[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 6850 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 6850
To improve technology and address human factors in aviation safety, and
for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
December 19, 2023
Mr. DeSaulnier (for himself, Ms. Norton, and Ms. Titus) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, and in addition to the Committee on Science, Space,
and Technology, for a period to be subsequently determined by the
Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall
within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To improve technology and address human factors in aviation safety, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Safe Landings Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Given that the United States enjoys an exceptionally
safe aviation system with an exceedingly low frequency of
airline accidents, efforts to improve aviation safety should
examine nonaccident safety incidents for all possible insights.
(2) Aviation safety should not be taken for granted, and
even with so few accidents, the U.S. Aerospace System should
proactively address safety concerns that emerge from our
dynamic and evolving economic conditions, technology, aviation
industry, and other factors.
(3) Preventing accidents from occurring in the airport
runway environment remains an objective requiring continued
effort, and incidents of runway confusion, defined as the
subset of runway incursions in which an aircraft
unintentionally takes off or lands on a taxiway or incorrect
runway, should be carefully monitored, reviewed, and studied
for insights to improve safety.
(4) While technology continues to advance and new
opportunities to use technology to address safety risks in
aviation are examined and pursued, the evolving role of
technology and the expanding use of automation should not be
used as justification to diminish attention to and
prioritization of the human contribution to aviation safety.
The aviation industry and the Government must ensure that
training programs for flight crews and other personnel are
appropriately evolving, that training standards and
expectations remain rigorous, and that risks and concerns
associated with the interaction between humans, technology, and
automated systems are identified, studied, and addressed in a
timely manner.
SEC. 3. IMPLEMENTATION OF NTSB RECOMMENDATIONS.
(a) NTSB Recommendation.--
(1) In general.--The Administrator shall implement the
recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board
numbered as A-18-25 and issued on October 11, 2018, and, not
later than 1 year after the enactment of this Act, the
Administrator shall issue to Congress a report on the status of
the implementation.
(2) Consideration.--In implementing this recommendation,
the Administrator shall consider any relevant findings
identified pursuant to section 334 of the FAA Reauthorization
Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-254).
(b) Pilot Alerts.--The Administrator shall--
(1) collaborate with aircraft and avionics manufacturers,
labor organizations representing pilots operating under part
121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, and software
developers to develop the technology for a cockpit system that
provides an alert to pilots when an airplane is not aligned
with the intended runway surface;
(2) once such technology described in paragraph (1) is
available, establish a requirement for the technology to be
installed on aircraft operating under part 121 of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations, landing at airports within Class B
and Class C airspace and certified under part 139 of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations;
(3) in establishing the requirement as described in
paragraph (2), consider any relevant findings identified
pursuant to section 334 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
(Public Law 115-254); and
(4) not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of
this Act, issue to Congress a report on the progress of the
work described in paragraph (1).
SEC. 4. INVESTIGATIONS FOR COVERED EVENTS.
(a) In General.--Once implementation of section 3(a) of this Act is
complete, the National Transportation Safety Board may initiate
investigations of covered events to determine risk factors specific to
the airport at which such an event occurred and other elements of the
National Airspace System that may contribute to the cause of the event.
The National Transportation Safety Board may also elect to consider
multiple events in a single report as part of a special investigation
or study to examine safety factors contributing to these events.
(b) Content.--The review and analysis shall examine factors present
at the time of any covered event at such airport, including--
(1) challenges pilots perceive when flying into and out of
the airport;
(2) challenges that air traffic controllers face when
working at the airport;
(3) characteristics of the communications among and between
groups of personnel whose work relates to the movement of
aircraft into and out of the airport including pilots, air
traffic controllers, maintenance workers, dispatchers, and
airline airport operations personnel; and
(4) physical characteristics of the airport and its
facilities, such as the configuration of runways, taxiways,
runway lighting, and construction activity.
(c) Protection of Information.--Individuals involved in any manner
in an investigation described in this section may request that the
Board take such action as appropriate to protect from public disclosure
any information that readily identifies such individual. The Board may
withhold the information if the Board determines that the information
may be withheld under an exemption under section 552 of title 5, United
States Code, and the publication of such information is not in the
public interest.
