[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 982 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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117th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 982
To extend the life of the Minuteman III and redirect savings from the
development of the new ground-based strategic deterrent program toward
the development of a universal coronavirus vaccine, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 25, 2021
Mr. Markey (for himself, Mr. Van Hollen, Mr. Sanders, and Mr. Merkley)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on Armed Services
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To extend the life of the Minuteman III and redirect savings from the
development of the new ground-based strategic deterrent program toward
the development of a universal coronavirus vaccine, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Investing in Cures Before Missiles
Act of 2021'' or the ``ICBM Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) According to the Congressional Budget Office, the
projected cost to sustain and modernize the United States
nuclear arsenal, as of 2017, ``is $1.2 trillion in 2017 dollars
over the 2017-2046 period: more than $800 billion to operate
and sustain (that is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear forces and
about $400 billion to modernize them''. With inflation, the
cost rises to $1,700,000,000,000 and does not include the cost
of the additional nuclear capabilities proposed in the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review.
(2) The Government Accountability Office found in July 2020
that the Department of Defense and the National Nuclear
Security Administration have still not taken meaningful steps
to address affordability concerns or heeded the Government
Accountability Office's recommendation to consider ``deferring
the start of or cancelling specific modernization programs'',
including the W87-1 warhead modification program, to address
increases in the weapons activities budget requests of the
National Nuclear Security Administration.
(3) The ground-based strategic deterrent program is
expected to cost between $93,100,000,000 and $95,800,000,000,
which does not include the cost of the W87-1 warhead
modification program or the cost to produce new plutonium pits
for the warhead. The total estimated life cycle cost of the
ground-based strategic deterrent program is $264,000,000,000,
and the program is intended to replace 400 deployed Minuteman
III missiles with more than 600 new missiles, to allow for test
flights and spares.
(4) The Air Force awarded a sole-source contract to
Northrop Grumman for the engineering and manufacturing
component of the ground-based strategic deterrent program in
September 2020, raising concerns that the absence of
competition for the award may result in higher than projected
costs to United States taxpayers.
(5) The National Nuclear Security Administration is also in
the early stages of developing a replacement intercontinental
ballistic missile warhead, the W87-1, and expanding plutonium
pit production to build new warhead cores, costing at least
$12,000,000,000 and $9,000,000,000, respectively, to meet the
modernization needs of the ground-based strategic deterrent
program.
(6) Maintaining and updating the current Minuteman III
missiles is possible for multiple decades and, according to the
Congressional Budget Office, through 2036, this would cost
$37,000,000,000 less in 2017 dollars than developing and
deploying the ground-based strategic deterrent program.
(7) A public opinion poll conducted from October 12 to 28,
2020, by ReThink Media and the Federation of American
Scientists found that only 26 percent of registered voters in
the United States preferred replacing the Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missile with the ground-based
strategic deterrent, as compared to 60 percent of registered
voters who opposed replacing the Minuteman III missile.
(8) On April 3, 2019, Lieutenant General Richard M. Clark,
then-Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence
and Nuclear Integration, noted in testimony before the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives
that we have ``one more opportunity'' to conduct life extension
on the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile,
indicating the technical feasibility of extending the Minuteman
III missile despite his stated preference for the ground-based
strategic deterrent.
(9) Even in the absence of an intercontinental ballistic
missile leg of the triad, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
signaled that the United States would have an assured
retaliatory capability in the form of several ballistic missile
submarines, which are, ``at present, virtually undetectable,
and there are no known, near-term credible threats to the
survivability of the [ballistic missile submarine] force'', a
benefit that will be enhanced as the Department of Defense
moves to replace the Ohio class ballistic submarine fleet with
the new Columbia class ballistic missile fleet.
(10) While intercontinental ballistic missiles had
historically been the most responsive leg of the United States
nuclear triad, advances in ballistic missile submarine
communications to allow for the dissemination of emergency
action messages in wartime have negated that advantage.
(11) Intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot be
recalled, leaving decision makers with mere minutes to decide
whether to launch the missiles before they are destroyed, known
as a posture of ``launch on warning'' or ``launch under
attack'' in the face of a perceived nuclear attack, greatly
increasing the risk of a national leader initiating a nuclear
war by mistake.
(12) In 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a former lieutenant colonel
of the Soviet Air Defense Forces correctly identified a false
warning in an early warning system that showed several United
States incoming nuclear missiles, preventing Soviet leaders
from launching a retaliatory response, earning Colonel Petrov
the nickname ``the man who saved the world''.
(13) Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, who once
briefed President Bill Clinton on a suspected Russian first
nuclear strike, wrote that the ground-based leg of the nuclear
triad is ``destabilizing because it invites an attack'' and
intercontinental ballistic missiles are ``some of the most
dangerous weapons in the world'' and ``could even trigger an
accidental nuclear war''.
(14) General James Cartwright, former vice chair of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of the United States
Strategic Command, wrote, with Secretary Perry, ``[T]he
greatest danger is not a Russian bolt but a US blunder--that we
might accidentally stumble into nuclear war. As we make
decisions about which weapons to buy, we should use this simple
rule: If a nuclear weapon increases the risk of accidental war
and is not needed to deter an intentional attack, we should not
build it. . . . Certain nuclear weapons, such as . . . the
[intercontinental ballistic missile], carry higher risks of
accidental war that, fortunately, we no longer need to bear. We
are safer without these expensive weapons, and it would be
foolish to replace them.''.
