[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2006 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 152
118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2006
To foster Tunisia's democratic institutions, to limit funds until
Tunisia restores checks and balances, and to authorize the creation of
a fund to support democratic reforms.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 15, 2023
Mr. Risch (for himself and Mr. Menendez) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
July 25, 2023
Reported by Mr. Menendez, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To foster Tunisia's democratic institutions, to limit funds until
Tunisia restores checks and balances, and to authorize the creation of
a fund to support democratic reforms.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Safeguarding Tunisian
Democracy Act of 2023''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In 2010 and 2011, waves of anti-government
protests and violence reshaped governments across the Middle
East and North Africa.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) While other countries in the Middle East and
North Africa experienced violent crackdown, rapid changes in
government, or descent into civil war, Tunisia's ``Jasmine
Revolution'' saw the ouster of autocratic President Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali and the emergence of a nascent, growing
democracy.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) On October 14, 2019, Tunisians overwhelmingly
elected Kais Saied, a constitutional law professor, as
President based on his pledges to combat corruption and improve
Tunisia's economic outlook.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) On July 25, 2021, President Saied unilaterally
suspended parliament and dismissed the Prime Minister, citing
exceptional circumstances and Article 80 of the 2014
constitution.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) On September 22, 2021, President Saied issued
Presidential Decree 117, consolidating full executive and
legislative powers within the presidency and authorizing
further decrees regulating the judiciary, media, political
parties, electoral law, freedoms and human rights.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) On February 6, 2022, President Saied dissolved
the Supreme Judicial Council, eliminating an independent
judiciary.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) On March 30, 2022, President Saied officially
dissolved parliament, further consolidating power and
eliminating checks and balances on the presidency.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) On June 30, 2022, President Saied unilaterally
introduced a new draft constitution, subject to a referendum,
consolidating broad powers under executive rule.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (9) On July 25, 2022, Saied claimed victory in a
constitutional referendum widely criticized for its lack of
credibility and participation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (10) On September 13, 2022, President Saied
announced Presidential Decree 2022-54 on Cybercrime, imposing
prison terms for ``false information or rumors'' online and
crippling free speech.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (11) On September 15, 2022, President Saied
announced Presidential Decree 2022-55 which weakened the role
of political parties and imposed burdensome requirements to run
for parliament.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (12) On October 15, 2022, the International
Monetary Fund reached a staff-level agreement to support
Tunisia's economic policies with a 48-month arrangement under
the Extended Fund Facility of $1,900,000,000 and the potential
for more from international donors.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (13) On December 17, 2022, only 11 percent of
Tunisians participated in parliamentary elections, reflecting
dissatisfaction with the referendum, barriers to political
parties, and low public trust for democratic institutions in
Tunisia.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (14) On January 20, 2023, 4 political opponents of
President Saied were sentenced through military courts for
``insulting a public official'' and disturbing public
order.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (15) On January 29, 2023, only 11 percent of
Tunisians participated in parliamentary run-off elections,
reaffirming low public trust for democratic institutions in
Tunisia.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (16) On February 1, 2023, President Saied extended
the state of emergency until the end of 2023.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (17) On February 10, 2023, President Saied
announced strengthened diplomatic ties with the Government of
Syria, a United States-designated State Sponsor of
Terrorism.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (18) On February 11, 2023, and in the following
weeks, President Saied launched a political crackdown by
arresting political activists, journalists, and business
leaders for allegedly plotting against the state, including by
opening a criminal investigation against a former Nidaa Tounes
parliamentarian.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (19) On February 21, 2023, President Saied
justified widespread arrests and harassment of African migrants
and Black Tunisians by accusing ``hordes of irregular
migrants'' of criminality and violence, claiming a ``criminal
enterprise hatched at the beginning of this century to change
the demographic composition of Tunisia'' threatened national
security.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (20) On February 22, 2023, Tunisian authorities
arrested Republican Party leader Issam Chebbi and National
Salvation Front member Chaima Issa.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (21) On February 24, 2023, Tunisian authorities
arrested National Salvation Front member Jawher Ben
Mbarek.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (22) On April 17, 2023, President Kais Saied vowed
``relentless war'' against opposition figures, jailed Ennahdha
party leader Rached Ghannouchi, detained president of the
National Salvation Front coalition Nejib Chebbi, and shuttered
Ennahdha offices and those of an ideologically broad opposition
coalition.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (23) As of April 20, 2023, an International
Monetary Fund loan for Tunisia remains stalled as President
Saied's characterized necessary reforms as ``foreign diktats''
and decried proposed cuts in subsidies as socially
destabilizing.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It shall be the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to forge a strong and lasting partnership with
