

118TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. 5491

To mobilize United States strategic, economic, and diplomatic tools to confront the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China and to set a positive agenda for United States economic and diplomatic efforts abroad, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 11, 2024

Mr. CARDIN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To mobilize United States strategic, economic, and diplomatic tools to confront the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China and to set a positive agenda for United States economic and diplomatic efforts abroad, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Realizing Economic and Strategic Objectives while Lead-
6 ing with Values and Engagement Act of 2024” or the
7 “RESOLVE Act of 2024”.

- 1 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
 2 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
 Sec. 2. Definitions.
 Sec. 3. Consultation and engagement with Congress.

TITLE I—INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE

Subtitle A—Combatting the PRC’s Economic Coercion

- Sec. 101. Definitions.

PART I—ECONOMIC COERCION DETERMINATIONS

- Sec. 105. Sense of Congress.
 Sec. 106. Targeted country determination.
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PART II—RESPONSE

- Sec. 111. Economic defense response teams.
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- Sec. 124. Developing economic tools to deter aggression against Taiwan.
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 Sec. 132. Enhancing United States-Africa trade and investment for prosperity.
 Sec. 133. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa.
 Sec. 134. Support for Bangladesh democracy and labor rights programs.

- Sec. 135. Support for anti-corruption programs and other programs to address impunity and justice in Sri Lanka.

PART II—ALIGNING WITH PARTNERS ON ECONOMIC TOOLS

- Sec. 141. Assistance to advance foreign investment screening of United States allies and partners to protect national interests.
- Sec. 142. Assistance to counter corrupt practices in foreign countries.
- Sec. 143. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners.
- Sec. 144. Pilot program to audit barriers to commerce in developing partner countries.
- Sec. 145. Strategy for promoting supply chain diversification.
- Sec. 146. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply chain diversification and management.
- Sec. 147. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector finance.

PART III—COUNTERING EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

- Sec. 151. International Monetary Fund new arrangements to borrow.
- Sec. 152. Participation of Taiwan in Inter-American Development Bank.
- Sec. 153. Increased United States cooperation with Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
- Sec. 154. Opposition of the United States to an increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the Special Drawing Rights basket of the International Monetary Fund.

Subtitle C—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

- Sec. 161. Department of State Infrastructure Coordination Task Force.
- Sec. 162. Authorization of Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment.
- Sec. 163. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network.
- Sec. 164. Strategic Ports Initiative.
- Sec. 165. Next-generation shipping.
- Sec. 166. Global Strategic Infrastructure Investment Fund.
- Sec. 167. Modifications of requirements to become a Millennium Challenge Corporation candidate country.
- Sec. 168. Africa energy security and diversification.
- Sec. 169. Enhancing resilient critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands.
- Sec. 170. Oceania Restoration and Hazards Removal Program.
- Sec. 171. Coordination with other Federal agencies and cooperation and participation of nongovernmental entities.
- Sec. 172. Findings related to the People's Republic of China's industrial pollution.
- Sec. 173. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative and Global Development Initiative.
- Sec. 174. International cooperation to secure critical mineral supply chains.

Subtitle D—Digital Technology and Connectivity

- Sec. 176. Office of the Special Envoy For Critical and Emerging Technology.
- Sec. 177. Realigning the Regional Technology Officer Program.
- Sec. 178. Annual semiconductor industry monitoring report on the People's Republic of China.
- Sec. 179. Combatting AI-enabled disinformation.

- Sec. 179A. International collaboration on research and development.
- Sec. 179B. Oversight of the United States-European Union Trade and Technology Council.
- Sec. 179C. Digital connectivity in the Pacific Islands.
- Sec. 179D. Cyber and digital security cooperation with respect to developing countries.

Subtitle E—Countering PRC Malign Influence

- Sec. 181. Sense of Congress distinguishing the PRC Government from the Chinese people.
- Sec. 182. Authorization of appropriations for countering the People's Republic of China Influence Fund.
- Sec. 183. Global Engagement Center.
- Sec. 184. Amendment to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961.
- Sec. 185. Countering malign information operations in the Americas.
- Sec. 186. Global Peace Operations Initiative.
- Sec. 187. Expansion of sanctions under the Fentanyl Sanctions Act.
- Sec. 188. Imposition of sanctions with respect to agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states.
- Sec. 189. Imposition of sanctions with respect to military and intelligence facilities of the People's Republic of China in Cuba.
- Sec. 190. Strategic stability dialogue and arms control.
- Sec. 191. Track 1.5 dialogues with the People's Republic of China on nuclear matters.
- Sec. 192. Oversight of life sciences dual use research of concern.

Subtitle F—Strengthening United States Public Diplomacy

- Sec. 196. Authorization of appropriations to promote United States education, exchange, cultural, and the Fulbright-Hays Program.
- Sec. 197. Public diplomacy training.
- Sec. 198. Public diplomacy efforts.
- Sec. 199. Supporting independent media and countering foreign information operations.
- Sec. 199A. Support for local media.

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES, PARTNERSHIPS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

PART I—PROMOTING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE INDO-PACIFIC

- Sec. 201. Sense of Congress condemning the PRC's support for Russia's war on Ukraine.
- Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad.
- Sec. 204. Statement of policy on enhancing United States-Taiwan partnership.
- Sec. 205. Expanding expertise on Taiwan matters.
- Sec. 206. United States-South Korea alliance.
- Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on United States-Japan-Republic of Korea cooperation.

- Sec. 208. Sense of Congress on the need for the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- Sec. 209. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea.
- Sec. 209A. Sense of Congress regarding universal implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
- Sec. 209B. Establishing a Senior Official for the Compacts of Free Association at the Department of State.

PART II—ENHANCING DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

- Sec. 211. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement with Pacific Island countries.
- Sec. 212. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Sec. 213. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.
- Sec. 214. Strengthening diplomatic efforts in Africa.
- Sec. 215. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies.

Subtitle B—International Organizations

- Sec. 221. Safeguarding the integrity of the United Nations system.
- Sec. 222. United States membership in United Nations specialized agencies and related organizations.
- Sec. 223. Establishment of Office on Multilateral Strategy and Personnel.
- Sec. 224. Authorization of appropriations to promote United States citizen employment at the United Nations and international organizations.
- Sec. 225. United States leadership and representation in standards-setting bodies.

Subtitle C—South China and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024

- Sec. 231. Short title.
- Sec. 232. Sanctions with respect to PRC persons responsible for the PRC's activities in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
- Sec. 233. Sense of Congress regarding portrayals of the South China Sea or the East China Sea as part of China.
- Sec. 234. Sense of Congress on 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration's tribunal ruling on arbitration case between Philippines and People's Republic of China.

TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

Subtitle A—Promoting Human Rights in People's Republic of China

PART I—PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS FOR CITIZENS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN CHINA

- Sec. 301. Protecting human rights in the People's Republic of China.
- Sec. 302. Report on corrupt activities of senior officials of Government of the People's Republic of China.
- Sec. 303. China exit bans.

PART II—MATTERS RELATED TO HONG KONG

- Sec. 305. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy, human rights, and civilian security in Hong Kong.
- Sec. 306. Development and deployment of internet freedom and circumvention tools for the people of Hong Kong.

PART III—MATTERS RELATED TO XINJIANG

- Sec. 311. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region.
- Sec. 312. Sense of Congress calling on organization of Islamic cooperation members to take action on atrocities in Xinjiang.
- Sec. 313. Reauthorization of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act.
- Sec. 314. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region.

PART IV—MATTERS RELATED TO TIBET

- Sec. 317. Policy with respect to Tibet.
- Sec. 318. United States policy and international engagement on the or reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.

Subtitle B—Promoting Human Rights Globally

- Sec. 321. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council that commit human rights abuses.
- Sec. 322. Protecting human rights defenders at the United Nations and other multilateral bodies.
- Sec. 323. Inclusion of surveillance technology abuse in human rights report.
- Sec. 324. Strengthening public reporting on corruption.
- Sec. 325. Authorization of funding for public reporting on corruption and corrupt practices.

TITLE IV—MODERNIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO MEET THE CHINA CHALLENGE

- Sec. 401. Establishing an Assistant Secretary of State for Indo-Pacific Affairs.
- Sec. 402. Enhancing strategic competition at the Department of State.
- Sec. 403. Department of State professional development and rotational program related to strategic competition.
- Sec. 404. Refocusing international security efforts for strategic competition.

TITLE V—OTHER MATTERS

- Sec. 501. Savings provisions.
- Sec. 502. Rule of Construction on Maintaining One China Policy.

1 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

2 In this Act:

1 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
2 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-
3 gress” means—

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
5 the Senate; and

6 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
7 the House of Representatives.

8 (2) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term “Joint
9 Declaration” means the Joint Declaration of the
10 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
11 and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
12 People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong
13 Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.

14 (3) PRC.—The term “PRC” means the Peo-
15 ple’s Republic of China.

16 (4) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term
17 “strategic infrastructure” means infrastructure
18 where a primary driver of United States national in-
19 terest in such infrastructure is—

20 (A) to advance United States national se-
21 curity or economic security interest or those of
22 the country in which the infrastructure is lo-
23 cated; or

1 (B) to deny the People’s Republic of China
2 of ownership or control over such infrastruc-
3 ture.

4 **SEC. 3. CONSULTATION AND ENGAGEMENT WITH CON-**
5 **GRESS.**

6 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
7 gress that—

8 (1) the strategic competition between the
9 United States and the PRC will require the United
10 States to marshal sustained and political will to pro-
11 tect its vital interests, promote its values, and ad-
12 vance its economic and national security objectives
13 for decades to come; and

14 (2) sustained prioritization of the challenge
15 posed by the PRC requires the participation of the
16 whole United States Government, including—

17 (A) the President to lead and direct the
18 entire executive branch to treat the PRC as the
19 greatest geopolitical and economic challenge for
20 United States foreign policy;

21 (B) bipartisan cooperation within Con-
22 gress; and

23 (C) frequent, sustained, and meaningful
24 collaboration and consultation between the exec-
25 utive branch and Congress.

1 (b) ENGAGEMENT WITH CONGRESS.—Consistent
 2 with section 15(b) of the State Department Basic Authori-
 3 ties Act (22 U.S.C. 2680(b)), the Department of State
 4 shall keep the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
 5 ate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
 6 of Representatives fully and currently informed with re-
 7 spect to all activities and responsibilities carried out in re-
 8 lation to the provisions of this Act, including by regularly
 9 consulting with the appropriate committees of Congress
 10 in the development and implementation of each of the
 11 strategies called for by the provisions of this Act.

12 **TITLE I—INVESTING IN A**
 13 **COMPETITIVE FUTURE**
 14 **Subtitle A—Combatting the PRC’s**
 15 **Economic Coercion**

16 **SEC. 101. DEFINITIONS.**

17 In this subtitle:

18 (1) PRC ECONOMIC COERCION.—The term
 19 “PRC economic coercion” means actions, practices,
 20 or threats by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
 21 to unreasonably restrict, obstruct, or manipulate
 22 commerce or economic relations with, foreign aid to,
 23 debt of, or investment in, any United States ally or
 24 partner in a capricious, pretextual, or non-trans-
 25 parent manner for the purpose of threatening or

1 causing economic harm to the United States allies or
 2 partners for the purpose of influencing, constraining
 3 or limiting such countries decision-making.

4 (2) TARGET COUNTRY.—The term “targeted
 5 country” is a country or entity determined by the
 6 Secretary to have been the subject of unusually ad-
 7 verse or acute PRC economic coercion.

8 (3) TARGETED GOOD OR SERVICE.—The term
 9 “targeted good or service” is a good or service sub-
 10 ject to export or import by a targeted country that
 11 is significantly or adversely affected by PRC eco-
 12 nomic coercion.

13 **PART I—ECONOMIC COERCION**

14 **DETERMINATIONS**

15 **SEC. 105. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

16 It is the sense of Congress that—

17 (1) the PRC is increasingly using economic co-
 18 ercion to pressure, punish, and influence the United
 19 States and United States allies and partners;

20 (2) economic coercion causes economic harm to
 21 United States allies and partners, threatens their
 22 economic security and attempts to constrain their
 23 ability to undertake sovereign political actions;

24 (3) economic coercion is often characterized
 25 by—

1 (A) arbitrary, abusive, or discriminatory
2 actions that seek to interfere with sovereign ac-
3 tions, or violate international rules;

4 (B) capricious, pretextual, or non-trans-
5 parent actions taken without due process af-
6 farded; or

7 (C) intimidation or threats of punitive ac-
8 tions;

9 (4) existing mechanisms for trade dispute reso-
10 lution and international arbitration may not apply to
11 claims related to economic coercion, and are often
12 inadequate for responding to economic coercion in a
13 timely and effective manner as the PRC exploits
14 plausible lengthy resolution processes to evade ac-
15 countability;

16 (5) the United States should provide meaning-
17 ful economic and political support to foreign part-
18 ners at their request and consistent with United
19 States interests, when they are the target of PRC
20 economic coercion that causes significant economic
21 and political harm;

22 (6) responding to economic coercion will be
23 most effective when the United States provides relief
24 to affected foreign partners in coordination with al-
25 lies and like-minded countries; and

1 (7) such coordination will further demonstrate
2 broad resolve against economic coercion.

3 **SEC. 106. TARGETED COUNTRY DETERMINATION.**

4 (a) SECRETARY OF STATE DETERMINATION.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State may
6 determine that a country is a targeted country and
7 may exercise the authorities described in section
8 111(b) and 112 with respect to that country.

9 (2) DELEGATION AND CONSULTATION WITH
10 CABINET MEMBERS.—To inform any determination
11 under paragraph (1) or exercise of authority de-
12 scribed in section 111(b) and 112, the Secretary
13 may delegate the authorities under this section to an
14 appropriate Senate-confirmed official at the Depart-
15 ment of State, who should consult with other Fed-
16 eral agencies, as appropriate.

17 (3) NOTIFICATION AND TRANSMITTAL TO CON-
18 GRESS.—In making any determination, the Sec-
19 retary shall notify the appropriate committees of
20 Congress not later than 10 days before issuing a de-
21 termination under paragraph (1) or exercising au-
22 thorities described in section 111(b) and submit
23 such determination and a justification to the appro-
24 priate committees of Congress in an unclassified
25 form, which may include a classified annex.

1 (b) EXPIRATION AND EXTENSION OF DETERMINA-
2 TION.—

3 (1) EXPIRATION OF INITIAL DETERMINA-
4 TION.—Any determination made by the Secretary
5 under subsection (a) shall expire 180 days after the
6 date of such determination, unless the Department
7 submits a notification to the appropriate committees
8 of Congress pursuant to paragraph (2) that PRC
9 economic coercion against the targeted country is
10 ongoing and requires an additional response.

11 (2) EXTENSION OF DETERMINATION; CONGRES-
12 SIONAL NOTIFICATION.—

13 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Department may
14 extend any determination under subsection (a)
15 for a period of one year by submitting a con-
16 gressional notification to the appropriate com-
17 mittees of Congress for their review not later
18 than 30 days in advance of an extension taking
19 effect.

20 (B) ELEMENTS.—Any notifications sub-
21 mitted to the appropriate committees of Con-
22 gress pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall in-
23 clude—

24 (i) a description of the status of the
25 PRC economic coercion that led to the ini-

1 tial determination made under subsection
2 (a);

3 (ii) an assessment of the targeted
4 country's political and economic vulner-
5 ability to such PRC economic coercion;

6 (iii) a description of the exercise of
7 the authorities and activities described in
8 section 111(b) or section 112 to date;

9 (iv) a plan for the continued exercise
10 of authorities under section 111(b) or sec-
11 tion 112;

12 (v) a description of the actions taken
13 by the PRC against a targeted country in
14 response to support provided to the tar-
15 geted country by the United States or
16 United States allies and partners;

17 (vi) coordination conducted with and
18 support provided by United States allies
19 and partners to assist the targeted coun-
20 try; and

21 (vii) a justification for why an exten-
22 sion is in the national interests of the
23 United States.

24 (C) CLASSIFICATION.—A notification
25 under this subsection shall be submitted in un-

1 classified form but may include a classified
2 annex.

3 (3) REVOCATION.—The Secretary may at any
4 time revoke a determination made under subsection
5 (a) or the extension of such determination made
6 under paragraph (2).

7 **SEC. 107. SUNSET.**

8 The authorities under this part shall expire 8 years
9 after the date of the enactment of this Act.

10 **PART II—RESPONSE**

11 **SEC. 111. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
13 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
14 shall establish, in coordination with other relevant Federal
15 departments and agencies as appropriate, a program for
16 the creation of economic defense response teams that can
17 provide rapid, targeted technical assistance and high-level
18 diplomatic support to the targeted country. Such assist-
19 ance and support may include the following activities:

20 (1) Developing and implementing bilateral or
21 multilateral contingency plans to lessen the political
22 and economic impact of PRC economic coercion, in-
23 cluding by surging technical assistance, diplomatic
24 support and economic assistance, as needed, to the
25 targeted country.

1 (2) Encouraging senior Department of State of-
2 ficials to engage with United States allies and part-
3 ners, the United States private sector and other rel-
4 evant interlocutors in support of the targeted coun-
5 try, as appropriate.

6 (3) In coordination with the targeted country,
7 developing plans and strategies for reducing
8 vulnerabilities and improving resilience.

9 (4) Deploying positive public messaging cam-
10 paigns to reinforce the policy independence and resil-
11 ience of the targeted country and to condemn PRC
12 economic coercion.

13 (b) ACTIVATION OF RESPONSE TEAMS.—Activation
14 of an economic defense response team to support a tar-
15 geted country may involve the following elements and oth-
16 ers as the circumstances require:

17 (1) Identification and designation of relevant
18 personnel to the task force, including economists,
19 data analysts, trade experts, legal experts and for-
20 eign policy and foreign assistance personnel within
21 the United States Government with expertise rel-
22 evant to the activities described in subsection (a).

23 (2) Negotiation of memoranda of understanding
24 or contracting mechanisms, where appropriate, with
25 other Federal departments and agencies and the

1 United States private sector, as needed, to ensure
2 access to the technical assistance identified under
3 subsection (a)(1) and expertise identified under
4 paragraph (1).

5 (3) Clear direction to United States diplomatic
6 missions on the rapid and effective activation of
7 such teams, and the establishment of appropriate li-
8 aison relationships, as appropriate, with local public
9 and private sector officials and entities.

10 **SEC. 112. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE FUND.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby established an
12 “Economic Defense Response Fund” within the Depart-
13 ment of State (in this section referred to as the “Fund”)
14 to provide support, including the provision of assistance
15 or the provision of loans to facilitate the purchase or redi-
16 rection of targeted goods, in particular goods of a stra-
17 tegic, time-sensitive, or perishable nature, in the targeted
18 country.

19 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
20 authorized to be appropriated not less than \$25,000,000
21 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the estab-
22 lishment and operation of the Fund. The Fund shall be
23 solely administered by the Secretary of State or the Sec-
24 retary’s designee, in consultation with the heads of other
25 Departments and agencies, as appropriate.

1 (c) USE OF LOANS.—The Economic Defense Re-
2 sponse Fund may be used to support loan programs to
3 underwrite purchases by third parties to redirect targeted
4 goods or services.

5 **SEC. 113. EXISTING AUTHORITIES THAT MAY BE USED TO**
6 **RESPOND TO ECONOMIC COERCION.**

7 The Secretary of State should use the following au-
8 thorities to respond to economic coercion against a tar-
9 geted country, as appropriate:

10 (1) Requesting appropriations for foreign aid to
11 the targeted country.

12 (2) Requesting the necessary authority and ap-
13 propriations for sovereign loan guarantees to the
14 targeted country.

15 (3) The waiver of policy requirements (other
16 than policy requirements mandated by an Act of
17 Congress) to facilitate the provision of financing to
18 the targeted country.

19 (4) Requesting appropriations for loan loss re-
20 serves to facilitate the provision of financing to sup-
21 port United States exports to the targeted country.

22 (5) Providing technical assistance and legal ex-
23 pertise to support a targeted country's response to
24 and redress of an act or acts of PRC economic coer-
25 cion.

1 (6) Other authorities that could benefit the tar-
 2 geted country and that require coordination and con-
 3 sultation with the relevant Federal departments and
 4 agencies.

5 **SEC. 114. SUNSET.**

6 The authorities under this part shall expire 8 years
 7 after the date of the enactment of this Act.

8 **PART III—RESILIENCE**

9 **SEC. 115. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is established at the De-
 11 partment of State an Office of the Chief Economist.

12 (b) DUTIES.—The Office will be led by the Chief
 13 Economist of the Department of State, at the Senior Ex-
 14 ecutive Service or equivalent level, and shall be responsible
 15 for—

16 (1) conducting economic research, collecting
 17 and analyzing data, and preparing reports and as-
 18 sessments and policy recommendations to senior De-
 19 partment leadership on international economic
 20 trends, opportunities, and challenges and unantici-
 21 pated global developments with economic impacts;
 22 and

23 (2) providing economic analysis to inform policy
 24 making, including related to—

25 (A) international trade and trade policy;

- 1 (B) international macroeconomics and fi-
2 nance;
- 3 (C) economic development;
- 4 (D) competition and industrial strategy;
- 5 (E) economic sanctions development and
6 implementation, and sanctions evasion; and
- 7 (F) capacity building;
- 8 (3) coordinating with allies and partners, other
9 relevant agencies, departments, and stakeholders on
10 international economic matters;
- 11 (4) identifying countries vulnerable to PRC eco-
12 nomic coercion, and analyzing commodities, prod-
13 ucts, services, and other economic linkages of each
14 such country that may be vulnerable targets for
15 PRC economic coercion, including examining risk
16 factors such as—
 - 17 (A) perishability;
 - 18 (B) strategic or political value, or to re-
19 gional or global supply chains;
 - 20 (C) proportion of the total export value for
21 the exporting country of the product being ex-
22 ported to a country engaged in economic coer-
23 cion;

1 (D) potential exposure of the product to
2 arbitrary or excessive regulatory, phytosanitary,
3 or other safety or inspection requirements; and

4 (E) reliance of a country on the import of
5 such commodities, product, or services; and

6 (5) analyzing and monitoring economic linkages
7 to identify goods and commodities with respect to
8 which United States allies and partners may be vul-
9 nerable to economic coercion that is informed by—

10 (A) current market data;

11 (B) information, including United States
12 intelligence, on economic coercion strategies;

13 (C) relevant data from before, during and
14 after past instances of economic coercion; and

15 (D) any other relevant information needed
16 to support economic analysis and policy rec-
17 ommendations, including access to information
18 technology systems which integrate and syn-
19 thesize economic and related data.

20 (c) PERSONNEL.—In addition to a qualified profes-
21 sional Chief Economist, the Secretary of State is author-
22 ized to employ sufficient full-time equivalent individuals
23 to fully execute the Office of the Chief Economist, includ-
24 ing—

- 1 (1) a Deputy Chief Economist, who must be a
- 2 qualified professional economist;
- 3 (2) at least four qualified professional econo-
- 4 mists at the GS–15 level;
- 5 (3) a Chief Data Officer;
- 6 (4) a Chief of Staff;
- 7 (5) research economists;
- 8 (6) career members of the foreign service, in-
- 9 cluding program support staff; and
- 10 (7) temporary staff, including fellows.

11 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
12 authorized to be appropriated \$5,000,000 for each of fis-
13 cal years 2025 through 2029 for the Office for personnel
14 costs, project and data services, and limited travel funds.

15 **SEC. 116. ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO ALLIES AND PARTNERS.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
17 date of the enactment of this Act, the Undersecretary of
18 State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environ-
19 ment, using the economic analysis as described in section
20 115, shall coordinate with other relevant Federal depart-
21 ments and agencies, as appropriate, to develop and imple-
22 ment a strategy to provide proactive support to partners
23 and allies at risk of becoming target countries for PRC
24 economic coercion. Such support may include the following
25 activities:

1 (1) Data and information sharing on economic
2 risks and vulnerabilities, including specific sectors.

3 (2) Technical support to establish proactive ac-
4 tion plan and contingency plans to reduce the part-
5 ner country's vulnerability to coercive economic prac-
6 tices and limit the damage of economic coercion.

7 (3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral
8 contingency plans for responding to the threat or
9 use of PRC economic coercion.