SEC. 5. STUDY ON HUMAN FACTORS AND AVIATION SAFETY.
(a) In General.--The National Academies of Science, Engineering,
and Medicine shall, in collaboration with other relevant Federal
institutions and agencies, conduct a study on the role of human factors
in high-risk professions, including aviation.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of
this Act, the National Academies shall submit to the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure and Committee on Education and
Workforce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions of the Senate a report on the results of
the study required under subsection (a), including best practices that
can be implemented across all high-risk professions, including within
the aviation industry, to reduce risk involved with human factors.
SEC. 6. TASK FORCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN AVIATION SAFETY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 6 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration shall convene a task force on human factors in aviation
safety (in this section referred to as the ``Task Force'').
(b) Composition.--The Task Force shall consist of members appointed
by the Administrator and having expertise in an operational or academic
discipline that is relevant to the analysis of human errors in
aviation. The number of members shall be determined by the
Administrator to ensure sufficient representation of relevant
operational and academic disciplines.
(c) Duration.--
(1) In general.--Members of the Task Force shall be
appointed for the length of the existence of the Task Force.
(2) Length of existence.--
(A) In general.--The Task Force shall have an
initial length of existence of 2 years.
(B) Option.--The Administrator may exercise an
option to lengthen the duration of the existence of the
Task Force for a period of 2 years.
(d) Disciplines.--For purposes of subsection (b), disciplines may
include air carrier operations, line pilot expertise, air traffic
control, technical operations, aeronautical information, aircraft
maintenance and mechanics psychology, linguistics, human-machine
integration, general aviation operations, and organizational behavior
and culture.
(e) Expertise.--
(1) In general.--No less than half of the members shall
have expertise in aviation.
(2) Additional expertise.--The Task Force shall include
members with expertise on human factors but whose experience
and training are not in aviation specifically and who have not
previously been engaged in work related to the Federal Aviation
Administration or the aviation industry. The Task Force shall
also include pilot labor organizations, certificated mechanic
labor organizations, and the exclusive bargaining
representative of the air traffic controllers certified under
section 7111 of title 5, United States Code.
(f) Federal Aviation Administration Members.--
(1) In general.--Not more than 4 members may be employees
of the Federal Aviation Administration and National
Transportation Safety Board, excluding representatives of the
labor representatives of employees of the air traffic control
system. Not more than 2 members may be employees of the
National Transportation Safety Board. The Federal Aviation
Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board
members shall be non-voting.
(2) Federal aviation administration employees.--Any member
who is an Federal Aviation Administration employee shall have
expertise in safety.
(g) Duties.--In coordination with the Research, Engineering, and
Development Advisory Committee established under section 44508 of title
49, United States Code, the Task Force shall--
(1) not later than the date on which the Task Force is no
longer in existence, produce a written report that--
(A) to the greatest extent possible, identifies the
most significant human factors and the relative
contribution of such factors to aviation safety risk;
(B) identifies new research priorities for research
in human factors in aviation safety;
(C) reviews existing products by other working
groups related to human factors in aviation safety
including the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)'s
work pertaining to flight crew responses to abnormal
events;
(D) provides recommendations on potential revisions
to any Federal Aviation Administration regulations and
guidance pertaining to the certification of aircraft
under part 25 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations,
including sections related to presumed pilot response
times and assumptions about the reliability of pilot
performance during unexpected, stressful events;
(E) reviews rules, regulations, or standards
regarding flight crew rest and fatigue, as well as
maintenance personnel rest and fatigue, that are used
by a sample of international air carriers, including
those deemed to be more stringent and less stringent
than the current standards pertaining to United States
air carriers, and identify risks to the National
Airspace System from any such variation in standards
across countries;
(F) reviews pilot training requirements and
recommend any revisions necessary to ensure adequate
understanding of automated systems on aircraft;
(G) reviews approach and landing misalignment and
make any recommendations for improving these events;
(H) identifies ways to enhance instrument landing
system maintenance schedules as well as other relevant
technology systems that facilitate safe landings that
are jointly used by air traffic controllers, pilots,
and Federal Aviation Administration technicians,
determines how a real-time smart system should be
developed that informs the Air Traffic Control System,
Airlines, and Airports about any changes in the state
of runway and taxiway lights, and identifies how this
system could be connected to the Federal Aviation
Administration's maintenance system;
(I) analyzes, with respect to human errors related
to aviation safety of part 121 air carriers--
(i) fatigue and distraction during critical
phases of work among pilots or other aviation
personnel;
(ii) tasks and workload;
(iii) organizational culture;
(iv) communication among personnel;
(v) adherence to safety procedures;
(vi) mental fitness of personnel; and
(vii) any other relevant factors that
affect human performance or are the cause or
potential cause of human error related to
aviation safety;
(J) includes a tabulation of the number of
accidents, incidents, or aviation safety database
entries received in which an item identified under
subparagraph (I) was a cause or potential cause of
human error related to aviation safety; and
(K) includes a list of causes or potential causes
of human error related to aviation safety about which
the Administrator believes additional information is
needed; and
(2) if the Secretary exercises the option described in
subsection (c)(2)(B), not later than the date that is 2 years
after the date of establishment of the Task Force, produce an
interim report containing the information described in
paragraph (1).
