[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3395 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 3395
To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
December 5, 2023
Mrs. Shaheen (for herself, Mr. Wicker, and Mr. Durbin) introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and
Sovereignty Act of 2023''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Section 2 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347;
22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
``Congress finds the following:
``(1) Consistently, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the illegitimate
leader of Belarus, engages in a pattern of clear and persistent
violations of human rights, democratic governance, and
fundamental freedoms.
``(2) Alyaksandr Lukashenka has overseen and participated
in multiple fundamentally flawed presidential and parliamentary
elections undermining the legitimacy of executive, judicial,
and legislative authority in Belarus.
``(3) On August 9, 2020, the Government of Belarus
conducted a presidential election that was fraudulent and did
not meet international standards. There were serious
irregularities with ballot counting and the reporting of
election results. The Government of Belarus also put in place
restrictive measures that impeded the work of local independent
observers and did not provide sufficient notice to the OSCE to
allow for the OSCE to monitor the elections, as is customary.
``(4) Independent election monitors recognized Sviatlana
Tsikhanouskaya as the legitimate winner of the August 9, 2020
election for president in Belarus following her candidacy after
her husband, opposition leader Sergei Tikhanovsky, was
imprisoned for challenging Lukashenka for president in 2020.
``(5) Following threats to her safety, Sviatlana
Tsikhanouskaya was forced into exile in Lithuania after Mr.
Lukashenka claimed victory in the fraudulent 2020 elections,
and since that time, the Government of Lithuania has hosted the
Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the Belarusian Democratic
Leader, and the Government of Poland has hosted the Belarusian
United Transitional Cabinet.
``(6) Thousands of employees at Belarusian state-owned
enterprises went on strike across the country to protest Mr.
Lukashenka's illegitimate election and the subsequent
crackdowns on peaceful protestors to the contested results of
the election, including at some of Belarus's largest factories
such as the BelAZ truck plant, the Minsk Tractor Works, and the
Minsk Automobile Plant.
``(7) After the August 9, 2020, presidential election, the
Government of Belarus restricted the free flow of information
to silence the opposition and to conceal the regime's violent
crackdown on peaceful protestors, including by stripping the
accreditation of journalists from major foreign news outlets,
disrupting internet access, limiting access to social media and
other digital communication platforms, and detaining and
harassing countless journalists.
``(8) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr
Lukashenka, continues to subject thousands of pro-democracy
political activists and peaceful protesters to harassment,
beatings, enforced disappearance, and imprisonment,
particularly as a result of their attempts to peacefully
exercise their right to freedom of assembly and association,
including following violent crackdowns on peaceful protestors
and mass detentions of peaceful protesters resisting the
results of the contested 2020 election.
``(9) Women serve as the leading force in demonstrations
across the country, protesting police brutality and mass
detentions by wearing white, carrying flowers, forming
`solidarity chains', and unmasking undercover police trying to
arrest demonstrators.
``(10) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr
Lukashenka, suppresses independent media and journalists and
restricts access to the internet, including social media and
other digital communication platforms, in violation of the
right to freedom of speech and expression of those dissenting
from the dictatorship of Alyaksandr Lukashenka.
``(11) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr
Lukashenka, has criminalized access to independent media
sources and media channels, including foreign media, by
designating such sources and channels as extremist and
conducting arbitrary arrests and detainments of media workers,
activists, and users.
``(12) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr
Lukashenka, continues a systematic campaign of harassment,
repression, and closure of nongovernmental organizations,
including independent trade unions and entrepreneurs, creating
a climate of fear that inhibits the development of civil
society and social solidarity.
``(13) The Government of Belarus, led by Alyaksandr
Lukashenka, has pursued a policy undermining the country's
sovereignty and independence by making Belarus political,
economic, cultural, and societal interests subservient to those
of Russia.
``(14) Against the will of the majority of the Belarusian
people, Russian President Vladimir Putin has propped up the
Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime, including by offering security
assistance, providing significant financial support, and
sending Russian propagandists to help disseminate pro-regime
and pro-Kremlin propaganda on Belarus state television.