10 (4) Providing technical assistance to partner
11 countries in screening foreign sovereign investment
12 in physical and digital infrastructure, and foreign in-
13 vestment in other strategic sectors that may increase
14 the partner country's vulnerability to PRC economic
15 coercion.

16 (5) Funding non-governmental entities to sup-
17 port public conferences and reports on the use of
18 economic coercion and options for response efforts.

19 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the
20 \$25,000,000 authorized in section 112(b), \$5,000,000
21 may be allocated to the Bureau of Economic and Business
22 Affairs to resource, staff, and implement the strategy in
23 subsection (a).

1 **PART IV—COORDINATION WITH ALLIES AND**
2 **PARTNERS**

3 **SEC. 119. COORDINATION WITH ORGANISATION FOR ECO-**
4 **NOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT**
5 **MEMBERS ON ENGAGEMENT FROM THE PEO-**
6 **PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

7 The Secretary of State shall coordinate with willing
8 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
9 member countries—

10 (1) to study the effects of coercive economic
11 practices associated with the PRC, such as those
12 through the Belt and Road Initiative, the Digital
13 Silk Road, and the Global Development Initiative,
14 which may include the extent to which such prac-
15 tices—

16 (A) are predatory or usurious;

17 (B) are inconsistent with internally accept-
18 ed banking and accounting practices;

19 (C) result in low quality infrastructure
20 that does not meet international standards;

21 (D) incorporate conditions intended to
22 limit transparency, including lending with con-
23 ditional restrictions on debt reporting, incon-
24 sistent with the borrower’s obligations to the
25 International Monetary Fund; and

1 (E) provide the PRC with undue influence
2 over the borrower in the event of the borrower's
3 default;

4 (2) to create a shared set of metrics to enable
5 evaluation of whether the PRC is engaging in the
6 practices referred to in paragraph (1) on particular
7 initiatives or projects, and promote transparency
8 with respect to those actions, including a joint anal-
9 ysis of—

10 (A) the PRC's distortive economic prac-
11 tices, such as subsidies provided by the PRC as
12 it pertains to state-owned enterprises and other
13 forms of market-distorting state intervention in
14 the PRC's economy; and

15 (B) the potential negative global spillovers
16 from such practices;
17 (3) to establish—

18 (A) a program or plan of action for future
19 dialogues on the PRC's unfair economic prac-
20 tices; and

21 (B) a clear understanding of common con-
22 cerns and priorities among member countries
23 with respect to such practices; and

1 (4) to issue joint informational reports that
 2 contain the results of the data gathering efforts de-
 3 scribed in this section.

4 **PART V—IMPLEMENTATION**

5 **SEC. 121. REPORT ON STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION.**

6 (a) STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
 8 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
 9 retary of State shall submit to the appropriate com-
 10 mittees of Congress a report on activities under this
 11 subtitle.

12 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under
 13 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

14 (A) A description of the establishment of
 15 the program authorized by section 111(a) de-
 16 scribing the development of the program, the
 17 major elements of the program, the personnel
 18 and institutions involved, and specifics on how
 19 the program incorporates the elements de-
 20 scribed in section 111(a).

21 (B) A description of the development and
 22 implementation of the strategy described in sec-
 23 tion 116, including—

24 (i) the development and use of data
 25 and analytical tools by the Office of the

Chief Economist in assessing potential interventions that could be pursued to address identified vulnerabilities to economic coercion in advance of such coercion or in preparation for such coercion;

(ii) a strategy for public engagement before, during and after instances of economic coercion to build resilience, domestic and international support to counter such coercion; and

(iii) how the Secretary of State will work with interagency stakeholders to implement the strategy required under section 116, and the potential contributions of other Federal departments and agencies to programs, initiatives, and activities that complement the Economic Defense Response Fund authorized in section 112.

(b) ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAM REPORTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the activation of an economic defense response team pursuant to section 111(b), and annually thereafter for so long as such team is active, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of

1 Congress a report describing the operations of the
 2 team with respect to the targeted country and an as-
 3 sessment of its effectiveness in countering the nega-
 4 tive impact to the targeted country of PRC economic
 5 coercion.

6 (2) CLASSIFICATION.—the report required
 7 under paragraph (1) shall be unclassified but may
 8 include a classified annex.

9 **PART VI—OTHER MATTERS**

10 **SEC. 124. DEVELOPING ECONOMIC TOOLS TO DETER AG-**
 11 **GRESSION AGAINST TAIWAN.**

12 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
 13 gress that the United States must be prepared to take im-
 14 mediate action to sanction any military or non-military en-
 15 tities owned, controlled, or acting at the direction of the
 16 Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party
 17 that are supporting actions by the Government of the PRC
 18 or the Chinese Communist Party to—

19 (1) overthrow or dismantle the governing insti-
 20 tutions in Taiwan;

21 (2) occupy any territory controlled or adminis-
 22 tered by Taiwan; or

23 (3) take significant action against Taiwan, or
 24 territory controlled or administered by Taiwan, in-
 25 cluding conducting a naval blockade, seizing Tai-

1 wan's outlying islands, or perpetrating a significant
2 cyberattack on Taiwan.

3 (b) TASK FORCE.—Not later than 180 days after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Office of the Sanc-
5 tions Coordinator of the Department of State and the Of-
6 fice of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the
7 Treasury shall establish an interagency task force to iden-
8 tify military or non-military entities that could be sanc-
9 tioned immediately following any action taken by the PRC
10 that demonstrates an attempt to achieve or has the signifi-
11 cant effect of achieving the physical or political control of
12 Taiwan, including by—

13 (1) overthrowing or dismantling the governing
14 institutions in Taiwan;

15 (2) occupying any territory controlled or admin-
16 istered by Taiwan as of the date of the enactment
17 of this Act; or

18 (3) taking significant action against Taiwan, or
19 territory controlled or administered by Taiwan, in-
20 cluding—

21 (A) the creation of a naval blockade of
22 Taiwan;

23 (B) the seizure of the outlying islands of
24 Taiwan; or

1 (C) the initiation of a significant
2 cyberattack that threatens civilian or military
3 infrastructure of Taiwan.

4 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days following
5 the establishment of the task force required under sub-
6 section (b), the task force shall submit to the appropriate
7 committees of Congress a strategy for identifying targets
8 that—

9 (1) assesses how existing sanctions programs
10 could be used following any action taken by the PRC
11 that demonstrates an attempt to achieve, or has the
12 significant effect of achieving, the physical or polit-
13 ical control of Taiwan as described in subsection (b);

14 (2) develops or proposes, as appropriate, new
15 sanctions authorities that might be required to im-
16 pose sanctions on targets identified under this sec-
17 tion;

18 (3) analyzes the potential economic con-
19 sequences to the United States, and to allies and
20 partners of the United States, of various types of
21 such sanctions and to assess measures that could be
22 taken to mitigate such consequences, including
23 through the use of licenses, exemptions, carve-outs,
24 and other approaches;

1 (4) includes coordination with allies and part-
2 ners to—

3 (A) leverage sanctions and other economic
4 tools to deter or respond to aggression against
5 Taiwan;

6 (B) identify and resolve potential impedi-
7 ments to coordinating sanctions-related efforts;
8 and

9 (C) identify industries, sectors, or goods
10 and services where the United States and allies
11 and partners can take coordinated action
12 through sanctions, or other economic tools that
13 will have a significant negative impact on the
14 economy of the PRC;

15 (5) assesses the resource gaps and needs at the
16 Department of State and the Department of the
17 Treasury, and other Federal departments and agen-
18 cies, as appropriate, to most effectively use sanctions
19 and other economic tools to respond to the threat
20 posed by the PRC;

21 (6) recommends how best to target sanctions
22 and other economic tools against individuals, enti-
23 ties, and economic sectors in the PRC, taking into
24 account the role of such targets in supporting Gov-
25 ernment of the PRC or Chinese Communist Party

1 policies and activities that pose a threat to the na-
 2 tional security or foreign policy interests of the
 3 United States, the negative economic implications
 4 for the PRC, including its ability to achieve its ob-
 5 jectives with respect to Taiwan, and the potential
 6 impact of such sanctions on the stability of the glob-
 7 al financial system, including with regard to—

8 (A) state-owned enterprises;

9 (B) government officials;

10 (C) financial institutions associated with
 11 the government; and

12 (D) PRC companies not formally des-
 13 igned by the Government of the PRC as
 14 state-owned enterprises;

15 (7) identifies any foreign military or non-mili-
 16 tary entities that would likely be used by the PRC
 17 in any action taken that demonstrates an attempt to
 18 achieve any, or has the significant effect of achiev-
 19 ing, the physical or political control of Taiwan, as
 20 described in subsection (b), including entities in—

21 (A) shipping;

22 (B) logistics;

23 (C) energy, including oil and gas;

24 (D) aviation;

25 (E) ground transportation; and

1 (F) technology;

2 (8) describes policies, to be applied in the event
3 of any PRC coercive action, including an invasion by
4 the PRC that fringes upon the territorial sovereignty
5 of Taiwan by preventing access to international wa-
6 terways, airspace, or telecommunications networks,
7 to—

8 (A) restrict the access of the People’s Lib-
9 eration Army to oil, natural gas, munitions, and
10 other supplies needed to conduct military oper-
11 ations against Taiwan, United States facilities
12 in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Oceans, and al-
13 lies and partners of the United States in the re-
14 gion;

15 (B) diminish the capacity of the industrial
16 base of the PRC to manufacture and deliver de-
17 fense articles to replace those lost in operations
18 of the People’s Liberation Army against Tai-
19 wan, the United States, and allies and partners
20 of the United States; and

21 (C) inhibit the ability of the PRC to evade
22 United States and multilateral sanctions
23 through third parties, including through sec-
24 ondary sanctions; and

(9) identifies tactics used by the Government of the PRC to influence the public in the United States and Taiwan through propaganda and disinformation campaigns, including such campaigns focused on delegitimizing Taiwan or legitimizing a forceful action by the PRC against Taiwan.

(d) REPORT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the submission of the strategy required under subsection (c), the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on potential sources of leverage against the PRC and recommendations to reduce United States vulnerabilities. The report shall—

(A) identify goods and services from the United States that are relied on by the PRC such that reliance presents a strategic opportunity and source of leverage against the PRC, including during a conflict;

(B) identify procurement practices of the United States Government, and critical sectors within the United States economy, that are reliant on trade with the PRC and other inputs from the PRC (including drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients, critical minerals, and

1 metallurgical inputs) such that those sectors
2 present a strategic vulnerability and source of
3 leverage that the Chinese Communist Party or
4 the PRC could exploit, including during a con-
5 flict; and

6 (C) includes recommendations to Congress
7 on steps that can be taken to reduce the
8 sources of leverage described in subparagraph
9 (B), including through—

10 (i) provision of economic incentives
11 and making other trade and contracting
12 reforms to support United States industry
13 in critical sectors and to indigenize produc-
14 tion of critical resources; and

15 (ii) policies to facilitate “near- or
16 friend-shoring”, or otherwise developing
17 strategies to facilitate that process with al-
18 lies and partners of the United States, in
19 other sectors for which domestic reshoring
20 would prove infeasible for any reason.

21 (2) FORM.—The report submitted under para-
22 graph (1) shall be submitted in an unclassified form,
23 but may include a classified annex.

1 **SEC. 125. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the
3 date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently
4 than annually thereafter for 8 years, the Secretary of
5 State, in coordination with the heads of other Federal de-
6 partments and agencies as the President determines ap-
7 propriate, shall create a list (referred to in this section
8 as the “intellectual property violators list”) that identi-
9 fies—

10 (1) all state-owned enterprises incorporated in
11 the PRC that have benefitted from—

12 (A) a significant act or series of acts of in-
13 tellectual property theft that caused significant
14 harm to an economic sector of the United
15 States or a company, partnership or entity in-
16 corporated or organized in the United States or
17 group or association of such entities; or

18 (B) an act or government policy of involun-
19 tary or coerced technology transfer of intellec-
20 tual property owned by an entity identified
21 company incorporated in the United States; and

22 (2) any foreign person with operational control
23 of an entity described in paragraph (1), including
24 senior corporate officers and principal shareholders
25 of the entity.

1 (b) RULES FOR IDENTIFICATION.—To determine
 2 whether there is a credible basis for determining that an
 3 entity should be included on the intellectual property viola-
 4 tors list, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
 5 departments and agencies specified in subsection (a) shall
 6 consider—

7 (1) any final adjudication by a court of com-
 8 petent authority in the United States that the entity
 9 has violated relevant United States laws intended to
 10 protect intellectual property rights; or

11 (2) substantial and credible information re-
 12 ceived from any entity described in subsection (c) or
 13 other interested persons.

14 (c) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, the
 15 Secretary of State, in coordination with the departments
 16 and agencies specified in subsection (a), may consult, as
 17 necessary and appropriate, with—

18 (1) other Federal agencies, including inde-
 19 pendent agencies;

20 (2) entities in the private sector, including
 21 trade associations;

22 (3) civil society organizations with relevant ex-
 23 pertise; and

24 (4) allies and partners of the United States.

25 (d) REPORTS.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year
2 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
3 nually thereafter for 8 years, the Secretary of State
4 shall publish in the Federal Register a report that—

5 (A) lists the entities identified pursuant to
6 subsection (a)(1) and the corporate officers of
7 such entities identified pursuant to subsection
8 (a)(2);

9 (B) describes the circumstances sur-
10 rounding acts or policies described in subsection
11 (a)(1), including any role of the Government of
12 the PRC;

13 (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the
14 economic advantage derived by the entities
15 identified pursuant to subsection (a)(1); and

16 (D) assesses whether each entity described
17 in subsection (a)(1) is using or has used stolen
18 intellectual property in commercial activity
19 within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United
20 States.

21 (2) CLASSIFIED REPORT.—Concurrent with
22 publication of the reports required under paragraph
23 (1), the Secretary of State shall submit to the For-
24 eign Relations Committee of the Senate and the
25 Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Rep-

1 representatives a classified version of the report that in-
 2 cludes greater detail and intelligence about the infor-
 3 mation specified in subparagraphs (A) through (D)
 4 of paragraph (1).

5 (e) REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL
 6 BUSINESS INFORMATION.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and
 8 the head of any other Federal agency involved in the
 9 production of the intellectual property violators list
 10 shall protect from disclosure any proprietary infor-
 11 mation submitted by a private sector party and
 12 marked as confidential business information, unless
 13 the party submitting the information—

14 (A) had notice, at the time of submission,
 15 that such information would be disclosed by the
 16 Secretary;

17 (B) subsequently consents to the disclosure
 18 of such information; or

19 (C) is an entity listed on the intellectual
 20 property violators list.

21 (2) INCLUSION IN CLASSIFIED VERSION OF RE-
 22 PORT.—If confidential business information is pro-
 23 vided by a private sector party in connection with
 24 the production of the intellectual property violators
 25 list, the Secretary of State shall include such infor-

1 mation in the classified version of the report under
2 subsection (d)(2).

3 (3) TREATMENT AS TRADE SECRETS.—Propri-
4 etary information submitted by a private sector
5 party (except an entity listed on the intellectual
6 property violators list) under this section—

7 (A) shall be considered to be trade secrets
8 and commercial or financial information exempt
9 under subsection (b)(4) of section 552 of title
10 5, United States Code, from being made avail-
11 able to the public under subsection (a) of that
12 section; and

13 (B) shall be exempt from disclosure with-
14 out the express approval of the party.

15 **SEC. 126. REPORT ON SUBSIDIES PROVIDED BY THE GOV-**
16 **ERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF**
17 **CHINA.**

18 (a) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date
19 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
20 10 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
21 United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of
22 Commerce, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
23 Congress a report that identifies—

24 (1) patterns of direct and indirect subsidies
25 provided by the central, provincial, or local govern-

1 ments of the PRC to state-owned enterprises and
2 private entities under the direction or control of the
3 Government of the PRC operating in economic sec-
4 tors deemed by the Government of the PRC to be
5 strategic sectors, including by identifying such sec-
6 tors in major policy initiatives or by inclusion in the
7 Chinese Communist Party’s five-year plans;

8 (2) discriminatory, non-market treatment favor-
9 ing state-owned and private enterprises in the PRC
10 and disadvantaging foreign market participants;

11 (3) any impacts that the activities outlined in
12 paragraphs (1) and (2) have on United States na-
13 tional security and economic competitiveness; and

14 (4) any coordination with foreign allies and
15 partners to address the impacts of the activities out-
16 lined in paragraphs (1) and (2).

17 (b) ELEMENTS OF REPORT.—In compiling the report
18 under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall con-
19 sider—

20 (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or pro-
21 moted by the central government of the PRC that—

22 (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in
23 the PRC that disadvantage foreign market par-
24 ticipants;

1 (B) shield centrally administered, state-
2 owned enterprises from competition; or

3 (C) otherwise suppress market-based com-
4 petition;

5 (2) financial subsidies, including subsidized
6 loans or below-market lending terms, from or pro-
7 moted by the central, provincial, or local govern-
8 ments of the PRC or state-owned enterprises in the
9 PRC that materially benefit enterprises in the PRC
10 over foreign market participants in contravention of
11 generally accepted market principles;

12 (3) any subsidy that meets the definition of
13 subsidy under article 1 of the Agreement on Sub-
14 sidies and Countervailing Measures referred to in
15 section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agree-
16 ments Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12));

17 (4) any impacts that the activities outlined in
18 paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) have on United States
19 national security and economic competitiveness; and

20 (5) any coordination with foreign allies and
21 partners to address the impacts of the activities out-
22 lined in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).

23 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required by sub-
24 section (a) may be submitted in classified form.

(d) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and appropriate, consult with—

(1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;

(2) the private sector; and

(3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.

Subtitle B—Economic Engagement With Allies and Partners

PART I—INVESTING IN ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

SEC. 131. INVESTING IN TALENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC ISLANDS, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.—In this section, the term “Latin America and the Caribbean” does not include Cuba, Nicaragua, or Venezuela.

(2) PACIFIC ISLANDS.—The term “Pacific Islands” means the nations of Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Papua New

1 Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Sol-
2 omon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

3 (3) SOUTHEAST ASIA.—The term “Southeast
4 Asia” means the nations of Brunei Darussalam,
5 Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia,
6 Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
7 Vietnam, and Timor-Leste.

8 (4) SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA.—The term “sub-Sa-
9 haran Africa” means a country or successor political
10 entity defined in section 107 of the African Growth
11 and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 3706).

12 (b) ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTERS OF EXCEL-
13 LENCE.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
14 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
15 national Development and, as appropriate, the heads of
16 other relevant Federal departments and agencies, is au-
17 thorized to enter into public-private partnerships and es-
18 tablish centers of excellence located in countries in South-
19 east Asia, Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin
20 America and the Caribbean to build and enhance the tech-
21 nical capacity of officials, emerging leaders, and other
22 qualified persons from countries in those regions.

23 (c) PRIORITY AREAS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
24 AND CAPACITY BUILDING.—The centers of excellence es-
25 tablished under subsection (b) shall provide technical as-

1 sistance and capacity building in areas, such as the fol-
2 lowing:

3 (1) Domestic resource mobilization.

4 (2) Regulatory management.

5 (3) Procurement processes, including tendering,
6 bidding, and contract negotiation.

7 (4) Budget management and oversight.

8 (5) Management of key economic sectors, in-
9 cluding energy, digital economy, and infrastructure.

10 (6) Project appraisal.

11 (7) Sovereign financial management.

12 (d) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—The program author-
13 ized under this section shall—

14 (1) leverage existing United States programs
15 and activities in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Is-
16 lands, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America,
17 which may include assistance provided under—

18 (A) future leaders initiatives, such as the
19 Young Southeast Asia Leaders Initiative and
20 the Young Pacific Leaders Program;

21 (B) the United States Agency for Inter-
22 national Development’s American Schools and
23 Hospitals Abroad (USAID/AHSA) initiative;

24 (C) the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003
25 (22 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.);

1 (D) U.S.-Support for Economic Growth in
2 Asia (US-SEGA);

3 (E) programs related to the Asia-Pacific
4 Economic Community (APEC);

5 (F) the Young African Leaders Initiative;

6 (G) the Young Leaders of the Americas
7 Initiative; and

8 (H) other relevant education or scholarship
9 programs;

10 (2) be supported by instructors that—

11 (A)(i) currently serve in relevant areas of
12 the United States Government with a rank of
13 not less than 14 on the GS scale; or

14 (ii) possess at least ten years of experience
15 relevant to the areas of instruction identified in
16 subsection (c);

17 (B) meet high professional standards with-
18 in their fields; and

19 (C)(i) are contracted by any center of ex-
20 cellence established pursuant to subsection (b);
21 or

22 (ii) are deployed or detailed directly from
23 a Federal Government agency;

24 (3) seek to attract participants who—

1 (A)(i) are currently senior or mid-career
2 officials in key technical ministries of partici-
3 pating countries in Southeast Asia, the Pacific
4 Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, or Latin America
5 and the Caribbean;

6 (ii) have demonstrated leadership potential
7 and direct responsibility for crafting or imple-
8 menting policies relevant to the areas of in-
9 struction described under subsection (c); or

10 (iii) demonstrate an intent to return to
11 government service after completing the pro-
12 gram outlined in this section; or

13 (B) are currently employed in utilities,
14 publicly or privately owned companies, or other
15 non-government entities with responsibility for
16 implementing policy and regulation or sup-
17 porting government functions in the areas of in-
18 struction described under subsection (c); and

19 (4) require financial or in-kind contributions
20 from participating governments, commensurate with
21 the gross domestic product of the countries.

22 (e) AUTHORIZATION TO ENTER AGREEMENTS AND
23 NON-BINDING INSTRUMENTS.—To fulfill the terms and
24 conditions specified by subsection (d), the Secretary of
25 State is authorized to enter agreements and non-binding

1 instruments with participating governments to determine
 2 what financial or in-kind contributions will be made by
 3 the United States and what financial or in-kind contribu-
 4 tions will be made by the participating government with
 5 respect to the activities described in this section.

6 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
 7 authorized to be appropriated \$45,000,000 for each of fis-
 8 cal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section.

9 **SEC. 132. ENHANCING UNITED STATES-AFRICA TRADE AND**
 10 **INVESTMENT FOR PROSPERITY.**

11 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
 12 United States to increase United States investment in Af-
 13 rica and to promote and facilitate trade between the
 14 United States and Africa, focused on key countries and
 15 sectors, that supports mutual economic growth and devel-
 16 opment outcomes, long-term development of markets, and
 17 the strategic interests of the United States.

18 (b) OFFICE TO COORDINATE POLICY.—

19 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall es-
 20 tablish an office, to be known as the “Prosper Africa
 21 Office,” and assign it to a bureau within the United
 22 States Agency for International Development to co-
 23 ordinate the activities of the United States Govern-
 24 ment related to increasing trade and investment be-
 25 tween the United States and Africa, which should

1 include representation from relevant agencies as des-
2 ignated by the President.

3 (2) DUTIES.—The office established pursuant
4 to paragraph (1) shall—

5 (A) identify priority countries or sectors as
6 appropriate for United States foreign invest-
7 ment in countries in Africa and sectors and
8 countries that support United States economic
9 growth and promotes trade based on the anal-
10 ysis required under subsection (c);

11 (B) coordinate activities and implementing
12 mechanisms, including at United States embas-
13 sies in Africa, to carry out the policy set forth
14 in subsection (a), including by—

15 (i) providing program support and
16 guidance to implement the policy in sub-
17 section (a);

18 (ii) providing information and analysis
19 to United States companies and investors
20 in countries and sectors identified in sub-
21 paragraph (A); and

22 (iii) serving, as needed, as an informa-
23 tion clearinghouse for the United States
24 Government for businesses, investors, and
25 civic organizations, and others in the

1 United States seeking information related
2 to investing in Africa, and connecting them
3 with teams at United States embassies
4 overseas; and

5 (C) identify barriers to trade and invest-
6 ment in priority countries and sectors, and
7 identify concrete actions to address them, in-
8 cluding strengthening programs and activities
9 aimed at improving the enabling environment in
10 those countries.

