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MARKUP OF H.R. 391, H.R. 1079, H.R. 1145, H.R. 1500, H.R. 1158, H.R. 1083, H.R. 1392, H.R. 1464, H.R. 256, H.R. 2118, H.Res. 245, H.R. 1934

MARKUP

BEFORE THE

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Thursday, March 25, 2021

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:15 p.m., via Webex, Hon. Gregory Meeks (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman MEEKS. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any point.

Pursuant to Committee Rule 4, the chair may postpone further proceedings on approving any measure or matter or adopting an amendment. Without objection, all members will have 5 days to submit statements or extraneous materials on today's business.

To say something into the record, please have your staff email the previously circulated address or contact full committee staff.

As a reminder to members, please keep your video function on at all times, even when you are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, and please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking.

Consistent with House rules, staff will only mute members as appropriate and they are not under recognition to eliminate background noise.

I see we have a quorum. As members were notified yesterday, we intend to first consider eight measures and their amendments en bloc. And then we will move to consider four measures and their amendments separately.

Any roll call votes will be postponed until the end of the markup.

Pursuant to notice, for purposes of markup, I now call up the measures and their amendments that were previously circulated to members' offices which without objection will be considered en bloc that each measure is considered as read and the amendments to each are considered as read and are agreed to.

Without objection, after remarks, the committee will vote to order the measures favorably reported en bloc, as amended if amended, and each member or amendments to each bill shall be reported as a single amendment in the nature of a substitute.

The measures in the en bloc package are H.R. 1145, To direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan in the World Health Organization, and for other purposes, with the Meeks amendment in the nature of a substitute.

H.R. 1500, To direct the Administrator of the USAID to submit to Congress a report on the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic on

global basic education programs, with a Houlahan amendment in the nature of a substitute and a Perry amendment.

H.R. 1158, To provide women and girls safe access to sanitation facilities in refugee camps.

H.R. 1083, Southeast Asia Strategy Act.

H. Res. 245, Calling for continued and robust international collaboration and coordination to fight COVID–19 across Africa, with a Bass amendment in the nature of a substitute.

H.R. 1079, Desert Locust Control Act, with a Smith amendment and a Perry amendment.

H.R. 1934, Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G, with a McCaul amendment and with another McCaul amendment.

H.R. 1392, Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021, with a Connolly amendment and a Meeks amendment.

I now recognize myself to speak on the en bloc package. I support all of these bipartisan measures and I am grateful to all of our members on both sides for their hard work and Ranking Member McCaul.

The legislation in our en bloc is reflective of an overarching theme of this markup: global health. Over the last year, it has become apparent to the entire world that viruses do not respect borders and that problems that develop on one side of the world can devastate people halfway around the globe.

Since COVID–19 was first detected, trillions of dollars of global economic output had evaporated and over one billion children have missed in-person schooling. According to the WHO, over 2.7 million people around the world have lost their lives to coronavirus. Of course, the old adage one million deaths is a statistic, one death is a tragedy is relevant to the COVID–19 pandemic. No figure can truly capture the suffering, heartbreak, and loss that the virus has caused.

I can vividly remember when we were at the height of the pandemic in New York City exactly 1 year ago today when so many people in my community were saying their final goodbyes to loved ones or thinking about how they were going to pay their rent and the rent after they were laid off.

Similarly, scenes have been repeated, not just over all of our great country, but indeed around the entire world. With Representative Karen Bass' resolution calling for decisive action to assist African nations is exactly the formula we should be putting forward in Africa and indeed around the world.

This resolution demands the U.S. Government to support efforts to distribute vaccines to Africa to support the GAVI Alliance and COVAX Facilities and calls for continued and aggressive efforts to address other unfortunate consequences of the pandemic.

I would also like to thank Representative Bass for her work with Representative Smith of the important legislation to address the locust swarms that are exacerbating food insecurity in parts of East Africa.

Representative Grace Meng also has an instrumental bill that will address one of the at-risk populations in the entire world, women and girls living in refugee camps. Often, these camps around the world do not provide safe and secure infrastructure to

protect the tens of millions of women and girls that reside in them. This bill will work to ensure safe and secure access to sanitation facilities for these women and girls.

Representative Houlahan's legislation, H.R. 1500, requires a report on the impact of COVID–19 from USAID basic education programs. As a global humanitarian leader, we must understand the effect of the pandemic on education if we are going to effectively address the consequences. This legislation will provide us the insights we need to fix the problems of the day and plan for the problems of tomorrow.

I am also proud to support a trio of bipartisan bills that will bring renewed attention and call for carefully developed strategies to a number of important issues, particularly with a focus on Asia.

Representative Kim's bill calls for a State Department strategy to get Taiwan observer status again at the WHO.

Representative McCaul's legislation addresses 5G networks and the importance of American leadership from global telecoms technology.

Representative Wagner, working with Representative Castro, also has an important role that calls on Secretaries of State and Commerce to develop a strategy to engage with ASEAN and South Asian nations.

And finally, Representative Connolly's bill the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act. Saudi Arabia is a long-standing U.S. partner in a complex region. Nonetheless, for far too long, Saudi Arabia's routine suppression of free expression and political dissidents has gone unaddressed. This legislation imposes reasonable limits on U.S. weapons transfer to Saudi intelligence agencies shown to be involved in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi and other political repression until such repression and abuse of dissidents abates.

To be clear, I want to be clear, the bill does not limit U.S. arm transfers to Saudi's defensive capabilities and Mr. Connolly has graciously incorporated my amendment which ensures that nothing in this legislation will deny the Saudi Government the ability to defend its territory against attacks, from external threats, or hinder its ability to defend the United States military, diplomatic personnel, or facilities in the kingdom.

I strongly support all the measures that we are considering today in the en bloc. And I urge all members to join me to do the same.

I will now recognize our Ranking Member, Mr. McCaul of Texas, for his remarks.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Chairman Meeks. And I want to thank you for holding this important markup and moving several important bills. I want to thank you for carrying on the traditions of this committee, working in a bipartisan manner and I want to thank the staff on both sides of the aisle for their hard work leading up to this markup.

I want to point out three bills from my Republican colleagues, one, Representative Smith's Desert Locust Control Act; Representative Wagner, Southeast Asia Strategy Act; and Representative Kim's bill directing the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan in the World Health Organization. It is important to note, Mr. Chairman, that Taiwan actually warned the Chinese Communist Party and the WHO that COVID

was transmittable to the human and that warning went unheeded sadly and now we are in the situation we are in.

I also want to thank Representatives Connolly, Chabot, and you, Mr. Chairman, for working with me on what I think are strong amendments to help improve the Global Health Security Act. It is critical that we apply the painful lessons learned from this pandemic so that we are better prepared in the future. I appreciate all of you for approaching such an important issue in a bipartisan manner.

I also want to thank Mr. Connolly for working with us on a compromised text that we got to within a matter of days for his Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act, and Mr. Chairman, thank you for your amendments because that is what got us to yes on this bill. It does not prohibit in any way Saudi's ability to obtain weapons to defend itself.

The killing of Jamal Khashoggi, a prominent Saudi journalist was an outrageously gruesome crime. It was also a major setback for our relationship with Saudi Arabia. This amendment will help us better use our leverage to push improvements in the kingdom's human rights practices. It will also help preserve our strategic interest in the Middle East including, as I mentioned, Saudi's ability to defend itself against an attack from Iran.

I am also pleased that we are considering my bill to promoting U.S. international leadership in the 5G Act. The Chinese Communist Party poses a generational threat to our country that we can no longer ignore. They are erasing ethnic groups in Xinjiang right now with the Muslim Uyghurs. They stole American national security data in the OPM hack including mine and are believed to be responsible for the Microsoft hack earlier this month. Now the Chinese Communist Party has designs to become the world's technology powers especially on 5G with their Huawei surveillance telecom program.

To achieve their goal, the CCP is launching cyber-attacks stealing intellectual property and spying on our companies and research institutions. That is precisely why in Houston, in my State, the consulate was shut down because they were stealing from the Texas Medical Center biomedical research, including research on the vaccine, and from NASA. They used that to increase their participation at standard setting bodies like the International Telecommunications Union, or ITU, to embed their technology around the world. And with the full backing of the CCP, military companies like Huawei have gained significant global market share in 5G and are positioning themselves to gain even more.

My bill will help the United States counter China's aggressive 5G expansion around the world by maintaining and in some cases increasing U.S. leadership and participation at critical international standard setting bodies for 5G. Specifically, it will allow our Government to better understand the security risks posed by the CCP's participation in 5G standard setting bodies. Setting 5G standards and increasing cooperation between the United States and our allies and partners puts us in the driver's seat for the future, not the CCP.

So Mr. Chairman, with that, I look forward to a healthy debate on all the measures and I want to say I think we all agree that

we need to exercise our Article 1 authorities. We'll be debating AUMF. We just have a little different position on that, but as we always do, we'll debate in very civil and an educational way. Thank you so much for holding this markup. I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. I thank you for that, Representative McCaul, and yes, we will be very civil as we markup as we always do. Thank you for that.

I will recognize members by committee seniority alternating between Democrats and Republicans for the purpose of speaking on the en bloc package. Please use the raise your hand function on Webex and I will recognize members by committee seniority alternating between Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your turn, please let our staff know, and we will come back to you.

Does anyone wish to speak on the en bloc?

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MEEKS. Yes. I recognize, Representative Brad Sherman of California for 5 minutes.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for taking up H.R. 1145 to direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan. I think it should be full status, but we will start with observer status for Taiwan at the World Health Organization. I am glad to join with Representative Young Kim, who is the lead Democrat on this important bill.

Just in the short amount of time that I have been in Congress, Taiwan has spent more than $6 billion providing international medical and humanitarian needs to more than 80 countries. Furthermore, Taiwan has used its public health expertise to respond to this pandemic effectively within its borders while donating tens of millions of masks and PPE equipment to other nations in need.

Due to the Chinese Communist Party, Taiwan was excluded from the WHO in 2017. This is outrageous as it shuts out Taiwan from important WHO information and makes it more difficult for Taiwan to share the information it has on its successful handling on the virus. And as Mr. McCaul points out, it was one of the first countries to ring the bell and to show us that indeed this disease is transmissible.

Following Tuesday's important hearings on Reclaiming Congress's War Powers Act, it is fitting that we will move on to H.R. 256, which I am pleased to cosponsor, To repeal the Authorization of Use of Military Force Against Iraq in 2002, AUMF. I have long supported this and voted for the repeal of this AUMF. The AUMF was there to protect us from Saddam Hussein's what we thought were weapons of mass destruction. It has clearly outlived its usefulness.

But we also need to make sure that the War Powers Act is fully enforceable against any administration. We had excellent witnesses in our hearing on Tuesday. We need a provision that gives Congress, Members of Congress, standing to go to court and as I have championed since 2011, we had a major floor vote on this in 2011. It has now been part of every appropriations bill. We must use our power of the first to say no money shall be spent in contravention of the War Powers Act. We need now to make this part of permanent law. I have introduced a bill with 30 cosponsors, H.R. 2108, that will do just that and whether it is in that legislative vehicle

or another legislative vehicle, we need to make the War Powers Act enforceable against presidents.

Mr. Connolly has put forward a good bill, H.R. 1392, Protection of the Saudi Dissidents Act and others have spoken about how important that is. And Mr. Malinowski has another bill that I believe that is important, 1464, the Khashoggi Accountability Act, demanding visa sanctions on anyone being responsible for Khashoggi's killing. And of course, that bill has important waivers in there for diplomatic visas.

Finally, I want to thank Chairman Bass for her resolution calling for a new, decisive, and robust international cooperation on the fight against COVID–19 across Africa. I was just on the phone with Dr. Marx, the Director of the FDA's Center for Biologics about how we are wasting vaccine here in the United States and how we can improve our own program, thus saving vaccine which can be used by the United States, but then around the world, particularly in Africa.

I want to commend Mr. Bera for his bill, Securing America from Epidemics Act. And finally, although it is not in this package, I do have almost a minute left, I want to comment on Mr. Perry's amendment dealing with the Wuhan lab. I will point out that Congress has already mandated in the omnibus that we get a report. That report is due in just a few days. That report should be on the origins of this virus. If that report is going to be adequate, it will answer a question a lot of us have and that is what did escape from the Wuhan virology laboratory. If that report fails to address that issue, then it will be defined for Congress to go back and mandate that that particular issue be the subject of a serious intelligence community report to Congress. I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MEEKS. Yes. The chair recognizes Representative Chris Smith of New Jersey who is the Ranking Member on the Subcommittee of Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights for 5 minutes.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and Ranking Member McCaul for including H.R. 1079, the Desert Locust Control Act in today's markup. H.R. 1079, which I introduced, joined by Africa Subcommittee Chair Karen Bass, will establish an inter-agency working group to develop a comprehensive, strategic plan to control locust outbreaks in the East Africa region and address future outbreaks in order to avert mass scale food insecurity and potential political destabilization.

According to USAID, Mr. Chairman, the desert locust is one of the most destructive migratory pests in the world, rapidly consuming most vegetation in its path including crops and pasture land, critical to maintaining the food security and livelihood of populations in East Africa. Locust swarms are highly mobile. And carried on the wind, swarms can travel up to 100 miles per day. And even a relatively small four-tenths of 1 percent square mile size swarm can consume an amount of food sufficient for approximately 35,000 people in 1 day.

The World Bank notes that and I quote, "A new generation of locusts emerge every 8 weeks. Each generation on average seeks a

twentyfold increase in the population. The growing swarms spread to new areas, disrupting the food supply, upending livelihoods, and requiring substantial resources to address."

At the end of the year, Mr. Chairman, as you know, some 42 million people in East Africa alone were suffering acute food insecurity and this does not include the Gulf States such as Yemen or India or Pakistan which are also highly impacted. Acute food insecurity is defined as the sudden lack of food or the ability to produce or access minimum requirements of food.

The theme for the legislation came about with the realization last year that various agencies in the Federal Government which shared partial responsibility for addressing the compounding locust, food, and COVID crises were not adequately coordinating their efforts and thus not achieving the best possible outcome. This including not only the State Department, USAID, but also the NSD, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Agriculture. It is in large part, thanks to the herculean efforts of our Ambassador to the U.N. Food Agencies in Rome, Kip Tom; the Executive Director of the World Food Program, former Governor David Beasley, that awareness of this crisis and steps to mitigate it have been at least a partial success. They prodded countries, all of which were under a COVID lockdown, in the FAO into action, without which we would have had an even greater food security crisis.

The crisis persists, Mr. Chairman, and the upsurge in locusts continues. The bill will help coordinate our Government's response and it will do it at a *de minimis* cost. And what is the cost of not acting? In testimony last week before the Africa Subcommittee in a hearing chaired by my friend and colleague and Congresswoman Bass, Ambassador Tip Tom noted that today some $240 million has been spent to address the crisis. Of this, USAID provided some $26 million in assistance, as of February 1st of this year for Fiscal Years 2020 and for 1921.

The German Government has provided the largest amount of assistance to combat the locusts. But if this blows up into a full-scale famine, abetted by on-going hostilities in Ethiopia, Ambassador Tom estimates that the humanitarian cost will balloon to $3 to $3.5 billion. And that would mean millions of lives, lives potentially lost to a horrific death by starvation, and implicate U.S.'s disaster assistance funding. So again, I am glad that you are putting this up on the markup today and I hope my colleagues will cosponsor and support the bill.

I also want to voice my support to my good friend and colleague, Karen Bass's Resolution 245, calling for a continued and robust international collaboration and coordination to fight COVID–19 across Africa.

Mr. Chairman, in 2020, Africa had fewer COVID deaths, about 3.5 percent of the world cases, according to the African Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and fewer deaths than other parts of the world. However—and that is attributable in part to robust containment and a younger population which were factors. But the emergence of variants that are more transmissible and deadly has now resulted in a fatality rate in 2021 that is above the global average.

And finally, I want to thank Congresswoman Young Kim for her bill, as well as all the bills today, but I just want to make sure I point this one out because we need a strategy with Taiwan to gain observer status at the WHO and I wanted again to remind my colleagues, I know you all know this, Taiwan has been a model citizen in how it engages the world with regards to health crises and its exclusion from the WHO at the behest of the Chinese Communist Party is a scandal.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I ask unanimous consent to revise and add some additional remarks.

Chairman MEEKS. Thank you. I now recognize Representative Albio Sires of New Jersey, who is the chair of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration, and International Economic Policy, for 5 minutes.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want say from the beginning that I support all these bills, but I want to speak briefly about H.R. 1145, important legislation to help Taiwan regain the status as an observer in the World Health Organization. Taiwan has long been a leader in global health as shown most recently throughout the ongoing pandemic. Not only did Taiwan manage the pandemic at home, it worked to share equipment and expertise with other nations including the United States.

I am particularly grateful for Taiwan's strong friendship in the early days of this crisis when my home State of New Jersey was extremely hard hit and personal protective equipment was scarce. Taiwan was sending regular shipments of masks to the United States. By regaining observer status in the WHO, Taiwan has helped other nations who are struggling with this pandemic. It is in the best global interest to have Taiwan regain observer status in the World Health Organization so that other nations can learn from Taiwan's success in battling COVID–19 and can be kept up to date on this international health emergency.

As the co-chair of the congressional Taiwan Caucus I am proud to co-sponsor H.R. 1145. I would like to thank my colleagues, Representatives Young Kim and Brad Sherman, for introducing this important legislation and I urge my colleagues to support it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize Representative Steve Chabot of Ohio, who is the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation for 5 minutes.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to voice my strong support, first, for H.R. 391, the Global Health Security Act, bipartisan legislation that my good friend Gerry Connolly and I first introduced in 2018 to strengthen U.S. and global preparedness for and capacity to respond to pandemics like COVID–19.

And I want to thank Chairman Meeks and Ranking Member McCaul for working with us to improve this Congress' version of the legislation as it heads toward enactment.

After a year of lockdowns and masks and social distancing, working from home, school closures, and, worst of all, a mounting death toll both here at home and around the world, COVID–19 has taught us like nothing else has the true cost of a pandemic.

COVID–19 has also shown just how vulnerable the U.S. is to a disease outbreak on the other side of the world. As we all know now, diseases do not respect borders, and a corrupt and nontransparent health system in another country, in this case China, can cause millions of deaths here in America.

China's politically motivated censorship of coronavirus information early on caused the world untold suffering. But a disease like COVID–19 could start anywhere. It could start in the Middle East, in South America, Africa, or even here.

That's why we must help less-prepared countries identify and contain future emergency deadly diseases when they originate, and mitigate their impact before they have a chance to grow to pandemic scale.

If I may say, our legislation was prescient in this regard. When we first introduced it back in 2018, COVID–19 did not exist.

However, we realized that Congress needed to support, direct, and provide oversight for the global health security work that had been done by the Obama Administration and carried forward by the Trump administration.

We also realized that the proper personnel needed to be in place to coordinate our response to emerging disease threats.

Our legislation supports each of these goals and so I strongly support it and would urge my colleagues to do so as well. I'd like to comment briefly on two other pieces of legislation that we have before us today.

I want to these—the first one I'd like to mention as a founder and a current co-chair of the congressional Taiwan Caucus, as a couple of the members have already mentioned, also as the ranking member of the Asian Pacific Subcommittee, I'd like to voice my support for H.R. 1145.

I'm an original co-sponsor of this legislation, which was introduced by a vice ranking member in one of our new and, I think, one of our best committee members will be for sure, Young Kim, as well as Congressman Brad Sherman, who is pretty good, too, to strengthen the State Department's efforts to get Taiwan included by the World Health Organization, and I long supported Taiwan's participation in international organizations.

The 23 million people of Taiwan deserve to have their voices heard. So I strongly support this, would urge my colleagues to support this as well.

And then, finally, I'd like to mention briefly H.R. 1500, of the Global Learning Loss Assessment Act, which was introduced by Ms. Houlahan and Mr. Fitzpatrick.

In 2017, I introduced the Girls Access to Education Act, along with my Democratic colleague, Congresswoman Robin Kelly, here in the House, and then Senator Rubio introduced it over in the Senate.

This legislation, which ultimately did become law, prioritized education in our humanitarian assistance to displaced individuals.

Unfortunately, COVID–19 has set that work back significantly. The pandemic has taken a serious toll on education as countries around the globe have closed down their school systems.

Worse, millions of children, especially girls, have dropped out of school as a result of the pandemic and may never return to the classroom in some of those countries across the globe.

H.R. 1500 is a critical step in understanding this problem and getting a grasp of who is being impacted and how so that we can craft an effective response as the pandemic comes to an end.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this markup, and I want to thank Mr. McCaul, our ranking member, on this as well. It's good to see us working in a bipartisan manner. And I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Gerry Connolly of Virginia, who's the president of the NATO Parliamentarian Assembly, for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much for holding this markup. It's great to see the committee actively moving on its legislation under your leadership and that of Mr. McCaul.

I want to join Mr. Chabot, as the co-chair of the Taiwan Caucus, in expressing specific support for H.R. 745. I think it's vitally important that we include Taiwan in the family, international family, especially when it comes to international health issues during a pandemic. It's absurd not to include the Taiwanese expertise and experience. And I congratulate both Brad Sherman and Young Kim for bringing that bill before us. And I'm pleased to support it.

I also want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and you, Mr. McCaul, for your bipartisan leadership in putting together an en bloc package of legislation, and I particularly want to thank you for including the Saudi Dissidents Act.

You know, we had a lot of hurdles to overcome. We have managed with your help and your input to improve the bill and to make it something that is a strong bipartisan bill. I think that's very important.

Jamal Khashoggi was my constituent. His brutal murder must not be forgotten and there has to be justice. This bill will be a vehicle for moving us toward eventful justice, and I might add that it isn't just about Jamal Khashoggi, bad as that was.

It's also about protecting dissidents. I've met—this bill grew out of a series of meetings I had with Saudi dissidents and Saudi American families who have folks back home who are being imprisoned and detained simply because they have a different political point of view and not a radical one, just one like Jamal Khashoggi's, to try to improve things in the kingdom, and there is no tolerance for that dissent.

And people are being killed. They're being detained. They're being tortured. They're being brutalized. We, as Americans, we, as the House Foreign Affairs Committee, cannot stand idle during that time. And just in the last 48 hours, if we needed a reminder of how important this subject is, we learned that the author of the U.N. report on the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, Agnes Callamard, has been threatened by Saudi officials.

Her safety has been threatened if she continues to persist in her findings. That is impunity of the of the highest order of magnitude,

and that, I think, underscores why we cannot be silent, why we must take this measure today.

And I'm very proud of the fact we are, I hope, going to do this in a very broad bipartisan way, in a measured but assertive way.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, all of the bills are worthy and are certainly going to have my support in the en bloc package. But I want to also thank you and Mr. McCaul for your support, and Mr. Chabot for his support. He's been unwavering for 3 years. And, you know, we look back on it and maybe we anticipated something in terms of the need for early monitoring of global health developments that could lead to pandemic.

Well, it happened. And on a bipartisan basis, we have never picked one administration over another. We believe that we have got to restore that capacity by code, by law, whoever is the president, and Mr. Chabot has been a wonderful Republican partner in that effort. And it has not always been easy. It's passed the House, I believe, four times, and we hope it will come out of our committee today on a big bipartisan vote.

And, again, I want to thank Mr. McCaul and you, Mr. Chairman, for thoughtful additions to this bill that make it stronger, and I would hope the committee upon reflection will maybe not yield to the temptation to burden it down with other issues that could make this very difficult to pass.

It's passed four times. It's passed the test in the House. I believe we're very close to getting support in the Senate that would allow it to become law, and let's try to do that during the middle of a pandemic on a bipartisan basis.

But, again, I thank you and Mr. McCaul for making that work. I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Joe Wilson of South Carolina, who's the ranking member of the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism, for 5 minutes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Gregory Meeks and Ranking Member Michael McCaul, for bringing these bipartisan measures before us today.

I support each of the eight bills. I am grateful for the wisdom and the initiative by our new colleague, Representative Young Kim, with H.R. 1145. Taiwan has contributed tremendously to global health but has not participated in the World Health Assembly as an observer country since 2017.

Following the election of President Tsai Ing-wen, efforts to curtail Taiwan's increasing international participation has been persistent. International challenges such as the ongoing pandemic require international cooperation.

I'm deeply concerned by the amount of undue influence Beijing wields over international organizations, especially given their repeated concealment of information during the pandemic.

I'm grateful for Taiwan's voluntary generosity during the pandemic. At the height of the supply chain strain, Taiwan generously donated 100,000 items of PPE to the citizens of South Carolina for front line workers, which my office helped to facilitate.

Congratulations to Representative Young Kim, Congressman Brad Sherman, Congressman Albio Sires, Congressman Steve

Chabot, and Congressman Gerry Connolly for their work on this measure.

It is so meaningful to me to see the bipartisan support for the courageous people of Taiwan.

I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Ted Deutch of Florida, who is the chair of the Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism for, 5 minutes.

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your continued leadership and ensuring that we accomplish meaningful work, while also asserting our authorities.

Thanks to Ranking Member McCaul for continuing to work in good faith and in the spirit of bipartisanship.

I'm proud to support the measures before us today, the en bloc. I also would like to comment briefly on some of the other bills in today's agenda.

I want to thank my friends, Mr. Connolly and Mr. Chabot, for their leadership on the Global Health Security Act, which I'm proud to co-sponsor, with respect to our fight against COVID–19.

We are not out of the woods yet. We cannot claim victory over this global pandemic until we stop its spread everywhere. Not just in the United States, but everywhere. This will require years of sustained vigilant U.S. leadership, harnessing the expertise of our government agencies, and working with our partners overseas.

Moreover, COVID–19 will not be the last infectious disease that threatens to become a global pandemic, and a Global Health Security Act will ensure we are prepared for years to come.

Although it's unfortunate we could not pass this into law before the emergence of COVID–19, it isn't too late for this legislation to make an important difference for all of us and for the world.

I'd also like to thank Mr. Connolly and Mr. Malinowski for their work on the two bills pertaining to Saudi Arabia and the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, which I—bills which I support.

Just last week, I chaired a hearing on human rights in Saudi Arabia, where our witnesses described how the kingdom continues to brutally repress speech and dissent. As I said then, we cannot be afraid to speak truth to our partners, important partners, and we can never sacrifice American values.

Saudi leadership must address American concerns about the treatment of our citizens and residents, and stop its targeting of Saudi dissidents and political activists.

Two and a half years after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and after the release of the intelligence report, Congress should reinforce the message that the United States will not tolerate gross human rights abuses, including the targeting of dissidents abroad.

I believe this is part of the challenging but necessary recalibration of U.S.-Saudi relations that the Biden administration has spoken of. So I'm hopeful that we once again have a partner in the executive branch as we pursue this goal.

Finally, I want to address H.R. 256, which repeals the 2002 AUMF. Frankly, it is long past time for Congress to take up meaningful debate and action on war powers authorities and this bill is an important first step.

Congress, America, and the world have changed significantly since 2002, and as we heard repeatedly at Tuesday's hearing, the 2002 AUMF is now completely unnecessary for addressing any of the security challenges that we face today.

Some of our colleagues have argued that while they might agree in principle, they take issue with the process of repealing the 2002 AUMF without also taking up the replacement of the 2001 AUMF.

I absolutely agree that we should work urgently along with the Biden administration to reconsider and modernize the 2001 AUMF.

But there is no reason that that needs to happen simultaneously with repealing the 2002 AUMF. We need to get it right. We can take these steps in succession and I very much, very much hope that we will.

And so I'll just close by thanking and commending the chairman and the ranking member again. Thanks for elevating these important issues. Thanks for ensuring this committee plays an active role in discussions and actions over war powers.

And I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Ann Wagner of Missouri, who is the vice ranking member of the full committee, for 5 minutes.

Mrs. WAGNER. I thank you, Chairman Meeks, and I'd also like to thank Ranking Member McCaul for including my bill, H.R. 1083, the Southeast Asia Strategy Act, in today's en banc markup.

I'd also like to thank Congressman Castro, with whom I founded the ASEAN Caucus, for working with me on this legislation and for his great support of U.S.-ASEAN relations.

Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, are vital to the prosperity of the U.S. economy, generating hundreds of thousands of American jobs.

H.R. 1083, the Southeast Asia Strategy Act, will deepen U.S. engagement in the region by requiring the United States to develop a coherent regional strategy that addresses all aspects of the relationship from trade and humanitarian goals to diplomatic and security arrangements.

U.S.-Southeast Asia relations are at a critical, critical juncture. People's Republic of China is working aggressively to expand its influence in this strategically important region, using predatory investment, threatening new military installments, and outright bullying to achieve its goals.

But Southeast Asian countries do not believe that China and its—China's interests are well intentioned. Our partners seek assurances that the United States will continue to demonstrate strength in the region, and we must support our partners and allies as they stand up to China's erratic and aggressive behavior.

The U.S. should be proactively crafting and implementing its Southeast Asia strategy, and this bill would require the administration to do just that.

My legislation will ensure that the United States seizes its opportunity to engage meaningfully and productively with this dynamic and growing region.

It will position the U.S. and its partners to safeguard freedom of navigation, promote mutually beneficial economic development, and strengthen the democratic norms that China seeks to undermine.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for your great work on the U.S.-Southeast Asian relations, and I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 1083, the Southeast Asia Strategy Act.

And I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentlelady yields back.

I now recognize Representative Karen Bass of California, who is the chair of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights, for 5 minutes.

Ms. BASS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank the ranking member for this markup today. I also want to thank the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Africa as I join him in cosponsoring H.R. 1079, the Desert Locust Control Act. I want to thank Ranking Member Smith.

COVID–19 has forced us to acknowledge that the world's fates are intertwined and that the world cannot be safe from this pandemic until everyone is.

That is why I introduced H. Res. 245, calling for continued and robust international collaboration and coordination to fight COVID–19 across Africa.

I'm pleased that this resolution is bipartisan and hope that we can move forward together to continue to work in a bipartisan manner to fight COVID–19.

Again, I want to thank the Ranking Member McCaul and the Africa Subcommittee Member Smith for supporting the resolution and showing that Congress can work together for the good of the American people and those around the world.

This resolution reaffirms that decreasing the spread of COVID–19 and preventing future COVID–19 variants globally and in Africa is in the national interest of the United States.

It also calls for continued and robust international collaboration and coordination to fight COVID–19 across Africa. Resources are increasingly limited in the United States and abroad. World economies are impacted due to the pandemic.

I recently had a hearing on the effect of COVID–19 in Africa, and one of the witnesses was the director of the Africa CDC. He stated how he was worried about a vaccine war on the continent because of shipment delays. This will significantly impact the ability to fight the virus on the continent and weaken solid economies and destroy weaker ones.

Botswana, for example, a pillar of democracy on the candidate—on the continent has had to shift its focus from development to defense. Its citizens are worried that the pandemic will destroy its tourism economy and the government is worried about maintaining its borders from outside countries with more severe COVID–19 cases.

This week, I spoke with the Ambassador from Botswana about the effects COVID–19 has had on his country, and he reiterated that several African countries allocated money for COVAX and Botswana paid for 20 percent of its population to be vaccinated.

But at this point, it doesn't look like this mark will be reached due to the supply. In another conversation I had with the U.S.—the Ambassador from India to the U.S. about his country recently made a grant in aid delivery of 30,000 COVID–19 vaccines to Bot-

swana on March 9th. The country has also made vaccines available to 30 other countries in Africa.

Although there are reports that the Serum Institute of India is suspending major exports of the AstraZeneca COVID–19 vaccine to the continent, they have shown a good faith and humanity.

It is time the United States do the same and I'm asking my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to help ramp up our efforts to the continent. This is why we must also leverage resources and utilize multilateral tools available in an equitable and efficient manner.

And this is why the United States must remain actively engaged and lead a sustained and robust COVID–19 recovery effort.

In Africa, that means working with the African Union and the Africa CDC to collaboratively tackle the continent's health system challenges by equipping them to deliver science-based and quality health care.

This resolution calls for the U.S. and international partners to work collaboratively to address the impacts of COVID–19 in Africa, the other impacts, including food insecurity, education challenges posed by the pandemic, global supply chain disruptions, equitable access to secure internet and digital connectivity, and good governance.

We must seize this renewed sense of urgency to help build a true partnership with Africa by looking beyond a short-term recovery to mitigate the growing number of complex interconnected risks.

I hope you will join me and my colleagues across the aisle and vote to support this resolution. Reaffirming decreasing the spread of COVID–19 and preventing future variants is in the national interests of the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentlelady yields back.

I now recognize Representative Young Kim of California, who's the vice ranking member of the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation, for 5 minutes.

Ms. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Chairman Meeks and Ranking Member McCaul. I am honored to speak in support of the bills included in this en bloc package before us today.

That includes my bill on directing the State Department to implement a strategy to help Taiwan regain its observer status at the World Health Organization and its decisionmaking body, the World Health Assembly.

In 2017, Taiwan was unjustly kicked out of the WHO by its leadership, under pressure by the Chinese Communist Party, which prevented it from sharing and receiving vital information before and during the COVID–19 pandemic.

Taiwan has long been a leader in global health security, collaborating with countries around the world in combating deadly disease outbreaks.

Since 1996, Taiwan has invested more than $6 billion in international medical and humanitarian aid efforts in more than 80 countries. During the 2014 Ebola crisis, Taiwan donated over a million dollars and provided 100,000 sets of personal protective equipment.

Additionally, Taiwan was one of the first countries to raise the alarm during the initial spread of COVID–19 using its public health expertise to respond to the pandemic very effectively within its borders while donating tens of millions of masks and PPE equipment to other nations in need.

Taiwan's actions have proven that not only do they deserve a seat at the table, but having Taiwan as an observer at the WHO also brings tangible healthy security benefits to the United States and the rest of the world.

I want to thank Chairman Meeks, Ranking Member McCaul, Asia Subcommittee Chairman Bera, and Ranking Member Chabot, all of whom are original co-sponsors of the bill for including this initiative in today's markup and passing the first Taiwan-related initiative of the 117th Congress out of this committee.

And I also want to thank my good friend, Congressman Brad Sherman, for co-leading this bill and ensuring that it received broad bipartisan support. Taiwan is a bipartisan issue, and I'm very encouraged by our committee's action today.

Thank you, and I yield the balance of my time.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentlelady yields back.

I now recognize Representative Ted Lieu of California for 5 minutes.

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Chairman Meeks, for holding this markup, and I want to, first of all, talk about the legislation related to Taiwan in directing the Secretary of State to have a strategy for putting Taiwan back into observer status at the World Health Organization.

I note that, unlike the Chinese government, which lied about the coronavirus at the beginning of the pandemic, Taiwan did everything right. They told the truth about the virus, which is that it could be transmitted by humans, and Taiwan relied on the science.

They used mask protocols. They engaged in social distancing. They put in effective virus suppression measures. And because of what they did, Taiwan reopened their economy much sooner than the United States.

The United States and the world has a lot to learn from Taiwan, and I fully support that legislation.

I also rise in support of the two bills regarding Saudi Arabia. I just want to remind everyone that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia lied to United States for 17 straight days. They lied to us, they lied to the world, about the murder of a U.S. legal permanent resident who was also an opinions columnist for the Washington Post.

And what we know is that Saudi Arabia has not suffered a lot of consequences that other normal countries would have suffered for lying about murdering a legal U.S. resident. So I support both of those two bills related to Saudi Arabia.

And then finally, I want to talk briefly about the AUMF. We shouldn't have forever wars, which means we shouldn't have AUMFs without sunsets that allow for these forever wars, and it's time that we repeal the 2002 AUMF and I want to commend Representative Barbara Lee and all the others who have worked on this issue.

And thank you again, Chairman, for holding this important markup, and I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Abigail Spanberger of Virginia, who is the vice chair of the Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, and the Environment and Cyber, for 5 minutes.

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you very much, Chairman Meeks, and thank you to Ranking Member McCaul for your legislation, the Promoting U.S. International Leadership in 5G Act. It is difficult to overState the long-term effects of the global transition to 5G and it's also important that we take seriously the risks involved in this transition, especially those posed by the Chinese government and Chinese government-backed companies.

According to a 2018 NATO report, Huawei's growing influence as a leading supplier of 5G technology could be exploited by China to engage in espionage, monitor foreign corporations and governments, and support Chinese military operations.

As China works hard to take advantage of this moment, the United States must redouble our efforts to support U.S. competitiveness and innovation in the telecom space and protect against threats to Americans and U.S. interests that are posed by foreign-backed 5G technologies and networks, and work with our allies and partners to pursue similar strategies to do this.

My bipartisan legislation that required a national strategy on 5G, one that would protect U.S. consumers and assist U.S. allies in maximizing the security of their 5G telecommunication systems, was signed into law by President Trump, and I appreciated Ranking Member McCaul's support for my legislation.

And today, I am happy to support your legislation, Mr. Ranking Member McCaul. It is critical that the United States develop strategies to better engage in international standard-setting bodies to ensure that U.S. interests are integrated as the international community deliberates on the standards that will shape the future of the international telecom industry.

By engaging diplomatically in these multilateral forums, the United States can enhance U.S. competitiveness and national security.

Thank you for your leadership on this, Ranking Member McCaul, and I look forward to continuing to work with you to ensure that the United States is leading the 5G transition and that we do our part to protect American security and economic considerations.

I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentlelady yields back.

I now recognize Representative Chrissy Houlahan of Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to everyone on the committee for your support of my critical piece of legislation, H.R. 1500, the Global Learning Loss Assessment Act. And I'd also like to thank my colleagues, Representatives Fitzpatrick, also from our home Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Representative Quigley, for their work on this bill. Together, through this legislation, we are requiring the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, to submit a report to Congress on the impacts of COVID–19 on USAID-based education programs and global learning.

Over the past year, COVID has disrupted the education of over 90 percent of the world's children. The Research Triangle Institute predicts that most students will return to school looking more like students in the middle or close to the end of their previous grade, and this disruption has compounded the global learning crisis that preceded the pandemic. Already, students were behind on literacy comprehension and much more, which makes the next few months incredibly important.

My colleagues and I on this bill are clear-minded about what needs to happen. To shore up the increasing gaps in learning and preserve the massive gains that the United States has made in global education rates, we need to understand the extent of the damage that this pandemic has caused. This bill will arm us with data that we need to move quickly, to invest effectively across our USAID programs, and to make our international basic education programs more resilient to crises like these.

We cannot afford to ignore the devastating effects of COVID–19 on students around the world. Education loss will continue without intentional steps on our behalf, and inaction will most certainly lead to further loss.

We must also recognize the disproportionate impact that this pandemic has had on vulnerable populations, particularly young girls. Education is key to the success and well-being of women and girls. It often provides economic opportunity that would otherwise not have been available.

And I am particularly concerned about the harrowing consequences that school-age girls are facing in the light of their school closures, including an increased likelihood of gender-based violence and unplanned pregnancies. Since the outbreak of COVID–19, emerging data and reports from those on the front lines have shown that all types of violence against women and girls has intensified during this time.

The United States has been an historic leader on global education, investing in USAID and partner programs to pave the way for a more educated global society. And I believe our leadership here is even more important and should continue. Our work in this space helps us to build mutually beneficial relationships with countries around the world, and investments in education extend far, far beyond the classroom.

Educating children helps lead to more prosperous and economically stable societies that are less likely to be gripped by conflict and extremism. We have the opportunity to empower young people across the globe, and I believe our Global Learning Loss Assessment Act is a necessary step in seizing on that opportunity.

With that, thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chair.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentlelady yields back her time.

Does anyone else wish to speak on the en bloc?

Hearing no further request for recognition, the committee will proceed to consider the notice of items en bloc.

Pursuant to the previous order, the question occurs on the measures of en bloc, as amended, if amended.

We're going to take a vote by voice. All members, please unmute your microphone.

All those in favor, say aye.

Those opposed, say no.

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it, and the motion to reconsider is laid on the table.

The measures considered en bloc are agreed to, and the motion to reconsider is laid on the table. And pursuant to the previous order of the committee, each measure is offered favorably reported, as amended, if amended. And each amendment or amendment to each bill shall be reported as a single amendment in the nature of a substitute.

Without objection, staff is authorized to make any technical and conforming changes.

Now it's time to move on to the next item of business. We will be considering separately the following measures and their amendments: H.R. 391, the Global Health Security Act of 2021; H.R. 2118, Securing America from Epidemics Act; H.R. 1464, the Khashoggi Accountability Act, and H.R. 256, to repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.

Now we will move on to consider H.R. 391, the Global Health Security Act of 2021.

Pursuant to notice, for purposes of markup, I now call up H.R. 391. The clerk will report the bill.

Ms. STILES. H.R. 391, a bill to authorize a comprehensive strategic approach for United States foreign assistance to developing countries to strengthen global health security, and for other purposes.

Chairman MEEKS. Without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with.

Without objection, the bill shall be considered as read and open to amendment at any point.

[The bill H.R. 391 follows:]

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117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 391

To authorize a comprehensive, strategic approach for United States foreign assistance to developing countries to strengthen global health security, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 21, 2021

Mr. CONNOLLY (for himself, Mr. CHABOT, Mrs. WAGNER, Mr. BERA, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Mr. LARSEN of Washington, Ms. BASS, Mrs. BEATTY, Mr. BEYER, Ms. BLUNT ROCHESTER, Ms. BROWNLEY, Mr. CARTWRIGHT, Mr. CASE, Mr. CASTEN, Mr. CICILLINE, Mr. CLEAVER, Mr. COLE, Mr. COOPER, Mr. COSTA, Ms. DEAN, Mr. DEFAZIO, Mr. DEUTCH, Mr. ESPAILLAT, Ms. LOIS FRANKEL of Florida, Mr. VICENTE GONZALEZ of Texas, Mr. HASTINGS, Mrs. HAYES, Ms. HOULAHAN, Ms. JACKSON LEE, Mr. KEATING, Mr. KHANNA, Mr. KILMER, Mr. LANGEVIN, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. LIEU, Mr. LYNCH, Mr. MALINOWSKI, Mr. MCGOVERN, Ms. MENG, Ms. NORTON, Mr. PHILLIPS, Mr. RUSH, Mr. SEAN PATRICK MALONEY of New York, Ms. SEWELL, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. SIRES, Mr. SOTO, Ms. SPANBERGER, Mr. SUOZZI, Ms. TITUS, Mr. TONKO, Mrs. TRAHAN, Mr. TRONE, Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN, Ms. WEXTON, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, and Ms. SÁNCHEZ) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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A BILL

To authorize a comprehensive, strategic approach for United States foreign assistance to developing countries to strengthen global health security, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Global Health Security Act of 2021".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) In December 2009, President Obama released the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, which listed as one of seven objectives "Promote global health security: Increase the availability of and access to knowledge and products of the life sciences that can help reduce the impact from outbreaks of infectious disease whether of natural, accidental, or deliberate origin".

(2) In February 2014, the United States and nearly 30 other nations launched the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) to address several high-priority, global infectious disease threats. The GHSA is a multi-faceted, multi-country initiative intended to accelerate partner countries' measurable capabilities to achieve specific targets to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats, whether naturally occurring, deliberate, or accidental.

(3) In 2015, the United Nations adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which include specific reference to the importance of global

health security as part of SDG 3 "ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages" as follows: "strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks".

(4) On November 4, 2016, President Obama signed Executive Order No. 13747, "Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats".

(5) In October 2017 at the GHSA Ministerial Meeting in Uganda, the United States and more than 40 GHSA member countries supported the "Kampala Declaration" to extend the GHSA for an additional 5 years to 2024.

(6) In December 2017, President Trump released the National Security Strategy, which includes the priority action: "Detect and contain biothreats at their source: We will work with other countries to detect and mitigate outbreaks early to prevent the spread of disease. We will encourage other countries to invest in basic health care systems and to strengthen global health security across the intersection of human and animal health to prevent infectious disease outbreaks".

(7) In September 2018, President Trump released the National Biodefense Strategy, which includes objectives to "strengthen global health security capacities to prevent local bioincidents from becoming epidemics", and "strengthen international preparedness to support international response and recovery capabilities".

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) promote global health security as a core national security interest;

(2) advance the aims of the Global Health Security Agenda;

(3) collaborate with other countries to detect and mitigate outbreaks early to prevent the spread of disease;

(4) encourage other countries to invest in basic resilient and sustainable health care systems; and

(5) strengthen global health security across the intersection of human and animal health to prevent infectious disease outbreaks and combat the growing threat of antimicrobial resistance.

SEC. 4. GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA INTERAGENCY REVIEW COUNCIL.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall establish a Global Health Security Agenda Interagency Review Council (in this section referred to as the "Council") to perform the general responsibilities described in subsection (c) and the specific roles and responsibilities described in subsection (e).

(b) MEETINGS.—The Council shall meet not less than four times per year to advance its mission and fulfill its responsibilities.

(c) GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Council shall be responsible for the following activities:

(1) Provide policy-level recommendations to participating agencies on Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) goals, objectives, and implementation.

(2) Facilitate interagency, multi-sectoral engagement to carry out GHSA implementation.

(3) Provide a forum for raising and working to resolve interagency disagreements concerning the GHSA.

(4)(A) Review the progress toward and work to resolve challenges in achieving United States commitments under the GHSA, including commitments

1 to assist other countries in achieving the GHSA tar-
2 gets.
3 (B) The Council shall consider, among other
4 issues, the following:
5 (i) The status of United States financial
6 commitments to the GHSA in the context of
7 commitments by other donors, and the con-
8 tributions of partner countries to achieve the
9 GHSA targets.
10 (ii) The progress toward the milestones
11 outlined in GHSA national plans for those
12 countries where the United States Government
13 has committed to assist in implementing the
14 GHSA and in annual work-plans outlining
15 agency priorities for implementing the GHSA.
16 (iii) The external evaluations of United
17 States and partner country capabilities to ad-
18 dress infectious disease threats, including the
19 ability to achieve the targets outlined within the
20 WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool, as
21 well as gaps identified by such external evalua-
22 tions.
23 (d) PARTICIPATION.—The Council shall consist of
24 representatives, serving at the Assistant Secretary level or
25 higher, from the following agencies:

1 (1) The Department of State.

2 (2) The Department of Defense.

3 (3) The Department of Justice.

4 (4) The Department of Agriculture.

5 (5) The Department of Health and Human
6 Services.

7 (6) The Department of Labor.

8 (7) The Department of Homeland Security.

9 (8) The Office of Management and Budget.

10 (9) The United States Agency for International
11 Development.

12 (10) The Environmental Protection Agency.

13 (11) The Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
14 vention.

15 (12) The Office of Science and Technology Pol-
16 icy.

17 (13) The National Institutes of Health.

18 (14) The National Institute of Allergy and In-
19 fectious Diseases.

20 (15) Such other agencies as the Council deter-
21 mines to be appropriate.

22 (e) SPECIFIC ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—The heads of agencies de-
24 scribed in subsection (d) shall—

1 (A) make the GHSA and its implementa-
2 tion a high priority within their respective agen-
3 cies, and include GHSA-related activities within
4 their respective agencies' strategic planning and
5 budget processes;
6 (B) designate a senior-level official to be
7 responsible for the implementation of this Act;
8 (C) designate, in accordance with sub-
9 section (d), an appropriate representative at the
10 Assistant Secretary level or higher to partici-
11 pate on the Council;
12 (D) keep the Council apprised of GHSA-
13 related activities undertaken within their re-
14 spective agencies;
15 (E) maintain responsibility for agency-re-
16 lated programmatic functions in coordination
17 with host governments, country teams, and
18 GHSA in-country teams, and in conjunction
19 with other relevant agencies;
20 (F) coordinate with other agencies that are
21 identified in this section to satisfy pro-
22 grammatic goals, and further facilitate coordi-
23 nation of country teams, implementers, and do-
24 nors in host countries; and

(G) coordinate across GHSA national plans and with GHSA partners to which the United States is providing assistance.

