[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3334 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 3334
To require reports on and impose sanctions with respect to Iran's
development of space-launch vehicles, intercontinental ballistic
missiles, and unmanned aerial systems, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November 15, 2023
Mr. Cotton introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require reports on and impose sanctions with respect to Iran's
development of space-launch vehicles, intercontinental ballistic
missiles, and unmanned aerial systems, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``No ICBMs or Drones
for Iran Act of 2023''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--SANCTIONS AND REPORT ON IRANIAN SPACE-LAUNCH VEHICLES AND
INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES
Sec. 101. Findings; sense of Congress.
Sec. 102. Determination and mandatory imposition of sanctions under
Executive Order 13382.
Sec. 103. Report on support for Iran's space, aerospace, and ballistic
missile sectors and United States capacity
to deny intercontinental ballistic missile
attacks from Iran.
Sec. 104. Report on senior officials of Government of Iran responsible
for space-launch vehicle or ballistic
missile tests.
TITLE II--SANCTIONS AND REPORTS RELATING TO IRANIAN UNMANNED AERIAL
SYSTEMS
Sec. 201. Findings; sense of Congress.
Sec. 202. Inclusion of unmanned aerial systems and cruise missiles
under Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.
Sec. 203. Inclusion of unmanned aerial systems in enforcement of arms
embargos under Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
Sec. 204. Inclusion of unmanned aerial systems under Iran-Iraq Arms
Non-Proliferation Act of 1992.
Sec. 205. Strategy to counter Iranian unmanned aerial systems.
Sec. 206. Report on support for Iran's unmanned aerial system program
and related technology transfers.
Sec. 207. Unmanned aerial system defined.
TITLE III--EXPANSION OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996
Sec. 301. Expansion of Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.
TITLE I--SANCTIONS AND REPORT ON IRANIAN SPACE-LAUNCH VEHICLES AND
INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES
SEC. 101. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Islamic Republic of Iran has the largest ballistic
missile arsenal in the Middle East, which Iran uses to threaten
forces of the United States and partners of the United States
in the region.
(2) Iran is progressing toward developing an
intercontinental ballistic missile (commonly referred to an
``ICBM'') capability. In 2023, the Defense Intelligence Agency
reported that Iran's progress on its space-launch vehicles
shortens the time needed for Iran to produce an ICBM since
space-launch vehicles and ICBMs use similar technologies.
(3) Iran continues to rely on illicit foreign procurement
to support its long-range missile aspirations. For example,
Iran recently tried to purchase from the Russian Federation and
the People's Republic of China ammonium perchlorate, which is
the main ingredient in solid propellants to power missiles.
(4) Iran relies at least in part on networks in Hong Kong
and the People's Republic of China to procure dual-use
materials and equipment for its longer-range ballistic missile
program.
(5) North Korea historically has played a role in
supporting longer-range Iranian ballistic missile capabilities.
Specifically, North Korea provided the Nodong-A to Iran in the
1990s, which Iran used to develop both its first nuclear-
capable medium-range ballistic missile and liquid propellant
engines for its space-launch vehicles.
(6) While the Iran Space Agency, a government organization
subject to sanctions, develops space capabilities for Iran's
ministry of defense as well as the communications sector,
Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (commonly
referred to as the ``IRGC-AF'') runs a parallel space program
employing solid-propellant motors, which if used in ICBM
technology, would enable launches with little warning.
(7) Iran continues work on larger diameter solid-propellant
motors, like the Rafa'e, and is now reportedly in the
possession of an all-solid-propellant space-launch vehicle
called the Qaem-100. The Qaem-100 was reportedly tested twice,
once in November 2022 and again in March 2023.
(8) The IRGC-AF last successfully launched a satellite into
orbit in September 2023 using its Qased rocket, fueled by both
liquid- and solid-fueled stages.