11 (3) ORGANIZATION.—

12 (A) IN GENERAL.—The office established
13 under paragraph (1) shall be led by an Execu-
14 tive Director who shall be designated by the Ad-
15 ministrator of the United States Agency for
16 International Development, and who shall—

17 (i) coordinate interagency efforts re-
18 lated to paragraph (2);

19 (ii) identify, not later than 90 days
20 after the release of the analysis required
21 under subsection (c), a list of priority
22 countries for the purposes of carrying out
23 this section;

24 (iii) plan, coordinate, and oversee the
25 policies, activities, and programs of United

1 States Government agencies, in the United
2 States and in overseas missions, involved
3 in promoting or facilitating trade and in-
4 vestment activities between the United
5 States and Africa and development and co-
6 ordination of relevant activities meant to
7 improve the enabling environment;

8 (iv) identify and provide information
9 about investment opportunities, market in-
10 formation, and United States Government
11 programs to support trade and investment
12 activities in priority countries and sectors
13 identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A);
14 and

15 (v) not less than 4 times per year,
16 convene a committee consisting of the di-
17 rectors from each agency designated under
18 subparagraph (B) to provide strategic
19 guidance and coordination for the policy,
20 programs, and activities of the office.

21 (B) DESIGNATION OF AGENCIES.—The
22 President shall designate Federal departments
23 and agencies to participate in support of the
24 policy set forth in subsection (a), and direct the
25 head of each designated agency to—

1 (i) designate an employee to serve as
2 a focal point for the agency's respective ac-
3 tivities related to subsection (a), who shall
4 coordinate the relevant activities of the
5 agency and liaise with the Executive Direc-
6 tor designated pursuant to subparagraph
7 (A); and

8 (ii) designate an employee to serve at
9 United States embassies in priority coun-
10 tries identified pursuant to subsection
11 (b)(2)(A).

12 (4) STAFFING.—In order to carry out this sec-
13 tion—

14 (A) the Executive Director shall have the
15 authority, as appropriate, to hire employees and
16 contractors in a manner that is consistent with
17 existing hiring authorities of USAID to support
18 the execution of efforts described in paragraph
19 (3)(A), and shall be supported, as appropriate,
20 by staff detailed from any Federal department
21 or agency designated pursuant to paragraph
22 (3)(B); and

23 (B) the Chief of Mission in relevant Sub-
24 Saharan and North Africa countries—

1 (i) shall take an active and direct
2 leadership role in promoting, supporting,
3 and facilitating activities pursuant to this
4 section;

5 (ii) shall designate a Foreign Service
6 Officer, Foreign Commercial Service Offi-
7 cer, or other direct hire person under Chief
8 of Mission authority to lead an interagency
9 team to support activities pursuant to this
10 section, who shall—

11 (I) conduct assessments of mar-
12 ket conditions and business operating
13 environments;

14 (II) identify investment opportu-
15 nities;

16 (III) foster relationships and
17 communications between United
18 States investors and businesses and
19 African businesses and individuals
20 within their country of responsibility;
21 and

22 (IV) carry out other duties as
23 necessary; and

24 (iii) is authorized to hire locally em-
25 ployed staff with relevant experience to

1 support the activities of the office estab-
2 lished pursuant to this subsection.

3 (c) MARKET AND SECTOR ANALYSIS.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
6 every 4 years thereafter until 2031, the Executive
7 Director shall commission and publish a study every
8 4 years of the investment environment in Africa that
9 incorporates the following elements:

10 (A) An analysis of which markets are the
11 most promising for private investment.

12 (B) An analysis of African markets that
13 identifies which industries and sectors United
14 States firms have an advantage in comparison
15 to other sources of foreign direct investment.

16 (C) An analysis of perceived and actual
17 barriers to United States private investment,
18 including—

19 (i) significant legal and regulatory
20 constraints to foreign investment and busi-
21 ness operating environments;

22 (ii) reputational risks;

23 (iii) investor information gaps; and

1 (iv) access to and affordability of cap-
2 ital, labor markets, currency volatility, and
3 infrastructure.

4 (2) AUTHORITY.—To produce the study re-
5 quired under paragraph (1), the Executive Director
6 is authorized to engage the services of a qualified
7 United States private sector consultant or subject
8 matter expert.

9 (3) SUBMISSION AND PUBLICATION.—The Ad-
10 ministrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
11 national Development shall submit each study re-
12 quired under paragraph (1) to the appropriate com-
13 mittees of Congress and shall make the study pub-
14 licly available.

15 (4) DETERMINATION OF PRIORITY COUN-
16 TRIES.—The Executive Director shall determine the
17 priority countries and sectors for purposes of sub-
18 section (b)(2)(A)(i) based on the findings of the re-
19 port required under this subsection.

20 (d) SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES.—The office
21 shall, to the extent practicable, promote and facilitate in-
22 vestments in small and medium enterprises, including by
23 establishing and supporting relationships between United
24 States Government institutions, philanthropic institutions,

1 and private lenders to mobilize blended finance for small
2 and medium enterprises in Africa.

3 (e) SUPPORT FOR DIASPORA INVESTMENT.—The of-
4 fice shall seek to support and facilitate investments in Af-
5 rica by United States citizens and residents who identify
6 as members of the African diaspora.

7 (f) PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON AFRICA DI-
8 ASPORA ENGAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.—

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Executive Director shall
10 consult with the President’s Advisory Council on Af-
11 rican Diaspora Engagement in the United States
12 (referred to in this subsection as the “Council”) es-
13 tablished by Executive Order 14089 on issues relat-
14 ing to increasing, developing, and sustaining invest-
15 ments in Africa by United States members of the
16 African diaspora.

17 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—The Executive Director
18 shall consult with the Chairman and Ranking Mem-
19 ber of the appropriate committees of Congress in de-
20 veloping recommendations to the President of not
21 less than 3 persons for appointment to the Council
22 who have significant relevant experience in the fields
23 of trade, private investment, economics, inter-
24 national development, or other relevant fields.

1 (3) DUTIES.—The Council shall publish an an-
2 nual report on investment in Africa by United States
3 members of the African diaspora and barriers to in-
4 creased investment by the diaspora.

5 (4) DIASPORA BUSINESS FORUMS.—The Execu-
6 tive Director shall organize public meetings through-
7 out the United States with members of the African
8 diaspora community that—

9 (A) provide a forum for communication,
10 education, and information about investment
11 opportunities; and

12 (B) as appropriate, may be coordinated
13 with local civic, community, and business orga-
14 nizations.

15 (g) BUSINESS-ENABLING ENVIRONMENT.—The Ex-
16 ecutive Director, in coordination with the respective Chiefs
17 of Mission at designated United States embassies, shall
18 seek to strengthen the business-enabling environment in
19 Africa by—

20 (1) identifying barriers to United States invest-
21 ment on a country-by-country basis;

22 (2) identifying existing development and tech-
23 nical assistance programs that can serve to eliminate
24 the barriers identified under paragraph (1);

- 1 (3) ensuring Country Development Cooperation
2 Strategies and Regional Development Cooperation
3 Strategies incorporate programs and activities fo-
4 cused on addressing specific barriers to private sec-
5 tor investment identified under paragraph (1); and
6 (4) providing policy advice and technical assist-
7 ance to select African countries to develop and im-
8 prove regulatory and legal structures, taxation and
9 customs regimes, policy frameworks, and other rel-
10 evant structures and practices to improve the oper-
11 ating environments for businesses and eliminate
12 other barriers to competition.

13 **SEC. 133. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE**
14 **UNITED STATES IN AFRICA.**

15 The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

- 16 (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign
17 Commercial Service Officers and Department of
18 State Economic Officers at United States embassies
19 in sub-Saharan Africa; and
20 (2) develop and submit to the appropriate com-
21 mittees of Congress an assessment of whether
22 human resource capacity in such embassies is ade-
23 quate to meet the goals of the various trade and eco-
24 nomic programs and initiatives in Africa, including

1 the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C.
2 3701 et seq.) and Prosper Africa.

3 **SEC. 134. SUPPORT FOR BANGLADESH DEMOCRACY AND**
4 **LABOR RIGHTS PROGRAMS.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is author-
6 ized to provide assistance under the Foreign Assistance
7 Act to support and develop programs in Bangladesh that
8 promote or expand—

9 (1) freedom of expression, including in the
10 media, by—

11 (A) supporting media personnel who are
12 victims of arbitrary arrests and legal harass-
13 ment about educating them about their rights
14 and resources under Bangladeshi law; and

15 (B) education and training for media per-
16 sonnel on how to promote democratic values in
17 a restrictive environment;

18 (2) access to labor rights, including—

19 (A) strengthened legal and policy frame-
20 works to protect workers seeking redress for
21 gender-based violence; and

22 (B) strengthened legal and policy frame-
23 works for migrant workers; and

24 (3) improved working conditions, including in
25 Bangladesh’s Ready Made Garment (RMG) sector.

1 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
2 authorized to be appropriated \$10,000,000 for each of fis-
3 cal years 2025 through 2027 for the Secretary of State
4 to carry out this section, which upon appropriation shall
5 remain available until expended.

6 **SEC. 135. SUPPORT FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMS**
7 **AND OTHER PROGRAMS TO ADDRESS IMPU-**
8 **NITY AND JUSTICE IN SRI LANKA.**

9 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
10 gress that—

11 (1) democracy, respect for human rights, justice
12 and reconciliation, and economic prosperity in Sri
13 Lanka are critical for the Sri Lankan people and to
14 safeguard United States interests in the Indo-Pa-
15 cific;

16 (2) numerous factors contributed to Sri
17 Lanka’s economic crisis, including government cor-
18 ruption, financial mismanagement, and dispropor-
19 tionate military expenditures at the expense of other
20 public policy priorities; and

21 (3) despite being a recipient of 16 International
22 Monetary Fund loans, the Government of Sri Lanka
23 has failed to address their governance and economic
24 issues given their predatory lending, inability to
25 tackle corruption, government impunity for atrocities

1 and justice for victims of atrocities, and other
2 abuses of human rights.

3 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
4 of the United States to—

5 (1) support the peaceful, democratic, and eco-
6 nomic aspirations of the people of Sri Lanka; and

7 (2) call on the Government of Sri Lanka to ad-
8 dress the recommendations of the International
9 Monetary Fund of the need to address corruption
10 and to hold officials accountable for past behaviors
11 in order to address the dire governance and eco-
12 nomic concerns in Sri Lanka.

13 (c) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary of State is au-
14 thorized to provide assistance to support and develop pro-
15 grams in Sri Lanka to address public sector corruption,
16 support accountability for those responsible for atrocities,
17 and promote justice for victims of atrocities.

18 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
19 authorized to be appropriated \$5,000,000 for each of fis-
20 cal years 2025 through 2027 for the Secretary of State
21 to carry out this section, which shall remain available until
22 expended.

1 **PART II—ALIGNING WITH PARTNERS ON**
2 **ECONOMIC TOOLS**

3 **SEC. 141. ASSISTANCE TO ADVANCE FOREIGN INVESTMENT**
4 **SCREENING OF UNITED STATES ALLIES AND**
5 **PARTNERS TO PROTECT NATIONAL INTER-**
6 **ESTS.**

7 (a) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN PART-
8 NERS.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
9 Secretary of the Treasury and, as appropriate, the heads
10 of other Federal departments and agencies as the Presi-
11 dent determines appropriate, shall offer to provide tech-
12 nical assistance to the governments of countries that are
13 allies and partners of the United States in establishing
14 or improving legislative and regulatory frameworks to
15 screen foreign investment for national security risks that
16 are, to the extent possible, similar to the frameworks set
17 forth in section 721 of the Defense Production Act of
18 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565).

19 (b) ENGAGEMENT WITH FOREIGN PARTNERS.—In
20 carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in con-
21 sultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and, as ap-
22 propriate, the heads of other Federal departments and
23 agencies, shall actively encourage the government of each
24 country that is an ally or partner of the United States—

1 (1) to establish transparent protocols for
2 screening foreign investment that protect the na-
3 tional security interests of such country; and

4 (2) to make decisions on the basis of the poten-
5 tial national security risk of such investments.

6 (c) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—In providing the
7 technical assistance described in subsection (b), the Sec-
8 retary of State shall—

9 (1) consult closely with the intended recipient of
10 such assistance to reach a mutual understanding re-
11 garding the scope and nature of the country’s par-
12 ticular national security needs with respect to invest-
13 ment screening and the appropriate response to
14 meet those needs, and take all reasonable care to en-
15 sure any screening process is transparent and na-
16 tional security-focused;

17 (2) encourage governments of countries receiv-
18 ing technical assistance to establish or improve the
19 regulatory and legislative frameworks to screen for-
20 eign investment as described in subsection (b) to
21 meet the security identified pursuant to paragraph
22 (1); and

23 (3) prioritize the conduct of diplomatic engage-
24 ment with government officials, including legislators,
25 from countries whose cooperation in foreign invest-

1 ment screening is deemed by the Secretary to be
2 critical to the interests of the United States.

3 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
4 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State
5 for fiscal year 2025 \$10,000,000 to carry out this section,
6 which may be administered either by the Department of
7 State or the United States Agency for International Devel-
8 opment.

9 **SEC. 142. ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER CORRUPT PRACTICES**
10 **IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.**

11 The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
12 heads of other Federal departments and agencies as ap-
13 propriate, shall offer to provide technical assistance to
14 help establish and implement regulatory and legislative
15 frameworks to combat the bribery of foreign public offi-
16 cials consistent with the principles of the Convention on
17 Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
18 national Business Transactions, adopted by the Negoti-
19 ating Conference of the Council of the Organisation for
20 Economic Co-operation and Development on November
21 21, 1997, to the government of any country—

22 (1) that is an ally or partner of the United
23 States;

24 (2) that has demonstrated a will to responsibly
25 combat corrupt practices in such country; and

1 (3) for which technical assistance will likely
2 achieve measurable results within five years.

3 **SEC. 143. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND**
4 **PARTNERS.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
6 nation with the heads of other participating Federal agen-
7 cies, shall establish and develop a program to facilitate
8 and encourage regular dialogues between United States
9 Government regulatory and technical agencies and their
10 counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries,
11 both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions
12 and organizations—

13 (1) to promote best practices in regulatory for-
14 mation and implementation;

15 (2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory
16 outcomes based on scientific, technical, and other
17 relevant principles;

18 (3) to seek better harmonization and alignment
19 of regulations and regulatory practices;

20 (4) to build consensus around industry and
21 technical standards in emerging sectors that will
22 drive future global economic growth and commerce;
23 and

24 (5) to promote United States standards regard-
25 ing environmental, labor, and other relevant protec-

1 tions in regulatory formation and implementation, in
2 keeping with the values of free, open, and demo-
3 cratic societies, including the rule of law.

4 (b) PRIORITIZATION OF ACTIVITIES.—In facilitating
5 expert exchanges under subsection (a), the Secretary shall
6 prioritize—

7 (1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with
8 countries where greater regulatory coherence, har-
9 monization of standards, or communication and dia-
10 logue between technical agencies is achievable and
11 best advances the economic and national security in-
12 terests of the United States;

13 (2) multilateral coordination and collaboration
14 where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization
15 of standards, or dialogue on other relevant regu-
16 latory matters is achievable and best advances the
17 economic and national security interests of the
18 United States, including with the members of—

19 (A) the European Union;

20 (B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
21 tion;

22 (C) the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
23 tions (ASEAN);

24 (D) the Organization for Economic Co-
25 operation and Development (OECD);

1 (E) the Pacific Alliance; and

2 (F) multilateral development banks; and

3 (3) regulatory practices and standards-setting
4 bodies focused on key economic sectors and emerg-
5 ing technologies.

6 (c) PARTICIPATION BY NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTI-
7 TIES.—With regard to the program described in sub-
8 section (a), the Secretary of State may facilitate, including
9 through the use of amounts authorized for such purposes
10 pursuant to subsection (d), the participation of relevant
11 organizations and individuals with relevant expertise, as
12 appropriate and to the extent that such participation ad-
13 vances the goals of such program.

14 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
15 authorized to be appropriated \$2,500,000 for each of fis-
16 cal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section.

17 **SEC. 144. PILOT PROGRAM TO AUDIT BARRIERS TO COM-**
18 **MERCE IN DEVELOPING PARTNER COUN-**
19 **TRIES.**

20 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State, in co-
21 ordination with the Administrator of the United States
22 Agency for International Development, shall establish a
23 pilot program—

1 (1) to identify and evaluate barriers to com-
2 merce in developing countries that are allies and
3 partners of the United States; and

4 (2) to provide assistance to promote economic
5 development and commerce to those countries.

6 (b) PURPOSES.—Under the pilot program established
7 under subsection (a), the Secretary shall, in partnership
8 with the countries selected under subsection (c)(1)—

9 (1) identify barriers in those countries to en-
10 hancing international commerce with the goal of set-
11 ting priorities for the efficient use of United States
12 trade-related assistance;

13 (2) focus United States trade-related assistance
14 on building self-sustaining institutional capacity for
15 expanding commerce with those countries, consistent
16 with their international obligations and commit-
17 ments; and

18 (3) further the national interests of the United
19 States by—

20 (A) expanding prosperity through the
21 elimination of foreign barriers to commercial
22 exchange;

23 (B) assisting such countries to identify and
24 reduce barriers through the provision of foreign
25 assistance to increase—

1 (i) international commerce; and

2 (ii) foreign investment;

3 (C) assisting each such country in under-
4 taking reforms that will promote economic de-
5 velopment, and promote conditions favorable for
6 business and commercial development and job
7 growth in the country; and

8 (D) assisting private sector entities in
9 those countries to engage in reform efforts and
10 enhance productive global supply chain partner-
11 ships with the United States and allies and
12 partners of the United States.

13 (c) SELECTION OF COUNTRIES.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall select
15 countries for participation in the pilot program es-
16 tablished under subsection (a) from among coun-
17 tries—

18 (A) that are developing countries and allies
19 and partners of the United States;

20 (B) the governments of which have clearly
21 demonstrated a willingness to make appropriate
22 legal, policy, and regulatory reforms that are
23 proven to stimulate economic growth and job
24 creation, consistent with international trade
25 rules and practices; and

1 (C) that meet such additional criteria as
2 may be established by the Secretary, in con-
3 sultation with, as appropriate, the Adminis-
4 trator of the United States Agency for Inter-
5 national Development and any other agency.

6 (2) CONSIDERATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL CRI-
7 TERIA.—In establishing additional criteria under
8 paragraph (1)(C), the Secretary and the Adminis-
9 trator shall—

10 (A) identify and address structural weak-
11 nesses, systemic flaws, or other impediments
12 within countries that may be considered for
13 participation in the pilot program under sub-
14 section (a) that impact the effectiveness of
15 United States assistance to and make rec-
16 ommendations for addressing those weaknesses,
17 flaws, and impediments;

18 (B) set priorities for commercial develop-
19 ment assistance building to focus resources on
20 countries where the provision of such assistance
21 can deliver the best value in identifying and
22 eliminating barriers to trade and investment,
23 including by fostering adherence to inter-
24 national trade obligations;

1 (C) developing appropriate performance
2 measures and establishing annual targets to
3 monitor and assess progress toward those tar-
4 gets, including measures to be used to termi-
5 nate the provision of assistance determined to
6 be ineffective; and

7 (D) ensure representation from across
8 multiple geographic regions.

9 (3) NUMBER AND DEADLINE FOR SELEC-
10 TIONS.—

11 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270
12 days after the date of the enactment of this
13 Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the
14 Secretary, with the concurrence of the Adminis-
15 trator, shall select countries under paragraph
16 (1) for participation in the pilot program under
17 subsection (a).

18 (B) NUMBER.—The Secretary shall select
19 for participation in the pilot program under
20 subsection (a)—

21 (i) not fewer than 5 countries during
22 the one-year period beginning on the date
23 of the enactment of this Act; and

1 (ii) not fewer than 15 countries dur-
2 ing the 5-year period beginning on such
3 date of enactment.

4 (4) PRIORITIZATION BASED ON RECOMMENDA-
5 TIONS FROM CHIEFS OF MISSION.—In selecting
6 countries under paragraph (1) for participation in
7 the pilot program under subsection (a), the Sec-
8 retary shall prioritize—

9 (A) countries recommended by chiefs of
10 mission and other agencies present at the mis-
11 sions, such as the United States Agency for
12 International Development—

13 (i) that will be able to substantially
14 benefit from expanded commercial develop-
15 ment assistance; and

16 (ii) the governments of which have
17 demonstrated the political will to effectively
18 and sustainably implement such assistance;
19 or

20 (B) groups of countries, including groups
21 of geographically contiguous countries, includ-
22 ing as recommended by chiefs of mission, that
23 meet the criteria under subparagraph (A) and
24 as a result of expanded United States commer-
25 cial development assistance, will contribute to

1 greater intra-regional commerce or regional eco-
2 nomic integration.

3 (d) PLANS OF ACTION.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, in consulta-
5 tion with the Administrator, as appropriate, shall
6 lead in engaging relevant officials of each country
7 selected under subsection (c)(1) to participate in the
8 pilot program under subsection (a) with respect to
9 the development of a plan of action to identify and
10 evaluate barriers to economic and commercial devel-
11 opment that then informs United States assistance.

12 (2) ANALYSIS REQUIRED.—The development of
13 a plan of action under paragraph (1) shall include
14 a comprehensive analysis of relevant legal, policy,
15 and regulatory constraints to economic and job
16 growth in that country.

17 (3) ELEMENTS.—A plan of action developed
18 under paragraph (1) for a country shall include the
19 following:

20 (A) Priorities for reform agreed to by the
21 government of that country and the United
22 States.

23 (B) Clearly defined policy responses, in-
24 cluding regulatory and legal reforms, as nec-

1 essary, to achieve improvement in the business
2 and commercial environment in the country.

3 (C) Identification of the anticipated costs
4 to establish and implement the plan.

5 (D) Identification of appropriate sequenc-
6 ing and phasing of implementation of the plan
7 to create cumulative benefits, as appropriate.

8 (E) Identification of best practices and
9 standards.

10 (F) Considerations with respect to how to
11 make the policy reform investments under the
12 plan long-lasting.

13 (G) Appropriate consultation with affected
14 stakeholders in that country and in the United
15 States.

16 (e) TERMINATION.—The pilot program established
17 under subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is
18 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

19 **SEC. 145. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING SUPPLY CHAIN DI-**
20 **VERSIFICATION.**

21 (a) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State, in consulta-
22 tion with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as
23 determined by the Secretary, shall develop, implement,
24 and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
25 strategy to increase supply chain resiliency and security

1 by promoting and strengthening efforts to incentivize the
2 relocation of supply chains from the PRC.

3 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
4 section (a) shall—

5 (1) be informed by consultations with the gov-
6 ernments of allies and partners of the United States;

7 (2) provide a description of how supply chain
8 diversification can be pursued in a complementary
9 fashion to strengthen the national interests of the
10 United States;

11 (3) include an assessment of—

12 (A) the status and effectiveness of current
13 efforts by governments, multilateral develop-
14 ment banks, and the private sector to attract
15 investment by private entities who are seeking
16 to diversify from reliance on the PRC;

17 (B) major challenges hindering those ef-
18 forts; and

19 (C) how the United States can strengthen
20 the effectiveness of those efforts;

21 (4) identify United States allies and partners
22 with comparative advantages for sourcing and manu-
23 facturing critical goods and countries with the great-
24 est opportunities and alignment with United States
25 values;

1 (5) identify how activities by the United States
2 Agency for International Development, the United
3 States Trade and Development Administration, and
4 the United States International Development Fi-
5 nance Corporation can effectively be leveraged to
6 strengthen and promote supply chain diversification,
7 including nearshoring to Latin America and the Car-
8 ibbean as appropriate;

9 (6) advance diplomatic initiatives to secure spe-
10 cific national commitments by governments in Latin
11 America and the Caribbean to undertake efforts to
12 create favorable conditions for nearshoring in the re-
13 gion, including commitments—

14 (A) to develop formalized national strate-
15 gies to attract United States investment;

16 (B) to address corruption and rule of law
17 concerns;

18 (C) to modernize digital and physical infra-
19 structure;

20 (D) to lower trade barriers;

21 (E) to improve ease of doing business; and

22 (F) to finance and incentivize nearshoring
23 initiatives;

24 (7) advance diplomatic initiatives towards mu-
25 tual recognition of standards and regulations, expe-

1 dite customs operations, and facilitate economic inte-
 2 gration and the World Trade Organization Trade
 3 Facilitation Agreement; and

4 (8) develop and implement programs to finance,
 5 incentivize, or otherwise promote supply chain diver-
 6 sification in accordance with the assessments and
 7 identifications made pursuant to paragraphs (3),
 8 (4), and (5), including, at minimum, programs—

9 (A) to develop physical and digital infra-
 10 structure;

11 (B) to promote transparency in procure-
 12 ment processes;

13 (C) to provide technical assistance in im-
 14 plementing national nearshoring strategies;

15 (D) to mobilize private investment; and

16 (E) to secure commitments by private sec-
 17 tor entities to relocate supply chains from the
 18 PRC.

