[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3225 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 3225
To impose sanctions with respect to any foreign person that the
President determines engages in or has engaged in a significant
transaction or transactions, or any dealings with, or has provided
material support to or for a military or intelligence facility of the
People's Republic of China in Cuba, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November 2, 2023
Mr. Risch (for himself, Mr. Barrasso, Mr. Hagerty, and Mr. Ricketts)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To impose sanctions with respect to any foreign person that the
President determines engages in or has engaged in a significant
transaction or transactions, or any dealings with, or has provided
material support to or for a military or intelligence facility of the
People's Republic of China in Cuba, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Countering Espionage And
Surveillance Entities in Cuba Act'' or the ``CEASE Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) On January 11, 2021, the Department of State designated
the Government of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism for
repeatedly providing support for acts of international
terrorism in granting safe harbor to terrorists, and Cuba
remains a significant national security threat to the United
States.
(2) The People's Republic of China and Cuba have maintained
close strategic relations since 1960, including through
diplomatic, military, economic, and intelligence cooperation,
reaffirmed by the People's Republic of China designating Cuba
as ``good brother, good comrade, good friend'', a title that is
not shared by any other country in the world.
(3) The relationship between the Government of Cuba and the
Government of the People's Republic of China heightens the
national security threat to the United States.
(4) A staff research report entitled ``China's Engagement
with Latin America and the Caribbean'' published by the by the
United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission in
October 2018 asserts that the military relationship between the
People's Republic of China and Cuba ``is characterized by
frequent senior-level meetings and technical assistance
provided by China's military to Cuba's military''.
(5) The report also asserts that the People's Republic of
China ``has a physical presence at multiple Soviet-era
intelligence facilities at Lourdes, Bejucal, and Santiago de
Cuba to collect signals intelligence''.
(6) In April 2019, September 2020, and January 2021, the
Department of State updated the List of Restricted Entities and
Subentities Associated with Cuba (commonly known as the ``Cuba
Restricted List'') to include entities and subentities under
the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, Cuban military,
intelligence, or security services or personnel with which
direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit
such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people
or private enterprise in Cuba.
(7) Recommendations issued in 2022 by the Committee for the
Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States
Telecommunications Services Sector stated that the People's
Republic of China ``remains the most sophisticated
counterintelligence and cyber threat to the United States''.
(8) According to the most recent report submitted to
Congress by the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to
section 108B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3043b) (commonly referred to as the ``Annual Threat
Assessment''), the People's Republic of China is expanding its
global intelligence and covert influence posture and
``represents the broadest, most active, and persistent cyber
espionage threat'' to the United States.
(9) On June 10, 2023, the White House confirmed reports
that the People's Republic of China has been operating and
upgrading intelligence collection facilities in Cuba since at
least 2019, and the People's Republic of China ``will keep
trying to enhance its presence in Cuba''.
(10) The People's Republic of China and Cuba have expanded
defense relations in recent years, including ``military-to-
military strategic mutual trust and practical cooperation'',
such as regular institutional and senior leader visits between
the two countries and the establishment of joint artificial
intelligence centers.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the growing military and intelligence collaboration
between the Government of People's Republic of China and the
Government of Cuba is a threat to the United States and the
peace and stability of the Western Hemisphere;
(2) the Secretary of State should ensure that United States
diplomatic personnel abroad understand, and are communicating
with foreign officials, the reasons for concerns of the United
States with respect to the military and intelligence
partnership between the Government of Cuba and the Government
of the People's Republic of China; and
(3) the Secretary of State should ensure that United States
diplomatic personnel abroad are urging foreign governments to
cooperate more effectively to address the threat from military
and intelligence cooperation between the Government of Cuba and
the Government of the People's Republic of China.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to hold accountable any foreign person that engages in
or has engaged in a significant transaction or transactions, or
any significant dealings with, or has provided, directly or
indirectly, material support to a military or intelligence
facility of the People's Republic of China in Cuba;
(2) to seek the speedy termination of access by the
Government of the People's Republic of China to military and
intelligence facilities in Cuba; and
(3) to be prepared to reduce sanctions imposed under
section 5 in response to the verifiable termination of access
by the Government of the People's Republic of China to and
withdrawal of personnel, including advisers, technicians, and
military personnel, from such facilities.
SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY AND
INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
IN CUBA.