(2) ADDITIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—In addition to the roles and responsibilities described in paragraph (1), the heads of agencies described in subsection (d) shall carry out their respective roles and responsibilities described in subsections (b) through (i) of section 3 of Executive Order No. 13747 (81 Fed. Reg. 78701; relating to Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats), as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 5. UNITED STATES COORDINATOR FOR GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall appoint an individual to the position of United States Coordinator for Global Health Security, who shall be responsible for the coordination of the interagency process for responding to global health security emergencies. As appropriate, the designee shall coordinate with the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance.

(b) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not less frequently than twice each year, the employee designated under this

1 section shall provide to the appropriate congressional com-
2 mittees a briefing on the responsibilities and activities of
3 the individual under this section.

4 **SEC. 6. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

5 It is the sense of the Congress that, given the complex
6 and multisectoral nature of global health threats to the
7 United States, the President—

8 (1) should consider appointing an individual
9 with significant background and expertise in public
10 health or emergency response management to the
11 position of United States Coordinator for Global
12 Health Security, as required by section 5(a), who is
13 an employee of the National Security Council at the
14 level of Deputy Assistant to the President or higher;
15 and

16 (2) in providing assistance to implement the
17 strategy required under section 7(a), should—

18 (A) coordinate, through a whole-of-govern-
19 ment approach, the efforts of relevant Federal
20 departments and agencies to implement the
21 strategy;

22 (B) seek to fully utilize the unique capa-
23 bilities of each relevant Federal department and
24 agency while collaborating with and leveraging
25 the contributions of other key stakeholders; and

(C) utilize open and streamlined solicitations to allow for the participation of a wide range of implementing partners through the most appropriate procurement mechanisms, which may include grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, and other instruments as necessary and appropriate.

SEC. 7. STRATEGY AND REPORTS.

(a) STRATEGY.—The United States Coordinator for Global Health Security (appointed under section 5(a)) shall coordinate the development and implementation of a strategy to implement the policy aims described in section 3, which shall—

(1) set specific and measurable goals, benchmarks, timetables, performance metrics, and monitoring and evaluation plans that reflect international best practices relating to transparency, accountability, and global health security;

(2) support and be aligned with country-owned global health security policy and investment plans developed with input from key stakeholders, as appropriate;

(3) facilitate communication and collaboration, as appropriate, among local stakeholders in support

of a multi-sectoral approach to global health security;

(4) support the long-term success of programs by building the capacity of local organizations and institutions in target countries and communities;

(5) develop community resilience to infectious disease threats and emergencies;

(6) leverage resources and expertise through partnerships with the private sector, health organizations, civil society, nongovernmental organizations, and health research and academic institutions; and

(7) support collaboration, as appropriate, between United States universities, and public and private institutions in target countries and communities to promote health security and innovation.

(b) COORDINATION.—The President, acting through the United States Coordinator for Global Health Security, shall coordinate, through a whole-of-government approach, the efforts of relevant Federal departments and agencies in the implementation of the strategy required under subsection (a) by—

(1) establishing monitoring and evaluation systems, coherence, and coordination across relevant Federal departments and agencies; and

(2) establishing platforms for regular consultation and collaboration with key stakeholders and the appropriate congressional committees.

(c) STRATEGY SUBMISSION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, in consultation with the head of each relevant Federal department and agency, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy required under subsection (a) that provides a detailed description of how the United States intends to advance the policy set forth in section 3 and the agency-specific plans described in paragraph (2).

(2) AGENCY-SPECIFIC PLANS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include specific implementation plans from each relevant Federal department and agency that describes—

(A) the anticipated contributions of the department or agency, including technical, financial, and in-kind contributions, to implement the strategy; and

(B) the efforts of the department or agency to ensure that the activities and programs carried out pursuant to the strategy are de-

signed to achieve maximum impact and long-term sustainability.

(d) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date on which the strategy required under subsection (a) is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under subsection (c), and not later than October 1 of each year thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the status of the implementation of the strategy.

(2) CONTENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) identify any substantial changes made in the strategy during the preceding calendar year;

(B) describe the progress made in implementing the strategy;

(C) identify the indicators used to establish benchmarks and measure results over time, as well as the mechanisms for reporting such results in an open and transparent manner;

(D) contain a transparent, open, and detailed accounting of expenditures by relevant Federal departments and agencies to implement

1 the strategy, including, to the extent prac-
2 ticable, for each Federal department and agen-
3 cy, the statutory source of expenditures,
4 amounts expended, partners, targeted popu-
5 lations, and types of activities supported;
6 (E) describe how the strategy leverages
7 other United States global health and develop-
8 ment assistance programs;
9 (F) assess efforts to coordinate United
10 States global health security programs, activi-
11 ties, and initiatives with key stakeholders;
12 (G) incorporate a plan for regularly review-
13 ing and updating strategies, partnerships, and
14 programs and sharing lessons learned with a
15 wide range of stakeholders, including key stake-
16 holders, in an open, transparent manner; and
17 (H) describe the progress achieved and
18 challenges concerning the United States Gov-
19 ernment's ability to advance the Global Health
20 Security Agenda across priority countries, in-
21 cluding data disaggregated by priority country
22 using indicators that are consistent on a year-
23 to-year basis and recommendations to resolve,
24 mitigate, or otherwise address the challenges
25 identified therein.

(e) FORM.—The strategy required under subsection (a) and the report required under subsection (d) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 8. COMPLIANCE WITH THE FOREIGN AID TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2016.

Section 2(3) of the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–191; 22 U.S.C. 2394c note) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking "and" at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end and inserting "; and"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

"(E) the Global Health Security Act of 2021.".

SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

1 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
2 and the Committee on Appropriations of the
3 Senate.
4 (2) GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY.—The term
5 "global health security" means activities supporting
6 epidemic and pandemic preparedness and capabili-
7 ties at the country and global levels in order to mini-
8 mize vulnerability to acute public health events that
9 can endanger the health of populations across geo-
10 graphical regions and international boundaries.

11 **SEC. 10. SUNSET.**

12 This Act, and the amendments made by this Act,
13 (other than section 5) shall cease to be effective on Decem-
14 ber 31, 2025.

○

Chairman MEEKS. Two bipartisan amendments to this bill were distributed to members in advance, and I understand members are prepared to accept them.

So, without objection, the two bipartisan amendments, Connolly Amendment No. 40 and McCaul Amendment No. 20, are supported by myself and Mr. McCaul and Mr. Connolly, and are agreed to en bloc.

[The amendments en bloc follow:]

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 391

OFFERED BY MR. CONNOLLY OF VIRGINIA

Strike sections 2, 3, and 4 and insert the following:

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress finds the following:

3 (1) In December 2009, President Obama re-
4 leased the National Strategy for Countering Biologi-
5 cal Threats, which listed as one of seven objectives
6 "Promote global health security: Increase the avail-
7 ability of and access to knowledge and products of
8 the life sciences that can help reduce the impact
9 from outbreaks of infectious disease whether of nat-
10 ural, accidental, or deliberate origin".

11 (2) In February 2014, the United States and
12 nearly 30 other nations launched the Global Health
13 Security Agenda (GHSA) to address several high-
14 priority, global infectious disease threats. The
15 GHSA is a multi-faceted, multi-country initiative in-
16 tended to accelerate partner countries' measurable
17 capabilities to achieve specific targets to prevent, de-
18 tect, and respond to infectious disease threats,
19 whether naturally occurring, deliberate, or acci-
20 dental.

(3) In 2015, the United Nations adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which include specific reference to the importance of global health security as part of SDG 3 ''ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages'' as follows: ''strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks''.

(4) On November 4, 2016, President Obama signed Executive Order No. 13747, ''Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats''.

(5) In October 2017 at the GHSA Ministerial Meeting in Uganda, the United States and more than 40 GHSA member countries supported the ''Kampala Declaration'' to extend the GHSA for an additional 5 years to 2024.

(6) In December 2017, President Trump released the National Security Strategy, which includes the priority action: ''Detect and contain biothreats at their source: We will work with other countries to detect and mitigate outbreaks early to prevent the spread of disease. We will encourage other countries to invest in basic health care systems

and to strengthen global health security across the intersection of human and animal health to prevent infectious disease outbreaks''.

(7) In September 2018, President Trump released the National Biodefense Strategy, which includes objectives to ''strengthen global health security capacities to prevent local bioincidents from becoming epidemics'', and ''strengthen international preparedness to support international response and recovery capabilities''.

(8) In January 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 13987 (86 Fed. Reg. 7019; relating to Organizing and Mobilizing the United States Government to Provide a Unified and Effective Response to Combat COVID–19 and to Provide United States Leadership on Global Health and Security), as well as National Security Memorandum on United States Global Leadership to Strengthen the International COVID–19 Response and to Advance Global Health Security and Biological Preparedness, which include objectives to strengthen and reform the World Health Organization, increase United States leadership in the global response to COVID–19, and to finance and advance global health security and pandemic preparedness.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) promote and invest in global health security and pandemic preparedness as a core national security interest;

(2) advance the aims of the Global Health Security Agenda;

(3) collaborate with other countries to detect and mitigate outbreaks early to prevent the spread of disease;

(4) encourage and support other countries to advance pandemic preparedness by investing in basic resilient and sustainable health care systems; and

(5) strengthen global health security across the intersection of human and animal health to prepare for and prevent infectious disease outbreaks and combat the growing threat of antimicrobial resistance.

SEC. 4. GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA INTERAGENCY REVIEW COUNCIL.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall establish a Global Health Security Agenda Interagency Review Council (in this section referred to as the "Council") to perform the general responsibilities described in subsection (c) and the specific roles and responsibilities described in subsection (e).

1 (b) MEETINGS.—The Council shall meet not less than
2 four times per year to advance its mission and fulfill its
3 responsibilities.

4 (c) GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Council shall
5 be responsible for the following activities:

6 (1) Provide policy-level recommendations to
7 participating agencies on Global Health Security
8 Agenda (GHSA) goals, objectives, and implementa-
9 tion, and other international efforts to strengthen
10 pandemic preparedness and response.

11 (2) Facilitate interagency, multi-sectoral en-
12 gagement to carry out GHSA implementation.

13 (3) Provide a forum for raising and working to
14 resolve interagency disagreements concerning the
15 GHSA, and other international efforts to strengthen
16 pandemic preparedness and response.

17 (4)(A) Review the progress toward and work to
18 resolve challenges in achieving United States com-
19 mitments under the GHSA, including commitments
20 to assist other countries in achieving the GHSA tar-
21 gets.

22 (B) The Council shall consider, among other
23 issues, the following:

24 (i) The status of United States financial
25 commitments to the GHSA in the context of

1 commitments by other donors, and the con-
2 tributions of partner countries to achieve the
3 GHSA targets.
4 (ii) The progress toward the milestones
5 outlined in GHSA national plans for those
6 countries where the United States Government
7 has committed to assist in implementing the
8 GHSA and in annual work-plans outlining
9 agency priorities for implementing the GHSA.
10 (iii) The external evaluations of United
11 States and partner country capabilities to ad-
12 dress infectious disease threats, including the
13 ability to achieve the targets outlined within the
14 WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool, as
15 well as gaps identified by such external evalua-
16 tions.
17 (d) PARTICIPATION.—The Council shall be headed by
18 the Assistant to the President for National Security Af-
19 fairs, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal
20 agencies. The Council shall consist of representatives from
21 the following agencies:
22 (1) The Department of State.
23 (2) The Department of Defense.
24 (3) The Department of Justice.
25 (4) The Department of Agriculture.

1 (5) The Department of Health and Human
2 Services.
3 (6) The Department of the Treasury.
4 (7) The Department of Labor.
5 (8) The Department of Homeland Security.
6 (9) The Office of Management and Budget.
7 (10) The Office of the Director of National In-
8 telligence.
9 (11) The United States Agency for Inter-
10 national Development.
11 (12) The Environmental Protection Agency.
12 (13) The Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
13 vention.
14 (14) The Office of Science and Technology Pol-
15 icy.
16 (15) The National Institutes of Health.
17 (16) The National Institute of Allergy and In-
18 fectious Diseases.
19 (17) Such other agencies as the Council deter-
20 mines to be appropriate.
21 (e) SPECIFIC ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—
22 (1) IN GENERAL.—The heads of agencies de-
23 scribed in subsection (d) shall—
24 (A) make the GHSA and its implementa-
25 tion and global pandemic preparedness a high

1 priority within their respective agencies, and in-
2 clude GHSA- and global pandemic prepared-
3 ness-related activities within their respective
4 agencies' strategic planning and budget proc-
5 esses;
6 (B) designate a senior-level official to be
7 responsible for the implementation of this Act;
8 (C) designate, in accordance with sub-
9 section (d), an appropriate representative at the
10 Assistant Secretary level or higher to partici-
11 pate on the Council;
12 (D) keep the Council apprised of GHSA-
13 related activities undertaken within their re-
14 spective agencies;
15 (E) maintain responsibility for agency-re-
16 lated programmatic functions in coordination
17 with host governments, country teams, and
18 GHSA in-country teams, and in conjunction
19 with other relevant agencies;
20 (F) coordinate with other agencies that are
21 identified in this section to satisfy pro-
22 grammatic goals, and further facilitate coordi-
23 nation of country teams, implementers, and do-
24 nors in host countries; and

(G) coordinate across national health security action plans and with GHSA and other partners, as appropriate, to which the United States is providing assistance.

(2) ADDITIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—In addition to the roles and responsibilities described in paragraph (1), the heads of agencies described in subsection (d) shall carry out their respective roles and responsibilities described in subsections (b) through (i) of section 3 of Executive Order 13747 (81 Fed. Reg. 78701; relating to Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats), as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 391

OFFERED BY MR. MCCAUL OF TEXAS

Strike sections 8, 9, and 10 and insert the following:

1 **SEC. 8. ESTABLISHMENT OF FUND FOR GLOBAL HEALTH**
2 **SECURITY AND PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS.**
3 (a) NEGOTIATIONS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A FUND
4 FOR GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AND PANDEMIC PRE-
5 PAREDNESS.—The Secretary of State, in coordination
6 with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of
7 the United States Agency for International Development,
8 the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the
9 heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies
10 as necessary and appropriate, should seek to enter into
11 negotiations with donors, relevant United Nations agen-
12 cies, including the World Health Organization, and other
13 key multilateral stakeholders, for the establishment of—
14 (1) a multilateral, catalytic financing mecha-
15 nism for global health security and pandemic pre-
16 paredness, which may be known as the Fund for
17 Global Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness
18 (in this title referred to as "the Fund"), in accord-
19 ance with the provisions of this section; and

1 (2) an Advisory Board to the Fund in accord-
2 ance with section 9.
3 (b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Fund should be
4 to close critical gaps in global health security and pan-
5 demic preparedness and build capacity in eligible partner
6 countries in the areas of global health security, infectious
7 disease control, and pandemic preparedness, such that
8 it—
9 (1) prioritizes capacity building and financing
10 availability in eligible partner countries;
11 (2) incentivizes countries to prioritize the use of
12 domestic resources for global health security and
13 pandemic preparedness;
14 (3) leverages government, nongovernment, and
15 private sector investments;
16 (4) regularly responds to and evaluates progress
17 based on clear metrics and benchmarks, such as the
18 Joint External Evaluation and Global Health Secu-
19 rity Index;
20 (5) aligns with and complements ongoing bilat-
21 eral and multilateral efforts and financing, including
22 through the World Bank, the World Health Organi-
23 zation, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuber-
24 culosis, and Malaria, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance;
25 and

(6) accelerates country compliance with the International Health Regulations (2005) and fulfillment of the Global Health Security Agenda 2024 Framework, in coordination with the ongoing Joint External Evaluation national action planning process.

(c) EXECUTIVE BOARD.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Fund should be governed by an Executive Board, which should be composed of not more than 20 representatives of donor governments, foundations, academic institutions, civil society, and the private sector that meet a minimum threshold in annual contributions and agree to uphold transparency measures.

(2) DUTIES.—The Executive Board should be charged with approving strategies, operations, and grant-making authorities, such that it is able to conduct effective fiduciary, monitoring, and evaluation efforts, and other oversight functions. In addition, the Executive Board should—

(A) be comprised only of contributors to the Fund at not less than the minimum threshold to be established pursuant to paragraph (1);

1 (B) determine operational procedures such
2 that the Fund is able to effectively fulfill its
3 mission; and
4 (C) provide oversight and accountability
5 for the Fund in collaboration with the Inspector
6 General to be established pursuant to section
7 10(e)(1)(A).
8 (3) COMPOSITION.—The Executive Board
9 should include—
10 (A) representatives of the governments of
11 founding permanent member countries who, in
12 addition to the requirements in paragraph (1),
13 qualify based upon meeting an established ini-
14 tial contribution threshold, which should be not
15 less than 10 percent of total initial contribu-
16 tions, and a demonstrated commitment to sup-
17 porting the International Health Regulations
18 (2005);
19 (B) term members, who are from academic
20 institutions, civil society, and the private sector
21 and are selected by the permanent members on
22 the basis of their experience and commitment to
23 innovation, best practices, and the advancement
24 of global health security objectives; and

(C) representatives of the World Health Organization, and the chair of the Global Health Security Steering Group.

(4) QUALIFICATIONS.—Individuals appointed to the Executive Board should have demonstrated knowledge and experience across a variety of sectors, including human and animal health, agriculture, development, defense, finance, research, and academia.

(5) CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.—

(A) TECHNICAL EXPERTS.—The Executive Board may include independent technical experts, provided they are not affiliated with or employed by a recipient country or organization.

(B) MULTILATERAL BODIES AND INSTITUTIONS.—Executive Board members appointed under paragraph (3)(C) should recuse themselves from matters presenting conflicts of interest, including financing decisions relating to such bodies and institutions.

(6) UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—

(i) FOUNDING PERMANENT MEMBER.—The Secretary of State shall seek to

establish the United States as a founding permanent member of the Fund.

(ii) COORDINATOR OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO ADVANCE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY.—The United States shall be represented on the Executive Board by an officer or employee of the United States appointed by the President.

(B) EFFECTIVE AND TERMINATION DATES.—

(i) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This paragraph shall take effect upon the date the Secretary of State, certifies and transmits to Congress an agreement establishing the Fund.

(ii) TERMINATION DATE.—The membership established pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall terminate upon the date of termination of the Fund.

(7) REMOVAL PROCEDURES.—The Fund should establish procedures for the removal of members of the Executive Board who engage in a consistent pattern of human rights abuses, fail to uphold global health data transparency requirements, or otherwise

1 violate the established standards of the Fund, in-
2 cluding in relation to corruption.
3 (8) ENFORCEABILITY.—Any agreement con-
4 cluded under the authorities provided by this section
5 shall be legally effective and binding upon the
6 United States, as may be provided in the agreement,
7 upon—
8 (A) the enactment of appropriate imple-
9 menting legislation which provides for the ap-
10 proval of the specific agreement or agreements,
11 including attachments, annexes, and supporting
12 documentation, as appropriate; or
13 (B) if concluded and submitted as a treaty,
14 receiving the necessary consent of the Senate.
15 (9) ELIGIBLE PARTNER COUNTRY DEFINED.—
16 In this section, the term "eligible partner country"
17 means a country with demonstrated—
18 (A) need, as identified through the Joint
19 External Evaluation process, the Global Health
20 Security Index classification of health systems,
21 national action plans for health security, and
22 other complementary or successor indicators of
23 global health security and pandemic prepared-
24 ness; and

(B) commitment to transparency, including budget and global health data transparency, complying with the International Health Regulations (2005), investing in domestic health systems, and achieving measurable results, and in which the Fund for Global Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness established under this section may finance global health security and pandemic preparedness assistance programs under this Act.

SEC. 9. FUND AUTHORITIES.

(a) PROGRAM OBJECTIVES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out the purpose set forth in section 8, the Fund, acting through the Executive Board, should provide grants, including challenge grants, technical assistance, concessional lending, catalytic investment funds, and other innovative funding mechanisms, as appropriate, to—

(A) help eligible partner countries close critical gaps in health security, as identified through the Joint External Evaluation process, the Global Health Security Index classification of health systems, and national action plans for health security and other complementary or

1 successor indicators of global health security
2 and pandemic preparedness; and
3 (B) support measures that enable such
4 countries, at both national and sub-national lev-
5 els, and in partnership with civil society and the
6 private sector, to strengthen and sustain resil-
7 ient health systems and supply chains with the
8 resources, capacity, and personnel required to
9 prevent, detect, mitigate, and respond to infec-
10 tious disease threats before they become
11 pandemics.
12 (2) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.—The activities to
13 be supported by the Fund should include efforts
14 to—
15 (A) enable eligible partner countries to for-
16 mulate and implement national health security
17 and pandemic preparedness action plans, ad-
18 vance action packages under the Global Health
19 Security Agenda, and adopt and uphold com-
20 mitments under the International Health Regu-
21 lations (2005) and other related international
22 health agreements, as appropriate;
23 (B) support global health security budget
24 planning in eligible partner countries, including

1 training in financial management and budget
2 and global health data transparency;
3 (C) strengthen the health security work-
4 force, including hiring, training, and deploying
5 experts to improve frontline preparedness for
6 emerging epidemic and pandemic threats;
7 (D) improve infection control and the pro-
8 tection of healthcare workers within healthcare
9 settings;
10 (E) combat the threat of antimicrobial re-
11 sistance;
12 (F) strengthen laboratory capacity and
13 promote biosafety and biosecurity through the
14 provision of material and technical assistance;
15 (G) reduce the risk of bioterrorism,
16 zoonotic disease spillover, and accidental bio-
17 logical release;
18 (H) build technical capacity to manage
19 global health security related supply chains, in-
20 cluding for personal protective equipment, oxy-
21 gen, testing reagents, and other lifesaving sup-
22 plies, through effective forecasting, procure-
23 ment, warehousing, and delivery from central
24 warehouses to points of service in both the pub-
25 lic and private sectors;

(I) enable bilateral, regional, and international partnerships and cooperation, including through pandemic early warning systems and emergency operations centers, to identify and address transnational infectious disease threats exacerbated by natural and man-made disasters, human displacement, and zoonotic infection;

(J) establish partnerships for the sharing of best practices and enabling eligible countries to meet targets and indicators under the Joint External Evaluation process, the Global Health Security Index classification of health systems, and national action plans for health security relating to the detection, treatment, and prevention of neglected tropical diseases;

(K) build the technical capacity of eligible partner countries to prepare for and respond to second order development impacts of infectious disease outbreaks, while accounting for the differentiated needs and vulnerabilities of marginalized populations;

(L) develop and utilize metrics to monitor and evaluate programmatic performance and identify best practices, including in accordance

with Joint External Evaluation benchmarks, Global Health Security Agenda targets, and Global Health Security Index indicators;

(M) develop and deploy mechanisms to enhance the transparency and accountability of global health security and pandemic preparedness programs and data, in compliance with the International Health Regulations (2005), including through the sharing of trends, risks, and lessons learned; and

(N) develop and implement simulation exercises, produce and release after action reports, and address related gaps.

(3) IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAM OBJECTIVES.—In carrying out the objectives of paragraph (1), the Fund should work to eliminate duplication and waste by upholding strict transparency and accountability standards and coordinating its programs and activities with key partners working to advance global health security and pandemic preparedness, including—

(A) governments, civil society, faith-based, and nongovernmental organizations, research and academic institutions, and private sector entities in eligible partner countries;

1 (B) the pandemic early warning systems
2 and international emergency operations centers
3 to be established under title II;
4 (C) the World Health Organization;
5 (D) the Global Health Security Agenda;
6 (E) the Global Health Security Initiative;
7 (F) the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tu-
8 berculosis, and Malaria;
9 (G) the United Nations Office for the Co-
10 ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNICEF,
11 and other relevant funds, programs, and spe-
12 cialized agencies of the United Nations;
13 (H) Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance;
14 (I) the Coalition for Epidemic Prepared-
15 ness Innovations (CEPI);
16 (J) the Global Polio Eradication Initiative;
17 and
18 (K) the Coordinator of United States Gov-
19 ernment Activities to Advance Global Health
20 Security and Diplomacy, established pursuant
21 to section 103.
22 (b) PRIORITY.—In providing assistance under this
23 section, the Fund should give priority to low-and lower-
24 middle income countries with—

1 (1) low scores on the Global Health Security
2 Index classification of health systems;
3 (2) measurable gaps in global health security
4 and pandemic preparedness identified under Joint
5 External Evaluations and national action plans for
6 health security;
7 (3) demonstrated political and financial com-
8 mitment to pandemic preparedness; and
9 (4) demonstrated commitment to upholding
10 global health budget and data transparency and ac-
11 countability standards, complying with the Inter-
12 national Health Regulations (2005), investing in do-
13 mestic health systems, and achieving measurable re-
14 sults.
15 (c) ELIGIBLE GRANT RECIPIENTS.—Governments
16 and nongovernmental organizations should be eligible to
17 receive grants as described in this section.
18 **SEC. 10. FUND ADMINISTRATION.**
19 (a) APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR.—The Ex-
20 ecutive Board of the Fund should appoint an Adminis-
21 trator who should be responsible for managing the day-
22 to-day operations of the Fund.
23 (b) AUTHORITY TO SOLICIT AND ACCEPT CONTRIBU-
24 TIONS.—The Fund should be authorized to solicit and ac-
25 cept contributions from governments, the private sector,

1 foundations, individuals, and nongovernmental entities of
2 all kinds.

3 (c) ACCOUNTABILITY OF FUNDS AND CRITERIA FOR
4 PROGRAMS.—As part of the negotiations described in sec-
5 tion 8(a), the Secretary of the State, shall, consistent with
6 subsection (d)—

7 (1) take such actions as are necessary to ensure
8 that the Fund will have in effect adequate proce-
9 dures and standards to account for and monitor the
10 use of funds contributed to the Fund, including the
11 cost of administering the Fund; and

12 (2) seek agreement on the criteria that should
13 be used to determine the programs and activities
14 that should be assisted by the Fund.

15 (d) SELECTION OF PARTNER COUNTRIES, PROJECTS,
16 AND RECIPIENTS.—The Executive Board should estab-
17 lish—

18 (1) eligible partner country selection criteria, to
19 include transparent metrics to measure and assess
20 global health security and pandemic preparedness
21 strengths and vulnerabilities in countries seeking as-
22 sistance;

23 (2) minimum standards for ensuring eligible
24 partner country ownership and commitment to long-

1 term results, including requirements for domestic
2 budgeting, resource mobilization, and co-investment;
3 (3) criteria for the selection of projects to re-
4 ceive support from the Fund;
5 (4) standards and criteria regarding qualifica-
6 tions of recipients of such support;
7 (5) such rules and procedures as may be nec-
8 essary for cost-effective management of the Fund;
9 and
10 (6) such rules and procedures as may be nec-
11 essary to ensure transparency and accountability in
12 the grant-making process.
13 (e) ADDITIONAL TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNT-
14 ABILITY REQUIREMENTS.—
15 (1) INSPECTOR GENERAL.—
16 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State
17 shall seek to ensure that the Fund maintains
18 an independent Office of the Inspector General
19 and ensure that the office has the requisite re-
20 sources and capacity to regularly conduct and
21 publish, on a publicly accessible website, rig-
22 orous financial, programmatic, and reporting
23 audits and investigations of the Fund and its
24 grantees.

1 (B) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CORRUP-
2 TION.—It is the sense of Congress that—
3 (i) corruption within global health
4 programs contribute directly to the loss of
5 human life and cannot be tolerated; and
6 (ii) in making financial recoveries re-
7 lating to a corrupt act or criminal conduct
8 under a grant, as determined by the In-
9 spector General, the responsible grant re-
10 cipient should be assessed at a recovery
11 rate of up to 150 percent of such loss.
12 (2) ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.—The Sec-
13 retary of State shall seek to ensure the Fund estab-
14 lishes, maintains, and makes publicly available a sys-
15 tem to track the administrative and management
16 costs of the Fund on a quarterly basis.
17 (3) FINANCIAL TRACKING SYSTEMS.—The Sec-
18 retary of State shall ensure that the Fund estab-
19 lishes, maintains, and makes publicly available a sys-
20 tem to track the amount of funds disbursed to each
21 grant recipient and sub-recipient during a grant's
22 fiscal cycle.
23 (4) EXEMPTION FROM DUTIES AND TAXES.—
24 The Secretary should ensure that the Fund adopts
25 rules that condition grants upon agreement by the

1 relevant national authorities in an eligible partner
2 country to exempt from duties and taxes all products
3 financed by such grants, including procurements by
4 any principal or sub-recipient for the purpose of car-
5 rying out such grants.

6 **SEC. 11. FUND ADVISORY BOARD.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—There should be an Advisory
8 Board to the Fund.

9 (b) APPOINTMENTS.—The members of the Advisory
10 Board should be composed of—

11 (1) individuals with experience and leadership
12 in the fields of development, global health, epidemi-
13 ology, medicine, biomedical research, and social
14 sciences; and

15 (2) representatives of relevant United Nations
16 agencies, including the World Health Organization,
17 and nongovernmental organizations with on-the-
18 ground experience in implementing global health
19 programs in low and lower-middle income countries.

20 (c) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Advisory Board should
21 provide advice and guidance to the Executive Board of the
22 Fund on the development and implementation of programs
23 and projects to be assisted by the Fund and on leveraging
24 donations to the Fund.

1 (d) PROHIBITION ON PAYMENT OF COMPENSA-
2 TION.—
3 (1) IN GENERAL.—Except for travel expenses
4 (including per diem in lieu of subsistence), no mem-
5 ber of the Advisory Board should receive compensa-
6 tion for services performed as a member of the
7 Board.
8 (2) UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE.—Not-
9 withstanding any other provision of law (including
10 an international agreement), a representative of the
11 United States on the Advisory Board may not accept
12 compensation for services performed as a member of
13 the Board, except that such representative may ac-
14 cept travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of
15 subsistence, while away from the representative's
16 home or regular place of business in the perform-
17 ance of services for the Board.
18 (e) CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.—Members of the Advi-
19 sory Board should be required to disclose any potential
20 conflicts of interest prior to serving on the Advisory
21 Board.
22 **SEC. 12. REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON THE FUND.**
23 (a) STATUS REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after
24 the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
25 in coordination with the Administrator of the United

1 States Agency for International Development, and the
2 heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies,
3 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
4 a report detailing the progress of international negotia-
5 tions to establish the Fund.

6 (b) ANNUAL REPORT.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after
8 the date of the establishment of the Fund, and an-
9 nually thereafter for the duration of the Fund, the
10 Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate
11 congressional committees a report on the Fund.

12 (2) REPORT ELEMENTS.—The report shall in-
13 clude a description of—

14 (A) the goals of the Fund;

15 (B) the programs, projects, and activities
16 supported by the Fund;

17 (C) private and governmental contributions
18 to the Fund; and

19 (D) the criteria utilized to determine the
20 programs and activities that should be assisted
21 by the Fund.

22 (c) GAO REPORT ON EFFECTIVENESS.—Not later
23 than 2 years after the date that the Fund comes into ef-
24 fect, the Comptroller General of the United States shall

1 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-
2 port evaluating the effectiveness of the Fund, including—
3 (1) the effectiveness of the programs, projects,
4 and activities supported by the Fund; and
5 (2) an assessment of the merits of continued
6 United States participation in the Fund.

7 **SEC. 13. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.**

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to submission of the cer-
9 tification under this section, the President is authorized
10 to make available for United States contributions to the
11 Fund such funds as may be authorized to be made avail-
12 able for such purpose.
13 (b) NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of State shall no-
14 tify the appropriate congressional committees not later
15 than 15 days in advance of making a contribution to the
16 Fund, including—
17 (1) the amount of the proposed contribution;
18 (2) the total of funds contributed by other do-
19 nors; and
20 (3) the national interests served by United
21 States participation in the Fund.
22 (c) LIMITATION.—At no point during the five years
23 after enactment of this Act shall a United States contribu-
24 tion to the Fund cause the cumulative total of United

1 States contributions to the Fund to exceed 33 percent of
2 the total contributions to the Fund from all sources.
3 (d) WITHHOLDINGS.—
4 (1) SUPPORT FOR ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL
5 TERRORISM.—If at any time the Secretary of State
6 determines that the Fund has provided assistance to
7 a country, the government of which the Secretary of
8 State has determined, for purposes of section 620A
9 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
10 2371) has repeatedly provided support for acts of
11 international terrorism, the United States shall with-
12 hold from its contribution to the Fund for the next
13 fiscal year an amount equal to the amount expended
14 by the Fund to the government of such country.
15 (2) EXCESSIVE SALARIES.—If at any time dur-
16 ing the five years after enactment of this Act, the
17 Secretary of State determines that the salary of any
18 individual employed by the Fund exceeds the salary
19 of the Vice President of the United States for that
20 fiscal year, then the United States should withhold
21 from its contribution for the next fiscal year an
22 amount equal to the aggregate amount by which the
23 salary of each such individual exceeds the salary of
24 the Vice President of the United States.

(3) ACCOUNTABILITY CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of State may withhold not more than 20 percent of planned United States contributions to the Fund until the Secretary certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Fund has established procedures to provide access by the Office of Inspector General of the Department of State, as cognizant Inspector General, the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Comptroller General of the United States to the Fund's financial data and other information relevant to United States contributions to the Fund (as determined by the Inspector General of the Department of State, in consultation with the Secretary of State).

SEC. 14. COMPLIANCE WITH THE FOREIGN AID TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2016.

Section 2(3) of the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–191; 22 U.S.C. 2394c note) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking "and" at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end and inserting "; and"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

"(E) the Global Health Security Act of 2021.".

SEC. 15. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional Committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

(2) GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY.—The term "global health security" means activities supporting epidemic and pandemic preparedness and capabilities at the country and global levels in order to minimize vulnerability to acute public health events that can endanger the health of populations across geographical regions and international boundaries.

SEC. 16. SUNSET.

This Act, and the amendments made by this Act shall cease to be effective 5 fiscal years after the enactment of this Act.

☒

Chairman MEEKS. At this time, I recognize myself to speak on the measure.

The past year has taught all of us the importance of global health security. Never has it been so clear that the pathogens around the world can dramatically affect American life here at home.

Representative Connolly has been a persistent leader on this issue in the past, and I so appreciate his work this Congress to further update this legislation.

As the saying goes, one ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. And that is undoubtedly true in global health. Pandemics do not respect borders. They do not care about nationalities, and we have spent the last year seeing that play out with horrific results in the COVID–19 pandemic.

Having a coordinated, whole-of-government approach to both preparing for and responding to these threats is critical, even more so, as we face a growing coronavirus outbreak.

This measure today would institutionalize the best practices the United States has learned in global health security. The bill establishes an Interagency Review Council to advance global health security and mandates a U.S. Global Health Security Coordinator to manage the U.S. response in these emergencies and to speak with one voice.

It also requires a strategy and reporting to Congress, which has communicated throughout this latest coronavirus outbreak its conviction that global health security is in our national interest, not just in playing catchup, but in getting ahead of the curve.

I support this important legislation and encourage everyone to do the same.

I realize that members wish to speak on the bill, and that some members have amendments to offer. Please use the "raise your hand" function on Webex, and I will recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between Democrats and Republicans, for the purpose of speaking on the bill first. If you miss your turn, please let our staff know. We will circle back to you. Then, we will move on to amendments.

I now recognize Representative Steve Chabot of Ohio, who is the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation, for 5 minutes.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for yielding. I'm not going to take the full 5 minutes because I spoke on this at the beginning.

But I want to again commend Mr. Connolly for his leadership on this. We've been working on this now for 3 years. And as I mentioned before, this really was prescient because we had never heard of COVID–19 when we put this legislation together and introduced it. We were concerned that we were vulnerable, and the rest of the world was vulnerable, to something like this. And so, we thought that we ought to be prepared for it here, and that, most importantly, we ought to be working with other countries across the globe who may not be as prepared as we are. And it turned out that Mr. Connolly and I were right, and obviously, this has been devastating to so many people. The worse, of course, is losing over half a million lives, but it has devastated small business; it's dev-

astated families, and you name it. So, it's been a terrible pandemic, and this will prepare us for the next one.

And so, I just want to, again, commend him and all the other members who have worked with us to get this to this point. I am hoping that we can actually pass this into legislation if we can get the Senate to act on it. So, I want to thank all the members for working on this with us.

And I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Gerry Connolly of Virginia, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. McCaul. And thank you to my good friend and partner in this enterprise, Mr. Chabot of Ohio.

This is an important bill. Tragically, we did not know how prescient or desperately needed this was when we first introduced it in December 2018. The global COVID–19 pandemic underscored not only the need for a robust Federal response to such a crisis, but also the importance of investing in global health security and pandemic preparedness around the world, because diseases do not respect borders.

I welcome the fact that the House Foreign Affairs Committee has coalesced around a bipartisan solution that addresses deficiencies in the current pandemic response effort, as well as demonstrating a commitment to a comprehensive and sustainable approach to global health security going forward.

We must rise to this occasion. We are in a pandemic that has cost over a million lives worldwide, but 600,000 lives here in our home country and tens of millions of Americans have suffered from COVID infection, many still with lingering, prolonged symptoms.

This bill would establish a Global Health Security Agenda Interagency Review Council, overseen by the National Security Advisor, and whose membership would include the heads of agencies relevant to carrying out the Global Health Security Agenda. It would establish a U.S. Coordinator for Global Health Security responsible for coordinating the interagency response to a global health security emergency. It would require the President to develop a Global Health Security Strategy with specific and measurable goals, benchmarks, and performance metrics that will improve U.S. leadership in global pandemic preparedness, and it would establish, finally, an International Fund for Global Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness.

I want to again thank you, Chairman Meeks and Ranking Member McCaul, for working with Mr. Chabot and me to strengthen this legislation. I also want to thank our respective committee staffs and our personal staffs for their commitment to this enterprise.

I really believe the result of our collaboration is a better bill that will have an even greater impact on our ability to emerge from this pandemic with a plan, with infrastructure and resources in place to prevent another catastrophic global health crisis.

Improvements to the bill include elevating the participants of the Interagency Council in a manner commensurate with the scope of the work that Council will need to carry out in the aftermath of

the pandemic; strengthening the scope of the Global Health Security Strategy with lessons learned from COVID–19, and the addition of a multilateral fund. These improvements happen to consistent with the Biden administration's now Security Memorandum on the Global United States Leadership to Strengthen the International COVID–19 Response and to advance global health security and biological preparedness.

Our statutory framework is careful not to be overly prescriptive and to prejudge the outcome of the current Response Framework offered by the administration. To that end, I want to thank Ranking Member McCaul for his willingness to be flexible on our vision for the U.S. Coordinator's role. Our approach does not mandate how or where the position should reside ultimately, and we think that approach gives us an opportunity to continue to have a dialog on this point and pursue a coordinated model that's informed by the best practices and lessons learned from this pandemic.

Republican and Democratic Presidents alike have recognized the critical importance of global health security, President Obama's role on launching the Global Health Security Agenda to President Trump's National Security Strategy and the National Biodefense Strategy.

Whether it's the current COVID–19 pandemic or the next crisis, it's clear these threats are ongoing and increasing, saving lives when the next global pandemic starts with investing and preparedness before is strikes. And we have seen time and again diseases do not respect borders and global health crises have immense security, economic, and humanitarian consequences.

Our Global Health Security Act recognizes the critical role of U.S. leadership in international health security, enshrines U.S. global health security policy in statute, and ensures that there is a permanent designated official responsible for coordinating these efforts and accountable for response outcomes.

I am proud that our Global Health Security Act has passed the House four times, and I think we are even better positioned now to pursue this effort and get it into law.

In closing, I want to thank all of my colleagues—Steve Chabot, Rick Larsen, Brian Fitzpatrick, Ami Bera, Ann Wagner—for serving as original co-sponsors of this bipartisan bill. And again, I cannot thank the chairman and ranking member enough for their involvement and their active support.

I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman's time has expired.

Seeing no further requests to speak, let's move on to amendments.

For what purpose does the Representative from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, seek recognition?

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment at the desk.

Chairman MEEKS. The clerk shall distribute the amendment to your staff virtually.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

Chairman MEEKS. I'm pausing briefly to give all members enough time to review the amendment.

Has everyone received a copy of the amendment?

The clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. STILES. Chabot Amendment No. 12. Strike Section 7 and insert the following: Section 7, Strategy and Reports.

Chairman MEEKS. Without objection, further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with.

[The Amendment No. 12 of Mr. Chabot follows:]

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 391

OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT OF OHIO

Strike section 7 and insert the following:

1 **SEC. 7. STRATEGY AND REPORTS.**

2 (a) STRATEGY.—The President shall coordinate the
3 development and implementation of a strategy to imple-
4 ment the policy aims described in section 3, which shall—

5 (1) seek to strengthen United States diplomatic
6 leadership and improve the effectiveness of United
7 States foreign assistance for global health security to
8 prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease
9 threats, including through advancement of the Glob-
10 al Health Security Agenda (GHSA), the Inter-
11 national Health Regulations (2005), and other rel-
12 evant frameworks that contribute to global health
13 security and pandemic preparedness;

14 (2) establish specific and measurable goals,
15 benchmarks, timetables, performance metrics, and
16 monitoring and evaluation plans for United States
17 foreign assistance for global health security that pro-
18 mote learning and reflect international best practices
19 relating to global health security, transparency, and
20 accountability;

(3) establish mechanisms to improve coordination and avoid duplication of effort between the United States Government and partner countries, donor countries, the private sector, multilateral organizations, and other key stakeholders;

(4) prioritize working with partner countries with demonstrated—

(A) need, as identified through the Joint External Evaluation process, the Global Health Security Index classification of health systems, national action plans for health security, GHSA Action Packages, and other complementary or successor indicators of global health security and pandemic preparedness; and

(B) commitment to transparency, including budget and global health data transparency, complying with the International Health Regulations (2005), investing in domestic health systems, and achieving measurable results;

(5) reduce long-term reliance upon United States foreign assistance for global health security by promoting partner country ownership, improved domestic resource mobilization, co-financing, and appropriate national budget allocations for global

health security and pandemic preparedness and response;

(6) assist partner countries in building the technical capacity of relevant ministries, systems, and networks to prepare, execute, monitor, and evaluate effective national action plans for health security, including mechanisms to enhance budget and global health data transparency, as necessary and appropriate;

(7) support and be aligned with country-owned global health security policy and investment plans developed with input from key stakeholders, as appropriate;

(8) facilitate communication and collaboration, as appropriate, among local stakeholders in support of a multi-sectoral approach to global health security;

(9) support the long-term success of programs by building the capacity of local organizations and institutions in target countries and communities;

(10) develop community resilience to infectious disease threats and emergencies;

(11) support global health budget and workforce planning in partner countries, including train-

ing in financial management and budget and global health data transparency;

(12) align United States foreign assistance for global health security with national action plans for health security in partner countries, developed with input from key stakeholders, including the private sector, to the greatest extent practicable and appropriate;

(13) strengthen linkages between complementary bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance programs, including efforts of the World Bank, the World Health Organization, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, that contribute to the development of more resilient health systems and supply chains in partner countries with the capacity, resources, and personnel required to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats;

(14) support innovation and public-private partnerships to improve pandemic preparedness and response, including for the development and deployment of effective, accessible, and affordable infectious disease tracking tools, diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines;

(15) support collaboration with and among relevant public and private research entities engaged in global health security; and

(16) support collaboration between United States universities and public and private institutions in partner countries that promote global health security and innovation.

(b) STRATEGY SUBMISSION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, in consultation with the head of each relevant Federal department and agency, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy required under subsection (a) that provides a detailed description of how the United States intends to advance the policy set forth in section 3 and the agency-specific plans described in paragraph (2).

(2) AGENCY-SPECIFIC PLANS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include specific implementation plans from each relevant Federal department and agency that describes—

(A) the anticipated contributions of the department or agency, including technical, financial, and in-kind contributions, to implement the strategy; and

(B) the efforts of the department or agency to ensure that the activities and programs carried out pursuant to the strategy are designed to achieve maximum impact and long-term sustainability.

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date on which the strategy required under subsection (a) is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under subsection (b), and not later than October 1 of each year thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the status of the implementation of the strategy.

(2) CONTENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) identify any substantial changes made in the strategy during the preceding calendar year;

(B) describe the progress made in implementing the strategy;

(C) identify the indicators used to establish benchmarks and measure results over time, as well as the mechanisms for reporting such results in an open and transparent manner;

(D) contain a transparent, open, and detailed accounting of expenditures by relevant Federal departments and agencies to implement the strategy, including, to the extent practicable, for each Federal department and agency, the statutory source of expenditures, amounts expended, partners, targeted populations, and types of activities supported;

(E) describe how the strategy leverages other United States global health and development assistance programs and bilateral and multilateral institutions;

(F) assess efforts to coordinate United States global health security programs, activities, and initiatives with key stakeholders;

(G) incorporate a plan for regularly reviewing and updating strategies, partnerships, and programs and sharing lessons learned with a wide range of stakeholders, including key stakeholders, in an open, transparent manner; and

(H) describe the progress achieved and challenges concerning the United States Government's ability to advance GHSA and pandemic preparedness, including data disaggregated by priority country using indica-

tors that are consistent on a year-to-year basis and recommendations to resolve, mitigate, or otherwise address the challenges identified therein.

(d) FORM.—The strategy required under subsection (a) and the report required under subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

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Chairman MEEKS. The Representative from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, is recognized for 5 minutes in support of Amendment No. 12.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not need to take that much time.

Throughout my time in Congress, I've always sought to ensure that taxpayer money is spent effectively. One way to do it is to include strategy and reporting requirements in legislation we pass to enhance our ability to do effective oversight.

If adopted, this amendment would strengthen both the strategy and the reports required by the Global Health Security Act to enhance better oversight over U.S. efforts to advance pandemic preparedness and response capabilities around the globe.

This amendment is a consensus product of bipartisan negotiations between myself, Mr. Connolly, Ranking Member McCaul, and Chairman Meeks. And I would urge that my colleagues support the amendment, and I yield back.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would my friend, Mr. Chabot, yield to me, Mr. Connolly?

Mr. CHABOT. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr. Connolly.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank you, Mr. Chabot.

I just want to briefly say I support the amendment, and I think it's a very thoughtful and substantive addition that strengthens the bill and strengthens our effort going forward. And I urge its adoption.

Thank you for yielding.

Mr. CHABOT. I'm happy to yield, and I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.

I support Mr. Chabot's amendment. Mr. Chabot's amendment, along with the McCaul and Connolly amendments to the GHSA, represent a bipartisan group of changes to the bill which I, the ranking member, Mr. Connolly, and Mr. Chabot support.

Mr. Chabot's amendment includes greater detail in the Global Health Security Strategy required by the bill, adding pieces like commitments to transparency, avoiding overlap and duplication, and supporting public-private partnerships. The strategy also calls for working closely with allies and partners, a crucial component to maintain global health security.

I encourage all of my colleagues to support this important amendment, and I yield back.

Is there any further debate on Chabot Amendment No. 12?

[No response.]

Chairman MEEKS. I understand that there are a couple of amendments to the Chabot amendment.

For what purpose does the Representative from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, seek recognition?

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have what I think is a friendly amendment at the desk.

Chairman MEEKS. The clerk shall distribute the amendment to your staff virtually.

Let's pause briefly to give members enough time to review the amendment.

Has everyone received a copy of the amendment?

The clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. STILES. Perry Amendment No. 51. At the end of Section 7(b), add the following——

Chairman MEEKS. Without objection, further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with.

[The Amendment No. 51 of Mr. Perry follows:]

AMENDMENT

OFFERED BY MR. PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT OF OHIO

[H.R. 391]

At the end of section 7(c), add the following:

(3) DETERMINATION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The President, in collaboration with the Director of National Intelligence, shall include in the initial report required under paragraph (1) a determination as to the likelihood of the SARS-CoV-2 virus leaking from a laboratory within the People's Republic of China.

(B) FORM.—The determination required under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may be included in a classified annex if the President determines it to be in the national security interests of the United States.

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Chairman MEEKS. A point of order is reserved.

The Representative from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is recognized for 5 minutes in support of the amendment.

Mr. PERRY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is the first of three I have on this piece of legislation.

