[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1471 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1471
To bolster the AUKUS partnership, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 4, 2023
Mr. Risch (for himself and Mr. Hagerty) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To bolster the AUKUS partnership, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Truncating Onerous
Regulations for Partners and Enhancing Deterrence Operations (TORPEDO)
Act of 2023''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Department of State personnel and resources.
Sec. 6. Reporting requirements.
Sec. 7. Exemption for license requirements for export of defense items
to the United Kingdom and Australia.
Sec. 8. United States Munitions List.
Sec. 9. Open general license for the export, reexport, transfer, and
retransfer of certain defense articles to
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom
under ITAR.
Sec. 10. License exception for export, reexport, and in-country
transfer of items on Commerce Control List
to or between Australia, Canada, and the
United Kingdom under Export Administration
Regulations.
Sec. 11. Treatment of national technology and industrial base as
domestic source under Defense Production
Act of 1950.
Sec. 12. Expedited release of advanced technologies to Australia,
Canada, and the United Kingdom through the
Foreign Military Sales program.
Sec. 13. Anticipatory disclosure policy for Australia, Canada, and the
United Kingdom.
Sec. 14. Report on AUKUS strategy.
Sec. 15. Australia, United Kingdom, and United States submarine
security training.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Armed
Services of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Appropriations, and the Committee on Armed Services
of the House of Representatives.
(2) AUKUS; aukus partnership.--The terms ``AUKUS'' and
``AUKUS partnership'' means the trilateral security partnership
between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia,
which includes the following two pillars:
(A) Pillar One of AUKUS is focused on developing a
pathway for Australia to acquire conventionally armed,
nuclear powered submarines.
(B) Pillar Two of AUKUS is focused on enhancing
trilateral collaboration on advanced defense
capabilities to include hypersonic and counter
hypersonic capabilities, quantum technologies, undersea
technologies, and artificial intelligence.
(3) AUKUS partner.--The term ``AUKUS partner'' refers to a
member of AUKUS.
(4) Defense article; defense service.--The terms ``defense
article'' and ``defense service'' have the meanings given those
terms in section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2794).
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States has entered into a period of intense
strategic rivalry with China that includes military competition
on a scale unseen in generations.
(2) The perpetuation of a military balance of power in the
Indo-Pacific favorable to the United States and its allies and
partners can no longer be assumed as China continues to invest
massive resources in its military.
(3) China has undertaken a nuclear breakout, fields the
world's largest navy, and is fielding a fully modernized air
force.
(4) North Korea remains an urgent and gathering threat as
it fields an increasingly diverse and advanced nuclear and
missile force backed by a massive conventional army.
(5) Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons capability
while fomenting unrest in the Middle East and beyond.
(6) While China remains the pacing threat for the United
States, Russia's unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine
makes clear that multiple dissatisfied powers are coalescing
into an informal bloc designed to challenge the existing United
States-led global order.
(7) United States efforts to help Ukraine defend itself
against Russian aggression and strengthen Taiwan's ability to
resist the coercion of the Chinese Communist Party have exposed
the production constraints inherent in the United States
defense industrial base.
(8) The capacity limitations of the United States defense
industrial base require urgent remedy to include a renewed
examination of burden sharing roles with United States allies.
(9) To meet this comprehensive challenge to American
interests, we must act at the speed of relevance to expand the
resilience and capacity of our defense industrial base. United
States allies should be full partners in this effort and the
AUKUS partnership is a necessary first step to share the
responsibility of perpetuating the existing rules-based order.
(10) The security partnership between Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States (referred to as the ``AUKUS
partnership'') is meant to bolster capability of the United
States and allies in the Indo-Pacific and beyond through
technology sharing, cooperation, and defense exports.
(11) The AUKUS partnership's focus on conventionally armed
nuclear-powered submarines and advanced capabilities, known
respectively as Pillars One and Two, rightly centers on
cooperation at the highest end of security and geostrategic
competition.
(12) Pillar One, while bold, is complex, highly contingent
and unlikely to produce additive submarine capability in the
Indo-Pacific until the 2030s.
(13) The Pillar One initiative will rely on the expertise
developed by the United States and United Kingdom in operating
their submarine fleets to bring an Australian capability into
service at the earliest achievable date.
(14) Pillar Two proposes that AUKUS partners will also
deepen cooperation and integration on advanced defense
technologies to include hypersonic missiles, space technology,
artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and additional
undersea capabilities.
