[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3854 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 375
118th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3854
To combat transnational repression abroad, to strengthen tools to
combat authoritarianism, corruption, and kleptocracy, to invest in
democracy research and development, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
February 29, 2024
Mr. Cardin (for himself and Mr. Wicker) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
May 7, 2024
Reported by Mr. Cardin, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To combat transnational repression abroad, to strengthen tools to
combat authoritarianism, corruption, and kleptocracy, to invest in
democracy research and development, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``International Freedom Protection Act''.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:</DELETED>
<DELETED>Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
<DELETED>Sec. 2. Findings.
<DELETED>Sec. 3. Definitions.
<DELETED>Sec. 4. Combating transnational repression abroad.
<DELETED>Sec. 5. Strengthening tools to combat authoritarianism.
<DELETED>Sec. 6. Combating corruption and kleptocracy.
<DELETED>Sec. 7. Investing in democracy research and development.
<DELETED>Sec. 8. Addressing authoritarians in the multilateral system.
<DELETED>Sec. 9. Confronting digital authoritarianism.
<DELETED>Sec. 10. Protecting political prisoners.
<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) According to Freedom House's 2023 report,
``Freedom in the World'', democracy experienced a worldwide
decline for 17 consecutive years and has been weakened by
factors, such as attacks on democratic institutions, impunity,
corruption, disinformation, human rights violations, and
conflict.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Since 2006, autocratic forces and illiberal
forces have been on the rise, with emboldened autocrats from
China, Russia, and Iran--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) refining their tactics to undermine
democracy globally;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) suppressing dissent to sustain their
own regimes; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) frequently collaborating with each
another in such efforts.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) The rise of authoritarianism--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) undermines the national security of
the United States and the security of our democratic
allies and partners;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) creates instability;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) weakens the rule of law; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) increases the risk of war.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) Democracies are ill-prepared to fight back
against the growing complexity and emerging challenges posed by
autocratic and illiberal forces.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) There is an urgent need to update the United
States Government's approach to countering authoritarianism by
strengthening and revitalizing the relevant tools, strategies,
and institutions.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> In this Act:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The
term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Relevant federal agencies.--The term
``relevant Federal agencies'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the Department of State;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the United States Agency for
International Development; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) other Federal agencies that are
relevant for purposes of this Act.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Transnational repression.--The term
``transnational repression''--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) means acts by governments (either
directly or through others) to silence, intimidate, or
exact reprisal against individuals outside their
sovereign borders, including members of diaspora
populations, political opponents, civil society
activists, human rights defenders, journalists, and
members of ethnic or religious minority groups;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) may include--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) extrajudicial
killings;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) physical assaults and
intimidation;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) arbitrary
detentions;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iv) renditions;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (v) deportations;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (vi) unexplained or enforced
disappearances;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (vii) physical or online
surveillance or stalking;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (viii) unwarranted passport
cancellation or control over other
identification documents;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ix) abuse of international law
enforcement systems;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (x) unlawful asset
freezes;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (xi) digital threats, such as
cyberattacks, targeted surveillance and
spyware, online harassment, and intimidation;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (xii) coercion by proxy, such as
harassment of, or threats or harm to, family
and associates of private individuals who
remain in their country of origin.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 4. COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION ABROAD.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following
findings:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Amidst a backdrop of global democratic
decline, authoritarian governments are increasingly
collaborating and employing aggressive tactics across borders
to silence, coerce, harass, or harm individuals for peacefully
exercising their rights and fundamental freedoms.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Governments commit transnational repression
through physical and digital means. The advancement of digital
technology provides new tools for censoring, surveilling,
harassing, and targeting individuals deemed to be threats
across international borders. This is particularly significant
for dissidents and journalists forced abroad who rely on
communications technology to amplify their messages and
communicate with their professional and personal support
networks.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Since 2014, Freedom House has documented 854
direct physical incidents of transnational repression committed
by 38 governments in 91 countries. Nonphysical acts of
transnational repression are occurring even more frequently.