I certainly thank the gentlemen and ladies on both sides of the aisle that have worked diligently for years to bring this to fruition. I just want to bring it up-to-date, especially based on what has happened in the last year and some-odd months.

A discussion on this legislation cannot go without mentioning the lack of global health security as a result of the action of the Chinese Communist Party. Now this amendment does not for anything except accountability. We simply must acknowledge that the main reason we're discussing global health security today is because of China.

Understandably, there have been epidemics and/or pandemics in the past, including the outbreak of H1N1 in this country and the outbreak of Ebola in Africa. However, the fact that the CCP controls or has outsized influence in so many international institutions is a very real threat to the success of any interagency or multilateral effort to combat the spread of diseases around the world.

Now this amendment would address serious concerns that have been raised in numerous outlets regarding gain-of-function research being conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. To be clear, gain-of-function research is the deliberate manipulation of a virus to make it more transmissible and fatal.

In a letter I led to the HHS OIG last month, I noted that the Wuhan Institute was somehow eligible for NIH grant funding. This is entirely unacceptable. And a few hours after my colleagues and I delivered that letter to the OIG's office, the Biden administration pledged to not provide funds to the Wuhan Institute, thank goodness, because I was pretty sure they were prepared to continue to fund the Institute again.

This is a good start, but we need to continue to hold China accountable. We know that the NIH has previously provided funds to the Wuhan Institute, and we know that the NIH grantees, including the EcoHealth Alliance, have provided funds to the Wuhan Institute as well.

Aside from preventing funds from going to the WIV, or any institution in the People's Republic of China engaging in gain-of-function research, we need to assess the extent and scope of such research in preparing for future virus outbreaks. And we need to be fully in the know, which leads to my last point.

China has been far from a helpful partner during this pandemic. We know for a fact that they lied to us and made the virus far more impactful than it had to be.

The second part of this amendment includes a strategy for ensuring maximum readiness against future pandemics, in light of the PRC's historic refusal to cooperate on issues of global health security. Put plainly, they're not going to want to cooperate with us. So, we need to begin to assess how we might otherwise avoid putting ourselves in a position that doesn't again leave millions of Americans out of jobs and hundreds of thousands of American families without a loved one today.

This amendment is less about how we can work with China—they have shown time and time again they have very little interest in working with us on issues of global health security—but it is more about how we can best monitor China's roguish behavior.

With that, I urge adoption of this amendment, and I yield back the remainder of the time, Mr. Chair.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back. But I want the gentleman to know that we called up the Perry Amendment No. 51. I think that you were articulating about the Perry Amendment No. 48, if that's not correct. We called up 51, the proposed amendment which requires the President, in collaboration with ODNI, to make a determination on the likelihood that COVID originated in a Chinese lab. That's No. 51.

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for being out of order here. Somehow, they had it up that way on my sheet, and I do not have them listed in the numbers that you have them listed in.

Chairman MEEKS. So, let me just let the record reflect that now I'll call up, since you debated Perry No. 48——

Mr. PERRY. Okay.

Chairman MEEKS [continuing]. I will respond to No. 48, and we will recall 51 after we debate 48.

So, I have to make sure now that everyone has received a copy of the Amendment No. 48 for their review.

Okay. Has everybody received 48?

Seeing that everyone has Perry Amendment No. 48, I now recognize myself for 5—oh, no, let me let the clerk read 48.

Ms. STILES. Perry Amendment No. 48. At the end of Section 7(c), add the following: Determination. The report required under paragraph (1) shall include: (A) A determination of the President, acting through the United States Coordinator for Global Health Security, which may be submitted——

Chairman MEEKS. Without objection, further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with.

[The Amendment No. 48 of Mr. Perry follows:]

AMENDMENT

OFFERED BY MR. PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT OF OHIO

[H.R. 391]

At the end of section 7(c), add the following:

1 (3) DETERMINATION.—The report required
2 under paragraph (1) shall include—
3 (A) a determination of the President, act-
4 ing through the United States Coordinator for
5 Global Health Security, which may be sub-
6 mitted in a classified annex, on the extent and
7 scope of gain-of-function research conducted
8 within research facilities in the People's Repub-
9 lic of China, particularly at the Wuhan Insti-
10 tute of Virology; and
11 (B) a strategy for ensuring maximum
12 readiness against future pandemics in light of
13 the People's Republic of China's historic refusal
14 to cooperate on issues of global health security.

☒

Chairman MEEKS. And now, since I had yielded such time to Mr. Perry, I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.

Gain-of-function research is an ongoing issue, including in the United States, and should be looked at globally, not just in a single country. The strategy required under Section 7 already seeks to prevent, detect, and respond to future outbreaks. Additionally, the current strategy in the bill includes prioritizing working with countries who have demonstrated commitment to transparency and the international health regulations, the language that was included at the request of the minority.

We need to remain vigilant regarding China when it comes to public health, but the next pandemic could start anywhere in the world. An effective strategy must be holistic and global in nature, and thereby, I oppose this amendment and yield back the balance of my time.

Is there any further debate on the amendment?

Hearing none——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MEEKS. Yes?

Mr. CONNOLLY. This is Mr. Connolly.

Chairman MEEKS. Yes, Mr. Connolly is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your clarification.

The whole issue of gain-of-function research is a global issue, not limited to one country. And I might add, I made a counteroffer to Mr. Perry with broader language that would have incorporated I think what he is trying to get at without fingering a specific lab in a specific country. That counteroffer was rejected.

Second, as you point out, we added Republican language to the bill that incorporated a goal of working with countries dedicated to transparency and international health regulations.

I believe that these two amendments, if I can speak to both of them, specifically imply that the virus outbreak came from a laboratory with Wuhan in the Republic of China. That is not a proven assertion. And for this committee to go on record as doing that will fracture bipartisan support for this bill, and there's something else.

We just witnessed eight people mowed down in a violent gun attack in Atlanta, Georgia. Six of those eight people were Asian-Americans. All across America, our fellow Americans, Asian-Americans, Asian-American descent, are expressing fear and anger about a pattern of harassment and hate in correlation with a pandemic for which they bear no responsibility, but all too many fellow Americans blame them.

The FBI has reported an increase to 3800 hate crimes aimed at Asian-Americans during the pandemic. When key figures refer to the "China flu" or the "Wuhan virus," they apparently do not understand that some who hear them, then, act on that and blame Asian-Americans for something they are blameless for.

How can we, while this Nation is grieving of the loss of these lives in a violent act of hatred, how can we add to that agony and that pain by fingering a particular lab in a particular country that will have racial ramifications in America, and will say to the world we've learned nothing?

The House Foreign Affairs Committee cannot do this, even though, privately and personally. Many people may very well feel or believe China is believe, this bill is not the place in which to encumber ourselves with enshrining this through this amendment in law. It would be a mistake, it would be retrograde, and it would be a slap in the face of grieving our Asian-Americans all over our country.

I urge the committee on a bipartisan basis to reject these two amendments. They serve no purpose other than ventilation, and they will do real harm.

I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

Is there any further debate on Amendment No. 48?

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MEEKS. Yes, who seeks recognition?

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chabot.

Chairman MEEKS. Mr. Chabot, you're recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CHABOT. Yes, I hadn't necessarily intended to speak on this, but since we've had a bit of a discussion, I think I should, just to clarify where I stand and where I think some of my colleagues may stand on this. I do not know for sure.

But this has been a very bipartisan process. We worked very closely with Mr. Connolly and Mr. Meeks, and others. Mr. Perry has offered amendments. I think it's perfectly legitimate to call out Beijing and the Wuhan region where this happened, and whether it actually came out of the lab, I do not think we know for sure, but it may well have. And I do not think there are any racial overtones to this whatsoever. However, obviously, members can agree or disagree on those types of things.

But I personally think that Mr. Perry's amendments make a good bill better. So, I intend to support them. If they do not pass, I certainly intend to support the legislation without that particular amendment.

The other amendments were worked on in a partisan manner. This part couldn't be, and that's why we are where we are. But I will support this whether this amendment passes or not.

And I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman yields back.

Is there any further debate on Amendment No. 48?

Mr. MAST. Representative Mast seeks recognition.

Chairman MEEKS. Representative Mast is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly will not need 5 minutes.

It's just I think our colleague, Mr. Connolly, my friend Mr. Connolly, has sparked some debate among us, and I would only offer this comment: that should every white person in the United States of America take offense and feel at risk because somebody is calling out white supremacy within our country? I do not think that we would jump to that conclusion, nor should we jump to, because we are pointing to the origins of a pandemic, that every person of an Asian descent should feel as though we're somehow pointing a fin-

ger at them when we're talking about a specific origin. It would be hyperbolic in both instances, in my opinion, to do so.

And in that, I yield my time back.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, this is Congressman Green. I'd also like to make a quick comment about this, if I could.

Chairman MEEKS. Mr. Green——

Ms. BASS. And, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, this is Congressman Bass. I would like to as well.

Chairman MEEKS. I now recognize Congresswoman Bass for 5 minutes.

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was just a little concerned at my colleagues' comments. I think what is actual fact is that, since the virus—since the President, since President Trump started calling it "the China virus," there has been a massive increase in hate crimes directed toward Asians, over a 200 percent increase. And many times when those crimes take place, the person that is attacking the individual specifically links it to that. So, that is the concern. There is no such correlation between denouncing white supremacy and, then, white Americans being concerned. There is no relationship to that at all. And I am very concerned that, after a year of vitriol from the administration, that it is not shocking to me that we had what happened last week.

So, with that, I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentlelady yields back.

I now recognize Representative Green from Tennessee for 5 minutes.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to say that the Chinese scientists who were silenced by China because they took the same position that this amendment takes, that China has suppressed the truth about the virus, were Asian. They were Chinese. So, this isn't about any demographic. This about the leadership of a country who even suppressed and disappeared their own Chinese Asian people's scientists from telling the truth about the origins of this virus and the truth about its spread, and the truth about what was going on in the Wuhan Lab and the Wuhan region of China. So, making this somehow a racial thing, sure, it may serve some political agenda, but it has no purpose in this committee.

And in regards to Atlanta, the FBI has clearly not released an intent for that murderer, just as in Colorado he is of Muslim descent, but there is no intent yet that has been stated from those shooters. So, to assume that there is some kind of racial motivation because most of the people were of a certain demographic is unfair at this point. Now it may very well prove to be true, but at this point that's unfair. So, we're conflating things that we shouldn't.

This virus came from that area. Their own scientists were accusing their government of making huge mistakes, and those scientists were silenced. It has nothing to do with race or ethnicity, or anything like that.

And with that, I yield.

Chairman MEEKS. Is there further debate on Amendment No. 47—48?

Ms. WILD. Mr. Meeks?

Chairman MEEKS. Yes?

Ms. WILD. Susan Wild here.

Chairman MEEKS. Ms. Wild is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. WILD. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I do not need 5 minutes.

I wish to associate myself with the remarks of Representative Bass and, also, to comment upon my colleague's statement about whether all whites should be threatened by the media's and public's denouncing of white supremacy, to which my answer would be, only those whites who are themselves white supremacists.

And with that, I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentlelady yields back.

Who seeks recognition?

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MEEKS. Yes, I recognize Ranking Member McCaul for 5 minutes.

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to see the tone of this debate really more fact-based and not go down the way it's going. I just want to offer, factually, when I chaired the China Task Force, what we were able to uncover is really evidence. We do know it came out of Wuhan. There's some uncertainty whether it came from the wet market or the laboratory.

And I think Mr. Perry's amendment is proper in terms of reporting, so we know about the origins of COVID–19, so we can stop this from ever happening again. Millions of people have died. Millions of jobs have been destroyed. We're entitled, as Congress, to know the truth.

The fact is that they were researching coronaviruses from bats, how they could extrapolate to humans, at the lab and to develop a vaccine. We also know from Department of State cables that were declassified that there were many safety concerns about the protocols being used at the lab. As we saw in 2004, researchers walked out contaminated with the SARS virus. It's not a huge stretch, but we just do not know what all the evidence would be with respect to it leaking from this laboratory.

But I think Congress is entitled to have a full both classified and unclassified briefing on this. It's a very important issue, and I think the extent to which the Chinese Communist Party went to cover this up, it needs to be talked about here. They silenced the doctors that were on WeChat talking about a SARS-like virus. They destroyed lab samples. They would not take the Taiwanese or the WHO's own expert's in Wuhan advice that it was human to human. And instead, the Director General Tedros and the WHO did not issue that alert, the international pandemic alert, but, rather, chose to sit on it.

And meanwhile, the big festival in January took place, and 5 million people exited Wuhan, traveled through mainland China, and then, traveled internationally. That's precisely, Mr. Chairman, when this went from a contained, local epidemic, or not contained, but local epidemic, to a global pandemic. And those are just facts.

I do not think this discussion has anything to do with someone's race or anything. I think it's just it's fact-based, and I think Congress is entitled to know the facts about what happened, what did or did not happen at that laboratory.

And so, I thank you. I think I would like to return to more civility in our discussion, and I thank the chairman for the time. And I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back. Is there any further debate on Amendment No. 48, Perry No. 48?

Hearing no further requests to speak, the question is on Perry Amendment No. 48.

We're going to take a vote by voice. All members, please unmute your microphones.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, say no.

In the opinion of the chair, the noes have it, and the amendment is not agreed to.

And without objection, the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table.

For what purpose does the Representative from Pennsylvania seek recognition?

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment at the desk. I believe it's No. 51 on this occasion.

Chairman MEEKS. The clerk shall distribute the amendment to our staff virtually.

Let's pause briefly to give all members enough time to review the amendment.

Has everyone received a copy of the amendment?

The clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. STILES. Perry Amendment No. 51. At the end of Section 7(b), add the following: (3) Determination.

Chairman MEEKS. Without objection, further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with.

[The Amendment No. 51 of Mr. Perry follows:]

AMENDMENT

OFFERED BY MR. PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT OF OHIO

[H.R. 391]

At the end of section 7(c), add the following:

1 (3) DETERMINATION.—

2 (A) IN GENERAL.—The President, in col-
3 laboration with the Director of National Intel-
4 ligence, shall include in the initial report re-
5 quired under paragraph (1) a determination as
6 to the likelihood of the SARS-CoV-2 virus leak-
7 ing from a laboratory within the People's Re-
8 public of China.

9 (B) FORM.—The determination required
10 under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in
11 unclassified form but may be included in a clas-
12 sified annex if the President determines it to be
13 in the national security interests of the United
14 States.

Chairman MEEKS. A point of order is reserved.

The Representative from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is now recognized for 5 minutes in support of the amendment.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The greatest mystery surrounding the coronavirus pandemic will almost certainly never be solved—how it began. Whether it originated in a wet market in Wuhan or leaked from a laboratory as a result of gain-of-function research promoted by Chinese health authorities, we'll likely never know because the CCP will do absolutely everything they can to avoid cooperating on the subject and having the world find out the truth.

The lab theory was dismissed early on as a right-wing conspiracy less than 1 year ago. However, just last month, The Washington Post, not exactly an outlet known for advocacy of conservative viewpoints, published an article on the lab hypothesis in an op-ed. More and more questions continue to surround this hypothesis, especially in light of circumstances immediately preceding the pandemic.

For example, in 2018, the State Department offered a briefing regarding the potential pandemic risk of research conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology indicating that our government knew about the potential of coronavirus experts at the WIV as well as biosafety concerns at the facility in general.

The National Institutes of Health until recently, apparently, made research grants available to the WIV and, also, made grants available to benefactors of the WIV, including the EcoHealth Alliance. It would seem unlikely that the NIH was unaware of the scope of the gain-in-function experiments occurring in Wuhan. More than a month ago, after sending a letter to the HHS OIG office requesting specific information on the NIH's relationship with the WIV, I have not received answers to any of my questions.

Now this has been a very long year for the American people, and after a devastating pandemic that has left more than half a million dead and millions out of work, the very least they deserve are answers to the questions they continue to have. This amendment would offer that option by directing the President to offer an assessment on the likelihood that the coronavirus was leaked from a laboratory within the People's Republic of China. It allows for a classified annex to be applied to this requirement if the President judges it to be in the national security interest of the United States.

It is true that a simple reporting requirement cannot establish with certainty that this virus may have escaped from a lab. However, conducting as thorough an analysis as possible may allow for a greater clarity as to the potential origins of the virus, and they could go a long way to informing us on how to avoid future pandemics. Knowing as much as possible about the virus' origins is crucial to the future of global health security.

And before I close, I just want to say, quite honestly, how disappointed I am in the tenor of this discussion that it has taken, and I hope we can remain on the subject at hand, which has nothing to do with race and has everything to do with the Communist Chinese Party who revels—who revels and delights—in the fact that we would not even reference them, that we're cowed, that we

are suppressed at referencing their involvement in whatever happened, wherever it happened, regarding China and around the globe. And the fact that we would conflate the horrific acts that were conducted around the country and somehow link them to our business of trying to get to the truth for this thing that has plagued not only the world, but the United States of America is just very, very disappointing to me, to say the least. So, again, we're just trying to get to the facts.

I associate myself with the comments of the members on my side of the aisle in the last portion of the debate, and I appreciate the opportunity to try and make our country, and the world, a safer place and acknowledge—and acknowledge—who has not been helpful, who has not been forthcoming and transparent. And that is the Communist Chinese Party. That's who it is, not Chinese-Americans and not the vast majority of Chinese people. But if we cannot discuss it, well, China's going to win, and I'm not going to aid or abet that.

And with that, I'm going to calm down, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time, and urge passage of this amendment as well.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

As Mr. Sherman has noted in his opening, this is an unnecessary amendment, given that the Fiscal Year omnibus bill contains a reporting requirement on the origins of the virus. We expect to receive this report from the administration in the next few days.

Separately, it is critical that any approach to understanding the virus origins be unbiased and based on facts and appropriately scoped. And that is not the case with this amendment.

Mr. Connolly's bill looks forward, seeking to increase pandemic preparedness, improve interagency coordination, and leverage support from others to address global health security, period. Thereby, I oppose this amendment, and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would the chairman yield to me, Mr. Connolly?

Chairman MEEKS. Yes, I yield to Mr. Connolly.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, rather than seeking simple recognition.

I would just point out, first of all, references to the tragedy in Atlanta are about context. They're not accusing anybody on our committee of anything untoward, and certainly not Mr. Perry in terms of his motivation, which I'm sure is sincere.

I am recalling for my colleagues, though, we act in a context, and the context right now is one of great fear in the Asian-American community throughout our country. That's a fact, and you can talk to your own Asian-American communities to confirm it. And therefore, doing something specific that points to China, when we do not have to do it, I think in this context is harmful.

Second, I offered a compromise, Mr. Chairman, in terms of language today. Here's the language: in lieu of both of Mr. Perry's amendments, we offered to say, add an amendment that said, "The President, in coordination with the United States Coordinator, shall include"—shall include—"in the initial report," required under paragraph 1, "an evaluation as practical and appropriate,

concerns regarding gain-of-function research and the potential origins of pandemics, including the ongoing COVID–19 pandemic."

That language would have absolutely encompassed what I thought Mr. Perry was seeking. But, obviously, my friends, some of my friends on the other side of the aisle want to be much more specific in pointing the finger at China. I believe in the current context in America that's a mistake. I think it would hurt the bill, and I think it's unnecessary. And that's why I posed this amendment as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.

Chairman MEEKS. Reclaiming my time, I now yield back the balance of my time.

Is there any further debate on the amendment?

Hearing no further requests to speak, the question is on the Perry Amendment No. 51.

We are going to take a vote by voice. All members, please unmute your microphone.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, say no.

In the opinion of the chair, the noes have it, and the amendment is not agreed to.

And without objection, the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table.

For what purpose does the gentleman, the Representative from Pennsylvania, seek recognition?

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment at the desk. I believe it's designated Amendment No. 54.

Chairman MEEKS. Hold 1 second.

I believe that there should be the Chabot amendment first.

Mr. PERRY. All right, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield.

Chairman MEEKS. Mr. Chabot?

Hearing no further requests to speak, the question is on the Chabot Amendment No. 12.

And with that, I'll take a vote by voice. All members, please unmute your microphone.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, say no.

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it, and the amendment is agreed to.

And without objection, the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table.

Now are there other amendments?

For what purpose does the gentleman from Pennsylvania seek recognition?

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe I have an amendment at the desk. I believe it's No. 54, unless I stand corrected.

Chairman MEEKS. All right. You're right.

The clerk shall distribute the amendment to your staff virtually.

Let's pause briefly to give all members enough time to review the amendment.

Have everybody received a copy of the amendment?

The clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. STILES. Perry Amendment No. 54. Amendment to H.R. 391. At the end of the bill, add the following——

Chairman MEEKS. Without objection, further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with.

[The Amendment No. 54 of Mr. Perry follows:]

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 391

OFFERED BY MR. PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA

At the end of the bill, add the following:

1 **SEC. __. LIMITATION.**

2 None of the funds made available to carry out this
3 Act may be used to make contributions to the World
4 Health Organization until the World Health Organization
5 undertakes organization-specific reforms highlighted in
6 the 2020 China Task Force Report.

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Chairman MEEKS. A point of order is reserved.

And the Representative from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is recognized for 5 minutes in support of the amendment.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm certainly grateful for the opportunity to speak on this amendment today, a proposal that would mandate the fulfillment of the recommendations listed in the 2020 China Task Force Report.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that global health security is an important goal and we must also hold both our adversaries and our partners accountable when they undermine global health objectives and U.S. security interests. Specifically, this amendment would ensure that none of the funds made available to carry out this Act, the Global Health Security Act, may be used to make contributions to the World Health Organization until the WHO undertakes organization-specific reforms. These reforms include:

First, and very specifically, the resignation of Dr. Tedros. Dr. Tedros refused to declare a public health emergency of international concern on January 23d, 2020; in fact, was the deciding vote against doing so, stymying international cooperation to contain the spread of this pandemic. He know that the PRC was withholding information and willfully promulgated the lies the Communist regime in Beijing was spewing. On every possible metric, Dr. Tedros has demonstrated stunning incompetence and bears responsibility for making this pandemic as bad as it is.

Next year, Dr. Tedros is up for reelection. However, I fear that the CCP, who promoted Dr. Tedros to this current role, may use their influence to maintain him in that position. We should take up the recommendations for reforms of the WHO by removing by Dr. Tedros from his post before he has an opportunity to marginalize global health security even further.

Second, we must make sure that Taiwan regains observer status in the WHO. On this topic, I do not think there is much opposition among committee members. Taiwan has more than proven themselves to be a reliable partner on issues of global health security, and at the very least, merits readmittance to the World Health Assembly as an observer. But note this will never happen with Dr. Tedros in power. Both of these reforms go hand-in-hand.

Third, we must continue to insist on an independent international investigation with like-minded partners, including Taiwan, into the CCP's lies during the early going of the pandemic and the WHO's actions in concealing the missteps taken by the PRC.

Finally, we must ensure the World Health Organization undertakes international health regulation reform. It is clear that, while many countries have still failed to ensure compliance by the 2005 IHRs, China routinely ignores the IHRs, despite unquestionably having the capacity to fulfill its obligations. In doing so, the PRC has clearly highlighted the need for IHR reform. You've got Article 6, Article 9, Article 10, and Article 12, all that need compliance and adherence to by the CCP.

It's irresponsible—it is irresponsible—to simply re-engage with the World Health Organization with no strings attached. We should be holding them to account and ensure that they fulfill these recommendations listed in the China Task Force Report to

ensure accountability in international organizations when they fall short.

I encourage adoption of this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.

Even prior to the current pandemic, Congress recognized the need to address global health security and to help ensure that the different actors in the Federal Government helping inform its response must act collaboratively and with one voice.

The bill does not include any funding for the WHO. Rather, it is intended to enhance coordination and proposes a mechanism to actually encourage other donors to invest in global health security.

While the WHO is not perfect, its technical capabilities and capacities, and relationships around the world, make it uniquely placed to help confront the global health challenges addressed by this Act. The United States is best positioned to effect positive changes by maintaining our seat at the table. Attaching artificial limits to our funding forfeits our voice and erodes our ability to seek reforms.

We're in the midst of a pandemic. The Trump administration did enough damage to the global public health response by disengaging with the WHO. The best way to implement change is to do what the Biden administration is doing, reasserting U.S. leadership and strengthening our ties with our partners to work collaboratively—collaboratively—to reform the WHO.

And I yield back the balance of my time.

Who seeks recognition?

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MEEKS. Mr. McCaul, you're recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

And let me say I support this amendment, but let me just say, Mr. Chairman, whether or not this amendment passes or fails, I do think you and I and the committee should be looking, as we're doing with my 5G bill, at the rise of the Chinese Communist Party within the United Nations. They almost got the Intellectual Property Organization leadership, which would be laughable, given their theft of IP. Just like we're doing with my 5G bill, I think we need to have a thorough examination of the leadership at the WHO.

We know that Director General Tedros is very close to President Xi, and he utterly failed the world in the most important role that he has, to notify the world about the threat of a global pandemic. When the issue was presented to him, and when his own expert in Wuhan was telling him it was transmittable human to human, he cast the tie-breaking vote to not warn the world of an international global pandemic, or the risk of it, or that it was human to human. I think he utterly failed in his most important mission in that job, and I personally would like to see him replaced.

But I think, moving forward, when we have hearings in this committee, and particularly, on the Asian-Pacific, we need to really be examining the leadership of the WHO, because I think it's factual and it's correct, and it's important for the United States and the

world to have a WHO that does its job without the influence of the Chinese Communist Party, but, rather, with the entire world, you know, the best interests of the entire world, and to protect them from a pandemic in the future.

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you on this important issue, and I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

Is there any further debate on the amendment?

Hearing no further requests to speak——

Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MEEKS. Who seeks recognition?

Mr. BARR. Barr, Kentucky.

Chairman MEEKS. Recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will not take the full 5 minutes. I just want to make the point that, in our hearing with the Secretary of State, I mentioned this issue and expressed my concern with the administration's decision to rejoin the World Health Organization and re-engage without a plan to reform the institution.

We know now, after the WHO's recent report, that the World Health Organization was aware that there were individuals in the Wuhan Institute of Virology who were sick in the fall of 2019. And they were aware of human-to-human transmission, and yet, collaborated and conspired with the Chinese Communist Party to facilitate this disinformation that enabled the spread of a global pandemic.

I think the issue of corruption at the World Health Organization, the legitimate issues of capture of Mr. Tedros and others at the World Health Organization that have close ties to the CCP, in facilitating and enabling the spread of this virus, points to, at minimum, a need to have major reforms.

And what Mr. Perry's amendment seeks to do is to simply say, look, if we are going to take the Biden administration's approach—and there is an argument for re-engaging in the WHO, and I take the Secretary of State's word that he earnestly believes that that is the best way forward—if that is the case, and if you take that position, if we, as Members of Congress, agree with the administration's approach, at least we should want the administration to give us a plan for how they intend to reform the WHO through that engagement and re-engagement in the WHO.

So, I fully support Mr. Perry's amendment because it just simply says that, if we're going to rejoin the WHO, we do so on the condition that there be reforms that make sure that this kind of misconduct at the WHO never happens again.

With that, I yield back.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MEEKS. Who seeks recognition? Who seeks recognition?

Mr. SMITH. Chris Smith, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MEEKS. Yes. Hold on. Let me go to the Democrat first.

Representative Gerry Connolly of Virginia——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment. Like Mr. Chabot, I'm the Co-Chair of the Taiwan Caucus. There's been no more relent-

less critic of the Communist Party in China and its leadership than myself. And I would gladly join in a bipartisan effort to look at, as Mr. McCaul suggests, the nature of the communist government in China and its malign activities around the world.

This bill is not about that. This bill is not about WHO. The fact that Mr. Tedros may have overly praised Chinese reaction in the early stages of the pandemic is regrettable, but he was not alone. Perhaps we conveniently forget President Trump publicly praised President Xi Jinping of China for his robust and strong crackdown in Wuhan in response to the virus. It was only later he changed his mind about it.

And so, maybe we need a new leader at WHO. The best way to decide that is to re-engage in WHO as a member. The decision by President Trump to withdraw from WHO actually only strengthened China's influence in the organization because we weren't there.

So, if there are going to be internal reforms, I favor them, and let's be engaged. But this bill is not the vehicle in which this committee should be addressing that. This bill is about how our government organizes itself, so that we're prepared, so that we have plans, so that we are not caught short again, as we were a year ago. And I think we need to stick to that focus. And therefore, I join in your comments, Mr. Chairman, and I would oppose this amendment on this bill.

I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize the Representative from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, for 5 minutes.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I appreciate that you said that there needs to be reforms, and I think the more we are specific as to what those reforms are at WHO, the better. I mean, the lack of transparency on the part of, first, China and Xi Jinping, who to this day says that no genocide is occurring against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, who has broken his word with impunity vis-a-vis Hong Kong. I mean, it's a matter of treaty obligation. And what has the Chinese Community Party done in Hong Kong? They have put some of the best and the bravest and the brightest into prison, including Joshua Wong and Martin Lee, who is undergoing a trial.

So, you've got to realize that when an organization like WHO, then, poll parrots the disinformation, we have a very serious problem because it now affects the health of people in my district, your district, and, of course, the entire world. With over half a million people dead in the United States alone, we absolutely deserve absolute transparency, not a group that goes over there and finds that the Chinese interlocutors that they're investigating with are not being forthcoming.

So, this has been, I think, very serious, and we should never ever, ever allow this to be replicated again. And so, those reforms have to be very real and we've got to get the transparency.

So, there's been a cover-up here. Xi Jinping is a notorious liar. He does it in human rights abuse across the board. I have chaired 75 congressional hearings on human rights abuse in China. It has never been worse than under Xi Jinping.

And Tedros got his job courtesy of the Chinese Communist Party. I knew when he was in Ethiopia as a minister, argued with him many times. There were allegations that he covered up certain sicknesses that occurred in Ethiopia over time. You know, he was a very affable guy, very good to talk to, and very civil. But when you poll parrot misinformation that so disastrously affects the world and kills so many people, there's time for accountability.

I have introduced a bill—maybe members of the committee would like to join in—to provide justice for victims of State misrepresentations to the World Health Organization, and it's patterned after JASTA, you might recall, in which we focused on Saudi Arabia and their complicity in 9/11, to waive the Sovereign Immunities Act, so that we can try to get some kind of discovery in a court of law in the United States. Nobody thought it would happen with JASTA. It was the only bill, to my recollection, over 8 years where Barack Obama was overridden by way of veto, because he did veto that bill. And it was bipartisan because we wanted the truth. We're still not there in getting the truth about 9/11 and the Saudi Arabian complicity in that, but we have to have it here.

There's just the loss of life, the morbidity, the economic losses are incalculable around the world, including in my district and yours. So, transparency, Mr. Chairman, and we ought to really be dogged in demanding—do not poll parrot what this man says, Xi Jinping and his cronies in Beijing. Be independent. We wouldn't settle for this in a democracy. We absolutely cannot settle for it in a Chinese Communist Party dictatorship.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

Is there any further debate on the amendment?

Mr. VARGAS. Vargas from California.

Chairman MEEKS. Is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I also believe in truth and transparency, and I believe that we shouldn't parrot misinformation, as was stated. So, I'd like to read some remarks that are direct quotes.

This direct quote: "I just spoke to President Xi last night, and, you know, we're working on the problem, the virus. It's a very tough situation, but I think he's going to handle it. I think he's handled it really well. We're helping wherever we can."

February 7th: "Just had a long and very good conversation by phone with President Xi of China. He is strong, sharp, and powerful, focused on leading the counterattack to the coronavirus. He feels they are doing very well, even building hospitals in a matter of only days. Great discipline taking place in China, as President Xi strongly leads what will be a very successful operation. We are working closely with China to help."

Remarks again on February 7th: "Last night, I had a very good talk with President Xi, and we talked about, mostly about the coronavirus. They're working really hard, and I think they're doing a very good, professional job. They're in touch with the world, the World Organization, CDC also. We're working together. But the World Health is working with them. CDC is working with them. Had a great conversation last night with President Xi. It's a tough situation. I think we're doing a very good job."

February 10th: "I think China is very, you know, professionally run in the sense that they have everything under control," Trump said. "I really believe they are going to have it under control fairly soon. You know, in April, supposedly, it dies with hotter weather, and that's a beautiful date to look forward to. But China, I can tell you, is working very hard."

"I spoke with President Xi." This is February 10th. "I spoke with President Xi, and they're working very, very hard, and I think it's all going to work out fine."

February 13th: "I think they've handled it professionally, and I think they're extremely capable, and I think President Xi is extremely capable. And I hope that it's going to be resolved."

I will not go on and on, but I could because there's many, many more quotes here. So, I do think that it's important to stop misinformation and not to parrot, and that's why I wanted to read exact quotes.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Will my good friend yield for a second?

Mr. VARGAS. Sure. Of course.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, I appreciate that.

Mr. VARGAS. Of course. Of course.

Mr. SMITH. And, of course, in those early days, the WHO, and weeks before, which had access to the information, or should have, put the gloss of they're doing everything possible. So, why wouldn't we, all of us, believe at that point that it wasn't as bad as we might have thought it would be just a month later, or 2 months later?

So, my point is, the source of the information, the WHO, which their source was Xi Jinping and his government, you know, they're the ones who had the primary access to the information. And, of course, in retrospect, those quotes were misinformed, no doubt about it, but the people who should have known better were the top brass, including Tedros, at the WHO.

And I thank my good friend for yielding.

Mr. VARGAS. Of course. I reclaim my time.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Will my friend yield, Mr. Vargas?

Mr. VARGAS. Why shouldn't we have trusted them?

Yes, of course, I yield to my good friend, Mr. Connolly.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Vargas. This is Mr. Connolly.

I just want to point out what Mr. Smith failed to point out was, what you quoted were direct conversations between President Trump and President Xi. They weren't filtered through the WHO. So, if Tedros made the same mistake, so did Mr. Trump.

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. I reclaim my time.

I was about to State that these quotes were actually not through the WHO, but I think Mr. Connolly has pointed that out well. This was a conversation, conversations held between President Trump and President Xi.

I yield back. Thank you.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

Is there any further debate on the amendment?

Hearing no further requests to speak, the question is on the Perry Amendment No. 54.

We're going to take a vote by voice. All members, please unmute your microphones.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, say no.

In the opinion of the chair, the noes have it, and the amendment is not agreed upon, is not agreed to.

And without objection, the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table.

Seeing no further amendments, then, without objection, the committee will postpone further consideration of H.R. 391.

The committee will be taking a short recess, and we'll, then, take up the SAFE Act, the Khashoggi Accountability Act, and H.R. 256.

We stand in recess for 30 minutes.

[Recess.]

Chairman MEEKS. I now reconvene this markup.

The question is to report H.R. 391, the Global Health Security Act of 2021 to the House with the recommendation that the bill do pass, as amended, and amendments to the bill shall be reported as a single amendment in the nature of a substitute.

We're going to take a vote by voice. All members, please unmute your microphones.

All those in favor, say aye.

All opposed, no.

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it.

And without objection, the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table.

Now we go to consider H.R. 2118, Securing America From Epidemics Act.

Pursuant to notice, for purposes of markup, I now call up H.R. 2118. The clerk will report the bill.

Ms. STILES. H.R. 2118, to authorize the United States participation in the Coalition for Epidemic——

Chairman MEEKS. Without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with.

Without objection, the bill shall be considered as read and open to amendment at any point.

[The bill H.R. 2118 follows:]

[~116H6334RFS]

.....

(Original Signature of Member)

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. _____

To authorize United States participation in the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. BERA introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To authorize United States participation in the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Securing America From Epidemics Act".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Due to increasing population and population density, human mobility, and ecological change, emerging infectious diseases pose a real and growing threat to global health security.

(2) While vaccines can be the most effective tools to protect against infectious disease, the absence of vaccines for a new or emerging infectious disease with epidemic potential is a major health security threat globally, posing catastrophic potential human and economic costs.

(3) The COVID–19 pandemic has infected more than 119,960,700 individuals and has killed at least 2,656,822 people worldwide, and it is likely that unreported cases and deaths are significant.

(4) Even regional outbreaks can have enormous human costs and substantially disrupt the global economy and cripple regional economies. The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa killed more than 11,000 and cost $2,800,000,000 in losses in the affected countries alone.

(5) While the need for vaccines to address emerging epidemic threats is acute, markets to drive the necessary development of vaccines to address them—a complex and expensive undertaking—are very often critically absent. Also absent are mecha-

nisms to ensure access to those vaccines by those who need them when they need them.

(6) To address this global vulnerability and the deficit of political commitment, institutional capacity, and funding, in 2017, several countries and private partners launched the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). CEPI's mission is to stimulate, finance, and coordinate development of vaccines for high-priority, epidemic-potential threats in cases where traditional markets do not exist or cannot create sufficient demand.

(7) Through funding of partnerships, CEPI seeks to bring priority vaccines candidates through the end of phase II clinical trials, as well as support vaccine platforms that can be rapidly deployed against emerging pathogens.

(8) CEPI supported the manufacturing of the United States-developed Moderna COVID–19 vaccine during its Phase 1 clinical trial, and CEPI has initiated at least 12 partnerships to develop vaccines against COVID–19.

(9) CEPI is co-leading COVAX, the vaccines pillar of the ACT–Accelerator, which is a global collaboration to quickly produce and equitably dis-

tribute safe and effective vaccines and therapeutics for COVID–19.

(10) Support for and participation in CEPI is an important part of the United States own health security and biodefense and is in the national interest, complementing the work of many Federal agencies and providing significant value through global partnership and burden-sharing.

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The United States is hereby authorized to participate in the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (''Coalition'').

(b) DESIGNATION.—The President is authorized to designate an employee of the relevant Federal department or agency providing the majority of United States contributions to the Coalition, who should demonstrate knowledge and experience in the fields of development and public health, epidemiology, or medicine, to serve—

(1) on the Investors Council of the Coalition; and

(2) if nominated by the President, on the Board of Directors of the Coalition, as a representative of the United States.

(c) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes the following:

(1) The United States planned contributions to the Coalition and the mechanisms for United States participation in such Coalition.

(2) The manner and extent to which the United States shall participate in the governance of the Coalition.

(3) How participation in the Coalition supports relevant United States Government strategies and programs in health security and biodefense, including—

(A) the Global Health Security Strategy required by section 7058(c)(3) of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (Public Law 115–141);

(B) the applicable revision of the National Biodefense Strategy required by section 1086 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (6 U.S.C. 104); and

(C) any other relevant decision-making process for policy, planning, and spending in global health security, biodefense, or vaccine

and medical countermeasures research and development.

(d) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated under chapters 1 and 10 of part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) are authorized to be made available for United States contributions to the Coalition.

(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term ''appropriate congressional committees'' means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

Chairman MEEKS. At this time, I recognize myself to speak on the measure.

The COVID–19 crisis has shown just how interconnected our world is, and how important vaccines are to ending one of the greatest catastrophes of the 21st century. This bill addresses these vital issues. The scientists, researchers, and health care workers have stepped up in a big way and created a vaccine in record time. But vaccines by themselves do not end pandemics. Shots in the arms do. This means we need to have the means to mass produce vaccines rapidly, as well as the resources, the logistical knowhow, and political will to get them out, not just here in the United States, but around the world.

We must also ensure people around the world have proper confidence in the vaccine. The collective resources of the private sector, of multilateral organizations, national governments, civil society, and health experts are all very important.

This bill would authorize the United States to participate in the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, a private-public partnership that helps accelerate the development of vaccines against emergent infectious disease, including Ebola and COVID–19. This has never been more important, I know, in my lifetime—and I'm getting old. By supporting CEPI, we demonstrate the value of leveraging the individual strengths toward collective action, helping develop vaccines to stop future pandemics.

Now I encourage all of my colleagues to vote for this important legislation.

I realize that there are members who wish to speak on the bill and that some members have amendments to offer. Please use the "raise your hand" function on Webex, and I will recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between Democrats and Republicans, for the purpose of speaking on the bill first. If you miss your turn, please let our staff know, and we will circle back to you. Then, we will move on to amendments.

Do any members wish to speak on the measure?

Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to speak. This is Congressman Bera.

Chairman MEEKS. You're recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank both the chairman and Ranking Member McCaul for including my legislation, H.R. 2118, the Securing America From Epidemics, or SAFE, Act.

This legislation, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, would authorize our participation in the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, or CEPI. Last Congress, this committee, our committee, passed this. The bill went through the committee and passed on the House floor on suspension, and it was also part of the second HEROES Act. In this Congress, let's get this legislation to the President's desk.

CEPI was an organization that was created in the aftermath of the 2015 West African Ebola crisis, and its sole function was to help us get ready for the next pandemic. One of CEPI's earliest successes, it was one of the early investors in the Moderna vaccine, which is one of our most effective and safest vaccines as we combat COVID–19.

By authorizing participation in CEPI, the bill will enable the United States to firmly claim a seat at the CEPI table, shape its priorities and governance, and allow Congress to provide contributions to the organizations. It will also help us be ready to respond even faster to the next pandemic and prevent another large-scale event like what we're living through right now.

Thank you again to Chairman Meeks for your hard work. Thank you to my colleague, Congressman Brian Fitzpatrick, for being the co-sponsor of this and the co-lead on this.

And again, I will yield back. Thank you.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

Any other members who wish to speak on the measure?

Hearing no further requests, let's move on to amendments.

For what purpose does the Representative from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, seek recognition?

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

Chairman MEEKS. The clerk shall distribute the amendment to your staff virtually.

Let's pause briefly to give all members enough time to review the amendment.

Has everyone received a copy of the amendment?

The clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. STILES. Perry Amendment No. 53. Add at the end, the following: The authorization provided under section 3——

Chairman MEEKS. Without objection, further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with.

[The Amendment No. 53 of Mr. Perry follows:]

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2118

OFFERED BY MR. PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Add at the end the following:

1 **SEC. ___. LIMITATION.**

2 The authorization provided under section 3 shall not
3 take effect until the date on which the Scientific Advisory
4 Committee of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness In-
5 novations offers an invitation to the Agency Executive of
6 the Taiwan Centers for Disease Centers to join the Sci-
7 entific Advisory Committee, with full voting and
8 participatory rights as other members.

Chairman MEEKS. A point of order is reserved.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I'm proud to introduce this amendment before this committee today. It is a testament to the great friendship between Taiwan and the United States and a manifestation of what we've learned in the past year. Taiwan is a necessary U.S. partner in issues related to global health security.

From December 31st, 2019, Taiwan has proven that its voice is one worth having in international institutions. Today, we're also marking up a bill to 1 day secure Taiwan's position as an observer in the World Health Organization. This amendment to the Securing America From Epidemics Act continues the effort to ensure Taiwan's increased participation in international organizations.

I recall last year, when the SAFE Act was first taken up, that one argument in favor of U.S. participation in the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations was that the People's Republic of China did not contribute or participate in that organization, and it was an opportunity for the United States to exercise its sorely needed leadership in pursuit of a coronavirus vaccine. By allowing Taiwan to join our international partner on CEPI's Scientific Advisory Committee, we would be extending a genuine offer of cooperation to a like-minded partner in pursuit of advancements in global health.

Lest anyone think otherwise, this is in no way a politically motivated amendment. This is not an amendment aimed at disparaging the People's Republic of China. It does not address the fact that an active member of China's Center for Disease Control sits on the Scientific Advisory Committee. However, concerning that fact, it actually is.

However, this amendment is solely focused on Taiwan and our interest in including a partner with a strong track record on global health issues and working toward the common good. Specifically, the language of this amendment conditions U.S. participation in CEPI on the organization's simply extending an invitation to the agency executive of the Taiwan Center for Disease Control to join CEPI's Scientific Advisory Committee as a full voting member.

Certainly, my hope is that this committee, in recognition of Taiwan's great contributions to the international community, adopts this amendment in a bipartisan fashion.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.

This authorization supports efforts to develop and distribute vaccines, including for COVID, and has strong bipartisan support. We've seen through this COVID crisis how important it is for the United States to lead an efforts to combat the outbreak, engaging in institutions to positively influence their actions.

Conditioning our participation in CEPI would not cede the playing field, not advance the efforts of vaccine development. CEPI is an association with engagement and support from a variety of entities from philanthropic foundations to countries, to individuals, to

NGO's. It is not a U.N. body with member States. The U.S. Government does not determine the Scientific Advisory's Committee's composition. The Advisory Committee solicits public nominations. It's free to be nominated and considered.

While we welcome greater participation by Taiwan in more international fora, conditioning Taiwan's participating on the Scientific Advisory Committee, a process we do not control, could hold up much-needed progress and advancement at this critical time. Further, CEPI's Scientific Advisory Committee is a group of experts who support CEPI's work, but explicitly it does not have final decisionmaking authority over CEPI's activities, and it is not representative of CEPI's participants.

Therefore, I oppose this amendment. And I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BERA. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment?

Chairman MEEKS. Yes.

Mr. BERA. This is Congressman Bera.

I appreciate my good friend Pennsylvania's sentiment here, but I echo the comments of the chairman that anything that would delay U.S. participation in CEPI is not a good thing, particularly in the middle of this pandemic. And we have to be sitting at the table.

I look forward to working with my colleague from Pennsylvania on ways we can strengthen our relationship with Taiwan, get Taiwan into multilateral and international organizations, where they belong, and again, continue to send a strong message of our friendship and partnership with Taiwan.

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. Yes. I gave you time. So, I now will reclaim my time and yield back the balance of my time.

Is there any further request for debate on the amendment?

Hearing no further requests to speak, the question is on the amendment.

We're going to take a vote by voice. All members, please unmute your microphones.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, no.

In the opinion of the chair, the noes have it, and the amendment is not agreed to.

And the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Chairman, I request a recorded vote.

Chairman MEEKS. A roll call vote is requested.

Pursuant to Committee Rule 4(a)(2), further proceedings on the amendment shall be postponed.

Are there any other amendments?

Seeing no further amendment, then, without objection, the committee will postpone further consideration of H.R. 2118 and move to consider H.R. 1464.

We now move on to consider H.R. 1464, the Khashoggi Accountability Act. Pursuant to notice, for purposes of markup, I now call up H.R. 1464. The clerk will report the bill.

Ms. STILES. H.R. 1464, to impose sanctions with respect to foreign persons listed in the Office of the Director of——

Chairman MEEKS. Without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with.

And without objection, the bill shall be considered as read and open to amendment at any point.

[The bill H.R. 1464 follows:]

(Original Signature of Member)

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. _____

To impose sanctions with respect to foreign persons listed in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence report titled "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi", dated February 11, 2021.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. MALINOWSKI introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To impose sanctions with respect to foreign persons listed in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence report titled "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi", dated February 11, 2021.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Saudi Arabia Accountability for Gross Violations of Human Rights Act".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) On October 2, 2018, Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered by Saudi government agents in Istanbul, having reportedly been lured out of the United States by Saudi diplomatic officials in Washington, D.C. and monitored through surveillance spyware.

(2) On July 25, 2019, the House of Representatives passed by a margin of 405-7 the Saudi Arabia Human Rights and Accountability Act of 2019, which required—

(A) an unclassified report by the Director of National Intelligence on parties responsible for Khashoggi's murder, a requirement ultimately inserted into and passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020;

(B) visa sanctions on all persons identified in such report; and

(C) a report on human rights on Saudi Arabia.

(3) On February 26, 2021, the Director of National Intelligence released the report produced pursuant to congressional direction, directly implicating Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and

other senior Saudi officials in the planning and direction of Khashoggi's murder.

(4) Section 7031(c) of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116–260) requires the Secretary of State to deny entry into the United States of ''officials of foreign governments and their immediate family members about whom the Secretary of State has credible information have been involved, directly or indirectly, in. . . a gross violation of human rights''.

(5) The Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) prohibits weapons transfers to foreign countries determined by the President to be engaged in a ''pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States''.

(6) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) directs the President to formulate and conduct international security assistance programs of the United States in a manner which will ''avoid identification of the United States, through such programs, with governments which deny to their people internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms''.