``(15) Efforts by the Government of the Russian Federation
to subsume Belarus into its sphere of influence and consider
Belarus as part of the Russian empire or as a `Union State'
include security, political, economic, and ideological
integration between Russia and Belarus, which intensified in
2020 after President Putin supported Mr. Lukashenka's
illegitimate election and resulted in the Government of Belarus
permitting Russian troops to use Belarusian territory to
conduct military exercises ahead of the February 2022 further
invasion of Ukraine and staging part of the February 2022
further invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory,
including by providing Russia with the use of airbases which
allowed Russia to shoot artillery and missiles from Belarusian
territory into Ukraine.
``(16) The United States Government and United States
partners and allies have imposed sanctions on Alyaksandr
Lukashenka and the Government of Belarus in response to anti-
democratic activities and human rights abuses for more than 20
years, including in response to the Government of Belarus'
support for Russia's further invasion of Ukraine, which include
property blocking and visa restrictions and export
restrictions.
``(17) The Kremlin has provided the Government of Belarus
with loans amounting to more than $1,500,000,000 dollars to
prop up Lukashenka's illegitimate regime and Russia continues
to provide Belarus with access to an economic market to avoid
the impacts of United States and allied countries' sanctions on
key Belarusian industries.
``(18) The Government of Belarus is relied upon by the
Government of the Russian Federation to increase production of
ammunition and other military equipment to facilitate the
Kremlin's crimes of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity during the illegal war in Ukraine.
``(19) Since before the 2022 further invasion of Ukraine,
the Government of Belarus has hosted Russian troops on
Belarusian territory and enabled the violation of Ukraine's
sovereignty by Russia in February 2022 and since the further
invasion of Ukraine, the Government of Belarus has also hosted
Russian mercenary fighters and reportedly hosted Russian
nuclear warheads.
``(20) The international community has seen credible
evidence that children forcibly removed from Ukraine by Russia
during the further invasion of Ukraine have transited through
the territory of Belarus or been illegally removed to the
territory of Belarus with support from Alyaksandr Lukashenka
and been subjected to Russian re-education programs.
``(21) The Government of Belarus' continued support of
Russia, especially in the unprovoked further invasion of
Ukraine, and continued oppression of the Belarusian people may
amount to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression.
``(22) The Government of Belarus also threatens the safety,
security, and sovereignty of European countries, including NATO
allies Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, by facilitating illegal
migration through the territory of Belarus, resulting in
efforts by the United States to support a Customs and Border
Patrol Technical Assessment in Latvia to ensure European allies
and partners can secure their borders.
``(23) The Government of Lithuania and other United States
partners and allies host independent Belarusian free media,
including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Minsk bureau, and
facilitate information and content in the Belarusian language,
which the Lukashenka regime has dismissed and de-facto outlawed
as an inferior language to Russian for the purpose of
facilitating Russification campaigns in Belarus.
``(24) The governments of Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and
other European partners host members of the Belarusian pro-
democracy movement, including political leaders, free and
independent media, and exiled civil society groups and provide
essential support to these individuals and groups that make up
the Belarus democracy movement.
``(25) The Government of Belarus has further attempted to
suppress freedom of movement of Belarusian people and
Belarusian diaspora and retaliate against those Belarusians
living overseas and who have fled the Lukashenka regime by
refusing to provide overseas passport services.
``(26) The International Civil Aviation Organization found
that the Government of Belarus committed an act of unlawful
interference when it deliberately diverted Ryanair Flight 9478
in order to arrest two Belarusian citizens, including an
opposition activist and journalist.