The combined effect of these direct threats produces a chilling
effect that compels countless more people to modify their
behavior due to fear of transnational repression.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) In 2023, the countries whose governments are
committing the highest number of direct physical acts of
transnational repression are China, Turkey, Tajikistan, Russia,
and Egypt.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Transnational repression is used by
governments to target perceived critics, who may include human
rights defenders, democracy activists, political opponents,
members of diaspora groups, and the family members of such
individuals.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Statement of Policy on Transnational Repression.--It
is the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to regard transnational repression as a direct
threat to the United States national interests of upholding and
promoting democratic values and human rights;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to address transnational repression, including
by protecting targeted individuals and groups;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) to strengthen the actions of United States
embassy and mission staff in countering transnational
repression, including by--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) monitoring and documenting instances
of transnational repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) conducting regular outreach with at-
risk or affected populations to provide information
regarding available resources without putting such
people at further risk; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) working with local and national law
enforcement, as appropriate, to support victims of
transnational repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) to develop policy and programmatic responses
based on input from--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) vulnerable populations who are at risk
of, or are experiencing, transnational
repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) nongovernmental organizations working
on issues of transnational repression; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the private sector;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) to provide training to relevant Federal
personnel--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) to enhance their understanding of
transnational repression; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) to identify and combat threats of
transnational repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) to strengthen documentation and monitoring by
the United States Government of transnational repression in
foreign countries and within international organizations;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) to seek to hold perpetrators of transnational
repression accountable, including through the use of targeted
sanctions and visa restrictions.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Report on Transnational Repression.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 2 years
thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report
to the appropriate congressional committees that assesses the
efforts of the United States Government to implement the policy
objectives described in subsection (b).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph
(1) shall include--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) a detailed description and assessment
of United States Government efforts to monitor,
prevent, and respond to transnational repression
abroad;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) a detailed accounting, disaggregated
by country, of the most common tactics of transnational
repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) instances of transnational repression
occurring within international organizations;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) a list of countries perpetrating acts
of transnational repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) a list of countries whose governments
are known to frequently cooperate with other
governments in committing transnational
repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) a description of--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) efforts by personnel at United
States embassies and missions to support
victims of or those at risk of transnational
repression; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) resources provided to United
States embassies and missions to support such
efforts; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (G) a strategy to strengthen interagency
efforts and coordination to combat transnational
repression, which shall include--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) a plan, developed in
consultation with partner governments, civil
society, the business community, and other
entities, to promote respect for rule of law
and human rights in surveillance technology
use, which shall include--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (I) improving export
licensing policy, including by applying
additional scrutiny to export licensing
applications for products exported to
perpetrators;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (II) protecting personal
digital data from being used for the
purposes of transnational
repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (III) establishing
safeguards to prevent the misuse of
surveillance technology, including
elements such as appropriate legal
protections, a prohibition on
discrimination, oversight and
accountability mechanisms, transparency
on the applicable legal framework,
limiting biometric tools for
surveillance to what is lawful and
appropriate, testing and evaluation,
and training;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (IV) working to ensure, as
applicable, that such technologies are
designed, developed, and deployed with
safeguards to protect human rights
(including privacy), consistent with
the United Nations Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) public diplomacy efforts and
plans for, including the use of the voice,
vote, and influence of the United States at
international organizations, to promote
awareness of and oppose acts of transnational
repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) a plan to develop or enhance
global coalitions to monitor cases of
transnational repression at international
organizations and to strengthen alert
mechanisms for key stakeholders
worldwide;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iv) a description, as
appropriate, of how the United States
Government has previously provided, and will
continue to provide, support to civil society
organizations in foreign countries in which
transnational repression occurs--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (I) to improve the
documentation, investigation, and
research of cases, trends, and tactics
of transnational repression;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (II) to promote
accountability and transparency in
government actions impacting victims of
transnational repression; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (v) a description of new or
existing emergency assistance mechanisms, to
aid at-risk groups, communities, and
individuals in countries abroad in which
transnational repression occurs.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Form of report.--The report required under
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Training of United States Personnel.--The Secretary of
State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal
agencies, shall provide personnel of the Department of State and other
relevant Federal agencies, whether serving in the United States or
overseas, with training regarding--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) identifying physical and nonphysical threats
of transnational repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) foreign governments that are most frequently
involved in transnational repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) foreign governments that are known to
frequently cooperate with other governments in committing
transnational repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) digital surveillance and cyber tools commonly
used in transnational repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) safe outreach methods for vulnerable
populations at risk of transnational repression; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) tools to respond to transnational repression
threats, including relevant authorities which may be
invoked.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (e) Training of Foreign Service Officers and Presidential
Appointees.--Section 708(a)(1) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22
U.S.C. 4028(a)(1)) is amended--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``and'' at
the end;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at
the end and inserting ``; and''; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) by adding at the end the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(E) for Foreign Service Officers and
Presidential appointees, including chiefs of mission,
in missions abroad who work on political, economic,
public diplomacy, security, or development issues, a
dedicated module of instruction on transnational
repression (as such term is defined in section 3(3) of
the International Freedom Protection Act), including--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(i) how to recognize threats of
transnational repression;</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(ii) an overview of relevant
laws that can be invoked to combat such
threats; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(iii) how to support individuals
experiencing transnational
repression.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING TOOLS TO COMBAT
AUTHORITARIANISM.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Transnational Repression.--The President shall
consider the use of transnational repression by a foreign person in
determining whether to impose sanctions with respect to such foreign
person under--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) section 7031(c) of the Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2023 (division K of Public Law 117-328; 8 U.S.C. 1182 note);
or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) any other relevant statutory provision
granting human rights-related sanctions authority under which a
foreign person has been sanctioned.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Modifications to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act.--Section 1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22
U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) in subsection (a)--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``or''
at the end;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) by striking paragraph (4);
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the
following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(4) is responsible for or complicit in, or has
directly or indirectly engaged in, significant actions or
policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions;
or</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(5) has materially assisted, sponsored, or
provided financial, material, or technological support for, or
goods or services in support of, an activity described in this
subsection.''; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) in subsection (d)(2), by striking subparagraph
(B) and inserting the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(B) Requests relating to corruption.--A
request described in paragraph (1) with respect to
whether a foreign person has engaged in an activity
described in paragraph (3) or (5) of subsection (a)
shall be submitted to the President in writing jointly
