[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3110 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 3110
To support United States policy toward Taiwan.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
October 24, 2023
Mr. Rubio (for himself and Mr. Merkley) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To support United States policy toward Taiwan.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act
of 2023''.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States Government should strengthen
cooperation with the military of Taiwan under the framework of
the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et
seq.) and the Six Assurances with consideration of the ongoing
military buildup in China and the imbalance in the security
environment in the Taiwan Strait;
(2) the United States Government should urge Taiwan to
increase its own investments in military capabilities that
support implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy;
(3) the United States Government should promote dignity and
respect for its Taiwanese counterparts, who represent more than
23,000,000 citizens, by using the full range of diplomatic and
financial tools available to promote Taiwan's inclusion and
meaningful participation in international organizations as well
as in bilateral and multilateral security summits, military
exercises, and economic dialogues and forums; and
(4) in order to deepen economic ties and advance the
interests of the United States, the United States Government
should prioritize the negotiation of a free-trade agreement
with Taiwan that provides high levels of labor rights and
environmental protection as soon as possible.
SEC. 3. A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PARTNERSHIP WITH TAIWAN.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
create and execute a plan for enhancing its relationship with Taiwan by
forming a robust partnership that meets the challenges of the 21st
century, fully accounts for Taiwan's democratization, and remains
faithful to United States principles and values in keeping with the
Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances.
(b) Interagency Taiwan Policy Task Force.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall create
an interagency Taiwan policy task force consisting of senior officials
from the Office of the President, the National Security Council, the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Office of the United
States Trade Representative.
(c) Report.--The interagency Taiwan Policy Task Force established
under subsection (b) shall submit an annual unclassified report with a
classified annex to the appropriate congressional committees outlining
policy and actions to be taken to create and execute a plan for
enhancing our partnership and relations with Taiwan.
SEC. 4. AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN.
The position of Director of the American Institute in Taiwan's
Taipei office shall be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate,
and effective upon enactment of this Act shall have the title of
Representative.
SEC. 5. REPORT ON EDUCATION AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on cooperation between the United States Government
and the Taiwanese Government on efforts to promote freedom, democracy,
universal values, culture, and history in conjunction with Chinese
language education.
SEC. 6. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
promote Taiwan's inclusion and meaningful participation in meetings
held by international organizations.
(b) Support for Meaningful Participation.--The Permanent
Representative of the United States to the United Nations and other
relevant United States officials should actively support Taiwan's
membership and meaningful participation in international organizations.
(c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on China's efforts at the United
Nations and other international bodies to block Taiwan's meaningful
participation and inclusion and recommend appropriate responses to be
taken by the United States.
SEC. 7. INVITATION OF TAIWANESE COUNTERPARTS TO HIGH-LEVEL BILATERAL
AND MULTILATERAL FORUMS AND EXERCISES.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
invite Taiwanese counterparts to participate in high-level bilateral
and multilateral summits, military exercises, and economic dialogues
and forums.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States Government should invite Taiwan to
regional dialogues on issues of mutual concern;
(2) the United States Government and Taiwanese counterparts
should resume meetings under the United States-Taiwan Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement and reach a bilateral free trade
agreement;
(3) the United States Government should invite Taiwan to
participate in bilateral and multilateral military training
exercises; and
(4) the United States Government and Taiwanese counterparts
should engage in a regular and routine strategic bilateral
dialogue on arms sales in accordance with Foreign Military
Sales mechanisms, and the United States Government should
support export licenses for direct commercial sales supporting
Taiwan's indigenous defensive capabilities.
SEC. 8. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST UNDERMINING UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING
TAIWAN.
(a) Finding.--Congress finds that the efforts by the Government of
the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party to
compel private United States businesses, corporations, and
nongovernmental entities to use PRC-mandated language to describe the
relationship between Taiwan and China are an intolerable attempt to
enforce political censorship globally and should be considered an
attack on the fundamental underpinnings of all democratic and free
societies, including the constitutionally protected right to freedom of
speech.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States Government, in coordination with United States businesses and
nongovernmental entities, should formulate a code of conduct for
interacting with the Government of the People's Republic of China and
the Chinese Communist Party and affiliated entities, the aim of which
is--
(1) to counter PRC sharp power operations, which threaten
free speech, academic freedom, and the normal operations of
United States businesses and nongovernmental entities; and
(2) to counter PRC efforts to censor the way the world
refers to issues deemed sensitive to the Government of the
People's Republic of China and Chinese Communist Party leaders,
including issues related to Taiwan, Tibet, the Tiananmen Square
Massacre, and the mass internment of Uyghurs and other Turkic
Muslims, among many other issues.
