
and Verification Assessment With Respect to Such Agreements.--
(1) Transmission of agreements.--Not later than 5 days
after reaching an agreement with North Korea relating to the
nuclear and missile program of North Korea, the President shall
transmit to the appropriate congressional committees, the
majority and minority leader of the Senate and the Speaker,
majority leader, and minority leader of the House of
Representatives--
(A) the agreement, including all related materials
and annexes; and
(B) a verification assessment report prepared by
the Secretary of State in accordance with paragraph
(2).
(2) Verification assessment report.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall
prepare, with respect to an agreement described in
paragraph (1), a report assessing--
(i) the extent to which the United States
Government will be able to verify that North
Korea is complying with its obligations and
commitments under the agreement, including how
North Korea might attempt to conceal its
program;
(ii) the adequacy of the safeguards and
other control mechanisms and other assurances
contained in the agreement with respect to
North Korean nuclear and missile programs to
ensure North Korea activities are limited to
the subset of activities permitted under the
agreement; and
(iii) the capacity and capability of the
United States and international organizations,
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency,
to effectively implement the verification
regime required by or related to the agreement,
including whether the United States or
international organizations will have--
(I) sufficient access to--
(aa) all nuclear facilities
that span the entire nuclear
fuel cycle;
(bb) facilities associated
with the nuclear weaponization
program;
(cc) facilities associated
with its missile program; and
(dd) declared and
undeclared sites; and
(II) the ability to investigate
suspicious sites or allegations of
covert nuclear-related activities.
(B) Classified annex.--The report required under
subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted in unclassified
form, but shall include a classified annex prepared in
consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified
information.
(b) Sense of Congress on North Korea Final Agreement.--It is the
sense of Congress that any binding agreement between the United States
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should be submitted to
the United States as a treaty and subject to the advice and consent of
the Senate in accordance with article II, section 2, clause 2 of the
Constitution of the United States.
SEC. 9. ADDITIONAL REPORTS.
(a) Verification and Compliance Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after entering into
an agreement with North Korea, the Secretary of State, with the
concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
North Korea's record of verification and compliance.
(2) Classification.--The report required under paragraph--
(A) may be submitted in classified form;
(B) shall contain an unclassified executive
summary; and
(C) may contain an unclassified annex.
(b) Semi-Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after entering
into an agreement with North Korea, and not less frequently than once
every 180 days thereafter for a period of two years, the President
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership
a report on North Korea's nuclear and missile program and the
compliance of North Korea with the agreement during the period covered
by the report, which shall include--
(1) a description of any action or failure to act by the
Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that
breached the agreement or is in noncompliance with the terms of
the agreement;
(2) a description of the status and activities of any North
Korea nuclear facilities related to the nuclear fuel cycle,
including mining and exploration, milling, conversion,
enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactors, reprocessing, and
storage;
(3) a description of the status and activities of any North
Korea nuclear facilities related to the North Korean nuclear
weaponization program, including research and development,
education and training, and testing;
(4) a description of the status and activities of any North
Korea missile facilities, including research and development,
production, testing, and basing;
(5) a description of any delay by the Government of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea of more than 1 week in
providing inspectors access to facilities, people, and
documents in North Korea as required by the agreement;
(6) a description of any covert nuclear activities
undertaken by the Government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, including any covert nuclear weapons-
related, covert fissile material activities, covert missile
activities, or research and development; and
(7) a description of any transfer or diversion by the
Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its
nuclear materials, components, technology, or equipment to
state or non-state actors.
SEC. 10. REPORT ON NORTH KOREAN CYBER ACTIVITIES TO FUND ITS WEAPONS
PROGRAM.
(a) Finding.--As North Korea continues to be cut off from the
international financial system, North Korea increasingly relies on new
methods and means--such as cryptocurrency, digital currency, and
cyberattacks--to finance its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles
programs. A February 2022 United Nations report found that North Korean
hackers stole more than $50,000,000 in cryptocurrencies between 2020
and mid-2021. The report follows the United Nations' 2019 findings that
North Korea had accumulated an estimated $2,000,000,000 in stolen
assets to facilitate its weapons program through cyberattacks.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary
of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
Attorney General, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on North Korea's use of cyberattacks and
cryptocurrency and other digital currency to finance its
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs, including
through the evasion of sanctions.
(2) Elements.--The report required under subparagraph (A)
shall include--
(A) a review of how North Korea uses cyberattacks,
including stealing virtual assets, to support its
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs;
(B) a discussion of how cryptocurrency exchanges
and exchange operators facilitate North Korean theft,
and recommendations for sanctioning persons and
entities linked to illicit cryptocurrency exchange;
(C) a review of how the United States Government is
tracing, disrupting, interdicting, and deterring these
attacks, including--
(i) efforts to deter telecommunications
companies from facilitating North Korean
cyberattacks directed at digital financial
platforms;
(ii) efforts to deter over-the-counter
(OTC) brokers and other actors from laundering
digital assets and converting such assets to
fiat currencies;
(iii) efforts to coordinate cryptocurrency
regulations with partners and allies, including
through forums like the United Nations, the
Financial Action Task Force, the Group of
Seven, and the Group of Twenty; and
(iv) efforts to increase intelligence
sharing on cyber threats with partners and
allies to better trace North Korean
cyberattacks and cyber theft of digital assets;
and
(D) a review of how the United States Government is
working with its allies and partners, as well as
international institutions and the private sector, to
trace, disrupt, interdict, and deter North Korea's
cyberattacks.
SEC. 11. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO USE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY
TO EVADE SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA
AND ABDUCTION BY NORTH KOREAN PERSONS OF CITIZENS OF
JAPAN.
Section 104(a) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement
Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9214(a)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (14), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (15) as paragraph (17);
(3) by inserting after paragraph (14) the following:
``(15) knowingly uses or has used, or directly facilitates
or has directly facilitated the use of, cryptocurrency, a
digital currency, or a comparable monetary instrument to evade
sanctions with respect to North Korea imposed by the United
States or pursuant to an applicable United Nations Security
Council resolution;
``(16) is a North Korean person and knowingly participated
in or facilitated the abduction of a citizen of Japan; or'';
and
(4) in paragraph (17), as redesignated by paragraph (2) of
this section, by striking ``(14)'' and inserting ``(16)''.
SEC. 12. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL STABILITY OF NORTH
KOREA.
Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of
National Intelligence shall jointly submit to Congress a classified
report on the political, economic, and social stability of North Korea.
SEC. 13. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NORTH KOREA.
(a) In General.--There is established, within the Department of
State, the Office of the Special Representative for North Korea (in
this section referred to as the ``Office''). The head of the Office
shall have the rank and status of ambassador and shall be appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
head of the Office shall report directly to the Secretary of State.
(b) Duties.--The head of the Office shall have such duties and
exercise such powers as the Secretary of State shall prescribe,
including implementing the policy of the United States towards North
Korea, preparations for possible negotiations with North Korea, and
long-term planning for various scenarios with respect to the Korean
Peninsula.
(c) Independence of the Office.--The Office of the Special
Representative for North Korea shall maintain management and budget
independence and shall maintain an adequate number of dedicated staff.
(d) Briefing.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Department of State shall brief the
appropriate congressional committees on the structure and priorities of
the Office, including with respect to staffing and management.
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