by the chairperson and the ranking member of--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(i) any of the appropriate
congressional committees of the Senate;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(ii) any of the appropriate
congressional committees of the House of
Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(C) Requests relating to undermining
democracy.--A request described in paragraph (1) with
respect to whether a foreign person has engaged in an
activity described in subsection (a)(4) shall be
submitted in writing to the President jointly by the
chairperson and ranking member of any of the
appropriate congressional committees.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Anti-Kleptocracy and Human Rights Ineligibility.--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Ineligibility.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) Significant corruption or human rights
violations.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and
(3), a foreign government official shall be ineligible
for entry into the United States if the Secretary of
State determines that such official was knowingly
directly or indirectly involved in--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) significant corruption,
including corruption related to the extraction
of natural resources; or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) a gross violation of human
rights, including the wrongful detention of--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (I) locally employed staff
of a United States diplomatic mission;
or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (II) a United States
citizen or national.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) Undermining democratic governance.--
Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a foreign
government official may be ineligible for entry into
the United States if the Secretary of State determines
that such official was knowingly directly or indirectly
involved in significant actions that undermine
democratic governance.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) Immediate family members.--The
immediate family members of an official described in
subparagraph (A) or (B) may be subject to the same
restriction on entry into the United States as such
official.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) Referral.--The Secretary of State, in
implementing this subsection, shall, as appropriate,
provide information regarding the actions of officials
described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) to the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the
Treasury, which shall determine whether to impose
sanctions authorized under Federal law to block the
transfer of property and interests in property, and all
financial transactions, in the United States involving
any such official.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) Designation or determination.--The
Secretary of State shall publicly or privately
designate or make the determination that the foreign
government officials or party members about whom the
Secretary has made such designation or determination
regarding significant corruption or gross violations of
human rights, and their immediate family members,
without regard to whether any such individual has
applied for a visa.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Exceptions.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) In general.--Individuals are not
ineligible for entry into the United States pursuant to
paragraph (1) if such entry--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) would further important United
States law enforcement objectives; or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) is necessary to permit the
United States to fulfill its obligations under
the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the
United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26,
1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947,
between the United Nations and the United
States or under other international obligations
of the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) Savings provision.--Nothing in
paragraph (1) may be construed to derogate from United
States Government obligations under applicable
international agreements or obligations.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the
application of paragraph (1) with respect to any individual if
the Secretary determines that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) such waiver would serve a compelling
national interest of the United States; or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the circumstances that caused such
individual to be ineligible for entry into the United
States have sufficiently changed.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) Semiannual report.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) In general.--Not later than 30 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every
180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall
submit a report, including a classified annex if
necessary, to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives. Each such report shall
include--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) all relevant information
relating to corruption, human rights
violations, or undermining democratic
governance that was a factor in identifying,
during the most recent 12-month period--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (I) individuals who are
ineligible for entry into the United
States under paragraph
(1)(A);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (II) individuals about
whom the Secretary has made a
designation or determination pursuant
to paragraph (1)(E); and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (III) individuals who
would be ineligible for entry into the
United States under paragraph (1)(A),
but were excluded from such restriction
pursuant to paragraph (2);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) a list of any waivers granted
by the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (3);
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) a description of the
justification for each such waiver.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) Posting of report.--The unclassified
portion of each report required under subparagraph (A)
shall be posted on a publicly accessible website of the
Department of State.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Clarification.--For purposes of paragraphs (1)
and (4), the records of the Department of State and of
diplomatic and consular offices of the United States pertaining
to the issuance or refusal of visas or permits to enter the
United States shall not be considered confidential.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Restriction on Assistance in the Wake of a Coup
D'etat.--Chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following:</DELETED>
<DELETED>``SEC. 620N. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE IN THE WAKE OF A COUP
D'ETAT.</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(a) In General.--Except as provided under subsections
(b) and (d), no assistance may be furnished under this Act or under the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751) to the central government of
any country in which the duly elected head of government was deposed by
a military coup d'etat or decree or a coup d'etat or decree in which
the military played a decisive role.</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(b) Exemption for National Security.--The Secretary of
State, after consultation with the heads of relevant Federal agencies,
may waive the restriction on assistance described in subsection (a) if
the Secretary certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional
committees, not later than 30 days before the provision of such
assistance to such government, that such waiver is in the national
security interest of the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(c) Resumption of Assistance.--Assistance to a foreign
government that is subject to the restriction described in subsection
(a) may be resumed if the Secretary of State certifies and reports to
the appropriate congressional committees, not fewer than 30 days before
the resumption of such assistance, that a democratically elected
government has taken office subsequent to the termination of assistance
pursuant to subsection (a).</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(d) Exception for Democracy and Humanitarian
Assistance.--The restriction under subsection (a) shall not apply to
any assistance used--</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(1) to promote democratic elections or public
participation in the democratic processes;</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(2) to support a democratic transition;
or</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(3) for humanitarian purposes.</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(e) Defined Term.--In this section, the term
`appropriate congressional committees' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 6. COMBATING CORRUPTION AND KLEPTOCRACY.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Prioritization.--The Secretary of State and the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development
shall combat authoritarianism by prioritizing governance and anti-
corruption activities and programs that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) enhance the transparency, accountability, and
responsiveness of governments across relevant
sectors;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2)(A) improve the detection and exposure of
corruption crimes, including crimes that cross
borders;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) improve citizen oversight and
advocacy;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) protect free expression and civic activism;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) support investigative journalism and media
independence;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3)(A) expand the investigation and prosecution of
corrupt acts;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) hold corrupt actors accountable;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) promote the adoption and implementation of
anticorruption preventive measures; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) promote good governance, public
administration, and impartial judiciaries;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) address corruption in key sectors, whether at
the level of--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) delivery of services to
citizens;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) important governmental processes, such
as procurement; or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) priority economic sectors;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) strengthen democratic norms and standards at
the local, national, regional, and international
levels;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) augment cooperation with the private sector
and key industries to root out corruption that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) harms competitiveness, economic
growth, and development; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) taints critical supply
chains;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) address corrosive capital and the strategic
use of corruption by authoritarian states to undermine
democracy and good governance; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) provide essential skills and resources to
civil society and media--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) to counter corruption; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) to address the weak governance and
poor human rights conditions that cultivate
corruption.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Rewards Program.--Section
36(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C.