(c) Prohibition on Recognition of PRC Claims to Sovereignty Over
Taiwan.--
(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) issues related to the sovereignty of Taiwan are
for the people of Taiwan to decide through the
democratic process they have established;
(B) the dispute between the People's Republic of
China and Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with
the assent of the people of Taiwan;
(C) the primary obstacle to peaceful resolution is
the authoritarian nature of the PRC political system
under one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party,
which is fundamentally incompatible with Taiwan's
democracy; and
(D) any attempt to coerce the people of Taiwan to
accept a political arrangement that would subject them
to direct or indirect rule by the PRC, including a
``one country, two systems'' framework, would
constitute a grave challenge to United States security
interests in the region.
(2) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United
States to oppose any attempt by the PRC authorities to
unilaterally impose a timetable or deadline for unification on
Taiwan.
(3) Prohibition on recognition of prc claims without assent
of people of taiwan.-- No department or agency of the United
States Government may formally or informally recognize PRC
claims to sovereignty over Taiwan without the assent of the
people of Taiwan, as expressed directly through the democratic
process.
(4) Treatment of taiwan government.--
(A) In general.--The Department of State and other
United States Government agencies shall treat the
democratically elected Government of Taiwan as the
legitimate representative of the people of Taiwan and
end the outdated practice of referring to the
government in Taiwan as the ``authorities''.
Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of the
American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out United
States foreign policy and protecting United States
interests in Taiwan, the United States Government shall
not place any restrictions on the ability of officials
of the Department of State and other United States
Government agencies from interacting directly and
routinely with counterparts in the Taiwan government.
(B) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this
paragraph shall be construed as entailing restoration
of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China,
which were terminated on January 1, 1979, or altering
the United States Government's position on Taiwan's
international status.
(d) Strategy To Protect United States Businesses and
Nongovernmental Entities From Coercion.--Not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall
submit an unclassified report, with a classified annex if necessary, to
protect United States businesses and nongovernmental entities from
sharp power operations, including coercion and threats that lead to
censorship or self-censorship, or which compel compliance with
political or foreign policy positions of the Government of the People's
Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party. The strategy shall
include the following elements:
(1) Information on efforts by the Government of the
People's Republic of China to censor the websites of United
States airlines, hotels, and other businesses regarding the
relationship between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China.
(2) Information on efforts by the Government of the
People's Republic of China to target United States
nongovernmental entities through sharp power operations
intended to weaken support for Taiwan.
(3) Information on United States Government efforts to
counter the threats posed by Chinese state-sponsored propaganda
and disinformation, including information on best practices,
current successes, and existing barriers to responding to this
threat.
(4) Details of any actions undertaken to create a code of
conduct pursuant to subsection (b) and a timetable for
implementation.
SEC. 9. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO SHARP POWER OPERATIONS TARGETING TAIWAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and
implement a strategy to respond to sharp power operations and the
united front campaign supported by the Government of the People's
Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed
toward persons or entities in Taiwan.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall
include the following elements:
(1) Development of a response to PRC propaganda and
disinformation campaigns and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan,
including--
(A) assistance in building the capacity of the
Taiwan Government and private-sector entities to
document and expose propaganda and disinformation
supported by the Government of the People's Republic of
China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated
entities;
(B) assistance to enhance the Taiwan Government's
ability to develop a whole-of-government strategy to
respond to sharp power operations, including election
interference; and
(C) media training for Taiwan officials and other
Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns.
(2) Development of a response to political influence
operations that includes an assessment of the extent of
influence exerted by the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local
political parties, financial institutions, media organizations,
and other entities.
(3) Support for exchanges and other technical assistance to
strengthen the Taiwan legal system's ability to respond to
sharp power operations.
(4) Establishment of a coordinated partnership, through the
Global Cooperation and Training Framework, with like-minded
governments to share data and best practices with the
Government of Taiwan on ways to address sharp power operations
supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China
and the Chinese Communist Party.
SEC. 10. REPORT ON DETERRENCE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
joint report that assesses the military posture of Taiwan and the
United States as it specifically pertains to the deterrence of military
conflict and conflict readiness in the Taiwan Strait. In light of the
changing military balance in the Taiwan Strait, the report should
include analysis of whether current Taiwan and United States policies
sufficiently deter efforts to determine the future of Taiwan by other
than peaceful means.
SEC. 11. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2) Sharp power.--The term ``sharp power'' means the
coordinated and often concealed application of disinformation,
media manipulation, economic coercion, cyber-intrusions,
targeted investments, and academic censorship that is
intended--
(A) to corrupt political and nongovernmental
institutions and interfere in democratic elections and
encourage self-censorship of views at odds with those
of the Government of the People's Republic of China or
the Chinese Communist Party; or
(B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or
outcomes in Taiwan and elsewhere that support the
interests of the Government of the People's Republic of
China or the Chinese Communist Party.
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