[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4433 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 4433
To enhance United States cooperation with European countries to improve
the security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 23, 2024
Mr. Ricketts (for himself and Mrs. Shaheen) introduced the following
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To enhance United States cooperation with European countries to improve
the security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.
This Act may be cited as the ``Building Options for the Lasting
Security of Taiwan through European Resolve Act'' or the ``BOLSTER
Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) In an October 2022 speech before the 20th National
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, General Secretary Xi
Jinping declared that the People's Republic of China (referred
to in this Act as the ``PRC'') has not ruled out the use of
force regarding Taiwan.
(2) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence's
Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
published on February 6, 2023, noted that ``Beijing is working
to meet its goal of fielding a military by 2027 designed to
deter U.S. intervention in a future cross-Strait crisis.''.
(3) The risk of economic disruption following a conflict in
the Taiwan Strait could amount to approximately
$2,000,000,000,000 in a blockade scenario, which would
immediately, and potentially irreversibly impact global trade
and investment, key supply chains for semiconductors, and other
trade and national security priorities.
(4) The European Union's foreign and security policy
service, the European External Action Service, recognizes that
the European Union may use sanctions to promote the objectives
of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, all of which have
potential relevance in the event of military action or coercion
against Taiwan.
(5) The European Union has imposed sanctions on--
(A) PRC officials and entities responsible for
human rights abuses in Xinjiang; and
(B) PRC entities for their support of Russia's
illegal and unprovoked war in Ukraine.
(6) In July 2022, Jorge Toledo Albinana, Ambassador of the
European Union to the People's Republic of China, said, ``In
the event of a military invasion [of Taiwan], we have made it
very clear that the European Union, with the United States and
its allies, will impose similar or even greater measures than
those we have now taken against Russia.''.
(7) On January 18, 2023, the European Parliament passed a
resolution calling upon ``all competent European Union
institutions to urgently draw up a scenario-based strategy for
tackling security challenges in Taiwan.''.
(8) In an April 18, 2023, speech to the European
Parliament, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen
emphasized that the European Union ``stand[s] strongly against
any unilateral change of the status quo [in the Taiwan Strait],
in particular by the use of force.''.
(9) The PRC has supported Russia's illegal, full-scale
invasion of Ukraine by resupplying Russia's defense industrial
base.
(10) Taiwan has--
(A) aligned itself with European Union sanctions
against Russia in response to the full-scale invasion
of Ukraine; and
(B) provided Ukraine more than $113,000,000 in
financial support and more than 950 metric tons of
humanitarian supplies.
SEC. 3. CONSULTATIONS, PLANS, REPORTS, AND BRIEFINGS.
(a) Consultations With European Governments Regarding Sanctions
Against the PRC Under Certain Circumstances.--
(1) In general.--The head of the Office of Sanctions
Coordination at the Department of State, in consultation with
the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the
Department of the Treasury, shall engage in regular
consultations with the International Special Envoy for the
Implementation of European Union Sanctions and appropriate
government officials of European countries, including the
United Kingdom, to develop coordinated plans and share
information on independent plans to impose sanctions and other
economic measures against the PRC, as appropriate, if the PRC
is found to be involved in--
(A) overthrowing or dismantling the governing
institutions in Taiwan, including engaging in
disinformation campaigns in Taiwan that promote the
strategic interests of the PRC;
(B) occupying any territory controlled or
administered by Taiwan as of the date of the enactment
of this Act;
(C) violating the territorial integrity of Taiwan;
(D) taking significant action against Taiwan,
including--
(i) creating a naval blockade or other
quarantine of Taiwan;
(ii) seizing the outer lying islands of
Taiwan; or
(iii) initiating a cyberattack that
threatens civilian or military infrastructure
in Taiwan; or
(E) providing assistance that helps the security
forces of the Russian Federation in executing Russia's
unprovoked, illegal war against Ukraine.