2708(b)) is amended--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) in paragraph (13), by striking ``or'' at the
end;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) in paragraph (14), by striking the period at
the end and inserting ``; or''; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) by adding at the end the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(15) the restraining, seizing, forfeiting, or
repatriating of stolen assets linked to foreign government
corruption and the proceeds of such corruption.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 7. INVESTING IN DEMOCRACY RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Program for Democracy Research and Development.--The
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development, shall establish a
program for democracy research and development that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) supports research and development by the
Department of State, the United States Agency for International
Development, and the National Endowment for Democracy on
policies and programs relating to democracy efforts;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) drives innovation within such agencies
regarding the response to complex, multidimensional challenges
to democracy, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) combating transnational
kleptocracy;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) mitigating
hyperpolarization;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) countering malign authoritarian
influence; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) leveraging emerging technology for
democracy;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) incentivizes collaboration among governments,
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to
identify and mitigate threats to global democracy;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) identifies lessons learned and best practices
for democracy programs and diplomatic approaches to create
feedback loops and shape future evidence-based programming and
diplomacy;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) encourages private sector actors to establish
and implement business practices that will--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) strengthen democratic
institutions;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) bolster democratic processes;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) support democracy activists and human
rights defenders; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) strengthens the resilience of democratic
actors and institutions.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives that describes the efforts and results of the
program established pursuant to subsection (a).</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 8. ADDRESSING AUTHORITARIANS IN THE MULTILATERAL
SYSTEM.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State
and the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations
should use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
United Nations and with other multilateral bodies--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1)(A) to promote the full participation of civil
society actors within the United National Human Rights Council
and other multilateral bodies;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) to closely monitor instances of reprisals
against such actors; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) to support the use of targeted sanctions,
censure of member states, and other diplomatic measures to hold
responsible any person who engages in reprisals against human
rights defenders and civil society within such multilateral
bodies;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to reform the process for suspending the
rights of membership in the United Nations Human Rights Council
for member states that commit gross and systemic violations of
human rights, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) ensuring information detailing the
member state's human rights record is publicly
available before a vote for membership or a vote on
suspending the rights of membership of such member
state; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) making publicly available the vote of
each member state on the suspension of rights of
membership from the United Nations Human Rights
Council;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) to reform the rules for electing members to
the United Nations Human Rights Council to seek to ensure that
member states that have committed gross and systemic violations
of human rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) to oppose the election to the United Nations
Human Rights Council of any member state--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) that engages in a consistent pattern
of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights, as determined pursuant to section 116 or 502B
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n
and 2304);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the government of which has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism,
as determined pursuant to section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) that is designated as a Tier 3 country
under section 110(b)(1)(C) of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C.
7107(b)(1)(C));</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) that is included on the list published
by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 404(b)(1)
of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C.