(15) Pillar Two, if executed with the vision described by
the three allies in the AUKUS announcement of September 2021,
offers the potential to produce meaningful capability and
increase industrial capacity during the current decade.
(16) Pillar Two can also expand and build resilience across
the supply chain of the AUKUS partners.
(17) However, certain statutory components of the United
States export control and regulatory system are overly
cumbersome for industries in the United States, Australia, and
the United Kingdom, delaying and complicating the United States
from achieving national security objectives at the speed of
relevance.
(18) Australia and the United Kingdom have legal,
regulatory, and technology control regimes that are
sufficiently comparable to those of the United States.
(19) United States technology controls and export licensing
decisions must balance the relatively low risk of compromise
that exists across all three AUKUS partners regulatory regimes
against the requirements to respond at the speed of relevance
to the rapid military advances made by the Chinese People's
Liberation Army.
(20) In order to implement the AUKUS agreement and realize
the value of increased cooperation between the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Australia, the United States must
ensure cooperation is fostered, not inhibited, by the United
States regulatory system.
(21) The United States export control system, encompassing
both the International Traffic and Arms Regulations and the
Export Administration Regulations, is largely based on a
bilateral government-to-government relationship, is not
optimized for a trilateral arrangement, and must reflect the
new era of allied partnership continuing evolution of United
States export control regulation.
(22) The Department of State, in concert with the
Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, and other
relevant United States agencies, should clearly communicate to
our AUKUS partners any United States requirements to address
matters related to the technology security and export control
measures of Australia and the United Kingdom.
(23) Further, the Department of State, in concert with the
Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, and other
relevant United States agencies, should work to reduce barriers
to defense innovation, cooperation, trade, production, and
sustainment with the governments and industry partners of the
United Kingdom and Australia.
(24) These barriers include the overuse of ``no foreign
nationals'' (NOFORN) and Controlled Unclassified Information
(CUI) determinations that inhibit collaboration among AUKUS
partners in determining requirements, design, development,
acquisition, testing, operation, and sustainment of
capabilities designed to be interoperable.
(25) The successful implementation of the AUKUS partnership
requires regulatory and licensing changes on the part of all
AUKUS partner countries and the continued enhancement of the
export control and technology security regimes of all three
nations.
(26) If AUKUS realizes its potential, it will set a
precedent and incentivize similar agreements with other close
United States allies, which will be necessary if we are to
prevail in the long-term competition with China, Russia and its
partners.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to support a transformation and expansion of our
already close cooperation on a range of defense and security
issues with the United Kingdom and Australia, including
enhancing cooperation in the development and fielding of
advanced commercial and defense capabilities and in pursuing
deeper integration of our defense industrial bases and
supporting supply chains;
(2) to use AUKUS to enhance trilateral cooperation across
the submarine fleets of the partner countries and to support
Australian efforts to acquire nuclear-powered submarines for
the Royal Australian Navy;
(3) to reassess, and as needed revise, existing regulatory
and legal regimes, to include licensing, technology release and
contracting procedures to meet the objectives outlined in the
September 15, 2021, announcement of the AUKUS partnership;
(4) to reinvigorate burden sharing with United States
allies as a key component of adopting a sustainable long-term
strategy to compete with China, Russia, and other revanchist
dissatisfied powers; and
(5) to modernize the United States export control system to
reflect the new era of cooperation with partners and allies,
incorporating commercial and defense technology that preserve,
and enhance our way of life.
SEC. 5. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES.
(a) Senior Advisor at the State Department for AUKUS.--
(1) Designation.--The Secretary of State shall appoint a
senior advisor at the Department of State to oversee and
coordinate the implementation of the AUKUS agreement by the
Department of State (referred to in this Act as the ``Senior
Advisor'').
(2) Reporting.--The senior advisor shall report directly to
the Secretary of State.
(3) Responsibilities.--It shall be the responsibility of
the senior advisor--
(A) to coordinate AUKUS implementation between
relevant Department of State bureaus, directorates, and
offices;
(B) to represent the Department of State on matters
relating to AUKUS in the interagency process;
(C) to engage with relevant government and industry
entities in the United Kingdom and Australia; and
(D) to issue guidance, including promulgating
regulations, in order to reduce barriers to defense
collaboration, innovation, trade, and production with
the Governments and industry partners of the United
States, United Kingdom, and Australia.
(4) Salary.--The annual salary of the senior advisor
described in this section shall not exceed salaries authorized
in the Office of Personnel Management's Executive pay scale.