``(27) The Belarus democracy movement has legitimate
aspirations for a transatlantic future for the people of
Belarus and continue to seek justice for those imprisoned and
oppressed by the Lukashenka regime and resist Russian
encroachment on Belarusian territory, culture, and identity.''.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
Section 3 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347;
22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
``It is the policy of the United States--
``(1) to condemn the conduct of the August 9, 2020,
presidential election and crackdown on opposition candidates,
members of the Coordination Council, peaceful protestors,
employees from state-owned enterprises participating in
strikes, independent election observers, and independent
journalists and bloggers;
``(2) to recognize Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as the
Democratic Leader of Belarus;
``(3) to refuse to recognize Alyaksandr Lukashenka as the
legitimately elected leader of Belarus;
``(4) to seek to engage with the United Transitional
Cabinet as the executive body that represents the aspirations
and beliefs of the Belarusian people and as a legitimate
institution to participate in a dialogue on a peaceful
transition of power and support its stated objectives of--
``(A) defending the independence and sovereignty of
the Republic of Belarus;
``(B) representing the national interests of
Belarus;
``(C) carrying out the de-facto de-occupation of
Belarus;
``(D) restoring constitutional legality and the
rule of law;
``(E) developing and implementing measures to
thwart illegal retention of power;
``(F) ensuring the transition of power from
dictatorship to democracy;
``(G) creating conditions for free and fair
elections in Belarus; and
``(H) developing and implementing solutions needed
to secure democratic changes in Belarus;
``(5) to continue to call for the immediate release without
preconditions of all political prisoners in Belarus;
``(6) to continue to support the aspirations of the people
of Belarus for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law;
``(7) to continue to support actively the aspirations of
the people of the Republic of Belarus to preserve the
independence and sovereignty of their country and to pursue a
Euro-Atlantic future;
``(8) not to recognize any incorporation of Belarus into a
`Union State' with Russia, as this so-called `Union State'
would be both an attempt to absorb Belarus and a step to
reconstituting the totalitarian Soviet Union;
``(9) to condemn efforts by the Government of the Russian
Federation to undermine the sovereignty and independence of
Belarus, and to continue to implement policies, including
sanctions, that serve to punish Russia for its anti-democratic
and illegal actions involving Belarus;
``(10) to continue to reject the fraudulent victory of Mr.
Lukashenka on August 9, 2020, and to support calls for new
presidential and parliamentary elections, conducted in a manner
that is free and fair according to OSCE standards and under the
supervision of OSCE observers and independent domestic
observers;
``(11) to continue to call for the fulfillment by the
Government of Belarus of Belarus's freely undertaken
obligations as an OSCE participating state and as a signatory
of the Charter of the United Nations;
``(12) to support an OSCE role in mediating a dialogue
within Belarus between the government and genuine
representatives of Belarusian society;
``(13) to support international efforts to launch
investigations into the Government of Belarus and individuals
associated with the Government of Belarus for war crimes and
crimes against humanity against the people of Belarus and the
people of Ukraine for their actions during the further invasion
of Ukraine;
``(14) to support a United States diplomatic presence to
engage with the people of Belarus, including the regular
appointment of a United States Special Envoy to Belarus until
such a time that the credentials of a United States Ambassador
to Belarus are recognized by the Government of Belarus;
``(15) to continue to work closely with the European Union,
the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries and
international organizations, to promote the principles of
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in Belarus;
``(16) to remain open to reevaluating United States policy
toward Belarus as warranted by demonstrable progress made by
the Government of Belarus consistent with the aims of this Act,
as stated in this section;
``(17) to express concern in the event that social media or
technology companies move to block independent media content or
participate in media blackouts that prevent free and
independent media services from transmitting information into
Belarus;
``(18) to continue to support Belarusian language and
cultural programs, including by supporting Belarusian language
independent media programs, and Belarusian civil society,
including efforts to restore democracy and the regular function
of democratic institutions in Belarus;
``(19) to work with the Belarusian democratic movement and
European allies and partners to ensure Belarusian nationals
living outside of Belarus have access to national
identification documentation following the Lukashenka regime's
decision to stop supplying overseas passport services to
Belarusians;
``(20) to provide technical support to the United
Transitional Cabinet of Belarus and European allies and
partners to develop and implement national identification
documents (New Belarusian Passport) that will enable the more
than 2,000,000 Belarusians living abroad to access freedom of
movement and essential services while maintaining Belarusian
national identity and unity;
``(21) to include Belarusian nationals living in Ukraine as
of February 24, 2022, in the Uniting For Ukraine program to
provide a pathway for Belarusian nations and their immediate
family members outside of the United States to come to the
United States and stay for a period of not more than two years
of parole and subject those Belarusian nationals to the same
qualifications for entry into the program as Ukrainian
nationals;
``(22) to engage in the United States-Belarus democratic