19 (c) COORDINATION WITH MULTILATERAL DEVELOP-
 20 MENT BANKS.—In implementing the strategy required
 21 under subsection (a), the Secretary of State and the heads
 22 of other relevant Federal agencies, as determined by the
 23 Secretary, should, as appropriate, coordinate with the
 24 United States Executive Director to the World Bank

1 Group and the United States executive directors to re-
2 gional development banks.

3 **SEC. 146. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM-**
4 **PANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVER-**
5 **SIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.**

6 (a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The
7 Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
8 Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facili-
9 tate contracting by the Department of State for the pro-
10 fessional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable
11 fee-for-service basis, to assist interested United States
12 persons, including business entities, with supply chain
13 management issues related to the PRC, including—

14 (1) exiting from the market of the PRC or relo-
15 cating certain production facilities to locations out-
16 side the PRC;

17 (2) diversifying sources of inputs and other ef-
18 forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside
19 of the PRC;

20 (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal-
21 lenges in the course of activities described in para-
22 graphs (1) and (2); and

23 (4) identifying alternative markets for produc-
24 tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including
25 through providing market intelligence, facilitating

1 contact with reliable local partners as appropriate,
2 and other services.

3 (b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—An individual
4 hired to perform services described in subsection (a)
5 shall—

6 (1) be under the authority of the United States
7 chief of mission in the country in which the indi-
8 vidual is hired, in accordance with existing United
9 States laws;

10 (2) coordinate with officers of the Department
11 of State and the Department of Commerce; and

12 (3) coordinate with United States missions and
13 relevant local partners in other countries as needed
14 to provide those services.

15 (c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME-
16 DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—In carrying out the program
17 authorized under subsection (a), the Secretary shall
18 prioritize the provision of services described in that sub-
19 section to assist micro-, small-, and medium-sized enter-
20 prises with supply chain management issues described in
21 that subsection.

22 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
23 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State
24 \$15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029
25 for the purposes of carrying out this section.

1 (e) PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY THE
2 PRC.—

3 (1) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds appro-
4 priated pursuant to the authorization of appropria-
5 tions under subsection (d) may be provided to an en-
6 tity—

7 (A) under the foreign ownership, control,
8 or influence of the Government of the PRC or
9 the Chinese Communist Party;

10 (B) determined to have beneficial owner-
11 ship from foreign individuals subject to the ju-
12 risdiction, direction, or influence of the PRC; or

13 (C) that, at the time any of such funds
14 would be provided, has a contract in effect, or
15 has had a contract in effect in the preceding
16 year, with—

17 (i) the Government of the PRC;

18 (ii) the Chinese Communist Party;

19 (iii) the Chinese military;

20 (iv) an entity majority-owned, major-
21 ity-controlled, or majority-financed by the
22 Government of the PRC, the Chinese Com-
23 munist Party, or the Chinese military; or

1 (v) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of
 2 an entity specified in any of clauses (i)
 3 through (iv).

4 (2) FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, OR INFLU-
 5 ENCE DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “for-
 6 eign ownership, control, or influence” has the mean-
 7 ing given that term in the National Industrial Secu-
 8 rity Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M),
 9 or a successor document, part 117 of title 32, Code
 10 of Federal Regulations (or a successor regulation).

11 **SEC. 147. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON**
 12 **PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE.**

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should work with
 14 transatlantic partners to enhance coordination that fosters
 15 private sector-led development and provides market-based
 16 alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging mar-
 17 kets, particularly as related to the PRC’s Belt and Road
 18 Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative
 19 (GDI), including by supporting efforts, including—

20 (1) the 2023 MOU between the Development
 21 Finance Corporation and the European Investment
 22 Bank;

23 (2) the European Union Strategy on Con-
 24 necting Europe and Asia;

1 (3) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas
2 Initiative Investment Fund;

3 (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has
4 leveraged \$65,000,000,000 for infrastructure
5 projects and emphasizes transparency standards;

6 (5) the Partnership for Global Infrastructure
7 and Investment; and

8 (6) cooperation with multilateral development
9 banks and international financial institutions, in-
10 cluding the World Bank, International Finance Cor-
11 poration, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American
12 Development Bank, and other regional multilateral
13 development banks.

14 (b) COOPERATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS.—The
15 United States should coordinate efforts with the European
16 Union and European countries to address the Government
17 of the PRC's use of the United Nations to advance and
18 legitimize BRI as a global good, including the proliferation
19 of memoranda of understanding between the PRC and
20 United Nations funds and programs on BRI implementa-
21 tion.

22 (c) STANDARDS.—The United States and the Euro-
23 pean Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to
24 enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the
25 Paris Club to provide alternatives to BRI projects for the

1 development of critical infrastructure, including by ena-
 2 bling developing countries to negotiate more favorable
 3 terms that meet international performance and trans-
 4 parency standards.

5 **PART III—COUNTERING EFFORTS TO UNDER-**
 6 **MINE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANI-**
 7 **ZATIONS**

8 **SEC. 151. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND NEW AR-**
 9 **RANGEMENTS TO BORROW.**

10 Section 17(a)(6) of the Bretton Woods Agreements
 11 Act (22 U.S.C. 286e–2(a)(6)) is amended by striking “De-
 12 cember 31, 2025” and inserting “December 31, 2030”.

13 **SEC. 152. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN INTER-AMERICAN**
 14 **DEVELOPMENT BANK.**

15 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
 16 gress that—

17 (1) the United States fully supports Taiwan’s
 18 participation in, and contribution to, international
 19 organizations and underscores the importance of the
 20 relationship between Taiwan and the United States;

21 (2) diversifying the Inter-American Develop-
 22 ment Bank’s donor base and increasing ally engage-
 23 ment in the Western Hemisphere reinforces United
 24 States national interests;

1 (3) Taiwan's significant contribution to the de-
 2 velopment and economies of Latin America and the
 3 Caribbean demonstrate that Taiwan's membership
 4 in the Inter-American Development Bank as a non-
 5 borrowing member would benefit the Bank and the
 6 entire Latin American and Caribbean region; and

7 (4) non-borrowing membership in the Inter-
 8 American Development Bank would allow Taiwan to
 9 substantially leverage and channel the immense re-
 10 sources Taiwan already provides to Latin America
 11 and the Caribbean to reach a larger number of bene-
 12 ficiaries.

13 (b) PLAN FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN
 14 THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK.—The Sec-
 15 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the
 16 Treasury, as appropriate, is authorized—

17 (1) to initiate a United States plan to endorse
 18 non-borrowing membership in the Inter-American
 19 Development Bank for Taiwan, including by advanc-
 20 ing amendments, as necessary, to the Agreement Es-
 21 tablishing the Inter-American Development Bank,
 22 done at Washington April 8, 1959 (10 UST 3029);
 23 and

24 (2) to instruct the United States Governor of
 25 the Bank to work with the Board of Governors of

1 the Bank to admit Taiwan as a non-borrowing mem-
2 ber of the Bank, including by advancing amend-
3 ments, as necessary, to that Agreement.

4 **SEC. 153. INCREASED UNITED STATES COOPERATION WITH**
5 **ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION.**

6 The Secretary of State should pursue the following
7 objectives at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
8 (APEC) forum:

9 (1) Improving efficiency in supply chains, par-
10 ticularly semiconductor supply chains.

11 (2) Encouraging continued public-private dia-
12 logues with policymakers and promoting a common
13 set of technology standards.

14 (3) Promoting the development and use of pol-
15 icy recommendations for governments—

16 (A) to adopt clean energy standards; and

17 (B) to support research and development
18 of clean energy, both renewable and non-renew-
19 able.

20 (4) Advancing cooperation that reduces barriers
21 to cross-border investment and creates opportunities
22 for United States small- and medium-sized enter-
23 prises to access APEC emerging and growing mar-
24 kets.

1 (5) Improving cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific
 2 region and developing tools for governments to com-
 3 bat cyber threats, including ransomware,
 4 disinformation, and cyber hacks.

5 (6) Increasing coordination in prohibiting and
 6 preventing the facilitation of trade in goods pro-
 7 duced using forced labor.

8 (7) Confronting issues such as intellectual prop-
 9 erty theft and counterfeit goods.

10 (8) Enhancing sufficient and sustainable food
 11 security by promoting the development of advanced
 12 agricultural technologies and farming practices.

13 (9) Expanding the economic opportunities for
 14 women to fully and meaningfully engage in a busi-
 15 ness environment that promotes women’s economic
 16 participation.

17 **SEC. 154. OPPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES TO AN IN-**
 18 **CREASE IN THE WEIGHT OF THE CHINESE**
 19 **RENMINBI IN THE SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS**
 20 **BASKET OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY**
 21 **FUND.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury
 23 shall instruct the United States Governor of, and the
 24 United States Executive Director at, the International
 25 Monetary Fund (in this section referred to as the “Fund”)

1 to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose
2 any increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the
3 basket of currencies used to determine the value of Special
4 Drawing Rights, unless the Secretary of the Treasury has
5 submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
6 Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the
7 House of Representatives a written report that includes
8 an assessment that—

9 (1) in the 12 months preceding submission of
10 the report—

11 (A) the PRC does not appear, based on
12 publicly available data, to have been in violation
13 of its obligations under Article VIII of the Arti-
14 cles of Agreement of the Fund;

15 (B) the Secretary of the Treasury has not
16 determined under section 3004 of the Omnibus
17 Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (22
18 U.S.C. 5304) that the PRC has manipulated
19 the rate of exchange between its currency and
20 the United States dollar for purposes of pre-
21 venting effective balance of payments adjust-
22 ments or gaining unfair competitive advantage
23 in international trade; and

24 (C) the President, through the Secretary of
25 the Treasury, has not taken an action against

1 the PRC pursuant to section 701 of the Trade
2 Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of
3 2015 (19 U.S.C. 4421) for failing to adopt ap-
4 propriate policies following enhanced bilateral
5 engagement conducted pursuant to that section;

6 (2) the renminbi is freely usable (within the
7 meaning of Article XXX(f) of the Articles of Agree-
8 ment of the Fund); and

9 (3) the PRC provides financing assurances and
10 debt treatments consistent with debt sustainability
11 analyses of the Fund for countries participating in
12 the Common Framework for Debt Treatments be-
13 yond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (com-
14 monly known as the “Common Framework”) and
15 debt treatments outside the Common Framework.

16 (b) WAIVER.—The Secretary of the Treasury may
17 waive any of the conditions described in paragraph (1),
18 (2), or (3) of subsection (a) upon certifying to the Com-
19 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Com-
20 mittee on Financial Services of the House of Representa-
21 tives that such a waiver is in the national interest of the
22 United States.

23 (c) SUNSET.—Subsection (a) shall have no force or
24 effect on or after the date that is 8 years after the date
25 of the enactment of this Act.

1 **Subtitle C—Global Infrastructure**
2 **and Energy Development**

3 **SEC. 161. DEPARTMENT OF STATE INFRASTRUCTURE CO-**
4 **ORDINATION TASK FORCE.**

5 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established at the
6 Department of State a task force, to be known as the “In-
7 frastructure Coordination Task Force”, which shall be led
8 by an appropriate Senate-confirmed official at the Depart-
9 ment of State. If the leader of the Task Force is not the
10 Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy
11 and the Environment, then the leader of the task force
12 shall coordinate with such Under Secretary on matters re-
13 lated to the task force.

14 (b) DUTIES.—The Infrastructure Coordination Task
15 Force shall—

16 (1) coordinate international infrastructure poli-
17 cies and projects supported by the United States
18 Government, with participation by the relevant Fed-
19 eral departments and agencies;

20 (2) engage international partners such as the
21 Group of Seven (G7), multilateral development
22 banks, international financial institutions, the
23 United States private sector, multinational corpora-
24 tions and banks, nongovernmental organizations,
25 and other partners in industrialized countries;

1 (3) advance United States objectives through
2 initiatives such as the Blue Dot Network, Infra-
3 structure Transaction Assistance Network, the
4 Transaction Advisory Fund, and the Strategic Ports
5 Initiative; and

6 (4) produce strategic guidance that identifies
7 international infrastructure projects.

8 **SEC. 162. AUTHORIZATION OF PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL**
9 **INFRASTRUCTURE AND INVESTMENT.**

10 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There shall be an office at the
11 Department of State to support the Partnership for Global
12 Infrastructure and Investment, or a successor entity
13 (hereafter, “the Office”). The Office shall be led by a “Co-
14 ordinator for Global Infrastructure and Investment”
15 (hereafter, “the Coordinator”) who shall be an official
16 serving in a position to which the individual was appointed
17 by the President, with the advice and consent of the
18 United States Senate.

19 (b) AUTHORITY.—The Coordinator shall have the au-
20 thority to convene the interagency on matters relating to
21 its policy remit. The Office is authorized to deploy United
22 States public and private sector capital and expertise for
23 the purpose of mobilizing foreign public and private sector
24 capital and expertise—

1 (1) to help identify and meet the strategic in-
2 frastructure needs of countries that are allies and
3 partners of the United States; and

4 (2) to provide allies and partners of the United
5 States with mutually beneficial strategic infrastruc-
6 ture investment solutions that are alternatives to ex-
7 ploitative, coercive, or harmful foreign infrastructure
8 investments.

9 (c) PRIORITIZATION.—In evaluating proposals for
10 strategic infrastructure projects funded through the Part-
11 nership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the Sec-
12 retary of State, in consultation with other departments
13 and agencies as appropriate, should prioritize—

14 (1) projects that have the highest strategic
15 value to the United States; and

16 (2) projects related to—

17 (A) strategic transport infrastructure, in-
18 cluding ports, airports, intermodal transfer fa-
19 cilities, railroads, and highways;

20 (B) energy infrastructure, technology, and
21 supply chains, critical minerals, and related
22 areas that align with the energy needs of part-
23 ner countries and with the objective of maxi-
24 mizing such countries' energy access, energy se-

1 security, energy transition and modernization,
2 and resilience needs.

3 (C) secure information and communica-
4 tions technology systems, networks, and infra-
5 structure to strengthen the potential for eco-
6 nomic growth and promote an open, interoper-
7 able, reliable, and secure Internet; and

8 (D) global health security, including
9 through infrastructure projects that increase
10 the availability, accessibility, and affordability
11 of health care in partner countries.

12 (d) STANDARDS.—In carrying out the purposes de-
13 scribed in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall ad-
14 here to standards for sustainable, transparent, and quality
15 infrastructure investment and ensure interventions include
16 opportunities to advance economic growth priorities in rel-
17 evant sectors in the partner country and support good gov-
18 ernance and the rule of law.

19 (e) PROJECTS IN HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES.—Sup-
20 port provided by the United States under the Partnership
21 for Global Infrastructure and Investment shall not be pro-
22 vided in countries with high-income economies (as those
23 terms are defined by the World Bank) unless the Sec-
24 retary certifies to the appropriate congressional commit-
25 tees that such support—

1 (1) is necessary to attempt to preempt or
2 counter efforts by a strategic competitor of the
3 United States to secure significant political or eco-
4 nomic leverage or acquire national security-sensitive
5 technologies or infrastructure in a country that is an
6 ally or partner of the United States; and

7 (2) includes cost-sharing arrangements with
8 partner countries to ensure effective burden-sharing
9 and long-term sustainability, including through the
10 involvement of private sector investments.

11 (f) REPORT.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
13 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
14 nually thereafter for a period of two years, the Sec-
15 retary of State, in consultation with the Adminis-
16 trator for the United States Agency for Inter-
17 national Development and the heads of other Fed-
18 eral departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall
19 submit a report to the appropriate committees of
20 Congress that—

21 (A) identifies all current infrastructure
22 projects supported by the Partnership for Glob-
23 al Infrastructure and Investment;

1 (B) describes how the Partnership for
 2 Global Infrastructure and Investment supported
 3 each project;

4 (C) explains the rationale of the United
 5 States and partner country interests served by
 6 the United States providing support to such
 7 projects, including as it relates to the priorities
 8 described in subsection (c);

9 (D) describes how the Partnership for
 10 Global Infrastructure and Investment cooper-
 11 ates with other entities in the United States
 12 Government that support infrastructure, includ-
 13 ing de-confliction of efforts; and

14 (E) to the extent possible, describes the es-
 15 timated timeline for completion of the projects
 16 supported by the Partnership for Global Infra-
 17 structure and Investment.

18 (2) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required
 19 under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassi-
 20 fied form, but may include a classified annex.

21 **SEC. 163. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSIST-**
 22 **ANCE NETWORK.**

23 (a) AUTHORITY.—There is established an initiative,
 24 to be known as the “Infrastructure Transaction and As-
 25 sistance Network”, under which the Secretary of State,

1 in consultation with the Administrator of the United
2 States Agency for International Development and the
3 heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as appropriate,
4 shall carry out programs to advance the development of
5 sustainable, transparent, and quality infrastructure glob-
6 ally in countries that are eligible for foreign assistance,
7 by—

8 (1) strengthening the capacities of United
9 States allies and partners to improve infrastructure
10 project evaluation processes, regulatory and procure-
11 ment environments, and infrastructure project prep-
12 aration;

13 (2) providing transaction advisory services and
14 project preparation assistance to support sustainable
15 infrastructure; and

16 (3) coordinating the provision of United States
17 assistance for the development of infrastructure, in-
18 cluding infrastructure that utilizes United States-
19 manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing in-
20 vestment led by the private sector.

21 (b) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the
22 Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network de-
23 scribed under subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in
24 coordination with the Administrator of the United States
25 Agency for International Development, and in consulta-

tion, as appropriate, with other Federal departments and agencies, shall provide support, including through the Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost the capacity of partner countries globally to evaluate contracts in line with international standards, including through providing services such as—

(1) legal services, including with the objectives of—

(A) minimizing opportunities for corrupt practices; and

(B) ensuring agreements are transparent, clear, and enforceable;

(2) project preparation and feasibility studies;

(3) debt sustainability analyses;

(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and

(5) other services relevant to advancing the development of sustainable, transparent, and quality infrastructure.

(c) INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” described under subsection (a), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including through the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for tech-

1 nical assistance, project preparation, development,
 2 and execution, and other infrastructure project sup-
 3 port in the countries of the Indo-Pacific region.

4 (2) JOINT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—
 5 Funds authorized for the Indo-Pacific Strategic In-
 6 frastructure Fund should be used in coordination
 7 with the Department of Defense, the International
 8 Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Im-
 9 port Bank of the United States, the United States
 10 Trade and Development Agency, like-minded donor
 11 partners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to
 12 support joint infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pa-
 13 cific region.

14 (3) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—
 15 Funds authorized for the Indo-Pacific Strategic In-
 16 frastructure Fund should be used to support stra-
 17 tegic infrastructure projects.

18 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
 19 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years
 20 2025 through 2029, \$50,000,000 for the Transaction Ad-
 21 visory Fund and \$100,000,000 for the Indo-Pacific Stra-
 22 tegic Infrastructure Fund.

23 **SEC. 164. STRATEGIC PORTS INITIATIVE.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in con-
 25 sultation with the Administrator of the United States

1 Agency for International Development, the Chief Execu-
2 tive Officer of United States International Development
3 Finance Corporation, the Trade and Development Agency,
4 and other relevant Federal departments and agencies, as
5 appropriate, shall carry out a program entitled the “Stra-
6 tegic Ports Initiative” for the following purposes:

7 (1) To provide training and technical assistance
8 to partner country officials and institutions, and oth-
9 ers, as appropriate, responsible for building, man-
10 aging, and securing seaports, airports, and related
11 infrastructure abroad.

12 (2) To identify ports and airports vulnerable to
13 ownership or other forms of control by strategic
14 competitors, including the PRC, and make rec-
15 ommendations for United States Government action.

16 (3) To contribute to United States Government
17 diplomatic engagements and other efforts with part-
18 ner countries and economies, and relevant and trust-
19 ed private sector entities with respect to ownership
20 or control of seaports and airports by strategic com-
21 petitors, including the PRC.

22 (4) To generate priority countries and projects
23 for United States assistance and investment, includ-
24 ing through coordination with the Infrastructure Co-

1 ordination Task Force established pursuant to sec-
2 tion 161.

3 (5) To ensure that all Department of State ini-
4 tiatives, activities, and funding related to seaports
5 and airports align with the national security inter-
6 ests of the United States and account for the
7 vulnerabilities, technical constraints, and other na-
8 tional security implications of seaport and airport in-
9 frastructure to construction, ownership, operation,
10 or other forms of direct and indirect control by stra-
11 tegic competitors, including the PRC.

12 (6) To ensure, to the greatest extent prac-
13 ticable, that projects supported by the United States
14 use local labor and professional capacities, in con-
15 trast to infrastructure projects carried out by the
16 PRC.

17 (7) To assist in identifying and promoting al-
18 ternatives for port logistics data management sys-
19 tems currently offered by strategic competitors, in-
20 cluding the PRC.

21 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
22 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years
23 2025 through 2029, \$6,000,000 to carry out the purposes
24 of the Strategic Ports Initiative.

1 **SEC. 165. NEXT-GENERATION SHIPPING.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is author-
3 ized to carry out the following activities to support the
4 development of next-generation shipping corridors or
5 green shipping corridors:

6 (1) Conduct analysis to determine United
7 States priorities for cooperation with partner coun-
8 tries on next-generation shipping corridors or green
9 shipping corridors.

10 (2) Support research and development initia-
11 tives and technical assistance, as appropriate, in the
12 following areas:

13 (A) Next-generation port design, engineer-
14 ing, and architecture.

15 (B) Hydrogen fuel production and hydro-
16 gen fuel storage and utilization capacities at
17 ports.

18 (C) Commercial-scale high-speed electric
19 vehicle trucking fleet charging infrastructure.

20 (D) Logistics and shipping corridor plan-
21 ning.

22 (E) Hydrogen pipelines.

23 (F) Liquid hydrogen power vessels, and
24 other next-generation marine propulsion sys-
25 tems, design and manufacturing, including both

1 new vessels and retrofit and refurbishment of
2 existing vessels.

3 (3) Support private sector investment in next-
4 generation shipping infrastructure in partner coun-
5 tries with strong or emerging commercial ties with
6 the United States that—

7 (A) are strategically or centrally located
8 markets in international commerce; or

9 (B) face growing or concerning financial
10 entanglements with malign foreign govern-
11 ments.

12 (b) PARAMETERS.—In carrying out activities author-
13 ized under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall en-
14 sure that all activities align with the national security in-
15 terests of the United States and the purposes of the Stra-
16 tegic Ports Initiative authorized pursuant to section 164.

17 (c) INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION.—
18 The United States shall use its voice, vote, and influence
19 in the International Maritime Organization to—

20 (1) counter any attempts by the PRC or other
21 strategic competitors to advance or advocate for poli-
22 cies, regulations, or technical standards that unfairly
23 benefit particular countries and their domestic in-
24 dustries and products to the detriment of free and
25 fair markets;

1 (2) advocate for the adoption of next-generation
2 shipping industry technologies and infrastructure
3 standards, policies, regulations and cooperation ini-
4 tiatives that advance United States national and eco-
5 nomic security interests;

6 (3) participate in the International Maritime
7 Organization’s global technical cooperation projects
8 to support growing the capacity of parties to develop
9 and modernize global shipping industries tech-
10 nologies and infrastructure; and

11 (4) represent the interests of United States
12 stakeholders impacted by International Maritime Or-
13 ganization initiatives.

14 (d) LIMITATION.—Prior to providing funding for ac-
15 tivities to support the establishment and development of
16 next-generation shipping corridors or green shipping cor-
17 ridors, the Department of State shall obtain commitments
18 from participating countries in the following areas:

19 (1) Prohibiting exclusivity or preferences for
20 specific international shipping routes, including ex-
21 clusive access for specific vessels, fleets, or maritime
22 shipping companies of the PRC.