the Government of Tunisia to support shared national security
interests to include countering the enduring threat of
transnational terrorism and promoting regional
stability;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to develop and implement a security strategy
that builds partner capacity to address shared threats and
cements the role of the United States as the partner of
choice;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) to encourage standards and training for the
Tunisian Armed Forces that enshrines military professionalism
and respect for civil-military relations;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) to support the Tunisian people's aspirations
for a democratic future and support democratic principles in
Tunisia, to include a robust civil society, respect for
freedoms of expression and association, press freedom,
separation of powers, and the rule of law;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) to support the Tunisian people's livelihoods
and aspirations for economic dignity;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) to work in tandem with our G7 and other
partners to promote Tunisia's return to democratic principles
in a manner that halts democratic backsliding, stabilizes the
economic crisis, spurs economic development, and mitigates
destabilizing migration flows; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) to readjust bilateral United States foreign
assistance, including security assistance, based on the
progress of the Government of Tunisia toward meeting the
democratic aspirations and economic needs of the Tunisian
people.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON FUNDS; CREATION OF TUNISIA DEMOCRACY
SUPPORT FUND; REPORT.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) In General.--Effective upon the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) shall limit funding to Tunisia, as provided
for in subsection (b); and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) is authorized to establish a ``Tunisia
Democracy Support Fund'', as provided for in subsection (c), to
encourage reforms that restore Tunisian democracy and rule of
law.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Limitation on Funds.--Of the funds authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available in fiscal years 2024 and 2025
to carry out chapters 1 and 8 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), chapters 1 through 6, 8, and 9 of
part II of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.), and section 23 of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) for the Government of Tunisia,
an aggregate amount of 25 percent for each such fiscal year shall be
withheld from obligation, with the exception of funding for Tunisian
civil society, until the Secretary of State determines and certifies to
the appropriate congressional committees that the state of emergency
declared on July 25, 2021, has been terminated.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Tunisia Democracy Support Fund Authorized.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary of State $100,000,000 for each of
the fiscal years 2024 and 2025, which shall be used to
establish the ``Tunisia Democracy Support Fund'' for the
purpose of encouraging reforms that restore Tunisia's
democratic institutions and rule of law.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Limitation.--Funds authorized to be
appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not be available
for obligation until the Secretary of State certifies in
writing to the appropriate congressional committees that the
Government of Tunisia has demonstrated measurable progress
towards the democratic benchmarks outlined in subsection
(d).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Democratic Benchmarks.--Pursuant to subsection (c)(2),
the democratic benchmarks to be addressed in the Secretary of State's
certification are whether the Government of Tunisia--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) appropriately empowers Parliament to serve the
Tunisian people and serve as an independent, co-equal branch of
government essential to a healthy democracy;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) restores judicial independence and establishes
the Constitutional Court in a manner that fosters an
independent judiciary and serves as a check on the
presidency;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) is taking credible steps to respect freedoms
of expression, association, and the press;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) creates an enabling operating environment in
which Tunisian civil society organizations can operate without
undue interference, including permitting international
funding;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) ceases use of military courts to try
civilians; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) ceases efforts to intimidate Tunisian
independent media through arbitrary arrests and criminal
prosecutions of journalists on illegitimate charges.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (e) Initial Report, Annual Report and Briefing.--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Initial report.--Not later than 120 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter
through 2028, the Secretary of State shall provide a report and
accompanying briefing on the state of Tunisia's democracy and
associated progress on the democratic benchmarks outlined in
subsection (d) to the appropriate congressional
committees.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Form of report.--The report required by
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (f) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the
limitation on funding under subsection (b) if the Secretary, not later
than 15 days before the waiver is to take effect, certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that such waiver is in the
national interest of the United States. The Secretary shall submit with
the certification a detailed justification explaining the reasons for
the waiver.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (g) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 5. TERMINATION.</DELETED>
<DELETED> This Act shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after
the date of the enactment of this Act.</DELETED>
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Safeguarding Tunisian Democracy Act
of 2023''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In 2010 and 2011, waves of anti-government protests and
violence reshaped governments across the Middle East and North
Africa.