(h) Methodology.--
(1) In general.--To complete the report under subparagraphs
(I) through (K) of subsection (g)(1), the Task Force shall
consult with the National Transportation Safety Board and use
all available data compiled and analysis conducted on safety
incidents and irregularities collected during the relevant
fiscal years from the following:
(A) Flight Operations Quality Assurance.
(B) Aviation Safety Action Program.
(C) Aviation Safety Information Analysis and
Sharing.
(D) The Aviation Safety Reporting System.
(E) Aviation safety recommendations and
investigation findings of the National Transportation
Safety Board.
(F) Other relevant programs or sources.
(2) Protection of information.--The Task Force shall ensure
that any data described in paragraph (1) has strong protections
to protect employees from data being used to undertake punitive
measures against the employee or personal liability.
(i) Applicable Law.--Section 1013 of title 5, United States Code,
shall not apply to the Task Force.
SEC. 7. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM ON NEW APPROACHES TO DATA
ANALYSIS FOR AVIATION SAFETY.
(a) In General.--The Secretary shall establish a new research and
development program to be undertaken by the FAA's Consortium in
Aviation Operations Research (NEXTOR III) to investigate and develop
new approaches to data analysis for understanding the factors in
aviation safety incidents and identifying emerging risks of future
safety incidents.
(b) Approaches.--The approaches described in subsection (a) include
the use of new algorithms for analyzing the text and audio of
communications between flight crews and air traffic controllers and the
use of machine learning or artificial intelligence methods for
analyzing a variety of data sets, including, data on weather,
performance of communication, navigation and surveillance equipment and
facilities, flight delays, safety incidents, flight crew work
schedules, and air traffic and crew member communications for detecting
anomalies in the National Airspace System.
(c) Collaboration.--In carrying out the research program
established in this section, member institutions of the Consortium
shall collaborate in the sharing of data for the purpose of testing and
demonstrating the potential effectiveness of new approaches to
analysis--
(1) with each other;
(2) with aviation industry partners;
(3) with units within the FAA including groups within the
Air Traffic Organization, NextGen Office, Office of Airports,
and Aviation Safety; and
(4) with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's Aviation Safety Reporting System.
(d) Research.--
(1) In general.--The research undertaken pursuant to this
section shall prioritize understanding the ways that various
forms of human factors contribute to aviation safety risk.
(2) Factors.--The factors described in paragraph (1) may
include fatigue and distraction during critical phases of work
among pilots or other aviation personnel, tasks and workload,
organizational structure and culture, communication among
personnel, adherence to safety procedures, and any other
relevant factors that are the cause or potential cause of human
error in aviation operations.