2370c-1(b)(1)) as a government that recruits and uses
child soldiers; or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) the government of which the United
States determines to have committed genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, or ethnic
cleansing.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 9. CONFRONTING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to combat digital authoritarianism, including
the use of digital technologies, that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) restricts the exercise of civil and
political rights;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) weakens democratic processes and
institutions, including elections; or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) surveils, censors, or represses human
rights defenders, democracy activists, civil society
actors, independent media, or political
opponents;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to counter misinformation and disinformation,
especially in the digital domain;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) to promote internet freedom and elevate the
protection of human rights and democratic principles in the
design and deployment of current and emerging technologies;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) to support efforts to counter government
censorship and surveillance, including efforts--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) to bypass internet shutdowns and other
forms of censorship, including blocks on services
through circumvention technologies; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) to provide digital security and
digital activism support and training for democracy
activists, human rights defenders, journalists, and
other at-risk groups.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional
committees that describes the Department of State's efforts to
implement the policy objectives described in subsection (a).</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 10. PROTECTING POLITICAL PRISONERS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that includes, with
respect to unjustly detained political prisoners worldwide--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) a description of existing Department of State
processes and efforts to carry out the political prisoner-
related activities described in subsection (b);</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) an assessment of any resource gaps or
institutional deficiencies that adversely impact the Department
of State's ability to engage in the activities described in
subsection (b) in order to respond to increasing numbers of
unjustly detained political prisoners; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) a strategy for enhancing the efforts of the
Department of State and other Federal agencies to carry out the
political prisoner-related activities described in subsection
(b).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Political Prisoner-Related Activities.--The report
required under subsection (a) shall include a description of the
Department of State's efforts--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to monitor regional and global trends
concerning unjustly detained political prisoners and maintain
information regarding individual cases;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to consistently raise concerns regarding
unjustly detained political prisoners, including specific
individuals, through public and private engagement with foreign
governments, public reporting, and multilateral
engagement;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) to routinely--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) attend the trials of political
prisoners;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) conduct wellness visits of political
prisoners, to the extent practicable and pending
approval from political prisoners or their legal
counsel;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) visit political prisoners incarcerated
under home arrest, subject to a travel ban, or confined
in detention; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) report on the well-being of such
political prisoners;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) to regularly request information and specific
actions related to individual prisoners' medical conditions,
treatment, access to legal counsel, location, and family
visits;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) to identify cases in which an imminent arrest,
a potential re-arrest, or physical violence poses a risk to an
at-risk individual;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) to utilize foreign assistance resources to
provide support to civil society and others advocating for the
release of unjustly detained political prisoners;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) to utilize embassy resources to provide
shelter or facilitate the safe evacuation of willing
individuals and their families, whenever feasible;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) to use sanctions and other accountability
mechanisms to encourage the release of unjustly detained
political prisoners.</DELETED>
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``International
Freedom Protection Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
Sec. 4. Combating transnational repression abroad.
Sec. 5. Strengthening tools to combat authoritarianism.
Sec. 6. Amendment to Rewards for Justice Program.
Sec. 7. Investing in democracy research and development.
Sec. 8. Addressing authoritarians in the multilateral system.
Sec. 9. Confronting digital authoritarianism.
Sec. 10. Protecting political prisoners.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) According to Freedom House's 2023 report, ``Freedom in
the World'', democracy experienced a worldwide decline for 17
consecutive years and has been weakened by factors, such as
attacks on democratic institutions, impunity, corruption,
disinformation, human rights violations, and conflict.
(2) Since 2006, autocratic forces have been on the rise,
with emboldened autocrats from China, Russia, and Iran--
(A) refining their tactics to undermine democracy
globally;
(B) suppressing dissent to sustain their own
regimes; and
(C) frequently collaborating with each another in
such efforts.
(3) Authoritarian governments are increasingly employing
both physical and nonphysical transnational repression tactics
that reach across borders to silence, coerce, harass, or harm
individuals for peacefully exercising their internationally-
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, which
produces a chilling effect that compels people to modify their
behavior due to fear.
(4) The rise of authoritarianism--
(A) undermines the national security of the United
States and the security of our democratic allies and
partners;
(B) creates instability;
(C) weakens the rule of law; and
(D) increases the risk of war.
(5) Democracies are ill-prepared to fight back against the
growing complexity and emerging challenges posed by autocratic
forces.
(6) There is an urgent need to modernize the United States
Government's approach to countering authoritarianism, including
by revitalizing and strengthening the relevant tools,
strategies, and institutions.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Relevant federal agencies.--The term ``relevant Federal
agencies'' means--
(A) the Department of State;
(B) the United States Agency for International
Development; and
(C) other Federal agencies that are relevant for
purposes of this Act.
(3) Transnational repression.--The term ``transnational
repression''--
(A) means actions of a foreign government, or
agents of a foreign government, involving the
transgression of national borders through physical,
digital, or analog means to intimidate, silence,
coerce, harass, or harm members of diaspora
populations, political opponents, civil society
activists, journalists, or members of ethnic or
religious minority groups to prevent their exercise of
internationally recognized human rights; and
(B) may include--
(i) extrajudicial killings;
(ii) physical assaults and intimidation;
(iii) arbitrary detentions;
(iv) renditions;
(v) deportations;
(vi) unexplained or enforced
disappearances;
(vii) physical or online surveillance or
stalking;
(viii) unwarranted passport cancellation or
control over other identification documents;
(ix) abuse of international law enforcement
systems;
(x) unlawful asset freezes;
(xi) digital threats, such as cyberattacks,
targeted surveillance and spyware, online
harassment, and intimidation; and
(xii) coercion by proxy, such as harassment
of, or threats or harm to, family and
associates of private individuals who remain in
their country of origin.
SEC. 4. COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION ABROAD.
