118 S416 RS: Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries Act
U.S. Senate
2023-07-25
text/xml
EN
Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.
II
Calendar No. 147
118th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 416
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
February 14, 2023
Mr. Wicker (for himself, Mr. Cardin, Mrs. Shaheen, Mr. Tillis, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Graham, Mr. Whitehouse, Mr. Rubio, Mrs. Blackburn, Mr. Heinrich, Mr. Scott of Florida, Mr. Kelly, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Manchin, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Young, and Mr. Padilla) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
July 25, 2023
Reported by Mr. Menendez, with an amendment
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic
A BILL
To designate the Russian-based mercenary Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist organization, and for other purposes.
1.

Short titles
This Act may be cited as the “Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries Act” or the “HARM Act”.
2.

Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
The Secretary of State's designation of an entity as a foreign terrorist organization results from a determination that—
(A)
the entity is foreign and engages in terrorism or terrorist activity; and
(B)
the terrorist activity threatens the security of the United States or its nationals.
(2)
The activities of the Wagner Group and affiliated entities of Russian national Yevgeniy Prigozhin pose a threat to the national interests and national security of the United States and allies and partners of the United States, including with respect to Russia’s war on Ukraine, which President Biden declared, on March 2, 2022, “pose[s] an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States”.
(3)
On June 20, 2017, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated the Wagner Group and its military leader, Dmitry Utkin, pursuant to Executive Order 13660 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) “for being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine”.
(4)
On September 20, 2018, the Department of State added Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities, including the Wagner Group, to the list of persons identified as part of, or operating for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation under section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9525).
(5)
On January 20, 2023, a White House spokesperson announced that the Department of the Treasury will designate the Wagner Group as a significant transnational criminal organization pursuant to Executive Order 13581 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of transnational criminal organizations), consistent with the authority granted to the President under section 203(a) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702).
(6)
The Wagner Group, a self-described private actor that undertakes military action and subversive operations at the behest of the Government of the Russian Federation, is a “terrorist group” that engages in “terrorism” (as defined in section 140(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d))), which is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”.
(7)
The Wagner Group and its affiliated entities have committed, or are credibly accused of committing, terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B))), through their involvement in—
(A)
the massacres, rape, and torture of civilians in Bucha, Ukraine, in March 2022;
(B)
the massacres in Moura, Mali, in March 2022;
(C)
the massacres of migrant workers and civilians in mining regions along the Sudan- Central African Republic border in 2022;
(D)
the murder of Russian journalists in the Central African Republic in June 2018 as well as threats against United States journalists investigating such incident;
(E)
the kidnapping of children in the Central African Republic in 2022 to work in mines;
(F)
the rape and sex trafficking of women and children in the Central African Republic between 2018 and 2022;
(G)
the sabotage and lethal suppression of civilian protestors in Sudan in 2019;
(H)
the use of nerve agents against Libya’s Government of National Accord and deployment of illegal land mines and booby-traps in civilian areas of Tripoli between 2019 and 2020;
(I)
the torture and execution of a Syrian national in June 2017;
(J)
efforts to assassinate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in March 2022; and
(K)
the receipt of weapons shipments initially reported in December 2022 from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which the Secretary of State had designated a state sponsor of terrorism on November 20, 2017.
3.

Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the Russian-based mercenary Wagner Group meets the criteria for designation by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)); and
(2)
the Secretary of State should designate the Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist organization under such section 219(a).
4.

Designation of the mercenary Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist organization
(a)

In general
Upon the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall designate the Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist organization in accordance with section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
(b)

Application
The designation required under subsection (a) shall equally apply to any affiliated and successor entities to the Wagner Group undertaking malign activities against the United States and its allies and partners, including activities taking place in Ukraine, Africa, and the Middle East.
(c)

Waiver
The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if the President determines and reports to the appropriate congressional committees that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.
(d)

Annual report
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing the international activities of the Russian-based mercenary Wagner Group.
(e)

Defined term
In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(1)
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(3)
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
(4)
the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives;
(5)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(6)
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(7)
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
1.

Short titles
This Act may be cited as the “Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries Act” or the “HARM Act”.
2.

Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
The Secretary of State's designation of an entity as a foreign terrorist organization results from a determination that—
(A)
the entity is foreign and engages in terrorism or terrorist activity; and
(B)
the terrorist activity threatens the security of the United States or its nationals.
(2)
The activities of the Wagner Group and affiliated entities of Russian national Yevgeniy Prigozhin pose a threat to the national interests and national security of the United States and allies and partners of the United States, including with respect to Russia’s war on Ukraine, which President Biden declared, on March 2, 2022, “pose[s] an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States”.
(3)
On June 20, 2017, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated the Wagner Group and its military leader, Dmitry Utkin, pursuant to Executive Order 13660 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) “for being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine”.
(4)
On September 20, 2018, the Department of State added Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his affiliated entities, including the Wagner Group, to the list of persons identified as part of, or operating for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation under section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9525).
(5)
On January 20, 2023, a White House spokesperson announced that the Department of the Treasury will designate the Wagner Group as a significant transnational criminal organization pursuant to Executive Order 13581 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of transnational criminal organizations), consistent with the authority granted to the President under section 203(a) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702).
(6)
The Wagner Group, a self-described private actor that undertakes military action and subversive operations at the behest of the Government of the Russian Federation, is a “terrorist group” that engages in “terrorism” (as defined in section 140(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d))), which is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”.
(7)
The Wagner Group and its affiliated entities have committed, or are credibly accused of committing, terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B))), through their involvement in—
(A)
the massacres, rape, and torture of civilians in Bucha, Ukraine, in March 2022;
(B)
the massacres in Moura, Mali, in March 2022;
(C)
the massacres of migrant workers and civilians in mining regions along the Sudan- Central African Republic border in 2022;
(D)
the murder of Russian journalists in the Central African Republic in June 2018 as well as threats against United States journalists investigating such incident;
(E)
the kidnapping of children in the Central African Republic in 2022 to work in mines;
(F)
the rape and sex trafficking of women and children in the Central African Republic between 2018 and 2022;
(G)
the sabotage and lethal suppression of civilian protestors in Sudan in 2019;
(H)
the use of nerve agents against Libya’s Government of National Accord and deployment of illegal land mines and booby-traps in civilian areas of Tripoli between 2019 and 2020;
(I)
the torture and execution of a Syrian national in June 2017;
(J)
efforts to assassinate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in March 2022; and
(K)
the receipt of weapons shipments initially reported in December 2022 from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which the Secretary of State had designated a state sponsor of terrorism on November 20, 2017.
3.

Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the Russian-based mercenary Wagner Group meets the criteria for designation by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)); and
(2)
the Secretary of State should designate the Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist organization under such section 219(a).
4.

Designation of the mercenary Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist organization
(a)

In general
Upon the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall designate the Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist organization in accordance with section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
(b)

Application
The designation required under subsection (a) shall equally apply to any affiliated and successor entities to the Wagner Group undertaking malign activities against the United States and its allies and partners, including activities taking place in Ukraine, Africa, and the Middle East.
(c)

Waiver
The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if the President determines and reports to the appropriate congressional committees that such a waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.
(d)

Annual report
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing the international activities of the Russian-based mercenary Wagner Group.
(e)

Defined term
In this Act, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(1)
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(3)
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
(4)
the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives;
(5)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(6)
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(7)
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(f)

Exception for humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding activities
When applying the terms material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A(b)(1) of title 18, United States Code) and material support (as defined at section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182 (a)(3)(B)) with respect to activities and transactions involving the Wagner Group, such terms shall exclude activities and support directly related to humanitarian assistance or peacebuilding activities, including—
(1)
activities and transactions described in an authorizing document issued by the Secretary of the Treasury (or designee) by means of a license, regulation, exemption, or other document;
(2)
activities that—
(A)
support humanitarian projects to meet basic human needs and to support education;
(B)
support peacebuilding, conflict prevention, or conflict resolution programs;
(C)
support disarmament, demobilization, or reintegration programs;
(D)
directly benefit the civilian population, including support for the removal of landmines and economic development projects directly benefitting the civilian population;
(E)
support democracy building;
(F)
support non-commercial development projects directly benefitting civilians; and
(G)
support environmental and natural resource protection;
(3)
any transaction by a nongovernmental organization that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the activities described in paragraph (2), including—
(A)
processing and transferring funds;
(B)
paying taxes, fees, or import duties;
(C)
the purchase or receipt of permits, visas, licenses, or public utility services if such nongovernmental organization is not a person or entity whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to another provision of statute or regulation; and
(4)
noncommercial transactions that are related to the direct or indirect provision of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components for medical devices, or software updates for medical devices to an individual whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to another provision of statute or regulation, if such items are transferred in quantities consistent with personal, noncommercial use.
5.