(7) Secretary of State Antony Blinken has affirmed the United States national interest in pre-

venting authoritarian foreign governments from reaching beyond their borders to intimidate or harm persons within the United States, stating that: "As a matter of safety for all within our borders, perpetrators targeting perceived dissidents on behalf of any foreign government should not be permitted to reach American soil. . . We have made absolutely clear that extraterritorial threats and assaults by Saudi Arabia against activists, dissidents, and journalists must end.".

SEC. 3. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PERSONS LISTED IN THE REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE MURDER OF JAMAL KHASHOGGI.

(a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—On and after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the sanctions described in subsection (b) shall be imposed with respect to each foreign person listed in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence report titled "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi", dated February 11, 2021.

(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(A) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS AND ADMISSION TO THE UNITED STATES.—

(i) Inadmissibility to the United States.

(ii) Ineligibility to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States.

(iii) Ineligibility to otherwise be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 110et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) Revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) A revocation under clause (i) shall—

(I) take effect immediately; and

(II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the foreign person's possession.

(2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Sanctions under paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a foreign person if admitting or paroling the person into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations.

(3) WAIVER IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY.—The President may waive for an individual entry into the United States the application of this section with respect to a foreign person who is A-1 visa eligible and who is present in or seeking admission into the United States for purposes of official business if the President determines and transmits to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassified written notice and justification not later than 15 days before the granting of such waiver, that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States.

(c) SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may suspend in whole or in part the imposition of sanctions otherwise required under this section if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the following criteria have been met in Saudi Arabia:

(A) The Government of Saudi Arabia is not arbitrarily detaining citizens or legal residents of the United States or any other third country for arbitrary political reasons, including criticism of Saudi government policies, peaceful advocacy of political beliefs, or the pursuit of United States citizenship.

(B) The Government of Saudi Arabia is cooperating in outstanding criminal proceedings in the United States in which a Saudi citizen or national departed from the United States while the citizen or national was awaiting trial or sentencing for a criminal offense committed in the United States.

(C) The Government of Saudi Arabia has made significant numerical reductions in individuals detained for peaceful political reasons, including activists, journalists, bloggers, lawyers, or critics.

(D) The Government of Saudi Arabia has disbanded any units of its intelligence or security apparatus dedicated to the forced repatriation of dissidents or critical voices in other countries.

(E) The Government of Saudi Arabia has made meaningful commitments to a multilateral framework on the lawful use, sale, transfer of digital surveillance items and services that can be used to abuse human rights.

(F) The Government of Saudi Arabia has instituted meaningful legal reforms to protect the rights of freedom of expression, religion, women's rights, and due process in its judicial system.

(2) REPORT.—Accompanying the certification described in paragraph (1), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a detailed description of Saudi Arabia's adherence to the criteria described in the certification.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms ''admitted'' and ''alien'' have the meanings given those terms in

1 section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
2 (8 U.S.C. 1101).
3 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
4 TEES.—The term ''appropriate congressional com-
5 mittees'' means—
6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
7 Committee on the Judiciary, and the Perma-
8 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
9 House of Representatives; and
10 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
11 the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Select
12 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
13 (3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ''foreign per-
14 son'' has the meaning given such term in section
15 595.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as
16 in effect on the day before the date of the enactment
17 of this Act), except that such term does not include
18 an entity (as such term is described in such section).
19 (4) FOREIGN PERSON WHO IS A-1 VISA ELIGI-
20 BLE.—The term ''foreign person who is A-1 visa eli-
21 gible'' means an alien described in section
22 101(a)(15)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
23 Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(A)(i)).
24 (5) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
25 ''United States person'' means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 4. REPORT AND SUSPENSION OF ASSISTANCE FOR INCIDENTS OF ARBITRARY DETENTION, VIOLENCE, AND STATE-SANCTIONED HARASSMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on incidents of arbitrary detention, violence, and state-sanctioned harassment by the Government of Saudi Arabia against United States citizens and their family members who are not United States citizens, in the United States and foreign countries.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a detailed description of such incidents in the past 5 years;

(2) a certification of whether Saudi Arabia is engaging in a "pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States" pursuant to section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2756); and

(3) any other actions taken to deter incidents of intimidation or harassment against Americans and their families by such government's security agencies.

(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

(d) SUSPENSION OF ASSISTANCE.—If the President determines in any report issued pursuant to subsection (a) that the government of Saudi Arabia has engaged in a pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States, the President shall cancel or suspend any letters of offer, credits, guarantees, or export licenses with such government, in compliance with section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2756) until such time as the President determines

that the pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment has ceased.

(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ''appropriate congressional committees'' means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 5. MEASURES TO DISASSOCIATE UNITES STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE FROM HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue draft regulations to be promulgated in the Foreign Affairs Manual that each individual concurrence by the Department of State for an instance of United States security assistance, including military-to-military activities and arms transfers, with the Government of Saudi Arabia shall be accompanied by the publication on a text-searchable website of an unclassified report that describes whether

1 and how the provision of such assistance will ''avoid identi-
2 fication of the United States, through such programs, with
3 governments which deny to their people internationally
4 recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, in
5 violation of international law or in contravention of the
6 policy of the United States'' in accordance with section
7 502B the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2304).

Chairman MEEKS. Three amendments to this bill will be distributed to members in advance, and I understand members are prepared to voice vote them.

Without objection, the three amendments, the Malinowski No. 1 amendment, Malinowski No. 2 amendment, and Omar No. 26 are agreed to en bloc.

[The Amendment No. 1 of Mr. Malinowski, Amendment No. 2 of Mr. Malinowski, and Amendment No. 26 of Ms. Omar en bloc follow:]

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1464

OFFERED BY MR. MALINOWSKI OF NEW JERSEY

Strike section 2 and insert the following:

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress finds the following:

3 (1) On October 2, 2018, Washington Post jour-
4 nalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered by Saudi
5 Government agents in Istanbul.

6 (2) According to the United Nations Special
7 Rapporteur's June 2019 report, Mr. Khashoggi con-
8 tacted the Saudi Embassy in Washington regarding
9 required documentation he needed to obtain from
10 Saudi authorities and "was told to obtain the docu-
11 ment from the Saudi embassy in Turkey".

12 (3) According to press reports, Mr. Khashoggi's
13 associates were surveilled after having their phones
14 infiltrated by spyware.

15 (4) On July 15, 2019, the House of Represent-
16 atives passed by a margin of 405-7 the Saudi Arabia
17 Human Rights and Accountability Act of 2019
18 (H.R. 2037), which required—

19 (A) an unclassified report by the Director
20 of National Intelligence on parties responsible

for Khashoggi's murder, a requirement ultimately inserted into and passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92);

(B) visa sanctions on all persons identified in such report; and

(C) a report on human rights in Saudi Arabia.

(5) On February 26, 2021, the Director of National Intelligence released the report produced pursuant to congressional direction, which stated, ''we assess that Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman approved an operation in Istanbul, Turkey to capture or kill Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.''. The report also identified several individuals who ''participated in, ordered, or were otherwise complicit in or responsible for the death of Jamal Khashoggi on behalf of Muhammad bin Salman. We do not know whether these individuals knew in advance that the operation would result in Khashoggi's death.''.

(6) Section 7031(c) of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 states ''Officials of foreign governments and their immediate family members about whom the Secretary of State has

credible information have been involved, directly or indirectly, in. . .a gross violation of human rights. . . shall be ineligible for entry into the United States.''.

(7) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2756) provides that no letters of offer may be issued, no credits or guarantees may be extended, and no export licenses may be issued with respect to any country determined by the President to be engaged in a ''consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States''.

(8) Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304) directs the President to formulate and conduct international security assistance programs of the United States in a manner which will ''promote and advance human rights and avoid identification of the United States, through such programs, with governments which deny to their people internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, in violation of international law or in contravention of the policy of the United States''.

(9) Secretary of State Antony Blinken on February 26, 2021, stated: ''As a matter of safety for

all within our borders, perpetrators targeting perceived dissidents on behalf of any foreign government should not be permitted to reach American soil. . . We have made absolutely clear that extraterritorial threats and assaults by Saudi Arabia against activists, dissidents, and journalists must end.''.

☒

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1464

OFFERED BY MR. MALINOWSKI OF NEW JERSEY

Strike sections 3, 4, and 5 and insert the following:

1 **SEC. 3. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PERSONS**
2 **LISTED IN THE REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR**
3 **OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE MUR-**
4 **DER OF JAMAL KHASHOGGI.**

5 (a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—On and after the
6 date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of
7 this Act, the sanctions described in subsection (b) shall
8 be imposed with respect to each foreign person listed in
9 the Office of the Director of National Intelligence report
10 titled "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Kill-
11 ing of Jamal Khashoggi", dated February 11, 2021.

12 (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in
14 this subsection are the following:

15 (A) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS AND ADMIS-
16 SION TO THE UNITED STATES.—

17 (i) Inadmissibility to the United
18 States.

(ii) Ineligibility to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States.

(iii) Ineligibility to otherwise be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 110et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) Revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) A revocation under clause (i) shall—

(I) take effect immediately; and

(II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the foreign person's possession.

(2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Sanctions under paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a foreign person if admitting or paroling the person into the United States is necessary to permit the United

1 States to comply with the Agreement regarding the
2 Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake
3 Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force No-
4 vember 21, 1947, between the United Nations and
5 the United States, or other applicable international
6 obligations.

7 (3) WAIVER IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL
8 SECURITY.—The President may waive for an indi-
9 vidual entry into the United States the application
10 of this section with respect to a foreign person who
11 is A-1 visa eligible and who is present in or seeking
12 admission into the United States for purposes of of-
13 ficial business if the President determines and trans-
14 mits to the appropriate congressional committees an
15 unclassified written notice and justification not later
16 than 15 days before the granting of such waiver,
17 that such a waiver is in the national security inter-
18 ests of the United States.

19 (c) SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may suspend
21 in whole or in part the imposition of sanctions other-
22 wise required under this section if the President cer-
23 tifies to the appropriate congressional committees
24 that the following criteria have been met in Saudi
25 Arabia:

1 (A) The Government of Saudi Arabia is
2 not arbitrarily detaining citizens or legal resi-
3 dents of the United States for arbitrary polit-
4 ical reasons, including criticism of Saudi gov-
5 ernment policies, peaceful advocacy of political
6 beliefs, or the pursuit of United States citizen-
7 ship.
8 (B) The Government of Saudi Arabia is
9 cooperating in outstanding criminal proceedings
10 in the United States in which a Saudi citizen or
11 national departed from the United States while
12 the citizen or national was awaiting trial or sen-
13 tencing for a criminal offense committed in the
14 United States.
15 (C) The Government of Saudi Arabia has
16 made significant numerical reductions in indi-
17 viduals detained for peaceful political reasons,
18 including activists, journalists, bloggers, law-
19 yers, or critics.
20 (D) The Government of Saudi Arabia has
21 disbanded any units of its intelligence or secu-
22 rity apparatus dedicated to the forced repatri-
23 ation of dissidents or critical voices in other
24 countries.

1 (E) The Government of Saudi Arabia has
2 made meaningful public commitments to uphold
3 internationally recognized standards governing
4 the use, sale, and transfer of digital surveillance
5 items and services that can be used to abuse
6 human rights.
7 (F) The Government of Saudi Arabia has
8 instituted meaningful legal reforms to protect
9 the rights of women, the rights of freedom of
10 expression and religion, and due process in its
11 judicial system.
12 (2) REPORT.—Accompanying the certification
13 described in paragraph (1), the President shall sub-
14 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a
15 report that contains a detailed description of Saudi
16 Arabia's adherence to the criteria described in the
17 certification.
18 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
19 (1) ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms "admitted"
20 and "alien" have the meanings given those terms in
21 section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
22 (8 U.S.C. 1101).
23 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
24 TEES.—The term "appropriate congressional com-
25 mittees" means—

1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
2 Committee on the Judiciary, and the Perma-
3 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
4 House of Representatives; and
5 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
6 the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Select
7 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
8 (3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term "foreign per-
9 son" has the meaning given such term in section
10 595.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as
11 in effect on the day before the date of the enactment
12 of this Act), except that such term does not include
13 an entity (as such term is described in such section).
14 (4) FOREIGN PERSON WHO IS A-1 VISA ELIGI-
15 BLE.—The term "foreign person who is A-1 visa eli-
16 gible" means an alien described in section
17 101(a)(15)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
18 Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(A)(i)).
19 (5) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
20 "United States person" means—
21 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
22 fully admitted for permanent residence to the
23 United States; or
24 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
25 the United States or any jurisdiction within the

United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON INTIMIDATION OR HARASSMENT DIRECTED AGAINST INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER MATTERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report identifying any entities, instrumentalities, or agents of the Government of Saudi Arabia engaged in "a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States" pursuant to section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2756).

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A detailed description of such acts in the preceding ~~5-year~~ period.

(2) A certification of whether such acts during the preceding ~~5-year~~ period constitute a "consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States" pur-

1 suant to section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
2 (22 U.S.C. 2756).
3 (3) A determination of whether any United
4 States-origin defense articles were used in the com-
5 mission of such acts.
6 (4) A determination of whether entities, instru-
7 mentalities, or agents of the Government of Saudi
8 Arabia supported or received support from foreign
9 governments, including China, in the commission of
10 such acts.
11 (5) Any actions taken by the United States
12 Government to deter incidents of intimidation or
13 harassment directed against individuals in the
14 United States.
15 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
16 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
17 a classified annex.
18 (d) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the
19 date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of
20 this Act.
21 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
22 FINED.—In this section, the term ''appropriate congres-
23 sional committees'' means—
24 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
25 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent

1 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
2 Representatives; and
3 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
4 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
5 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate.

6 **SEC. 5. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO UPHOLD HUMAN RIGHTS**
7 **IN UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE**
8 **PROGRAMS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF**
9 **SAUDI ARABIA.**

10 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
11 ment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to
12 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
13 resentative and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
14 Senate a report on efforts of the Department of State to
15 ensure that United States security assistance programs
16 with Saudi Arabia are formulated in a manner that will
17 "avoid identification of the United States, through such
18 programs, with governments which deny to their people
19 internationally recognized human rights and fundamental
20 freedoms" in accordance with section 502B of the Foreign
21 Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2304).

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1464

OFFERED BY MS. OMAR OF MINNESOTA

At the end of the bill, add the following:

1 **SEC. 6. REPORT ON CERTAIN ENTITIES CONNECTED TO**
2 **FOREIGN PERSONS ON THE MURDER OF**
3 **JAMAL KHASHOGGI.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
6 in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies,
7 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
8 a report on private, commercial, and nongovernmental en-
9 tities, including non-profit foundations, controlled in whole
10 or in part by any foreign person named in the Office of
11 the Director of National Intelligence report titled ''Assess-
12 ing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal
13 Khashoggi'', dated February 11, 2021.

14 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
15 quired by subsection (a) shall include the following:

16 (1) A description of such entities.

17 (2) A detailed assessment, based in part on
18 credible open sources and other publicly-available in-
19 formation, of the roles, if any, such entities played
20 in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi or any other

gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.

(3) A certification of whether any such entity is subject to sanctions pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ''appropriate congressional committees'' means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

Chairman MEEKS. We're going to take a vote by voice. All members, please unmute your microphones.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, say no.

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it, and the motion to reconsider is laid on the table.

At this time, I recognize myself to speak on the measure.

The brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a Washington Post columnist and U.S. permanent resident, shocked Americans, including myself. The Biden administration's release of the DNI report on the killing was a good step toward accountability, but further steps need to be taken.

Together with Mr. Connolly's bill, Mr. Malinowski's Khashoggi Accountability Act ensures a thorough and sufficient response to Saudi Arabia's repressive actions of the killing of Mr. Khashoggi. Rep. Malinowski's bill mandates visa sanctions on anyone, including Saudi officials, deemed responsible for the killing. It absolutely will result in an expanded universe of sanctions on Saudi officials who have not yet been punished. This will be a strong imposition of Congress' authority and an important step in defending not only American values, but American residents and American citizens.

The legislation does include national security waiver authority, but such waivers must be exercised each time such a Saudi official seeks U.S. entry and a justification must be sent to Congress for each entry.

I want to thank Mr. Malinowski for his work on this legislation and, indeed, for his tireless work on behalf of human rights around the entire world.

I encourage all of my colleagues to vote for this important legislation.

I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. McCaul, for his remarks.

I realize that I do not see Mr. McCaul.

So, I realize members wish to speak on the bill and that some members have amendments to offer. Please use the "raise your hand" function of Webex, and I will recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between Democrats and Republicans, for the purpose of speaking on the bill first. If you miss your turn, please let our staff know and we will circle back to you. Then, we will move on to amendments.

I now recognize Representative David Cicilline of Rhode Island for the purpose of speaking on the bill for 5 minutes.

[No response.]

Chairman MEEKS. Are there any other members who wish to speak on this measure?

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MEEKS. Yes, Mr. Malinowski, you're recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you. I heard Mr. Connolly also ask to speak. I would be happy to let him go first, if he would like to.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I sought to speak simply to thank you, Mr. Malinowski, for your leadership on human rights in general and your deep interest in the grisly murder of Jamal Khashoggi. I know

that insisting on justice in this case is something vitally important to the Saudi community here, but to his family and to especially his fiancee who needs closure. And we need not only closure on this terrible tragedy, but we need to bring people to justice. Your persistence in this matter is something that I very much salute, and I want to congratulate you and thank you for this piece of legislation.

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

Is there anyone else who would like to speak on the measure?

I recognize Mr. Malinowski for 5 minutes.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you so much, Mr. Connolly. I think our measures are a good one-two punch here today, serving the same interest. I know that Mr. Khashoggi was your constituent and you have a particularly personal in making sure that his family sees the accountability that they deserve.

Look, we've spoken a lot in this committee about important issues inside Saudi Arabia—about the treatment of dissidents and women's rights activities. We've talked about the suffering imposed on the people of Yemen and that country's brutal civil war. And those are all very important issues that are part of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

But the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, as I've often argued, is a very different matter. This is not something that the Saudi government did to somebody inside Saudi Arabia. This is a deliberate decision by the de facto ruler of the country to reach inside the United States to threaten and, then, kill a resident of our country because that person living in our country was criticizing the Saudi leadership.

And it's not the only example of this kind of behavior. The former Saudi intelligence chief, Saad Al Jabry, a very close ally of the United States, has made, I think, very credible allegations that the Saudi government sent a hit squad to kill him. He's living in Canada. And they operated inside the United States.

Yesterday, just yesterday, the United Nations confirmed a story that a Saudi government official had threatened Agnes Callamard, who was the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, threatened that she would be "taken care of," quote-unquote, if she continued her advocacy on the Khashoggi case.

Now the Biden administration, very, very commendably, released the report identifying the Crown Prince MBS as being the author of this crime. And in addition, the administration laid out a much-needed policy of zero tolerance for this kind of extraterritorial repression—Saudi Arabia and other countries reaching into the United States to go after their enemies.

This bill makes good on that pledge. It's very measured. It basically gives effect to existing U.S. laws, no more. For example, Section 7031 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, current law, says that, if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that a foreign government official is responsible for a gross human rights abuse, that official shall be denied entry into the United States, unless the Secretary of State issues a waiver. This bill simply gives effect and

clarity to that provision of law. It is identical to legislation we passed in the House in 2019 overwhelmingly.

A second key provision in existing law—it's been in place for over 30 years—says that, and this is under the Arms Export Control Act, says that, if a foreign government is engaged in a consistent pattern of trying to threaten, intimidate, or harass persons in the United States, then we cannot sell arms to that country.

This legislation simply asks the State Department to make a determination to us in 6 months as to whether Saudi Arabia is still at that point engaged in such a consistent pattern. Again, this is about threatening and killing people inside the United States of America, not really talking about human rights inside Saudi Arabia.

I do not want to blow up our relationship with Saudi Arabia. We have interest in maintaining that relationship, including helping them defend themselves and defending our troops. But Saudi Arabia also has an interest in preserving its relationship with the United States. In fact, they need us a lot more than we need them.

This legislation, just as Mr. Connolly's, is about shifting the burden of preserving this relationship where it belongs, onto Saudi Arabia, so that we are not constantly asked to overlook Saudi Arabia's sins against us for the sake of our relationship with them. That is the definition of an unhealthy and unbalanced relationship. We are trying to restore that balance.

I thank the chairman for his support.

I see my colleague Andy Kim as well, who is co-sponsor of this bill. Thank you, Andy.

I'm also very pleased to have been able to work with Ranking Member McCaul to bring the legislation to fruition.

Thank you all. I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman's time has expired.

I now recognize Ranking Member McCaul for 5 minutes.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank Mr. Malinowski and you for working with us.

I want to thank the staff that worked tirelessly around the clock to continue the bipartisan spirit of this committee and to reach a compromise agreement on Mr. Malinowski's bill.

It's an attempt to really balance our concerns about the gruesome murder of Khashoggi versus geopolitical interests in the region and the threat from Iran. I think our relationship with the Saudis covers many strategic interests, including the very real and deadly threat of Iran. Iran attacked Saudi Arabia in September 2019, and Iran-backed Houthis are attacking Saudi almost every day.

As Congressman Malinowski mentioned, I think we can strongly advocate for human rights in the Kingdom and Saudi nationals abroad without leaving Saudi Arabia and Americans living in Saudi Arabia vulnerable to these threats. With these changes—and again, I want to thank the gentleman from New Jersey for working really almost to the last minute to get a good result, so we can call this bipartisan—with these changes, I believe this measure now allows us to help the Saudis defend themselves against these threats. And that was my biggest concern.

This sound measure recognizes the importance of human rights while preserving our strategic relationship with the Kingdom. And I'm grateful for the teamwork here.

And I think, as Congressman Malinowski stated, the events of what happened to Khashoggi were horrible, but I also think we need to look at, again, the alliance of Israel with Saudi, our partnership with the Saudis. We know from the Ayatollah that they're on a path to a nuclear bomb; that they're about 60 percent enriched now; that they could be at 90 percent in a matter of months. And they have short-range missile capability that I do not believe the Saudis are capable of defending themselves, unless we help them. And so, this bill condemns the human rights violations while at the same time preserves the security of Saudi to defend itself as a Nation.

And so, I want to thank the two of you for working hard with me to get to the point where we are today.

And with that, I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Susan Wild of Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.

Ms. WILD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Two years ago, Jamal Khashoggi's fiancee, Hatice Cengiz, testified before this committee, and in heartbreaking detail, she recounted his disappearance inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, where he was brutally assassinated under direct orders from the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS.

And after her testimony, I spoke with Ms. Cengiz and assured her that the United States would ultimately work to deliver justice and accountability in the wake of her fiance's assassination. We must keep that promise. That means rendering MBS and every individual implicated in this case ineligible for admission into the United States, as this legislation would do, regardless of the position, power, or wealth that they possess.

The report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that the Biden administration recently declassified could not be clearer. It stated, "We assess that Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman approved an operation in Istanbul, Turkey to capture or kill Mr. Khashoggi."

This isn't only about exposing a major breach of international law and an attack meant to silence journalists and dissidents everywhere. It is also about sending an unequivocal message: we will not allow these kinds of acts to be committed with impunity.

Reporting just this week underscores why this legislation is so crucial. According to these reports, officials at the highest level of the Saudi regime made death threats against the United Nations Special Rapporteur who led the U.N.'s investigation into Mr. Khashoggi's assassination. Even in the midst of global outrage, the Saudi regime continued to engage in gangster-like tactics against anyone working to expose the truth about the regime's actions. We cannot allow it to continue to operate like this. It is beyond time to make clear that Members of Congress and this committee, and beyond, are prepared to stand up against the abuses of the Saudi regime.

I urge my colleagues to join me in passing this legislation by a resounding bipartisan margin.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentlelady yields back.

I now recognize Representative Scott Perry of Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I just want to just add to the conversation, while I think that, certainly, accountability and responsibility in this matter, which is, indeed, horrific and did, indeed, shock me and the rest of the world, this accountability, this responsibility is absolutely in order.

And I would also say that accountability and responsibility regarding members of the Muslim Brotherhood, even though they do not occupy a nation State, so to speak, as a government, but they exist within governments, and they exist to terminate the U.S. Government as we know it and Western civilization as we know it, and Americans, and they have done so in the past. And I hope that in the future that the members of this committee will join me and endeavor to call them out and assign responsibility and accountability for the actions that they have conducted and the actions they seek to conduct, not only in the United States, but in the Western civilized world, and hold them accountable as well.

And so, whether it's this journalist or whether it's United States journalists as well, I'm concerned about the silencing, not only by authoritarian regimes, but we see it right here in the United States of America. We see this cancel culture happening, and I'm not wishing to draw the exact parallel for what happened to Mr. Khashoggi, but it doesn't start with the untimely death of journalists. That's not where it starts. That's where it ends. It starts with this intimidation that is happening in our country as well by certain portions that dislike certain narratives that they do not want to hear about or want to discredit.

And so, I think we need be mindful of that. We need to be mindful of the Muslim Brotherhood as well. And I look forward to working with the committee members on bills in the future that hold them accountable for their malign activities and wishes as well.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Andy Kim of New Jersey for 5 minutes.

Mr. KIM OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you, Chairman, for yielding to me here.

I want to thank my colleague from New Jersey, Mr. Malinowski, for his leadership here. I've been very proud to be able to work alongside him to be able to move this forward, because I really want to make sure that we understand that this is not a choice between accountability and justice on one side and our national security and our interests on the other. I am doing this, I am voting in favor of this because of our interests, because of the need for us to be able to demonstrate what a successful and healthy alliance and relationship and partnership is all about.

This is not an element where this would potentially derail our partnership or our engagement and our relationship with Saudi

Arabia. The Crown Prince has already done the damage. The damage has been done to our partnership, and this is an effort to try to heal that, to try to put forward steps for us to be able to heal and see whether or not we can repair this in the way that is necessary for us to be able to move forward.

This is potentially a person who will be leader of his nation for half a century, and it is very important for us at this point to make sure that we very clearly articulate what terms that will be on. And I'd rather it be on our terms rather than their terms, and this is our way of trying to assert American leadership and determination of how we define our role with our partners, as well as globally.

So, I would just very strongly support this effort. I'm appreciative of Mr. Malinowski and others for moving this forward and being able to get the wide support that we need to, and look forward to its passage.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

Are there any other members who wish to speak on the measure?

Hearing no further requests, let's move on to amendments. Are there any amendments?

Hearing no amendments——

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MEEKS. Yes? Who's seeking——

Mr. MALINOWSKI. I have an amendment at the desk.

Chairman MEEKS. You have an amendment at the desk? I'm trying to find it. I think we passed your amendment.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Oh, did we pass it?

Chairman MEEKS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. You're right. Sorry, I was following the old script. I apologize.

[Laughter.]

Chairman MEEKS. Not a problem. So, we're going to now move to final passage. The question is to report H.R. 1464, the Khashoggi Accountability Act, to the House with the recommendation that the bill do pass, as amended, and amendments to the bill shall be reported as a single amendment in the nature of a substitute.

We're going to take a vote by voice. All members, please unmute your microphones.

All those in favor, say aye.

All opposed, no.

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it, and the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table. The measure is favorably reported, as amended, and without objection, amendments to the bill shall be reported as a single amendment in the nature of a substitute.

Without objection, staff is authorized to make any technical and conforming changes.

Now we move on to consider H.R. 256, to repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.

Pursuant to notice, for purpose of markup, I now call up H.R. 256, and the clerk will report the bill.

Ms. STILES. H.R. 256, a bill to repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.

Chairman MEEKS. Without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with.

Without objection, the bill shall be considered as read and open to amendment at any point.

[The bill H.R. 256 follows:]

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117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 256

To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 11, 2021

Ms. LEE of California (for herself, Mr. BIGGS, Mr. MOONEY, Mr. MASSIE, Ms. TLAIB, Mr. HUFFMAN, Mr. TRONE, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. SHERMAN, Ms. PRESSLEY, Ms. MOORE of Wisconsin, Mr. BEYER, Ms. SPEIER, Mr. LOWENTHAL, Ms. DEGETTE, Mr. KHANNA, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Ms. NORTON, Mr. RUSH, Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN, Mr. POCAN, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. CICILLINE, Mr. DEFAZIO, Mr. MCGOVERN, Mr. TONKO, Mr. JONES, Ms. CLARK of Massachusetts, Ms. JAYAPAL, Mr. RASKIN, Mr. RYAN, Mr. WELCH, Mr. ESPAILLAT, Ms. ESHOO, Mr. BROWN, Mr. COHEN, Mr. PALLONE, Mr. MOULTON, and Ms. SPANBERGER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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A BILL

To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

SECTION 1. REPEAL OF AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002.

The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–243; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) is hereby repealed.

○

Chairman MEEKS. At this time, I recognize myself to speak on the measure.

Early this week, we heard from a bipartisan panel of former executive branch attorneys who are among the foremost experts on authorizations to use military force. All of them, whether Republican or Democrat, testified that this committee should repeal the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq and not replace it.

The conversation about a 2002 AUMF did not begin this week, however, or this year, or even in the last decade. This committee has held numerous hearings on this issue. The text we are considering today has already been passed by the House as an amendment to the NDAA.

I am always the first to emphasize the importance of dialog, conversation, and negotiation, but we must also be able to distinguish between issues that need more discussion and issues that are ready for action. The 2002 AUMF is ready for action.

It was passed to authorize a war against Saddam Hussein almost 20 years ago, when I had first arrived at the Congress. The text of the resolution makes the purpose clear. It authorizes the President to, one, defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq, and, two, enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. These resolutions are long since expired. Iraq is a security partner of the United States. Saddam Hussein is long gone. No current operations depend on a 2002 AUMF. Those operations would continue under the 2001 AUMF, which is the AUMF we passed to deal with terrorists.

Some members may look to the "whereas" clauses of the 2002 AUMF, which mention debunked links between Saddam Hussein's regime and terrorist groups. But, again, the text is what makes the purpose clear. Each clause builds a case against Saddam Hussein's regime. None of them authorize force against terrorist groups.

This AUMF also does not authorize force against Iran. It doesn't mention Iran at all. America's resolve to stand up to Iran and its proxies is not in question here. So, this resolution simply is not about Iran.

America does face serious challenges in Iraq. There are continuing threats from Iranian-backed militants. There are threats from ISIS and Al Qaeda. That said, the 2002 AUMF doesn't help us deal with any of these threats. Our forces would stay in Iraq under the 2001 AUMF, and the President can always defend America and our forces under Article II. All of our witnesses made that clear.

Now some of our witnesses also said we should take out the 2001 AUMF along with the 2002 AUMF. And I understand that view. Many of us have been calling for action on the 2001 AUMF for years, and I committed to replacing the 2001 AUMF with a more focused authority. But much more work is needed on that effort.

So, in the meantime, there is absolutely no reason to delay the 2002 AUMF simply because we do not have an agreement yet on the 2001 AUMF, which is the 2001 is entirely a different authority for entirely a different war. The authority provided in the 2001 AUMF is still needed. The authority for the 2002 AUMF simply is

not. Repeal the one that's not needed. Keep the one that is. That's simple.

Some might ask, what harm could come from leaving the 2002 AUMF on the books, even though it's not needed? Keeping it in place leaves the door wide open for future administrations to claim Congress already authorized action we clearly never envisioned when the 2002 AUMF was written. It's happened many times before. That's the whole point of this effort.

If you agree the President should come to Congress before taking action beyond his Article II power, we cannot leave unneeded AUMFs on the books. I assure all of my colleagues that we will continue to discuss the solemn issues surrounding Congress' war power, including the 2001 AUMF and the War Powers Resolution. Those laws will need to be carefully reformed, but the 2002 AUMF, it's different. It doesn't need to be reformed. It simply needs to be repealed.

I urge all of my colleagues to support this important bipartisan legislation and to repeal the 2002 AUMF in this historic committee vote.

I now recognize Ranking Member McCaul for his remarks.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the excellent hearing and discussion we held on Tuesday to begin exploring serious war powers reform. I think we all agree we would abdicate our Article I responsibility. And we need to look at updating these very old authorized uses of military force.

I think we have kind of the same goal in mind. I think we just have a different way of getting there. For that reason, I oppose rushing this standalone repeal just 2 days after having this conversation without the due diligence I think is required. And as insightful and as helpful as the witnesses were, I think, in fact Professor Goldsmith agreed that if we repeal 2002, we need to concurrently have an updated authorized use of military force, but I also think we need to consult with more than just three professors who have not had access to intelligence or targeting decisions for years.

Doing this the right way I think involves consulting with the Department of State and the Department of Defense, the White House, the intelligence community, the Government of Iraq, and our coalition partners and allies to fully understand the impact of just an outright standalone repeal.

And I understand the desire—and I think the chairman makes some good points—I understand the desire to repeat 2002 AUMF, as well as the 2001. But I believe we must do this as part of a comprehensive, updated replacement to provide clear authorities against the terrorists who still plot to kill Americans at home and abroad. And we were reminded of that with the recent proxy Shia militia attacks against our servicemen and women.

I believe the threat is not gone, it has just evolved. The 2002 AUMF clearly addresses terrorist threats arising in Iraq. And while people can disagree about whether it should still be used, it has been used for that purpose by every prior administration since 9/11, both Republican and Democrat.

The Obama and Trump administrations even used identical language to describe the scope of the 2002. "The statute, in accordance with its expressed goals, has always been understood to authorize

use of force for the related dual purposes of helping to establish a stable, democratic Iraq, and of addressing, most importantly, terrorist threats emanating from Iraq."

I think this could be updated to terrorist threats emanating out of Iran.

There are terrorist groups that are very active today, as we heard in our classified hearing. And I appreciate the chairman putting that together. Inside Iraq they threaten our diplomats, our soldiers, and our partners who cannot be targeted under the 2001 AUMF because they are not associated with the forces of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or ISIS. A rushed, standalone repeal of our Iraq force authority sends a message of U.S. disengagement that could destabilize Iraq, embolden Iran, and strengthen Al-Qaeda, and ISIS.

I think it sends the wrong message. It could cost life. That danger could be eliminated if we, if we took up the task of repeal and replacement together, as was discussed at our hearing. Real AUMF reform requires Congress and the Administration, working together on actual texts, to replace the aging 2001, 2002 AUMFs to provide authorities needed to keep the American people, and most importantly, our deployed troops, safe from terrorists.

I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman. I think you will see, honestly, there is a lot of bipartisan support. And we, we have had our discussions. I think this committee should continue to discuss updating the old AUMFs after all.

Some of our troops over there serving weren't even born, they were born after 9/11. And I do think it is time. And I am willing to go down a discussion of repealing the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, but only if we can update it with a AUMF that really addresses the modern day threats and, with the 2002 one, particularly the threats emanating out of Iran that we have seen recently.

And I was actually supportive of President Biden's decision to proportionately strike back because that is the only way you are going to deter them. And I think President Biden—you may not hear me say this all the time—I think he did the right thing here.

And I know that that got some on the other side of the aisle upset, but I think it was the right message to the terrorists who attacked our Green Zone and servicemen and women, including in Erbil.

And so, let me close with I look forward to having this great debate. Nothing is more serious on this committee than issues of war and peace. And this is right to the heart of it. I am all for re-exercising our authorities. I just want to do it the way I think is the right way to proceed.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I realize members wish to speak on the bill, and that some members have amendments to offer. Please use the raised hand function on Webex and I will recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between Democrats and Republicans, for the purpose of speaking on the bill first.

If you miss your turn, let our staff know and we will circle back to you. Then we will move on to amendments.

I now recognize Representative David Cicilline of Rhode Island for 5 minutes to speak on the bill.

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Meeks. And thank you for including H.R. 256 in today's markup. And thank you to my friend Barbara Lee for her longtime advocacy on this very important issue. Her leadership on the fundamental question of the role of Congress in matters of war in Congress has been unwavering, and we owe her a debt of gratitude for her commitment to bring this issue to the forefront.

Nearly two decades ago, Congress passed a resolution authorizing military force against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. That resolution, aided in its passage by deeply flawed intelligence that we now know had no basis in fact, authorized the use of force for two express purposes: to defend the national security of the U.S. against the continuing threat posed by Iraq, and to enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

It has been 18 years since Saddam Hussein was deposed. It has been a decade since the United States declared a formal end of operations in Iraq. The Iraqi Government is a regional partner and the U.N. Security Council resolution referenced above has been fulfilled. In short, there is no reason to allow the 2002 AUMF to continue to stand.

Congress must not forfeit its constitutional responsibility to directly authorize the use of force. Any administration should receive direct authorization from the Congress to engage in global conflict.

Just 2 days ago, this committee had a productive hearing where each of the three expert witnesses testified that this AUMF is not necessary. It does not enhance our national security. It does not make Americans any safer. It does not make the mission of our men and women in uniform any easier.

To repeat this resolution would not tie the hands of the current Administration, or any future administration in their responsibility to preserve the national security of the United States. It would, instead, ensure that it could not be manipulated to take us into a war that Congress did not authorize.

We must act to let Congress again assert its ability and responsibility to authorize war. We must pass H.R. 256 and show the American people and our men and women in uniform that this country only goes to war when absolutely necessary, and all other options are exhausted, and when specifically authorized by Congress.

I again thank Representative Lee for her leadership on this issue. And I encourage my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 256. And with that, I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Joe Wilson of South Carolina for 5 minutes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, and colleagues, I oppose H.R. 256 to standalone repeal of the 2002 authorization for use of military force against Iraq. I support the Perry Amendment No. 57.

As the grateful dad of two servicemembers who have served in Iraq, I know firsthand the success of liberating the people of Iraq from an authoritarian dictatorship for an opportunity for freedom. While modernization of this authorization is prudent, any repeal should be done concurrently with replacement after full consider-

ation and consultation with relevant partners. Our primary focus should be updating the 2002 AUMF to provide our national security apparatus the necessary authorization to mitigate and defeat transnational terrorist threats abroad to protect American families at home.

By bypassing key stakeholders, the White House, Department of Defense, Department of State, the Iraqi Government, and our allies, the consideration to repeal the 2002 AUMF, with no replacement, is counterproductive. This amounts to a largely symbolic measure designed to address shortsighted ideological demands, and will embolden enemies in the region who are targeting American families.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose the standalone repeal and urge colleagues to avoid weakening our ability to conduct counterterrorism operations and, instead, to address repeal and replacement simultaneously, as proposed by the Perry Amendment No. 52.

I yield back my time.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back his time.

I now recognize Representative Ted Lieu of California for 5 minutes.

I now recognize Representative Susan Wild of Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.

Ms. WILD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

H.R. 256, repealing the authorization of military force against Iraq is an important step in a much broader effort, clearly reasserting Congress' constitutional authority to authorize and limit our country's military operations. We in the House are the elected representatives of the American people. We are closest to the people of our communities and to the men and women from our communities that serve on the front lines of our armed forces.

For far too long, presidents of both parties have overreached beyond their roles as defined in the Constitution, using existing AUMF to prolong or extend conflicts beyond what Congress had authorized. It is past time that we reclaim the authority that the framers clearly established in our hands.

There are no more consequential decisions than those which placed our servicemembers in harm's way. After putting their lives on the line for their country, the very least they should be able to expect is that every decision affecting them will be taken with the greatest care and consideration, and always according to our Constitution.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentlelady yields back.

I now recognize Representative Brian Mast of Florida for 5 minutes.

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by saying I agree with almost everything that you said in your opening remarks about this piece of legislation. You

[inaudible]. Our previous colleague just spoke about giving our servicemembers, of which I am a veteran, the assurance that we take the greatest care and consideration in our decisions.

That has not been done. I would challenge anybody to prove me wrong. We have heard from a professor from Harvard, Yale, and NYU. Can any of the ten freshman that just joined Congress, that

have been a part of no other hearing, I would yield my time to any of the ten freshman right now who can tell me that they spoke to a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one of our military secretaries. Happy to yield to any one of our ten freshman that heard from one of them on AUMF.

Mr. MEIJER. Representative Mast, are you including those who spoke at the briefing we had on the CBC?

Mr. MAST. Can you go ahead one more time?

Mr. MEIJER. Are you including the CBC briefing? I am not sure if we are able to reference that, given the setting that it was provided in.

Mr. MAST. I think you can reference all you want. But this is what I am saying. Speak up. If your—you know, have our ten freshman heard—have our ten freshman spoken to our joint chiefs, our military secretaries?

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Mast, this is Representative Jacobs. I am a freshman. And I have talked to many members and leaders in our military about this issue. And I also have a master's degree in international security policy.

Mr. MAST. Congratulations. I am glad to know that you spoke to them.

Any of our other freshmen? It shows some diligence, that is great, which is what our committee has not done here.

Chairman MEEKS. Mr. Mast, would you yield?

Mr. MAST. I do not know who asked, but——

Chairman MEEKS. It is the chairman.

Mr. MAST. I will in a moment to you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to give a little bit more time to some of our freshman. But I will bear in mind that you asked for time. So, yes, Mr. Chairman. Hold on a minute.

Any of our other freshmen want to say that they heard on this? This is a big deal. We are aligned on this, but my point is simply in my opinion we make a joke out of this committee, which is very important to me. We spend a lot of time on this committee dealing with very serious issues to not hear from the correct people on such an important matter, especially an issue where there is common ground among us. But to not give it that due diligence is a very serious issue to me.

Mr. Chairman, I see that I have 2 minutes here. I will certainly, you know, yield you a little bit of time. I am probably going to reclaim at some point, but go ahead, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MEEKS. Yes. Mr. Mast, I just wanted to remind you that the witnesses that were before us were not just simply professors. They held high senior positions in the White House, in DoD, and DOJ. So, I just wanted to remind you of the credentials of the witnesses that were before us. They were not simple professors.

I yield back to the gentleman.

Mr. MAST. Yes, happy to yield to you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your comments. But, I would remind you of this: it was literally given to us in answer by the witnesses that they do not have the same access to information as us. Some of those witnesses literally said that to us as they were answering our questions: Representative, I do not have the same access to information as you do, but let me give you my opinion.

That is a problem. That is a problem in diligence that we, as our colleague, your Democrat colleague just mentioned. We owe that to our men and women. This is common ground that we have here. Like I said, we agree on almost everything here. But let's give this the diligence that it deserves and call before the Foreign Affairs Committee, show the rest of Congress that this committee will be taking that seriously. Call before us the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense. Take your pick of secretaries out there that we will have that conversation with them. Because it is owed to our servicemembers.

And anybody again I would challenge you, tell me that having a conversation with one of them isn't at a substantially higher level than having a conversation with the individuals from Yale, Harvard, and NYU. Because it is, it deserves that diligence.

I think I have made my point, Mr. Chairman. And I am making this point as somebody that loves our committee, that loves our military, that has lost over 67 friends in combat, killed in action, personal friends of mine. I take this with the utmost seriousness, and that is why I ask that this be taken with the utmost seriousness by our committee.

I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Andy Levin of Michigan for 5 minutes. I ask Mr. Levin if he would give me just 10 seconds, the opening 10 seconds.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield to you such time as you may consume, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MEEKS. Yes. I just want to remind everyone on the committee, and Mr. Mast, that we had a classified briefing on the use of force in Iraq that no one would have been able to talk about in the forum that we had our hearing. So, we had additional information about Iraq in a classified session.

So, it was not taken lightly as to what we are doing today and why we are doing it. We had expert and classified materials to do it.

I yield back to the gentleman.

Mr. LEVIN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for your leadership on this issue.

I strongly support this move. It is long overdue. I think Congress needs to reclaim our responsibility and, frankly, the courage to authorize force when it needs to be authorized. We ought to, as one of our witnesses said, we ought to put a sunset on every authorization.

In my view, every person in our country who served for 2 years in this House ought to have to vote on whether we ought to continue authorizing force for a given reason. Here we are not talking about eliminating all AUMFs in this moment, we are talking about repealing the 2002 AUMF, which was for a very specific purpose. And it is not, it has been stretched beyond belief, it is not needed anymore. And it is not appropriate for us to just fail to do our duty, frankly.

And, so, I appreciate the ranking member's comments very much. And I think he has a case to make about, you know, if perhaps in discussions of the 2001 AUMF he might say, well, we ought to ne-

gotiate something in its place. I think the Administration is interested in talking to us about, you know, what new authorization might be necessary. But this, that doesn't apply to this one.

So, I think it is incumbent on us to do this. And we ought to have done it a long time ago. It doesn't need any further study. Everyone knows what it says. And this is a matter of basic our, really, our form of government that we are the branch that declares war, we are the branch that raises the funds for war, and then the President is the commander-in-chief to carry it out.

And let's step up to the plate, clean this mess up, and decide precisely what offensive war powers the President needs and do that, and not leave these things hanging out there which are, as you said, Mr. Chairman, vulnerable to misuse.

So, let's get this done. I appreciate your leadership on this and our colleague Barbara Lee's leadership on this, who I believe, Mr. Chairman, was a member of this committee long before I was here. And I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back the balance of time.

I now recognize Representative Scott Perry of Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to begin by associating myself with the comments from my very good friend Mr. Mast, who has sacrificed on behalf of this country things that any single, every single one of us can scarcely imagine.

That having been said, I have listened very diligently to the conversation from beginning to end to this point. Democrat, Republican, conservative, liberal, anything in between, quite honestly I almost agree with every single bit of it. So, you know there is a "but" coming.

This has been used by presidents of both parties. And whether they should have or shouldn't have is part of the discussion here. But I think that there has been for an issue so weighty—and the chairman knows that I am a fan, we are friends, and I appreciate him—but this is a weighty, weighty issue that I think deserves much more careful contemplation. And it is not about me just trying to slow down the train or anything like this. I have had an AUMF written, a replacement written for 6 years, Mr. Chairman. So, I agree that we should enforce and take back, claw back our Article I authority, just like every single one here. That is the purview of Congress. And so, we are in complete agreement there.

I agree that it is outdated, which is why I wrote a replacement. So, we are in agreement there.

I think where the disagreement for me comes is in process. I think that we need much more careful deliberation because in my mind, while we have servicemembers down range right now when we sit in the comfort or our office, or our kitchen, or our living rooms, or wherever we are, we are back at Fort Living Room, they are out on the wire. They are out over the wire. They are in contact.

And we are going to send a message to the world today that we are just going to throw down our arms. All of us people in our nice shirts and, you know, sitting in comfort, we are just going to walk

away and embolden the enemy that while the next time somebody attacks us, or something like that, we are going to have to discuss it.

Ladies and gentlemen, when you are out there on the edge the people back in Washington, DC. are far, far away, and you have to deal with what is right in front of you right then at that moment. You have to make decisions. And anything that helps the enemy have a leg up on you is unacceptable. It is unacceptable to me.

So, I would just say to me, while I agree that it needs to be repealed, but it also, it also at the same time must be replaced. And we haven't discussed that at all as far as what the tenets of that are. So, we are walking away.

You know, it is like sitting on one side of the firing line, you at your cannon, the enemy's at theirs, and you decide, well, look, we are not being real effective here so I am just going to walk away and let them first rounds in on my side.

I do not know who would do that. I do not know why we would do that. I do not know why we would do that. We are for repeal, but repeal must be followed immediately, or concomitantly, concurrently, with replacement so that we have the—there is a reason it was used. There is a reason it was used by presidents on both sides of the aisle.

Now, we might disagree with that, but there is a rationale for that. And we haven't gotten to that. We haven't had that discussion.

And so, I understand we want to work together with the majority here, and there is a lot that we agree on. But unilateral disarmament is provocative, it is dangerous in my opinion, it is irresponsible, and it is a disservice, in my opinion, having been very honored to wear the Nation's uniform and serve, and serve literally in Iraq as well, to those members, those United States citizens who are out there on the line, you know, for an idea, for an ideal which is represented in our flag and this piece of paper called the Constitution.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I know I am going to get to speak on my amendment, but I just, I just felt like I, I had to say that.

And one just final thing to correct the record. It was in this very committee under my questioning that John Kerry admitted, as Secretary of State, that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. He knows it. I know it. I was there. Anybody that was there knows it. I know it is the narrative, I know it is the rhetoric, but I get tired of hearing that. Might not have been what you thought it was, but for people that were there, they know what it was.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

I now recognize Representative Sara Jacobs of California for 5 minutes.