(a) Statement of Policy on Transnational Repression.--It is the
policy of the United States--
(1) to identify and address transnational repression as a
direct threat to the United States national interests of
upholding and promoting democratic values and internationally
recognized human rights;
(2) to address transnational repression, including by
protecting targeted individuals and groups;
(3) to strengthen the capacity of United States embassy and
mission staff to counter transnational repression, including
by--
(A) monitoring and documenting instances of
transnational repression;
(B) conducting regular outreach with at-risk or
affected populations to provide information regarding
available resources without putting such people at
further risk; and
(C) working with local and national law
enforcement, as appropriate, to support victims of
transnational repression;
(4) to develop policy and programmatic responses based on
input from--
(A) vulnerable populations who are at risk of, or
are experiencing, transnational repression;
(B) nongovernmental organizations working to
address transnational repression; and
(C) the private sector;
(5) to provide training to relevant Federal personnel--
(A) to enhance their understanding of transnational
repression; and
(B) to identify and combat threats of transnational
repression;
(6) to strengthen documentation and monitoring by the
United States Government of transnational repression by foreign
governments in the United States, in foreign countries, and
within international organizations; and
(7) to seek to hold perpetrators of transnational
repression accountable, including through the use of targeted
sanctions and visa restrictions.
(b) Report on Transnational Repression.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter for the
following 10 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit
a classified report to the appropriate congressional committees
that assesses the efforts of the United States Government to
implement the policy objectives described in subsection (a).
(2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1)
shall include--
(A) a detailed description and assessment of United
States Government efforts to monitor, prevent, and
respond to transnational repression abroad;
(B) a detailed accounting of the most common
tactics of transnational repression;
(C) instances of transnational repression occurring
within international organizations;
(D) a description of--
(i) efforts by personnel at United States
embassies and missions to support victims of or
those at risk of transnational repression; and
(ii) resources provided to United States
embassies and missions to support such efforts;
and
(E) a strategy to strengthen interagency efforts
and coordination to combat transnational repression,
which shall include--
(i) a plan, developed in consultation with
partner governments, civil society, the
business community, and other entities, to
promote respect for rule of law and human
rights in surveillance technology use, which
shall include--
(I) protecting personal digital
data from being used for the purposes
of transnational repression;
(II) establishing safeguards to
prevent the misuse of surveillance
technology, including elements such as
appropriate legal protections, a
prohibition on discrimination,
oversight and accountability
mechanisms, transparency on the
applicable legal framework, limiting
biometric tools for surveillance to
what is lawful and appropriate, testing
and evaluation, and training; and
(III) working to ensure, as
applicable, that such technologies are
designed, developed, and deployed with
safeguards to protect human rights
(including privacy), consistent with
the United Nations Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights;
(ii) public diplomacy efforts and plans
for, including the use of the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at international
organizations, to promote awareness of and
oppose acts of transnational repression;
(iii) a plan to develop or enhance global
coalitions to monitor cases of transnational
repression at international organizations and
to strengthen alert mechanisms for key
stakeholders worldwide;
(iv) a description, as appropriate, of how
the United States Government has previously
provided, and will continue to provide, support
to civil society organizations in foreign
countries in which transnational repression
occurs--
(I) to improve the documentation,
investigation, and research of cases,
trends, and tactics of transnational
repression; and
(II) to promote accountability and
transparency in government actions
impacting victims of transnational
repression; and
(v) a description of new or existing
emergency assistance mechanisms, to aid at-risk
groups, communities, and individuals in
countries abroad in which transnational
repression occurs.
(3) Form of report.--The report required under paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in classified form, but may include an
unclassified annex.
(c) Training of United States Personnel.--The Secretary of State,
in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments
and agencies, shall develop and provide training to relevant personnel
of the Department of State and other relevant Federal agencies, whether
serving in the United States or overseas, to advance the purposes of
this Act, including training on the identification of--
(1) physical and nonphysical threats of transnational
repression;
(2) foreign governments that are most frequently involved
in transnational repression;
(3) foreign governments that are known to frequently
cooperate with other governments in committing transnational
repression;
(4) digital surveillance and cyber tools commonly used in
transnational repression;
(5) safe outreach methods for vulnerable populations at
risk of transnational repression; and
(6) tools to respond to transnational repression threats,
including relevant authorities which may be invoked.
(d) Training of Foreign Service Officers and Presidential
Appointees.--Section 708(a)(1) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22
U.S.C. 4028(a)(1)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(E) for Foreign Service Officers and Presidential
appointees, including chiefs of mission, in missions
abroad who work on political, economic, public
diplomacy, security, or development issues, a dedicated
module of instruction on transnational repression (as
such term is defined in section 3(3) of the
International Freedom Protection Act), including--
``(i) how to recognize threats of
transnational repression;
``(ii) an overview of relevant laws that
can be invoked to combat such threats; and
``(iii) how to support individuals
experiencing transnational repression.''.
SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING TOOLS TO COMBAT AUTHORITARIANISM.
(a) Transnational Repression.--The President should consider the
use of transnational repression by a foreign person in determining
whether to impose sanctions with respect to such foreign person under--
(1) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
(22 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.);
(2) section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023
(division K of Public Law 117-328; 8 U.S.C. 1182 note); or
(3) any other relevant statutory provision granting human
rights-related sanctions authority under which a foreign person
has been sanctioned.
(b) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than
annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a
report to the appropriate congressional committees that, except
as provided in paragraph (2), identifies each foreign person
about whom the President has made a determination to impose
sanctions pursuant to paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection
(a) based on the consideration of the use of transnational
repression.
(2) Exception.--The report required under paragraph (1) may
not identify individuals if such identification would interfere
with law enforcement efforts.
