II

118TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 5276

To require a roadmap for the future desired state for the solid rocket motor (SRM) industrial base, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 25, 2024

Mr. CORNYN (for himself, Mr. PADILLA, and Mr. WICKER) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

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A BILL

To require a roadmap for the future desired state for the solid rocket motor (SRM) industrial base, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Solid Propulsion Enhancement and Advancement for Readiness Act of 2024'' or the ''SPEAR Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. SOLID ROCKET MOTOR INDUSTRIAL BASE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2025, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Sustainment, acting through the Director of the Joint Production Accelerator Cell and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a roadmap for the future desired state for the solid rocket motor (SRM) industrial base.

(b) COORDINATION.—In developing this roadmap required under subsection (a), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment shall coordinate with the following officials:

(1) The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition.

(2) The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology.

(3) The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

(4) Service munitions Program Executive Officers, as appropriate.

(5) The Director of the Missile Defense Agency.

(c) ELEMENTS.—The roadmap under subsection (a) shall include the following elements:

(1) The current and future capability and capacity of existing solid rocket motor manufacturers, Aerojet Rocketdyne and Northrop Grumman (formerly Orbital ATK).

(2) The capability and capacity of potential new entrants to the solid rocket motor industrial base, including companies funded by the United States Government.

(3) An assessment of the process for qualifying new entrants, including new manufacturing processes, for solid rocket motors.

(4) An assessment of the capacity and capability of the SRM industrial base to support the demands of existing munitions program of record.

(5) An assessment of the capacity and capability of the SRM industrial base to support potential future demands of munitions programs.

(6) An assessment of emerging technologies or manufacturing processes that would support the modernization or evolution of the SRM industrial base.

(7) A mapping of program of record and anticipated or potential future munitions programs to SRM manufacturer throughput.

(8) Identification of current and potential shortfalls in common precursors and chemicals.

(9) United States Government funding to date for the SRM industrial base, whether through programs of record or through Defense Production Act

(DPA) or Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) programs, broken out by fiscal year and purpose.

(10) A plan to prioritize government funding for energetics facilities in the following precedence:

(A) Government-owned, government-operated facilities.

(B) Government-owned, contractor-operated facilities.

(C) Contractor-owned, contractor-operated facilities.

(d) GAO REVIEW.—Not later than June 1, 2025, the Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a review of Department of Defense decisions regarding the SRM industry since February 1, 2022, including—

(1) the requested levels of funding for munitions using solid rocket motors, broken down by motor diameter;

(2) the requested levels of funding for direct investment in government-owned, government-operated facilities, government-owned, contractor-operated facilities, and contractor-owned, contractor-operated facilities;

(3) the requested levels of funding for direct investment in the SRM supplier base;

(4) the potential adverse effects of prioritizing privately owned SRM production infrastructure over government-owned SRM production infrastructure; and

(5) a cost and capabilities comparison between the expansion of existing infrastructure at the Allegany Ballistics Laboratory and construction of new infrastructure at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head.

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