(2) While other countries in the Middle East and North
Africa experienced violent crackdown, rapid changes in
government, or descent into civil war, Tunisia's ``Jasmine
Revolution'' saw the ouster of autocratic President Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali and the emergence of a nascent, growing
democracy.
(3) On October 14, 2019, Tunisians overwhelmingly elected
Kais Saied, a constitutional law professor, as President based
on his pledges to combat corruption and improve Tunisia's
economic outlook.
(4) On July 25, 2021, President Saied unilaterally
suspended parliament and dismissed the Prime Minister, citing
exceptional circumstances and Article 80 of the 2014
constitution.
(5) On September 22, 2021, President Saied issued
Presidential Decree 117, consolidating full executive and
legislative powers within the presidency and authorizing
further decrees regulating the judiciary, media, political
parties, electoral law, freedoms and human rights.
(6) On February 6, 2022, President Saied dissolved the
Supreme Judicial Council, eliminating an independent judiciary.
(7) On March 30, 2022, President Saied officially dissolved
parliament, further consolidating power and eliminating checks
and balances on the presidency.
(8) On June 30, 2022, President Saied unilaterally
introduced a new draft constitution, subject to a referendum,
consolidating broad powers under executive rule.
(9) On July 25, 2022, Saied claimed victory in a
constitutional referendum widely criticized for its lack of
credibility and participation.
(10) On September 13, 2022, President Saied announced
Presidential Decree 2022-54 on Cybercrime, imposing prison
terms for ``false information or rumors'' online and crippling
free speech.
(11) On September 15, 2022, President Saied announced
Presidential Decree 2022-55 which weakened the role of
political parties and imposed burdensome requirements to run
for parliament.
(12) On October 15, 2022, the International Monetary Fund
reached a staff-level agreement to support Tunisia's economic
policies with a 48-month arrangement under the Extended Fund
Facility of $1,900,000,000 and the potential for more from
international donors.
(13) On December 17, 2022, only 11 percent of Tunisians
participated in parliamentary elections, reflecting
dissatisfaction with the referendum, barriers to political
parties, and low public trust for democratic institutions in
Tunisia.
(14) On January 20, 2023, four political opponents of
President Saied were sentenced through military courts for
``insulting a public official'' and disturbing public order.
(15) On January 29, 2023, only 11 percent of Tunisians
participated in parliamentary run-off elections, reaffirming
low public trust for democratic institutions in Tunisia.
(16) On February 1, 2023, President Saied extended the
state of emergency until the end of 2023.
(17) On February 10, 2023, President Saied announced
strengthened diplomatic ties with the Government of Syria, a
United States-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism.
(18) On February 11, 2023, and in the following weeks,
President Saied launched a political crackdown by arresting
political activists, journalists, and business leaders for
allegedly plotting against the state, including by opening a
criminal investigation against a former Nidaa Tounes
parliamentarian.
(19) On February 21, 2023, President Saied justified
widespread arrests and harassment of African migrants and Black
Tunisians by accusing ``hordes of irregular migrants'' of
criminality and violence, claiming a ``criminal enterprise
hatched at the beginning of this century to change the
demographic composition of Tunisia'' threatened national
security.
(20) On February 22, 2023, Tunisian authorities arrested
Republican Party leader Issam Chebbi and National Salvation
Front member Chaima Issa.
(21) On February 24, 2023, Tunisian authorities arrested
National Salvation Front member Jawher Ben Mbarek.
(22) On April 17, 2023, President Kais Saied vowed
``relentless war'' against opposition figures, such as jailed
Ennahdha party leader Rached Ghannouchi, and shuttered Ennahdha
offices and the offices of an ideologically broad opposition
coalition.