(15) General George Lee Butler, the former Commander-in-
Chief of the Strategic Air Command and subsequently Commander-
in-Chief of the United States Strategic Command, said, ``I
would have removed land-based missiles from our arsenal a long
time ago. I'd be happy to put that mission on the submarines.
So, with a significant fraction of bombers having a nuclear
weapons capability that can be restored to alert very quickly,
and with even a small component of Trident submarines--with all
those missiles and all those warheads on patrol--it's hard to
imagine we couldn't get by.''.
(16) While a sudden ``bolt from the blue'' first strike
from a near-peer nuclear adversary is a highly unlikely
scenario, extending the Minuteman III would maintain the
purported role of the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of
the triad to absorb such an attack.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON EXTENSION OF LIFESPAN OF MINUTEMAN III
AND DEVELOPING A VACCINE OF MASS PREVENTION.
It is the policy of the United States that--
(1) the operational life of the Minuteman III missiles can
be safely extended until at least 2050; and
(2) investments in developing a universal coronavirus
vaccine and efforts to save lives from other types of
infectious diseases are a better use of United States taxpayer
resources than building a new and unnecessary intercontinental
ballistic missile.
SEC. 4. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR VACCINES INSTEAD OF MISSILES.
(a) Transfer From Department of Defense.--Of the unobligated
balances of appropriations made available for the Department of Defense
for the research, development, test, and evaluation of the ground-based
strategic deterrent program, the Secretary of Defense shall transfer
$1,000,000,000 to the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases to conduct or support comprehensive research for the
development of a universal coronavirus vaccine.
(b) Transfer From National Nuclear Security Administration.--The
Secretary of Energy shall transfer all unobligated balances of
appropriations made available for the National Nuclear Security
Administration for the W87-1 warhead modification program to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to research and combat
emerging and zoonotic infectious diseases.
SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR GROUND-BASED STRATEGIC
DETERRENT PROGRAM AND W87-1 WARHEAD MODIFICATION PROGRAM.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for fiscal year 2022 may be obligated or expended for the
ground-based strategic deterrent program or the W87-1 warhead
modification program.
SEC. 6. INDEPENDENT STUDY ON EXTENSION OF MINUTEMAN III
INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES.
(a) Independent Study.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall seek to enter
into a contract with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a
study on extending the life of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic
missiles to 2050.
(b) Matters Included.--The study under subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) A comparison of the costs through 2050 of--
(A) extending the life of Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missiles; and
(B) deploying the ground-based strategic deterrent
program.
(2) An analysis of opportunities to incorporate
technologies into the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic
missile program as part of a service life extension program
that could also be incorporated in the future ground-based
strategic deterrent program, including, at a minimum,
opportunities to increase the resilience against adversary
missile defenses.
(3) An analysis of the benefits and risks of incorporating
sensors and nondestructive testing methods and technologies to
reduce destructive testing requirements and increase the
service life and number of Minuteman III missiles through 2050.
(4) An analysis and validation of the methods used to
estimate the operational service life of Minuteman II and
Minuteman III motors, taking into account the test and launch
experience of motors retired after the operational service life
of such motors in the rocket systems launch program.
(5) An analysis of the risks and benefits of alternative
methods of estimating the operational service life of Minuteman
III motors, such as those methods based on fundamental physical
and chemical processes and nondestructive measurements of
individual motor properties.
(6) An analysis of risks, benefits, and costs of
configuring a Trident II D5 submarine launched ballistic
missile for deployment in a Minuteman III silo.
(7) An analysis of the impacts of the estimated service
life of the Minuteman III force associated with decreasing the
deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles delivery vehicle
force from 400 to 300.
(8) An assessment on the degree to which the Columbia class
ballistic missile submarines will possess features that will
enhance the current invulnerability of ballistic missile
submarines of the United States to future antisubmarine warfare
threats.
(9) An analysis of the degree to which an extension of the
Minuteman III would impact the decision of Russian Federation
to target intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United
States in a crisis, as compared to proceeding with the ground-
based strategic deterrent.
(10) A best case estimate of what percentage of the
strategic forces of the United States would survive a
counterforce strike from the Russian Federation, broken down by
intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile
submarines, and heavy bomber aircraft.
(11) The benefits, risks, and costs of relying on the W-78
warhead for either the Minuteman III or a new ground-based
strategic deterrent missile as compared to proceeding with the
W-87 life extension.
(12) The benefits, risks, and costs of adding additional
launchers or uploading submarine-launched ballistic missiles
with additional warheads to compensate for a reduced deployment
of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United States.
(c) Submission to Department of Defense.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the National Academy of
Sciences shall submit to the Secretary a report containing the study
conducted under subsection (a).
(d) Submission to Congress.--Not later than 210 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall transmit to the
appropriate congressional committees the report required by subsection
(c), without change.
(e) Form.--The report required by subsection (c) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 7. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.
In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
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