movement strategic dialogue when necessary to reaffirm
commitments to promoting freedom and democracy in Belarus and
promote efforts to restore free and open presidential and
parliamentary elections in Belarus that are conducted
consistent with OSCE standards and under the supervision of
OSCE observers and independent domestic observers;
``(23) to refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the
Lukashenka regime to enter into any international agreements or
treaties;
``(24) to advocate for the inclusion of the Belarus
democratic movement to participate in international
institutions and be granted Permanent Observer Status by the
United Nations General Assembly;
``(25) to establish a Belarus service at Voice of America
through the United States Agency for Global Media that
broadcasts in the Belarusian language;
``(26) to continue to support the Governments of Lithuania,
Latvia, and Poland in providing critical support to the
Belarusian government, civil society, and media in exile;
``(27) to transfer when applicable existing bilateral
funding for Belarus toward sustaining pro-democracy and civil
society initiatives outside the territory of Belarus;
``(28) to continue to ban ticket sales for air travel to
Belarus until such a time that civilians do not face random
arrests by the Government of Belarus, a ban that was enacted
following the unlawful actions of the Government of Belarus to
deliberately divert Ryanair Flight 9478; and
``(29) to continue to work with international allies and
partners to coordinate support for the people of Belarus and
their legitimate aspirations for a free, open, and democratic
society and the regular conduct of free and fair elections.''.
SEC. 4. SPECIAL ENVOY FOR BELARUS.
(a) Special Envoy.--The President shall appoint a Special Envoy for
Belarus within the Department of State (referred to in this section as
the ``Special Envoy'').
(b) Qualifications.--The Special Envoy--
(1) should be a person of recognized distinction in the
field of European security, geopolitics, democracy, and human
rights; and
(2) may be a career foreign service officer.
(c) Central Objective.--The central objective of the Special Envoy
is to coordinate and promote efforts--
(1) to improve respect for the fundamental human rights of
the people of Belarus;
(2) to sustain focus on the national security implications,
for the United States, of Belarus's political and military
alignment; and
(3) to respond to the political, economic, and security
impacts of events in Belarus on neighboring countries and the
wider region.
(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--The Special Envoy shall--
(1) engage in discussions with Belarusian officials
regarding human rights and political, economic, and security
issues in Belarus;
(2) support international efforts to promote human rights
and political freedoms in Belarus, including coordination and
dialogue between the United States and the United Nations, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
European Union, Belarus, and the other countries in Eastern
Europe;
(3) consult with nongovernmental organizations that have
attempted to address human rights and political and economic
instability in Belarus;
(4) make recommendations regarding the funding of
activities promoting human rights, democracy, the rule of law,
and the development of a market economy in Belarus;
(5) review strategies for improving protection of human
rights in Belarus, including technical training and exchange
programs;
(6) develop an action plan for holding to account the
perpetrators of the human rights violations, documented in the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights report on the
situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020
presidential election and its aftermath (Human Rights Council
Resolution 49/36);
(7) engage with member countries of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, and the European Union with respect to
the implications of Belarus's political and security alignment
for transatlantic security; and
(8) work within the Department of State and among
partnering countries to sustain focus on the political
situation in Belarus.
(e) Role.--The position of Special Envoy--
(1) shall be a full-time position;
(2) may not be combined with any other position within the
Department of State;
(3) shall only exist for the period during which United
States diplomatic operations in Belarus at the United States
Embassy in Minsk have been suspended; and
(4) shall oversee the operations and personnel of the
Belarus Affairs Unit of the Department of State.
(f) Report on Activities.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following
[five] years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Special
Envoy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that describes the activities undertaken pursuant to subsection
(d) during the reporting period.
(g) Termination.--The position of Special Envoy for Belarus Affairs
and the authorities provided by this section shall terminate on the
date that is [five] years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 5. STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH THE BELARUS DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT.
(a) Strategic Dialogue.--The President shall direct the Secretary
of State to host a strategic dialogue with the Belarus Democracy
Movement not fewer than once every 12 months following the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(b) Central Objective.--The central objective of the strategic
dialogue required under subsection (a) is to coordinate and promote
efforts--
(1) to consider the efforts needed to return to democratic
rule in Belarus, including the efforts needed to support free
and fair elections in Belarus;
(2) to support the day-to-day functions of the Belarus
Democracy Movement, which represents the legitimate aspirations
of the Belarusian people, and ensure that Belarusians living
outside the territory of Belarus have adequate access to
essential services; and
(3) to respond to the political, economic, and security
impacts of events in Belarus and Russia on neighboring
countries and the wider region.