23 (2) Preventing the sale, lease, or operational
24 control of port operations, or any subsidiary oper-
25 ations, including security, communications and infor-

1 mation technology, or energy suppliers to entities
 2 owned or controlled by the PRC.

3 (3) Prohibiting the use of, or contracts with
 4 communications, survey, and logistics management
 5 providers owned or controlled by the PRC.

6 (4) Maintaining transparent and accountable
 7 security operations that are not contracted to enti-
 8 ties owned or controlled by the PRC.

9 (5) Ensuring that ports do not serve as ports
 10 of call for PRC military or research vessels.

11 (6) Ensuring that ports are operated in a trans-
 12 parent and accountable manner, consistent with do-
 13 mestic and applicable international law.

14 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
 15 authorized to be appropriated \$120,000,000 over the next
 16 three fiscal years to carry out activities under this section.

17 **SEC. 166. GLOBAL STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE INVEST-**
 18 **MENT FUND.**

19 (a) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
 20 FUND.—

21 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in
 22 the Treasury of the United States a fund to be
 23 known as the “Global Strategic Infrastructure
 24 Fund” (in this section referred to as the “Fund”)
 25 for the Secretary of State to provide for assistance,

1 including through contributions for strategic infra-
2 structure projects globally as authorized under this
3 section.

4 (2) APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts
5 otherwise available for such purposes, there is appro-
6 priated to the Fund established in subsection (a)(1),
7 out of amounts in the Treasury not otherwise appro-
8 priated—

9 (A) for fiscal year 2025, \$400,000,000, to
10 remain available until expended;

11 (B) for fiscal year 2026, \$400,000,000, to
12 remain available until expended;

13 (C) for fiscal year 2027, \$400,000,000, to
14 remain available until expended;

15 (D) for fiscal year 2028, \$400,000,000, to
16 remain available until expended; and

17 (E) for fiscal year 2029, \$400,000,000, to
18 remain available until expended.

19 (3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—Amounts in the
20 Fund shall be transferred and merged with accounts
21 within the Department of State, the United States
22 Agency for International Development, the Export-
23 Import Bank of the United States, the United
24 States International Development Finance Corpora-
25 tion, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the

1 United States Trade and Development Agency, as
2 appropriate, to be used for such purposes.

3 (4) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State
4 shall consult with the Administrator of the United
5 States Agency for International Development on the
6 allocations of the Fund.

7 (5) LOANS AND LOAN GUARANTEES.—Amounts
8 transferred from the Fund to the Export-Import
9 Bank and the United States International Develop-
10 ment Finance Corporation, among other purposes,
11 may be made available for the costs of direct loans
12 and loan guarantees, including the cost of modifying
13 such loans and loan guarantees, as defined in section
14 502 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2
15 U.S.C. 661a).

16 (b) PRIORITIZATION.—In evaluating proposals for
17 strategic infrastructure projects funded pursuant to sub-
18 section (a), the Secretary of State shall prioritize—

19 (1) projects that have the highest strategic
20 value to the United States; and

21 (2) projects related to—

22 (A) strategic transport infrastructure, in-
23 cluding ports, airports, railroads, and highways;

24 (B) energy infrastructure, technology, and
25 supply chains, critical minerals, and related

1 areas that align with the officially conveyed en-
2 ergy needs of partner countries and with the
3 objective of maximizing such countries' energy
4 access, energy security, energy transition, and
5 resilience needs;

6 (C) secure information and communica-
7 tions technology networks and infrastructure to
8 strengthen the potential for economic growth
9 and to promote an open, interoperable, reliable,
10 and secure internet; and

11 (D) global health security, including
12 through infrastructure projects that increase
13 the availability, accessibility, and affordability
14 of health care in partner countries.

15 (c) STANDARDS.—In evaluating proposals for stra-
16 tegic infrastructure projects funded pursuant to sub-
17 section (a), the Secretary of State shall adhere to stand-
18 ards for sustainable, transparent, and quality infrastruc-
19 ture investment and ensure projects include opportunities
20 to advance economic growth priorities in the partner coun-
21 try and support good governance and the rule of law.

22 (d) PROJECTS IN HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES.—Sup-
23 port provided under the Fund shall not be provided in
24 countries with high-income economies (as those terms are
25 defined by the World Bank) unless the President certifies

1 to the appropriate congressional committees that such
2 support—

3 (1) is necessary to preempt or counter efforts
4 by a strategic competitor of the United States to se-
5 cure significant political or economic leverage or ac-
6 quire national security-sensitive technologies or in-
7 frastructure in a country that is an ally or partner
8 of the United States; and

9 (2) includes cost-sharing arrangements with
10 partner countries to ensure effective burden-sharing
11 and long-term sustainability.

12 **SEC. 167. MODIFICATIONS OF REQUIREMENTS TO BECOME**
13 **A MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION**
14 **CANDIDATE COUNTRY.**

15 (a) CANDIDATE COUNTRY QUALIFICATIONS.—Sec-
16 tion 606 of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22
17 U.S.C. 7705) is amended to read as follows:

18 **“SEC. 606. CANDIDATE COUNTRIES.**

19 “(a) IN GENERAL.—A country shall be a candidate
20 country for purposes of eligibility to receive assistance
21 under section 605 if—

22 “(1) the per capita income of the country in a
23 fiscal year is equal to or less than the World Bank
24 threshold for initiating the International Bank for

1 Reconstruction and Development graduation process
 2 for the fiscal year; and

3 “(2) subject to subsection (b), the country is
 4 not ineligible to receive United States economic as-
 5 sistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act
 6 of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) by reason of the
 7 application of any provision of the Foreign Assist-
 8 ance Act of 1961 or any other provision of law.

9 “(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—For the purposes of
 10 determining whether a country is eligible, pursuant to sub-
 11 section (a)(2), to receive assistance under section 605, the
 12 exercise by the President, the Secretary of State, or any
 13 other officer or employee of the United States Government
 14 of any waiver or suspension of any provision of law re-
 15 ferred to in subsection (a)(2), and notification to the ap-
 16 propriate congressional committees in accordance with
 17 such provision of law, shall be construed as satisfying the
 18 requirements under subsection (a).

19 “(c) DETERMINATION BY THE BOARD.—The Board
 20 shall determine whether a country is a candidate country
 21 for purposes of this section.”.

22 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

23 (1) AMENDMENT TO REPORT IDENTIFYING
 24 CANDIDATE COUNTRIES.—Section 608(a)(1) of the
 25 Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C.

1 7707(a)(1)) is amended by striking “section
2 606(a)(1)(B)” and inserting “section 606(a)(2)”.

3 (2) AMENDMENT TO MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE
4 COMPACT AUTHORITY.—Section 609(b)(2) of such
5 Act (22 U.S.C. 7708(b)(2)) is amended—

6 (A) by amending the paragraph heading to
7 read as follows: “COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS”;
8 and

9 (B) by striking “with respect to a lower
10 middle income country described in section
11 606(b),”.

12 (3) AMENDMENT TO AUTHORIZATION TO PRO-
13 VIDE ASSISTANCE FOR CANDIDATE COUNTRIES.—
14 Section 616(b)(1) of such Act (22 U.S.C.
15 7715(b)(1)) is amended by striking “subsection (a)
16 or (b) of section 606” and inserting “section
17 606(a)”.

18 (c) MODIFICATION TO FACTORS IN DETERMINING
19 ELIGIBILITY.—Section 607(c)(2) of the Millennium Chal-
20 lenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7706(c)(2)) is amended in
21 the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking “con-
22 sider” and inserting “prioritize need and impact by con-
23 sidering”.

1 **SEC. 168. AFRICA ENERGY SECURITY AND DIVERSIFICA-**
2 **TION.**

3 Section 3 of the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (Public
4 Law 114–121; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note) is amended—

5 (1) in paragraph (8), by striking “; and” and
6 inserting a semicolon;

7 (2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at
8 the end and inserting a semicolon; and

9 (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol-
10 lowing new paragraphs:

11 “(10) advance United States foreign policy and
12 development goals by assisting African countries to
13 reduce their dependence on countries that use en-
14 ergy dependence for political influence, such as the
15 Russian Federation or the People’s Republic of
16 China, which have used energy and financial re-
17 sources to influence other countries;

18 “(11) promote the energy security and domestic
19 energy resource mobilization of allies and partners of
20 the United States in Africa by—

21 “(A) encouraging the development of ac-
22 cessible, transparent, and competitive energy
23 markets that provide diversified sources and re-
24 liable and affordable power, including civil nu-
25 clear energy;

1 “(B) promoting domestic energy resource
 2 mobilization, advancing regulatory reforms in
 3 the energy sector, and supporting grid mod-
 4 ernization and energy storage deployment ef-
 5 forts; and

6 “(C) facilitating the efforts of partner
 7 countries to meet their goals and commitments
 8 related to energy resource production and con-
 9 sumption;

10 “(12) encourage United States public and pri-
 11 vate sector investment in African energy infrastruc-
 12 ture projects to bridge the gap between energy secu-
 13 rity requirements and commercial demand in a way
 14 that is consistent with the region’s capacity and the
 15 goals and commitments of partner countries; and

16 “(13) help facilitate the trade and cooperation
 17 on energy production, advance energy technology de-
 18 velopment and deployment, and provide technical as-
 19 sistance to build capacities on regulatory improve-
 20 ments and greater expertise on global markets in a
 21 way that benefits the energy security of allies and
 22 partners of the United States, including in Africa.”.

23 **SEC. 169. ENHANCING RESILIENT CRITICAL INFRASTRUC-**
 24 **TURE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.**

25 (a) PROGRAM.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in
2 coordination with the heads of other relevant Fed-
3 eral departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall
4 develop and implement a strategy for the expansion,
5 improvement, and protection of resilient critical in-
6 frastructure in the Pacific Islands.

7 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy and related pro-
8 gramming under paragraph (1) shall—

9 (A) consider the—

10 (i) current and forecasted gaps in
11 functionality of, and threats to, critical in-
12 frastructure in the Pacific Islands, includ-
13 ing—

14 (I) for disaster preparedness and
15 response, transport connectivity, oper-
16 ability of health systems, information
17 and communications technology, food
18 security, coastal zone management,
19 marine and water resource manage-
20 ment, and energy security and access
21 to electricity; and

22 (II) to the extent practicable, the
23 rates, severity and drivers of deterio-
24 ration, structural deficiencies, and
25 most pressing threats to public safety

1 from aging, at-risk, and failing infra-
2 structure;

3 (ii) United States national security
4 risks posed by weak, outdated, at-risk, and
5 failing critical infrastructure in the Pacific
6 Islands, with particular consideration for
7 the interconnectedness of supply chains,
8 interconnected transportation networks,
9 technology, communications, and financial
10 systems; and

11 (iii) the policy-enabling environment
12 for public and private sector investment in
13 critical infrastructure in the Pacific Is-
14 lands, including through local resource mo-
15 bilization, early stage project preparation,
16 development finance, and foreign direct in-
17 vestment;

18 (B) seek to enhance the ability of Pacific
19 Islanders, including governments at the na-
20 tional and local levels, civil society leaders, and
21 private sector partners, to attract and effec-
22 tively manage public and private investment in
23 critical infrastructure while resisting predatory
24 lending and resource extraction deals by malign
25 actors;

1 (C) identify priorities for critical infra-
2 structure improvement, reinforcement, re-engi-
3 neering, or replacement based on the signifi-
4 cance of such infrastructure to ensuring public
5 health, safety, and economic growth;

6 (D) support investment and improvement
7 in natural resource management and conserva-
8 tion;

9 (E) include recommendations for policy
10 and governance reforms in the Pacific Islands,
11 as necessary and appropriate, to strengthen
12 critical infrastructure resilience; and

13 (F) support trainings and information
14 sharing, technology exchanges, reverse trade
15 missions, and pilot projects that provide Pacific
16 Islanders with access to proven, cost-effective
17 solutions for mitigating the risks associated
18 with critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and
19 related interdependencies.

20 (b) COORDINATION.—The program developed under
21 this section should be coordinated with like-minded allies,
22 partners, and regional and international organizations to
23 encourage alignment of efforts and to avoid duplicative in-
24 vestments and programming.

1 (c) DISASTER PREPAREDNESS.—The Administrator
2 of the United States Agency for International Develop-
3 ment, in consultation with the relevant Federal depart-
4 ments and agencies with technical and practical expertise,
5 shall work with Pacific Island countries to—

6 (1) provide technical assistance, education, and
7 training, including through grants and cooperative
8 agreements for qualified United States and local
9 nongovernmental organizations, to enhance early
10 warning systems, emergency management and pre-
11 paredness procedures, and post-disaster relief and
12 recovery; and

13 (2) enhance coordination of existing disaster
14 mitigation and response plans in the Pacific Islands
15 region, including by United States allies and part-
16 ners in the region.

17 (d) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—
18 The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the representa-
19 tives of the United States to the World Bank Group, the
20 International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development
21 Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to
22 support sustainable, resilient, and high quality infrastruc-
23 ture projects in the Pacific Islands.

1 **SEC. 170. OCEANIA RESTORATION AND HAZARDS REMOVAL**
2 **PROGRAM.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall es-
4 tablish an Oceania Restoration and Hazards Removal Pro-
5 gram (in this section referred to as the “Program”).

6 (b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Program is—

7 (1) to coordinate with the countries of Oce-
8 ania—

9 (A) to support survey and clearance oper-
10 ations of buried and abandoned bombs, mor-
11 tars, artillery shells, and unexploded ordnance
12 from battlefields of World War II; and

13 (B) to identify, isolate, and where appro-
14 priate, mitigate environmental risks associated
15 with submerged maritime vessels that pose a
16 threat to public health or marine resources be-
17 cause of the presence of oil, fuel, corrosive met-
18 als, or other toxins; and

19 (2) to build the national capacity of the coun-
20 tries of Oceania to identify, isolate, and mitigate
21 risks related to explosive ordnance hazards, sub-
22 merged maritime vessels, or related hazardous ma-
23 rine debris through survey and disposal training,
24 funding to relevant nongovernmental organizations,
25 and support to regional cooperation initiatives with
26 countries that are allies and partners of the United

1 States, including Australia, France, Japan, New
 2 Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the United
 3 Kingdom.

4 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
 5 authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State
 6 \$1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029
 7 to carry out this section.

8 **SEC. 171. COORDINATION WITH OTHER FEDERAL AGEN-**
 9 **CIES AND COOPERATION AND PARTICIPA-**
 10 **TION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.**

11 The Federal officials responsible for carrying out
 12 policies and actions under sections 168 and 169 should,
 13 as appropriate—

14 (1) coordinate with existing programs and ef-
 15 forts of relevant agencies of the United States Gov-
 16 ernment, including with regard to the Republic of
 17 the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micro-
 18 nesia, and the Republic of Palau;

19 (2) seek the cooperation and participation of
 20 United States private sector, United States non-
 21 governmental organizations, and United States insti-
 22 tutions of higher education; and

23 (3) work with civil society organizations and
 24 other relevant stakeholders in Pacific Island coun-
 25 tries, as appropriate.

1 **SEC. 172. FINDINGS RELATED TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC**
2 **OF CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION.**

3 Congress makes the following findings:

4 (1) State-owned enterprises of the PRC are
5 subject to the direction of both the state and the
6 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the CCP
7 strives to increase their influence over the global
8 economy by pursuing predatory and exploitative
9 trade, economic, and industrial practices designed to
10 out-compete the United States and other market
11 economies.

12 (2) The PRC's control of key components of
13 critical global supply chains, including critical min-
14 erals, semiconductors, batteries, solar panels, and
15 pharmaceuticals, as outlined in the Office of the Di-
16 rector of National Intelligence's February 2023 "An-
17 nual Threat Assessment", represents a direct threat
18 to United States national security and harms global
19 economic competition.

20 (3) The CCP's industrial strategy, as articu-
21 lated in the Made in China 2025 plan, aims to domi-
22 nate global manufacturing in crucial energy tech-
23 nologies, including advanced materials, batteries,
24 and power equipment.

25 (4) The PRC, by far the world's largest pol-
26 luter, accounts for approximately $\frac{1}{3}$ of global carbon

1 dioxide (CO₂) emissions according to the Inter-
2 national Energy Administration and subsidizes its
3 industries, manufacturers, and exports by neither
4 implementing nor enforcing adequate environmental
5 or labor protection standards.

6 (5) The PRC's industrial sectors like agri-
7 culture, mining, automotive production, and com-
8 puter and electronics manufacturing emit 3 times
9 more carbon dioxide as compared to the United
10 States' same industrial sectors, and nearly 2 times
11 more carbon dioxide than the global average of the
12 production of comparable goods in other foreign
13 countries, according to industry tracking data from
14 the International Energy Agency.

15 (6) The CCP seeks to utilize the Belt and Road
16 Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initia-
17 tive (GDI) to increase the dependence of low-income
18 and lower-middle income countries in Asia, Africa,
19 Europe, and the Americas on the PRC at the ex-
20 pense of trapping such countries in long-term, high-
21 polluting, debt-ridden, low-quality infrastructure
22 projects that undermine developing countries' efforts
23 to sustainably grow and industrialize their economies
24 to maximize benefits and participation for their citi-
25 zenry, while increasing global pollution.

1 (7) The United States—

2 (A) has adopted many environmental pro-
3 tections, including the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.
4 7401 et seq.), the Federal Water Pollution Con-
5 trol Act (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.), the Toxic
6 Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. 2601 et
7 seq.), and more than 15 other major environ-
8 mental protection laws that—

9 (i) add costs to the production of
10 goods in order to secure the benefits of en-
11 vironmental protection and conservation ef-
12 forts; and

13 (ii) serve to meaningfully decrease
14 greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide
15 (CO₂), methane (CH₄), nitrous oxide
16 (N₂O), sulfur hexafluoride (SF₆),
17 hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
18 perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and other
19 fluorinated greenhouse gases;

20 (B) is the world's largest consumer market
21 and its economy is highly integrated into the
22 world; and

23 (C) bears responsibility to ensure that the
24 United States market does not incentivize
25 forum shopping for the production of goods to

jurisdictions with low environmental standards to obtain a competitive cost advantage while undermining efforts to address transnational environmental and resource challenges as well as global public health.

(8) Any realistic pathway to substantially reduce global carbon emissions will require the PRC to be held accountable for its role as the world's largest polluter.

SEC. 173. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES TO THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President should seek opportunities to partner with multilateral development finance institutions to develop financing tools based on shared development finance criteria and mechanisms to support investments in developing countries that—

(1) support low carbon economic development; and

(2) promote resiliency and adaptation to environmental changes.

(b) PARTNERSHIP.—The Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation should seek to partner with other multilateral

1 development finance institutions and development finance
 2 institutions to leverage the respective available funds to
 3 support low carbon economic development, which may in-
 4 clude nuclear energy projects, environmental adaptation,
 5 and resilience activities in developing countries.

6 (c) JOINT COOPERATION ON INFRASTRUCTURE
 7 PROJECTS.—

8 (1) JOINT SUPPORT.—Subject to paragraph
 9 (2), the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the
 10 United States Agency for International Develop-
 11 ment, and other relevant agency heads may co-fi-
 12 nance, or provide joint support for, infrastructure
 13 projects that advance the development of the United
 14 States overseas and provide viable alternatives to
 15 projects that would otherwise be included within the
 16 PRC's Belt and Initiative and Global Development
 17 Initiative.

18 (2) CONDITIONS.—Co-financing agreements
 19 and arrangements authorized pursuant to paragraph
 20 (1) may not be approved unless—

21 (A) the projects to be financed—

22 (i) promote the public good; and

23 (ii) will have substantially lower envi-
 24 ronmental impact than the proposed Belt

1 and Road Initiative and Global Develop-
2 ment Initiative alternative; and

3 (B) the appropriate committees of Con-
4 gress are notified not later than 15 days in ad-
5 vance of entering into such co-financing ar-
6 rangements.

7 **SEC. 174. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO SECURE CRIT-**
8 **ICAL MINERAL SUPPLY CHAINS.**

9 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY ON CRITICAL MINERAL
10 SUPPLY CHAINS.—It is the policy of the United States—

11 (1) to collaborate with allies and partners of the
12 United States to build secure and resilient critical
13 minerals supply chains, including in the mining,
14 processing, and valuation of critical minerals, as well
15 as with respect to advanced manufacturing that in-
16 cludes critical minerals;

17 (2) to prioritize the development and production
18 of critical minerals domestically, both to supply do-
19 mestic needs and for export to allies and partners
20 that participate in secure and resilient supply chains
21 for critical minerals;

22 (3) to reduce or eliminate reliance and depend-
23 ence on critical mineral supply chains controlled by
24 the PRC, the Russian Federation, Iran, or any other
25 adversary of the United States;

1 (4) to work with allies and partners on enhance-
2 ing evaluation capability and technology in trusted
3 countries that produce critical minerals to avoid the
4 export of mined and processed critical minerals to
5 adversaries of the United States;

6 (5) to identify and implement market-based in-
7 centives for the purposes of facilitating the creation
8 and maintenance of secure and resilient critical min-
9 eral supply chains in collaboration with allies and
10 partners;

11 (6) to prioritize securing critical mineral supply
12 chains in United States foreign policy, including
13 through the use of economic tools to invest respon-
14 sibly in projects in partner countries in a manner
15 that both benefits local populations and bolsters the
16 supply of critical minerals to the United States and
17 allies and partners of the United States; and

18 (7) that collaboration with allies and partners
19 to build secure and resilient critical mineral supply
20 chains shall not replace United States efforts to in-
21 crease domestic development and production of crit-
22 ical minerals.

23 (b) INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO
24 PROTECTING CRITICAL MINERAL SUPPLY CHAINS.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized
2 to negotiate an agreement with international part-
3 ners for the purposes of establishing a coalition—

4 (A) to facilitate—

5 (i) the mining, processing, and supply
6 of critical minerals; and

7 (ii) advanced manufacturing that in-
8 cludes critical minerals; and

9 (B) to secure an adequate supply of critical
10 minerals and relevant products, manufacturing
11 inputs, and components that are heavily de-
12 pendent on critical mineral resources for the
13 United States and other members of the coal-
14 tion (in this subsection referred to as “member
15 countries”).

16 (2) NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.—The overall
17 objectives for negotiating an agreement described in
18 paragraph (1) should be—

19 (A) to establish mechanisms for member
20 countries to build secure and resilient supply
21 chains for critical minerals, including in—

22 (i) the mining, refinement, processing,
23 and valuation of critical minerals; and

1 (ii) advanced manufacturing of prod-
2 ucts, components, and materials that are
3 dependent on critical minerals;

4 (B) to improve economies of scale and
5 joint cooperation with international partners in
6 securing access and means of production
7 throughout the supply chains of critical min-
8 erals and manufacturing processes dependent
9 on critical minerals;

10 (C) to establish mechanisms, with appro-
11 priate market-based disciplines, that provide
12 and maintain opportunities among member
13 countries for creating industry economies of
14 scale to attract joint investment among those
15 countries, including—

16 (i) cooperation on joint projects, in-
17 cluding cost-sharing on building appro-
18 priate infrastructure to access deposits of
19 critical minerals; and

20 (ii) creation or enhancement of na-
21 tional and international programs to sup-
22 port the development of robust industries
23 by providing appropriate sector-specific in-
24 centives, such as political risk and other

1 insurance opportunities, financing, and
2 other support, for—

3 (I) mining and processing critical
4 minerals;

5 (II) manufacturing of products,
6 components, and materials that are
7 dependent on critical minerals and are
8 essential to consumer technology
9 products or have important national
10 security implications; and

11 (III) associated transportation
12 needs that are tailored to the han-
13 dling, movement, and logistics man-
14 agement of critical minerals and prod-
15 ucts, components, and materials that
16 are dependent on critical minerals;

17 (D) to establish market-based rules for
18 member countries regarding adoption of quali-
19 fying tax and other incentives to stimulate in-
20 vestment, as balanced by market-based dis-
21 ciplines to ensure a fair playing field among
22 those countries;

23 (E) to establish recommended best prac-
24 tices to protect—

25 (i) labor rights;

1 (ii) the natural environment and eco-
 2 systems near critical mineral industrial
 3 sites; and

4 (iii) safety of communities near crit-
 5 ical mineral industrial activities;

6 (F) to advance economic growth in devel-
 7 oping countries with critical mineral reserves,
 8 including for the benefit of the citizens of those
 9 countries;

10 (G) to establish rules allowing for the es-
 11 tablishment of a consortium that is resourced
 12 and empowered to bid and compete in acquiring
 13 and securing potential deposits of critical min-
 14 erals in countries that are not members of the
 15 coalition described in paragraph (1) (in this
 16 subsection referred to as “nonmember coun-
 17 tries”);

18 (H) to establish a mechanism for joint re-
 19 source mapping with procedures for equitable
 20 sharing of information on potential deposits of
 21 critical minerals not less frequently than annu-
 22 ally;

23 (I) to establish appropriate mechanisms for
 24 the recognition and enforcement by a member
 25 country of judgments relating to environmental

1 and related harms caused by mining operations
 2 within such member country in contravention of
 3 that country's laws; and

4 (J) to improve supply chain security
 5 among member countries by providing for na-
 6 tional treatment investment protections among
 7 those countries that are equal to, or better
 8 than, the standards in the United States model
 9 bilateral investment treaty.