(b) Directorate of Defense Trade Controls Staffing.--Section 45 of
the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2717) is
amended--
(1) in the first sentence, by striking ``100 percent of the
registration fees collected by the Office of Defense Trade
Controls of the Department of State'' and inserting ``100
percent of the defense trade control registration fees
collected by the Department of State'';
(2) in the second sentence, by inserting ``management,
licensing, compliance, and policy activities in the defense
trade controls function, including'' after ``incurred for'';
(3) in paragraph (1), by striking ``contract personnel to
assist in'';
(4) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(5) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(6) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(4) the facilitation of defense trade policy development,
implementation, and cooperation with a specific focus on
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, review of commodity
jurisdiction determinations, outreach to United States industry
and foreign parties, and analysis of scientific and
technological developments as they relate to the exercise of
defense trade control authorities; and
``(5) contract personnel to assist in such activities.''.
SEC. 6. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Report on Department of State Implementation of Partnership.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and, as appropriate,
the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Energy, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
efforts of the Department of State to implement the AUKUS
partnership.
(2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1)
shall include the following elements:
(A) Regarding the achievement of Phase One goals
for of the Optimal Pathway for AUKUS Pillar One for
each of calendar years 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, and
2027, the following:
(i) A description of progress by the
Government of Australia in negotiating an
Article 14 Arrangement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
(ii) A description of the status of efforts
by the Government of Australia to build the
supporting infrastructure to base
conventionally armed nuclear powered attack
submarines.
(iii) Updates on the efforts by the
Government of Australia to train a workforce
that can build, sustain, and operate
conventionally armed nuclear powered attack
submarines.
(iv) A description of progress by the
Government of Australia in building a new
submarine facility to support the basing and
disposition of a nuclear attack submarine on
the east coast of Australia.
(v) The number of Australian personnel
embedded on United States Navy ships during
Phase One of the Optimal Pathway.
(vi) A description of progress in
establishing basing to support submarine
rotational forces in western Australia by 2027.
(vii) A description of how the United
States plans to provide up to five Virginia
Class submarines to Australia by the early to
mid-2030's.
(viii) A strategy for AUKUS partners to
integrate newly built SSN-AUKUS submarines and
five United States Virginia Class submarines
into a single, cohesive fleet.
(ix) A detailed assessment of how
Australia's sovereign conventionally armed
nuclear attack submarines contribute to United
States defense and deterrence objectives in the
Indo-Pacific region.
(B) For each of the calendar years 2021 and 2022--
(i) the average and median times for the
United States Government to review applications
for licenses, disaggregated by license type and
other agreements, to export defense articles or
defense services to persons, corporations, and
the governments (including agencies and
subdivisions of such governments, including
official missions of such governments) of
Australia and the United Kingdom;
(ii) the number of applications from
Australia and the United Kingdom for licenses
to export defense articles and defense services
that were denied, returned without action, or
approved with provisos, listed by year;
(iii) the average and median times for the
United States Government to review applications
from Australia and the United Kingdom for
foreign military sales beginning from the date
Australia or the United Kingdom submitted a
letter of request that resulted in a letter of
acceptance; and
(iv) the number of requests from Australia
and the United Kingdom for foreign military
sales that were denied.
(C) A list of relevant United States laws,
regulations, and treaties and other international
agreements to which the United States is a party that
govern authorizations to export defense articles or
defense services that are required to implement the
AUKUS partnership.
(D) An assessment of key recommendations the United
States Government has provided to the Governments of
Australia and the United Kingdom to revise laws,
regulations, and policies of such countries that are
required to implement the AUKUS partnership.
(E) An assessment of--
(i) recommended improvements to export
control laws and regulations of Australia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States that such
countries should make to implement the AUKUS
partnership and to otherwise meet the
requirements of section 38(j)(2) of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(j)(2)); and
(ii) the challenges the Governments of
Australia and the United Kingdom have conveyed
in meeting these requirements, including with
respect to sensitive defense technology
security controls.
(b) Report on Interagency Actions.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
Energy, and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on actions taken
at the interagency level to implement the advanced capabilities
pillar of the AUKUS agreement.
(2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1)
shall include the following elements:
(A) A description of changes to the International
Traffic in Regulations (ITAR) and the United States
export control regime that are necessary to implement
the AUKUS agreement and to permit AUKUS member states
and Canada to exchange defense items at classified and
unclassified levels.
(B) A plan for reducing barriers and implementing
the changes as described in ITAR, including a
description of any changes that will require new
authorities from Congress.
