[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3040 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 3040
To establish the principle of reciprocity in the relationship between
the United States and the People's Republic of China, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
October 16, 2023
Mr. Sullivan (for himself and Mr. Van Hollen) introduced the following
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To establish the principle of reciprocity in the relationship between
the United States and the People's Republic of China, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``True Reciprocity Act of 2023''.
SEC. 2. RECIPROCITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In a number of areas, the relationship between the
United States and the People's Republic of China is
unacceptably nonreciprocal.
(2) The imbalance in the relationship creates avenues of
influence for the People's Republic of China and the Chinese
Communist Party in the United States that the United States
does not enjoy in the People's Republic of China.
(3) Diplomats, Members of Congress, and other officials of
the United States are highly restricted with respect to where
they can travel and with whom they can meet in the People's
Republic of China.
(4) The Government of the United States requires diplomats
of the People's Republic of China to notify the Department of
State of some travel and meeting plans, and the Government of
the United States requires such diplomats to obtain approval
from the Department of State for some travel within the United
States. However, when such approval is required, it is almost
always granted expeditiously, and access and interactions are
unimpeded.
(5) Diplomats of the People's Republic of China based in
the United States generally avail themselves of the freedom to
travel within the United States and lobby city councils,
mayors, State legislators, and Governors to support initiatives
of the People's Republic of China and refrain from passing
resolutions, issuing proclamations, or making statements
critical of the Government of the People's Republic of China.
(6) According to the Integrated Country Strategy of the
Department of State on the People's Republic of China (approved
May 3, 2022, and updated February 2, 2023), ``Local [PRC] law
enforcement and security services frequently employ
extrajudicial means against U.S. citizens without regard to
international norms, including the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations and the 1980 U.S.-China Bilateral Consular
Convention. These include broad travel prohibitions, known as
`exit bans.' These are sometimes used to prevent U.S. citizens,
who are not themselves suspected of a crime, from leaving the
PRC to pressure relatives or associates in the United States
who are wanted by PRC law enforcement to return to the PRC. PRC
officials also arbitrarily detain and interrogate U.S. citizens
for reasons related to `state security' . . . [and] the PRC
criminal justice system often subjects U.S. citizens to overly
lengthy pre-trial detention in extremely difficult conditions
while investigations are ongoing, and detention facilities
arbitrarily prevent/limit detainees' access to lawyers, medical
treatment, and mail.''
(7) The People's Republic of China is considered one of the
least free countries to operate in as a journalist, ranked 179
out of 180 in the 2023 World Press Freedom Index published by
Reporters Without Borders, above only North Korea. The ranking
of the People's Republic of China stems from the country's near
complete lack of independent journalism.
(8) In 2022, Freedom House's ``Freedom on the Net'' annual
report ranked the People's Republic of China as the world's
worst abuser of internet freedom for the eighth consecutive
year, with censorship intensifying during the 2022 Beijing
Olympics.
(9) According to the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China,
the Government of the People's Republic of China restricts the
activities of journalists from the United States and
journalists representing United States media outlets by denying
entry into the People's Republic of China or restricting access
to people and places, attempting to censor their reporting, and
harassing their colleagues and sources.
(10) The Government of the United States generally allows
journalists not affiliated with publications designated as
foreign missions under the Foreign Missions Act (22 U.S.C. 4301
et seq.) and other citizens of the People's Republic of China
to travel freely within the United States, including on college
and university campuses and in the halls of Congress.
(11) The Government of the People's Republic of China
continues to either directly or indirectly fund Confucius
Institutes and Confucius Classrooms operated on campuses of
institutions of higher education in the United States and in K-
12 public school districts, in many cases rebranding them to
avoid recent scrutiny, but similar institutes funded by the
Government of the United States in the People's Republic of
China have been forced to close.
(12) Under the Law of the People's Republic of China on the
Management of the Activities of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations in Mainland China, since 2017, foreign
nongovernmental organizations operating in mainland China have
been required to submit to supervision by the Government of the
People's Republic of China.
(13) Since 2019, the People's Republic of China has imposed
sanctions on employees of United States nongovernmental
organizations, including the National Endowment for Democracy,
Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, the National Democratic
Institute, and the International Republican Institute.
(14) The Government of the People's Republic of China has
failed to fulfill key commitments to the World Trade
Organization, including with respect to forced transfers of
intellectual property, joint venture requirements, subsidies,
and nontariff barriers, that would level opportunities for
trade, investment, and United States influence in the People's
Republic of China.
(15) The Government of the People's Republic of China
provides massive subsidies for agriculture, fishery, aluminum
and steel, and technology manufacturing and services that
distort domestic and global competition in favor of businesses
of the People's Republic of China and at the expense of market
access for United States companies. These discriminatory and
distortionary policies harm United States security at home and
give the Government of the People's Republic of China unfair
advantage in its global competition with the United States.