(a) In General.--The President shall direct the Secretary of State
to impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any
foreign person that the Secretary determines engages in or has engaged
in a significant transaction or transactions, or any significant
dealings with, or has provided material support to or for a military or
intelligence facility of the People's Republic of China in Cuba.
(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection with respect to a foreign person are the following:
(1) Asset blocking.--The exercise of all powers granted to
the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block
and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in
property of the foreign person if such property and interests
in property are in the United States, come within the United
States, or are or come within the possession or control of a
United States person.
(2) Exclusion from the united states and revocation of visa
or other documentation.--In the case of a foreign person who is
an alien, denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United
States of, the alien, and revocation in accordance with section
221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1201(i)), of any visa or other documentation of the alien.
(c) Implementation; Penalties.--
(1) Implementation.--The President shall exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and
1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties.--A person that knowingly violates, attempts
to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (b)(2) or any regulation, license, or order issued
to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties
set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to
the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of that section.
(d) Exceptions.--
(1) Importation of goods.--
(A) In general.--The authorities and requirements
to impose sanctions authorized under this section shall
not include the authority or a requirement to impose
sanctions on the importation of goods.
(B) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term
``good'' means any article, natural or manmade
substance, material, supply, or manufactured product,
including inspection and test equipment, and excluding
technical data.
(2) Compliance with united nations headquarters
agreement.--Sanctions under subsection (b)(3) shall not apply
to an alien if admitting the alien into the United States is
necessary to permit the United States to comply with the
Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force
November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United
States, or other applicable international obligations.
(e) Termination of Sanctions.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, this section shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after
the date on which the President determines and certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees (and Congress has not enacted
legislation disapproving the determination within that 30-day period)
that Cuba has closed and dismantled all military or intelligence
facilities of the People's Republic of China in Cuba.
(f) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The President may waive the application of
sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person
if the President, not later than 10 days before the waiver is
to take effect, determines and certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that the waiver is in the vital
national security interest of the United States.
(2) Justification.--The President shall include with a
certification submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to a
waiver a detailed justification explaining the reasons for the
waiver.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Alien.--The term ``alien'' has the meaning given that
term in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' includes--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
(3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a
person that is not a United States person.
(4) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or
entity.
(5) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) an individual who is a United States citizen or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
the United States;
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the
United States or any jurisdiction within the United
States, including a foreign branch of such an entity;
or
(C) any person in the United States.
SEC. 6. REPORT ON ASSISTANCE BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF CUBA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
describing--
(1) diplomatic engagement between the Government of the
People's Republic of China and the Government of Cuba;
(2) the military and intelligence activities of the
Government of the People's Republic of China in Cuba, including
any military or intelligence facilities used by that government
in Cuba;
(3) the purposes for which the Government of the People's
Republic of China conducts those activities and uses those
facilities in Cuba;
(4) the extent to which the Government of the People's
Republic of China provides payment or government credits to the
Government of Cuba for the continued use of those facilities in
Cuba; and
(5) any progress toward the verifiable termination of
access by the Government of the People's Republic of China to
those facilities and withdrawal of personnel, including
advisers, technicians, and military personnel, from those
facilities.
(b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form and shall include a classified annex.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agency or instrumentality of the government of cuba.--
The term ``agency or instrumentality of the Government of
Cuba'' means an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as
defined in section 1603(b) of title 28, United States Code,
with each reference in that section to ``a foreign state''
deemed to be a reference to ``Cuba''.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' includes--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
(3) Government of cuba.--The term ``Government of Cuba''
includes the government of any political subdivision of Cuba
and any agency or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba.
SEC. 7. REPORT ON SPECIFIC LICENSES THAT AUTHORIZE TRANSACTIONS WITH
SANCTIONED PERSONS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of
the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit
to the committees specified in subsection (c) a report that includes--
(1) a list of specific licenses issued by the Secretary of
the Treasury during the period specified in subsection (b) that
authorize any transaction with a person with respect to which
sanctions have been imposed under section 5 or any relevant
Executive order; and
(2) a copy of each such license.
(b) Period Specified.--The period specified in this subsection is--
(1) in the case of the first report required by paragraph
(1), the 180-day period preceding submission of the report; and
(2) in the case of any subsequent report required by that
paragraph, the 90-day period preceding submission of the
report.
(c) Committees Specified.--The committees specified in this
subsection are--
(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Financial Services and the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
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