[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 9766 Introduced in House (IH)]
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118th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 9766
To establish an interagency working group to ensure the security,
resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
September 23, 2024
Mr. Pfluger introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on
Homeland Security, and Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently
determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To establish an interagency working group to ensure the security,
resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Undersea Cable Security and
Protection Act''.
SEC. 2. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP AND REPORT ON ENSURING THE SECURITY,
RESILIENCY, AND INTEGRITY OF UNDERSEA CABLES.
(a) Interagency Working Group.--
(1) Preparation of report.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Chairperson of the
Federal Communications Commission, shall convene an interagency
working group (in this section referred to as the ``working
group'') to prepare the report under subsection (b) and provide
the briefing under subsection (c).
(2) Chairperson.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall
serve as the chairperson of the working group.
(3) Membership.--The working group shall be composed of
participants with relevant background or expertise, as
determined by the Security of Homeland Security, with the
approval of the head of the relevant Federal department,
agency, or component, as appropriate, from each of the
following:
(A) The Department of Homeland Security.
(B) The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency of the Department.
(C) The United States Coast Guard.
(D) The Department of Justice.
(E) The Department of Defense.
(F) The Federal Communications Commission.
(G) The Department of Commerce.
(H) Any other component of the United States
Government, regardless of whether such component is an
element of the intelligence community, that the
Secretary, in consultation with the head of such
component, determines would materially assist in the
activities of the interagency working group.
(b) Report.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
in consultation with the Chairperson of the Federal
Communications Commission, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report--
(A) assessing the challenges of protecting
commercial undersea telecommunications cables landing
in the United States (in this section referred to as
``undersea cables'') and cable landing stations in the
United States from security threats posed by the
People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, and any foreign entity of
concern; and
(B) examining the roles and responsibilities of the
United States Government and the private sector to
ensure the security, resiliency, and integrity of such
undersea cables and cable landing stations.
(2) Matters to be included.--The report under paragraph (1)
shall include a description of each of the following:
(A) Past, ongoing, or planned efforts by the
Department of Homeland Security, pursuant to its role
and responsibilities as the Sector Risk Management
Agency for the communications sector in accordance with
National Security Memorandum-22, issued April 30, 2024
(relating to critical infrastructure security and
resilience), and the Federal Communications Commission,
to protect undersea cables and cable landing stations
in the United States from acts of espionage,
cybersecurity threats, and from physical damage or
disruption, including the cutting of such cables, and
efforts to protect cable landing stations in the United
States from vandalism, sabotage, and related terrorism
threats.
(B) The capabilities of the People's Republic of
China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of
Iran, and any foreign entity of concern to target and
compromise undersea cables, or to intercept data
transmissions or sensitive information originating from
such cables.
(C) The potential for espionage or malicious cyber
activity by repair vessels that are owned, controlled,
or operated by state-owned entities of the People's
Republic of China and involved in the construction,
maintenance, or repair of undersea cables.
(D) The risks, including an associated assessment,
posed to undersea cables by natural causes, the lack of
geographic undersea diversity of cable landing stations
in the United States, and accidental damage, and the
extent to which United States cable operators and
telecommunications companies rely on repair vessels
that are owned, controlled, or operated by state-owned
entities of the People's Republic of China.
(E) Past, ongoing, or planned actions of the
Department and the Commission to conduct outreach to
allies and partners of the United States relating to
countering the security threats posed to commercial
undersea telecommunications cables of such allies and
partners by the People's Republic of China, the Russian
Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and any
foreign entity of concern.
(F) Current mechanisms in place within the
Department, the Commission, and the private sector to
detect, prevent, suppress, investigate, mitigate, and
respond to any acts or threats referred to in
subparagraph (A) affecting undersea cables or at cable
landing stations in the United States.
(G) The resources required for the Department and
Commission to initiate new, or expand existing,
operations to protect undersea cables from acts of
espionage, cybersecurity threats, or physical damage or
disruption, including the cutting of undersea cables,
and to protect cable landing stations in the United
States from vandalism, sabotage, or related terrorism
threats.
(H) Recommendations for expanding operations by the
Department and the Commission to protect undersea
cables from acts of espionage, cybersecurity threats,
or physical damage or disruption, including the cutting
of undersea cables, and to protect cable landing
stations in the United States from vandalism, sabotage,
or related terrorism threats, including an assessment
of the feasibility of the following:
(i) Establishing an interagency and public-
private coordination and incident and threat
reporting mechanism to ensure the security,
resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables
and the protection of cable landing stations in
the United States.
(ii) Training a dedicated intelligence
officer or analyst cadre of the Department
composed of undersea cable experts to ensure
the security, resiliency, and integrity of
undersea cables and the protection of cable
landing stations in the United States.
(I) Recommendations for the Department, the
Commission, private sector partners, and Federal,
State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners to
jointly develop and establish standards, guidelines,
best practices, methodologies, procedures, or processes
to ensure the security, resiliency, and integrity of
undersea cables and the protection of cable landing
stations in the United States.
(J) The benefits and drawbacks, and associated
analysis, of designating the Department of Homeland
Security as the lead Federal entity responsible for
ensuring the security, resiliency, and integrity of
undersea cables and the protection of cable landing
stations in the United States.
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in classified form, but may include an unclassified
annex.
(c) Briefing.--Not later than 30 days after the submission of the
report under paragraph (1), the working group shall provide to the
appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the findings and
recommendations contained in such report.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Homeland Security and the
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
(2) Cybersecurity threat.--The term ``cybersecurity
threat'' has the meaning given such term in section 2200 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650).
(3) Foreign entity of concern.--The term ``foreign entity
of concern'' has the meaning given such term in section 9901 of
the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4651).
(4) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
(5) Malicious cyber activity.--The term ``malicious cyber
activity'' means activities, other than those authorized by or
in accordance with United States law, that seek to compromise
or impair the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
computers, information or communications systems, networks,
physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or
information systems (as such term is defined in section 2200 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650)), or
information resident thereon.
(6) Sector risk management agency.--The term ``Sector Risk
Management Agency'' has the meaning given such term in section
2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650).
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