(2) Semiannual congressional briefings.--Not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
semiannually thereafter for the following 5 years, the head of
the Office of Sanctions Coordination shall provide a briefing
regarding the progress of the consultations required under
paragraph (1) to--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives.
(b) Coordination of Humanitarian Support in a Taiwan Contingency.--
(1) Plan.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development (referred to in this
section as the ``Administrator''), in coordination with the
Secretary of State, shall develop a plan to deliver
humanitarian aid to Taiwan in the event of a blockade,
quarantine, or military invasion of Taiwan by the People's
Liberation Army (referred to in this Act as the ``PLA'').
(2) Consultation requirement.--In developing the plan
required under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall consult
with the European Commission's Emergency Response Coordination
Centre and appropriate government officials of European
countries regarding cooperation to provide aid to Indo-Pacific
countries as the result of a blockade, quarantine, or military
invasion of Taiwan by the PLA, including the extent to which
European countries could backfill United States humanitarian
aid to other parts of the world.
(3) Congressional engagement.--Upon completion of the plan
required under paragraph (1), the Administrator shall provide a
briefing regarding the details of such plan and the
consultations required under paragraph (2) to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(c) Report on the Economic Impacts of PRC Military Action Against
Taiwan.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report
to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
that contains an independent assessment of the expected
economic impact of--
(A) a 30-day blockade or quarantine of Taiwan by
the PLA; and
(B) a 180-day blockade or quarantine of Taiwan by
the PLA.
(2) Assessment elements.--The assessment required under
paragraph (1) shall contain a description of--
(A) the impact of the blockade or quarantine of
Taiwan on global trade and output;
(B) the 10 economic sectors that would be most
disrupted by a sustained blockade of Taiwan by the PLA;
and
(C) the expected economic impact of a sustained
blockade of Taiwan by the PLA on the domestic economies
of European countries that are members of NATO or the
European Union.
(3) Independent assessment.--
(A) In general.--The assessment required under
paragraph (1) shall be conducted by a federally-funded
research and development center or another appropriate
independent entity with expertise in economic analysis.
(B) Use of data from previous studies.--The entity
conducting the assessment required under paragraph (1)
may use and incorporate information contained in
previous studies on matters relevant to the elements of
the assessment.
SEC. 4. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION AND EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS
REGARDING INCREASING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS
WITH TAIWAN.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Representative offices in Taiwan have been established
by--
(A) 16 of the 27 European Union member states;
(B) the European Union;
(C) the United Kingdom; and
(D) Switzerland.
(2) Taiwan has representative offices in--
(A) 19 of the 27 European Union countries;
(B) the United Kingdom; and
(C) Switzerland.
(3) The PRC has used its economic power to pressure
Taiwan's diplomatic allies to cut ties and switch diplomatic
recognition to the PRC, which has reduced Taiwan's diplomatic
allies to just 12, including The Holy See.
(4) On November 18, 2021, Taiwan formally opened the
Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania, which is the
first such office in Europe that uses Taiwan in its title
rather than the PRC-preferred title, ``Taipei'', despite
actions of economic coercion imposed on Lithuania by the PRC.
(5) Since 2020, legislative bodies in Poland, Lithuania,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Italy,
Switzerland, Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, and
Slovakia have passed legislation or resolutions that call for--
(A) deepening ties and exchanges with Taiwan;
(B) supporting Taiwan's participation in
international organizations; or
(C) maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan
Strait.
(6) Since 2020, parliamentary delegations from Slovakia,
the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Spain, France,
Finland, Romania, Portugal, Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Italy,
Estonia, Latvia, and the European Union have visited Taiwan.
(7) In May 2023, representatives from the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, and the Czech Republic joined the United
States, Australia, and Japan in a joint statement calling for
Taiwan's inclusion in the 76th World Health Assembly.
(8) The November 2023 Group of 7 Japan 2023 Foreign
Ministers' Statement expressed ``support for Taiwan's
meaningful participation in international organizations,
including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical
meetings.''.