Task force on countering Russian malign actors and mercenary proxies
(a)

Establishment
(1)

In general
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish a task force on countering the Russian mercenary groups and their proxies (referred to in this section as the “Task Force”).
(2)

Russian mercenary groups and their proxies defined
In this section, the term Russian mercenary groups and their proxies means—
(A)
mercenary proxy groups, such as Wagner PMC (and any relevant successors that engage in similar conduct), PMC Patriot, Andreyevsky Krest PMC, PMC Convoy, Akhmat PMC, Moran Security Group, and RSB Group;
(B)
any organization or network that is directly involved in planning and carrying out influence operations in the United States or in any country that is an ally or partner of the United States; and
(C)
any overt or covert financial, procurement, or logistics network directly involved in supporting the actors or activities described in subparagraphs (A) or (B).
(b)

Objectives
The objectives of the Task Force shall be to—
(1)
identify individuals and entities linked to Russian mercenary groups and their proxies that are responsible for, or complicit in, transnational criminal activities and atrocities in Africa;
(2)
degrade the operational capabilities of Russian mercenary groups and their proxies worldwide;
(3)
disrupt and degrade the financial, procurement, and logistics networks that sustain Russian mercenary groups and their proxies and networks;
(4)
deny Russian mercenary groups and their proxies the use of third-country safe havens or bases of operations that can be used to project influence or support their operations globally;
(5)
coordinate diplomatic activities in countries in which the Wagner Group poses a national security threat;
(6)
engage with allies and partners of the United States to carry out the objectives described in paragraphs (1) through (5); and
(7)
make recommendations for sanctions, including regarding designations and any additional sanctions authorities that may be needed.
(c)

Composition
(1)

Leadership
The Task Force shall be led by the Deputy Secretary of State or another senior official of the Department of State who has been designated by the Secretary of State to lead the Task Force.
(2)

Department of state representatives
Members of the Task Force shall include representatives of—
(A)
relevant regional or functional bureaus of the Department of State;
(B)
the Global Engagement Center;
(C)
the Office of Sanctions Coordination;
(D)
the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy; and
(E)
other offices and bureaus of the Department of State that the Secretary of State determines should be represented on the Task Force.
(3)

Other federal departments and agencies
Members of the Task Force shall also include representatives of—
(A)
the Department of Defense;
(B)
the Department of the Treasury;
(C)
the intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003);
(D)
the Department of Justice; and
(E)
any other relevant Federal department or agency.
(d)

Report
Not later than 90 days after establishment of the Task Force, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing—
(1)
a summary of the Task Force’s efforts to counter Russian mercenary groups and their proxies during the preceding year;
(2)
a description of the Task Force's diplomatic efforts to carry out the objectives described in subsection (b), including—
(A)
diplomatic demarches;
(B)
bilateral engagements;
(C)
coordination of multilateral initiatives with allies and partners; and
(D)
any other relevant diplomatic activities;
(3)
a description of financial, cyber, military, or intelligence tools or authorities used to carry out the objectives described in subsection (b), including the cyber capabilities authorized to be shared under section 398 of title 10, United States Code;
(4)
a description of any information operations or public diplomacy efforts associated with any of the activities described in paragraphs (1) through (3); and
(5)
a description of the coordination and synchronization of efforts among the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Department of Defense, and any other relevant Federal agencies, to counter Russian mercenary groups and their proxies in affected countries.
6.