(9) Iran's development, production, and transfer of space-
launch vehicle and ballistic missile technology violated Annex
B of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),
which enshrined certain restrictions under the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action. Those restrictions expired on
October 18, 2023.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Iran's space program continues to function as a cover
for Iran's quest for an ICBM;
(2) the possession by Iran of an ICBM would pose a direct
threat to the United States homeland and partners of the United
States in Europe; and
(3) the United States should work to deny Iran the ability
to hold the United States homeland or European partners of the
United States at risk with an ICBM.
SEC. 102. DETERMINATION AND MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13382.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall--
(1) determine whether each individual or entity specified
in subsection (b) meets the criteria for the imposition of
sanctions under Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note;
relating to blocking property of weapons of mass destruction
proliferators and their supporters); and
(2) with respect to any such individual or entity the
President determines does meet such criteria, impose such
sanctions.
(b) Individuals and Entities Specified.--The individuals and
entities specified in this subsection are the following:
(1) The Space Division of the IRGC-AF.
(2) All senior officers of the IRGC-AF.
(3) Brigadier General Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of
the IRGC-AF.
(4) General Majid Mousavi, the deputy commander of the
IRGC-AF.
(5) Second Brigadier General Ali-Jafarabadi, the commander
of the Space Division of the IRGC-AF.
SEC. 103. REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S SPACE, AEROSPACE, AND BALLISTIC
MISSILE SECTORS AND UNITED STATES CAPACITY TO DENY
INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACKS FROM IRAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Commerce, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to
the congressional defense committees a report that includes the
following:
(1) An identification of entities in Iran not subject to
sanctions imposed by the United States as of the date of the
report that are helping to support Iran's space, aerospace, and
ballistic missile sectors, including public and private
entities making a material contribution to Iran's development
of space-launch vehicles or ICBMs.
(2) An identification of the countries the governments of
which continue to support Iran's space, aerospace, and
ballistic missile activities.
(3) With respect to each country identified under paragraph
(2), the following:
(A) Actions taken by the government of the country
or other entities within the country to support Iran's
space, aerospace, and ballistic missile activities,
including the transfer of missiles, engines, propellant
or materials that can be used for fuel, or other
technologies that could make a material contribution to
development of space-launch vehicles or ICBMs.
(B) Any actions described in subparagraph (A) or
proposals for such actions being negotiated or
discussed as of the date of the report.
(4) An assessment of Iran's ICBM technology, including the
following:
(A) Key steps Iran would need to take to develop an
ICBM.
(B) An assessment of which rocket motors Iran would
likely use to build an ICBM.
(C) Technological hurdles Iran would still need to
overcome to develop an ICBM.
(D) Pathways to overcome the hurdles described in
subparagraph (C), including the potential transfer of
technologies from North Korea, the Russian Federation,
or the People's Republic of China.
(E) An estimated timeline for Iran to develop an
ICBM if Iran chooses to do so.
(5) An assessment of the missile defense capabilities of
the United States, as of the date of the report and anticipated
for the future, with respect to denying an attack by Iran on
the United States homeland, including the following:
(A) An assessment of the ability of the Ground-
Based Midcourse Defense System, as it exists on the
date of the enactment of this Act, to prevent such an
attack.
(B) An assessment of how the procurement of the
Next Generation Interceptor would improve the ability
of the United States to intercept ICBMs launched from
Iran.
(C) How a third missile defense site on the East
Coast of the United States would improve the ability of
the United States to intercept ICBMs launched from
Iran.
(b) Updates.--As new information becomes available and not less
frequently than annually, the Secretary shall submit to the
congressional defense committees an updated version of the report
required by subsection (a) that includes updated information under
paragraphs (1) through (4) of that subsection.
(c) Form.--Each report submitted under this section shall be
submitting in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this section, the
term ``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given that
term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.
SEC. 104. REPORT ON SENIOR OFFICIALS OF GOVERNMENT OF IRAN RESPONSIBLE
FOR SPACE-LAUNCH VEHICLE OR BALLISTIC MISSILE TESTS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which the
President determines that the Government of Iran has conducted a test
of a space-launch vehicle or ballistic missile, the President shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notification that
identifies each senior official of the Government of Iran that the
President determines is responsible for ordering, controlling, or
otherwise directing the test.
