[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1499 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1499
To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United
States, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 9, 2023
Mr. Markey (for himself and Mr. Merkley) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United
States, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Hastening Arms Limitations Talks Act
of 2023'' or the ``HALT Act of 2023''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an existential threat
to humanity, a fact that led President Ronald Reagan and Soviet
Premier Mikhail Gorbachev to declare in a joint statement in
1987 that a ``nuclear war cannot be won and must never be
fought'', a sentiment affirmed by the People's Republic of
China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and
the United States in January 2022.
(2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 people
attended the largest peace rally in United States history, in
support of a movement to freeze and reverse the nuclear arms
race, a movement that helped to create the political will
necessary for the negotiation of several bilateral arms control
treaties between the United States and former Soviet Union, and
then the Russian Federation. Those treaties contributed to
strategic stability through mutual and verifiable reciprocal
nuclear weapons reductions.
(3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, millions
of people around the world have stood up to demand meaningful,
immediate international action to halt, reduce, and eliminate
the threats posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing,
and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet.
(4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21
UST 483) (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT''), entered into force,
which includes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weapon
states (commonly referred to as the ``P5''), among other
things, ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race . .
. and to nuclear disarmament''.
(5) Bipartisan United States global leadership has curbed
the growth in the number of countries possessing nuclear
weapons and has slowed overall vertical proliferation among
countries already possessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted
by a more than 90 percent reduction in the United States
nuclear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 31,255 in
1967.
(6) The United States testing of nuclear weapons is no
longer necessary as a result of the following major technical
developments since the Senate's consideration of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as
the ``CTBT'') in 1999:
(A) The verification architecture of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization
(commonly referred to as the ``CTBTO'')--
(i) has made significant advancements, as
seen through its network of 300 International
Monitoring Stations and its International Data
Centre, which together provide for the near
instantaneous detection of nuclear explosives
tests, including all 6 such tests conducted by
North Korea between 2006 and 2017; and
(ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week.
(B) Since the United States signed the CTBT,
confidence has grown in the science-based Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan of the Department of
Energy, which forms the basis of annual certifications
to the President regarding the continual safety,
security, and effectiveness of the United States
nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing,
leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz to
remark in 2015 that ``lab directors today now state
that they certainly understand much more about how
nuclear weapons work than during the period of nuclear
testing''.
(7) Despite the progress made to reduce the number and role
of, and risks posed by, nuclear weapons, and to halt the Cold
War-era nuclear arms race, tensions between countries that
possess nuclear weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk
reduction treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of
weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a qualitative
global nuclear arms race is now underway with each of the
countries that possess nuclear weapons spending tens of
billions of dollars each year to maintain and improve their
arsenals.
(8) The Russian Federation is pursuing the development of
destabilizing types of nuclear weapons that are not presently
covered under any existing arms control treaty or agreement and
the People's Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea have each taken
concerning steps to diversify their more modest sized, but
nonetheless very deadly, nuclear arsenals.
(9) President Joseph R. Biden's 2022 Nuclear Posture Review
was right to label the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
missile as ``no longer necessary'', as that missile, if
deployed, would have the effect of lowering the threshold for
nuclear weapons use.
(10) On February 3, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden
preserved binding and verifiable limits on the deployed and
non-deployed strategic forces of the largest two nuclear
weapons powers through the five-year extension of the Treaty
between the United States of America and the Russian Federation
on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered
into force February 5, 2011 (commonly referred to as the ``New
START Treaty'').
(11) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons employment
strategy of the United States submitted under section 492 of
title 10, United States Code, determined that it is possible to
ensure the security of the United States and allies and
partners of the United States and maintain a strong and
credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a \1/
3\ reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level
established in the New START Treaty.
(12) On January 12, 2017, then-Vice President Biden stated,
``[G]iven our non-nuclear capabilities and the nature of
today's threats--it's hard to envision a plausible scenario in
which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States
would be necessary. Or make sense.''.
(13) In light of moves by the United States and other
countries to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons, a
global nuclear freeze would seek to halt the new nuclear arms
race by seeking conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable
freeze on the testing, deployment, and production of nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicles for such weapons.
(14) The reckless and repeated nuclear threats by Russian
President Vladimir Putin since the February 2022 invasion of
Ukraine by the Russian Federation underscore the need for a
global nuclear freeze.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
The following is the policy of the United States:
(1) The United States should build upon its decades long,
bipartisan efforts to reduce the number and salience of nuclear
weapons by leading international negotiations on specific arms-
reduction measures as part of a 21st century global nuclear
freeze movement.