(c) Termination.--The strategic dialogue with the Belarus Democracy
Movement and the authorities provided by this section shall terminate
on the date that is [five] years after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
SEC. 6. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY
IN BELARUS.
Section 4 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347;
22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, including by
establishing a Belarus service at Voice of America to
include broadcasts in the Belarusian language'' after
``within Belarus'';
(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``in the
Belarusian language'' after ``and Internet media'';
(C) by striking paragraphs (11) and (14);
(D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (10) as
paragraphs (4) through (11), respectively;
(E) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following
new paragraph:
``(3) countering internet and media censorship and
repressive surveillance technology that seeks to limit free
association, control access to information, and prevent
citizens from exercising their rights to free speech;'';
(F) in paragraph (11), as redesignated by
subparagraph (C), by inserting ``and the development of
Belarusian cultural programs'' after ``supporting the
development of Belarusian language education'';
(G) in paragraph (12), by inserting ``, including
refugees from Belarus in Ukraine and refugees from
Ukraine fleeing Russia's unprovoked war following the
February 2022 further invasion of Ukraine'' after
``supporting political refugees in neighboring European
countries fleeing the crackdown in Belarus'';
(H) in paragraph (13)--
(i) by inserting ``and war crimes'' after
``human rights abuses''; and
(ii) by striking the semicolon and
inserting ``; and''; and
(I) by redesignating paragraph (15) as paragraph
(14);
(2) in subsection (f), by striking ``2020'' and inserting
``2023''; and
(3) by striking subsection (g).
SEC. 7. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, INTERNET FREEDOM, AND ACCESS TO
INFORMATION IN BELARUS.
Section 5 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty
Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1), by inserting ``and Voice of
America'' after ``Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty''; and
(2) in subsection (b)(1)--
(A) by striking ``2020'' and inserting ``2023'';
(B) in subparagraph (A) by inserting ``, including
through social media platforms,'' after
``communications in Belarus''; and
(C) in subparagraph (C) by inserting ``, including
by ensuring private companies do not comply with media
blackouts directed by or favored by the Government of
Belarus'' after ``access and block content online''.
SEC. 8. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS.
Section 6 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty
Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as
paragraphs (3) through (6), respectively;
(B) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following
new paragraph:
``(2) The release of Ukrainian nationals illegally held in
Belarus, including those illegally transferred to Belarus after
the 2022 Russian further invasion of Ukraine.'';
(C) in paragraph (3), as redesignated by
subparagraph (A), by inserting ``, and people who
protested the support of the Government of Belarus for
the further Russian invasion of Ukraine and cooperation
of the Government of Belarus with Russia'' after
``August 9, 2020''; and
(D) in paragraph (5), as so redesignated, by
inserting ``, or for providing support in connection
with the illegal further Russian invasion of Ukraine''
after ``August 9, 2020''; and
(2) in subsection (c)--
(A) in the subsection heading, by inserting ``and
the February, 24, 2022, Further Invasion of Ukraine''
after ``Election'';
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (9) as
paragraphs (6) through (10), respectively;
(C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following
new paragraph:
``(5) assisted the Government of Belarus in--
``(A) supporting security cooperation with the
Government of Russia in advance of the February 24,
2022, further invasion of Ukraine;
``(B) supporting the presence of Russian
mercenaries in the territory of Belarus; or
``(C) supporting ongoing security cooperation with
the Government of Russia, including the Government of
Belarus' decision to host Russian tactical nuclear
weapons;''; and
(D) in paragraph (6), as redesignated by
subparagraph (B), by inserting ``, or in connection
with the 2022 Russian further invasion of Ukraine''
after ``August 9, 2020''.
SEC. 9. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION.