Ms. JACOBS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to first thank you for making this repeal a priority and for bringing this legislation forward so early in this session. The legislation you have prioritized for this committee over the past 2 months will undoubt-

edly improve the lives of millions of Americans, our diplomats, and servicemembers, and people around the world.

And I also want to recognize and thank Congresswoman Barbara Lee for authorizing this—for authoring this bill, and for her enduring commitment to a responsible and just American foreign policy, and reasserting Congress' role in it.

I was in middle school when this authorization for the use of military force was approved. And today, as a Member of Congress, I will vote to repeal it.

I emphasize this because my generation has grown up in the shadow of America's protracted wars. And San Diego, the community I am proud to represent, is home to servicemembers, veterans, and military families who understand better than most the human impact of our foreign policy and our decisions to go to war. To my constituents the issues of war and peace, of whether we send their loved ones into harm's way are kitchen table issues. And Congress has abrogated that responsibility for too long.

I often wonder whether the Members of Congress who voted in favor of the 2002 AUMF had any idea of the impact that vote would have on a generation of Americans. But the reality is I may never know because many of them have long since retired. This AUMF outlasted even them.

In fact, on this distinguished committee only six of our 51 members were in office in 2002. And as just one young American whose life was shaped by the decisions made by this body 19 years ago, I want to especially thank you, Mr. Chair, for being the last remaining member of this committee to have voted no.

Today we have a chance to at last turn the page. This repeal is an important first step in reasserting Congress' rightful and primary role in authorizing war.

And to my colleague Mr. Mast's concerns, I want to thank you for your service to this country. But it is not the military generals, nor the President, nor any professor's job to tell us what to do. The principle of civilian control of the military places ultimate authority over the U.S. armed services in the hands of civilian leadership. This decision is ours, and ours alone. And as we have heard from so many others, there is not a single operation that would be impacted by this decision.

With that, I am proud to vote for this repeal. And I want to thank my colleagues and staff who have worked toward this day for years. Let this vote mark a new chapter in American foreign policy and in Congress' role in it.

And with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentlelady yields back the remainder of her time.

I now recognize Representative Darrell Issa of California for 5 minutes.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry for forgetting to unmute.

I want to associate myself, surprisingly, with several of the earlier speakers. And as Congresswoman Jacobs said, there aren't too many of us who were here for that vote. And, Mr. Chairman, you and I were.

I stand with those who want to see an end to open-ended use of military force. And I would like to see a sunset clause put in any future use of military force.

Later today I will be offering an amendment that would modify this legislation to simply put a ending date not later than January 2023, with a requirement that the President extend by specific request for no more than 90 days at a time. I believe it is the middle ground that could cause all of us to realize that this, and every other outdated use of military force, should in fact be given a terminal date. And if a President wants to, and I believe this President wants a new use of military force authorized, then he can negotiate in good faith with both sides of the aisle between now and January of year after next.

If we do that, I believe we can come to common ground.

Having said that, I am not in a position to vote for an immediate elimination of this before the Administration has been able to weigh in on whether they would use this the way the previous Administration and the Obama Administration did. But, I look forward to each of these amendments. Hopefully, you will consider my amendment as an extremely friendly one, one that Congresswoman Lee and I could cause as a—could consider as a base for future use of military force so that we never again have a no sunset use of military force.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you, I will not use my whole 5 minutes, and I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Spanberger of Virginia for 5 minutes.

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for bringing up Representative Barbara Lee's legislation to repeal the 2002 Iraq War AUMF. I appreciate Representative Lee's strong leadership on this issue.

Last Congress I, like so many on the committee, voted with the bipartisan majority of the House to repeal the 2002 AUMF. In this Congress I am an original co-sponsor of this bipartisan legislation, and I am hopeful that it will pass out of committee today.

Since coming to Congress I have been very clear on this topic: Congress, please, must take the steps to reassert congressional authority in decisions of war and peace. It is required by the Constitution, and it is fundamental to our ability to represent our constituents, particularly servicemembers we represent.

I join with members of my own party and members across the aisle and across the political spectrum to introduce legislation and make the case to the American people, in interviews and joint op-eds, that there is not only an interest in Congress reclaiming our constitutional authority, but we have a recognition that we must finally take steps to do so. Repealing the outdated, inactive 2002 AUMF is a first step.

And we heard that clearly from the witnesses who testified at our hearing this week. They affirmed that repealing the 2002 AUMF is a priority, a principal first step and, importantly, a step that would not impact ongoing military and counterterrorism operations which are authorized under the 2001 AUMF.

But, repealing the 2002 would prevent our country from entering into another potentially protracted engagement without Congress having a voice. And for too long we have seen men and women fighting and dying under authorities voted on decades ago, a generation ago. And the American people, especially the American men and women in uniform, deserve to see us take a vote on these issues.

Repealing the 2002 AUMF is not only a step that we need to take, but we must address Congress' ongoing challenges with the 2001 AUMF. We must replace and update the 2001 AUMF in the future. It is an authorization that has been stretched beyond its original intent to contend with threats that were certainly not present at the time that it got a vote a generation ago.

But, addressing the 2001 AUMF is not the question before us today. Repealing the 2002 outdated and unused AUMF is. And for those who say we should keep old authorizations on the books just in case we need them, I would remind them that that is not how it is supposed to work.

If there is a new threat, then those decisions to initiate new actions should be deliberated and should involve Congress. And the President has authorities provided by the Constitution and by the War Powers Resolution. But no President should be able to reach for irrelevant authorities that are just left on the books to engage in military action.

For those who are saying that we are moving too fast, I would like to remind them that this bill is bipartisan and has passed the House multiple times. And it is severely overdue. And let's remember that the 2002 AUMF was enacted by Congress prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq that toppled the government of Saddam Hussein. And U.S. military deployments for related purposes ended back in 2011.

I would also like to speak not only in support of Representative Lee's bill but in opposition to Mr. Perry's amendment that would tie the 2002 AUMF repeal to a replacement of the 2001. My colleague from Pennsylvania and I joined with our colleagues at the time, Justin Amash, Ken Buck, Jared Golden, Dean Phillips, and Chip Roy, in writing an op-ed on the 16th of January 2020. And we wrote, "To start, it is time to have a serious debate and vote on the repeal of the 2002 AUMF which authorized the use of force against Saddam Hussein's Government in Iraq. This authorization has fully outlived its purpose, given the death of Hussein, regime change, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011, regardless of how one views the merit of that withdrawal."

"The 2002 authorization, as well as the lingering 1991 authorization, should be removed from the books," we wrote, "lest either be used to justify further military engagement beyond what Congress intended."

And we continued and noted separately, and I quote, "We must also foster an informed debate on a strategic alternative to the 2001 authorization."

Yes, we need to keep working on reform to other AUMFs. We have to repeal the 1957 and the 1991 AUMFs that are still on the books. But Mr. Perry's amendment would hamper our ability to

take a first step by requiring that progress and the repeal of the 2002 be tied to our ability to address the 2001 AUMF all at once.

Moving Representative Lee's common sense, bipartisan piece of legislation is a first step, and it is one that we should take. I look forward to taking this action today. And if Congress is actually ready to engage, ready to reassert ourselves in these hard conversations, these decisions where for too long certainly many of our predecessors have shirked those responsibilities, then we can move forward in the future with replacing the 2001.

But, today's vote is not about that. Today's vote is not about a particular president, a particular party, or the Administration, it is about reasserting the role of Congress in decisions of war and peace. And I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in voting to repeal the 2002 AUMF. And I look forward to future conversations about replacing the 2001 AUMF.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentlelady's time has expired.

I now recognize Representative Mark Green for 5 minutes.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I wasn't planning on speaking on this today, but I have heard a lot of passion in the discussion, and I thought I would just share a little bit from my personal experience.

Many people today have talked about this being a multi-generational war, folks in grade school, or wherever it was when the thing was written. I was actually in combat on this AUMF in Iraq.

It is a multi-generational war because then my son just last year deployed to Syria under this AUMF. And the reason that I would implore my colleagues to let's replace, repeal and replace together, those forces that are there that may possibly need either somebody, some group changes its name or changes it location where it hides out, where it bases itself from, our enemy so to speak. We need the flexibility.

And as I thought of my son being there in Syria during that time, I was glad to know that those authorizations were there.

So, I am for replacing it. I am not for repealing without a replacement. And that comes not, you know, from anything other than just having been there myself, having taken on these terrorists, having looked them in the eye, and knowing that my son has done the very same thing as a young Army Ranger.

So, that is my impassioned plea to the committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Gerry Connolly of Virginia for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for having this markup and including maybe the most consequential issue any Congress ever faces, the issue of war and peace.

Since World War II, Congress has, frankly, abrogated its responsibility under Article I of the Constitution. We have yielded to encroachment after encroachment, assertion of power and accretion of power to the executive branch that the Constitution never foresaw. And lives were lost because of that.

It is time that Congress reasserted its Article I powers, explicit and imputed.

The commander-in-chief role has expanded far beyond the imagination of any of the writers of the Constitution. When they wrote the Constitution, granted it was a different period of time, but they were deeply suspicious of too much power being vested in an executive. They had just, after all, successfully revolted against an absolute monarch, George III. They were not about to repeat that experience by imputing or even devolving powers for an all-powerful chief executive, especially in matters of war and peace.

They envisioned in Article I the Congress playing the primary role and the chief executive essentially executing the direction of the Congress, where to deploy troops, how many troops to deploy, what engagements we might have, what hostilities we might be engaged in.

Now, we live in a more complex world. Challenges require sometimes instant reaction. But in the case of both Iraq and Afghanistan, we have been involved in the two longest wars in our history. They began with an authorization of use of military force in response to a very specific set of circumstances. And, unfortunately, once again the executive has encroached on that authorization and used it to rationalize and justify many, many actions not envisioned by Congress just a dozen years ago. It is time to repeal the AUMF and, thoughtfully, to consider what and how we replace it.

We cannot do that on the fly, but we most certainly can start by repealing an outdated and I think dangerous authorization, dangerous in its extended use, dangerous in the commitments and entanglements and military hostilities that we might be engaged in without any of it having been contemplated by the original Congress that authorized it in the first place.

So, prudence dictates we take action. The American people want us to take this action. And it is in the process a very focused rebalancing of powers that have gotten way out of whack between the legislative and executive branches about the most significant decisions we ever make, those of war and peace.

I support the motion with respect to the AUMF, and yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Andy Barr for 5 minutes.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank all my colleagues for all of the thoughtful comments and opinions offered today, and especially want to thank my colleagues who have either served the country before their service in Congress in uniform, or in other capacities. My colleague Representative Spanberger in her capacity and certainly Representative Jacobs in her service to the country, all my colleagues I really enjoyed listening to the thoughtful comments and the arguments that are being offered.

But I have to rise today in opposition to H.R. 256 and in support of Mr. Perry's amendment. And I will offer a couple of thoughts for consideration to my colleagues about why.

Certainly I cannot speak from the same position of authority on this as General Perry or Representatives Mast or Green having served in uniform in Iraq. And I also understand that the AUMF for both 2001 and 2002 are certainly arguably outdated, probably

are outdated, and they need to be updated. Perhaps we need a consolidated single replacement for both.

I also am well aware that the American people, including my constituents, are weary of protracted war and that we may need AUMF reform in general. I agree with Representative Connolly that we need to reassert our Article I powers.

And, Mr. Chairman, you made a point at the outset that these were entirely different wars, the wars related to the one AUMF and the war, the Iraq War, the 2002 AUMF. They are different in some respects in that they are different types of enemies perhaps, but there is a connection. And the connection is that it is all the global war on terror.

So, my view is that we need to be very clear about what we are doing today by repealing the 2002 AUMF, admittedly outdated, without a replacement at the same time. What we are doing is we are repealing or we are withdrawing the authority that we, as Congress, has given to the commander-in-chief to protect Americans against threats in and emanating from Iraq. We are voting to cut-off the President's power to protect Americans who are in harm's way without a replacement.

I see this as a vote to disregard the terrorist threats that remain in Iraq such as the Shia threat; the Shia militia groups that we see active right now; the Iranian proxies; the remnants of Sunni radicals in Iraq, including ISIS; jihadist groups that are connected to ISIS.

And so, you know, I understand that this is a protracted war, as Representative Jacobs pointed out, but these are protracted threats. The threats remain, and we still have servicemembers in harm's way.

I do agree with Ranking Member McCaul when he says this sends a very bad signal. We have to remember what happened when President Obama totally disregarded the threat of the rise of ISIS. I think this is an analogous, wrong message that we send.

I agree with my colleagues who support this bill that we need to repeal the 2002 AUMF. We just cannot do it without doing anything replacing it right now immediately because of the remaining threats.

And maybe the command-in-chief has inherent executive power. I have heard several of my colleagues to act if we do face a problem here. I have heard several of my colleagues talk about how this bill would not interrupt or disrupt any ongoing operations, no ongoing operations would be impacted, that it wouldn't in any way compromise the ability of the commander-in-chief to act. But I have to say, I mean, if that is the case then why have an AUMF to begin with? It implies that the commander-in-chief can act without authorization.

And I thought the whole point of this, the point of our hearing and the testimony of the professors the other day was that Congress needs to reassert itself in the authorization of use of military force, we shouldn't allow the commander-in-chief to act unilaterally. And in effect we are inviting the commander-in-chief to do so when our troops will be inevitably threatened without this AUMF in place.

So, look, I agree with many of my colleagues in what they are saying here on both sides of this debate, but I would urge that we, that we take this repeal up with a replacement at the same time, and do our job under Article I.

Let's do our job. Let's reassert our Article I authority in this context, but let's not invite these threats without giving the commander-in-chief the ability to act in defense of our brave men and women in harm's way.

And I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman's time has expired.

I now recognize Mr. Pfluger of Texas for 5 minutes.

Mr. PFLUGER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. Ranking Member McCaul, thank you for the leadership. The efforts that have been taken I think are a good step in the right direction. As somebody who served in this area at the height of ISIS, and saw not just things that were happening in Iraq but also in Syria, which involved national States, non-nation States, and a tremendous amount of actors in the region, this is a very, very complicated issue.

And I would also like to say that I very much appreciate on both sides of the aisle today the acknowledgment that the most important thing that anybody in Congress can do is make a decision whether or not to send our troops to war. And I couldn't agree more. And as somebody who has been sent into harm's way by both Democrat and Republican presidents, it is a very emotional thing. And I would like to thank everybody for their service, whether it was in the military or in other departments that have dealt with this.

But I would like to ask the question: if it truly is the most important thing that we do in Congress, if that truly is a fact, then I would ask all of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle today, let's have the discussion because we owe it to those troops that are fighting right now. And then let's proceed to a dialog, and then we can end in debate.

And let's give the time—the proportional amount of time—required to this very important subject, to ask the Department of Defense at the very highest levels—and I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, the opportunity to have a classified briefing.

I think we need more of those with each of the service chiefs and the joint chiefs and the combatant commanders, with the secretary of State and with other key leaders and principals who can guide us in the reform because it is a dynamic environment.

As I served there, it changed in the course of a year, but every single day as a pilot, as somebody who was tasked with carrying out the orders of our President and of our government to keep not only ourselves safe, but to also make sure that every instrument of power that we had continued to keep the world safe, I would ask that we look at that dynamic environment and we take this into account and we do a good bipartisan job because security is not partisan. And I know everybody on this hearing appreciates that, and I appreciate listening and learning from each of you on this subject.

We need to take some time to put thought into it, so that the authorizations appropriately meet the threat and that we understand what Iraq is going to look like with the actions that we take.

And, Mr. Chairman, I would just implore everyone here to consider how important it is to send our troops into harm's way, and to give it everything we have, which means sitting as a bipartisan committee, in classified briefings together, without TV cameras, so that we can have that debate and we can come up with the solutions that we need.

And, Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now recognize Representative Peter Meijer from Michigan for 5 minutes.

Mr. MEIJER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wish to associate myself with the remarks of both yourself, Chairman Meeks, and also Ranking Member McCaul, in strong agreement and how positive it is that there is bipartisan support on this issue. As many have noted before, I think we share broadly a sense of where we need to go. We just are on different sides in terms of how to get there.

I just want to clear something up. The 2002 AUMF has not been used in the sense of being the operative authorization for any military action undertaken in and around Iraq roughly since the time I left Iraq in 2011. If we had repealed this AUMF in 2012, it would not have constrained American operations. It would not have hampered our ability to defend ourselves.

The majority of the operations that have taken place since then, whether it was ISIS using the 2001 AUMF or some of the attacks—or some of the—I shouldn't say attacks—some of the operations we have seen more recently that have been predicated on the Article 2 self-defense provisions, while they may have tangentially referenced 2002 as a backstop, they were not solely predicated on that 2002 AUMF.

So the idea that we would be left defenseless I find disingenuous, and that is exactly why we have Article 2 self-defense provisions, so we are well-equipped to defend ourselves.

And I actually do not think this bill goes far enough. In addition to the outdated and irrelevant 2002 AUMF, we still have authorizations on the books, as my colleague Ms. Spanberger said, from the original Gulf War in 1991 and 1957 around some Middle East operations.

In fact, I am proud to co-sponsor legislation with Ms. Spanberger, Mike Gallagher, Jared Golden, in order to do everything we can to not only repeal 1902 but also 1991 and 1957.

And a preemptive response to Mr. Mast's question, I have not asked the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor the secretary of defense, their thoughts on the 1991 or 1957 repeals for the simple fact that they are irrelevant to current operations.

Perhaps not holding 6 months of hearings to check might be hamstringing our efforts to check Communist influence in The Levant or to liberate Kuwait, if it is re-invaded by Iraq. But if that happens, there is a very easy solution to those outlandish hypotheticals, and that is we pass a new AUMF or we can engage in Title 50 operations or we could find justification under Article 2 self-defense provisions.

Or, frankly, we could probably find a way to finagle it into the 2001 AUMF, because in this hypothetical scenario there is just about no way that we haven't been able to find that Sunni terrorist nexus to justify operations.

We have used it to justify going after groups that did not even exist on 9/11. We have used it to go after groups that have actively fought al-Qaeda. So we could probably figure out a way to shoehorn other threats in as well. But at the end of the day, it is the 2001 AUMF that has been the basis for our offensive operations in the Middle East and Central Asia.

And I strongly agree and second all of the efforts of—or all of the comments on this committee talking about the need to reform it, and I think it should be reformed in a thoughtful, forward-looking way. But the 2002 AUMF, in comparison, is simply dead letter.

And in response to the idea that by doing this we may be emboldening the enemy, I think we are fooling ourselves if we think evildoers are tenting their fingers, watching this hearing and seeing weakness. In fact, you know, not only do we not need the 2002 AUMF to drop a hellfire on Qasem Soleimani, but I think this whole conversation that we are having, the vibrancy of this discussion, shows the strength of our commitment to thinking in a thoughtful way.

The passion in this debate I think is incredibly healthy. You know, it projects that we as a committee are stepping up, we are committed to stepping up, and that we are not stepping back. And I think the best way to do this is to discard these irrelevant AUMFs, so we can step forward and strengthen our Nation for that long term.

Therefore, I will probably be voting to support this bill, Congresswoman Lee's bill to repeal the 2002 AUMF.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

Do any other members wish to speak on this measure? Hearing no further requests, let's move on to amendments. For what purpose does the representative from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, seek recognition?

Mr. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have got an amendment at the desk.

Chairman MEEKS. The clerk shall distribute the amendment to your staff virtually. Let's pause briefly to give all members enough time to review the amendment.

Has everyone received a copy of the amendment? The clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. STILES. Perry Amendment Number 52, amend the bill, add the following, effective date.

[The amendment offered by Mr. Perry follows:]

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 256

OFFERED BY MR. PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA

At the end of the bill, add the following:

SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Act shall take effect upon the date of the enactment of an Act that—

(1) provides new, specific statutory authorization for the use of military force against specified terrorist groups;

(2) repeals the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note); and

(3) states that it is intended to satisfy the requirements of this section.

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Chairman MEEKS. Without objection, further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with, and a point of order is reserved. The representative from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. PERRY. Thank you very much again, Mr. Chairman. And like many of my colleagues, I was a little surprised to see a clean repeal of the 2002 AUMF on the schedule for today's markup.

It seemed to me a bill of this magnitude, and the implication it can carry for U.S. strategy in the Middle East, would have required feedback from numerous key stakeholders in the security arena, including DoD, Department of State, et cetera. To unilaterally pursue this measure I think would be, as I said before, grossly irresponsible.

It, therefore, begs asking if due diligence was undertaken to buffer the integrity of this proposal. Did the architects of this bill consult with the intelligence community in bringing this repeal before us today? Did they consult with the Department of Defense? Did they consult with the Department of State?

I am not sure I have really any indication that any of that happened. And I guess it doesn't have to to bring a bill, but I think it speaks to what maybe is lacking.

Who did the architects of the bill consult? All indicators point to the leftist wing of the—the leftist wing of the Democrat party, disappointed that the President chose to launch a strike in Syria last month. And let me just say, many of us were not critical of that. In the last administration, anytime President Trump lifted a finger everybody acted like World War III was going to start.

Nobody likes exercising military authority. It is the last resort. But if it keeps America safe, at least I will tell you, I am for it whether it is President Trump or President Biden.

These individuals I think are infuriated that the President chose to attack select targets in Syria, targets that could have been justified by the 2002 AUMF. The 2002 AUMF has provided the past three administrations with legal cover to pursue Iran-backed militias in Iraq and the wider region.

You know, I know there is a border between Iran and Iraq, and I know they fought a war. But I will tell you this: when you are standing on it, it is hard to tell. You know, one grain of sand looks like the other grain of sand right next to it.

To be clear, it needs to be replaced. There is no doubt. We agree on that. It seems like everybody on the committee agrees. It is outdated, and everyone here can see we are no longer trying to get rid of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq.

That being said, I think it is foolish to risk doing away with the 2002 AUMF with no replacement. Some of the left want to get rid of this amendment because they want to disincentivize the administration from pursuing similar activities in the future. But it is clear that we should be able and willing to target Iran-backed militias, especially when they attack U.S. targets in the region.

They are attacking—they have been attacking them almost, it seems like, my whole life, and they are attacking right now.

This amendment would allow for the repeal of the 2002 AUMF, but in a responsible way that secures U.S. national security interests. It would provide new, specific statutory authorization for the

use of military force against specified terrorist groups. In doing so, it would repeal the 2001 AUMF but not without denying the United States the ability to specifically target new and emerging threats since the 9/11 attacks, including the Islamic State.

This amendment would secure war powers reform and place decisionmaking, including decisions regarding specific targets, squarely in the purview of Congress where it belongs. On that we all agree.

Today we have the opportunity to put an end to years of debate on critical issues of U.S. national security, given everything at stake. And I know, look, I am sure it is going to get rammed through the committee, and it will probably get rammed through on the floor. And that is a shame because I think if we were a little—spent a little more time personally and were a little more thoughtful and deliberate about this, we could have overwhelming bipartisan support in the committee and on the floor.

But, unfortunately, this is going to go I think the way of a lot of things where one side generally supports it and the other side doesn't. And it is not indicative of how most of us on this committee feel, and quite honestly, I do not think it is indicative of how most Americans feel.

They want Congress to do its role. They do not want unilateral unrestricted powers vested in the executive branch. They want us to be thoughtful, but they do not want us to walk away from the responsibility we have to safeguard America for the sake of politics and scoring points. And, unfortunately, I feel a lot of—that that is what this is about.

I agree with Abigail. I did sign the letter, and I agree with the assessment of the letter. But I never said we should walk away from our commitment, especially to troops in contact right now. I never said we should disarm unilaterally. Absolutely, like I said, I support repeal. I wrote an AUMF 6 years ago because I support repeal—repeal and replacement—not repeal, unilaterally disarm, and walk away.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman's time has expired.

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. I oppose this amendment. The Perry amendment would keep the 2002 UMA—UMF—AUMF, excuse me, getting tired—AUMF on the books until Congress provides new, specific statutory authorization for the use of military force against specified terrorist groups.

The problem with that is, the 2002 AUMF does not authorize force against any specified terrorist groups. So the amendment will prevent Congress from repealing an authority that does not apply to terrorists until we enact a new authority that does apply to terrorist.

That doesn't make any sense, especially because Congress authorized force against terrorist groups in a separate authority. It is called a 2001 AUMF. That is what authorizes force against certain terrorists. It is not in the 2002 AUMF.

I know we have been urged to take up 2001 AUMF also. Believe me, I support doing so. But replacing the 2001 AUMF requires much more work, much of the work that you are talking about now, of which I am saying we will get done in a bipartisan manner. We will work with the 2001 AUMF, as most of us are saying needs

to be updated. And we need to do that in a bipartisan manner and take our time and make sure we are doing it right because it is still needed.

But replacing the—and the 2001 just isn't so—the bottom line is that the 2002 AUMF is not needed for any current operations. Can't protect us because it is not needed for any operations.

Look, a repeal passed the House 2 years ago. There is no reason to wait now. And it was bipartisan. It was done in the NDAA. But guess what, folks? It should have been done in the Foreign Affairs Committee. It is our jurisdiction. We do not want to pass up the vote. I know many members on both the Foreign Affairs and the Armed Services. But it is the jurisdiction of the Armed Services to pass any AUMF.

We need to do our job in this committee. So, clearly, our job is to be very clear about where Congress stands on the 2002 AUMF, unlike the 2001. Keeping the 2002 AUMF in place does not help the President fight terrorism. It just helps the executive branch avoid working with Congress.

We need to be decisive about Congress' power to authorize force. The hardest vote that I have had to take in my 22 years in the U.S. Congress is whether or not I send our women and men into war. I do not want to punt that responsibility. I do not want to give it to the executive branch. I want it to be right here with Congress, and I want this committee to lead in that regard. And for that reason, I oppose Mr. Perry's amendment.

Is there any further debate on the amendment? Hearing no further requests to speak, the question is on the amendment. We are going to take a vote by voice. All members, please unmute your microphones.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, say no.

In the opinion of the chair, the noes have it, and the amendment is not agreed to. And without objection, the motion to——

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Chairman, I request a recorded vote.

Chairman MEEKS [continuing]. Reconsider is laid upon the table.

Mr. PERRY. Mr. Chairman, I request a recorded vote.

Chairman MEEKS. A roll call vote is requested. Pursuant to committee Rule 4A(2), further proceedings on the amendment shall be postponed.

Are there any other amendments?

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, this is Congressman Issa. I have an amendment at the desk.

Chairman MEEKS. The clerk shall distribute the amendment. Let's pause briefly to give all members time to review the amendment.

Everyone has a copy of the amendment? The clerk will please report the amendment.

Ms. STILES. Issa Amendment Number 18, strike Section 1 and insert the following. Section 1——

[The Amendment offered by Mr. Issa follows:]

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 256

OFFERED BY MR. ISSA OF CALIFORNIA

Strike section 1 and insert the following:

SECTION 1. REPEAL OF AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Effective 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–243; 50 U.S.C. 6 1541 note) is hereby repealed.

(b) EXTENSION OF DELAYED REPEAL.—The President may extend the delay of the repeal of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 for one or more 90-day periods beginning after the end of the 90-day period described in subsection (a), but not beyond January 31, 2023, if the President submits to Congress a notification of such proposed extension prior to the start of each such 90-day period.

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Chairman MEEKS. Without objection, further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with. A point of order is reserved. The representative from California, Mr. Issa, is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be brief. As I explained a little bit earlier, this would make two substantive changes to the existing elimination of the AUMF. One is it would move its

[inaudible] no matter what to January 30, 2023.

Second, it would require that the President of the United States, on an every–90-day basis, request with specificity a reason for extending or continuing it. I believe that the current administration would likely extend once or twice while we work together to fashion a new AUMF if they needed one.

However, if they continue to use it every 90 days, they would have to come to the realization that less than 2 years from today that ability would disappear completely. I think this puts the administration in the right position to have to come to Congress, if they anticipate some portion of this legislation or this authorization continue to be used.

If they truly do not believe that they will need it, then this would be almost moot because this would—90 days after enactment of the Act, the AUMF would be canceled, since the President would not have asked for a specific 90-day extension.

I think this finds some middle ground between both sides where Ms. Lee would like to have this be upon enactment, but if we do not get an enactment—in the last Congress we did not—that we get immediate enactment. If, on the other hand, we are willing to allow the administration the possibility of a short extension based on specific need, with the recognition that if they do not need it, then Congresswoman Lee's vision would happen just 90 days later and likely would allow for the Senate to enact this bill.

So I fashioned this after listening to what I thought were the arguments over the last 2 years by both sides and believing that this legislation that I voted for in my first term in Congress truly does need to have a sunset certainty. And this would allow for us to get sunset certainty.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield for whatever time you need.

Chairman MEEKS. The gentleman yields back.

I now yield 5 minutes to myself. Let me first thank, as many of my colleagues, Barbara Lee for her great work for all of these years in putting this bill together in regards to the AUMF.

And I respect Rep Issa's interest in some sense, but the problem is the 2002 AUMF doesn't need a sunset. It just needs to be repealed. It is not for anything else. It doesn't need a sunset. It needs to be repealed. It is our duty to consider and vote on authorizations to use military force. We simply cannot keep avoiding that responsibility.

I repeat again, the 2002 AUMF is not needed for any current operations. That is what the 2001 AUMF is for.

If the President needs authorization for a future operation, he should come to us in Congress, and we should consider an issue on its own merits. That is how it is supposed to work. The President

can take defensive action without Congress, but if he wants to take offensive action, he needs to work with Congress. And we need to do our jobs and work with him.

Letting the President just continue to extend the 2002 AUMF for any purposes he sees fit is exactly how Congress ended up on the sideline on issues of war and peace in the first place.

I am cutting my remarks short there, because that is the reason I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.

Do any other members wish to speak on this amendment? Hearing no further requests to speak, the question is on the amendment. We are going to take a vote by voice. All members, please unmute your microphones.

All those in favor, say aye.

All those opposed, no.

In the opinion of the chair, the noes have it, and the amendment is not agreed to. And without objection, the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table.

Mute me for a second.

The committee will now resume consideration of the amendment to H.R. 2118, the other measure of which roll call votes were requested and postponed. The question is on the amendment designated number—what was that designation? 53. We are going to do 53, to H.R. 2118, Securing America From Epidemics Act.

A recorded vote is ordered. All members, please make sure you are visible to the chair, and unmute your microphone when your name is called. As you cast your vote, please be sure to say your name for the record first, and then for your vote. For example, Representative Jones votes no.

The clerk, will you please call the roll?

Ms. STILES. Representative Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. This is a vote on final passage?

Chairman MEEKS. This is—yes, on the amendment to H.R. 2118.

Mr. SHERMAN. Oh. So this is a vote on the amendment offered by which member?

Chairman MEEKS. Perry.

Mr. SHERMAN. Sherman votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Sherman votes no.

Representative SIRES.

Mr. SIRES. Sires votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Sires votes no.

Representative CONNOLLY.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Connolly votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Connolly votes no.

Representative DEUTCH.

Mr. DEUTCH. Deutch votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Deutch votes no.

I do not see Representative Bass.

Representative KEATING.

Chairman MEEKS. Can somebody mute until your name is called by the clerk?

Ms. STILES. Representative Keating.

Chairman MEEKS. You have to unmute, Representative Keating. I see you, but I do not hear you.

Ms. STILES. I will come back to you.

Representative CICILLINE.
Mr. CICILLINE. Cicilline votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Cicilline votes no.
Representative BERA.
Mr. BERA. Representative Bera votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Bera votes no.
Representative CASTRO.
Mr. CASTRO. Castro votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Castro votes no.
Representative TITUS.
Ms. TITUS. Titus votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Titus votes no.
I do not see Representative Lieu. Oh, there you are, sir. Representative Lieu.
Mr. LIEU. How did the chair vote?
Ms. STILES. The chair has not voted, sir. It is Perry Amendment Number 53.
Chairman MEEKS. It is a vote on the Perry amendment.
Mr. LIEU. No.
Ms. STILES. Representative Lieu votes no.
Representative WILD.
Ms. WILD. Wild votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Wild votes no.
Representative PHILLIPS.
Mr. PHILLIPS. Phillips votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Phillips votes no.
I do not see Representative Omar.
Representative ALLRED.
Mr. ALLRED. Allred votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Allred votes no.
Representative LEVIN.
Mr. LEVIN. Levin votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Levin votes no.
Representative SPANBERGER.

Ms. SPANBERGER. Spanberger votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Spanberger votes no.
Representative HOULAHAN.
Ms. HOULAHAN. Houlahan votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Houlahan votes no.
Representative MALINOWSKI.
Mr. MALINOWSKI. Malinowski, no. And not because it is from Mr. Perry.
Ms. STILES. Representative Malinowski votes no.
Representative KIM.
Mr. KIM OF NEW JERSEY. No.
Ms. STILES. Representative Kim votes no.
Representative JACOBS.
Ms. JACOBS. Representative Jacobs votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Jacobs votes no.
Representative MANNING.
Ms. MANNING. Manning votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Manning votes no.
Representative COSTA.

Mr. COSTA. Costa votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Costa votes no.
Representative VARGAS.
Mr. VARGAS. Vargas, no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Vargas votes no.
I do not see Representative Gonzalez.
Representative SCHNEIDER.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Schneider votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Schneider votes no.
Ranking Member McCaul.
Mr. MCCAUL. McCaul votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Ranking Member McCaul votes aye.
Representative SMITH.
Mr. SMITH. Smith votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Smith votes aye.
Representative CHABOT.
Mr. CHABOT. Chabot votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Chabot votes aye.
Representative WILSON.
Mr. WILSON. Mr. Wilson votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Wilson votes aye.
Representative PERRY.
Mr. PERRY. Even if it is Perry, Perry votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Perry votes aye.
Representative ISSA.
Mr. ISSA. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Issa votes aye.
Representative KINZINGER.
Mr. KINZINGER. Kinzinger, aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Kinzinger votes aye.
I do not see Representative Zeldin.

Mr. ZELDIN. Zeldin votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Oh. I am so sorry, sir. One more time?
Mr. ZELDIN. Zeldin votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Thank you. Representative Zeldin votes aye.
Representative WAGNER.
Mrs. WAGNER. Wagner votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Wagner votes aye.
Representative MAST.
Mr. MAST. Representative Mast votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Mast votes aye.
Representative FITZPATRICK.
Mr. FITZPATRICK. Fitzpatrick votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Fitzpatrick votes aye.
Representative BUCK.
Mr. BUCK. Buck votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Buck votes aye.
Representative BURCHETT.
Mr. BURCHETT. Burchett votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Burchett votes aye.
Representative GREEN.
Mr. GREEN. Green votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Green votes aye.

Representative BARR.
Mr. BARR. Barr, aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Barr votes aye.
I do not see Representative Steube.
Representative MEUSER.
Mr. MEUSER. Meuser votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Meuser votes aye.
I do not see Representative Tenney.
Representative PFLUGER.
Mr. PFLUGER. Pfluger votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Pfluger votes aye.
Representative MALLIOTAKIS.
Ms. MALLIOTAKIS. Malliotakis votes yes.
Ms. STILES. Representative Malliotakis votes aye.
Representative MEIJER.
Mr. MEIJER. Meijer votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Meijer votes aye.
Representative JACKSON.
Mr. JACKSON. Representative Jackson
[inaudible].
Ms. STILES. I am sorry. One more time, Representative Jackson?
Mr. JACKSON. Representative Jackson votes yes.
Ms. STILES. Representative Jackson votes aye.
Representative Young Kim.
Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Representative Young Kim votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Young Kim votes aye.
I do not see Representative Salazar.
And I am going to go back through, make sure I did not miss anyone here.
First, I will start with Chair Meeks.
Chairman MEEKS. Chairman Meeks votes no.
Ms. STILES. Chair Meeks votes no.
Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman MEEKS. Yes.
Mr. KEATING. Representative Keating. Have I been recorded?
Ms. STILES. Representative Keating, I do not have a vote for you yet, sir.
Mr. KEATING. Keating votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Keating votes no.
Chairman MEEKS. Have all members been recorded?
Ms. STILES. One moment, please, sir.
Chair Meeks, all members have been recorded.
Chairman MEEKS. The clerk will report the tally.
Ms. STILES. Chair Meeks, on that vote, we had 24 noes and 21 ayes.
Chairman MEEKS. The amendment is not agreed to.
Without objection, the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table.
The question is to report H.R. 2118, Securing America From Epidemics Act, to the House with the recommendation that the bill do pass. We are going to take a vote by voice. All members, please unmute your microphones.
All those in favor, say aye.
All opposed, no.

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it, and the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table.

The question is on the amendment designated Number 52, the Perry Amendment Number 52, to H.R. 256, repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.

A recorded vote is ordered. All members, make sure you are visible to the chair and unmute your microphones when your name is called. As you cast your vote, please be sure to say your name for the record first, and then your vote. For example, Representative Jones votes no.

The clerk will call the roll.

Ms. STILES. Representative Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. On the Perry amendment, Sherman votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Sherman votes no.

Representative SIRES.

Mr. SIRES. Sires votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Sires votes no.

Representative CONNOLLY.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Connolly votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Connolly votes no.

Representative DEUTCH.

Mr. DEUTCH. Deutch votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Deutch votes no.

I do not see Representative Bass.

Representative KEATING.

Mr. KEATING. Keating votes no. People should mute, please. I could barely hear you.

Ms. STILES. Representative Keating votes no.

Representative CICILLINE.

Mr. CICILLINE. Representative Cicilline votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Cicilline votes no.

Representative BERA.

Mr. BERA. Representative Bera votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Bera votes no.

Representative CASTRO.

Mr. CASTRO. Castro votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Castro votes no.

Representative TITUS.

Ms. TITUS. Titus votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Titus votes no.

Representative LIEU.

Mr. LIEU. Lieu votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Lieu votes no.

Representative WILD.

Ms. WILD. Wild votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Wild votes no.

Representative PHILLIPS.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Phillips votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Phillips votes no.

Representative OMAR. I am sorry. I do not see Representative Omar here. All right.

Representative ALLRED.

Mr. ALLRED. Allred votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Allred votes no.

Representative LEVIN.
Mr. LEVIN. Levin votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Levin votes no.
Representative SPANBERGER.
Ms. SPANBERGER. Spanberger votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Spanberger votes no.
Representative HOULAHAN.
Ms. HOULAHAN. Houlahan votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Houlahan votes no.
Representative MALINOWSKI.
Mr. MALINOWSKI. Malinowski, no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Malinowski votes no.
Representative KIM.
Mr. KIM OF NEW JERSEY. No.
Ms. STILES. Representative Kim votes no.
Representative JACOBS. Representative Jacobs, I see you on camera, ma'am. Would you like to vote? Representative Jacobs, would you like to cast your vote?
Ms. JACOBS. Representative Jacobs votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Jacobs votes no.
Representative MANNING.
Ms. MANNING. Manning votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Manning votes no.
Representative COSTA.
Mr. COSTA. Representative Costa votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Costa votes no.
Representative VARGAS.
Mr. VARGAS. Vargas, no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Vargas votes no.
I do not see Representative Gonzalez.
Representative SCHNEIDER.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Schneider votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Schneider votes no.
Ranking Member McCaul.
Mr. MCCAUL. McCaul votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Ranking Member McCaul votes aye.
Representative SMITH.
Mr. SMITH. Smith votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Smith votes aye.
Representative CHABOT.
Mr. CHABOT. Aye. Chabot is aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Chabot votes aye.
Representative WILSON.
Mr. WILSON. Wilson votes aye on the Perry amendment.
Ms. STILES. Representative Wilson votes aye.
Representative PERRY.
Mr. PERRY. Perry votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Perry votes aye.
Representative ISSA. Representative Issa, I see you on camera, sir.
Mr. ISSA. Representative Issa votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Issa votes aye.
Representative KINZINGER.
Mr. KINZINGER. Kinzinger, aye.

Ms. STILES. Representative Kinzinger votes aye.
Representative ZELDIN.
Mr. ZELDIN. Zeldin votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Zeldin votes aye.
Representative WAGNER.
Mrs. WAGNER. Wagner, aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Wagner votes aye.
Representative MAST.
Mr. MAST. Representative Mast votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Mast votes aye.
Representative FITZPATRICK.
Mr. FITZPATRICK. Fitzpatrick votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Fitzpatrick votes aye.
I do not see Representative Buck.
Mr. BUCK. Can you see me now?
Ms. STILES. Yes. Now I can, sir. Would you like to cast your vote?
Mr. BUCK. Buck votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Buck votes no.
Representative BURCHETT. Representative Burchett, you are muted, sir.
Mr. BURCHETT. Burchett votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Burchett votes aye.
Representative GREEN.
Mr. GREEN. Green votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Green votes aye.
Representative BARR.
Mr. BARR. Barr, aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Barr votes aye.
I do not see Representative Steube.
Representative MEUSER.
Mr. MEUSER. Meuser votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Meuser votes aye.
I do not see Representative Tenney.
Representative PFLUGER.
Mr. PFLUGER. Pfluger votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Pfluger votes aye.
Representative MALLIOTAKIS.
Ms. MALLIOTAKIS. Malliotakis votes yes.
Ms. STILES. Representative Malliotakis votes aye.
Representative MEIJER.
Mr. MEIJER. Meijer votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Meijer votes no.
I do not see Representative Jackson.
Mr. JACKSON. Representative Jackson. Can you see me?
Ms. STILES. Sorry, sir. I do now. Would you like to cast your vote?
Mr. JACKSON. Yes. Representative Jackson votes yes.
Ms. STILES. Representative Jackson votes aye.
Representative Young Kim.
Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Representative Young Kim votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Young Kim votes aye.
I do not see Representative Salazar.
Chair Meeks.
Chairman MEEKS. Chairman Meeks votes no.

Ms. STILES. Chair Meeks votes no.

Chairman MEEKS. Have all members been recorded?

Mr. GONZALEZ. No, sir. Congressman Gonzalez, Vincente Gonzalez, votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Gonzalez votes no.

Chairman MEEKS. Have all members been recorded? Any members wishing to change their vote?

Will the clerk please report the tally?

Ms. STILES. Chair Meeks, on that vote, there were 27 noes and 19 ayes.

Chairman MEEKS. The amendment is not agreed to.

The question is to report H.R. 256, to repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, to the House, with a recommendation that the bill do pass.

We are going to take a vote by voice. All members, please unmute your microphones.

All those in favor, say aye.

All opposed, say no.

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it, and the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table.

Without objection, staff is authorized to make any technical and conforming changes.

Pursuant to the House Rule——

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MEEKS. Mr. McCaul?

Mr. MCCAUL. With that, I ask for a recorded vote.

Chairman MEEKS. The question to report H.R. 256 to repeat the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, with the recommendation that the bill be passed. All members, please turn on your video, so you are visible to the chair, and wait to unmute your microphone until your name is called, as you cast your vote. Please be sure to say your name for the recording—for the record first, and then for your vote.

The clerk will please call the roll.

Ms. STILES. Representative Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Sherman votes aye.

Ms. STILES. Representative Sherman votes aye.

Representative SIRES.

Mr. SIRES. Sires votes yes.

Ms. STILES. Representative Sires votes aye.

Representative CONNOLLY.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Connolly votes aye.

Ms. STILES. Representative Connolly votes aye.

Representative DEUTCH.

Mr. DEUTCH. Deutch votes aye.

Ms. STILES. Representative Deutch votes aye.

I do not see Representative Bass.

Ms. BASS. I am here. I vote aye.

Ms. STILES. I am so sorry, ma'am.

Ms. BASS. Can you see me?

Ms. STILES. Yes, ma'am. I do. Representative Bass votes aye.

Representative KEATING.

Mr. KEATING. Yes.

Ms. STILES. Representative Keating votes aye.

Representative CICILLINE.
Mr. CICILLINE. Representative Cicilline votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Cicilline votes aye.
Representative BERA.
Mr. BERA. Representative Bera votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Bera votes aye.
Representative CASTRO.
Mr. CASTRO. Castro votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Castro votes aye.
Representative TITUS.
Ms. TITUS. Titus votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Titus votes aye.
Representative LIEU.
Mr. LIEU. Lieu votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Lieu votes aye.
Representative WILD.
Ms. WILD. Wild votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Wild votes aye.
Representative PHILLIPS.
Mr. PHILLIPS. Phillips votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Phillips votes aye.
I do not see Representative Omar.
Representative ALLRED.
Mr. ALLRED. Allred votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Allred votes aye.
Representative LEVIN.
Mr. LEVIN. Levin votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Levin votes aye.
Representative SPANBERGER.
Ms. SPANBERGER. Spanberger votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Spanberger votes aye.
Representative HOULAHAN.
Ms. HOULAHAN. Houlahan votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Houlahan votes aye.
Representative MALINOWSKI.
Mr. MALINOWSKI. Malinowski, aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Malinowski votes aye.
Representative Andy Kim.
Mr. KIM OF NEW JERSEY. Aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Andy Kim votes aye.
Representative JACOBS.
Ms. JACOBS. Representative Jacobs votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Jacobs votes aye.
Representative MANNING.
Ms. MANNING. Manning votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Manning votes aye.
Representative COSTA.
Mr. COSTA. Representative Costa votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Costa votes aye.
Representative VARGAS.
Mr. VARGAS. Vargas, aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Vargas votes aye.
Representative GONZALEZ.
Mr. GONZALEZ. Gonzalez votes

[inaudible].
Ms. STILES. I am sorry, sir. One more time?
Mr. GONZALEZ. Gonzalez votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Gonzalez votes aye.
Representative SCHNEIDER.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Schneider votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Schneider votes aye.
Ranking Member McCaul.
Mr. MCCAUL. McCaul votes no.
Ms. STILES. Ranking Member McCaul votes no.
Representative SMITH.
Mr. SMITH. Smith votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Smith votes no.
Representative CHABOT.
Mr. CHABOT. Chabot votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Chabot votes no.
Representative WILSON.
Mr. WILSON. Wilson votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Wilson votes no.
Representative PERRY.
Mr. PERRY. Perry is no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Perry votes no.
Representative ISSA.
Mr. ISSA. No.
Ms. STILES. Representative Issa votes no.
Representative KINZINGER.
Mr. KINZINGER. Kinzinger votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Kinzinger votes no.
Representative ZELDIN.
Mr. ZELDIN. Zeldin votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Zeldin votes no.
Representative WAGNER.
Mrs. WAGNER. Wagner votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Wagner votes no.
Representative MAST.
Mr. MAST. Representative Mast votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Mast votes no.
Representative FITZPATRICK.
Mr. FITZPATRICK. Fitzpatrick votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Fitzpatrick votes no.
Representative BUCK.
Mr. BUCK. Buck votes aye.
Ms. STILES. Representative Buck votes aye.
Representative BURCHETT.
Mr. BURCHETT. Burchett votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Burchett votes no.
Representative GREEN.
Mr. GREEN. Green votes no.
Ms. STILES. Representative Green votes no.
Representative BARR.
Mr. BARR. No.
Ms. STILES. Representative Barr votes no.
I do not see Representative Steube.
Representative MEUSER.

Mr. MEUSER. Meuser votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Meuser votes no.

I do not see Representative Tenney.

Representative PFLUGER. You are unmuted, sir. Or, I am sorry, you are muted. Representative Pfluger. Representative Pfluger, your audio is cutoff, sir. I am going to keep going, but we will ask after we are done. Okay. Let the record show that Representative Pfluger did a thumbs down sign. So Representative Pfluger votes no.

Representative MALLIOTAKIS.

Ms. MALLIOTAKIS. Malliotakis is no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Malliotakis votes no.

Representative MEIJER.

Mr. MEIJER. Meijer votes aye.

Ms. STILES. Representative Meijer votes aye.

Representative JACKSON.

Mr. JACKSON. Representative Jackson, no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Jackson votes no.

Representative Young Kim.

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Representative Young Kim votes no.

Ms. STILES. Representative Young Kim votes no.

I do not see Representative Salazar.

Chair Meeks.