Enhanced diplomatic efforts and increasing personnel to counter the activities of the Wagner Group and other Russian military companies
(a)

Plan to enhance diplomatic efforts
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for enhancing diplomatic efforts with governments and regional organizations to counter the Wagner Group, any relevant successors to the Wagner Group that engage in similar conduct, and other Russian mercenary groups and their proxies. Such plan shall include recommendations for increasing the number of personnel at certain United States diplomatic missions to ensure that relevant embassies have the personnel to focus on the activities, policies, and investments of Russian mercenary groups and their proxies.
(b)

Additional staffing plan
(1)

In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a staffing plan to the appropriate congressional committees for key diplomatic posts in Africa (including north Africa) to increase monitoring and reporting on the activities of the Wagner Group, any relevant successors to the Wagner Group that engage in similar conduct, and other Russian mercenary groups and their proxies. Such plan shall identify new incentives for filling positions that are hard to staff.
(2)

Financial and human resources
The Secretary of State shall prioritize efforts to ensure that United States diplomatic missions in countries in which the Wagner Group poses a national security threat have sufficient financial and human resources to engage in effective public diplomacy to counter the influence of the Wagner Group and other Russian mercenary proxy groups.
(c)

Branding and marking United States foreign assistance
The Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies should—
(1)
prescribe the use of the United States flag to identify, consistent with section 641 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2401), all foreign assistance provided by the United States to countries in which the Wagner Group poses a national security threat;
(2)
limit the use of branding and marking waivers, as appropriate, for humanitarian assistance provided by the United States to such countries; and
(3)
only use branding and marking waivers on a case-by-case basis for non-humanitarian programs administered by the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, or another Federal department or agency administering programs in such countries.
(d)

Efforts to limit benefits from illicit extraction and trade in natural resources
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall engage in diplomatic efforts to limit the ability of the Wagner Group, any successor to the Wagner Group that engages in similar conduct, and other Russian mercenary proxy groups to engage in, or materially benefit from, the smuggling and illicit extraction, refining, and trade of gold and other natural resources, including by encouraging—
(1)
the harmonization of tax regimes;
(2)
the adoption of due diligence and international standards for conflict-free and responsible sourcing of natural resources; and
(3)
the formalization of artisanal mining sectors.
7.

Strategy to counter the Wagner Group
(a)

In general
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with relevant Federal agencies, shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy to deter and counter the global activities of the Wagner Group and any successor to the Wagner Group that engages in similar conduct.
(b)

Elements
The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements:
(1)
Regional and country-specific approaches to countering the influence and activities of the Wagner Group and any successor that engages in similar conduct in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America, including efforts to counter recruitment by or on behalf of the Wagner Group and any successor to the Wagner Group that engages in similar conduct.
(2)
A comprehensive campaign, conducted in partnership with the Global Engagement Center, designed to—
(A)
expose the activities of the Wagner Group and any successor to the Wagner Group that engages in similar conduct; and
(B)
counter the propaganda and disinformation and misinformation operations of the Wagner Group.
(3)
Examples of past efforts to accomplish the objectives described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2) and a list of the tools that have been used for disinformation purposes.
(4)
A plan to utilize other tools available to the United States Government to degrade the operations of the Wagner Group and any successor to the Wagner Group that engages in similar conduct.
(5)
An analysis of policy and programmatic limitations, gaps, and resource requirements to effectively counter the Russian Federation’s malign influence and activities in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Asia, and other regions, as appropriate.
(6)
Recommendations for any additional authorities or resources needed to more effectively degrade operations and influence of the Wagner Group, any successor to the Wagner Group that engages in similar conduct, and similar groups.
(c)

Form
The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
8.

Influencing international financial institutions to consider Wagner Group mining concessions when considering loans and development financing projects
(a)

Consideration by International Monetary Fund of mining concessions with affiliated entities of the Wagner Group
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall advise the United States Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund to use the voice and vote of the United States to ensure that the International Monetary Fund, when considering a loan to a country, considers whether the potential recipient of such loan has provided mining concessions or direct budgetary support to the Wagner Group or entities affiliated with the Wagner Group.
(b)

Consideration by Export-Import Bank of the United States of mining projects
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Treasury, shall advise the United States Chair and Director of the Board of Governors of the Export-Import Bank of the United States to use the voice and vote of the United States to ensure that the Export-Import Bank, when considering development financing projects, reviews whether the potential recipient has provided mining concessions or direct budgetary support to the Wagner Group or entities affiliated with the Wagner Group.
9.

Information sharing on high-value Wagner Group targets
The Secretary of State is authorized to take appropriate steps to share information regarding high-value Wagner Group targets with like-minded foreign government partners, which could include full names and biometric data of individual targets, if available and relevant to determining visa restrictions.
July 25, 2023
Reported with an amendment