(9) As of 2022, Taiwan was the European Union's 13th
largest trading partner overall and its 5th largest Asian
trading partner.
(10) Taiwan is a leading investor in the Czech Republic,
which currently hosts more than $1,000,000,000 in foreign
direct investment from Taiwan, resulting in thousands of jobs
for Czech citizens.
(11) From 2021 to 2022, trade between Lithuania and Taiwan
increased by 50 percent. Taiwan has invested in Lithuania's
emerging chip sector, laser companies, and other high-tech
industries.
(12) In June 2022, the European Commission, for the first
time, upgraded its trade and investment dialogues with Taiwan,
which had been ongoing at the technical level for more than 20
years, to the ministerial and director-general level for the
first time in recognition of the benefit from higher-level
coordination.
(13) In August 2023, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Company Limited announced partnerships with various European
technology firms and investments of $3,500,000,000 to build its
first semiconductor plant in Europe in Germany.
(14) On November 8, 2023, the Government of the United
Kingdom signed an Enhanced Trade Partnership agreement with
Taiwan. This is the first such agreement between Taiwan and a
European country.
(15) On December 13, 2023 the European Parliament passed a
resolution that--
(A) urges the European Union to pursue a resilient
supply chain agreement with Taiwan; and
(B) calls for a bilateral investment agreement
between Taiwan and the European Union to enhance a 2-
way partnership in digital trade and cyber resilience.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States, Europe, and Taiwan are like-minded
partners that--
(A) share common values, such as democracy, the
rule of law and human rights; and
(B) enjoy a close trade and economic partnership;
(2) bolstering political, economic, and people-to-people
relations with Taiwan would benefit the European Union,
individual European countries, and the United States;
(3) the European Union can play an important role in
helping Taiwan resist the economic coercion of the PRC by
negotiating with Taiwan regarding new economic, commercial, and
investment agreements;
(4) the United States and European countries should
coordinate and increase diplomatic efforts to facilitate
Taiwan's meaningful participation in international
organizations;
(5) the United States and European countries should--
(A) publicly and repeatedly emphasize the
differences between their respective ``One China''
policies and the PRC's ``One China'' principle; and
(B) counter the PRC's propaganda and false
narratives about United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 2758 (XXVI), which claim the resolution
recognizes PRC territorial claims to Taiwan; and
(6) Taiwan's inclusion in the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology
Council's Secure Supply Chain working group would bring
valuable expertise and enhance transatlantic cooperation in the
semiconductor sector.
(c) Congressional Briefing.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter for the
following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding the
Department of State's engagements with the European Union and the
governments of European countries to increase political and economic
relations with Taiwan, including--
(1) public statements of support for Taiwan's democracy and
its meaningful participation in international organizations;
(2) unofficial diplomatic visits to and from Taiwan by
high-ranking government officials and parliamentarians;
(3) the establishment of parliamentary caucuses or groups
that promote strong relations with Taiwan;
(4) strengthening subnational diplomacy, including
diplomatic and trade-related visits to and from Taiwan by local
government officials;
(5) strengthening coordination between United States and
European business chambers, universities, think tanks, and
other civil society groups with similar groups in Taiwan;
(6) establishing new representative, economic, or cultural
offices in a European country or in Taiwan;
(7) promoting direct flights to and from Taiwan;
(8) facilitating visits by religious leaders to Taiwan; and
(9) increasing economic engagement and trade relations.
SEC. 5. CONSULTATIONS WITH EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ON SUPPORTING TAIWAN'S
SELF-DEFENSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) In September 2021, the European Commission released the
European Union Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,
which acknowledges that increased tensions between the PRC and
Taiwan could impact European security and economic prosperity.
(2) In 2019, 2021, and 2023, the French Navy sent warships
to transit the Taiwan Strait and in 2021, the British Navy
frigate HMS Richmond transited the Taiwan Strait.