Chairman MEEKS. Meeks votes aye.

Ms. STILES. Chair Meeks votes aye.

Chairman MEEKS. Have all members been recorded? Any members wishing to change their vote?

The clerk will report the tally. The clerk will report the tally.

Ms. STILES. Chair Meeks, on that vote, there were 28 ayes and 19 noes.

Chairman MEEKS. The ayes have it. And without objection, the motion to reconsider is laid upon the table. The measure is ordered favorably reported. Without objection, staff is authorized to make any technical and conforming changes.

Pursuant to House Rules, members will have 2 calendar days to file with the clerk of the committee supplemental, minority, additional, or dissenting views for inclusion in a report to the House on any of the bills ordered reported by the committee today.

This concludes our business today, and I want to thank Ranking Member McCaul and members of both sides of the aisle for all of their contributions to—and assistance to today's markup. It is a markup that I think that we had some very good debate, and I look forward to continuing to work together to make America stronger.

I now adjourn this markup.

[Whereupon, at 7:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Gregory W. Meeks (D-NY), Chair

March 25, 2021

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN markup of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held virtually via Cisco WebEx. The markup is available by live webcast on the Committee website at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/:

DATE: Thursday, March 25, 2021

TIME: 1:00 p.m., EDT

MARKUP OF: H.R. 391, Global Health Security Act of 2021

H.R. 1079, Desert Locust Control Act

H.R. 1145, To direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan in the World Health Organization, and for other purposes

H.R. 1500, To direct the Administrator of the USAID to submit to Congress a report on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global basic education programs

H.R. 1158, To provide women and girls safe access to sanitation facilities in refugee camps

H.R. 1083, Southeast Asia Strategy Act

H.R. 1392, Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021

H.R. 1464, Khashoggi Accountability Act

H.R. 256, To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002

H.R. 2118, Securing America From Epidemics Act

H.Res. 245, Calling for renewed, decisive, and robust international collaboration and coordination to fight COVID-19 across Africa

H.R. 1934, Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G Act

By Direction of the Chair

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE MARKUP

Day *Thursday* **Date** *03/25/2021* **Room** *Cisco WebEx*

Starting Time *1:15 p.m.* **Ending Time** *7:03 p.m.*

Recesses *1* (*3:31 p.m.* to *4:26 p.m.*) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____)

Presiding Member(s)

Chairman Gregory W. Meeks

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session ☑
Executive (closed) Session ☐
Televised ☑
Electronically Recorded (taped) ☑
Stenographic Record ☑

BILLS FOR MARKUP: *(Include bill number(s) and title(s) of legislation.)*

H.R. 391, Global Health Security Act of 2021; H.R. 1079, Desert Locust Control Act; H.R. 1145, To direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan in the World Health Organization, and for other purposes; H.R. 1500, To direct the Administrator of the USAID to submit to Congress a report on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global basic education programs; H.R. 1158, To provide women and girls safe access to sanitation facilities in refugee camps; H.R. 1083, Southeast Asia Strategy Act; H.R. 1392, Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021; H.R. 1464, Khashoggi Accountability Act; H.R. 256, To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002; H.R. 2118, Securing America From Epidemics Act; H.Res. 245, Calling for renewed, decisive, and robust international collaboration and coordination to fight COVID-19 across Africa; H.R. 1934, Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G Act

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

See attached.

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

IFR - Meeks

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE MARKUP: *(Attach copies of legislation and amendments.)*

The measures considered en bloc were agreed to by voice vote, ordered favorably reported, as amended, if amended, to the House. The four measures considered separately - H.R. 391, H.R. 2118, H.R. 1464, and H.R. 256 - were ordered favorably reported, as amended, if amended, to the House.

RECORDED VOTES TAKEN (FOR MARKUP): *(Attach final vote tally sheet listing each member.)*

Subject	Yeas	Nays	Present	Not Voting
Perry Amendment #53 to H.R. 2118	*21*	*24*	*0*	*6*
Perry Amendment #52 to H.R. 256	*19*	*27*	*0*	*5*
Reporting H.R. 256 to the House	*28*	*19*	*0*	*4*

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____
or
TIME ADJOURNED *7:03 p.m.*

Full Committee Hearing Coordinator

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FULL COMMITTEE ATTENDANCE

PRESENT	*MEMBER*
X	Gregory W. Meeks, NY
X	Brad Sherman, CA
X	Albio Sires, NJ
X	Gerald E. Connolly, VA
X	Theodore E. Deutch, FL
X	Karen Bass, CA
X	William Keating, MA
X	David Cicilline, RI
X	Ami Bera, CA
	Joaquin Castro, TX
X	Dina Titus, NV
X	Ted Lieu, CA
X	Susan Wild, PA
X	Dean Phillips, MN
	Ilhan Omar, MN
X	Colin Allred, TX
X	Andy Levin, MI
X	Abigail Spanberger, VA
X	Chrissy Houlahan, PA
X	Tom Malinowski, NJ
X	Andy Kim, NJ
X	Sara Jacobs, CA
X	Kathy Manning, NC
X	Jim Costa, CA
	Juan Vargas, CA
X	Vicente Gonzalez, TX
X	Brad Schneider, IL

PRESENT	*MEMBER*
X	Michael T. McCaul, TX
X	Christopher H. Smith, NJ
X	Steve Chabot, OH
X	Joe Wilson, SC
X	Scott Perry, PA
X	Darrell Issa, CA
X	Adam Kinzinger, IL
	Lee Zeldin, NY
X	Ann Wagner, MO
X	Brian J. Mast, FL
X	Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA
X	Ken Buck, CO
X	Tim Burchett, TN
X	Mark Green, TN
X	Andy Barr, KY
X	Greg Steube, FL
X	Dan Meuser, PA
	Claudia Tenney, NY
X	August Pfluger, TX
	Nicole Malliotakis, NY
X	Peter Meijer, MI
	Ronny Jackson, TX
X	Young Kim, CA
	Maria Elvira Salazar, FL

I

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1145

To direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan in the World Health Organization, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 18, 2021

Mrs. KIM of California (for herself, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. MCCAUL, Mr. RESCHENTHALER, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Mr. TIFFANY, Mr. GALLAGHER, Mr. NORMAN, Mr. BURCHETT, Mr. FERGUSON, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. MCKINLEY, Mr. BABIN, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. TIMMONS, Mr. WOMACK, Mr. YOUNG, Mr. MEEKS, Mr. WALTZ, Mrs. MURPHY of Florida, Mr. CURTIS, Mr. BERA, Mrs. MCCLAIN, Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota, Mr. GONZALEZ of Ohio, Mr. CASE, Mr. BACON, Mr. ESPAILLAT, Mr. SIRES, Mr. HARRIS, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. ROUZER, Mrs. NAPOLITANO, Ms. TITUS, and Mr. CASTRO of Texas) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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A BILL

To direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan in the World Health Organization, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The World Health Organization (WHO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations, charged with coordinating health efforts within the United Nations system. The World Health Assembly (WHA) is the decision-making body of the WHO, which convenes annually in May to set the policies and priorities of the organization. Statehood is not a requirement for attendance at the WHA, and numerous observers, including non-members and non-governmental organizations, attended the most recent virtual WHA in May 2020.

(2) Taiwan began seeking to participate in the WHO as an observer in 1997. In 2009, with strong support from successive United States Administrations, Congress, and like-minded WHO Member States, and during a period of improved Cross-Strait relations, Taiwan received an invitation to attend the WHA as an observer under the name ''Chinese Taipei''. Taiwan received the same invitation each year until 2016, when following the election of President Tsai-Ing Wen of the Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan's engagement in the international community began facing increased resistance from the People's Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan's invitation to the 2016 WHA was received late and in-

1 cluded new language conditioning Taiwan's partici-
2 pation on the PRC's "one China principle". The
3 WHO did not invite Taiwan to attend the WHA as
4 an observer in 2017, 2018, 2019, or 2020.
5 (3) Taiwan remains a model contributor to
6 world health, having provided financial and technical
7 assistance to respond to numerous global health
8 challenges. Taiwan has invested over $6 billion in
9 international medical and humanitarian aid efforts
10 impacting over 80 countries since 1996. In 2014,
11 Taiwan responded to the Ebola crisis by donating $1
12 million and providing 100,000 sets of personal pro-
13 tective equipment. Through the Global Cooperation
14 and Training Framework, the United States and
15 Taiwan have jointly conducted training programs for
16 experts to combat MERS, Dengue Fever, and Zika.
17 In 2020, after successfully containing the spread of
18 the novel coronavirus within its borders while up-
19 holding democratic principles, Taiwan generously do-
20 nated millions of pieces of personal protective equip-
21 ment and COVID-19 tests to countries in need.
22 These diseases know no borders, and Taiwan's need-
23 less exclusion from global health cooperation in-
24 creases the dangers presented by global pandemics.

(4) Taiwan's international engagement has faced increased resistance from the PRC. Taiwan was not invited to the 2016 Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), despite participating as a guest at the organization's prior summit in 2013. Taiwan's requests to participate in the General Assembly of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) have also been rejected. In May 2017, PRC delegates disrupted a meeting of the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds held in Perth, Australia, until delegates from Taiwan were asked to leave. Since 2016, the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, the Republic of Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, the Republic of El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and the Republic of Kiribati have terminated longstanding diplomatic relationships with Taiwan and granted diplomatic recognition to the PRC.

(5) Congress has established a policy of support for Taiwan's participation in international bodies that address shared transnational challenges, particularly in the WHO. Congress passed H.R. 1794 in the 106th Congress, H.R. 428 in the 107th Congress, and S. 2092 in the 108th Congress to direct the Secretary of State to establish a strategy for,

and to report annually to Congress on, efforts to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the WHA. Congress also passed H.R. 1151 in the 113th Congress, directing the Secretary to report on a strategy to gain observer status for Taiwan at the ICAO Assembly, and H.R. 1853 in the 114th Congress, directing the Secretary to report on a strategy to gain observer status for Taiwan at the INTERPOL Assembly. However, since 2016 Taiwan has not received an invitation to attend any of these events as an observer.

(b) AUGMENTATION OF REPORT CONCERNING THE PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (c) of section 1 of Public Law 108–235 (118 Stat. 656) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(3) An account of the changes and improvements the Secretary of State has made to the United States plan to endorse and obtain observer status for Taiwan at the World Health Assembly, following any annual meetings of the World Health Assembly at which Taiwan did not obtain observer status.".

1 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made
2 by paragraph (1) shall take effect and apply begin-
3 ning with the first report required under subsection
4 (c) of section 1 of Public Law 108–235 that is sub-
5 mitted after the date of the enactment of this Act.

○

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1145 OFFERED BY MR. MEEKS OF NEW YORK

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 **SECTION 1. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE WORLD**
2 **HEALTH ORGANIZATION.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
4 ings:

5 (1) The World Health Organization (WHO) is
6 a specialized agency of the United Nations, charged
7 with coordinating health efforts within the United
8 Nations system. The World Health Assembly
9 (WHA) is the decision-making body of the WHO,
10 which convenes annually in May to set the policies
11 and priorities of the organization. Statehood is not
12 a requirement for attendance at the WHA, and nu-
13 merous observers, including non-members and non-
14 governmental organizations, attended the most re-
15 cent virtual WHA in May 2020.

16 (2) Taiwan began seeking to participate in the
17 WHO as an observer in 1997. In 2009, with strong
18 support from successive United States Administra-

tions, Congress, and like-minded WHO Member States, and during a period of improved Cross-Strait relations, Taiwan received an invitation to attend the WHA as an observer under the name ''Chinese Taipei''. Taiwan received the same invitation each year until 2016, when following the election of President Tsai-Ing Wen of the Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan's engagement in the international community began facing increased resistance from the People's Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan's invitation to the 2016 WHA was received late and included new language conditioning Taiwan's participation on the PRC's ''one China principle''. The WHO did not invite Taiwan to attend the WHA as an observer in 2017, 2018, 2019, or 2020.

(3) Taiwan remains a model contributor to world health, having provided financial and technical assistance to respond to numerous global health challenges. Taiwan has invested over $6 billion in international medical and humanitarian aid efforts impacting over 80 countries since 1996. In 2014, Taiwan responded to the Ebola crisis by donating $1 million and providing 100,000 sets of personal protective equipment., Through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework – which partners Taiwan

with the United States and Japan as a platform for sharing Taiwan's expertise in a variety of crucial fields – the United States and Taiwan have jointly conducted training programs for technical health experts to combat MERS, Dengue Fever, and Zika. In 2020, after successfully containing the spread of the novel coronavirus within its borders while upholding democratic principles, Taiwan generously donated millions of pieces of personal protective equipment and COVID-19 tests to countries in need. These diseases know no borders, and Taiwan's needless exclusion from global health cooperation increases the dangers presented by global pandemics.

(4) Taiwan's international engagement has faced increased resistance from the PRC. Taiwan was not invited to the 2016 Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), despite participating as a guest at the organization's prior summit in 2013. Taiwan's requests to participate in the General Assembly of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) have also been rejected. In May 2017, PRC delegates disrupted a meeting of the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds held in Perth, Australia, until delegates from Taiwan were asked to leave. Since 2016, the Demo-

1 cratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, the Re-
2 public of Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina
3 Faso, the Republic of El Salvador, the Solomon Is-
4 lands, and the Republic of Kiribati have terminated
5 longstanding diplomatic relationships with Taiwan
6 and granted diplomatic recognition to the PRC.
7 (5) Congress has established a policy of support
8 for Taiwan's participation in international bodies
9 that address shared transnational challenges, par-
10 ticularly in the WHO. Congress has passed multiple
11 measures to direct the Secretary of State to estab-
12 lish a strategy for, and to report annually to Con-
13 gress on, efforts to obtain observer status for Tai-
14 wan at the WHA. Congress also passed legislation
15 directing the Secretary to report on a strategy to
16 gain observer status for Taiwan at the ICAO Assem-
17 bly, and to report on a strategy to gain observer sta-
18 tus for Taiwan at the INTERPOL Assembly. How-
19 ever, since 2016 Taiwan has not received an invita-
20 tion to attend any of these events as an observer.
21 (b) AUGMENTATION OF REPORT CONCERNING THE
22 PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE WORLD HEALTH OR-
23 GANIZATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (c) of section 1 of Public Law 108–235 (118 Stat. 656) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(3) An account of the changes and improvements the Secretary of State has made to the United States plan to endorse and obtain observer status for Taiwan at the World Health Assembly, following any annual meetings of the World Health Assembly at which Taiwan did not obtain observer status.".

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect and apply beginning with the first report required under subsection (c) of section 1 of Public Law 108–235 that is submitted after the date of the enactment of this Act.

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~116H8220

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(Original Signature of Member)

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. _____

To direct the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development to submit to Congress a report on the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic on global basic education programs.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Ms. HOULAHAN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To direct the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development to submit to Congress a report on the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic on global basic education programs.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Global Learning Loss Assessment Act of 2021".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Before the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (commonly referred to as "COVID–19") pandemic began, 258,000,000 children were out of school, including 130,000,000 girls.

(2) Students already at a disadvantage before COVID–19 will experience greater learning loss, thereby worsening inequity and inequality.

(3) Approximately 90 percent of the world's student population—over 1,600,000,000 children and youth—have had their education disrupted by school closure due to COVID–19.

(4) School closures lead to interrupted learning, poor nutrition, gaps in childcare, increased dropout rates, exposure to violence, and social isolation.

(5) Up to 24,000,000 children are at risk of dropping out of school permanently due to rising levels of child poverty associated with the pandemic.

(6) School closure and remote learning is especially burdensome on girls, who are frequently expected to shoulder more household chores and responsibilities and are more vulnerable to gender-based violence.

(7) During the Ebola epidemic, nationwide school closures in Sierra Leone in 2014 led to increased instances of sexual- and gender-based vio-

lence, teenage pregnancy, school dropout, and child labor for girls.

(8) More than 60 percent of national distance learning alternatives rely exclusively on online platforms but two-thirds of the world's school aged children, or 1,300,000,000 children aged 3-17, do not have internet connection in their homes, and schools and local learning centers also frequently have inadequate internet connectivity. 80 percent of students in sub-Saharan Africa lack such access, with an even higher rate for girls.

(9) Children and youth with disabilities are particularly vulnerable to the health, education, and socioeconomic consequences of the pandemic. As a further challenge, distance learning tools are not always accessible to learners with disabilities or those with complex learning needs, especially in poorer and rural households.

(10) Before the COVID–19 pandemic, refugee children were twice as likely to be out of school as other youth, and school closures and a lack of access to distance learning tools threaten to make the education gap among refugee children even more severe.

(11) The economic downturn caused by the COVID–19 pandemic could lead to an education fi-

nancing gap of $77,000,000,000 in low- and middle-income countries over the next two years.

(12) The economic cost of school closures could be up to $1,337 per student, which on a global scale equates to approximately $10,000,000,000,000 in lost economic output over the coming generation.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States that United States-funded basic education programs operating in foreign countries should—

(1) provide inclusive learning opportunities for students and teachers, especially for the most marginalized, including girls, children with disabilities, and previously out of school children;

(2) build local capacity and help countries strengthen their education systems, including opportunities for early childhood development;

(3) improve the availability, delivery, and quality of education services from early childhood through secondary education;

(4) improve equity and safety in education services; and

(5) support the return of children to school who have experienced interruptions in their education due to the COVID–19 pandemic and work to enroll

previously out-of-school children and youth, particularly the most marginalized.

SEC. 4. REPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, acting through the Senior Coordinator for International Basic Education Assistance and in consultation with the Senior Coordinator for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic on the Agency's basic education programs.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:

(1) An assessment of the magnitude of learning loss that will result from protracted school closures, including the specific effects of school and learning space closures on marginalized children and youth, including girls, minority populations, displaced children, and those with disabilities.

(2) Descriptions of the effectiveness, cost, accessibility, and reach of the most commonly used forms of distance learning in low resource contexts.

(3) An overview of Agency programs being carried out to continue learning during the COVID–19 pandemic, including existing data on funding and programmatic focus disaggregated by gender, country, education level, and disability.

(4) Identification and description of any gaps in, or barriers to, reaching and educating marginalized populations, such as girls, children with disabilities, displaced children, or other children adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic with distance learning interventions.

(5) A description of the Agency's plan and needed tools and resources to support continued distance learning interventions, safe school reopening, assessments of student learning levels, remedial and accelerated learning, reenrollment campaigns for out-of-school children and youth, and education system strengthening and resilience building efforts.

(6) An analysis of the efforts of other actors in global basic education policy and programming to provide education during COVID-19, including partner organizations, donors, and bilateral and multilateral organizations, and the role of the Agency in those efforts.

(7) Opportunities to partner and support efforts to expand access to digital infrastructure, internet connectivity, and learning resources in areas that lack access to digital and remote learning infrastructure and resources, including rural and remote communities.

(c) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be made available to the public.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ''appropriate congressional committees'' means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1500 OFFERED BY MS. HOULAHAN OF PENNSYLVANIA

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Global Learning Loss Assessment Act of 2021".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Before the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (commonly referred to as "COVID–19") pandemic began, 258,000,000 children were out of school globally, including 130,000,000 girls.

(2) Students already at a disadvantage before COVID–19 will experience greater learning loss, thereby worsening inequity and inequality.

(3) Approximately 90 percent of the world's student population—over 1,600,000,000 children and youth—have had their education disrupted by school closure due to COVID–19.

(4) School closures lead to interrupted learning, poor nutrition, gaps in childcare, increased dropout rates, exposure to violence, and social isolation.

(5) Up to 24,000,000 children are at risk of dropping out of school permanently due to rising levels of child poverty associated with the pandemic.

(6) School closure and remote learning is especially burdensome on girls, who are frequently expected to shoulder more household chores and responsibilities and are more vulnerable to gender-based violence.

(7) During the Ebola epidemic, nationwide school closures in Sierra Leone in 2014 led to increased instances of sexual- and gender-based violence, teenage pregnancy, school dropout, and child labor for girls.

(8) More than 60 percent of national distance learning alternatives rely exclusively on online platforms but two-thirds of the world's school aged children, or 1,300,000,000 children aged 3 through 17, do not have internet connection in their homes, and schools and local learning centers also frequently have inadequate internet connectivity. Eighty percent of students in sub-Saharan Africa lack such access, with an even higher rate for girls.

(9) Children and youth with disabilities are particularly vulnerable to the health, education, and socioeconomic consequences of the pandemic. As a further challenge, distance learning tools are not always accessible to learners with disabilities or those with complex learning needs, especially in poorer and rural households.

(10) Before the COVID–19 pandemic, refugee children were twice as likely to be out of school as other youth, and school closures and a lack of access to distance learning tools threaten to make the education gap among refugee children even more severe.

(11) The economic downturn caused by the COVID–19 pandemic could lead to an education financing gap of $77,000,000,000 in low- and middle-income countries over the next 2 years.

(12) The economic cost of school closures could be up to $1,337 per student, which on a global scale equates to approximately $10,000,000,000,000 in lost economic output over the coming generation.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States that United States-funded basic education programs operating in low- and middle-income countries should seek to—

(1) provide inclusive learning opportunities for students and teachers, especially for the most marginalized, including girls, children with disabilities, and previously out of school children;

(2) build local capacity and help countries strengthen their education systems, including opportunities for early childhood development;

(3) improve the availability, delivery, and quality of education services from early childhood through secondary education;

(4) improve equity and safety in education services; and

(5) support the return of children to school who have experienced interruptions in their education due to the COVID–19 pandemic and work to enroll previously out-of-school children and youth, particularly the most marginalized.

SEC. 4. REPORT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, acting through the Senior Coordinator for International Basic Education Assistance and in consultation with the Senior Coordinator for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment, shall submit to the appropriate congres-

sional committees a report on the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic on United States Agency for International Development basic education programs.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:

(1) An assessment of the impact of COVID–19 on such basic education programs, including the magnitude of learning loss that will result from protracted school closures and the specific effects of school and learning space closures on marginalized children and youth, including girls, minority populations, displaced children, and those with disabilities.

(2) A description of the effectiveness, cost, accessibility, and reach of the most commonly used forms of distance learning in low- and middle-income countries and low-resource contexts.

(3) A description of efforts to pivot and adapt such basic education programs during the COVID–19 pandemic, including an overview of existing data on funding and programmatic focus disaggregated by gender, country, education level, and disability.

(4) An identification and description of any gaps in, or barriers to, reaching and educating

marginalized populations, such as girls, children with disabilities, displaced children, or other children adversely affected by the COVID–19 pandemic with distance learning interventions.

(5) A description of the United States Agency for International Development's plan and needed authorities and resources to prevent degradation of such basic education programs and to support, as necessary and appropriate, continued distance learning interventions, safe school reopenings, assessments of student learning levels, remedial and accelerated learning, re-enrollment campaigns for out-of-school children and youth, and education system strengthening and resilience-building efforts.

(6) An analysis of the coordination between the United States Agency for International Development and other actors in global basic education policy and programming to provide education during the COVID–19 pandemic, including partner organizations, faith based-organizations, donors, and multilateral organizations.

(7) A description of opportunities to partner and support efforts to expand access to digital infrastructure, internet connectivity, and learning resources in areas that lack access to digital and re-

1 mote learning infrastructure and resources, includ-
2 ing rural and remote communities.
3 (c) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The report required by
4 subsection (a) shall be made available to the public.
5 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
6 DEFINED.—In this section, the term ''appropriate con-
7 gressional committees'' means—
8 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
9 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
10 resentatives; and
11 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
12 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

Amend the title so as to read: ''A bill to direct the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development to submit to Congress a report on the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic on United States Agency for International Development basic education programs.''.

AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1500 OFFERED BY MR. PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA

In section 4(b), redesignate paragraphs (2) through (7) as paragraphs (3) through (8), respectively, and insert after paragraph (1) the following:

1 (2) An assessment comparing academic out-
2 comes of beneficiaries of United States Agency for
3 International Development basic education pro-
4 grams, as practical and appropriate, between those
5 that attend schools that remain closed or continue to
6 operate remotely since the start of the COVID-19
7 pandemic and schools that have resumed in-person
8 instruction.

[~116H615RFS]

.....
(Original Signature of Member)

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. _____

To provide women and girls safe access to sanitation facilities in refugee camps.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MS. MENG introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To provide women and girls safe access to sanitation facilities in refugee camps.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Refugee Sanitation Facility Safety Act of 2021".

SEC. 2. SECURE ACCESS TO SANITATION FACILITIES FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS.

Subsection (a) of section 501 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (22 U.S.C. 2601 note) is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (6) through (11) as paragraphs (7) through (12), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following new paragraph:

"(6) the provision of safe and secure access to sanitation facilities, with a special emphasis on women, girls, and vulnerable populations.".

I

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1083

To require a strategy for engagement with Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 15, 2021

Mrs. WAGNER (for herself and Mr. CASTRO of Texas) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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A BILL

To require a strategy for engagement with Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Southeast Asia Strategy Act".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Southeast Asia is the fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific region, providing both a geographic and maritime link between East and South Asia.

(2) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional intergovernmental organization, remains central to the Indo-Pacific region's institutional architecture and to United States foreign policy toward the region.

(3) The United States has reaffirmed that the security and sovereignty of its Southeast Asian allies and partners, including a strong, independent ASEAN, remain vital to the prosperity and stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

(4) The United States has committed to deepen longstanding alliances and partnerships with a range of Southeast Asian nations, including by promoting our shared values, democracy, human rights, and civil society.

(5) Since the end of the Second World War, United States investments in strengthening alliances and partnerships with Southeast Asian nations have yielded tremendous returns for United States interests, as working with and through these alliances and partnerships have increased the region's ability to address common challenges.

(6) ASEAN member states are critical United States security partners in protecting the freedom and openness of the maritime domain and pre-

venting violent extremism and the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction.

(7) ASEAN member states have contributed significantly to regional disaster monitoring and management and emergency response through initiatives such as the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management, an inter-governmental organization that facilitates coordination and cooperation among ASEAN member states and international organizations in times of emergency.

(8) According to the 2018 ASEAN Business Outlook Survey, ASEAN member states are vital to the prosperity of the United States economy and exports to ASEAN economies support more than 500,000 jobs in the United States.

(9) The United States and ASEAN have established a new strategic partnership that will enhance cooperation across the economic, political-security, and people-to-people pillars of the relationship.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) deepen cooperation with ASEAN and ASEAN member states in the interest of promoting

peace, security, and stability in the Indo-Pacific region;

(2) affirm the importance of ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms in the evolving institutional architecture of the Indo-Pacific region; and

(3) establish and communicate a comprehensive strategy toward the Indo-Pacific region that articulates—

(A) the role and importance of Southeast Asia to the United States;

(B) the value of the United States-ASEAN relationship;

(C) the mutual interests of all parties;

(D) the concrete and material benefits all nations derive from strong United States engagement and leadership in Southeast Asia; and

(E) efforts to forge and maintain ASEAN consensus, especially on key issues of political and security concern to the region, such as the South China Sea.

SEC. 4. STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA AND ASEAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other Federal depart-

1 ments and agencies as appropriate, shall develop and sub-
2 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a com-
3 prehensive strategy for engagement with Southeast Asia
4 and ASEAN.

5 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy re-
6 quired by subsection (a) shall include the following:

7 (1) A statement of enduring United States in-
8 terests in Southeast Asia and a description of efforts
9 to bolster the effectiveness of ASEAN.

10 (2) A description of efforts to—

11 (A) deepen and expand Southeast Asian al-
12 liances, partnerships, and multilateral engage-
13 ments, including efforts to expand broad based
14 and inclusive economic growth, security ties, se-
15 curity cooperation and interoperability, eco-
16 nomic connectivity, and expand opportunities
17 for ASEAN to work with other like-minded
18 partners in the region; and

19 (B) encourage like-minded partners outside
20 of the Indo-Pacific region to engage with
21 ASEAN.

22 (3) A summary of initiatives across the whole
23 of the United States Government to strengthen the
24 United States partnership with Southeast Asian na-
25 tions and ASEAN, including to promote broad based

and inclusive economic growth, trade, investment, energy innovation and sustainability, public-private partnerships, physical and digital infrastructure development, education, disaster management, public health and global health security, and economic, political, and public diplomacy in Southeast Asia.

(4) A summary of initiatives across the whole of the United States Government to enhance the capacity of Southeast Asian nations with respect to enforcing international law and multilateral sanctions, and initiatives to cooperate with ASEAN as an institution in these areas.

(5) A summary of initiatives across the whole of the United States Government to promote human rights and democracy, to strengthen the rule of law, civil society, and transparent governance, to combat disinformation and to protect the integrity of elections from outside influence.

(6) A summary of initiatives to promote security cooperation and security assistance within Southeast Asian nations, including—

(A) maritime security and maritime domain awareness initiatives for protecting the maritime commons and supporting international

law and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea; and

(B) efforts to combat terrorism, human trafficking, piracy, and illegal fishing, and promote more open, reliable routes for sea lines of communication.

(c) DISTRIBUTION OF STRATEGY.—For the purposes of assuring allies and partners in Southeast Asia and deepening United States engagement with ASEAN, the Secretary of State shall direct each United States chief of mission to ASEAN and its member states to distribute the strategy required by subsection (a) to host governments.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ''appropriate congressional committees'' means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

○

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. RES. 245

Calling for renewed, decisive, and robust international collaboration and coordination to fight COVID–19 across Africa.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 17, 2021

Ms. BASS (for herself, Ms. NORTON, Mr. BISHOP of Georgia, Mr. RUSH, Ms. JACKSON LEE, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. BUTTERFIELD, Mr. SIRES, Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia, Mr. HASTINGS, Ms. TITUS, Mr. CICILLINE, Mr. BERA, Mr. VARGAS, Mr. CASTRO of Texas, Mr. CONNOLLY, Mrs. LAWRENCE, Mr. EVANS, Mr. SUOZZI, Mr. MORELLE, Mr. BROWN, Mr. KHANNA, Ms. PRESSLEY, Ms. OMAR, Mr. MALINOWSKI, Mr. NEGUSE, and Ms. JACOBS of California) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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RESOLUTION

Calling for renewed, decisive, and robust international collaboration and coordination to fight COVID–19 across Africa.

Whereas the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID–19 a pandemic on March 11, 2020, and by the end of that month, the virus had infected more than 500,000 people and killed nearly 30,000;

Whereas the first COVID–19 case on the African continent was recorded on February 14, 2020, in Egypt, and as of May 2020, the WHO's modeling predicted that if containment measures failed, 29,000,000 to 44,000,000 Af-

ricans could be infected in the first year of the pandemic, with 83,000 to 190,000 deaths;

Whereas, in early October 2020, a new COVID–19 variant was first detected in Nelson Mandela Bay, South Africa, and as of February 1, 2021, the South Africa variant had spread rapidly around the globe, including to the United States;

Whereas COVID–19 is highlighting how interconnected our social, economic, and environmental challenges are, and the United States will not fully emerge from the pandemic until COVID–19 has been contained worldwide, including in Africa;

Whereas leaders across Africa acted swiftly in response to the early spread of COVID–19 cases, repurposing existing health protocols and tools from previous epidemic outbreaks to fight COVID–19;

Whereas the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) warned that shortages of health care professionals in African countries would devastate already fragile health care systems that are unable to meet the unprecedented demands of the COVID–19 pandemic;

Whereas African countries have exhibited varying COVID–19 infection rates and responses, and different testing practices and capabilities among the continent have likely contributed to significant underreporting of COVID–19 confirmed cases and fatalities;

Whereas, as of February 2021, South Africa had reported more than 1,460,000 cases (roughly 40 percent of the total African continent's reported COVID–19 cases) and more than 49,000 COVID–19 related deaths (roughly 48

percent of the African continent's reported COVID–19 deaths);

Whereas across the African continent, COVID–19 has compounded existing education challenges, as schools have closed while limited access to electricity and technological gaps have hindered distance learning;

Whereas responses to COVID–19 by some African governments have raised concerns about democratic backsliding, with some countries postponing elections and violently cracking down on citizens accused of violating lockdown orders;

Whereas according to the WHO, women and girls in Africa are likely to be the hardest hit by health, social, and economic consequences of COVID–19, and women and girls may face a ''shadow pandemic'' of domestic violence, forcing large numbers of girls into early marriage and resulting in increased sexual violence and higher rates of unplanned pregnancies;

Whereas the WHO and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund have warned of an alarming decline in the number of children receiving lifesaving vaccines in Africa and elsewhere around the world, and social distancing and lockdowns to control the spread of COVID–19 have disrupted vaccination campaigns, as well as prevention and treatment programs, including those to treat and prevent HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria;

Whereas aid disruptions and rising food prices linked to the COVID–19 crisis are increasing the needs and vulnerabilities of refugees and internally displaced people across Africa, leading to even greater food insecurity for millions;

Whereas the World Food Programme estimated that in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, food insecurity rose by 1,000,000 to 4,800,000 since the start of the COVID–19 pandemic, and ongoing conflicts, mass displacement, droughts, and locust infestations have further contributed to severe food insecurity in parts of Africa;

Whereas Africa's youth are playing a crucial role to help their communities by fighting misinformation and leading campaigns to fight COVID–19; for example, in Nigeria, a young man disseminated accurate information about the pandemic in more than 60 local languages, and in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, youth activists went door-to-door distributing informational pamphlets on how to stop the spread of COVID–19;

Whereas many migrants and their families rely on remittances as a source of income, and the Brookings Institution reports that remittance to Sub-Saharan Africa will decline by 5.8 percent to $41,000,000,000 in 2021 compared to $44,000,000,000 in 2020 and $48,000,000,000 in 2019; and

Whereas there is a need for a renewed, strategic, and focused approach to United States policy toward Africa, and by focusing United States efforts, working respectfully with our allies, strategic partners, and other stakeholders, and mitigating future economic and security impacts stemming from COVID–19, the United States can protect Africa and the rest of the world's health economic security: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved,* That the House of Representatives—

(1) reaffirms that decreasing the spread of COVID–19 in Africa is in the national interest of the United States;

(2) commends the heroic work of Africa's front-line health workers to keep the continent and the world safe;

(3) calls on the international community to ensure equitable global distribution of personal protective equipment to keep African health care workers safe;

(4) urges the G–20 members, including the United States Government, to—

(A) renew their global public investments and efforts to develop and distribute therapeutics and vaccines to address COVID–19 and prevent further deaths, and for other global health purposes, including continued support for the GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund, multilateral funding institutions, civil society, and new global collaboration initiatives, such as the Access to COVID–19 Tools ACT-Accelerator and the COVAX facility;

(B) increase contributions to concessional lending facilities managed by the International Monetary Fund to support implementation of

COVID–19 containment measures and provide liquidity to African countries over the next 2 years;

(C) amend national remittance plans to cut the cost of remittance fees to close to zero and ensure remittance costs do not exceed the 3 percent called for in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals; and

(D) continue to support efforts, such as the G–20's Debt Service Standstill Initiative to finance debt standstill for African countries, to be followed by fair, transparent, and comprehensive debt restructuring to free up resources to respond to the pandemic and its fallout;

(5) calls on the United States Government aid recipients and donor countries to renew the global fight against hunger, including by contributing to the World Food Program appeal to raise $6,800,000,000 by April 2021 to avert famine during the COVID–19 crisis;

(6) encourages the United States, other donor governments, the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders to—

(A) maintain or increase support to African governments' responses to COVID–19, including their country-specific actionable national deployment and vaccination plans, and to support efforts by the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and the African Union (AU);

(B) align humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development efforts in Africa to respond more effectively and efficiently as COVID–19 exacerbates conditions and drains precious resources; and

(C) increase programming flexibilities, meaningfully engage local organizations, and adopt country-specific approaches to fight COVID–19 by recognizing the unique needs and challenges and enormous size and diversity of the African continent;

(7) urges the United States Government to—

(A) partner with the AU to ensure that United States Government assistance is aligned with the goals of the AU's and Africa CDC's Africa Task Force for Coronavirus to bolster the continentwide COVID–19 recovery response; and

(B) renew the commitment of the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Africa CDC to work collaboratively in order to tackle the continent's health system challenges and ensure that the Africa CDC is well equipped to deliver science-based and quality health care to the continent's more than 1,300,000,000 people; for example, the CDC should continue to embed staff at Africa CDC and continue supporting data analysis, and trainings, among other scientific activities;

(8) urges the United States to prioritize global education including a strong pledge at the Global Partnership for Education replenishment conference;

(9) urges African governments to prioritize education, including by strengthening electrification infrastructure, internet access, and technology to advance and facilitate learning amid the challenges posed by COVID–19;

(10) calls on AU member states, as well as civil society organizations, to—

(A) promote a comprehensive, people- and rights-centered response to COVID–19 by using the outbreak as an opportunity to reaffirm people's rights to equal treatment, dignity, access

to information, health care, and other necessities; and

(B) actively incorporate the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the AU's joint guidance entitled "Seven Possible Actions—Women's Rights and COVID–19" into their COVID–19 response plans; and

(11) encourages African governments, as part of COVID–19 response efforts, to implement inclusive development planning and policymaking that includes open, participatory, and transparent budgeting processes to allow citizens to participate in and monitor budget development and implementation, and to implement procurement, contract, and beneficial ownership transparency to ensure the accountable and effective use of COVID–19 emergency funds.

○

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H. RES. 245 OFFERED BY MS. BASS OF CALIFORNIA

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (commonly referred to as "COVID–19") a pandemic on March 11, 2020;

Whereas the first COVID–19 case on the African continent was recorded on February 14, 2020, in Egypt, and as of March 2021, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) has recorded approximately 4.1 million cases and more than 100,000 deaths;

Whereas, in early October 2020, a new COVID–19 variant was first detected in Nelson Mandela Bay, South Africa, and as of February 1, 2021, the South Africa variant had spread rapidly around the globe, including to the United States;

Whereas the COVID–19 pandemic demonstrates how interconnected United States domestic health and security is with the international community, underscores the importance of continued investments in global health security, and illustrates how the United States will not fully emerge from the pandemic until COVID–19 has been contained worldwide, including in Africa;

Whereas some leaders across Africa acted swiftly in response to the early spread of COVID–19 cases, repurposing ex-

isting health protocols and tools from previous epidemic outbreaks to fight COVID–19;

Whereas shortages of healthcare professionals in African countries have strained already fragile health care systems struggling to meet the unprecedented demands of the COVID–19 pandemic alongside other infectious disease outbreaks;

Whereas African countries have exhibited varying COVID–19 infection rates and limited testing capabilities across the continent have likely contributed to significant under-reporting of COVID–19 cases and fatalities;

Whereas, as of February 2021, South Africa had reported more than 1,460,000 COVID–19 cases (roughly 40 percent of the total African continent's reported COVID–19 cases) and more than 49,000 COVID–19 related deaths (roughly 48 percent of the African continent's reported COVID–19 deaths);

Whereas across the African continent, COVID–19 has compounded existing education challenges, as schools have closed while limited access to electricity and technological gaps have hindered distance learning;

Whereas some African governments have used COVID-19 response measures to delay elections, crack down on civil society, and violently enforce lockdown orders;

Whereas according to the World Health Organization (WHO), women and girls in Africa are likely to be the hardest hit by health, social, and economic consequences of COVID–19;

Whereas WHO and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund have warned of an alarming decline in the number of children receiving lifesaving vac-

cines in Africa and elsewhere around the world, and social distancing and lockdowns to control the spread of COVID–19 have disrupted vaccination campaigns, as well as prevention and treatment programs, including those to treat and prevent HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria;

Whereas aid disruptions, lockdowns and border closures, and rising food prices linked to the COVID–19 crisis are increasing the needs and vulnerabilities of refugees and internally displaced people across Africa, leading to even greater food insecurity for millions;

Whereas the World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, food insecurity rose by 1,000,000 to 4,800,000 since the start of the COVID–19 pandemic, and ongoing conflicts, mass displacement, droughts, and locust infestations have further contributed to severe food insecurity in parts of Africa;

Whereas Africa's youth are playing a crucial role to help their communities by fighting misinformation and leading campaigns to fight COVID–19; for example, in Nigeria, a young man disseminated accurate information about the pandemic in more than 60 local languages, and in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, youth activists went door-to-door distributing informational pamphlets on how to stop the spread of COVID–19;

Whereas many migrants and their families rely on remittances as a source of income, and the Brookings Institution reports that remittance to sub-Saharan Africa will decline by 5.8 percent to $41,000,000,000 in 2021 compared to $44,000,000,000 in 2020 and $48,000,000,000 in 2019;

Whereas as of March 2021, the United States has provided $1.6 billion and appropriated an additional $10 billion to prevent, prepare for, and respond to COVID–19 globally, including $410 million in Africa, and pledged $4 billion to COVID–19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX), the global COVID–19 vaccine facility;

Whereas COVID–19 response funding builds on more than $59 billion of United States investment in global health and global health systems strengthening on the continent over the last two decades, securing United States leadership in global health and as the largest global health donor in Africa by far; and

Whereas there is a need for strong United States engagement with African countries, in coordination with partners and allies, to mitigate future economic, security, and humanitarian impacts stemming from the COVID–19 pandemic: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the following:

1 That the House of Representatives—

2 (1) reaffirms that decreasing the spread of
3 COVID–19 and preventing future COVID–19
4 variants, globally and in Africa, is in the national in-
5 terest of the United States;

6 (2) commends the heroic work of Africa's front-
7 line health workers to keep the continent and the
8 world safe;

(3) urges the Group of Twenty (G–20) members, including the United States Government, to—

(A) increase contributions to concessional lending facilities managed by the International Monetary Fund to support implementation of COVID–19 containment measures and provide liquidity to African countries over the next 2 years;

(B) amend national remittance plans to promote financial inclusion amid the COVID-19 pandemic, and ensure remittance costs do not exceed the 3 percent called for in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals; and

(C) continue to support efforts, such as the G–20's Debt Service Standstill Initiative to finance debt standstill for African countries, to be followed by fair, transparent, and comprehensive debt restructuring to free up resources to respond to the pandemic and its fallout; and

(4) encourages the United States, other donor governments, African governments, the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders to—

(A) continue support for efforts to distribute personal protective equipment, therapeutics and vaccines to combat COVID–19, including continued support for the GAVI Alliance, the Access to COVID–19 Tools ACT-Accelerator, and the COVAX facility and other multilateral funding institutions to prevent backsliding in efforts to combat other infectious diseases;

(B) prioritize COVID–19 impacts on the most vulnerable, including women and girls, displaced populations, and the elderly, and frontline health workers;

(C) prioritize efforts to address the secondary and tertiary impacts of the COVID–19 pandemic, including on livelihoods, food security, education systems, global supply chains, access to secure internet and digital connectivity, and governance and election preparations;

(D) particularly in conflict-affected areas and fragile states, align humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development efforts to mitigate COVID–19 impacts and prevent further

destabilization as a result of the COVID–19 pandemic;

(E) maintain or increase support to coordinate with, as appropriate, African governments' and Ministry of Health COVID–19 response plans, including their country-specific actionable national deployment and vaccination plans, and efforts by the Africa CDC and the African Union; and

(F) meaningfully engage local organizations and build local capacity, implement inclusive and transparent development planning, consider host country buy in and commitment before allocating resources, and adopt flexible, country-specific approaches to fight COVID–19 by recognizing the unique needs and challenges of each country context.

Amend the title so as to read: "Calling for continued and robust international collaboration and coordination to fight COVID–19 across Africa.".

I

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1079

To establish an interagency working group to develop a comprehensive, strategic plan to control locust outbreaks in the East Africa region and address future outbreaks in order to avert mass scale food insecurity and potential political destabilization, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 15, 2021

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself and Ms. BASS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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A BILL

To establish an interagency working group to develop a comprehensive, strategic plan to control locust outbreaks in the East Africa region and address future outbreaks in order to avert mass scale food insecurity and potential political destabilization, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Desert Locust Control Act''.

SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to prioritize efforts to control the ongoing desert locust outbreak in East Africa and other affected regions, mitigate the impacts on food security, economic productivity, and political stability, improve interagency coordination to prevent future outbreaks, and promote resilience in affected countries.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The United States Agency for International Development reports that countries in East Africa are currently suffering the worst desert locust outbreak in decades, which will devour crops and pasture and destroy local livelihoods across the region.

(2) As of December 2020, the Food and Agriculture Organization reported that there were 42 million people experiencing acute food insecurity in East Africa, which numbers are projected to increase if the desert locust outbreak is not controlled.

(3) The desert locust outbreak in East Africa, particularly in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia, is negatively impacting food security, local livelihoods and economic productivity, and may threaten political stability in the region.

(4) Proactive investments now to control the desert locust outbreak could reduce the need for a

much larger United States humanitarian response effort later, as well as support economic and political stability and build resilience in affected countries.

(5) In order to optimize the United States response to the desert locust outbreak, an interagency working group should be established to develop and implement a comprehensive, strategic plan to control the desert locust outbreak in East Africa and other affected regions, mitigate impacts on food security, economic productivity, and political stability and prevent future outbreaks.

SEC. 4. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall establish an interagency working group to coordinate the United States response to the ongoing desert locust outbreak in East Africa and other affected regions, including the development of a comprehensive, strategic plan to control the outbreak, mitigate the impacts on food security, economic productivity, and political stability, and prevent future outbreaks.

(b) MEMBERSHIP.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The interagency working group shall be composed of the following:

(A) Two representatives from the United States Agency for International Development.

(B) One representative from each of the following:

(i) The United States Mission to the United Nations Agencies for Food and Agriculture.

(ii) The National Security Council.

(iii) The Department of State.

(iv) The Department of Defense.

(v) The Department of Agriculture.

(vi) Any other relevant Federal department or agency.

(2) CHAIR.—The President shall designate one of the representatives from the United States Agency for International Development described in paragraph (1)(A) to serve as chair of the interagency working group.

(c) DUTIES.—The interagency working group shall—

(1) assess the scope of the desert locust outbreak in East Africa and other affected regions, including its impact on food security, economic productivity, and political stability in affected countries;

(2) assess the impacts of restrictions relating to the coronavirus disease 2019 (commonly referred to as "COVID–19") pandemic;

(3) monitor the effectiveness of ongoing assistance efforts to control the desert locust outbreak and mitigate its impacts and identify gaps and opportunities for additional support to such programs;

(4) review the effectiveness of regional and multilateral efforts to control the desert locust outbreak and the coordination among relevant United States Government agencies, regional governments, and international organizations, including the World Food Programme and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization; and

(5) not later than 90 days after the establishment of the interagency working group under subsection (a), develop and submit to the President and the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive, strategic plan to control the desert locust outbreak, including a description of efforts to—

(A) improve coordination among relevant United States Government agencies, regional governments, and international organizations, including the World Food Programme and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization;

(B) ensure delivery of necessary assets control the desert locust outbreak and humani-

1 tarian and development assistance to address
2 and mitigate impacts to food security, economic
3 productivity, and political stability; and
4 (C) to the extent practicable, prevent and
5 mitigate future desert locust and other, similar
6 destructive insect outbreaks (such as Fall
7 Armyworm) in Africa and other parts of the
8 world, which require a humanitarian response.
9 (d) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP SUPPORT.—The
10 interagency working group shall continue to meet not less
11 than semi-annually to facilitate implementation of the
12 comprehensive, strategic plan required by subsection
13 (c)(5).
14 (e) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the
15 date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of
16 this Act, or at such time as there is no longer an upsurge
17 in the desert locust outbreak in East Africa, whichever oc-
18 curs earlier.
19 (f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
20 FINED.—In this section, the term ''appropriate congres-
21 sional committees'' means—
22 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
23 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
24 resentatives; and

1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
2 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

○

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1079

OFFERED BY MR. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY

Page 4, line 24, insert at the end before the semicolon the following: ''on efforts to control the desert locust outbreak and mitigate its impacts and in exacerbating food insecurity''.

☒

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1079

OFFERED BY MR. PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Strike subsection (e) of section 4 and insert the following:

1 (e) SUNSET.—This Act shall terminate on the date
2 that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of this
3 Act, or at such time as there is no longer an upsurge in
4 the desert locust outbreak in East Africa, whichever oc-
5 curs earlier.