10 (c) MINERALS SECURITY PARTNERSHIP AUTHORIZA-
 11 TION.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, act-
 13 ing through the Under Secretary of State for Eco-
 14 nomic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, is au-
 15 thorized to lead United States participation in the
 16 “Minerals Security Partnership”, for the following
 17 purposes:

18 (A) To identify and support investment
 19 and advocate for commercial critical mineral
 20 mining, processing, and refining projects that
 21 enable robust and secure critical mineral supply
 22 chains, in consultation with other Federal agen-
 23 cies, as appropriate.

24 (B) To coordinate with relevant regional
 25 bureaus to develop regional diplomatic engage-

1 ment strategies related to critical minerals
2 projects and to identify projects that are prior-
3 ities.

4 (C) To coordinate with United States mis-
5 sions abroad on projects, programs, and invest-
6 ments that enable robust and secure critical
7 mineral supply chains.

8 (D) To coordinate with current and pro-
9 spective members of the Minerals Security
10 Partnership.

11 (E) To establish a mechanism for informa-
12 tion-sharing with members of the Minerals Se-
13 curity Partnership.

14 (F) To establish policies and procedures,
15 and if necessary, to provide funding to facilitate
16 cooperation on joint projects with members of
17 the Minerals Security Partnership and the Min-
18 eral Security Forum, including those related to
19 cost-sharing agreements, political risk insur-
20 ance, financing, equity investments, and other
21 support, in coordination with other Federal
22 agencies, as appropriate.

23 (G) If an agreement described in sub-
24 section (b) is entered into, to support the estab-

1 lishment of the coalition described in that sub-
2 section.

3 (2) DATABASE.—As part of the Minerals Secu-
4 rity Partnership, the Secretary, acting through the
5 Under Secretary, is authorized to establish and
6 maintain a database of critical mineral projects for
7 the purpose of providing high quality and up-to-date
8 information to the private sector in order to spur
9 greater investment, increase the resilience of global
10 critical minerals supply chains, and boost United
11 States supply.

12 (3) QUALIFICATIONS FOR PERSONNEL.—With
13 respect to staffing personnel to carry out the Min-
14 erals Security Partnership, the Secretary shall
15 prioritize individuals with the following qualifica-
16 tions:

17 (A) Substantive knowledge and experience
18 in issues related to critical minerals supply
19 chain and their application to strategic indus-
20 tries, including in the defense, energy, and tech-
21 nology sectors.

22 (B) Substantive knowledge and experience
23 in large-scale multi-donor project financing and
24 related technical and diplomatic arrangements,

1 international coalition-building, and project
2 management.

3 (C) Substantive knowledge and experience
4 in trade and foreign policy, defense-industrial
5 base policy, or national security-sensitive supply
6 chain issues.

7 (4) PRIVATE SECTOR COORDINATION.—The
8 Secretary of State shall ensure close coordination be-
9 tween the Department of State, the private sector,
10 and relevant civil society groups on the implementa-
11 tion of this subsection.

12 (5) PROJECT SELECTION.—

13 (A) IN GENERAL.—The United States,
14 through its participation in the Minerals Secu-
15 rity Partnership, shall prioritize projects that
16 advance the national and economic security in-
17 terests of the United States and allies and part-
18 ners of the United States.

19 (B) CRITERIA REQUIREMENTS.—The
20 United States should advocate for the Minerals
21 Security Partnership to use environmental, so-
22 cial, or governance standards, including as cri-
23 teria for project selection, that are consistent
24 with United States law or international agree-
25 ments approved by Congress.

1 (d) UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTER-
2 NATIONAL NICKEL STUDY GROUP.—

3 (1) UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP.—The Presi-
4 dent is authorized to accept the Terms of Reference
5 of and maintain membership of the United States in
6 the International Nickel Study Group (INSG).

7 (2) PAYMENTS OF ASSESSED CONTRIBU-
8 TIONS.—For fiscal year 2024 and thereafter, the
9 United States assessed contributions to the INSG
10 may be paid from funds appropriated for “Contribu-
11 tions to International Organizations”.

12 (e) CRITICAL MINERAL DEFINED.—In this section,
13 the term “critical mineral”—

14 (1) has the meaning given the term in section
15 7002 of the Energy Act of 2020 (30 U.S.C. 1606);
16 and

17 (2) includes any other mineral or mineral mate-
18 rial determined by the Secretary of State—

19 (A) to be essential to the economic or na-
20 tional security of the United States; and

21 (B) to have a supply chain vulnerable to
22 disruption.

23 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
24 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State
25 \$75,000,000 for fiscal year 2025 to enhance critical min-

1 eral supply chain security, including to implement this sec-
 2 tion.

3 **Subtitle D—Digital Technology and** 4 **Connectivity**

5 **SEC. 176. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY FOR CRITICAL** 6 **AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY.**

7 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary shall establish
 8 an Office of the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging
 9 Technology (referred to in this section as the “Office”),
 10 which may be located within the Bureau for Cyberspace
 11 and Digital Policy.

12 (b) LEADERSHIP.—

13 (1) SPECIAL ENVOY.—The Office shall be head-
 14 ed by a Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging
 15 Technology, who shall—

16 (A) be appointed by the President, by and
 17 with the advice and consent of the Senate;

18 (B) have the rank and status of ambas-
 19 sador; and

20 (C) report to the Ambassador-at-Large for
 21 Cyberspace and Digital Policy.

22 (c) MEMBERSHIP.—The Office may include rep-
 23 resentatives or expert detailees from other key Federal
 24 agencies or research and technology-focused fellowship
 25 programs, as determined by the Special Envoy for Critical

1 and Emerging Technology and with the consent of the
2 Ambassador-at-Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy,
3 in coordination with relevant Department stakeholders
4 and appropriate senior officials of the Department of
5 State and such agencies.

6 (d) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Office are to
7 assist the Secretary of State in the coordination of Depart-
8 ment and interagency action in support of the functions
9 described in subsection (e).

10 (e) CRITICAL AND EMERGING FUNCTIONS.—The
11 Secretary of State shall—

12 (1) establish, in coordination with relevant bu-
13 reaus, offices and other Federal agencies, an inter-
14 agency security review process for proposals regard-
15 ing United States Government-funded international
16 collaboration on certain critical and emerging tech-
17 nologies and associated research;

18 (2) establish and coordinate an interagency
19 strategy to facilitate international cooperation with
20 United States allies and partners regarding the de-
21 velopment, use, and deployment of certain critical
22 and emerging technologies and associated standards
23 and safeguards for research security, intellectual
24 property protection, and illicit knowledge transfer;

1 (3) facilitate technology partnerships with coun-
2 tries and relevant political and economic unions that
3 are committed to—

4 (A) the rule of law and respect for human
5 rights, including freedom of speech, and expres-
6 sion;

7 (B) the safe and responsible development
8 and use of certain critical and emerging tech-
9 nologies and the establishment of related norms
10 and standards, including for research security
11 and the protection of sensitive data and tech-
12 nology;

13 (C) a secure internet architecture governed
14 by a multi-stakeholder model instead of central-
15 ized government control;

16 (D) robust international cooperation to
17 promote open and interoperable technological
18 products and services that are necessary to
19 freedom, innovation, transparency, and privacy;
20 and

21 (E) strengthening multilateral coordination
22 on certain critical and emerging technologies, as
23 defined in subsection (f), in coordination with
24 relevant Department stakeholders and bureaus,
25 including through diplomatic initiatives, infor-

1 mation sharing, and other activities, to defend
2 the principles described in subparagraphs (A)
3 through (D) against efforts by state and non-
4 state actors to undermine them;

5 (4) support efforts to harmonize critical and
6 emerging technology governance regimes with part-
7 ners, coordinating on basic and pre-competitive re-
8 search and development initiatives, and collaborating
9 to pursue such opportunities in certain critical and
10 emerging technologies;

11 (5) coordinate with other technology partners
12 on export control policies for certain critical and
13 emerging technologies, as defined in subsection (g),
14 including countering illicit knowledge and data
15 transfer related to certain critical and emerging
16 technologies research and use;

17 (6) conduct or support diplomatic engagement,
18 in coordination with other relevant Department
19 stakeholders and bureaus, offices, and relevant Fed-
20 eral departments and agencies, with allies and part-
21 ners to develop standards and coordinate policies de-
22 signed to counter illicit knowledge and data transfer
23 in academia related to certain critical and emerging
24 technology research;

1 (7) coordinate with allies, partners, and other
2 relevant Federal agencies, with the concurrence of
3 other relevant Department stakeholders and bu-
4 reaus, to prevent the exploitation of research part-
5 nerships related to certain critical and emerging
6 technologies;

7 (8) share information regarding the threat
8 posed by the transfer of certain critical and emerg-
9 ing technologies to authoritarian governments, in-
10 cluding the People’s Republic of China and the Rus-
11 sian Federation, and the ways in which autocratic
12 regimes are utilizing technology to erode individual
13 freedoms and other foundations of open, democratic
14 societies; and

15 (9) collaborate with private companies, trade
16 associations, and think tanks to realize the purposes
17 described in paragraphs (1) through (8), in coordi-
18 nation with relevant Department stakeholders and
19 bureaus.

20 (f) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date
21 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
22 the following 3 years, the Secretary, in coordination with
23 the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of
24 other relevant Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall sub-
25 mit to the appropriate congressional committees an un-

1 classified report, with a classified index, if necessary, re-
2 garding—

3 (1) the activities of the Office related to para-
4 graphs (1) through (9) of subsection (e), including
5 any cooperative initiatives and partnerships pursued
6 with United States allies and partners, and the re-
7 sults of such activities, initiatives, and partnerships;

8 (2) the activities of the Government of the Peo-
9 ple's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist
10 Party, and the Russian Federation in sectors related
11 to certain critical and emerging technologies and the
12 threats they pose to the United States; and

13 (3) an inventory of all international research
14 and development programs for certain critical and
15 emerging technologies funded by the Department or
16 USAID that include participation by institutions or
17 organizations that are affiliated with, or receive sup-
18 port from, the Government of the People's Republic
19 of China or the Government of the Russian Federa-
20 tion.

21 (g) CRITICAL AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES.—In
22 this section, the term “certain critical and emerging tech-
23 nologies” means technologies determined by the Secretary
24 from the critical and emerging technologies list published
25 by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)

1 at the Office of Science and Technology Policy, as amend-
2 ed by subsequent updates to the list issued by the NSTC.

3 **SEC. 177. REALIGNING THE REGIONAL TECHNOLOGY OFFI-**
4 **CER PROGRAM.**

5 Section 9508(a)(1) of the Department of State Au-
6 thorizations Act of 2022 (division I of Public Law 117–
7 263; 22 U.S.C. 10305(a)(1)) is amended by inserting “,
8 and shall be administered by the Bureau for Cyberspace
9 and Digital Policy” before the period at the end.

10 **SEC. 178. ANNUAL SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY MONI-**
11 **TORING REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUB-**
12 **LIC OF CHINA.**

13 (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than May 1,
14 2025, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary
15 of State, in coordination with the heads other Federal de-
16 partments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the
17 appropriate committees of Congress a report on the ad-
18 vanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of the
19 PRC.

20 (b) CONTENTS.—The report required by subsection
21 (a) shall include—

22 (1) the domestic semiconductor manufacturing
23 capabilities of the PRC;

24 (2) year-by-year technological development ef-
25 forts by the PRC in the fields of advanced semicon-

1 ductor manufacturing and artificial intelligence
2 chipmaking, including relevant government plans
3 and initiatives;

4 (3) engagement between the PRC and other
5 foreign countries with respect to advanced semicon-
6 ductor manufacturing equipment capabilities;

7 (4) an analysis of the impact of United States
8 and allied and partner export controls on covered
9 items related to the development of advanced semi-
10 conductor manufacturing in the PRC; and

11 (5) an assessment of whether such export con-
12 trols remain effective in curbing the development of
13 advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment
14 capabilities in the PRC and recommendations for en-
15 hancing effectiveness of such controls.

16 (c) FORM.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—The report required by sub-
18 section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form
19 and shall include a classified annex, providing addi-
20 tional details and supporting intelligence, as avail-
21 able.

22 (2) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified
23 portion or a synopsis of the report required under
24 subsection (a) shall be made available on a publicly

1 accessible internet website of the Federal Govern-
2 ment.

3 **SEC. 179. COMBATING AI-ENABLED DISINFORMATION.**

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that—

6 (1) the rapid development of publicly available,
7 affordable generative artificial intelligence (AI) tech-
8 nology, including the use of large language models
9 (LLM) to fuel natural language processing applica-
10 tions, has the potential to fundamentally alter the
11 nature of disinformation and propaganda campaigns
12 by enabling finely tailored, auto-generated
13 disinformation swiftly, in any language, at scale, and
14 at low-costs;

15 (2) academia and private industry, including so-
16 cial media platforms, play a critical role in estab-
17 lishing safeguards for powerful, publicly available
18 tools for producing AI-generated content, and it is
19 in the United States national security interest to en-
20 sure that these technologies are not misused by for-
21 eign malign actors to enhance influence operations
22 abroad;

23 (3) the ability to identify, track, and label origi-
24 nal text, audio, and visual content is becoming in-
25 creasingly vital to United States national interests

1 as sophisticated AI-generated content creation be-
2 comes increasingly available to the public at low
3 costs;

4 (4) coalitions such as the content authenticity
5 initiative (CAI) and the coalition for content prove-
6 nance and authority (C2PA) play important roles in
7 establishing open industry standards for content au-
8 thenticity and digital content provenance; and

9 (5) the Department, as the lead agency for
10 United States foreign affairs, including public diplo-
11 macy, should work within the interagency process to
12 develop a common approach to United States inter-
13 national engagement on issues related to AI-enabled
14 disinformation.

15 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—it shall be the policy
16 of the United States—

17 (1) to share knowledge with allies and partners
18 of instances when foreign state and non-state actors
19 have leveraged generative AI to augment
20 disinformation campaigns or propaganda;

21 (2) to work with private industry and academia,
22 as appropriate, to mitigate the risks associated with
23 public research on generative AI technologies; and

24 (3) to support efforts in developing digital con-
25 tent provenance detection techniques and tech-

1 nologies in line with United States national security
2 interests.

3 (c) ESTABLISHMENT OF COUNTERING AI-ENABLED
4 DISINFORMATION TASK FORCE.—

5 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 180 days
6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
7 retary of State shall establish within the Department
8 a Countering AI-Enabled Disinformation Task
9 Force (referred to in this section as the “Task
10 Force”) to—

11 (A) identify potential responses to the
12 growing threat of AI-enabled disinformation
13 and its use by foreign state and non-state ac-
14 tors to augment influence operations and
15 disinformation campaigns;

16 (B) work closely with private industry and
17 academia to identify and coordinate efforts in
18 developing digital content provenance detection
19 techniques and technologies;

20 (C) develop the department’s internal co-
21 ordination across regional and functional bu-
22 reaus on the issue of AI-enabled disinformation;

23 (D) develop a unified approach to inter-
24 national coordination on—

1 (i) establishing standards around dig-
2 ital content provenance techniques and
3 technologies, specifically as it relates to
4 countering AI-enabled disinformation cam-
5 paign; and

6 (ii) assessing the potential for estab-
7 lishing frameworks around the prolifera-
8 tion of tools that facilitate AI-enabled
9 disinformation; and

10 (E) identify any additional tools or re-
11 sources necessary to enhance the Department's
12 ability to—

13 (i) detect AI-enabled foreign
14 disinformation and propaganda;

15 (ii) rapidly produce original counter-
16 messaging to address AI-enabled
17 disinformation campaigns;

18 (iii) expand digital literacy program-
19 ming abroad to include education on how
20 media consumers in recipient countries can
21 identify and inoculate themselves from syn-
22 thetically produced media; and

23 (iv) coordinate and collaborate with
24 other governments, international organiza-

1 tions, civil society, the private sector, and
2 others, as necessary.

3 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—The Task Force shall be
4 comprised of a representative from relevant offices,
5 as determined by the Secretary, which may in-
6 clude—

7 (A) the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital
8 Policy;

9 (B) the Under Secretary for Public Diplo-
10 macy and Public Affairs;

11 (C) the Global Engagement Center;

12 (D) the Center for Analytics of the Office
13 of Management Strategy and Solutions;

14 (E) appropriate offices and Bureaus at the
15 United States Agency for International Devel-
16 opment; and

17 (F) any other officials or offices the Sec-
18 retary determines appropriate.

19 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

20 (1) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.—The term “ar-
21 tificial intelligence” has the meaning given that term
22 in section 238(g) of the John S. McCain National
23 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019
24 (Public Law 115–232; 10 U.S.C. 4001 note).

1 (2) DIGITAL CONTENT PROVENANCE.—The
2 term “digital content provenance” means the
3 verifiable chronology of the origin and history of a
4 piece of digital content, such as an image, video,
5 audio recording, or electronic document.

6 **SEC. 179A. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION ON RE-**
7 **SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.**

8 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
9 ings:

10 (1) Innovation in artificial intelligence and
11 other emerging technology domains has become in-
12 creasingly global. According to the Organisation for
13 Economic Co-operation and Development, worldwide
14 spending on research and development more than
15 tripled between 2000 and 2020. The United States
16 accounted for almost 70 percent of such spending in
17 1960, but less than $\frac{1}{3}$ in 2018.

18 (2) Many allies and partners of the United
19 States are technological powers in their own right,
20 with robust research and development activities and
21 world-leading capabilities in fields such as artificial
22 intelligence, semiconductors, robotics, and bio-
23 technology.

24 (3) Adversaries of the United States, including
25 the PRC, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic

1 Republic of Iran, also emphasize technology and in-
 2 novation in their geopolitical strategies. In par-
 3 ticular, the Chinese Communist Party believes inno-
 4 vation is essential to its continued rule and is invest-
 5 ing heavily in research and development as part of
 6 a strategy to “leapfrog” the United States into glob-
 7 al leadership.

8 (4) The United States and its allies and part-
 9 ners collectively control a much larger share of re-
 10 search and development activity than the PRC. To-
 11 gether, the United States and six like-minded coun-
 12 tries, namely, Japan, Germany, the Republic of
 13 Korea, India, France, and the United Kingdom, ac-
 14 count for more than $\frac{1}{2}$ of global spending on re-
 15 search and development, while the PRC accounts for
 16 approximately $\frac{1}{4}$.

17 (5) The National Science Board’s “Vision
 18 2030” report, issued in May 2020, states, “Staying
 19 at the frontiers of discovery requires leaning into
 20 internationalism, particularly given the nation’s fall-
 21 ing share of global knowledge production, paired
 22 with the rising importance and impact of inter-
 23 national collaboration and knowledge- and tech-
 24 nology-intensive industries.”.

1 (6) Previously, in 2008, the National Science
2 Board reported, “The U.S. Government could play a
3 more effective role in supporting international S&E
4 (science and engineering) partnerships by developing
5 a coherent international S&E strategy to coordinate
6 the activities and objectives of the various Federal
7 agencies that play a role in such partnerships. . . .
8 No single U.S. agency is responsible for coordinating
9 or supporting international S&E partnerships, and
10 few U.S. agencies that do S&E work have explicit
11 missions in international relations.”.

12 (7) Numerous Federal departments and offices
13 administer joint research and development activities
14 with international partners, including the Office of
15 International Science and Engineering within the
16 National Science Foundation, the Division of Inter-
17 national Relations within the National Institutes of
18 Health, and the Office of International Science &
19 Technology Cooperation within the Department of
20 Energy.

21 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
22 gress that—

23 (1) international collaboration on research and
24 development is critical to maintaining United States

1 leadership in artificial intelligence and other critical
2 technologies;

3 (2) Federal initiatives related to international
4 collaboration on research and development should—

5 (A) be consistently and adequately funded;

6 (B) be coordinated across agencies to in-
7 crease impact, minimize undue duplication, and
8 ensure alignment with policies and strategic ob-
9 jectives of the United States; and

10 (C) incorporate national security safe-
11 guards, including vetting processes, to protect
12 against exploitation by strategic competitors of
13 the United States;

14 (3) implement data privacy regimes, including
15 with respect to data sharing agreements between the
16 United States and its partners;

17 (4) the United States should work expeditiously
18 with its allies and partners to resolve issues related
19 to data privacy; and

20 (5) the United States, and Federal departments
21 and agencies must adopt rigorous safeguards and
22 countermeasures to protect research institutions, key
23 science and technological research data, and national
24 security-sensitive knowledge from efforts by United
25 States adversaries to gain access to such informa-

1 tion, including by exploiting international research
2 collaboration.

3 **SEC. 179B. OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN**
4 **UNION TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than December 1, 2024,
6 and annually thereafter for a period of 3 years, the Sec-
7 retary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the
8 United States Trade Representative shall jointly submit
9 to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the
10 United States-European Union Trade and Technology
11 Council (TTC), including a description of—

12 (1) the goals of the Council, its achievements to
13 date, and opportunities for cooperation in key areas;

14 (2) a status update on deliverables of the TTC,
15 particularly those itemized in public statements and
16 fact sheets published by the United States Govern-
17 ment;

18 (3) the expected impact of the progress made
19 on each deliverable on growing two-way trade,
20 achieving mutual recognition of relevant regulatory
21 standards, and increasing the ease of doing business,
22 including quantitative assessments;

23 (4) the expected impact of deliverables on na-
24 tional security, including technology security;

1 (5) a description of any trade or technology
2 topics that the United States has sought to incor-
3 porate into the TTC;

4 (6) a description of engagements during the re-
5 porting period with the private sector on issues ad-
6 dressed in the TTC, and the results of those engage-
7 ments; and

8 (7) other relevant updates with respect to the
9 work of the TTC's working groups.

10 (b) FIRST REPORT.—The first report submitted pur-
11 suant to subsection (a) shall cover progress from the first
12 TTC ministerial on September 29, 2021, through June
13 1, 2024.

14 (c) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.—All subsequent reports
15 submitted shall cover the previous year.

16 (d) FORM OF REPORT.—The reports required under
17 this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
18 may include a classified annex.

19 **SEC. 179C. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY IN THE PACIFIC IS-**
20 **LANDS.**

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the
22 Administrator for the United States Agency for Inter-
23 national Development, in coordination with other relevant
24 Federal departments and agencies, shall develop and im-

1 plement a digital connectivity initiative specific to Pacific
2 Island countries.