Section 7 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty
Act of 2020 (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1); by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new
paragraphs:
``(3) to condemn the continued collaboration between the
Government of Belarus and the Government of Russia,
particularly as it relates to the further invasion of Ukraine,
and further the purposes of this Act, including, as
appropriate, to levy sanctions and additional measures against
the Government of Belarus for its complicity in war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed in the territory of Ukraine;
and
``(4) to provide technical assistance to the Belarus
democracy movement on the creation and international
recognition of national identity documentation following the
Lukashenka regime's decision to cease overseas passport
services for Belarusian nationals, with the objective of
maintaining Belarusian national identity and unity but
providing Belarusians living overseas with freedom of movement
and the ability to access essential services.''.
SEC. 10. PARTICIPATION OF BELARUS IN UNITING FOR UKRAINE.
The Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2004
(Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended--
(1) by redesignating sections 8 and 9 as sections 9 and 10,
respectively; and
(2) by inserting after section 7 the following new section:
``SEC. 8. PARTICIPATION OF BELARUS IN UNITING FOR UKRAINE.
``(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
``(1) there are a significant number of Belarusian
nationals residing in Ukraine and suffering from Russian
aggression during the further Russian invasion of Ukraine; and
``(2) Belarusian nationals may experience threats to their
physical security due to political persecution or retribution
or human rights abuses if they return to Belarus.
``(b) Uniting for Ukraine Participation.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide a pathway for
Belarusian nationals living in Ukraine following the February
24, 2022, further invasion of Ukraine to participate in the
Uniting for Ukraine program.
``(2) Exception.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Homeland Security may delay implementation of the pathway
required under paragraph (1) if they determine that it is
counter to United States national security interests.''.
SEC. 11. REPORTS.
Section 9 of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty
Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note), as redesignated
by section 8(1) of this Act, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``2020'' and
inserting ``2023''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in subparagraph (G), by striking ``;
and'' and inserting a semicolon;
(ii) in subparagraph (H), by striking the
period at the end and inserting a semicolon;
and
(iii) by adding at the end the following
new subparagraphs:
``(I) an assessment of how the Government of Russia
is working to achieve deeper security cooperation and
interdependence or integration with Belarus;
``(J) a description of the Government of Belarus
actions to support the 2022 further Russian invasion of
Ukraine and ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine;
``(K) a description of how the Government of
Belarus supports, adopts, and deploys Russian
disinformation campaigns or Belarusian disinformation
campaigns; and
``(L) an identification of Belarusian officials
involved in continued support to Russia and the further
invasion of Ukraine and an identification of Russian
officials involved in continued support to Belarus and
the further invasion of Ukraine.'';
(2) in subsection (b)(1)--
(A) by striking ``2020'' and inserting ``2023'';
(B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(C) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at
the end and inserting a semicolon; and
(D) by adding at the end the following new
subparagraphs:
``(C) an identification of efforts by the
Government of Belarus and the Government of Russia to
circumvent sanctions, including those imposed by the
United States in response to the further invasion of
Ukraine;
``(D) an assessment of the shared assets and
business interests of Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr
Lukashenka and the Government of Belarus and the
Government of Russia; and
``(E) a determination on the possibility for
Belarus to host free and fair elections during the
parliamentary elections scheduled for 2024 and the
presidential election scheduled for 2025, including a
proposal of how the United States may support a return
to democracy in the anticipated elections in
Belarus.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(c) Report on Efforts To Enable Belarusians Living Outside the
Territory of Belarus to Travel Freely.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and
Sovereignty Act of 2023, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
describing efforts to provide Belarusians living outside the
territory of Belarus with national identification documents.
``(2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1)
shall include the following elements:
``(A) An assessment of the European Union's efforts
to provide Belarusians living overseas with national
identification documents that maintain Belarusian
nationality but enable Belarusians living overseas to
travel freely and access essential services.
``(B) A description of efforts to provide technical
assistance to the Belarus democratic movement on the
creation of national identification documents that
fulfill the needs described in subparagraph (A).
``(3) Form.--The report required by this subsection shall
be transmitted in unclassified form but may contain a
classified annex.''.
SEC. 12. DEFINITIONS.
Section 10(1)(B) of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (Public Law
108-347; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note), as redesignated by section 10(1) of this
Act, is amended by striking ``Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs'' and inserting ``the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs''.
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