[116H3763.EH]

.....

(Original Signature of Member)

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. _____

To direct the Federal Government to provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance the representation and leadership of the United States at international standards-setting bodies that set standards for equipment, systems, software, and virtually-defined networks that support 5th and future generations mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. MCCAUL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To direct the Federal Government to provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance the representation and leadership of the United States at international standards-setting bodies that set standards for equipment, systems, software, and virtually-defined networks that support 5th and future generations mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 2021".

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States and its allies and partners should maintain participation and leadership at international standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generations mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure;

(2) the United States should work with its allies and partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure supply chains and networks for 5th and future generations mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and

(3) the maintenance of a high standard of security in telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and its allies and partners is a national security interest of the United States.

SEC. 3. ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP OF UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS-SETTING BODIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish an interagency working group to provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance the representation and leadership of the United States at international standards-set-

1 ting bodies that set standards for equipment, systems,
2 software, and virtually-defined networks that support 5th
3 and future generations mobile telecommunications systems
4 and infrastructure, such as the International Tele-
5 communication Union and the 3rd Generation Partnership
6 Project. The President shall also work with allies and
7 partners, as well as the private sector, to increase produc-
8 tive engagement.

9 (b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The inter-
10 agency working group described in subsection (a) shall—

11 (1) be chaired by the Secretary of State or a
12 designee of the Secretary of State; and

13 (2) consist of the head (or designee) of each
14 Federal department or agency the President deter-
15 mines appropriate.

16 (c) BRIEFING.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
18 after the date of the enactment of this Act and sub-
19 sequently thereafter as provided in paragraph (2),
20 the interagency working group described in sub-
21 section (a) shall provide to the Committee on For-
22 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the
23 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a
24 briefing that shall include—

(A) a strategy to promote United States leadership at international standards-setting bodies for equipment, systems, software, and virtually-defined networks relevant to 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, taking into account the different processes followed by the various international standard-setting bodies;

(B) a strategy for diplomatic engagement with allies and partners to share security risk information and findings pertaining to equipment that supports or is used in 5th and future generations mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure and cooperation on mitigating such risks;

(C) a discussion of China's presence and activities at international standards-setting bodies relevant to 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, including information on the differences in the scope and scale of China's engagement at such bodies compared to engagement by the United States or its allies and partners and the security risks raised by Chinese proposals in such standards-setting bodies; and

(D) a strategy for engagement with private sector communications and information service providers, equipment developers, academia, federally funded research and development centers, and other private-sector stakeholders to propose and develop secure standards for equipment, systems, software, and virtually-defined networks that support 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure.

(2) SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS.—Upon request by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, or as determined appropriate by the chair of the interagency working group described in subsection (a), the interagency working group shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an updated briefing relating to the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph (1).

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1934
OFFERED BY MR. MCCAUL OF TEXAS

Amend section 3 to read as follows:

1 **SEC. 3. ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP**
2 **OF THE UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL**
3 **STANDARDS-SETTING BODIES.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish an
5 interagency working group to work with allies and inter-
6 national partners to increase and align their engagement
7 at multilateral international organizations, such as the
8 International Telecommunications Union (ITU), that ad-
9 dress communications networks, standards, and security,
10 including 5th and future generations mobile telecommuni-
11 cations and infrastructure.

12 (b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The inter-
13 agency working group described in subsection (a) shall—

14 (1) be chaired by the Secretary of State or a
15 designee of the Secretary of State; and

16 (2) consist of the head (or designee) of the De-
17 partment of Commerce and each Federal depart-
18 ment or agency the President determines appro-
19 priate.

(c) FUNCTION.—The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the members of the interagency working group to develop and implement a strategy for diplomatic engagement with allies and partners and monitor engagement by the Government of the People's Republic of China and entities under its ownership, control, or influence at multilateral international organizations described in subsection (a).

(d) BRIEFING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the interagency working group shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a briefing that includes—

(1) a strategy for diplomatic engagement with allies and partners to share security risk information and findings pertaining to equipment that supports or is used in 5th and future generations mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure and cooperation on mitigating such risks; and

(2) a discussion of China's presence and activities at multilateral international organizations described in subsection (a) relevant to 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and

1 infrastructure, including information on the dif-
2 ferences in the scope and scale of China's engage-
3 ment, as well as the success rate of proposals by
4 Chinese entities adopted into standards at such or-
5 ganizations compared to the engagement and success
6 rate of proposals adopted by the United States or its
7 allies and partners, and noting any mandatory do-
8 mestic Chinese standards that are adopted at such
9 organizations.

☒

(Original Signature of Member)

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. _____

To protect Saudi dissidents in the United States, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. CONNOLLY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To protect Saudi dissidents in the United States, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Jamal Khashoggi, a United States resident, Saudi journalist, and Washington Post columnist,

was killed and dismembered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey on October 2, 2018, by at least 14 intelligence officers of the Government of Saudi Arabia. Khashoggi was lured to the consulate under the false cover of needing to address a consular matter. Following the killing, 17 officers from the Saudi intelligence service, or Mabahith, reportedly visited Istanbul and cleansed the crime scene.

(2) At the time of his murder, Khashoggi was living in Virginia under an "O" visa and was in the process of applying for a permanent residency.

(3) A subsequent, highly-credible investigation by the United Nations concluded that Khashoggi's killing was premeditated and that the mission was endorsed, planned, and overseen by senior Saudi officials.

SEC. 3. RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES, DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, AND MAJOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA.

(a) INITIAL PERIOD.—During the 120-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may not sell, authorize a license for the export of, or otherwise transfer any defense articles or defense services, design and construction services, or major de-

1 fense equipment under the Arms Export Control Act (22
2 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) to an intelligence, internal security,
3 or law enforcement agency or instrumentality of the Gov-
4 ernment of Saudi Arabia, or to any person acting as an
5 agent of or on behalf of such agency or instrumentality.
6 (b) SUBSEQUENT PERIODS.—
7 (1) IN GENERAL.—During the 120-day period
8 beginning after the end of the 120-day period de-
9 scribed in subsection (a), and each 120-day period
10 thereafter, the President may not sell, authorize a li-
11 cense for the export of, or otherwise transfer any de-
12 fense articles or services, design and construction
13 services, or major defense equipment under the
14 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.),
15 regardless of the amount of such articles, services,
16 or equipment, to an intelligence, internal security, or
17 law enforcement agency or instrumentality of the
18 Government of Saudi Arabia, or to any person act-
19 ing as an agent of or on behalf of such agency or
20 instrumentality, unless the President has submitted
21 to the chairman and ranking member of the appro-
22 priate congressional committees a certification de-
23 scribed in paragraph (2).
24 (2) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described
25 in this paragraph is a certification that contains a

determination of the President that, during the 120-day period preceding the date of submission of the certification, the Government of Saudi Arabia has not conducted any of the following activities:

(A) Forced repatriation, silencing, or killing of dissidents in other countries.

(B) The unjust imprisonment in Saudi Arabia of United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence or the prohibition on these individuals and their family members from exiting Saudi Arabia.

(C) Torture of detainees in the custody of the Government of Saudi Arabia.

(c) WAIVER.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive the restrictions in this section if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report not later than 15 days before the granting of such waiver that contains—

(A) a determination of the President that such a waiver is in the vital national security interests of the United States; and

(B) a detailed justification for the use of such waiver and the reasons why the restrictions in this section cannot be met.

(2) FORM.—The report required by this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON CONSISTENT PATTERN OF ACTS OF INTIMIDATION OR HARASSMENT DIRECTED AGAINST INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED STATES.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2756) states that "no transfers or letters of offer may be issued, no credits or guarantees may be extended, and no export licenses may be issued under this Act with respect to any country determined by the President to be engaged in a consistent

pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States''.

(2) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act further requires the President to report any such determination promptly to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on—

(1) whether any official of the Government of Saudi Arabia engaged in a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against Jamal Khashoggi or any individual in the United States; and

(2) whether any United States-origin defense articles were used in the activities described in paragraph (1).

(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 5. REPORT AND CERTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO SAUDI DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report covering the three-year period preceding such date of enactment regarding whether and to what extent covered persons used diplomatic credentials, visas, or covered facilities to facilitate monitoring, tracking, surveillance, or harassment of, or harm to, other nationals of Saudi Arabia living in the United States.

(b) CERTIFICATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall, if the President determines that such is the case, submit to the appropriate congres-

sional committees a certification that covered persons are not using diplomatic credentials, visas, or covered facilities to facilitate monitoring, tracking, surveillance, or harassment of, or harm to, other nationals of Saudi Arabia living in the United States during the time period covered by each such certification.

(2) FAILURE TO SUBMIT CERTIFICATION.—If the President does not submit a certification under paragraph (1), the President shall—

(A) close one or more covered facilities for such period of time until the President does submit such a certification; and

(B) submit to the appropriate congressional committee a report that contains—

(i) a detailed explanation of why the President is unable to make such a certification;

(ii) a list and summary of engagements of the United States Government with the Government of Saudi Arabia regarding the use of diplomatic credentials, visas, or covered facilities described in paragraph (1); and

(iii) a description of actions the United States Government has taken or intends to take in response to the use of diplomatic credentials, visas, or covered facilities described in paragraph (1).

(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) and the certification and report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(d) WAIVER.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive the restrictions in this section if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report not later than 15 days before the granting of such waiver that contains—

(A) a determination of the President that such a waiver is in the vital national security interests of the United States; and

(B) a detailed justification for the use of such waiver and the reasons why the restrictions in this section cannot be met.

(2) FORM.—The report required by this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(2) COVERED FACILITY.—The term "covered facility" means a diplomatic or consular facility of Saudi Arabia in the United States.

(3) COVERED PERSON.—The term "covered person" means a national of Saudi Arabia credentialed to a covered facility.

SEC. 6. REPORT ON THE DUTY TO WARN OBLIGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that Intelligence Community Directive 191 provides that—

(1) when an element of the intelligence community of the United States collects or acquires credible and specific information indicating an impending threat of intentional killing, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping directed at a person, the agency must

"warn the intended victim or those responsible for protecting the intended victim, as appropriate"; and

(2) when issues arise with respect to whether the threat information rises to the threshold of "duty to warn", the directive calls for resolution in favor of warning the intended victim.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of other relevant United States intelligence agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report with respect to—

(1) whether and how the intelligence community fulfilled its duty to warn Jamal Khashoggi of threats to his life and liberty pursuant to Intelligence Community Directive 191; and

(2) in the case of the intelligence community not fulfilling its duty to warn as described in paragraph (1), why the intelligence community did not fulfill this duty.

(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(2) DUTY TO WARN.—The term "duty to warn" has the meaning given that term in Intelligence Community Directive 191, as in effect on July 21, 2015.

(3) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term "intelligence community" has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

(4) RELEVANT UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.—The term "relevant United States intelligence agency" means any element of the intelligence community that may have possessed intelligence reporting regarding threats to Jamal Khashoggi.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1392

OFFERED BY MR. CONNOLLY OF VIRGINIA

Strike section 2 and insert the following:

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress finds the following:

3 (1) Jamal Khashoggi, a United States resident,
4 Saudi journalist, and Washington Post columnist,
5 was killed and dismembered in the Saudi consulate
6 in Istanbul, Turkey on October 2, 2018.

7 (2) At the time of his murder, Khashoggi was
8 living in Virginia under an "O" visa and was in the
9 process of applying for a permanent residency.

10 (3) A report by the Office of the Director of
11 National Intelligence (ODNI) found that Saudi Ara-
12 bia's Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman ap-
13 proved an operation in Istanbul, Turkey to capture
14 or kill Khashoggi.

15 (4) The assessment of the ODNI was based on
16 "the Crown Prince's control of decisionmaking in
17 the Kingdom, the direct involvement of a key adviser
18 and members of Muhammad bin Salman's protective
19 detail in the operation, and the Crown Prince's sup-

port for using violent measures to silence dissidents abroad''.

(5) The report also reiterates that ''the Crown Prince has had absolute control of the Kingdom's security and intelligence organizations'' since 2017.

☒

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1392

OFFERED BY MR. MEEKS OF NEW YORK

Strike section 3 and insert the following:

1 **SEC. 3. RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS OF DEFENSE ARTI-**
2 **CLES AND SERVICES, DESIGN AND CON-**
3 **STRUCTION SERVICES, AND MAJOR DEFENSE**
4 **EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA.**

5 (a) INITIAL PERIOD.—During the 120-day period be-
6 ginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the
7 President may not sell, authorize a license for the export
8 of, or otherwise transfer any defense articles or defense
9 services, design and construction services, or major de-
10 fense equipment under the Arms Export Control Act (22
11 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) to an intelligence, internal security,
12 or law enforcement agency or instrumentality of the Gov-
13 ernment of Saudi Arabia, or to any person acting as an
14 agent of or on behalf of such agency or instrumentality.

15 (b) SUBSEQUENT PERIODS.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—During the 120-day period
17 beginning after the end of the 120-day period de-
18 scribed in subsection (a), and each 120-day period
19 thereafter, the President may not sell, authorize a li-
20 cense for the export of, or otherwise transfer any de-

fense articles or services, design and construction services, or major defense equipment under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), regardless of the amount of such articles, services, or equipment, to an intelligence, internal security, or law enforcement agency or instrumentality of the Government of Saudi Arabia, or to any person acting as an agent of or on behalf of such agency or instrumentality, unless the President has submitted to the chairman and ranking member of the appropriate congressional committees a certification described in paragraph (2).

(2) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described in this paragraph is a certification that contains a determination of the President that, during the 120-day period preceding the date of submission of the certification, the United States Government has not determined that the Government of Saudi Arabia has conducted any of the following activities:

(A) Forced repatriation, intimidation, or killing of dissidents in other countries.

(B) The unjust imprisonment in Saudi Arabia of United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence or the

1 prohibition on these individuals and their family
2 members from exiting Saudi Arabia.
3 (C) Torture of detainees in the custody of
4 the Government of Saudi Arabia.
5 (c) EXCEPTION.—The restrictions in this section
6 shall not apply with respect to the sale, authorization of
7 a license for export, or transfer of any defense articles or
8 services, design and construction services, or major de-
9 fense equipment under the Arms Export Control Act (22
10 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) for use in—
11 (1) the defense of the territory of Saudi Arabia
12 from external threats; or
13 (2) the defense of United States military or dip-
14 lomatic personnel or United States facilities located
15 in Saudi Arabia.
16 (d) WAIVER.—
17 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive
18 the restrictions in this section if the President sub-
19 mits to the appropriate congressional committees a
20 report not later than 15 days before the granting of
21 such waiver that contains—
22 (A) a determination of the President that
23 such a waiver is in the vital national security
24 interests of the United States; and

(B) a detailed justification for the use of such waiver and the reasons why the restrictions in this section cannot be met.

(2) FORM.—The report required by this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(e) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the date that is 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

Strike section 5 and insert the following:

SEC. 5. REPORT AND CERTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO SAUDI DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit

1 to the appropriate congressional committees a report cov-
2 ering the three-year period preceding such date of enact-
3 ment regarding whether and to what extent covered per-
4 sons used diplomatic credentials, visas, or covered facilities
5 to facilitate monitoring, tracking, surveillance, or harass-
6 ment of, or harm to, other nationals of Saudi Arabia living
7 in the United States.

8 (b) CERTIFICATION.—

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days
10 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and each
11 120-day period thereafter, the President shall, if the
12 President determines that such is the case, submit
13 to the appropriate congressional committees a cer-
14 tification that the United States Government has
15 not determined covered persons to be using diplo-
16 matic credentials, visas, or covered facilities to facili-
17 tate serious harassment of, or harm to, other nation-
18 als of Saudi Arabia living in the United States dur-
19 ing the time period covered by each such certifi-
20 cation.

21 (2) FAILURE TO SUBMIT CERTIFICATION.—If
22 the President does not submit a certification under
23 paragraph (1), the President shall—

(A) close one or more covered facilities for such period of time until the President does submit such a certification; and

(B) submit to the appropriate congressional committee a report that contains—

(i) a detailed explanation of why the President is unable to make such a certification;

(ii) a list and summary of engagements of the United States Government with the Government of Saudi Arabia regarding the use of diplomatic credentials, visas, or covered facilities described in paragraph (1); and

(iii) a description of actions the United States Government has taken or intends to take in response to the use of diplomatic credentials, visas, or covered facilities described in paragraph (1).

(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) and the certification and report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(d) WAIVER.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive
2 the restrictions in this section if the President sub-
3 mits to the appropriate congressional committees a
4 report not later than 15 days before the granting of
5 such waiver that contains—
6 (A) a determination of the President that
7 such a waiver is in the vital national security
8 interests of the United States; and
9 (B) a detailed justification for the use of
10 such waiver and the reasons why the restric-
11 tions in this section cannot be met.
12 (2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
13 section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
14 may contain a classified annex.
15 (e) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the
16 date that is 3 years after the date of the enactment of
17 this Act.
18 (f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
19 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
20 TEES.—The term ''appropriate congressional com-
21 mittees'' means—
22 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
23 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
24 of the House of Representatives; and

1 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
2 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
3 Senate.
4 (2) COVERED FACILITY.—The term ''covered
5 facility'' means a diplomatic or consular facility of
6 Saudi Arabia in the United States.
7 (3) COVERED PERSON.—The term ''covered
8 person'' means a national of Saudi Arabia
9 credentialed to a covered facility.

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117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 391

To authorize a comprehensive, strategic approach for United States foreign assistance to developing countries to strengthen global health security, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 21, 2021

Mr. CONNOLLY (for himself, Mr. CHABOT, Mrs. WAGNER, Mr. BERA, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Mr. LARSEN of Washington, Ms. BASS, Mrs. BEATTY, Mr. BEYER, Ms. BLUNT ROCHESTER, Ms. BROWNLEY, Mr. CARTWRIGHT, Mr. CASE, Mr. CASTEN, Mr. CICILLINE, Mr. CLEAVER, Mr. COLE, Mr. COOPER, Mr. COSTA, Ms. DEAN, Mr. DEFAZIO, Mr. DEUTCH, Mr. ESPAILLAT, Ms. LOIS FRANKEL of Florida, Mr. VICENTE GONZALEZ of Texas, Mr. HASTINGS, Mrs. HAYES, Ms. HOULAHAN, Ms. JACKSON LEE, Mr. KEATING, Mr. KHANNA, Mr. KILMER, Mr. LANGEVIN, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. LIEU, Mr. LYNCH, Mr. MALINOWSKI, Mr. MCGOVERN, Ms. MENG, Ms. NORTON, Mr. PHILLIPS, Mr. RUSH, Mr. SEAN PATRICK MALONEY of New York, Ms. SEWELL, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. SIRES, Mr. SOTO, Ms. SPANBERGER, Mr. SUOZZI, Ms. TITUS, Mr. TONKO, Mrs. TRAHAN, Mr. TRONE, Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN, Ms. WEXTON, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, and Ms. SÁNCHEZ) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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A BILL

To authorize a comprehensive, strategic approach for United States foreign assistance to developing countries to strengthen global health security, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Global Health Security Act of 2021".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) In December 2009, President Obama released the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, which listed as one of seven objectives "Promote global health security: Increase the availability of and access to knowledge and products of the life sciences that can help reduce the impact from outbreaks of infectious disease whether of natural, accidental, or deliberate origin".

(2) In February 2014, the United States and nearly 30 other nations launched the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) to address several high-priority, global infectious disease threats. The GHSA is a multi-faceted, multi-country initiative intended to accelerate partner countries' measurable capabilities to achieve specific targets to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats, whether naturally occurring, deliberate, or accidental.

(3) In 2015, the United Nations adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which include specific reference to the importance of global

health security as part of SDG 3 "ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages" as follows: "strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks".

(4) On November 4, 2016, President Obama signed Executive Order No. 13747, "Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats".

(5) In October 2017 at the GHSA Ministerial Meeting in Uganda, the United States and more than 40 GHSA member countries supported the "Kampala Declaration" to extend the GHSA for an additional 5 years to 2024.

(6) In December 2017, President Trump released the National Security Strategy, which includes the priority action: "Detect and contain biothreats at their source: We will work with other countries to detect and mitigate outbreaks early to prevent the spread of disease. We will encourage other countries to invest in basic health care systems and to strengthen global health security across the intersection of human and animal health to prevent infectious disease outbreaks".

(7) In September 2018, President Trump released the National Biodefense Strategy, which includes objectives to "strengthen global health security capacities to prevent local bioincidents from becoming epidemics", and "strengthen international preparedness to support international response and recovery capabilities".

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) promote global health security as a core national security interest;

(2) advance the aims of the Global Health Security Agenda;

(3) collaborate with other countries to detect and mitigate outbreaks early to prevent the spread of disease;

(4) encourage other countries to invest in basic resilient and sustainable health care systems; and

(5) strengthen global health security across the intersection of human and animal health to prevent infectious disease outbreaks and combat the growing threat of antimicrobial resistance.

1 **SEC. 4. GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA INTERAGENCY**
2 **REVIEW COUNCIL.**

3 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall establish
4 a Global Health Security Agenda Interagency Review
5 Council (in this section referred to as the "Council") to
6 perform the general responsibilities described in sub-
7 section (c) and the specific roles and responsibilities de-
8 scribed in subsection (e).

9 (b) MEETINGS.—The Council shall meet not less than
10 four times per year to advance its mission and fulfill its
11 responsibilities.

12 (c) GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Council shall
13 be responsible for the following activities:

14 (1) Provide policy-level recommendations to
15 participating agencies on Global Health Security
16 Agenda (GHSA) goals, objectives, and implementa-
17 tion.

18 (2) Facilitate interagency, multi-sectoral en-
19 gagement to carry out GHSA implementation.

20 (3) Provide a forum for raising and working to
21 resolve interagency disagreements concerning the
22 GHSA.

23 (4)(A) Review the progress toward and work to
24 resolve challenges in achieving United States com-
25 mitments under the GHSA, including commitments

1 to assist other countries in achieving the GHSA tar-
2 gets.
3 (B) The Council shall consider, among other
4 issues, the following:
5 (i) The status of United States financial
6 commitments to the GHSA in the context of
7 commitments by other donors, and the con-
8 tributions of partner countries to achieve the
9 GHSA targets.
10 (ii) The progress toward the milestones
11 outlined in GHSA national plans for those
12 countries where the United States Government
13 has committed to assist in implementing the
14 GHSA and in annual work-plans outlining
15 agency priorities for implementing the GHSA.
16 (iii) The external evaluations of United
17 States and partner country capabilities to ad-
18 dress infectious disease threats, including the
19 ability to achieve the targets outlined within the
20 WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool, as
21 well as gaps identified by such external evalua-
22 tions.
23 (d) PARTICIPATION.—The Council shall consist of
24 representatives, serving at the Assistant Secretary level or
25 higher, from the following agencies:

(1) The Department of State.

(2) The Department of Defense.

(3) The Department of Justice.

(4) The Department of Agriculture.

(5) The Department of Health and Human Services.

(6) The Department of Labor.

(7) The Department of Homeland Security.

(8) The Office of Management and Budget.

(9) The United States Agency for International Development.

(10) The Environmental Protection Agency.

(11) The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

(12) The Office of Science and Technology Policy.

(13) The National Institutes of Health.

(14) The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.

(15) Such other agencies as the Council determines to be appropriate.

(e) SPECIFIC ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The heads of agencies described in subsection (d) shall—

1 (A) make the GHSA and its implementa-
2 tion a high priority within their respective agen-
3 cies, and include GHSA-related activities within
4 their respective agencies' strategic planning and
5 budget processes;
6 (B) designate a senior-level official to be
7 responsible for the implementation of this Act;
8 (C) designate, in accordance with sub-
9 section (d), an appropriate representative at the
10 Assistant Secretary level or higher to partici-
11 pate on the Council;
12 (D) keep the Council apprised of GHSA-
13 related activities undertaken within their re-
14 spective agencies;
15 (E) maintain responsibility for agency-re-
16 lated programmatic functions in coordination
17 with host governments, country teams, and
18 GHSA in-country teams, and in conjunction
19 with other relevant agencies;
20 (F) coordinate with other agencies that are
21 identified in this section to satisfy pro-
22 grammatic goals, and further facilitate coordi-
23 nation of country teams, implementers, and do-
24 nors in host countries; and

(G) coordinate across GHSA national plans and with GHSA partners to which the United States is providing assistance.

(2) ADDITIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—In addition to the roles and responsibilities described in paragraph (1), the heads of agencies described in subsection (d) shall carry out their respective roles and responsibilities described in subsections (b) through (i) of section 3 of Executive Order No. 13747 (81 Fed. Reg. 78701; relating to Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats), as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 5. UNITED STATES COORDINATOR FOR GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall appoint an individual to the position of United States Coordinator for Global Health Security, who shall be responsible for the coordination of the interagency process for responding to global health security emergencies. As appropriate, the designee shall coordinate with the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance.

(b) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not less frequently than twice each year, the employee designated under this

1 section shall provide to the appropriate congressional com-
2 mittees a briefing on the responsibilities and activities of
3 the individual under this section.

4 **SEC. 6. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

5 It is the sense of the Congress that, given the complex
6 and multisectoral nature of global health threats to the
7 United States, the President—

8 (1) should consider appointing an individual
9 with significant background and expertise in public
10 health or emergency response management to the
11 position of United States Coordinator for Global
12 Health Security, as required by section 5(a), who is
13 an employee of the National Security Council at the
14 level of Deputy Assistant to the President or higher;
15 and

16 (2) in providing assistance to implement the
17 strategy required under section 7(a), should—

18 (A) coordinate, through a whole-of-govern-
19 ment approach, the efforts of relevant Federal
20 departments and agencies to implement the
21 strategy;

22 (B) seek to fully utilize the unique capa-
23 bilities of each relevant Federal department and
24 agency while collaborating with and leveraging
25 the contributions of other key stakeholders; and

(C) utilize open and streamlined solicitations to allow for the participation of a wide range of implementing partners through the most appropriate procurement mechanisms, which may include grants, contracts, cooperative agreements, and other instruments as necessary and appropriate.

SEC. 7. STRATEGY AND REPORTS.

(a) STRATEGY.—The United States Coordinator for Global Health Security (appointed under section 5(a)) shall coordinate the development and implementation of a strategy to implement the policy aims described in section 3, which shall—

(1) set specific and measurable goals, benchmarks, timetables, performance metrics, and monitoring and evaluation plans that reflect international best practices relating to transparency, accountability, and global health security;

(2) support and be aligned with country-owned global health security policy and investment plans developed with input from key stakeholders, as appropriate;

(3) facilitate communication and collaboration, as appropriate, among local stakeholders in support

of a multi-sectoral approach to global health security;

(4) support the long-term success of programs by building the capacity of local organizations and institutions in target countries and communities;

(5) develop community resilience to infectious disease threats and emergencies;

(6) leverage resources and expertise through partnerships with the private sector, health organizations, civil society, nongovernmental organizations, and health research and academic institutions; and

(7) support collaboration, as appropriate, between United States universities, and public and private institutions in target countries and communities to promote health security and innovation.

(b) COORDINATION.—The President, acting through the United States Coordinator for Global Health Security, shall coordinate, through a whole-of-government approach, the efforts of relevant Federal departments and agencies in the implementation of the strategy required under subsection (a) by—

(1) establishing monitoring and evaluation systems, coherence, and coordination across relevant Federal departments and agencies; and

(2) establishing platforms for regular consultation and collaboration with key stakeholders and the appropriate congressional committees.

(c) STRATEGY SUBMISSION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, in consultation with the head of each relevant Federal department and agency, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy required under subsection (a) that provides a detailed description of how the United States intends to advance the policy set forth in section 3 and the agency-specific plans described in paragraph (2).

(2) AGENCY-SPECIFIC PLANS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include specific implementation plans from each relevant Federal department and agency that describes—

(A) the anticipated contributions of the department or agency, including technical, financial, and in-kind contributions, to implement the strategy; and

(B) the efforts of the department or agency to ensure that the activities and programs carried out pursuant to the strategy are de-

signed to achieve maximum impact and long-term sustainability.

(d) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date on which the strategy required under subsection (a) is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under subsection (c), and not later than October 1 of each year thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the status of the implementation of the strategy.

(2) CONTENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) identify any substantial changes made in the strategy during the preceding calendar year;

(B) describe the progress made in implementing the strategy;

(C) identify the indicators used to establish benchmarks and measure results over time, as well as the mechanisms for reporting such results in an open and transparent manner;

(D) contain a transparent, open, and detailed accounting of expenditures by relevant Federal departments and agencies to implement

1 the strategy, including, to the extent prac-
2 ticable, for each Federal department and agen-
3 cy, the statutory source of expenditures,
4 amounts expended, partners, targeted popu-
5 lations, and types of activities supported;
6 (E) describe how the strategy leverages
7 other United States global health and develop-
8 ment assistance programs;
9 (F) assess efforts to coordinate United
10 States global health security programs, activi-
11 ties, and initiatives with key stakeholders;
12 (G) incorporate a plan for regularly review-
13 ing and updating strategies, partnerships, and
14 programs and sharing lessons learned with a
15 wide range of stakeholders, including key stake-
16 holders, in an open, transparent manner; and
17 (H) describe the progress achieved and
18 challenges concerning the United States Gov-
19 ernment's ability to advance the Global Health
20 Security Agenda across priority countries, in-
21 cluding data disaggregated by priority country
22 using indicators that are consistent on a year-
23 to-year basis and recommendations to resolve,
24 mitigate, or otherwise address the challenges
25 identified therein.

(e) FORM.—The strategy required under subsection (a) and the report required under subsection (d) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 8. COMPLIANCE WITH THE FOREIGN AID TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2016.

Section 2(3) of the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–191; 22 U.S.C. 2394c note) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking "and" at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end and inserting "; and"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

"(E) the Global Health Security Act of 2021.".

SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

1 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations
2 and the Committee on Appropriations of the
3 Senate.
4 (2) GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY.—The term
5 "global health security" means activities supporting
6 epidemic and pandemic preparedness and capabili-
7 ties at the country and global levels in order to mini-
8 mize vulnerability to acute public health events that
9 can endanger the health of populations across geo-
10 graphical regions and international boundaries.

11 **SEC. 10. SUNSET.**

12 This Act, and the amendments made by this Act,
13 (other than section 5) shall cease to be effective on Decem-
14 ber 31, 2025.

○

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 391

OFFERED BY MR. CONNOLLY OF VIRGINIA

Strike sections 2, 3, and 4 and insert the following:

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) In December 2009, President Obama released the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, which listed as one of seven objectives "Promote global health security: Increase the availability of and access to knowledge and products of the life sciences that can help reduce the impact from outbreaks of infectious disease whether of natural, accidental, or deliberate origin".

(2) In February 2014, the United States and nearly 30 other nations launched the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) to address several high-priority, global infectious disease threats. The GHSA is a multi-faceted, multi-country initiative intended to accelerate partner countries' measurable capabilities to achieve specific targets to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats, whether naturally occurring, deliberate, or accidental.

(3) In 2015, the United Nations adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which include specific reference to the importance of global health security as part of SDG 3 "ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages" as follows: "strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks".

(4) On November 4, 2016, President Obama signed Executive Order No. 13747, "Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda to Achieve a World Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats".

(5) In October 2017 at the GHSA Ministerial Meeting in Uganda, the United States and more than 40 GHSA member countries supported the "Kampala Declaration" to extend the GHSA for an additional 5 years to 2024.

(6) In December 2017, President Trump released the National Security Strategy, which includes the priority action: "Detect and contain biothreats at their source: We will work with other countries to detect and mitigate outbreaks early to prevent the spread of disease. We will encourage other countries to invest in basic health care systems

and to strengthen global health security across the intersection of human and animal health to prevent infectious disease outbreaks''.

(7) In September 2018, President Trump released the National Biodefense Strategy, which includes objectives to ''strengthen global health security capacities to prevent local bioincidents from becoming epidemics'', and ''strengthen international preparedness to support international response and recovery capabilities''.

(8) In January 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 13987 (86 Fed. Reg. 7019; relating to Organizing and Mobilizing the United States Government to Provide a Unified and Effective Response to Combat COVID–19 and to Provide United States Leadership on Global Health and Security), as well as National Security Memorandum on United States Global Leadership to Strengthen the International COVID–19 Response and to Advance Global Health Security and Biological Preparedness, which include objectives to strengthen and reform the World Health Organization, increase United States leadership in the global response to COVID–19, and to finance and advance global health security and pandemic preparedness.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to—

(1) promote and invest in global health security and pandemic preparedness as a core national security interest;

(2) advance the aims of the Global Health Security Agenda;

(3) collaborate with other countries to detect and mitigate outbreaks early to prevent the spread of disease;

(4) encourage and support other countries to advance pandemic preparedness by investing in basic resilient and sustainable health care systems; and

(5) strengthen global health security across the intersection of human and animal health to prepare for and prevent infectious disease outbreaks and combat the growing threat of antimicrobial resistance.

SEC. 4. GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA INTERAGENCY REVIEW COUNCIL.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall establish a Global Health Security Agenda Interagency Review Council (in this section referred to as the ''Council'') to perform the general responsibilities described in subsection (c) and the specific roles and responsibilities described in subsection (e).

1 (b) MEETINGS.—The Council shall meet not less than
2 four times per year to advance its mission and fulfill its
3 responsibilities.
4 (c) GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Council shall
5 be responsible for the following activities:
6 (1) Provide policy-level recommendations to
7 participating agencies on Global Health Security
8 Agenda (GHSA) goals, objectives, and implementa-
9 tion, and other international efforts to strengthen
10 pandemic preparedness and response.
11 (2) Facilitate interagency, multi-sectoral en-
12 gagement to carry out GHSA implementation.
13 (3) Provide a forum for raising and working to
14 resolve interagency disagreements concerning the
15 GHSA, and other international efforts to strengthen
16 pandemic preparedness and response.
17 (4)(A) Review the progress toward and work to
18 resolve challenges in achieving United States com-
19 mitments under the GHSA, including commitments
20 to assist other countries in achieving the GHSA tar-
21 gets.
22 (B) The Council shall consider, among other
23 issues, the following:
24 (i) The status of United States financial
25 commitments to the GHSA in the context of

1 commitments by other donors, and the con-
2 tributions of partner countries to achieve the
3 GHSA targets.
4 (ii) The progress toward the milestones
5 outlined in GHSA national plans for those
6 countries where the United States Government
7 has committed to assist in implementing the
8 GHSA and in annual work-plans outlining
9 agency priorities for implementing the GHSA.
10 (iii) The external evaluations of United
11 States and partner country capabilities to ad-
12 dress infectious disease threats, including the
13 ability to achieve the targets outlined within the
14 WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool, as
15 well as gaps identified by such external evalua-
16 tions.
17 (d) PARTICIPATION.—The Council shall be headed by
18 the Assistant to the President for National Security Af-
19 fairs, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal
20 agencies. The Council shall consist of representatives from
21 the following agencies:
22 (1) The Department of State.
23 (2) The Department of Defense.
24 (3) The Department of Justice.
25 (4) The Department of Agriculture.

(5) The Department of Health and Human Services.

(6) The Department of the Treasury.

(7) The Department of Labor.

(8) The Department of Homeland Security.

(9) The Office of Management and Budget.

(10) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(11) The United States Agency for International Development.

(12) The Environmental Protection Agency.

(13) The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

(14) The Office of Science and Technology Policy.

(15) The National Institutes of Health.

(16) The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.

(17) Such other agencies as the Council determines to be appropriate.

(e) SPECIFIC ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The heads of agencies described in subsection (d) shall—

(A) make the GHSA and its implementation and global pandemic preparedness a high

1 priority within their respective agencies, and in-
2 clude GHSA- and global pandemic prepared-
3 ness-related activities within their respective
4 agencies' strategic planning and budget proc-
5 esses;
6 (B) designate a senior-level official to be
7 responsible for the implementation of this Act;
8 (C) designate, in accordance with sub-
9 section (d), an appropriate representative at the
10 Assistant Secretary level or higher to partici-
11 pate on the Council;
12 (D) keep the Council apprised of GHSA-
13 related activities undertaken within their re-
14 spective agencies;
15 (E) maintain responsibility for agency-re-
16 lated programmatic functions in coordination
17 with host governments, country teams, and
18 GHSA in-country teams, and in conjunction
19 with other relevant agencies;
20 (F) coordinate with other agencies that are
21 identified in this section to satisfy pro-
22 grammatic goals, and further facilitate coordi-
23 nation of country teams, implementers, and do-
24 nors in host countries; and

1 (G) coordinate across national health secu-
2 rity action plans and with GHSA and other
3 partners, as appropriate, to which the United
4 States is providing assistance.
5 (2) ADDITIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBIL-
6 ITIES.—In addition to the roles and responsibilities
7 described in paragraph (1), the heads of agencies de-
8 scribed in subsection (d) shall carry out their respec-
9 tive roles and responsibilities described in sub-
10 sections (b) through (i) of section 3 of Executive
11 Order 13747 (81 Fed. Reg. 78701; relating to Ad-
12 vancing the Global Health Security Agenda to
13 Achieve a World Safe and Secure from Infectious
14 Disease Threats), as in effect on the day before the
15 date of the enactment of this Act.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 391

OFFERED BY MR. MCCAUL OF TEXAS

Strike sections 8, 9, and 10 and insert the following:

1 **SEC. 8. ESTABLISHMENT OF FUND FOR GLOBAL HEALTH**
2 **SECURITY AND PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS.**
3 (a) NEGOTIATIONS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A FUND
4 FOR GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AND PANDEMIC PRE-
5 PAREDNESS.—The Secretary of State, in coordination
6 with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of
7 the United States Agency for International Development,
8 the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the
9 heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies
10 as necessary and appropriate, should seek to enter into
11 negotiations with donors, relevant United Nations agen-
12 cies, including the World Health Organization, and other
13 key multilateral stakeholders, for the establishment of—
14 (1) a multilateral, catalytic financing mecha-
15 nism for global health security and pandemic pre-
16 paredness, which may be known as the Fund for
17 Global Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness
18 (in this title referred to as "the Fund"), in accord-
19 ance with the provisions of this section; and

1 (2) an Advisory Board to the Fund in accord-
2 ance with section 9.
3 (b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Fund should be
4 to close critical gaps in global health security and pan-
5 demic preparedness and build capacity in eligible partner
6 countries in the areas of global health security, infectious
7 disease control, and pandemic preparedness, such that
8 it—
9 (1) prioritizes capacity building and financing
10 availability in eligible partner countries;
11 (2) incentivizes countries to prioritize the use of
12 domestic resources for global health security and
13 pandemic preparedness;
14 (3) leverages government, nongovernment, and
15 private sector investments;
16 (4) regularly responds to and evaluates progress
17 based on clear metrics and benchmarks, such as the
18 Joint External Evaluation and Global Health Secu-
19 rity Index;
20 (5) aligns with and complements ongoing bilat-
21 eral and multilateral efforts and financing, including
22 through the World Bank, the World Health Organi-
23 zation, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuber-
24 culosis, and Malaria, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance;
25 and

1 (6) accelerates country compliance with the
2 International Health Regulations (2005) and fulfill-
3 ment of the Global Health Security Agenda 2024
4 Framework, in coordination with the ongoing Joint
5 External Evaluation national action planning proc-
6 ess.
7 (c) EXECUTIVE BOARD.—
8 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Fund should be gov-
9 erned by an Executive Board, which should be com-
10 posed of not more than 20 representatives of donor
11 governments, foundations, academic institutions,
12 civil society, and the private sector that meet a min-
13 imum threshold in annual contributions and agree to
14 uphold transparency measures.
15 (2) DUTIES.—The Executive Board should be
16 charged with approving strategies, operations, and
17 grant-making authorities, such that it is able to con-
18 duct effective fiduciary, monitoring, and evaluation
19 efforts, and other oversight functions. In addition,
20 the Executive Board should—
21 (A) be comprised only of contributors to
22 the Fund at not less than the minimum thresh-
23 old to be established pursuant to paragraph (1);

(B) determine operational procedures such that the Fund is able to effectively fulfill its mission; and

(C) provide oversight and accountability for the Fund in collaboration with the Inspector General to be established pursuant to section 10(e)(1)(A).

(3) COMPOSITION.—The Executive Board should include—

(A) representatives of the governments of founding permanent member countries who, in addition to the requirements in paragraph (1), qualify based upon meeting an established initial contribution threshold, which should be not less than 10 percent of total initial contributions, and a demonstrated commitment to supporting the International Health Regulations (2005);

(B) term members, who are from academic institutions, civil society, and the private sector and are selected by the permanent members on the basis of their experience and commitment to innovation, best practices, and the advancement of global health security objectives; and

(C) representatives of the World Health Organization, and the chair of the Global Health Security Steering Group.

(4) QUALIFICATIONS.—Individuals appointed to the Executive Board should have demonstrated knowledge and experience across a variety of sectors, including human and animal health, agriculture, development, defense, finance, research, and academia.

(5) CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.—

(A) TECHNICAL EXPERTS.—The Executive Board may include independent technical experts, provided they are not affiliated with or employed by a recipient country or organization.

(B) MULTILATERAL BODIES AND INSTITUTIONS.—Executive Board members appointed under paragraph (3)(C) should recuse themselves from matters presenting conflicts of interest, including financing decisions relating to such bodies and institutions.

(6) UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—

(i) FOUNDING PERMANENT MEMBER.—The Secretary of State shall seek to

establish the United States as a founding permanent member of the Fund.

(ii) COORDINATOR OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES TO ADVANCE GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY.—The United States shall be represented on the Executive Board by an officer or employee of the United States appointed by the President.

(B) EFFECTIVE AND TERMINATION DATES.—

(i) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This paragraph shall take effect upon the date the Secretary of State, certifies and transmits to Congress an agreement establishing the Fund.

(ii) TERMINATION DATE.—The membership established pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall terminate upon the date of termination of the Fund.

(7) REMOVAL PROCEDURES.—The Fund should establish procedures for the removal of members of the Executive Board who engage in a consistent pattern of human rights abuses, fail to uphold global health data transparency requirements, or otherwise

1 violate the established standards of the Fund, in-
2 cluding in relation to corruption.
3 (8) ENFORCEABILITY.—Any agreement con-
4 cluded under the authorities provided by this section
5 shall be legally effective and binding upon the
6 United States, as may be provided in the agreement,
7 upon—
8 (A) the enactment of appropriate imple-
9 menting legislation which provides for the ap-
10 proval of the specific agreement or agreements,
11 including attachments, annexes, and supporting
12 documentation, as appropriate; or
13 (B) if concluded and submitted as a treaty,
14 receiving the necessary consent of the Senate.
15 (9) ELIGIBLE PARTNER COUNTRY DEFINED.—
16 In this section, the term ''eligible partner country''
17 means a country with demonstrated—
18 (A) need, as identified through the Joint
19 External Evaluation process, the Global Health
20 Security Index classification of health systems,
21 national action plans for health security, and
22 other complementary or successor indicators of
23 global health security and pandemic prepared-
24 ness; and

(B) commitment to transparency, including budget and global health data transparency, complying with the International Health Regulations (2005), investing in domestic health systems, and achieving measurable results, and in which the Fund for Global Health Security and Pandemic Preparedness established under this section may finance global health security and pandemic preparedness assistance programs under this Act.

SEC. 9. FUND AUTHORITIES.

(a) PROGRAM OBJECTIVES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out the purpose set forth in section 8, the Fund, acting through the Executive Board, should provide grants, including challenge grants, technical assistance, concessional lending, catalytic investment funds, and other innovative funding mechanisms, as appropriate, to—

(A) help eligible partner countries close critical gaps in health security, as identified through the Joint External Evaluation process, the Global Health Security Index classification of health systems, and national action plans for health security and other complementary or

1 successor indicators of global health security
2 and pandemic preparedness; and
3 (B) support measures that enable such
4 countries, at both national and sub-national lev-
5 els, and in partnership with civil society and the
6 private sector, to strengthen and sustain resil-
7 ient health systems and supply chains with the
8 resources, capacity, and personnel required to
9 prevent, detect, mitigate, and respond to infec-
10 tious disease threats before they become
11 pandemics.
12 (2) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.—The activities to
13 be supported by the Fund should include efforts
14 to—
15 (A) enable eligible partner countries to for-
16 mulate and implement national health security
17 and pandemic preparedness action plans, ad-
18 vance action packages under the Global Health
19 Security Agenda, and adopt and uphold com-
20 mitments under the International Health Regu-
21 lations (2005) and other related international
22 health agreements, as appropriate;
23 (B) support global health security budget
24 planning in eligible partner countries, including

1 training in financial management and budget
2 and global health data transparency;
3 (C) strengthen the health security work-
4 force, including hiring, training, and deploying
5 experts to improve frontline preparedness for
6 emerging epidemic and pandemic threats;
7 (D) improve infection control and the pro-
8 tection of healthcare workers within healthcare
9 settings;
10 (E) combat the threat of antimicrobial re-
11 sistance;
12 (F) strengthen laboratory capacity and
13 promote biosafety and biosecurity through the
14 provision of material and technical assistance;
15 (G) reduce the risk of bioterrorism,
16 zoonotic disease spillover, and accidental bio-
17 logical release;
18 (H) build technical capacity to manage
19 global health security related supply chains, in-
20 cluding for personal protective equipment, oxy-
21 gen, testing reagents, and other lifesaving sup-
22 plies, through effective forecasting, procure-
23 ment, warehousing, and delivery from central
24 warehouses to points of service in both the pub-
25 lic and private sectors;

(I) enable bilateral, regional, and international partnerships and cooperation, including through pandemic early warning systems and emergency operations centers, to identify and address transnational infectious disease threats exacerbated by natural and man-made disasters, human displacement, and zoonotic infection;

(J) establish partnerships for the sharing of best practices and enabling eligible countries to meet targets and indicators under the Joint External Evaluation process, the Global Health Security Index classification of health systems, and national action plans for health security relating to the detection, treatment, and prevention of neglected tropical diseases;

(K) build the technical capacity of eligible partner countries to prepare for and respond to second order development impacts of infectious disease outbreaks, while accounting for the differentiated needs and vulnerabilities of marginalized populations;

(L) develop and utilize metrics to monitor and evaluate programmatic performance and identify best practices, including in accordance

with Joint External Evaluation benchmarks, Global Health Security Agenda targets, and Global Health Security Index indicators;

(M) develop and deploy mechanisms to enhance the transparency and accountability of global health security and pandemic preparedness programs and data, in compliance with the International Health Regulations (2005), including through the sharing of trends, risks, and lessons learned; and

(N) develop and implement simulation exercises, produce and release after action reports, and address related gaps.

(3) IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAM OBJECTIVES.—In carrying out the objectives of paragraph (1), the Fund should work to eliminate duplication and waste by upholding strict transparency and accountability standards and coordinating its programs and activities with key partners working to advance global health security and pandemic preparedness, including—

(A) governments, civil society, faith-based, and nongovernmental organizations, research and academic institutions, and private sector entities in eligible partner countries;

1 (B) the pandemic early warning systems
2 and international emergency operations centers
3 to be established under title II;
4 (C) the World Health Organization;
5 (D) the Global Health Security Agenda;
6 (E) the Global Health Security Initiative;
7 (F) the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tu-
8 berculosis, and Malaria;
9 (G) the United Nations Office for the Co-
10 ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNICEF,
11 and other relevant funds, programs, and spe-
12 cialized agencies of the United Nations;
13 (H) Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance;
14 (I) the Coalition for Epidemic Prepared-
15 ness Innovations (CEPI);
16 (J) the Global Polio Eradication Initiative;
17 and
18 (K) the Coordinator of United States Gov-
19 ernment Activities to Advance Global Health
20 Security and Diplomacy, established pursuant
21 to section 103.
22 (b) PRIORITY.—In providing assistance under this
23 section, the Fund should give priority to low-and lower-
24 middle income countries with—

(1) low scores on the Global Health Security Index classification of health systems;

(2) measurable gaps in global health security and pandemic preparedness identified under Joint External Evaluations and national action plans for health security;

(3) demonstrated political and financial commitment to pandemic preparedness; and

(4) demonstrated commitment to upholding global health budget and data transparency and accountability standards, complying with the International Health Regulations (2005), investing in domestic health systems, and achieving measurable results.