(b) Elements.--The notification required by subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) available information on the ballistic missile or the
generic class of ballistic missile or space rocket that was
launched;
(2) the trajectory, duration, range, and altitude of the
flight of the missile or rocket;
(3) the duration, range, and altitude of the flight of each
stage of the missile or rocket;
(4) the location of the launch point and impact point;
(5) the payload; and
(6) other technical information that is available.
(c) Form.--The notification required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
TITLE II--SANCTIONS AND REPORTS RELATING TO IRANIAN UNMANNED AERIAL
SYSTEMS
SEC. 201. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Iran has a robust unmanned aerial system program under
which Iran operates several unmanned aerial systems, including
combat drones, drones capable of conducting intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, and suicide or kamikaze
drones.
(2) As of December 2022, Iran reportedly supplied more than
1,700 unmanned aerial systems to the Russian Federation,
including several hundred of the Shahed-136 suicide drone.
(3) Iran and the Russian Federation are reportedly planning
to build 6,000 Geran-2 drones, the Russian-made version of the
Iranian Shahed-136, at a new facility in the Russian
Federation.
(4) The Iranian supply of unmanned aerial systems to the
Russian Federation has fueled the Russian Federation's
murderous invasion of Ukraine and caused countless civilian
deaths.
(5) The United States found parts made by more than a dozen
United States or western companies in an Iranian unmanned
aerial system downed in Ukraine, which are likely transferred
to Iran illegally.
(6) Iran is also responsible for the proliferation of
unmanned aerial systems to terrorist groups in the Middle East,
including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis
in Yemen, which have all employed drones in their murderous
attacks on Israel following the October 7, 2023, terrorist
attacks by Hamas in Israel, which killed more than 1,400
innocent civilians.
(7) Iran's transfer of unmanned aerial systems to other
governments and terrorist groups has violated Annex B of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) and
restrictions imposed under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action, which expired on October 18, 2023.
(8) Upon the expiration of those restrictions, Iran's
transfer of deadly unmanned aerial systems and ballistic
missiles to actors like Hamas and the Russian Federation became
legal under international law.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) Iran's unmanned aerial system program contributes
significantly to the instability of the Middle East and
threatens the security of the United States and its partners in
the Middle East, including Israel;
(2) the provision of Iranian unmanned aerial systems gives
the Russian Federation an advantage in its war in Ukraine and
contributes to the dangerous partnership between Iran and the
Russian Federation;
(3) the expiration of restrictions under the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action and Annex B of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2231 on October 18, 2023, helps
facilitate Iran's development and transfer of deadly unmanned
aerial systems and ballistic missiles to actors like Hamas and
the Russian Federation; and
(4) the United States should seek to hinder Iran's unmanned
aerial system production, its transfer of such systems to the
Russian Federation, Hamas, and other hostile state and non-
state actors, and to prevent the further use of United States
components in Iranian unmanned aerial systems.
SEC. 202. INCLUSION OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS AND CRUISE MISSILES
UNDER COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
DIVESTMENT ACT OF 2010.
(a) Findings.--Section 2(1) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501(1)) is
amended by striking ``and ballistic missiles'' and inserting ``,
ballistic missiles, and unmanned aerial systems and cruise missiles''.
(b) Inclusion in Goods, Services, and Technologies of Diversion
Concern.--Section 302(b)(1)(B) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8542(b)(1)(B)) is
amended--
(1) in clause (ii), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv); and
(3) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:
``(iii) unmanned aerial system (as defined
in section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for
Iran Act of 2023) or cruise missile program;
or''.
(c) Sunset.--Section 401(a)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)(2)) is
amended by striking ``and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile
launch technology'' and inserting ``, ballistic missiles and ballistic
missile launch technology, and unmanned aerial system (as defined in
section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023) and cruise
missile programs.''.
SEC. 203. INCLUSION OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS IN ENFORCEMENT OF ARMS
EMBARGOS UNDER COUNTERING AMERICA'S ADVERSARIES THROUGH
SANCTIONS ACT.