(C) A description of the progress the Department of
Defense, the Department of Energy, and the Department
of Commerce have made in implementing any changes as
described in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(D) A list of actions the Departments have
requested the Governments of the United Kingdom and
Australia to take in order to amend their export
control systems in a way that is comparable to that of
the United States.
(E) An assessment of the efforts of AUKUS partners
to enhance collaboration across the following eight
trilateral Lines of Effort:
(i) Undersea capabilities.
(ii) Quantum technologies.
(iii) Artificial Intelligence and autonomy.
(iv) Advanced cyber capabilities.
(v) Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic
capabilities.
(vi) Electronic warfare.
(vii) Innovation.
(viii) Information sharing.
(F) An annex describing the content and timing of
consultations amongst AUKUS partners on Pillar One and
for the eight Lines of Effort in Pillar Two.
(c) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment
of this Act, and annually thereafter for 7 years, the President shall
provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees
regarding the status of AUKUS implementation across both pillars and on
all lines of effort.
SEC. 7. EXEMPTION FOR LICENSE REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPORT OF DEFENSE ITEMS
TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND AUSTRALIA.
Section 38(j)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2778(j)(1)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B)--
(A) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``, the
United Kingdom, and Australia'' after ``Canada''; and
(B) by inserting ``, the United Kingdom, or
Australia'' after ``Canada''; and
(2) in subparagraph (C)--
(A) by striking ``treaties.--'' and all that
follows through ``(i) In general.--The requirement''
and inserting ``treaties.--The requirement'';
(B) by striking clause (ii); and
(C) by redesignating subclauses (I) and (II) as
clauses (i) and (ii) and moving such clauses, as so
redesignated, two ems to the left.
SEC. 8. UNITED STATES MUNITIONS LIST.
(a) Exemption for the Governments of the United Kingdom and
Australia From Certification and Congressional Notification
Requirements Applicable to Certain Transfers.--Section 38(f)(3) of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(f)(3)) is amended by inserting
``, the United Kingdom, or Australia'' after ``Canada''.
(b) United States Munitions List Periodic Reviews.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, acting through
authority delegated by the President to carry out period
reviews of items on the United States Munitions List under
subsection (f) of section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2778) and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Commerce, and the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall carry
out such reviews not less than every 2 years.
(2) Scope.--The periodic reviews described under paragraph
(1) shall focus on interagency resources to address current
threats faced by the United States, the evolving technological
and economic landscape, and the widespread availability of
certain technologies and items on the United States Munitions
List.
(3) Consultation.--The periodic reviews described under
paragraph (1) shall be conducted in coordination with the
Defense Trade Advisory Group (DTAG), who shall provide relevant
industry expertise and recommendations for improvements to
facilitate cooperation.
SEC. 9. OPEN GENERAL LICENSE FOR THE EXPORT, REEXPORT, TRANSFER, AND
RETRANSFER OF CERTAIN DEFENSE ARTICLES TO AUSTRALIA,
CANADA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM UNDER ITAR.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall publish in the
Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking relating to amending
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to establish a
Final Rule establishing an Open General Export License for export,
reexport, transfer, and retransfer of certain defense articles and
services to or between the United States, Australia, Canada, and the
United Kingdom. The Open General License shall be available for
exports, reexports, transfers, and retransfers of defense articles and
services between or among--
(1) the Government of Australia;
(2) the Government of Canada;
(3) the Government of the United Kingdom;
(4) members of the Australian Community as defined in part
126.16(d) of the ITAR, at all locations in Australia;
(5) members of the United Kingdom Community as defined in
part 126.17(d) of the ITAR, at all locations in the United
Kingdom; and
(6) Canadian-registered persons as defined in part 126.5(b)
of the ITAR.
(b) Applicable Requirements and Limitations.--The export, reexport,
transfer, or retransfer of any unclassified defense article pursuant to
subsection (a) to any of the parties listed in such subsection shall be
subject to the following requirements and limitations:
(1) Compliance with the requirements of part 123.9(b) of
the ITAR.
(2) Maintenance of the following records with respect to
each export, reexport, transfer, and retransfer:
(A) A description of the defense article or
service, including technical data.
(B) The name and address of the recipient and the
end-user, and other available contract information.
(C) The name of the person responsible for the
transaction.
(D) The stated end use of the defense article.
(E) The date of the transaction.
(F) The method of transfer.
(3) Ensuring that such records are made available upon
request to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) of
the Department of State.