(2) Building on the 2021 extension of the New START Treaty,
the United States should engage with all other countries that
possess nuclear weapons to seek to negotiate and conclude
future multilateral arms control, disarmament, and risk
reduction agreements, which should contain some or all of the
following provisions:
(A) An agreement by the United States and the
Russian Federation on a resumption of on-site
inspections and verification measures per the New START
Treaty and a follow-on treaty or agreement to the New
START Treaty that may lower the central limits of the
Treaty and cover new kinds of strategic delivery
vehicles or non-strategic nuclear weapons.
(B) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on the
testing, production, and further deployment of all
nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for such weapons.
(C) An agreement that establishes a verifiable
numerical ceiling on the deployed shorter-range and
intermediate-range and strategic delivery systems (as
defined by the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Elimination of Their Intermediate- Range and
Shorter-Range Missiles signed at Washington December 8,
1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988 (commonly
referred to as the ``Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty''), and the New START Treaty, respectively) and
the nuclear warheads associated with such systems
belonging to the P5, and to the extent possible, all
countries that possess nuclear weapons, at August 2,
2019, levels.
(D) An agreement by each country to adopt a policy
of no first use of nuclear weapons or provide
transparency into its nuclear declaratory policy.
(E) An agreement on a proactive United Nations
Security Council resolution that expands access by the
International Atomic Energy Agency to any country found
by the Board of Governors of that Agency to be
noncompliant with its obligations under the NPT.
(F) An agreement to refrain from configuring
nuclear forces in a ``launch on warning'' or ``launch
under warning'' nuclear posture, which may prompt a
nuclear armed country to launch a ballistic missile
attack in response to detection by an early-warning
satellite or sensor of a suspected incoming ballistic
missile.
(G) An agreement not to target or interfere in the
nuclear command, control, and communications (commonly
referred to as ``NC3'') infrastructure of another
country through a kinetic attack or a cyberattack.
(H) An agreement on transparency measures or
verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic cruise
missiles and glide vehicles that are fired from sea-
based, ground, and air platforms.
(I) An agreement to provide a baseline and
continuous exchanges detailing the aggregate number of
active nuclear weapons and associated systems possessed
by each country.
(3) The United States should rejuvenate efforts in the
United Nations Conference on Disarmament toward the negotiation
of a verifiable Fissile Material Treaty or Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty, or move negotiations to another international
body or fora, such as a meeting of the P5. Successful
conclusion of such a treaty would verifiably prevent any
country's production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium
for use in nuclear weapons.
(4) The United States should convene a series of head-of-
state level summits on nuclear disarmament modeled on the
Nuclear Security Summits process, which saw the elimination of
the equivalent of 3,000 nuclear weapons.
(5) The President should seek ratification by the Senate of
the CTBT and mobilize all countries covered by Annex 2 of the
CTBT to pursue similar action to hasten entry into force of the
CTBT. The entry into force of the CTBT, for which ratification
by the United States will provide critical momentum, will
activate the CTBT's onsite inspection provision to investigate
allegations that any country that is a party to the CTBT has
conducted a nuclear test of any yield.
(6) The President should make the accession of North Korea
to the CTBT a component of any final agreement in fulfilling
the pledges the Government of North Korea made in Singapore, as
North Korea is reportedly the only country to have conducted a
nuclear explosive test since 1998.
(7) The United States should--
(A) refrain from developing any new designs for
nuclear warheads or bombs, but especially designs that
could add a level of technical uncertainty into the
United States stockpile and thus renew calls to resume
nuclear explosive testing in order to test that new
design; and
(B) seek reciprocal commitments from other
countries that possess nuclear weapons.
SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR TEST EXPLOSIONS.
(a) In General.--None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2024 or any fiscal year
thereafter, or authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
available for any fiscal year before fiscal year 2024 and available for
obligation as of the date of the enactment of this Act, may be
obligated or expended to conduct or make preparations for any explosive
nuclear weapons test that produces any yield until such time as--
(1) the President submits to Congress an addendum to the
report required by section 4205 of the Atomic Energy Defense
Act (50 U.S.C. 2525) that details any change to the condition
of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile from the report
submitted under that section in the preceding year; and
(2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution of
Congress that approves the test.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Subsection (a) does not limit nuclear
stockpile stewardship activities that are consistent with the zero-
yield standard and other requirements under law.
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