(c) ELIGIBLE GRANT RECIPIENTS.—Governments and nongovernmental organizations should be eligible to receive grants as described in this section.

SEC. 10. FUND ADMINISTRATION.

(a) APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR.—The Executive Board of the Fund should appoint an Administrator who should be responsible for managing the day-to-day operations of the Fund.

(b) AUTHORITY TO SOLICIT AND ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS.—The Fund should be authorized to solicit and accept contributions from governments, the private sector,

1 foundations, individuals, and nongovernmental entities of
2 all kinds.

3 (c) ACCOUNTABILITY OF FUNDS AND CRITERIA FOR
4 PROGRAMS.—As part of the negotiations described in sec-
5 tion 8(a), the Secretary of the State, shall, consistent with
6 subsection (d)—

7 (1) take such actions as are necessary to ensure
8 that the Fund will have in effect adequate proce-
9 dures and standards to account for and monitor the
10 use of funds contributed to the Fund, including the
11 cost of administering the Fund; and

12 (2) seek agreement on the criteria that should
13 be used to determine the programs and activities
14 that should be assisted by the Fund.

15 (d) SELECTION OF PARTNER COUNTRIES, PROJECTS,
16 AND RECIPIENTS.—The Executive Board should estab-
17 lish—

18 (1) eligible partner country selection criteria, to
19 include transparent metrics to measure and assess
20 global health security and pandemic preparedness
21 strengths and vulnerabilities in countries seeking as-
22 sistance;

23 (2) minimum standards for ensuring eligible
24 partner country ownership and commitment to long-

1 term results, including requirements for domestic
2 budgeting, resource mobilization, and co-investment;
3 (3) criteria for the selection of projects to re-
4 ceive support from the Fund;
5 (4) standards and criteria regarding qualifica-
6 tions of recipients of such support;
7 (5) such rules and procedures as may be nec-
8 essary for cost-effective management of the Fund;
9 and
10 (6) such rules and procedures as may be nec-
11 essary to ensure transparency and accountability in
12 the grant-making process.
13 (e) ADDITIONAL TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNT-
14 ABILITY REQUIREMENTS.—
15 (1) INSPECTOR GENERAL.—
16 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State
17 shall seek to ensure that the Fund maintains
18 an independent Office of the Inspector General
19 and ensure that the office has the requisite re-
20 sources and capacity to regularly conduct and
21 publish, on a publicly accessible website, rig-
22 orous financial, programmatic, and reporting
23 audits and investigations of the Fund and its
24 grantees.

1 (B) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CORRUP-
2 TION.—It is the sense of Congress that—
3 (i) corruption within global health
4 programs contribute directly to the loss of
5 human life and cannot be tolerated; and
6 (ii) in making financial recoveries re-
7 lating to a corrupt act or criminal conduct
8 under a grant, as determined by the In-
9 spector General, the responsible grant re-
10 cipient should be assessed at a recovery
11 rate of up to 150 percent of such loss.
12 (2) ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.—The Sec-
13 retary of State shall seek to ensure the Fund estab-
14 lishes, maintains, and makes publicly available a sys-
15 tem to track the administrative and management
16 costs of the Fund on a quarterly basis.
17 (3) FINANCIAL TRACKING SYSTEMS.—The Sec-
18 retary of State shall ensure that the Fund estab-
19 lishes, maintains, and makes publicly available a sys-
20 tem to track the amount of funds disbursed to each
21 grant recipient and sub-recipient during a grant's
22 fiscal cycle.
23 (4) EXEMPTION FROM DUTIES AND TAXES.—
24 The Secretary should ensure that the Fund adopts
25 rules that condition grants upon agreement by the

1 relevant national authorities in an eligible partner
2 country to exempt from duties and taxes all products
3 financed by such grants, including procurements by
4 any principal or sub-recipient for the purpose of car-
5 rying out such grants.

6 **SEC. 11. FUND ADVISORY BOARD.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—There should be an Advisory
8 Board to the Fund.

9 (b) APPOINTMENTS.—The members of the Advisory
10 Board should be composed of—

11 (1) individuals with experience and leadership
12 in the fields of development, global health, epidemi-
13 ology, medicine, biomedical research, and social
14 sciences; and

15 (2) representatives of relevant United Nations
16 agencies, including the World Health Organization,
17 and nongovernmental organizations with on-the-
18 ground experience in implementing global health
19 programs in low and lower-middle income countries.

20 (c) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Advisory Board should
21 provide advice and guidance to the Executive Board of the
22 Fund on the development and implementation of programs
23 and projects to be assisted by the Fund and on leveraging
24 donations to the Fund.

(d) PROHIBITION ON PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except for travel expenses (including per diem in lieu of subsistence), no member of the Advisory Board should receive compensation for services performed as a member of the Board.

(2) UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including an international agreement), a representative of the United States on the Advisory Board may not accept compensation for services performed as a member of the Board, except that such representative may accept travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, while away from the representative's home or regular place of business in the performance of services for the Board.

(e) CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.—Members of the Advisory Board should be required to disclose any potential conflicts of interest prior to serving on the Advisory Board.

SEC. 12. REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON THE FUND.

(a) STATUS REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United

1 States Agency for International Development, and the
2 heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies,
3 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
4 a report detailing the progress of international negotia-
5 tions to establish the Fund.

6 (b) ANNUAL REPORT.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after
8 the date of the establishment of the Fund, and an-
9 nually thereafter for the duration of the Fund, the
10 Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate
11 congressional committees a report on the Fund.

12 (2) REPORT ELEMENTS.—The report shall in-
13 clude a description of—

14 (A) the goals of the Fund;

15 (B) the programs, projects, and activities
16 supported by the Fund;

17 (C) private and governmental contributions
18 to the Fund; and

19 (D) the criteria utilized to determine the
20 programs and activities that should be assisted
21 by the Fund.

22 (c) GAO REPORT ON EFFECTIVENESS.—Not later
23 than 2 years after the date that the Fund comes into ef-
24 fect, the Comptroller General of the United States shall

1 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-
2 port evaluating the effectiveness of the Fund, including—
3 (1) the effectiveness of the programs, projects,
4 and activities supported by the Fund; and
5 (2) an assessment of the merits of continued
6 United States participation in the Fund.

7 **SEC. 13. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.**

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to submission of the cer-
9 tification under this section, the President is authorized
10 to make available for United States contributions to the
11 Fund such funds as may be authorized to be made avail-
12 able for such purpose.
13 (b) NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of State shall no-
14 tify the appropriate congressional committees not later
15 than 15 days in advance of making a contribution to the
16 Fund, including—
17 (1) the amount of the proposed contribution;
18 (2) the total of funds contributed by other do-
19 nors; and
20 (3) the national interests served by United
21 States participation in the Fund.
22 (c) LIMITATION.—At no point during the five years
23 after enactment of this Act shall a United States contribu-
24 tion to the Fund cause the cumulative total of United

1 States contributions to the Fund to exceed 33 percent of
2 the total contributions to the Fund from all sources.
3 (d) WITHHOLDINGS.—
4 (1) SUPPORT FOR ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL
5 TERRORISM.—If at any time the Secretary of State
6 determines that the Fund has provided assistance to
7 a country, the government of which the Secretary of
8 State has determined, for purposes of section 620A
9 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
10 2371) has repeatedly provided support for acts of
11 international terrorism, the United States shall with-
12 hold from its contribution to the Fund for the next
13 fiscal year an amount equal to the amount expended
14 by the Fund to the government of such country.
15 (2) EXCESSIVE SALARIES.—If at any time dur-
16 ing the five years after enactment of this Act, the
17 Secretary of State determines that the salary of any
18 individual employed by the Fund exceeds the salary
19 of the Vice President of the United States for that
20 fiscal year, then the United States should withhold
21 from its contribution for the next fiscal year an
22 amount equal to the aggregate amount by which the
23 salary of each such individual exceeds the salary of
24 the Vice President of the United States.

(3) ACCOUNTABILITY CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of State may withhold not more than 20 percent of planned United States contributions to the Fund until the Secretary certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Fund has established procedures to provide access by the Office of Inspector General of the Department of State, as cognizant Inspector General, the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Comptroller General of the United States to the Fund's financial data and other information relevant to United States contributions to the Fund (as determined by the Inspector General of the Department of State, in consultation with the Secretary of State).

SEC. 14. COMPLIANCE WITH THE FOREIGN AID TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2016.

Section 2(3) of the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–191; 22 U.S.C. 2394c note) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking "and" at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end and inserting "; and"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

"(E) the Global Health Security Act of 2021.".

SEC. 15. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional Committees" means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

(2) GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY.—The term "global health security" means activities supporting epidemic and pandemic preparedness and capabilities at the country and global levels in order to minimize vulnerability to acute public health events that can endanger the health of populations across geographical regions and international boundaries.

SEC. 16. SUNSET.

This Act, and the amendments made by this Act shall cease to be effective 5 fiscal years after the enactment of this Act.

☒

AMENDMENT

OFFERED BY MR. PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT OF OHIO

[H.R. 391]

At the end of section 7(c), add the following:

1 (3) DETERMINATION.—The report required
2 under paragraph (1) shall include—
3 (A) a determination of the President, act-
4 ing through the United States Coordinator for
5 Global Health Security, which may be sub-
6 mitted in a classified annex, on the extent and
7 scope of gain-of-function research conducted
8 within research facilities in the People's Repub-
9 lic of China, particularly at the Wuhan Insti-
10 tute of Virology; and
11 (B) a strategy for ensuring maximum
12 readiness against future pandemics in light of
13 the People's Republic of China's historic refusal
14 to cooperate on issues of global health security.

☒

AMENDMENT

OFFERED BY MR. PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT OF OHIO

[H.R. 391]

At the end of section 7(c), add the following:

(3) DETERMINATION.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The President, in collaboration with the Director of National Intelligence, shall include in the initial report required under paragraph (1) a determination as to the likelihood of the SARS-CoV-2 virus leaking from a laboratory within the People's Republic of China.

(B) FORM.—The determination required under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may be included in a classified annex if the President determines it to be in the national security interests of the United States.

☒

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 391

OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT OF OHIO

Strike section 7 and insert the following:

SEC. 7. STRATEGY AND REPORTS.

(a) STRATEGY.—The President shall coordinate the development and implementation of a strategy to implement the policy aims described in section 3, which shall—

(1) seek to strengthen United States diplomatic leadership and improve the effectiveness of United States foreign assistance for global health security to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats, including through advancement of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), the International Health Regulations (2005), and other relevant frameworks that contribute to global health security and pandemic preparedness;

(2) establish specific and measurable goals, benchmarks, timetables, performance metrics, and monitoring and evaluation plans for United States foreign assistance for global health security that promote learning and reflect international best practices relating to global health security, transparency, and accountability;

(3) establish mechanisms to improve coordination and avoid duplication of effort between the United States Government and partner countries, donor countries, the private sector, multilateral organizations, and other key stakeholders;

(4) prioritize working with partner countries with demonstrated—

(A) need, as identified through the Joint External Evaluation process, the Global Health Security Index classification of health systems, national action plans for health security, GHSA Action Packages, and other complementary or successor indicators of global health security and pandemic preparedness; and

(B) commitment to transparency, including budget and global health data transparency, complying with the International Health Regulations (2005), investing in domestic health systems, and achieving measurable results;

(5) reduce long-term reliance upon United States foreign assistance for global health security by promoting partner country ownership, improved domestic resource mobilization, co-financing, and appropriate national budget allocations for global

health security and pandemic preparedness and response;

(6) assist partner countries in building the technical capacity of relevant ministries, systems, and networks to prepare, execute, monitor, and evaluate effective national action plans for health security, including mechanisms to enhance budget and global health data transparency, as necessary and appropriate;

(7) support and be aligned with country-owned global health security policy and investment plans developed with input from key stakeholders, as appropriate;

(8) facilitate communication and collaboration, as appropriate, among local stakeholders in support of a multi-sectoral approach to global health security;

(9) support the long-term success of programs by building the capacity of local organizations and institutions in target countries and communities;

(10) develop community resilience to infectious disease threats and emergencies;

(11) support global health budget and workforce planning in partner countries, including train-

ing in financial management and budget and global health data transparency;

(12) align United States foreign assistance for global health security with national action plans for health security in partner countries, developed with input from key stakeholders, including the private sector, to the greatest extent practicable and appropriate;

(13) strengthen linkages between complementary bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance programs, including efforts of the World Bank, the World Health Organization, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, that contribute to the development of more resilient health systems and supply chains in partner countries with the capacity, resources, and personnel required to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease threats;

(14) support innovation and public-private partnerships to improve pandemic preparedness and response, including for the development and deployment of effective, accessible, and affordable infectious disease tracking tools, diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines;

(15) support collaboration with and among relevant public and private research entities engaged in global health security; and

(16) support collaboration between United States universities and public and private institutions in partner countries that promote global health security and innovation.

(b) STRATEGY SUBMISSION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, in consultation with the head of each relevant Federal department and agency, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy required under subsection (a) that provides a detailed description of how the United States intends to advance the policy set forth in section 3 and the agency-specific plans described in paragraph (2).

(2) AGENCY-SPECIFIC PLANS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include specific implementation plans from each relevant Federal department and agency that describes—

(A) the anticipated contributions of the department or agency, including technical, financial, and in-kind contributions, to implement the strategy; and

(B) the efforts of the department or agency to ensure that the activities and programs carried out pursuant to the strategy are designed to achieve maximum impact and long-term sustainability.

(c) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date on which the strategy required under subsection (a) is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under subsection (b), and not later than October 1 of each year thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the status of the implementation of the strategy.

(2) CONTENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall—

(A) identify any substantial changes made in the strategy during the preceding calendar year;

(B) describe the progress made in implementing the strategy;

(C) identify the indicators used to establish benchmarks and measure results over time, as well as the mechanisms for reporting such results in an open and transparent manner;

(D) contain a transparent, open, and detailed accounting of expenditures by relevant Federal departments and agencies to implement the strategy, including, to the extent practicable, for each Federal department and agency, the statutory source of expenditures, amounts expended, partners, targeted populations, and types of activities supported;

(E) describe how the strategy leverages other United States global health and development assistance programs and bilateral and multilateral institutions;

(F) assess efforts to coordinate United States global health security programs, activities, and initiatives with key stakeholders;

(G) incorporate a plan for regularly reviewing and updating strategies, partnerships, and programs and sharing lessons learned with a wide range of stakeholders, including key stakeholders, in an open, transparent manner; and

(H) describe the progress achieved and challenges concerning the United States Government's ability to advance GHSA and pandemic preparedness, including data disaggregated by priority country using indica-

tors that are consistent on a year-to-year basis and recommendations to resolve, mitigate, or otherwise address the challenges identified therein.

(d) FORM.—The strategy required under subsection (a) and the report required under subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

☒

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 391

OFFERED BY MR. PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA

At the end of the bill, add the following:

1 **SEC. __. LIMITATION.**

2 None of the funds made available to carry out this
3 Act may be used to make contributions to the World
4 Health Organization until the World Health Organization
5 undertakes organization-specific reforms highlighted in
6 the 2020 China Task Force Report.

[~116H6334RFS]

.....

(Original Signature of Member)

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. _____

To authorize United States participation in the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. BERA introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To authorize United States participation in the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Securing America From Epidemics Act".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Due to increasing population and population density, human mobility, and ecological change, emerging infectious diseases pose a real and growing threat to global health security.

(2) While vaccines can be the most effective tools to protect against infectious disease, the absence of vaccines for a new or emerging infectious disease with epidemic potential is a major health security threat globally, posing catastrophic potential human and economic costs.

(3) The COVID–19 pandemic has infected more than 119,960,700 individuals and has killed at least 2,656,822 people worldwide, and it is likely that unreported cases and deaths are significant.

(4) Even regional outbreaks can have enormous human costs and substantially disrupt the global economy and cripple regional economies. The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa killed more than 11,000 and cost $2,800,000,000 in losses in the affected countries alone.

(5) While the need for vaccines to address emerging epidemic threats is acute, markets to drive the necessary development of vaccines to address them—a complex and expensive undertaking—are very often critically absent. Also absent are mecha-

nisms to ensure access to those vaccines by those who need them when they need them.

(6) To address this global vulnerability and the deficit of political commitment, institutional capacity, and funding, in 2017, several countries and private partners launched the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). CEPI's mission is to stimulate, finance, and coordinate development of vaccines for high-priority, epidemic-potential threats in cases where traditional markets do not exist or cannot create sufficient demand.

(7) Through funding of partnerships, CEPI seeks to bring priority vaccines candidates through the end of phase II clinical trials, as well as support vaccine platforms that can be rapidly deployed against emerging pathogens.

(8) CEPI supported the manufacturing of the United States-developed Moderna COVID–19 vaccine during its Phase 1 clinical trial, and CEPI has initiated at least 12 partnerships to develop vaccines against COVID–19.

(9) CEPI is co-leading COVAX, the vaccines pillar of the ACT–Accelerator, which is a global collaboration to quickly produce and equitably dis-

1 tribute safe and effective vaccines and therapeutics
2 for COVID–19.
3 (10) Support for and participation in CEPI is
4 an important part of the United States own health
5 security and biodefense and is in the national inter-
6 est, complementing the work of many Federal agen-
7 cies and providing significant value through global
8 partnership and burden-sharing.

9 **SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR UNITED STATES PARTICIPA-**
10 **TION.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States is hereby au-
12 thorized to participate in the Coalition for Epidemic Pre-
13 paredness Innovations (''Coalition'').
14 (b) DESIGNATION.—The President is authorized to
15 designate an employee of the relevant Federal department
16 or agency providing the majority of United States con-
17 tributions to the Coalition, who should demonstrate knowl-
18 edge and experience in the fields of development and pub-
19 lic health, epidemiology, or medicine, to serve—
20 (1) on the Investors Council of the Coalition;
21 and
22 (2) if nominated by the President, on the Board
23 of Directors of the Coalition, as a representative of
24 the United States.

1 (c) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 180
2 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Presi-
3 dent shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
4 mittees a report that includes the following:
5 (1) The United States planned contributions to
6 the Coalition and the mechanisms for United States
7 participation in such Coalition.
8 (2) The manner and extent to which the United
9 States shall participate in the governance of the Co-
10 alition.
11 (3) How participation in the Coalition supports
12 relevant United States Government strategies and
13 programs in health security and biodefense, includ-
14 ing—
15 (A) the Global Health Security Strategy
16 required by section 7058(c)(3) of division K of
17 the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018
18 (Public Law 115–141);
19 (B) the applicable revision of the National
20 Biodefense Strategy required by section 1086 of
21 the National Defense Authorization Act for Fis-
22 cal Year 2017 (6 U.S.C. 104); and
23 (C) any other relevant decision-making
24 process for policy, planning, and spending in
25 global health security, biodefense, or vaccine

and medical countermeasures research and development.

(d) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated under chapters 1 and 10 of part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) are authorized to be made available for United States contributions to the Coalition.

(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term ''appropriate congressional committees'' means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2118

OFFERED BY MR. PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Add at the end the following:

1 **SEC. ___. LIMITATION.**

2 The authorization provided under section 3 shall not
3 take effect until the date on which the Scientific Advisory
4 Committee of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness In-
5 novations offers an invitation to the Agency Executive of
6 the Taiwan Centers for Disease Centers to join the Sci-
7 entific Advisory Committee, with full voting and
8 participatory rights as other members.

(Original Signature of Member)

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. _____

To impose sanctions with respect to foreign persons listed in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence report titled "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi", dated February 11, 2021.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. MALINOWSKI introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To impose sanctions with respect to foreign persons listed in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence report titled "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi", dated February 11, 2021.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Saudi Arabia Accountability for Gross Violations of Human Rights Act".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) On October 2, 2018, Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered by Saudi government agents in Istanbul, having reportedly been lured out of the United States by Saudi diplomatic officials in Washington, D.C. and monitored through surveillance spyware.

(2) On July 25, 2019, the House of Representatives passed by a margin of 405-7 the Saudi Arabia Human Rights and Accountability Act of 2019, which required—

(A) an unclassified report by the Director of National Intelligence on parties responsible for Khashoggi's murder, a requirement ultimately inserted into and passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020;

(B) visa sanctions on all persons identified in such report; and

(C) a report on human rights on Saudi Arabia.

(3) On February 26, 2021, the Director of National Intelligence released the report produced pursuant to congressional direction, directly implicating Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and

other senior Saudi officials in the planning and direction of Khashoggi's murder.

(4) Section 7031(c) of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116–260) requires the Secretary of State to deny entry into the United States of ''officials of foreign governments and their immediate family members about whom the Secretary of State has credible information have been involved, directly or indirectly, in. . . a gross violation of human rights''.

(5) The Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) prohibits weapons transfers to foreign countries determined by the President to be engaged in a ''pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States''.

(6) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) directs the President to formulate and conduct international security assistance programs of the United States in a manner which will ''avoid identification of the United States, through such programs, with governments which deny to their people internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms''.

(7) Secretary of State Antony Blinken has affirmed the United States national interest in pre-

venting authoritarian foreign governments from reaching beyond their borders to intimidate or harm persons within the United States, stating that: "As a matter of safety for all within our borders, perpetrators targeting perceived dissidents on behalf of any foreign government should not be permitted to reach American soil. . . We have made absolutely clear that extraterritorial threats and assaults by Saudi Arabia against activists, dissidents, and journalists must end.".

SEC. 3. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PERSONS LISTED IN THE REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE MURDER OF JAMAL KHASHOGGI.

(a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—On and after the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the sanctions described in subsection (b) shall be imposed with respect to each foreign person listed in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence report titled "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi", dated February 11, 2021.

(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:

(A) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS AND ADMISSION TO THE UNITED STATES.—

(i) Inadmissibility to the United States.

(ii) Ineligibility to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States.

(iii) Ineligibility to otherwise be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 110et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) Revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) A revocation under clause (i) shall—

(I) take effect immediately; and

(II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the foreign person's possession.

(2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Sanctions under paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a foreign person if admitting or paroling the person into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations.

(3) WAIVER IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY.—The President may waive for an individual entry into the United States the application of this section with respect to a foreign person who is A-1 visa eligible and who is present in or seeking admission into the United States for purposes of official business if the President determines and transmits to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassified written notice and justification not later than 15 days before the granting of such waiver, that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States.

(c) SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may suspend in whole or in part the imposition of sanctions otherwise required under this section if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the following criteria have been met in Saudi Arabia:

(A) The Government of Saudi Arabia is not arbitrarily detaining citizens or legal residents of the United States or any other third country for arbitrary political reasons, including criticism of Saudi government policies, peaceful advocacy of political beliefs, or the pursuit of United States citizenship.

(B) The Government of Saudi Arabia is cooperating in outstanding criminal proceedings in the United States in which a Saudi citizen or national departed from the United States while the citizen or national was awaiting trial or sentencing for a criminal offense committed in the United States.

(C) The Government of Saudi Arabia has made significant numerical reductions in individuals detained for peaceful political reasons, including activists, journalists, bloggers, lawyers, or critics.

(D) The Government of Saudi Arabia has disbanded any units of its intelligence or security apparatus dedicated to the forced repatriation of dissidents or critical voices in other countries.

(E) The Government of Saudi Arabia has made meaningful commitments to a multilateral framework on the lawful use, sale, transfer of digital surveillance items and services that can be used to abuse human rights.

(F) The Government of Saudi Arabia has instituted meaningful legal reforms to protect the rights of freedom of expression, religion, women's rights, and due process in its judicial system.

(2) REPORT.—Accompanying the certification described in paragraph (1), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a detailed description of Saudi Arabia's adherence to the criteria described in the certification.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms ''admitted'' and ''alien'' have the meanings given those terms in

1 section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
2 (8 U.S.C. 1101).
3 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
4 TEES.—The term ''appropriate congressional com-
5 mittees'' means—
6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
7 Committee on the Judiciary, and the Perma-
8 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
9 House of Representatives; and
10 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
11 the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Select
12 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
13 (3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ''foreign per-
14 son'' has the meaning given such term in section
15 595.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as
16 in effect on the day before the date of the enactment
17 of this Act), except that such term does not include
18 an entity (as such term is described in such section).
19 (4) FOREIGN PERSON WHO IS A-1 VISA ELIGI-
20 BLE.—The term ''foreign person who is A-1 visa eli-
21 gible'' means an alien described in section
22 101(a)(15)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
23 Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(A)(i)).
24 (5) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
25 ''United States person'' means—

(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully for permanent residence to the United States; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 4. REPORT AND SUSPENSION OF ASSISTANCE FOR INCIDENTS OF ARBITRARY DETENTION, VIOLENCE, AND STATE-SANCTIONED HARASSMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on incidents of arbitrary detention, violence, and state-sanctioned harassment by the Government of Saudi Arabia against United States citizens and their family members who are not United States citizens, in the United States and foreign countries.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a detailed description of such incidents in the past 5 years;

(2) a certification of whether Saudi Arabia is engaging in a "pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States" pursuant to section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2756); and

(3) any other actions taken to deter incidents of intimidation or harassment against Americans and their families by such government's security agencies.

(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form.

(d) SUSPENSION OF ASSISTANCE.—If the President determines in any report issued pursuant to subsection (a) that the government of Saudi Arabia has engaged in a pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States, the President shall cancel or suspend any letters of offer, credits, guarantees, or export licenses with such government, in compliance with section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2756) until such time as the President determines

that the pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment has ceased.

(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ''appropriate congressional committees'' means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 5. MEASURES TO DISASSOCIATE UNITES STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE FROM HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue draft regulations to be promulgated in the Foreign Affairs Manual that each individual concurrence by the Department of State for an instance of United States security assistance, including military-to-military activities and arms transfers, with the Government of Saudi Arabia shall be accompanied by the publication on a text-searchable website of an unclassified report that describes whether

1 and how the provision of such assistance will ''avoid identi-
2 fication of the United States, through such programs, with
3 governments which deny to their people internationally
4 recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, in
5 violation of international law or in contravention of the
6 policy of the United States'' in accordance with section
7 502B the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2304).

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1464

OFFERED BY MR. MALINOWSKI OF NEW JERSEY

Strike section 2 and insert the following:

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress finds the following:

3 (1) On October 2, 2018, Washington Post jour-
4 nalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered by Saudi
5 Government agents in Istanbul.

6 (2) According to the United Nations Special
7 Rapporteur's June 2019 report, Mr. Khashoggi con-
8 tacted the Saudi Embassy in Washington regarding
9 required documentation he needed to obtain from
10 Saudi authorities and "was told to obtain the docu-
11 ment from the Saudi embassy in Turkey".

12 (3) According to press reports, Mr. Khashoggi's
13 associates were surveilled after having their phones
14 infiltrated by spyware.

15 (4) On July 15, 2019, the House of Represent-
16 atives passed by a margin of 405-7 the Saudi Arabia
17 Human Rights and Accountability Act of 2019
18 (H.R. 2037), which required—

19 (A) an unclassified report by the Director
20 of National Intelligence on parties responsible

for Khashoggi's murder, a requirement ultimately inserted into and passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92);

(B) visa sanctions on all persons identified in such report; and

(C) a report on human rights in Saudi Arabia.

(5) On February 26, 2021, the Director of National Intelligence released the report produced pursuant to congressional direction, which stated, ''we assess that Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman approved an operation in Istanbul, Turkey to capture or kill Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.''. The report also identified several individuals who ''participated in, ordered, or were otherwise complicit in or responsible for the death of Jamal Khashoggi on behalf of Muhammad bin Salman. We do not know whether these individuals knew in advance that the operation would result in Khashoggi's death.''.

(6) Section 7031(c) of division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 states ''Officials of foreign governments and their immediate family members about whom the Secretary of State has

credible information have been involved, directly or indirectly, in. . .a gross violation of human rights. . . shall be ineligible for entry into the United States.''.

(7) Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2756) provides that no letters of offer may be issued, no credits or guarantees may be extended, and no export licenses may be issued with respect to any country determined by the President to be engaged in a ''consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States''.

(8) Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304) directs the President to formulate and conduct international security assistance programs of the United States in a manner which will ''promote and advance human rights and avoid identification of the United States, through such programs, with governments which deny to their people internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, in violation of international law or in contravention of the policy of the United States''.

(9) Secretary of State Antony Blinken on February 26, 2021, stated: ''As a matter of safety for

all within our borders, perpetrators targeting perceived dissidents on behalf of any foreign government should not be permitted to reach American soil. . . We have made absolutely clear that extraterritorial threats and assaults by Saudi Arabia against activists, dissidents, and journalists must end.''.

☒

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1464

OFFERED BY MR. MALINOWSKI OF NEW JERSEY

Strike sections 3, 4, and 5 and insert the following:

1 **SEC. 3. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PERSONS**
2 **LISTED IN THE REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR**
3 **OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE MUR-**
4 **DER OF JAMAL KHASHOGGI.**

5 (a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—On and after the
6 date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of
7 this Act, the sanctions described in subsection (b) shall
8 be imposed with respect to each foreign person listed in
9 the Office of the Director of National Intelligence report
10 titled "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Kill-
11 ing of Jamal Khashoggi", dated February 11, 2021.

12 (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in
14 this subsection are the following:

15 (A) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS AND ADMIS-
16 SION TO THE UNITED STATES.—

17 (i) Inadmissibility to the United
18 States.

(ii) Ineligibility to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States.

(iii) Ineligibility to otherwise be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 110et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) Revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.

(ii) A revocation under clause (i) shall—

(I) take effect immediately; and

(II) automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the foreign person's possession.

(2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—Sanctions under paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a foreign person if admitting or paroling the person into the United States is necessary to permit the United

1 States to comply with the Agreement regarding the
2 Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake
3 Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force No-
4 vember 21, 1947, between the United Nations and
5 the United States, or other applicable international
6 obligations.

7 (3) WAIVER IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL
8 SECURITY.—The President may waive for an indi-
9 vidual entry into the United States the application
10 of this section with respect to a foreign person who
11 is A-1 visa eligible and who is present in or seeking
12 admission into the United States for purposes of of-
13 ficial business if the President determines and trans-
14 mits to the appropriate congressional committees an
15 unclassified written notice and justification not later
16 than 15 days before the granting of such waiver,
17 that such a waiver is in the national security inter-
18 ests of the United States.

19 (c) SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may suspend
21 in whole or in part the imposition of sanctions other-
22 wise required under this section if the President cer-
23 tifies to the appropriate congressional committees
24 that the following criteria have been met in Saudi
25 Arabia:

1 (A) The Government of Saudi Arabia is
2 not arbitrarily detaining citizens or legal resi-
3 dents of the United States for arbitrary polit-
4 ical reasons, including criticism of Saudi gov-
5 ernment policies, peaceful advocacy of political
6 beliefs, or the pursuit of United States citizen-
7 ship.
8 (B) The Government of Saudi Arabia is
9 cooperating in outstanding criminal proceedings
10 in the United States in which a Saudi citizen or
11 national departed from the United States while
12 the citizen or national was awaiting trial or sen-
13 tencing for a criminal offense committed in the
14 United States.
15 (C) The Government of Saudi Arabia has
16 made significant numerical reductions in indi-
17 viduals detained for peaceful political reasons,
18 including activists, journalists, bloggers, law-
19 yers, or critics.
20 (D) The Government of Saudi Arabia has
21 disbanded any units of its intelligence or secu-
22 rity apparatus dedicated to the forced repatri-
23 ation of dissidents or critical voices in other
24 countries.

(E) The Government of Saudi Arabia has made meaningful public commitments to uphold internationally recognized standards governing the use, sale, and transfer of digital surveillance items and services that can be used to abuse human rights.

(F) The Government of Saudi Arabia has instituted meaningful legal reforms to protect the rights of women, the rights of freedom of expression and religion, and due process in its judicial system.

(2) REPORT.—Accompanying the certification described in paragraph (1), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains a detailed description of Saudi Arabia's adherence to the criteria described in the certification.

(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms "admitted" and "alien" have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term "appropriate congressional committees" means—

1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
2 Committee on the Judiciary, and the Perma-
3 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
4 House of Representatives; and
5 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
6 the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Select
7 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
8 (3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term "foreign per-
9 son" has the meaning given such term in section
10 595.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as
11 in effect on the day before the date of the enactment
12 of this Act), except that such term does not include
13 an entity (as such term is described in such section).
14 (4) FOREIGN PERSON WHO IS A-1 VISA ELIGI-
15 BLE.—The term "foreign person who is A-1 visa eli-
16 gible" means an alien described in section
17 101(a)(15)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
18 Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(A)(i)).
19 (5) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
20 "United States person" means—
21 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
22 fully admitted for permanent residence to the
23 United States; or
24 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
25 the United States or any jurisdiction within the

United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON INTIMIDATION OR HARASSMENT DIRECTED AGAINST INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER MATTERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report identifying any entities, instrumentalities, or agents of the Government of Saudi Arabia engaged in "a consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States" pursuant to section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2756).

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A detailed description of such acts in the preceding ~~5-year~~ period.

(2) A certification of whether such acts during the preceding ~~5-year~~ period constitute a "consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States" pur-

1 suant to section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act
2 (22 U.S.C. 2756).
3 (3) A determination of whether any United
4 States-origin defense articles were used in the com-
5 mission of such acts.
6 (4) A determination of whether entities, instru-
7 mentalities, or agents of the Government of Saudi
8 Arabia supported or received support from foreign
9 governments, including China, in the commission of
10 such acts.
11 (5) Any actions taken by the United States
12 Government to deter incidents of intimidation or
13 harassment directed against individuals in the
14 United States.
15 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
16 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
17 a classified annex.
18 (d) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the
19 date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of
20 this Act.
21 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
22 FINED.—In this section, the term ''appropriate congres-
23 sional committees'' means—
24 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
25 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent

1 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
2 Representatives; and
3 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
4 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
5 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate.

6 **SEC. 5. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO UPHOLD HUMAN RIGHTS**
7 **IN UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE**
8 **PROGRAMS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF**
9 **SAUDI ARABIA.**

10 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
11 ment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to
12 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
13 resentative and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
14 Senate a report on efforts of the Department of State to
15 ensure that United States security assistance programs
16 with Saudi Arabia are formulated in a manner that will
17 "avoid identification of the United States, through such
18 programs, with governments which deny to their people
19 internationally recognized human rights and fundamental
20 freedoms" in accordance with section 502B of the Foreign
21 Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2304).

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1464

OFFERED BY MS. OMAR OF MINNESOTA

At the end of the bill, add the following:

SEC. 6. REPORT ON CERTAIN ENTITIES CONNECTED TO FOREIGN PERSONS ON THE MURDER OF JAMAL KHASHOGGI.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of appropriate agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on private, commercial, and nongovernmental entities, including non-profit foundations, controlled in whole or in part by any foreign person named in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence report titled ''Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi'', dated February 11, 2021.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A description of such entities.

(2) A detailed assessment, based in part on credible open sources and other publicly-available information, of the roles, if any, such entities played in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi or any other

gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.

(3) A certification of whether any such entity is subject to sanctions pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ''appropriate congressional committees'' means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

I

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 256

To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 11, 2021

Ms. LEE of California (for herself, Mr. BIGGS, Mr. MOONEY, Mr. MASSIE, Ms. TLAIB, Mr. HUFFMAN, Mr. TRONE, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. SHERMAN, Ms. PRESSLEY, Ms. MOORE of Wisconsin, Mr. BEYER, Ms. SPEIER, Mr. LOWENTHAL, Ms. DEGETTE, Mr. KHANNA, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Ms. NORTON, Mr. RUSH, Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN, Mr. POCAN, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. CICILLINE, Mr. DEFAZIO, Mr. MCGOVERN, Mr. TONKO, Mr. JONES, Ms. CLARK of Massachusetts, Ms. JAYAPAL, Mr. RASKIN, Mr. RYAN, Mr. WELCH, Mr. ESPAILLAT, Ms. ESHOO, Mr. BROWN, Mr. COHEN, Mr. PALLONE, Mr. MOULTON, and Ms. SPANBERGER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

---

A BILL

To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

SECTION 1. REPEAL OF AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002.

The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–243; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) is hereby repealed.

○

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 256

OFFERED BY MR. PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA

At the end of the bill, add the following:

SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This Act shall take effect upon the date of the enactment of an Act that—

(1) provides new, specific statutory authorization for the use of military force against specified terrorist groups;

(2) repeals the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note); and

(3) states that it is intended to satisfy the requirements of this section.

☒

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 256

OFFERED BY MR. ISSA OF CALIFORNIA

Strike section 1 and insert the following:

SECTION 1. REPEAL OF AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Effective 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–243; 50 U.S.C. 6 1541 note) is hereby repealed.

(b) EXTENSION OF DELAYED REPEAL.—The President may extend the delay of the repeal of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 for one or more 90-day periods beginning after the end of the 90-day period described in subsection (a), but not beyond January 31, 2023, if the President submits to Congress a notification of such proposed extension prior to the start of each such 90-day period.

☒

VOTES

Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

117th Congress

Date: _03/25/21_____

Record Vote Description:

Perry Amendment #53 to H.R. 2118

An amendment making the H.R. 2118 bill's authorization contingent upon CEPI offering a seat on its Scientific Advisory Board to the Taiwanese CDC.

Member	Aye	No	Present
Gregory W. Meeks, D-NY, Chair		X	
Brad Sherman, D-CA		X	
Albio Sires, D-NJ		X	
Gerald E. Connolly, D-VA		X	
Theodore E. Deutch, D-FL		X	
Karen Bass, D-CA			
William R. Keating, D-MA		X	
David N. Cicilline, D-RI		X	
Ami Bera, D-CA		X	
Joaquin Castro, D-TX		X	
Dina Titus, D-NV		X	
Ted Lieu, D-CA		X	
Susan Wild, D-PA		X	
Dean Phillips, D-MN		X	
Ilhan Omar, D-MN			
Colin Allred, D-TX		X	
Andy Levin, D-MI		X	
Abigail Spanberger, D-VA		X	
Chrissy Houlahan, D-PA		X	
Tom Malinowski, D-NJ		X	
Andy Kim, D-NJ		X	
Sara Jacobs, D-CA		X	
Kathy Manning, D-NC		X	
Jim Costa, D-CA		X	
Juan Vargas, D-CA		X	
Vicente González, D-TX			
Brad Schneider, D-IL		X	
SUBTOTAL 1		24	

Member	Aye	No	Present
Michael T. McCaul, R-TX	X		
Chris Smith, R-NJ	X		
Steve Chabot, R-OH	X		
Joe Wilson, R-SC	X		
Scott Perry, R-PA	X		
Darrell Issa, R-OH	X		
Adam Kinzinger, R-IL	X		
Lee Zeldin, R-NY	X		
Ann Wagner, R-MO	X		
Brian Mast, R-FL	X		
Brian Fitzpatrick, R-PA	X		
Ken Buck, R-CO	X		
Tim Burchett, R-TN	X		
Mark Green, R-FL	X		
Andy Barr, R-KY	X		
Greg Steube, R-FL			
Dan Meuser, R-PA	X		
Claudia Tenney, R-NY			
August Pfluger, R-TX	X		
Nicole Malliotakis, R-NY	X		
Peter Meijer, R-MI	X		
Ronny Jackson, R-TX	X		
Young Kim, R-CA	X		
Maria Elvira Salazar, R-FL			
SUBTOTAL 2	21		

	Aye	No	Present
TOTAL	**21**	**24**	

Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

117th Congress

Date: _03/25/21_____

Record Vote Description:

Perry Amendment #52

An amendment to delay repeal of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 until Congress passes an AUMF against terrorist groups and repeals the 2001 AUMF.

Member	Aye	No	Present
Gregory W. Meeks, D-NY, Chair		X	
Brad Sherman, D-CA		X	
Albio Sires, D-NJ		X	
Gerald E. Connolly, D-VA		X	
Theodore E. Deutch, D-FL		X	
Karen Bass, D-CA			
William R. Keating, D-MA		X	
David N. Cicilline, D-RI		X	
Ami Bera, D-CA		X	
Joaquin Castro, D-TX		X	
Dina Titus, D-NV		X	
Ted Lieu, D-CA		X	
Susan Wild, D-PA		X	
Dean Phillips, D-MN		X	
Ilhan Omar, D-MN			
Colin Allred, D-TX		X	
Andy Levin, D-MI		X	
Abigail Spanberger, D-VA		X	
Chrissy Houlahan, D-PA		X	
Tom Malinowski, D-NJ		X	
Andy Kim, D-NJ		X	
Sara Jacobs, D-CA		X	
Kathy Manning, D-NC		X	
Jim Costa, D-CA		X	
Juan Vargas, D-CA		X	
Vicente González, D-TX		X	
Brad Schneider, D-IL		X	
SUBTOTAL 1		25	

Member	Aye	No	Present
Michael T. McCaul, R-TX	X		
Chris Smith, R-NJ	X		
Steve Chabot, R-OH	X		
Joe Wilson, R-SC	X		
Scott Perry, R-PA	X		
Darrell Issa, R-OH	X		
Adam Kinzinger, R-IL	X		
Lee Zeldin, R-NY	X		
Ann Wagner, R-MO	X		
Brian Mast, R-FL	X		
Brian Fitzpatrick, R-PA	X		
Ken Buck, R-CO		X	
Tim Burchett, R-TN	X		
Mark Green, R-FL	X		
Andy Barr, R-KY	X		
Greg Steube, R-FL			
Dan Meuser, R-PA	X		
Claudia Tenney, R-NY			
August Pfluger, R-TX	X		
Nicole Malliotakis, R-NY	X		
Peter Meijer, R-MI		X	
Ronny Jackson, R-TX	X		
Young Kim, R-CA	X		
Maria Elvira Salazar, R-FL			
SUBTOTAL 2	19	2	

	Aye	No	Present
TOTAL	**19**	**27**	

Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

117th Congress

Date: _03/25/21_____

Record Vote Description:

H.R. 256

To repeal the authorization for use of military force against Iraq resolution of 2002

Member	Aye	No	Present
Gregory W. Meeks, D-NY, Chair	X		
Brad Sherman, D-CA	X		
Albio Sires, D-NJ	X		
Gerald E. Connolly, D-VA	X		
Theodore E. Deutch, D-FL	X		
Karen Bass, D-CA	X		
William R. Keating, D-MA	X		
David N. Cicilline, D-RI	X		
Ami Bera, D-CA	X		
Joaquin Castro, D-TX	X		
Dina Titus, D-NV	X		
Ted Lieu, D-CA	X		
Susan Wild, D-PA	X		
Dean Phillips, D-MN	X		
Ilhan Omar, D-MN			
Colin Allred, D-TX	X		
Andy Levin, D-MI	X		
Abigail Spanberger, D-VA	X		
Chrissy Houlahan, D-PA	X		
Tom Malinowski, D-NJ	X		
Andy Kim, D-NJ	X		
Sara Jacobs, D-CA	X		
Kathy Manning, D-NC	X		
Jim Costa, D-CA	X		
Juan Vargas, D-CA	X		
Vicente González, D-TX	X		
Brad Schneider, D-IL	X		
SUBTOTAL 1	26		

Member	Aye	No	Present
Michael T. McCaul, R-TX		X	
Chris Smith, R-NJ		X	
Steve Chabot, R-OH		X	
Joe Wilson, R-SC		X	
Scott Perry, R-PA		X	
Darrell Issa, R-OH		X	
Adam Kinzinger, R-IL		X	
Lee Zeldin, R-NY		X	
Ann Wagner, R-MO		X	
Brian Mast, R-FL		X	
Brian Fitzpatrick, R-PA		X	
Ken Buck, R-CO	X		
Tim Burchett, R-TN		X	
Mark Green, R-FL		X	
Andy Barr, R-KY		X	
Greg Steube, R-FL		X	
Dan Meuser, R-PA		X	
Claudia Tenney, R-NY		X	
August Pfluger, R-TX		X	
Nicole Malliotakis, R-NY		X	
Peter Meijer, R-MI	X		
Ronny Jackson, R-TX		X	
Young Kim, R-CA		X	
Maria Elvira Salazar, R-FL		X	
SUBTOTAL 2	2	19	

	Aye	No	Present
TOTAL	**28**	**19**	

MARKUP SUMMARY

03/25/2021 House Foreign Affairs Committee Markup Summary

The Chair called up the following measures and amendments, previously circulated to Members and considered *en bloc:*

(1) H.R. 1145, To direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan in the World Health Organization, and for other purposes (Y. Kim)
- Meeks, an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1145

(2) H.R. 1500, To direct the Administrator of the USAID to submit to Congress a report on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global basic education programs (Houlahan)
- Houlahan, an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1500
- Perry Amendment #50

(3) H.R. 1158, To provide women and girls safe access to sanitation facilities in refugee camps (Meng)

(4) H.R. 1083, Southeast Asia Strategy Act (Wagner)

(5) H.Res. 245, Calling for continued and robust international collaboration and coordination to fight COVID-19 across Africa (Bass)
- Bass, an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.Res. 245

(6) H.R. 1079, Desert Locust Control Act (Smith)
- Smith Amendment #15
- Perry Amendment #49

(7) H.R. 1934, Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G (McCaul)
- McCaul Amendment #19

(8) H.R. 1392, Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act of 2021 (Connolly)
- Connolly Amendment #1
- Meeks Amendment #2

The measures considered *en bloc* were agreed to by voice vote, ordered favorably reported, as amended, if amended, to the House.

The Chair called up the following measures considered separately:

(1) H.R. 391, Global Health Security Act of 2021 (Connolly) (agreed to by voice vote)

Amendments considered en bloc and adopted without objection:
- Connolly Amendment #40
- McCaul Amendment #20

Amendments considered separately:

- Perry Amendment #48 to Chabot #12 (not adopted, voice vote)
- Perry Amendment #51 to Chabot #12 (not adopted, voice vote)
- Chabot Amendment #12 (adopted, voice vote)
- Perry Amendment #54 (not adopted, voice vote)

(2) H.R. 2118, Securing America From Epidemics Act (Bera) (agreed to by voice vote)

- Perry Amendment #53 (not adopted, roll call 24N-21Y)

(3) H.R. 1464, Khashoggi Accountability Act (Malinowski) (agreed to by voice vote)

Amendments considered en bloc and voice voted without objection:

- Malinowski Amendment #1
- Malinowski Amendment #2
- Omar Amendment #26

(4) H.R. 256, To repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Lee) (adopted, roll call 28Y-19N)

- Perry Amendment #52 (not adopted, roll call 27N-19Y)
- Issa Amendment #18 (not adopted, voice vote)

The four measures considered separately were ordered favorably reported, as amended, if amended, to the House.

The Committee adjourned.

All measures can be found here.

INFORMATION FOR THE RECORD

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 25, 2014

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Today the House will consider H.Con.Res. 105, a resolution introduced by Representative James McGovern, Representative Walter Jones, and Representative Barbara Lee. We appreciate the House debate on Iraq, and its readiness to vote on a resolution consistent with the Administration's views.

As the President unequivocally stated in late June, "American forces will not be returning to combat in Iraq, but we will help Iraqis as they take the fight to terrorists who threaten the Iraqi people, the region, and American interests as well."

The President has also made clear that if American interests are threatened, "we will be prepared to take targeted and precise military action if and when we determine that the situation on the ground requires it." The President has made exceedingly clear that he will consult closely with Congress and leaders in Iraq and in the region.

While we understand the House of Representatives will consider this resolution that supports the President's position, we believe a more appropriate and timely action for Congress to take is the repeal of the outdated 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force in Iraq (P.L. 107-243). With American combat troops having completed their withdrawal from Iraq on December 18, 2011, the Iraq AUMF is no longer used for any U.S. government activities and the Administration fully supports its repeal. Such a repeal would go much further in giving the American people confidence that ground forces will not be sent into combat in Iraq.

We look forward to continuing to work with the Congress on this important issue.

Sincerely,



Susan E. Rice
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

The Honorable John A. Boehner
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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