(23) As of April 20, 2023, an International Monetary Fund
loan for Tunisia remains stalled as President Saied's
characterized necessary reforms as ``foreign diktats'' and
decried proposed cuts in subsidies as socially destabilizing.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It shall be the policy of the United States--
(1) to forge a strong and lasting partnership with the
Government of Tunisia to support shared national security
interests to include countering the enduring threat of
transnational terrorism and promoting regional stability;
(2) to develop and implement a security strategy that
builds partner capacity to address shared threats and cements
the role of the United States as the partner of choice;
(3) to encourage standards and training for the Tunisian
Armed Forces that enshrines military professionalism and
respect for civil-military relations;
(4) to support the Tunisian people's aspirations for a
democratic future and support democratic principles in Tunisia,
to include a robust civil society, respect for freedoms of
expression and association, press freedom, separation of
powers, and the rule of law;
(5) to support the Tunisian people's livelihoods and
aspirations for economic dignity;
(6) to work in tandem with our G7 and other partners to
promote Tunisia's return to democratic principles in a manner
that halts democratic backsliding, stabilizes the economic
crisis, spurs economic development, and mitigates destabilizing
migration flows; and
(7) to readjust bilateral United States foreign assistance,
including security assistance, based on the progress of the
Government of Tunisia toward meeting the democratic aspirations
and economic needs of the Tunisian people.
SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON FUNDS; CREATION OF TUNISIA DEMOCRACY SUPPORT
FUND; REPORT.
(a) In General.--Effective upon the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State , in conjunction with the Administrator of
the United States Agency for International Development--
(1) shall limit funding to Tunisia, as provided for in
subsection (b); and
(2) is authorized to establish a ``Tunisia Democracy
Support Fund'', as provided for in subsection (c), to encourage
reforms that restore Tunisian democracy and rule of law.
(b) Limitation on Funds.--Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated or otherwise made available in fiscal years 2024 and 2025
to carry out chapters 1 and 8 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), chapters 1 through 6, 8, and 9 of
part II of such Act (22 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.), and section 23 of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) for the Government of Tunisia,
25 percent the amount made available under each such authority for each
such fiscal year shall be withheld from obligation, with the exception
of funding for Tunisian civil society, until the Secretary of State
determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees
that the Government of Tunisia--
(1) has ceased its use of military courts to try civilians;
(2) is making clear and consistent progress in releasing
political prisoners; and
(3) has terminated all states of emergency.
(c) Tunisia Democracy Support Fund Authorized.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to
the Secretary of State $100,000,000 for each of the fiscal
years 2024 and 2025, which shall be used to establish the
``Tunisia Democracy Support Fund'' for the purpose of
encouraging reforms that--
(A) restore Tunisia's democratic institutions;
(B) restore the rule of law; and
(C) stabilize the Tunisian economy.
(2) Limitation.--Funds authorized to be appropriated
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not be available for obligation
until the Secretary of State certifies in writing to the
appropriate congressional committees that the Government of
Tunisia has demonstrated measurable progress towards the
democratic benchmarks outlined in subsection (d).
(d) Democratic Benchmarks.--Pursuant to subsection (c)(2), the
democratic benchmarks to be addressed in the Secretary of State's
certification are whether the Government of Tunisia--
(1) appropriately empowers Parliament to serve the Tunisian
people and serve as an independent, co-equal branch of
government essential to a healthy democracy;
(2) restores judicial independence and establishes the
Constitutional Court in a manner that fosters an independent
judiciary and serves as a check on the presidency;
(3) is taking credible steps to respect freedoms of
expression, association, and the press;
(4) creates an enabling operating environment in which
Tunisian civil society organizations can operate without undue
interference, including permitting international funding; and
(5) ceases efforts to intimidate Tunisian independent media
through arbitrary arrests and criminal prosecutions of
journalists on illegitimate charges.
(e) Initial Report, Annual Report and Briefing.--
(1) Initial report.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter through
2028, the Secretary of State shall provide a report and
accompanying briefing to the appropriate congressional
committees that describes--
(A) the state of Tunisia's democracy and associated
progress on the democratic benchmarks outlined in
subsection (d); and
(B) how United States foreign assistance is funding
programs to support progress towards achieving such
benchmarks.
(2) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(f) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the limitation on
funding under subsection (b) if the Secretary, not later than 15 days
before the waiver is to take effect, certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that such waiver is in the national interest
of the United States. The Secretary shall submit with the certification
a detailed justification explaining the reasons for the waiver.
(g) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 5. SUNSET.
This Act shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
Calendar No. 152
118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 2006
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To foster Tunisia's democratic institutions, to limit funds until
Tunisia restores checks and balances, and to authorize the creation of
a fund to support democratic reforms.
_______________________________________________________________________
July 25, 2023
Reported with an amendment