3 (b) ELEMENTS AND CONDUCT OF PACIFIC ISLANDS
4 DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY INITIATIVE.—The initiative de-
5 veloped pursuant to subsection (a) shall—

6 (1) include an assessment of opportunities to
7 coordinate with regional allies, including through the
8 United States-Japan Global Digital Connectivity
9 Partnership and the United States-Japan-Australia
10 Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership;

11 (2) identify and address country-driven digital
12 transformation priorities;

13 (3) conduct an assessment of the digital eco-
14 system of Pacific Island countries, such as through
15 the United States Agency for International Develop-
16 ment’s (USAID) Digital Ecosystem Country Assess-
17 ments, to identify opportunities and risks;

18 (4) seek to develop human and institutional ca-
19 pacity and infrastructure to catalyze private sector
20 investments in Pacific Island countries’ digital eco-
21 system;

22 (5) assist in the development of digital policy
23 and regulatory schemes in Pacific Island countries,
24 including information and communications tech-

1 nology (ICT) regulations and procurement best prac-
2 tices and relevant reforms;

3 (6) advance digital platforms and solutions for
4 the delivery of public services and enhance digital
5 skills and literacy;

6 (7) seek to expand access to open, interoper-
7 able, reliable, and secure internet for Pacific Island
8 communities;

9 (8) identify roles that digital technologies can
10 play in addressing important challenges for Pacific
11 Island countries, including the environment, sustain-
12 able fishing, readiness, including in response to tsu-
13 nami warnings;

14 (9) identify ways to support women-owned en-
15 terprises in the digital ecosystem of Pacific Island
16 countries;

17 (10) seek to expand the availability of and ac-
18 cess to secure and reliable subsea cable systems;

19 (11) regularly assess opportunities for which
20 United States businesses, or those of other like-
21 minded partners, would be competitive;

22 (12) promote exports of United States ICT
23 goods and services to advance a secure ICT supply
24 chain and increase United States company market
25 share in Pacific Island digital markets;

1 (13) support the development and expand avail-
2 ability of telehealth services for Pacific Island coun-
3 try communities; and

4 (14) build digital connectivity among edu-
5 cational institutions within the region as well as with
6 educational institutions in the United States.

7 (c) PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES DEFINED.—In this
8 section, the term “Pacific Island countries” means the
9 Cook Islands, the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of
10 Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Fed-
11 erated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru, Niue,
12 the Republic of Palau, the Independent State of Papua
13 New Guinea, the Independent State of Samoa, the Sol-
14 omon Islands, the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Re-
15 public of Vanuatu.

16 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
17 authorized to be appropriated \$3,500,000 for each of fis-
18 cal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section.

19 **SEC. 179D. CYBER AND DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION**
20 **WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.**

21 (a) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER
22 PRC CYBER AND DIGITAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN DE-
23 VELOPING COUNTRIES.—The Secretary of State shall es-
24 tablish an interagency Working Group, which shall include
25 the National Cyber Director and representatives from the

1 Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Of-
2 fice of the Director of National Intelligence, the United
3 States Agency for International Development, and such
4 other agencies of the United States Government as the
5 Secretary considers appropriate, on means to counter PRC
6 cyber and digital security activities in developing coun-
7 tries, which could coordinate, as appropriate, with other
8 related interagency mechanisms.

9 (b) DUTIES.—The Working Group established pursu-
10 ant to this section shall develop and submit to the appro-
11 priate committees of Congress a set of recommendations
12 for—

13 (1) bolstering the capacity of governments in
14 governments in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the
15 Caribbean to ensure the integrity of their data net-
16 works and critical infrastructure, where applicable;

17 (2) providing alternatives to Huawei and other
18 untrusted vendors of cyber and digital security tech-
19 nology; and

20 (3) an action plan for United States embassies
21 to assist host-country governments with respect to
22 protecting their vital digital networks and infrastruc-
23 ture from the PRC.

**Subtitle E—Countering PRC
Malign Influence**

**SEC. 181. SENSE OF CONGRESS DISTINGUISHING THE PRC
GOVERNMENT FROM THE CHINESE PEOPLE.**

(a) FINDINGS.—Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese people have attempted to highlight the abuses of the Communist Party of China, including in 1989 with the Tiananmen Square protests and resulting massacre, and most recently through mass demonstrations in November 2022, known as the “White Paper Movement” to protest censorship and the harsh zero-COVID policy, but the efforts of the Chinese people have consistently been met with brutal suppression by CCP authorities and further efforts to monitor, control, and politically indoctrinate Chinese citizens.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the challenges and threats posed by the PRC stem primarily from the actions and behavior of the CCP and the PRC government, not the people of China or people of Chinese descent;

(2) the United States Government should seek to support the aspirations of the Chinese people, and other peoples suffering in oppressive, authoritarian regimes, by promoting human rights and supporting

1 their ability to express their own opinions and views
2 about their government;

3 (3) the United States is a diverse nation, and
4 the strength and vibrancy of the United States is en-
5 hanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and toler-
6 ance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and
7 people of Chinese descent; and

8 (4) the United States Government and govern-
9 ments around the world must actively oppose racism
10 and intolerance in all forms, and use all available
11 and appropriate tools to combat the spread of anti-
12 Asian racism and discrimination.

13 **SEC. 182. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR**
14 **COUNTERING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF**
15 **CHINA INFLUENCE FUND.**

16 (a) COUNTERING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
17 CHINA INFLUENCE FUND.—There is authorized to be ap-
18 propriated \$600,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025
19 through 2029 for the Countering the People’s Republic of
20 China Influence Fund to counter PRC malign influence.
21 Amounts appropriated pursuant to this authorization are
22 authorized to remain available until expended and shall
23 be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be ap-
24 propriated to counter such influence.

1 (b) POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND AP-
2 PROVAL.—

3 (1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State
4 shall designate an existing senior official as the Co-
5 ordinator for the Countering the People’s Republic
6 of China Influence Fund (in this section referred to
7 as “Coordinator”) to provide policy guidance, coordi-
8 nation within the Department and the interagency
9 as appropriate, and recommendations for the obliga-
10 tion of funds authorized pursuant to subsection (a).

11 (2) DUTIES.—The Coordinator designated pur-
12 suant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for—

13 (A) on an annual basis, the identification
14 of specific strategic priorities for using the
15 funds authorized to be appropriated under sub-
16 section (a), such as geographic areas of focus or
17 functional categories of programming that
18 funds are to be concentrated within, consistent
19 with the national interests of the United States
20 and the purposes of this section;

21 (B) the coordination and approval of all
22 programming conducted using the funds au-
23 thorized to be appropriated under subsection
24 (a), based on an assessment that such program-
25 ming directly counters PRC malign influence,

1 including specific activities or policies advanced
2 by such influence, pursuant to the strategic ob-
3 jectives of the United States;

4 (C) ensuring that all programming ap-
5 proved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to coun-
6 tering PRC malign influence and adheres to the
7 requirements outlined in subsection (d);

8 (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and
9 evaluation of the effectiveness of all program-
10 ming conducted using the funds authorized to
11 be appropriated under subsection (a) to ensure
12 that it advances United States interests and de-
13 grades the ability of the Government of the
14 PRC, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or
15 entities acting on their behalf, to advance the
16 activities described in subsection (c); and

17 (E) ensuring, to the maximum extent prac-
18 ticable, that all approved programming under
19 subsection (a) is carried out in coordination
20 with other Federal activities to counter the ma-
21 lign influence and activities of the Government
22 of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their
23 behalf.

24 (3) ASSISTANT COORDINATOR.—The Adminis-
25 trator of the United States Agency for International

1 Development shall designate an official with direct
2 responsibility for policy with respect to the PRC to
3 assist the Coordinator designated pursuant to para-
4 graph (1), particularly with respect to such assist-
5 ance handled by the United States Agency for Inter-
6 national Development.

7 (c) PRC MALIGN INFLUENCE DEFINED.—In this
8 section, the term “PRC malign influence” means influence
9 of the Government of the PRC and the Chinese Com-
10 munist Party (CCP) or entities acting on their behalf glob-
11 ally that—

12 (1) undermines a free and open international
13 order;

14 (2) advances an alternative, repressive inter-
15 national order that bolsters the PRC or the Chinese
16 Communist Party’s hegemonic ambitions and is
17 characterized by coercion and dependency;

18 (3) undermines the national security, territorial
19 integrity, or sovereignty of the United States or
20 other countries; or

21 (4) undermines the political and economic secu-
22 rity of the United States or other countries, includ-
23 ing by promoting corruption or elite capture, and
24 advancing coercive economic practices.

1 (d) ACTIVITIES TO COUNTER PRC MALIGN INFLU-
2 ENCE.—In this section, countering malign influence
3 through the use of funds authorized to be appropriated
4 by subsection (a) include efforts—

5 (1) to promote transparency and accountability,
6 and reduce corruption, including in governance
7 structures targeted by the malign influence of the
8 Government of the PRC or the CCP;

9 (2) to support civil society and independent
10 media to raise awareness of and increase trans-
11 parency regarding the negative impact of activities
12 and initiatives of the Government of the PRC and
13 the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, including
14 the Belt and Road Initiative and other initiatives
15 that lack transparency, fail to meet international
16 standards, and are associated with coercive economic
17 practices;

18 (3) to counter transnational criminal networks
19 that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of
20 the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities
21 acting on their behalf;

22 (4) to encourage economic development struc-
23 tures that help protect against predatory lending
24 schemes, including support for market-based alter-

1 natives in key economic sectors, such as digital econ-
2 omy, energy, and infrastructure;

3 (5) to counter activities that provide undue in-
4 fluence to the security forces of the PRC;

5 (6) to expose foreign influence operations and
6 propaganda of the Government of the PRC, the
7 CCP, or entities acting on their behalf;

8 (7) to counter efforts by the Government of the
9 PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf to
10 legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and
11 governance models, including its model of a state-
12 dominated cyber and digital ecosystem;

13 (8) to counter efforts by the Government of the
14 PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, to
15 silence, intimidate, or exact reprisal against individ-
16 uals outside of their sovereign borders, including
17 members of diaspora populations such as political
18 opponents, repressed religious or spiritual practi-
19 tioners, marginalized ethnic community members,
20 civil society activists, human rights defenders, re-
21 searchers, and journalists;

22 (9) to provide alternatives to problematic PRC
23 technology offerings, which could provide the Gov-
24 ernment of the PRC undue access to or influence
25 over global data flows or sensitive information, and

1 compete with problematic PRC efforts to leverage or
2 make gains in the development of advanced and
3 emerging technologies;

4 (10) to counter PRC activities that directly en-
5 able critical supply chain monopolization or other
6 monopolistic practices;

7 (11) to counter aggressive PRC efforts to make
8 inroads into the nuclear energy sectors of countries
9 to the detriment of United States national security,
10 strategic, and nonproliferation interests; and

11 (12) to counter efforts by the Government of
12 the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf,
13 to undermine the democratic processes and institu-
14 tions of United States allies and partners.

15 **SEC. 183. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.**

16 (a) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National
17 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22
18 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking “the date that
19 is 8 years after the date of the enactment” and inserting
20 “the date that is 13 years after the date of the enact-
21 ment”.

22 (b) AMENDMENTS.—Section 1287 of the National
23 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22
24 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended—

1 (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking “foreign
2 state and foreign non-state propaganda and
3 disinformation efforts,” and inserting “foreign state
4 and non-state influence operations”;

5 (2) in subsection (b)—

6 (A) in paragraph (3)—

7 (i) by striking “propaganda and
8 disinformation,” and inserting “foreign in-
9 fluence operations”; and

10 (ii) inserting “, including by working
11 directly with United States embassies and
12 consulates” before the period at the end;

13 (B) in paragraph (4), by striking “refute
14 foreign propaganda and disinformation,” and
15 inserting “counter foreign influence oper-
16 ations”; and

17 (C) in paragraph (8)—

18 (i) by striking “propaganda and
19 disinformation,” and inserting “foreign in-
20 fluence operations,”; and

21 (ii) by striking “propaganda and
22 disinformation is” and inserting “foreign
23 influence operations are”.

24 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
25 gress that the Secretary of State should empower the

1 Global Engagement Center to expand its coordinating ca-
2 pacity, including through the exchange of liaison officers
3 with Federal departments and agencies that manage as-
4 pects of identifying and countering foreign influence oper-
5 ations.

6 (d) COMPLEMENTING UNITED STATES EMBASSY OP-
7 ERATIONS.—In carrying out its mandate as outlined in
8 section 1287 of the National Defense Authorization Act
9 for Fiscal Year 2017, the Global Engagement Center
10 should ensure its efforts complement United States Em-
11 bassy operations where applicable, including—

12 (1) working with key posts to equip and sup-
13 port officers tasked with countering foreign influence
14 operations;

15 (2) supporting posts in developing country-spe-
16 cific programs to counter foreign influence oper-
17 ations; and

18 (3) working with regional bureaus to ensure ef-
19 fective coordination and mutual visibility and input
20 into regional strategies and activities related to for-
21 eign influence operations.

22 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
23 authorized to be appropriated \$150,000,000 for fiscal year
24 2025 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign
25 state and non-state influence operations.

1 **SEC. 184. AMENDMENT TO THE MUTUAL EDUCATIONAL**
2 **AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE ACT OF 1961.**

3 Section 108A(a)(1) of the Mutual Educational and
4 Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2458a) is
5 amended—

6 (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking “; and”
7 and inserting a semicolon;

8 (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the semi-
9 colon and inserting “and,”; and

10 (3) by adding at the end the following new sub-
11 paragraph:

12 “(D) which is not an exchange with the
13 People’s Republic of China, unless the Sec-
14 retary of State has determined and certified to
15 the appropriate committees of Congress that
16 participation by Federal employees in the ex-
17 change is in the national security interest of the
18 United States.”.

19 **SEC. 185. COUNTERING MALIGN INFORMATION OPER-**
20 **ATIONS IN THE AMERICAS.**

21 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
22 gress that—

23 (1) foreign influence operations pose serious
24 threats to national sovereignty, democratic govern-
25 ance and human rights;

1 (2) foreign influence operations in Latin Amer-
2 ica and the Caribbean—

3 (A) have been carried out by the Maduro
4 regime and other foreign state actors, including
5 the PRC, the Republic of Cuba, the Russian
6 Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran;
7 and

8 (B) have undermined United States na-
9 tional interests, including by—

10 (i) undermining democratic electoral
11 processes;

12 (ii) exacerbating political polarization;
13 and

14 (iii) spreading false narratives con-
15 trary to the interests of the United States
16 and its allies; and

17 (3) the United States Government should en-
18 sure sufficient attention and resources are allocated
19 to efforts to protect independent media spaces,
20 strengthen transparency of links between local media
21 ecosystems and foreign actors, and counter Spanish-
22 language and other non-English language foreign in-
23 fluence operations in Latin America and the Carib-
24 bean, including through Global Engagement Center
25 research, grants, and programs.

1 (b) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State shall develop
2 and implement a strategy for protecting independent
3 media spaces and countering the creation and amplifi-
4 cation of foreign state and nonstate influence operations
5 in Latin America and the Caribbean and to identify initia-
6 tives in Latin America and the Caribbean to counter ef-
7 forts by the Governments of the PRC and the Russian
8 Federation to undermine sovereignty, territorial integrity,
9 and democratic processes and institutions in the region.

10 (c) MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY.—The Secretary of
11 State should convene summits, forums, and multi-stake-
12 holder initiatives to address global threats to independent
13 media ecosystems and develop solutions to the challenges
14 posed by foreign influence operations, which could in-
15 clude—

16 (1) a “Latin America and Caribbean Tech
17 Challenge” that is—

18 (A) sponsored by the Global Engagement
19 Center; and

20 (B) aimed at advancing the development of
21 innovative solutions to counter disinformation
22 and propaganda across Latin America and the
23 Caribbean; and

1 (2) a high-level, multi-stakeholder summit con-
 2 vened by the Secretary of State in Latin America
 3 and the Caribbean that seeks to—

4 (A) strengthen information sharing and
 5 other cooperation among regional governments,
 6 independent media, academia, tech companies,
 7 and civil society organizations in Latin America
 8 and the Caribbean for purposes of developing
 9 joint solutions to counter disinformation;

10 (B) counter efforts by the PRC and Russia
 11 to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integ-
 12 rity, and democratic processes and institutions
 13 of United States allies and partners; and

14 (C) promote efforts to protect the sustain-
 15 ability of independent media and freedom of the
 16 press.

17 **SEC. 186. GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE.**

18 Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
 19 (22 U.S.C. 2348a) is amended by adding at the end the
 20 following new subsection:

21 “(e) RESTRICTION RELATED TO PEOPLE’S REPUB-
 22 LIC OF CHINA.—None of the funds authorized to be ap-
 23 propriated or otherwise made available to carry out this
 24 chapter, including for the Global Peace Operations Initia-
 25 tive of the United States Department of State, may be

1 used to train or support foreign military forces in peace-
2 keeping training exercises by the Government of the Peo-
3 ple’s Republic of China or the People’s Liberation Army
4 unless, by not later than October 1 of each year, the Sec-
5 retary of State certifies to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
6 tions of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
7 of the House of Representatives that such training or sup-
8 port is important to the national security interests of the
9 United States.”.

10 **SEC. 187. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS UNDER THE**
11 **FENTANYL SANCTIONS ACT.**

12 Section 7212 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21
13 U.S.C. 2312) is amended—

14 (1) in paragraph (1), by striking “; or” and in-
15 serting a semicolon;

16 (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at
17 the end and inserting a semicolon; and

18 (3) by adding at the end the following new
19 paragraphs:

20 “(3) the President determines has knowingly
21 engaged in, on or after the date of enactment of this
22 paragraph, a significant activity or financial trans-
23 action that has materially contributed to, foreign
24 opioid trafficking; or

25 “(4) the President determines—

1 “(A) has received any property or interest
2 in property that the foreign person knows—

3 “(i) constitutes or is derived from the
4 proceeds of an activity or transaction de-
5 scribed in paragraph (3); or

6 “(ii) was used or intended to be used
7 to commit or to facilitate such an activity
8 or transaction;

9 “(B) has knowingly provided significant fi-
10 nancial, material, or technological support for,
11 including through the provision of goods or
12 services in support of—

13 “(i) any activity or transaction de-
14 scribed in paragraph (3); or

15 “(ii) any foreign person described in
16 paragraph (3);

17 “(C) is or has been owned, controlled, or
18 directed by, or has knowingly acted or pur-
19 ported to act for or on behalf of, directly or in-
20 directly, any foreign person described in para-
21 graph (3) or subparagraph (A) or (B).”.

22 **SEC. 188. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
23 **AGENCIES OR INSTRUMENTALITIES OF FOR-**
24 **EIGN STATES.**

25 The President shall—

1 (1) impose one or more of the sanctions de-
2 scribed in section 7213 of the Fentanyl Sanctions
3 Act (21 U.S.C. 2313) with respect to each agency or
4 instrumentality of a foreign state (as defined in sec-
5 tion 1603(b) of title 28, United States Code) that
6 the President determines—

7 (A) has engaged in, on or after the date of
8 enactment of this section, a significant activity
9 or transaction that has materially contributed
10 to opioid trafficking; or

11 (B) has provided, or attempted to provide,
12 financial, material, or technological support for,
13 including through the provision of goods or
14 services in support of, any activity or trans-
15 action described in subparagraph (A); or

16 (2) impose the sanction described in subsection
17 (a)(6) of such section 7213 on each foreign person
18 that the President determines—

19 (A) is a senior official of an agency or in-
20 strumentality of a foreign state described in
21 paragraph (1); or

22 (B) that the President determines is or has
23 been owned, controlled, or directed by, or has
24 knowingly acted or purported to act for or on
25 behalf of, directly or indirectly, an agency or in-

1 strumentality of a foreign state described in
2 paragraph (1).

3 **SEC. 189. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
4 **MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES OF**
5 **THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN CUBA.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the
7 sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any
8 foreign person that the President determines has engaged
9 in, after the date of enactment of this Act, a significant
10 transaction or transactions, or any significant dealings
11 with, or, after the date of enactment of this Act, has pro-
12 vided significant material support to or for a military or
13 intelligence facility of the PRC in Cuba.

14 (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de-
15 scribed in this subsection with respect to a foreign person
16 are the following:

17 (1) ASSET BLOCKING.—The exercise of all pow-
18 ers granted to the President by the International
19 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
20 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit
21 all transactions in all property and interests in prop-
22 erty of the foreign person if such property and inter-
23 ests in property are in the United States, come with-
24 in the United States, or are or come within the pos-
25 session or control of a United States person.

1 (2) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES
2 AND REVOCATION OF VISA OR OTHER DOCUMENTA-
3 TION.—In the case of a foreign person who is an
4 alien, denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the
5 United States of, the alien, and revocation in accord-
6 ance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Na-
7 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of any visa or other
8 documentation of the alien.

9 (c) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

10 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President shall ex-
11 ercise authorities provided under sections 203 and
12 205 of the International Emergency Economic Pow-
13 ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this
14 section.

15 (2) PENALTIES.—A person that knowingly vio-
16 lates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or
17 causes a violation of subsection (b)(1) or any regula-
18 tion, license, or order issued to carry out that sub-
19 section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
20 subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter-
21 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
22 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that
23 commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a)
24 of that section.

25 (d) EXCEPTIONS.—

1 (1) IMPORTATION OF GOODS.—

2 (A) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and re-
3 quirements to impose sanctions authorized
4 under this section shall not include the author-
5 ity or a requirement to impose sanctions on the
6 importation of goods.

7 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,
8 the term “good” means any article, natural or
9 manmade substance, material, supply, or manu-
10 factured product, including inspection and test
11 equipment, and excluding technical data.

12 (2) COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS HEAD-
13 QUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Sanctions under sub-
14 section (b)(2) shall not apply to an alien if admitting
15 the alien into the United States is necessary to per-
16 mit the United States to comply with the Agreement
17 regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
18 signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered
19 into force November 21, 1947, between the United
20 Nations and the United States, or other applicable
21 international obligations.

22 (e) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.—The President
23 may waive the imposition of sanctions under this section
24 with respect to a foreign person on a case-by-case basis
25 if the President submits to the appropriate committees of

1 Congress a determination that the waiver is in the na-
 2 tional interests of the United States.

3 (f) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—Notwithstanding
 4 any other provision of law, this section shall terminate on
 5 the date that is 30 days after the date on which the Presi-
 6 dent determines and certifies to the appropriate commit-
 7 tees of Congress (and Congress has not enacted legislation
 8 disapproving the determination within that 30-day period)
 9 that all military or intelligence facilities of the PRC in
 10 Cuba have been closed.

11 (g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

12 (1) ALIEN.—The term “alien” has the meaning
 13 given that term in section 101 of the Immigration
 14 and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

15 (2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-
 16 son” means a person that is not a United States
 17 person.

18 (3) PERSON.—The term “person” means an in-
 19 dividual or entity.

20 (4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
 21 “United States person” means—

22 (A) an individual who is a United States
 23 citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
 24 nent residence to the United States;

1 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
 2 the United States or any jurisdiction within the
 3 United States, including a foreign branch of
 4 such an entity; or

5 (C) any person in the United States.

6 **SEC. 190. STRATEGIC STABILITY DIALOGUE AND ARMS**
 7 **CONTROL.**

8 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
 9 ings:

10 (1) The United States and the PRC have both
 11 made commitments to advancing strategic security
 12 through enforceable arms control and non-prolifera-
 13 tion agreements as states parties to the Treaty on
 14 the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at
 15 Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.

16 (2) The United States has long taken tangible
 17 steps to seek effective, verifiable, and enforceable
 18 arms control and non-proliferation agreements that
 19 support United States and allied security by—

20 (A) controlling the spread of nuclear mate-
 21 rials and technology;

22 (B) placing limits on the production, stock-
 23 piling, and deployment of nuclear weapons;

24 (C) decreasing the risk of misperception
 25 and miscalculation; and

1 (D) avoiding the destabilizing effects of
2 nuclear arms competition.

3 (3) The PRC's current nuclear expansion, part
4 of a massive modernization of the PLA that is ex-
5 pected to be completed by 2035, combined with the
6 PLA's aggressive actions, has increasingly desta-
7 bilized the Indo-Pacific region.

8 (4) The long-planned United States nuclear
9 modernization program will not increase the United
10 States nuclear weapons stockpile, predates China's
11 conventional military and nuclear expansion, and is
12 not an arms race against China.

13 (5) The United States extended nuclear deter-
14 rence—

15 (A) provides critical strategic security
16 around the world;

17 (B) is an essential element of United
18 States military alliances; and

19 (C) serves a vital non-proliferation func-
20 tion.

21 (6) The United States has, on numerous occa-
22 sions, called on the PRC to participate in strategic
23 arms control negotiations, and has sought to engage
24 the PRC in a strategic stability dialogue, but the
25 PRC has so far declined. Such negotiations and dia-

1 logue would benefit the entire world by developing
2 guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer
3 into conflict.

4 (7) Provocations such as the “balloon incident”
5 in 2023 and the inability of United States officials
6 to reach PRC counterparts via deconfliction lines
7 underscore the need for further engagement on risk
8 reduction, including through near-term dialogue and
9 eventual arms control negotiations.