Section 107(a)(1) of the Countering America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9406(a)(1)) is amended by inserting ``unmanned
aerial systems (as defined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for
Iran Act of 2023),'' after ``warships,''.
SEC. 204. INCLUSION OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS UNDER IRAN-IRAQ ARMS
NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1992.
Section 1608(1) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992
(Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by inserting
``unmanned aerial systems (as defined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or
Drones for Iran Act of 2023),'' after ``cruise missiles,''.
SEC. 205. STRATEGY TO COUNTER IRANIAN UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report (with a classified annex) that
includes a strategy for countering Iran's growing unmanned aerial
systems program and its transfer of unmanned aerial systems and related
technology to foreign states and non-state actors.
(b) Plan To Prevent Iran Obtaining United States Materials.--
(1) In general.--The strategy required by subsection (a)
shall draw upon the work of the President Biden's interagency
task force investigating the presence of United States parts in
Iranian unmanned aerial systems to develop a plan for
preventing Iran from obtaining United States materials for its
unmanned aerial system program.
(2) Elements.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A list of identified United States components
found in Iranian unmanned aerial systems and a list of
United States suppliers of those components.
(B) An assessment of existing export controls for
components described in subparagraph (A) and a plan to
strengthen those export controls, including through any
necessary legislative action by Congress.
(C) An investigation into and identification of
foreign actors, including individuals and government
and nongovernmental entities, that are supplying
components to the Iranian unmanned aerial system and
weapons programs.
(D) Strategies to deny supply chains for such
components, including any sanctions or other actions to
target the individuals or entities identified under
subparagraph (C).
(E) An identification of any additional authorities
or funding needed to enable the investigation of how
Iran is obtaining United States components for its
unmanned aerial system program.
(F) An assessment of how the Bureau of Industry and
Security of the Department of Commerce is monitoring
compliance with their restrictions on Iranian unmanned
aerial system producers aimed at ensuring United States
and other foreign-made components are not being used in
Iranian unmanned aerial systems.
(G) An investigation into Iran's use of shell
companies to evade sanctions and restrictions on the
use of United States or other foreign-made components
in Iranian unmanned aerial system production.
(H) Strategies to ensure United States
manufacturers of critical components for unmanned
aerial systems can verify the end users of those
components.
(I) Any other actions that could be use to disrupt
Iran's unmanned aerial system and weapons programs and
its transfers to foreign states and non-state actors.
(c) Diplomatic Strategy.--The strategy required by subsection (a)
shall include a diplomatic strategy to coordinate with allies of the
United States to counter Iran's unmanned aerial system production and
transfer of unmanned aerial systems and related technologies to foreign
states and non-state actors, including the following:
(1) Coordination with respect to sanctions comparable to
the sanctions the United States is required to apply under the
amendments made by this title.
(2) Intelligence sharing with allies of the United States
to determine how Iran is obtaining western components for its
unmanned aerial system program.
(3) Intelligence sharing with allies of the United States
to track, monitor, and disrupt Iranian transfers of its
unmanned aerial system technology to foreign states and non-
state actors.
(4) A plan to cooperate with allies of the United States to
develop or advance anti-unmanned aerial system equipment.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 206. REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM PROGRAM
AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with
the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit
to the congressional defense committees a report that outlines the
following:
(1) Domestic industries, individuals, or entities in Iran
not subject to sanctions imposed by the United States as of the
date of the report that are helping to support Iran's unmanned
aerial system program, including both public and private
entities making a material contribution to Iran's production of
unmanned aerial systems.
(2) A list of foreign states or non-state actors using
Iranian unmanned aerial system technology or looking to
purchase it, including any negotiations or discussions ongoing
as of the date of the enactment of this Act between Iran and a
foreign state or non-state actor to acquire such technology
from Iran.
(3) An assessment of cooperation between Iran and the
People's Republic of China to develop, produce, acquire, or
export unmanned aerial system technology.
(4) An assessment of cooperation between Iran and the
Russian Federation to develop, produce, acquire, or export
unmanned aerial system technology, including a status update on
Russian capabilities to produce Iranian unmanned aerial
systems.