(3) In November 2021, the German Navy committed to sending
vessels to the Indo-Pacific every 2 years to expand cooperation
with like-minded states advocating for freedom of navigation
and a rules-based international order.
(4) European deterrence efforts in the Taiwan Strait
support the United States' strategic interests, as the United
States also sends warships through the Taiwan Strait to promote
deterrence and respond to aggressive behavior by the PRC
towards Taiwan.
(5) In April 2023, European Commission Vice-President Josep
Borrell Fontelles called on European navies to patrol the
Taiwan Strait to show Europe's commitment to freedom of
navigation.
(6) In August 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron signed
into law legislation emphasizing that France would defend
freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region, including the
South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
(7) European countries, including France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and
Lithuania, have developed Indo-Pacific strategies.
(8) At the 2022 Madrid Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization unveiled a new Strategic Concept, stating that
allies will work together ``to address the systemic challenges
posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security'' and underscored
the importance of the Indo-Pacific for NATO, ``given that
developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic
security.''.
(9) In September 2022, the North Atlantic Council held its
first dedicated discussion about the status of Taiwan, its
democratic government, and its critical role in the
manufacturing of microchips globally.
(10) In 2022, the United Kingdom approved a substantial
increase in exports of submarine components and technology to
Taiwan to upgrade its naval forces.
(11) In 2024, Taiwan's defense ministry signed an agreement
with France's DCI Group for the supply of parts and accessories
to maintain its Lafayette-class frigates.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) preserving peace and security in the Taiwan Strait is a
shared interest of the United States and Europe;
(2) European countries, particularly countries with
experience combating Russian aggression and malign activities,
can provide Taiwan with lessons learned from their ``total
defense'' programs to mobilize the military and civilians in a
time of crisis;
(3) the United States and Europe should increase
coordination to strengthen Taiwan's cybersecurity, especially
for critical infrastructure and network defense operations;
(4) the United States and Europe should work with Taiwan--
(A) to improve its energy resiliency;
(B) to strengthen its food security;
(C) to combat misinformation, disinformation,
digital authoritarianism, and foreign interference; and
(D) to provide expertise on how to improve defense
infrastructure;
(5) European naval powers, in coordination with the United
States, should increase freedom of navigation transits through
the Taiwan Strait; and
(6) European naval powers, the United States, and Taiwan
should establish exchanges and partnerships among their coast
guards to counter coercion by the PRC.
(c) Congressional Briefings.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter for the
following 5 years the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense, shall provide a briefing to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives regarding discussions with governments of European NATO
countries about contributions to Taiwan's self-defense through--
(1) public statements of support for Taiwan's security;
(2) arms transfers or arms sales, particularly of weapons
consistent with an asymmetric defense strategy;
(3) transfers or sales of dual-use items and technology;
(4) transfers or sales of critical nonmilitary supplies,
such as food and medicine;
(5) increasing the military presence of such countries in
the Indo-Pacific region;
(6) joint training and military exercises;
(7) enhancing Taiwan's critical infrastructure resiliency,
including communication and digital infrastructure;
(8) coordination to counter disinformation;
(9) coordination to counter offensive cyber operations; and
(10) any other matter deemed important by the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense.
SEC. 6. EXPEDITED LICENSING FOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TRANSFERRING
MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO TAIWAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish an
expedited decision-making process for blanket third party transfers of
defense articles and services from NATO countries to Taiwan, including
transfers and re-transfers of United States origin grant, Foreign
Military Sales, and Direct Commercial Sales end-items not covered by an
exemption under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations under
subchapter M of chapter I of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations.
(b) Availability.--The expedited decision-making process described
in subsection (a)--
(1) shall be available for classified and unclassified
items; and
(2) shall, to the extent practicable--
(A) require the approval, return, or denial of any
licensing application to export defense articles and
services that is related to a government-to-government
agreement within 15 days after the submission of such
application; and
(B) require the completion of the review of all
other licensing requests not later than 30 days after
the submission of such application.
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