(3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(c) Anti-kleptocracy and Human Rights Ineligibility.--
(1) Ineligibility.--
(A) Significant corruption or human rights
violations.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and
(3), a foreign government official shall be ineligible
for entry into the United States if the Secretary of
State determines that such official was knowingly
directly or indirectly involved in--
(i) significant corruption, including
corruption related to the extraction of natural
resources; or
(ii) a gross violation of internationally
recognized human rights (as defined in section
502B(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304(d)(1))), including the
wrongful detention of--
(I) locally employed staff of a
United States diplomatic mission; or
(II) a United States citizen or
national.
(B) Immediate family members.--The immediate family
members of an official described in subparagraph (A)
may be subject to the same restriction on entry into
the United States as such official.
(C) Referral.--The Secretary of State, in
implementing this subsection, shall, as appropriate,
provide information regarding the actions of officials
described in subparagraph (A) to the Office of Foreign
Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury, which
shall determine whether to impose sanctions authorized
under Federal law to block the transfer of property and
interests in property, and all financial transactions,
in the United States involving any such official.
(D) Designation or determination.--The Secretary of
State shall publicly or privately designate or make the
determination that the foreign government officials or
party members about whom the Secretary has made such
designation or determination regarding significant
corruption or gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights, and their immediate family
members, without regard to whether any such individual
has applied for a visa.
(2) Exceptions.--
(A) In general.--Individuals are not ineligible for
entry into the United States pursuant to paragraph (1)
if such entry--
(i) would further important United States
law enforcement objectives; or
(ii) is necessary to permit the United
States to fulfill its obligations under the
Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the
United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26,
1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947,
between the United Nations and the United
States or under other international obligations
of the United States.
(B) Savings provision.--Nothing in paragraph (1)
may be construed to derogate from United States
Government obligations under applicable international
agreements or obligations.
(3) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the
application of paragraph (1) with respect to any individual if
the Secretary determines that--
(A) such waiver would serve a compelling national
interest of the United States; or
(B) the circumstances that caused such individual
to be ineligible for entry into the United States have
sufficiently changed.
(4) Semiannual report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a
report, including a classified annex if necessary, to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives. Each such report shall include--
(i) all relevant information relating to
corruption or gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights that
was a factor in identifying, during the most
recent 12-month period--
(I) individuals who are ineligible
for entry into the United States under
paragraph (1)(A); and
(II) individuals about whom the
Secretary has made a designation or
determination pursuant to paragraph
(1)(D); and
(III) individuals who would be
ineligible for entry into the United
States under paragraph (1)(A), but were
excluded from such restriction pursuant
to paragraph (2);
(ii) a list of any waivers granted by the
Secretary pursuant to paragraph (3); and
(iii) a description of the justification
for each such waiver.
(B) Posting of report.--The unclassified portion of
each report required under subparagraph (A) shall be
posted on a publicly accessible website of the
Department of State.
(5) Clarification.--For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (4),
the records of the Department of State and of diplomatic and
consular offices of the United States pertaining to the
issuance or refusal of visas or permits to enter the United
States shall not be considered confidential.
(d) Restriction on Assistance in the Wake of a Coup D'etat.--
Chapter 1 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2751 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 620N. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE IN THE WAKE OF A COUP D'ETAT.
``(a) In General.--Except as provided under subsections (b) and
(d), no assistance may be provided under this Act or under the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751) to the central government of any
country in which the head of government, as recognized by the United
States, was deposed by a military coup d'etat or decree or a coup
d'etat or decree in which the military played a decisive role.
``(b) Exemption for National Security.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, after
consultation with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, may
exempt assistance from the restriction described in subsection
(a), on a program by program basis for a 90-day renewable
period, if the Secretary determines that the continuation of
such assistance is in the national security interest of the
United States.
``(2) Justification.--The Secretary of State shall provide
a justification to the appropriate congressional committees for
each exemption granted pursuant to paragraph (1) not later than
5 days after making such determination.
``(3) Updates.--The Secretary of State shall provide
periodic updates, not less frequently than every 90 days,
regarding the status of any assistance subject to the exemption
granted pursuant to paragraph (1).
``(c) Resumption of Assistance.--Assistance to a foreign government
that is subject to the restriction described in subsection (a) may be
resumed if the Secretary of State certifies and reports to the
appropriate congressional committees, not fewer than 30 days before the
resumption of such assistance, that a democratically-elected government
has taken office subsequent to the termination of assistance pursuant
to subsection (a).
``(d) Exception for Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance.--The
restriction under subsection (a) shall not apply to any assistance
used--
``(1) to promote democratic elections or public
participation in the democratic processes;
``(2) to support a democratic transition; or
``(3) for humanitarian purposes.
``(e) Defined Term.--In this section, the term `appropriate
congressional committees' means--
``(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
``(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
``(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
``(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.''.
SEC. 6. AMENDMENT TO REWARDS FOR JUSTICE PROGRAM.
Section 36(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956
(22 U.S.C. 2708(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (13), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (14), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(15) the restraining, seizing, forfeiting, or
repatriating of stolen assets linked to foreign government
corruption and the proceeds of such corruption.''.