(16) The Government of the People's Republic of China uses
multiple policy tools, including caps on foreign equity
ownership, data localization, and other administrative
procedures, to coerce foreign companies to transfer technology
as a precondition for market access. These policies pose
immediate and far-reaching challenges for United States
companies and limit market access for United States products
and services in ways that Chinese counterparts do not face in
the United States market.
(17) The internet and online restrictions imposed by the
Government of the People's Republic of China hamper the
operations of United States businesses in the People's Republic
of China, and certain United States technology companies have
been pushed out and effectively banned from doing business in
the People's Republic of China.
(18) Businesses of the People's Republic of China, both
state- and party-owned businesses and private businesses, are
tied to representing state and party interests, and the access
of those businesses to the United States furthers those
interests.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to establish the principle of reciprocity in the
relationship between the United States and the People's
Republic of China in order to expose the full range of
instruments of influence of the People's Republic of China and
the Chinese Communist Party in the United States;
(2) to clearly differentiate, in official statements, media
communications, and messaging, between the people of the
People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party;
(3) that any negotiations on trade restrictions or
investment with respect to the People's Republic of China
should be concluded in a manner that addresses nonreciprocal
arrangements between the two countries;
(4) that any agreements resulting from such negotiations
should, to the extent possible--
(A) ensure that the People's Republic of China
commits to structural changes in its trade and economic
policies;
(B) ensure that the People's Republic of China
meets previously made bilateral and multilateral
commitments;
(C) hold the People's Republic of China accountable
to those commitments;
(D) address national security concerns related to
the targets of Chinese investments in the United
States, United States investments in the People's
Republic of China, and the export and import of
technology; and
(E) take into account ties of Chinese businesses to
the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist
Party, and the People's Liberation Army that enable
those businesses to influence United States business,
government, and society in ways closed to United States
businesses attempting to exercise the same influence in
the People's Republic of China;
(5) to seek a relationship with the People's Republic of
China that is founded on the principles of basic reciprocity
across sectors, including economic, diplomatic, educational,
and communications sectors;
(6) to prioritize the principle of reciprocity in the
relationship between the United States and the People's
Republic of China as a goal in the Integrated Country Strategy
of the Department of State on the People's Republic of China;
(7) to recognize that engagement between the United States
and the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist
Party can be useful, but only in the context of reciprocity and
when the terms of such engagement advance United States
interests; and
(8) to coordinate with allies and partners on policy
approaches to reciprocity in the relationship between the
United States and the People's Republic of China and the
Chinese Communist Party.
(c) Report and Strategy Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with relevant Federal departments and agencies,
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees--
(A) a report comparing the manners in which the
United States Government and the Government of the
People's Republic of China treat one another's
diplomats and other officials, journalists, businesses,
and nongovernmental organizations; and
(B) a strategy for addressing imbalances in the
treatment described in subparagraph (A).
(2) Elements of report.--The report required by paragraph
(1)(A) shall include the following:
(A) A summary of obstacles that United States
diplomats and other officials, journalists, businesses,
and nongovernmental organizations encounter in carrying
out their work in the People's Republic of China.
(B) A summary of United States Government
regulations and policies with regard to the activities
of diplomats and other officials, journalists,
businesses, and nongovernmental organizations of the
People's Republic of China in the United States.
(C) A description of the efforts that officials of
the United States have made to rectify any differences
in the treatment of diplomats and other officials,
journalists, businesses, and nongovernmental
organizations by the United States and by the People's
Republic of China, and the results of those efforts.
(D) An assessment of the adherence of the
Government of the People's Republic of China, in its
treatment of United States citizens, to the
requirements of--
(i) the Convention on Consular Relations,
done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into
force March 19, 1967 (21 U.S.T. 77); and
(ii) the Consular Convention, signed at
Washington September 17, 1980, and entered into
force February 19, 1982, between the United
States and the People's Republic of China.
(E) An assessment of any impacts of the People's
Republic of China's internet restrictions on
reciprocity between the United States and the People's
Republic of China.
(F) A summary of other notable areas in which the
Government of the People's Republic of China or
entities affiliated with that Government are able to
conduct activities or investments in the United States
but that are denied to United States entities in the
People's Republic of China.
(G) Recommendations for any changes in law
necessary to improve reciprocity in the relationship
between the United States and the People's Republic of
China.
(3) Form of report; availability.--
(A) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1)(A)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified index.
(B) Availability.--The unclassified portion of the
report required by paragraph (1)(A) shall be posted on
a publicly available internet website of the Department
of State.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2) Reciprocity.--The term ``reciprocity'' means the mutual
and equitable exchange of privileges between governments,
countries, businesses, or individuals.
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