(4) Defense articles may not be exported, reexported,
transferred, or retransferred under the licenses under
subsection (a) if they will be used to support the design,
development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly,
testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation,
destruction or processing of missile or space launch vehicles
listed as missile technology on the United States Munitions
List (USML) maintained under part 121 of the ITAR.
(5) The export, reexport, transfer, or retransfer must take
place wholly within or between the physical territory of
Australia, Canada, or the United Kingdom and the United States
except for the purposes of maintenance, repair, replacement, or
overhaul.
(6) Any export, reexport, transfer, or retransfer of a
defense article other than technical data shall be for end use
by, or operation on behalf of, the Government of Australia, the
Government of Canada, the Government of the United Kingdom, or
the Government of the United States.
(7) A license issued pursuant to subsection (a) may not be
utilized by persons to whom a presumption of denial is applied
by DDTC pursuant to part 120.1(c) or 127.11(a) of the ITAR,
including, among other reasons, for past convictions of certain
United States criminal statutes or because the persons are
otherwise ineligible to contract with or receive an export or
import license from an agency of the United States Government.
(8) No exporter may use a license issued pursuant to
subsection (a) to export, reexport, transfer, retransfer, or
otherwise provide defense articles, defense services, or
technical data to any foreign person subject to any United
States sanctions as administered by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC), subject to any embargo maintained by the
United States, or otherwise ineligible to receive defense
articles, defense services, or technical data under ITAR
license or authorizations.
(c) Congressional Notification.--The export, reexport, transfer, or
retransfer pursuant to subsection (a) of any major defense equipment
(as defined in part 120.8 of the ITAR) valued (in terms of its original
acquisition cost) at $25,000,000 or more or any defense article or
related training or other defense service valued (in terms of its
original acquisition cost) at $100,000,000 or more shall be notified to
Congress for a 15 day formal review period as outlined in the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
SEC. 10. LICENSE EXCEPTION FOR EXPORT, REEXPORT, AND IN-COUNTRY
TRANSFER OF ITEMS ON COMMERCE CONTROL LIST TO OR BETWEEN
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM UNDER EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce shall publish in the
Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking relating to amending
the Export Administration Regulations to establish a license exception
for the export, reexport, and in-country transfer of items on the
Commerce Control List to or between covered persons in Australia,
Canada, and the United Kingdom.
(b) Requirements.--A person that exports, reexports, or in-country
transfers an item on the Commerce Control List under the license
exception established under subsection (a), and a recipient of such an
item, shall--
(1) comply with all applicable requirements of the Export
Administration Regulations;
(2) maintain, for each such export, reexport, or in-country
transfer, a record of--
(A) the exporter;
(B) a description of the item, including
technology;
(C) the name and address, and other available
contact information, of the recipient and the end-user
of the item;
(D) the name of the person responsible for the
transaction;
(E) the stated end use of the item;
(F) the date of the transaction; and
(G) the method of transfer; and
(3) ensure that such records are made available, upon
request, to the Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and
Security.
(c) Limitations.--
(1) Limitation on reexports through third countries.--The
export, reexport, or in-country transfer of an item under the
license exception established under subsection (a) is required
to take place wholly within or between the physical territory
of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, or the United States,
except for the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of such
an item for the purposes of maintenance, repair, replacement,
or overhaul.
(2) Prohibition on exports to restricted persons.--An item
may not be exported, reexported, or in-country transferred
under the license exception established under subsection (a) to
any foreign person--
(A) with respect to which sanctions have been
imposed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the
Department of the Treasury;
(B) on any restricted parties list;
(C) subject to any embargo maintained by the United
States; or
(D) that is otherwise ineligible to receive
controlled dual-use or commercial articles or
technology on the Commerce Control List.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Commerce control list.--The term ``Commerce Control
List'' means the list maintained by the Bureau of Industry and
Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in
Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration
Regulations.
(2) Covered person.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided by subparagraph
(B), the term ``covered person'' means--
(i) the government of Australia, Canada, or
the United Kingdom;
(ii) a citizen or national of Australia,
Canada, or the United Kingdom; or
(iii) an entity organized under the laws
of, or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction
of, Australia, Canada, or the United Kingdom.
(B) Exclusions.--The term ``covered person'' does
not include any person on any a restricted parties
list.
(3) Restricted parties list.--The term ``restricted parties
list'' means any of the following lists maintained by the
Bureau of Industry and Security:
(A) The Entity List set forth in Supplement No. 4
to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations.