(5) An assessment on how the October 18, 2023, expiration
of sanctions and other restrictions under Annex B of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) have or have
not increased cooperation between Iran and the Russian
Federation or Iran and the People's Republic of China relating
to transactions previously restricted under that resolution.
(b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this section, the
term ``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given that
term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.
SEC. 207. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM DEFINED.
In this title, the term ``unmanned aerial system''--
(1) means an aircraft without a human pilot onboard that is
controlled by an operator remotely or programmed to fly
autonomously; and
(2) includes--
(A) unmanned vehicles that conduct intelligence,
surveillance, or reconnaissance operations;
(B) unmanned vehicles that can loiter, such as
suicide or kamikaze drones; and
(C) unmanned combat aerial vehicles.
TITLE III--EXPANSION OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996
SEC. 301. EXPANSION OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.
(a) Expansion of Sanctions With Respect to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Conventional Weapons.--Section 5(b)(1) of the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is
amended--
(1) in the paragraph heading, by striking ``Exports,
transfers, and transshipments'' and inserting ``Weapons of mass
destruction and conventional weapons'';
(2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012'' and inserting
``the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023'';
(3) in subparagraph (B)--
(A) in clause (i), by striking ``would likely'' and
inserting ``may'';
(B) in clause (ii)--
(i) in subclause (I)--
(I) by striking ``or develop'' and
inserting ``develop, or export''; and
(II) by striking ``; or'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(ii) by redesignating subclause (II) as
subclause (IV); and
(iii) by inserting after subclause (I) the
following:
``(II) acquire or develop ballistic
missiles or ballistic missile launch
technologies;
``(III) acquire or develop unmanned
aerial systems (as defined in section
207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran
Act of 2023); or''.
(b) Sanctions With Respect to Space-Launch and Ballistic Missile
Programs.--Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law
104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(4) Space-launch and ballistic missile goods, services,
or technology.--
``(A) Transfer to iran.--Except as provided in
subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of
the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to
a person if the President determines that the person,
on or after the date of the enactment of the No ICBMs
or Drones for Iran Act of 2023, knowingly exports,
transfers, or permits or otherwise facilitates the
transshipment or reexport of goods, services,
technology, or other items to Iran that may support
Iran's efforts to acquire, develop, or export its
space-launch programs, space-launch vehicles, or
ballistic missiles or ballistic missile launch
technologies.
``(B) Development and support for development.--
Except as provided in subsection (f), the President
shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in
section 6(a) with respect to--
``(i) an agency or instrumentality of the
Government of Iran if the President determines
that the agency or instrumentality knowingly,
on or after the date of the enactment of the No
ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023, seeks to
develop, procure, or acquire goods, services,
or technology that may support efforts by the
Government of Iran with respect to space-launch
vehicle or ballistic missile-related goods,
services, and items listed on the Equipment,
Software, and Technology Annex of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (commonly referred to
as the `MTCR Annex');
``(ii) a foreign person or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state (as defined
in section 1603(b) of title 28, United States
Code) if the President determines that the
person or agency or instrumentality knowingly,
on or after such date of enactment, provides
material support to the Government of Iran that
may support efforts by the Government of Iran
with respect to space-launch vehicle or
ballistic missile-related goods, services, and
items listed on the MTCR Annex; and
``(iii) a foreign person that the President
determines knowingly, on or after such date of
enactment, engages in a transaction or
transactions with, or provides financial
services for, a foreign person or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state described in
clause (i) or (ii) with respect to space-launch
vehicle or ballistic missile-related goods,
services, and items listed on the MTCR Annex.
``(C) Congressional requests.--Not later than 30
days after receiving a request from the chairman or
ranking member of the appropriate congressional
committees with respect to whether a person meets the
criteria for the imposition of sanctions under
subparagraph (A) or (B), the President shall--
``(i) determine if the person meets such
criteria; and
``(ii) submit a report to the chairman or
ranking member, as the case may be, who
submitted the request with respect to that
determination that includes a statement of
whether or not the President imposed or intends
to impose sanctions with respect to the
person.''.
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