(3) Highly automated aircraft.--Research should seek ways
to improve the design of highly automated aircraft to reduce
instances of mode confusion and to combat problems of reduced
awareness of basic flight parameters resulting from complacency
about automated systems.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated $20,000,000 for carrying out the program described in this
section for each fiscal year from 2024 through 2029, including grants
to participating research institutions, including the academic
institutions that make up the FAA's Consortium in Aviation Operations
Research (NEXTOR III), the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the FAA's Office of Safety, the NextGen office, and
units within the FAA's Air Traffic Organization that work on safety
issues.
(f) Sunset.--The program shall terminate on the date that is 6
years after the date on which the program is established.
SEC. 8. USING INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES AS BACKUPS TO VISUAL
APPROACHES.
(a) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Administrator shall issue a report to the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate
that uses a representative sample of part 121 and part 129 air carriers
to review the current range of air carrier practices in requiring the
use of instrument approach procedures as a backup system for visual
approaches and the extent to which operators require pilots to use
approach procedures.
(b) Issuance of Guidance.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall review and analyze the
collected data from the report described in subsection (a) and issue
guidance to air carriers on the most effective techniques and
procedures to use instrument approach procedures as a backup system for
visual approaches. Such guidance shall encourage the use of instruments
to provide vertical and lateral guidance to mitigate the potential for
a wrong surface alignment and to provide flight crews with more precise
vertical and lateral deviation information.
SEC. 9. NOTAM MODERNIZATION INITIATIVE.
Section 2(c) of the NOTAM improvement Act of 2023 (49 U.S.C. 40101
note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
``(4) collaborating with avionics manufacturers and
software developers in considering hardware and software for
sending, assessing, and displaying NOTAMs; and''.
SEC. 10. GAO STUDY ON RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF CVR DATA IN
FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
(a) In General.--The Comptroller General shall take the lead in
carrying out a study on the risks associated with the use of CVR data
in investigations led by foreign governments or units of foreign
governments.
(b) Contents.--At minimum, this study shall--
(1) review past incidents in which CVR data was used by
foreign governments or units of foreign governments in such a
way that the National Transportation Safety Board found to
depart from the National Transportation Safety Board's
standards and procedures for a safety investigation, including
the use or circulation of CVR data for purposes other than
determining the causes of an accident or safety incident,
inappropriate release of data contained on a CVR, or the
dissemination of information or conclusions based on a
misinterpretation of data contained on a CVR;
(2) document the protections provided for cockpit voice
recordings and transcripts by ICAO and other countries where
United States-based air carriers operate;
(3) identify and assess the risks to United States flight
crews, air carriers, manufacturers, and other stakeholders in
the aviation industry associated with CVRs capable of recording
more than 2 hours of data; and
(4) provide recommendations on measures to adopt to
mitigate against such risks and ensure that any use of CVR data
serves the sole purpose of a safety investigation, including
recommendations for the United States to make to ICAO to
mitigate these risks.
SEC. 11. TRANSPARENCY IN AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR WORK.
(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment
of this Act, the Administrator shall update the guidelines of the FAA
for part 121 certificate holders in implementing a Continuing Analysis
and Surveillance System (CASS) for their air carrier maintenance
programs to include reporting no less than once every 6 months by
certificate holders to the FAA of any failure to follow procedures in
aircraft maintenance as well as any major alteration, complete
overhaul, or repair of mechanical irregularities of each airframe,
engine, propeller, and appliance.
(b) Advisory.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Administrator shall issue an advisory with formatting
guidelines for air carriers to report information as required under
subsection (a).
(c) Inclusion.--For each instance of a failure to follow procedures
and for each major alteration, overhaul, or repair reported under the
requirements of this section, the Administrator shall require
certificate holders to include any name and any physical address where
the work is carried out for each maintenance provider that performs
work.
(d) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``major alterations'',
``airframe'', ``propeller'', and ``appliance'' have the meanings given
such terms in part 1 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
SEC. 12. REVIEW OF FAA'S AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTION PROGRAM.
(a) Audit by the Department of Transportation Inspector General.--
Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Inspector General of the Department of Transportation shall initiate a
review of the FAA's August 2017 Flight Standards reorganization and its
aviation safety inspection program.