(B) The Military End-User List set forth in
Supplement No. 7 to part 744 of the Export
Administration Regulations.
(C) The Denied Persons List maintained pursuant to
section 764.3(a)(2) of the Export Administration
Regulations.
(D) The Unverified List set forth in Supplement No.
6 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations.
(4) Other terms.--The terms ``export'', ``Export
Administration Regulations'', ``in-country transfer'',
``item'', and ``reexport'' have the meanings given those terms
in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50
U.S.C. 4801).
SEC. 11. TREATMENT OF NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE AS
DOMESTIC SOURCE UNDER DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950.
Section 702(7)(A) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.
4552(7)(A)) is amended by striking ``Canada'' and inserting ``a country
of the national technology and industrial base (as defined in section
4801 of title 10, United States Code)''.
SEC. 12. EXPEDITED RELEASE OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES TO AUSTRALIA,
CANADA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM THROUGH THE FOREIGN
MILITARY SALES PROGRAM.
(a) Preclearance of Certain Military Sales Items.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
Defense, and in conjunction with coordinating entities such as
the National Disclosure Policy Committee, the Arms Transfer and
Technology Release Senior Steering Group, and other appropriate
entities, shall compile a list of available and emerging
military platforms, technologies, and equipment that are pre-
cleared and prioritized for sale and release to Australia,
Canada, and the United Kingdom through the Foreign Military
Sales program.
(2) Rules of construction regarding selection of items.--
(A) No limitation on foreign military sales program
activities.--The list compiled pursuant to paragraph
(1) shall not be construed as limiting the type,
timing, or quantity of items that may be requested by,
or sold to, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada
under the Foreign Military Sales program.
(B) Congressional notification requirements.--
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to supersede
congressional notification requirements under the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et. seq.).
(b) Expedited Processing of Foreign Military Sales Requests.--The
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall expedite the
processing of requests of Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada
under the Foreign Military Sales program.
(c) Release Policy for Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.--
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
shall create an anticipatory release policy for key Foreign Military
Sales capabilities for Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
Review of these capabilities for releasability shall be subject to a
``fast track'' decision-making process with a presumption of approval.
The capabilities subject to this policy should include--
(1) Pillar One technologies associated with submarine and
associated combat systems; and
(2) Pillar Two technologies, including hypersonic missiles,
cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum
technologies, and undersea capabilities, and other advanced
technologies.
(d) Interagency Policy.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense shall jointly review and update interagency policies and
implementation guidance related to Foreign Military Sales requests,
including incorporating the anticipatory release provisions of this
section.
SEC. 13. ANTICIPATORY DISCLOSURE POLICY FOR AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM.
The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, shall direct the National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) to
adopt a classification category for the purposes of anticipatory
disclosure policy to facilitate information sharing on Pillar One,
Pillar Two, and other critical technologies for Australia, Canada, and
the United Kingdom.
SEC. 14. REPORT ON AUKUS STRATEGY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees
an AUKUS strategy identifying.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) An identification of the defensive military capability
gaps and capacity shortfalls that AUKUS seeks to offset.
(2) An explanation of the total cost associated with Pillar
One of AUKUS and the operational rationale for Australia's
acquisition of nuclear submarines.
(3) An assessment of possible opportunity costs for other
defense capabilities associated with investing in the SSN-AUKUS
program.
(4) A detailed explanation of how the Australian industrial
base will contribute to strengthening the United States
strategic position in Asia.
(5) A detailed explanation of the military and strategic
benefit provided by the improved access provided by Australian
naval bases.
(6) An assessment of how sovereign United Kingdom and
Australian submarines contribute to the achievement of United
States military objectives as defined in United States strategy
and planning documents.
(7) A net assessment contrasting the investments the
Government of the People's Republic of China is making in its
submarine, hypersonic missile, and unmanned antisubmarine
technologies relative to that of the AUKUS partners.
SEC. 15. AUSTRALIA, UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED STATES SUBMARINE
SECURITY TRAINING.
(a) In General.--The President may transfer or authorize export of
defense services to the Government of Australia under the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) that may also be directly exported
to Australian private sector personnel to support the development of
the Australian submarine industrial base necessary for submarine
security activities between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, including where such private-sector personnel are not
officers, employees, or agents of the Government of Australia.
(b) Application of Requirements for Further Transfer.--Any transfer
of defense services to the Government of Australia pursuant to
subsection (a) to persons other than those directly provided such
defense services pursuant to such subsection shall only be made in
accordance with the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
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