SEC. 7. INVESTING IN DEMOCRACY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of
the United States Agency for International Development, should
establish, within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, a
program for democracy research and development that--
(1) supports research and development by the Department of
State, the United States Agency for International Development,
and the National Endowment for Democracy on policies and
programs relating to democracy efforts;
(2) drives innovation within such agencies regarding the
response to complex, multidimensional challenges to democracy;
(3) identifies lessons learned and best practices for
democracy programs and diplomatic approaches to create feedback
loops and shape future evidence-based programming and
diplomacy;
(4) encourages private sector actors to establish and
implement business practices that will--
(A) strengthen democratic institutions; and
(B) bolster democratic processes; and
(5) strengthens the resilience of democratic actors and
institutions.
SEC. 8. ADDRESSING AUTHORITARIANS IN THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM.
It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State and the
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations should use
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United
Nations and with other multilateral bodies--
(1)(A) to promote the full participation of civil society
actors within the United Nations Human Rights Council and other
multilateral bodies;
(B) to closely monitor instances of reprisals against such
actors; and
(C) to support the use of targeted sanctions, censure of
member states, and other diplomatic measures to hold
responsible any person who engages in reprisals against human
rights defenders and civil society within such multilateral
bodies;
(2) to reform the process for suspending the rights of
membership in the United Nations Human Rights Council for
member states that commit gross and systemic violations of
internationally recognized human rights, including--
(A) ensuring information detailing the member
state's human rights record is publicly available
before a vote for membership or a vote on suspending
the rights of membership of such member state; and
(B) making publicly available the vote of each
member state on the suspension of rights of membership
from the United Nations Human Rights Council;
(3) to reform the rules for electing members to the United
Nations Human Rights Council to seek to ensure that member
states that have committed gross and systemic violations of
internationally recognized human rights are not elected to the
Human Rights Council; and
(4) to oppose the election to the United Nations Human
Rights Council of any member state--
(A) that engages in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights,
as determined pursuant to section 116 or 502B of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n and
2304);
(B) the government of which has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism, as
determined pursuant to section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);
(C) that is designated as a Tier 3 country under
section 110(b)(1)(C) of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)(1)(C));
(D) that is included on the list published by the
Secretary of State pursuant to section 404(b)(1) of the
Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c-
1(b)(1)) as a government that recruits and uses child
soldiers; or
(E) the government of which the United States
determines to have committed genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, or ethnic cleansing.
SEC. 9. CONFRONTING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to combat digital authoritarianism, including the use
of digital technologies, that--
(A) restricts the exercise of civil and political
rights (as defined in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, done at New York December
16, 1966);
(B) weakens democratic processes and institutions,
including elections; or
(C) surveils, censors, or represses human rights
defenders, democracy activists, civil society actors,
independent media, or political opponents;
(2) to promote internet freedom; and
(3) to support efforts to counter government censorship and
surveillance, including efforts--
(A) to bypass internet shutdowns and other forms of
censorship, including blocks on services through
circumvention technologies; and
(B) to provide digital security support and
training for democracy activists, journalists, and
other at-risk groups.
(b) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional
committees that describes the Department of State's efforts to
implement the policy objectives described in subsection (a).
SEC. 10. PROTECTING POLITICAL PRISONERS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that includes, with
respect to unjustly detained political prisoners worldwide--
(1) a description of existing Department of State processes
and efforts to carry out the political prisoner-related
activities described in subsection (b);
(2) an assessment of any resource gaps or institutional
deficiencies that adversely impact the Department of State's
ability to engage in the activities described in subsection (b)
in order to respond to increasing numbers of unjustly detained
political prisoners; and
(3) a strategy for enhancing the efforts of the Department
of State and other Federal agencies to carry out the political
prisoner-related activities described in subsection (b).
(b) Political Prisoner-related Activities.--The report required
under subsection (a) shall include a description of the Department of
State's efforts--
(1) to monitor regional and global trends concerning
unjustly detained political prisoners and maintain information
regarding individual cases;
(2) to consistently raise concerns regarding unjustly
detained political prisoners, including specific individuals,
through public and private engagement with foreign governments,
public reporting, and multilateral engagement;
(3) to routinely--
(A) attend the trials of political prisoners;
(B) conduct wellness visits of political prisoners,
to the extent practicable and pending approval from
political prisoners or their legal counsel;
(C) visit political prisoners incarcerated under
home arrest, subject to a travel ban, or confined in
detention; and
(D) report on the well-being of such political
prisoners;
(4) to regularly request information and specific actions
related to individual prisoners' medical conditions, treatment,
access to legal counsel, location, and family visits;
(5) to identify cases in which an imminent arrest, a
potential re-arrest, or physical violence poses a risk to an
at-risk individual;
(6) to utilize embassy resources to provide shelter or
facilitate the safe evacuation of willing individuals and their
families, whenever feasible; and
(7) to use sanctions and other accountability mechanisms to
encourage the release of unjustly detained political prisoners.
Calendar No. 375
118th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 3854
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To combat transnational repression abroad, to strengthen tools to
combat authoritarianism, corruption, and kleptocracy, to invest in
democracy research and development, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
May 7, 2024
Reported with an amendment