(b) Review.--The review shall include an evaluation of--
(1) the FAA Flight Standards reorganization from a
geographic-based system to a functional-based system;
(2) the implementation of the FAA's Compliance Philosophy
as it relates to safety inspections and enforcements;
(3) the FAA's oversight system known as the Safety
Assurance System (SAS);
(4) training for aviation safety inspector and operational
research analysts on the Compliance Philosophy and SAS; and
(5) the impact of the FAA's reorganization and SAS on the
FAA's ability to produce reliable estimates of aviation safety
inspector and operational research analyst staffing needs.
(c) Report.--The Inspector General shall submit to the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a
report on the results of its review and any recommendations to improve
the aviation safety inspection program of the FAA.
SEC. 13. REVIEW OF ICAO BEST AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGIES AND STANDARDS.
(a) In General.--The Administrator shall conduct a study on the
International Civil Aviation Organization's best available technologies
and standards.
(b) Report to Congress.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit to Congress a
report containing the timeline for the Federal Aviation Administrator
to adopt the best available technologies and standards studied under
subsection (a) and, if the Administrator determines the Administrator
will not adopt any such technologies or standards, a justification as
to the reason for not adopting.
SEC. 14. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS AUDIT.
(a) In General.--Not later than 4 years after the date of enactment
of this Act, the inspector general of the Department of Transportation
shall conduct an audit of--
(1) existing whistleblower protections and standards and
practices in place for the aviation industry; and
(2) the whistleblower program of the Federal Aviation
Administration, including how such program has evolved since
the most recent audit by the inspector general and whether
there are any shortcomings or challenges for the program.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the publication of the
results of the audit under subsection (a), the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration shall submit to the relevant committees
of jurisdiction of Congress a report on the implementation plan for any
recommendations from such audit and any reasons for not implementing
any recommendation for which the Administrator will not implement.
SEC. 15. TWO PILOT RULE.
Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall issue such
regulations as are necessary to require that all part 121 air carriers
providing air transportation of passengers or cargo require a minimum
of 2 pilots in the cockpit for any flight carrying such passengers or
cargo.
SEC. 16. FLIGHT SAFETY INFORMATION PROTECTION.
Section 40123 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding
at the end the following:
``(c) Flight Safety Information Protection.--The Administrator may
not disclose under this section flight safety information, including
flight safety information voluntarily reported by Federal Aviation
Administration employees, and data provided from flight data recorders,
service difficulty recorders, accident and incident data systems,
airline required crew narrative reports and summaries, ADS-B, aircraft
communication addressing and reporting systems, and ATC voice
communications and recorded radar data.''.
SEC. 17. KNOWLEDGE SAFETY EXPERTS.
The Administrator shall take such actions as are necessary to
ensure that any advisory committee of the Federal Aviation
Administration that provides recommendations on topics that relate to
or impact the safety of passengers, aircraft, crew members, ground
crew, airports, or any other safety aspect have representation from
knowledge safety experts in addition to representation from trade
industry experts.
SEC. 18. TRANSPARENCY IN AVIATION INDUSTRY.
The Administrator shall take such actions as are necessary to
ensure that air carriers and other persons providing air transportation
are prohibited from hiding information determined to be important by
the Administrator in any investigation regarding aircraft incidents,
including incidents that result in death or injury.
SEC. 19. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Administrator.--The term ``Administrator'' means the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
(2) Covered event.--The term ``covered event'' means--
(A) a category A or B runway incursion, as defined
in Order 7050.1B of the Federal Aviation Administration
(dated November 3, 2013);
(B) a landing on a taxiway, incorrect runway, or
other area not designed as a runway at a public-use
airport on land;
(C) descent by an aircraft below 300 feet above
ground level on approach to a taxiway, incorrect
runway, or other area not designed as a runway at a
public-use airport on land; or
(D) a landing by an aircraft notwithstanding an
instruction by air traffic control that the aircraft
perform a missed approach or go-around.
(3) FAA.--The term ``FAA'' means the Federal Aviation
Administration.
(4) Part 121 air carrier.--The term ``part 121 air
carrier'' means an air carrier that holds a certificate issued
under part 121 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
(5) Part 129 air carrier.--The term ``part 129 air
carrier'' means an air carrier that holds a certificate issued
under part 129 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.
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