10 (8) The Governments of Japan, the United
11 Kingdom, Poland, Slovenia, Denmark, Norway, Lat-
12 via, Lithuania, Estonia, the Netherlands, Romania,
13 Austria, Montenegro, Ukraine, Slovakia, Spain,
14 North Macedonia, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Cro-
15 atia, and Albania, as well as the Deputy Secretary
16 General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
17 have all encouraged the PRC to join arms control
18 discussions.

19 (b) REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES-
20 PRC INTERACTIONS ON NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC
21 ISSUES.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
24 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
25 Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit

1 to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
2 that outlines the strategy and objectives in engaging
3 the Government of the PRC on nuclear and strategic
4 issues, which shall include—

5 (A) areas of potential dialogue between the
6 Governments of the United States and the
7 PRC, including the interplay of ballistic,
8 hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles, conven-
9 tional forces, nuclear, space, artificial intel-
10 ligence and cyberspace issues, as well as other
11 new strategic domains, which could reduce the
12 likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict
13 were to occur, and constrain a destabilizing
14 arms race in the Indo-Pacific region;

15 (B) the types of strategic military capabili-
16 ties of the PRC that the United States Govern-
17 ment is most interested in limiting;

18 (C) an assessment of whether additional
19 crisis consultation mechanisms should be devel-
20 oped to avoid, manage, or control inadvertent
21 nuclear, conventional, and unconventional mili-
22 tary escalation between the United States and
23 the PRC;

1 (D) the personnel and expertise required to
 2 effectively engage the PRC in strategic stability
 3 and arms control dialogues; and

4 (E) opportunities and methods to encour-
 5 age transparency and predictability from the
 6 PRC with regard to the growth and purpose of
 7 its nuclear and related strategic forces.

8 (2) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required
 9 under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassi-
 10 fied form, but may include a classified annex.

11 **SEC. 191. TRACK 1.5 DIALOGUES WITH THE PEOPLE'S RE-**
 12 **PUBLIC OF CHINA ON NUCLEAR MATTERS.**

13 Not later than 15 days before any United States Gov-
 14 ernment official participates in a Track 1.5 dialogue on
 15 nuclear policy with any institution under the direct control
 16 of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in-
 17 cluding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of
 18 Defense, or the People's Liberation Army of the PRC, the
 19 Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on For-
 20 eign Relations in the Senate and the Committee on For-
 21 eign Affairs in the House of Representatives a notification
 22 of such United States official participation and a justifica-
 23 tion for such participation, including how—

24 (1) the Track 1.5 dialogue supports official
 25 talks between the United States and the Peoples Re-

public of China on arms control, crisis stability, or other dialogues related to nuclear policy; and

(2) United States Government official participation in the Track 1.5 dialogue directly supports the national security interests of the United States.

SEC. 192. OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.—The term “Biological Weapons Convention” means the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington, London, and Moscow, April 10, 1972.

(2) LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN.—The term “life sciences dual use research of concern” means life sciences research that—

(A) involves the Peoples Republic of China;

and

(B) based on current understanding can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be misapplied to do harm with no, or only minor, modification to pose a significant threat

1 with potential consequences to public health
2 and safety, agricultural crops and other plants,
3 animals, the environment, materiel, or national
4 security.

5 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
6 United States to—

7 (1) conduct rigorous scrutiny of, and regularly
8 review, collaboration on international biological, bac-
9 teriological, virological, and other relevant research
10 that could be weaponized or could reasonably be con-
11 sidered life sciences dual-use research of concern,
12 and incorporate national security and nonprolifera-
13 tion considerations and country-specific conditions
14 into decisions regarding such collaboration;

15 (2) ensure that, in the search for solutions to
16 pressing global health challenges, United States Gov-
17 ernment support for public health research and
18 other actions does not advance the capabilities of the
19 PRC in the area of life sciences dual use research
20 of concern or inadvertently contribute to the pro-
21 liferation of biological weapons technologies; and

22 (3) declassify, to the maximum extent possible,
23 all intelligence relevant to the PRC's compliance or
24 lack of compliance with its obligations under the Bi-
25 ological Weapons Convention (BWC), and other na-

1 tional security concerns regarding PRC biological,
2 bacteriological, virological, and other relevant re-
3 search that could be weaponized or could reasonably
4 be considered life sciences dual use research of con-
5 cern that may be outside the scope of the BWC.

6 (c) OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RE-
7 SEARCH OF CONCERN.—

8 (1) SECRETARY OF STATE.—The Secretary of
9 State shall—

10 (A) ensure robust and consistent Depart-
11 ment of State participation in interagency proc-
12 esses and review mechanisms related to over-
13 sight of life sciences dual-use research of con-
14 cern;

15 (B) participate in interagency working
16 groups and task forces related to vetting United
17 States Government funding related to inter-
18 national cooperation in nonproliferation, life
19 sciences, high containment laboratories, and in-
20 fectionous diseases, to develop policies and proc-
21 esses for post-award oversight of grants and
22 funding for life sciences dual use research of
23 concern, including as aligned with current laws
24 and regulations and for grants or funding from
25 other Federal departments and agencies, in

1 order to keep apprised of any national security
2 or foreign policy concerns that may arise with
3 respect to an international project or a project
4 involving a foreign partner, funded by another
5 Federal department or agency;

6 (C) conduct periodic reviews of the ade-
7 quacy of consultative mechanisms with other
8 Federal Departments and agencies with respect
9 to oversight of life sciences dual use research of
10 concern, especially consultative mechanisms
11 mandated in United States law, and identify
12 recommendations for improving such consult-
13 ative mechanisms;

14 (D) direct Chiefs of Mission to ensure
15 Country Team Assessments are submitted to
16 the Department of State and the head of the
17 Federal department or agency proposing to
18 sponsor a program or collaboration to assess
19 whether such program or collaboration involves
20 life sciences dual use research of concern, and
21 ensure that such Assessments are integrated
22 into relevant interagency processes; and

23 (E) direct Chiefs of Mission to increase
24 embassy reporting on life sciences dual use re-
25 search of concern, biosecurity hazards trends in

1 the development of synthetic biology and bio-
2 technology, and other related matters.

3 (2) ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES
4 AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.—The
5 Administrator of the United States Agency for
6 International Development shall report to and con-
7 sult with the Department of State on any proposed
8 programs, projects, initiatives, or funding for life
9 sciences dual use research of concern.

10 (d) UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, PROGRAMS, AND
11 FUNDS.—

12 (1) REQUIREMENT.—The Permanent Rep-
13 resentative of the United States to the United Na-
14 tions should use the voice, vote, and influence of the
15 United States at the United Nations to block rep-
16 resentatives from any country listed in paragraph 2
17 from serving in leadership positions within any
18 United Nations organ, fund, program, or related
19 specialized agency with responsibility for global
20 health security (including animal health), biosecu-
21 rity, atomic, biological or chemical weapons, or food
22 security and agricultural development.

23 (2) LIST OF COUNTRIES SPECIFIED.—The
24 countries described in paragraph (1) are—

25 (A) the People's Republic of China;

- 1 (B) the Russian Federation;
2 (C) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
3 (D) the Democratic People's Republic of
4 Korea;
5 (E) the Assad Regime of Syria; and
6 (F) any other country specified in the re-
7 port required by section 403(a) of the Arms
8 Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C.
9 2593a(a)) in the relevant calendar year.

10 (3) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on
11 the date that is 5 years after the date of the enact-
12 ment of this Act.

13 **Subtitle F—Strengthening United**
14 **States Public Diplomacy**

15 **SEC. 196. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS TO PRO-**
16 **MOTE UNITED STATES EDUCATION, EX-**
17 **CHANGE, CULTURAL, AND THE FULBRIGHT-**
18 **HAYS PROGRAM.**

19 There is authorized to be appropriated, for each year
20 of the 5-year period beginning on October 1, 2025,
21 \$20,000,000, to promote education, training, research,
22 and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-Hays
23 Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual
24 Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22
25 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

1 **SEC. 197. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TRAINING.**

2 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
3 gress that—

4 (1) the PRC has invested heavily in public di-
5 plomacy efforts that promote positive narratives of
6 the PRC while obfuscating the nefarious actions of
7 the government against its own people, its use of
8 threats and coercive diplomacy to demand deference
9 from other countries, its use of United Front Work
10 Department, affiliated organizations, and other tools
11 and tactics to conduct malign influence operations
12 and undermine democratic values in other countries,
13 and its anti-competitive economic practices;

14 (2) these include huge state-sponsored invest-
15 ments into media outlets throughout the world, ad-
16 vancement of censorship, and the establishment of
17 cultural centers; and

18 (3) the United States must respond with invest-
19 ment, training, and personnel to effectively counter
20 these public diplomacy efforts.

21 (b) HIRING.—The Secretary of State should
22 prioritize increasing recruitment, hiring of, and the place-
23 ment of public diplomacy officers for the purposes of stra-
24 tegic competition.

25 (c) TRAINING.—The Secretary of State shall require
26 all Foreign Service Officers to regularly complete public

1 diplomacy training courses through the Foreign Service
2 Institute or other Department-approved professional de-
3 velopment training in public diplomacy, including pre-
4 paring them to—

5 (1) counter foreign malign influence, especially
6 the effective use by the PRC, Russia, and other rel-
7 evant countries of tools to influence and manipulate
8 foreign audiences, present narratives favorable to
9 their regimes, undermine democratic values and fun-
10 damental freedoms, and obfuscate harmful or coer-
11 cive policies and practices;

12 (2) understand foreign media landscapes to un-
13 derstand how United States public diplomacy efforts
14 can be most effective; and

15 (3) partner with local organizations focused on
16 countering malign foreign influence, including
17 through disinformation, public influence campaigns,
18 and other means.

19 (d) DEVELOPING DEPARTMENT-WIDE GUIDANCE.—
20 The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy shall, in con-
21 sultation with United States missions abroad, develop De-
22 partment-wide guidance for public diplomacy officers and
23 senior officers at posts to enable them to better counter
24 foreign malign influence, as described in subsection (c).

1 (e) FORM OF GUIDANCE.—The guidance required
2 under subsection (d) may take the form of—

3 (1) regularly updated cables;

4 (2) a handbook for the development of public
5 diplomacy efforts at post to counter foreign malign
6 influence; and

7 (3) other forms of guidance as determined ap-
8 propriate by the Under Secretary.

9 **SEC. 198. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS.**

10 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
11 gress that—

12 (1) the Peoples' Republic of China, Russia, and
13 other strategic competitors vastly overshadow the
14 United States in efforts to shape global public opin-
15 ion in favor of their own narrow political, commer-
16 cial, and economic interests, including through pro-
17 moting disinformation and propaganda as well as in-
18 vesting in exchange programs, scholarships, cultural
19 diplomacy, and other programs;

20 (2) the United States must utilize its full spec-
21 trum of public diplomacy tools to promote United
22 States interests and security as well as combat Rus-
23 sian and PRC disinformation; and

24 (3) the Department of State should ensure that
25 adequate resources are available for posts to gen-

1 erate locally tailored public diplomacy programming
2 that advances United States national security objec-
3 tives.

4 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
6 shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
7 a strategy to modernize and increase the operational and
8 programming capacity of American Spaces, American Cor-
9 ners, and American Centers throughout the world, includ-
10 ing on—

11 (1) leveraging public private partnerships;

12 (2) options for United States Government sti-
13 pends or additional pay to augment the current sala-
14 ries of local staff at partner organizations hosting
15 American Spaces to locally employed staff of Amer-
16 ican Spaces and American Corners; and

17 (3) opportunities for United States businesses
18 and nongovernmental organizations to better utilize
19 American Spaces in alignment with overall United
20 States Government priorities.

21 **SEC. 199. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUN-**
22 **TERING FOREIGN INFORMATION OPER-**
23 **ATIONS.**

24 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that the PRC is in-
25 creasing its spending on public diplomacy, including influ-

1 ence campaigns, advertising, and investments into state-
2 sponsored media publications outside of the PRC. This in-
3 cludes, for example, more than \$10,000,000,000 in foreign
4 direct investment in communications infrastructure, plat-
5 forms, and properties, as well as bringing journalists to
6 the PRC for training programs.

7 (b) THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR GLOBAL
8 MEDIA.—The United States Agency for Global Media
9 (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal entities
10 shall, consistent with the other executive branch under-
11 takings in this Act led by the President or the Secretary
12 of State, and in accordance with the highest standards of
13 journalism, undertake the following actions to support
14 independent journalism, counter foreign malign influence,
15 and combat surveillance in countries where the Chinese
16 Communist Party (CCP) and other malign actors are pro-
17 moting foreign information operations, propaganda, and
18 manipulated media markets:

19 (1) Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of Amer-
20 ica (VOA) shall expand coverage and digital pro-
21 gramming in China for all China services and other
22 affiliate language broadcasting services.

23 (2) All USAGM operating entities shall seek to
24 increase coverage on CCP influence in their coverage
25 regions, including RFA in Asia, RFE/RL in Central

1 Asia, MBN in the Middle East, Office of Cuba
2 Broadcasting in Cuba, and Voice America globally.

3 (3) Radio Free Asia (RFA) shall expand its
4 Mandarin-language Asia Fact Check Lab to expose
5 and analyze false narratives on social media by pro-
6 Beijing influencers and content creators.

7 (4) Voice of America shall continue the bilin-
8 gual Asia Fact Check Lab, established in 2022, and
9 expand on the Jiehuang Pindao initiative to continue
10 identifying and exposing PRC information oper-
11 ations.

12 (5) Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc.
13 (MBN) shall expand coverage of the PRC's influence
14 in the Middle East and North Africa, a topic that
15 is void on indigenous media in the region.

16 (6) USAGM shall expand existing training and
17 partnership programs that promote journalistic
18 standards, investigative reporting, cybersecurity, and
19 digital analytics to help expose and counter false
20 CCP narratives.

21 (7) The Open Technology Fund shall continue
22 its work to support applied research, and the devel-
23 opment and deployment of tools and technologies to
24 circumvent censorship and surveillance by the CCP,

1 both inside the PRC as well as abroad where the
2 PRC has exported these technologies.

3 (8) Voice of America shall continue its mission
4 of providing accurate, objective, and comprehensive
5 news as well as presenting the policies of the United
6 States clearly and effectively.

7 (9) The Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB)
8 shall continue its work promoting freedom and de-
9 mocracy by providing the people of Cuba with objec-
10 tive news and information, including exposing and
11 reporting on Chinese disinformation and malign in-
12 fluence for its Cuban and Latin American audiences.

13 (10) RFE/RL shall establish an investigative
14 unit dedicated to working across Central Asia to de-
15 velop multimedia responses to local information op-
16 eration efforts by the CCP and other malign actors.

17 (11) All USAGM operating units may establish
18 or further develop investigative units.

19 (12) The networks and grantees of the United
20 States Agency for Global Media shall continue their
21 mission of providing credible and timely news cov-
22 erage, including on the PRC's malign behavior and
23 activities across the world.

24 (c) AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

1 (1) USAGM.—There is authorized to be appro-
2 priated, for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029
3 for the United States Agency for Global Media,
4 \$1,500,000.

5 (2) MEDIA SUPPORT.—There is authorized to
6 be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2025
7 through 2029, \$250,000,000 for ongoing and new
8 programs to support local media, build independent
9 media, combat PRC information operations inside
10 and outside of China, invest in technology to subvert
11 censorship, and monitor and evaluate these pro-
12 grams. Such funds shall be directed to—

13 (A) RFA to expand—

14 (i) its China language services (includ-
15 ing Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Ti-
16 betan);

17 (ii) its coverage in Southeast Asia and
18 the Pacific Islands to counter the Chinese
19 Communist Party’s propaganda;

20 (iii) its Global Mandarin digital brand
21 WHYNOT/Wainao, which engages Chi-
22 nese-speaking populations both inside
23 China and around the world;

24 (iv) its investigative unit, which
25 probes PRC influence and relevant issues

1 including transnational repression and
2 cross-border crime in Asia, the Pacific, and
3 globally; and

4 (v) its Asia Fact Check Lab, which
5 counters and analyzes PRC disinformation
6 and malign influence in the information
7 space.

8 (B) RFE/RL to increase Kazakh, Kyrgyz,
9 Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek language services;

10 (C) the Open Technology Fund for censor-
11 ship circumvention and privacy enhancing tech-
12 nologies which contribute to—

13 (i) enabling Chinese citizens to safely
14 access independent news and information;
15 and

16 (ii) countering Chinese information
17 control technologies in authoritarian coun-
18 tries where they are being exported and
19 adopted;

20 (D) MBN to increase coverage of China's
21 influence in the region through its award-win-
22 ning investigative reporting, including expan-
23 sion of its digital series “Did it Really Hap-
24 pen?” to counter false narratives being spread
25 by the PRC through social media;

1 (E) OCB to increase efforts to expose and
 2 counter China's active propaganda and
 3 disinformation machine within Cuba, including
 4 expanded fact-checking, journalistic training,
 5 and investments in technology; and

6 (F) Voice of America to expand—

7 (i) its coverage addressing China's
 8 malign influences within China and across
 9 Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Eurasia;

10 (ii) direct reporting in key regions, in-
 11 cluding Taiwan and the Pacific Islands, in-
 12 cluding establishing a Mongolian Service;
 13 and

14 (iii) Open-Source Intelligence jour-
 15 nalism, to leverage data mining capabilities
 16 to uncover insights into China's domestic
 17 developments and its global activities.

18 (d) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than one year
 19 after the date of the enactment of this Act, USAGM shall
 20 submit to Congress a report on the audience size and part-
 21 nerships developed in furtherance of its efforts to counter
 22 CCP's malign influence.

23 **SEC. 199A. SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, acting
 25 through the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, the

1 Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
2 Rights, and Labor and in coordination with the Adminis-
3 trator of the United States Agency for International De-
4 velopment, shall support civil society and foreign media
5 organizations in the implementation of programs to train
6 foreign media personnel on investigative techniques, pro-
7 vide journalist protection, improve media literacy among
8 the school-aged and general populations, boost access to
9 accurate and reliable news and information generally, as
10 well as other media-related activities in order to ensure
11 public accountability related to the Belt and Road Initia-
12 tive and the Global Development Initiative, the PRC's use
13 of and export of surveillance and other technologies, and
14 other influence operations abroad direct or directly sup-
15 ported by the Chinese Communist Party or the Govern-
16 ment of the PRC.

17 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
18 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State,
19 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029, \$100,000,000
20 in support of the activities outlined in subsection (a), in-
21 cluding for ongoing and new programs in support of press
22 freedom, training, media literacy, and protection of jour-
23 nalists.

1 **TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLI-**
2 **ANCES, PARTNERSHIPS, AND**
3 **INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-**
4 **TIONS**

5 **Subtitle A—Strategic and**
6 **Diplomatic Matters**

7 **PART I—PROMOTING UNITED STATES LEADER-**
8 **SHIP ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE INDO-**
9 **PACIFIC**

10 **SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING THE PRC’S**
11 **SUPPORT FOR RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE.**

12 It is the sense of Congress that—

13 (1) the PRC and the Russian Federation are
14 strengthening their relationship to advance their mu-
15 tual interests, including in creating divisions between
16 the United States and its allies and partners;

17 (2) the PRC is supporting Russia’s unprovoked,
18 full-scale, and brutal invasion of Ukraine, including
19 through increasing trade with Russia by 30 percent
20 in 2022, and another 26.3 percent in 2023, pur-
21 chasing 2,140,000 barrels of Russian crude oil per
22 day in 2023 under embargo by the transatlantic alli-
23 ance, selling high-precision machinery, electronics,
24 base metals, textiles and apparel, vehicles, ships, air-
25 craft to Russia, abetting sanctions evasion in coun-

1 tries on Russia’s borders, and amplifying Russian
2 propaganda and false information;

3 (3) the PRC has explored providing weapons
4 and ammunition to the Russian Federation in order
5 to support that country’s unlawful, imperialist war
6 of aggression against Ukraine;

7 (4) the Government of the PRC is not taking
8 sufficient action to prevent PRC-based companies
9 from exporting lethal equipment to the Russian Fed-
10 eration, as revealed by the credible evidence that
11 PRC companies and entities have—

12 (A) shipped unmanned aerial vehicles to
13 Russia that were designated on customs forms
14 as being “for use in the special military oper-
15 ation.”;

16 (B) supplied Iran with drone parts that
17 were later used by Russian forces in Ukraine;

18 (C) sent “Tiger” armored personnel car-
19 riers to Chechen forces, raising the possibility
20 that these vehicles being could be deployed to
21 Ukraine;

22 (D) shipped tens of thousands of kilograms
23 of smokeless gunpowder to a munitions factory
24 in Russia;

1 (E) provided Russia with optical parts
2 used in tanks and armored vehicles;

3 (F) provided nitrocellulose used in gun-
4 powder; and

5 (G) allowed the shipment of dual use en-
6 gines for missiles and drones to Russia;

7 (5) because of the PRC's ongoing support for
8 Russia's war against Ukraine, the United States has
9 sanctioned numerous PRC and Hong Kong-based
10 entities;

11 (6) the PRC's support for Russia's war against
12 Ukraine threatens European stability and security,
13 including that of those countries that the United
14 States is committed to defend under the terms of
15 the North Atlantic Treaty;

16 (7) the United States, the European Union,
17 and European countries must continue and increase
18 implementation of sanctions and other appropriate
19 economic tools against PRC firms supporting the
20 Russian Federation's war against Ukraine, including
21 those supporting Russian paramilitary organizations;

22 (8) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's
23 (NATO's) 2022 Strategic Concept correctly recog-
24 nizes the need to prepare for, and respond to, the
25 threats posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security,

1 including threats derived from its relationship with
2 the Russian Federation and its efforts to divide
3 United States and European allies;

4 (9) NATO members must work to implement
5 and build on steps identified in NATO's Strategic
6 Concept, including building greater NATO expertise
7 on the PRC and its military and intelligence
8 apparatuses, using NATO summits as an oppor-
9 tunity to check progress and update priorities, and
10 making any needed adjustments to NATO's oper-
11 ational plans to account for the ownership or in-
12 volvement of PRC state-owned enterprises and other
13 entities in space, key seaports, communications
14 nodes, and airports;

15 (10) the Government of the PRC has been clear
16 about its desire to be included in diplomatic discus-
17 sions about ending Russia's war in Ukraine, includ-
18 ing through the February 2023 publication of a 12-
19 point position paper on the "political settlement of
20 the Ukraine crisis" and the appointment of a Special
21 Envoy for Eurasian Affairs;

22 (11) the Government of the PRC has done
23 nothing to deliver tangible outcomes on the elements
24 of its position paper beyond symbolic actions;

1 (12) although the PRC’s position paper calls
2 for the full implementation of the July 2022 United
3 Nations-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative as a
4 means to maintain global food security, and despite
5 Xi Jinping’s emphasis on food security for his own
6 country, the Government of the PRC did nothing to
7 pressure the Russian Federation to return to the
8 deal, which it abrogated in July 2023;

9 (13) President Joseph R. Biden rightly dis-
10 missed the PRC’s “peace plan” (referring to the 12-
11 point position paper) as something that would not
12 help “anyone other than Russia,” as he stated in
13 February 2023;

14 (14) the United States should remain wary of
15 PRC engagement in Ukraine and instead focus its
16 efforts on strengthening the coalition of like-minded
17 partners in support of Ukraine’s full sovereignty and
18 territorial integrity;

19 (15) given the PRC’s significant support for
20 Russia, Xi Jinping and the Government of the PRC
21 should not be viewed as impartial brokers that will
22 bring this war to an end on terms that will be posi-
23 tive for Ukraine, its independence, and the security
24 of Europe;

1 (16) although Russia and the PRC have dis-
2 agreements, both countries assess that their partner-
3 ship is critical to countering the United States;

4 (17) PRC diplomatic involvement in Ukraine
5 would lead to greater PRC involvement in European
6 security issues, while also presenting the PRC as a
7 responsible party to the international community;

8 (18) it is of vital importance that the United
9 States and Europe remain united in confronting the
10 security and economic risks posed by a significant
11 PRC role in diplomatic efforts to end Russia's war
12 in Ukraine, executing policies that account for great-
13 er Sino-Russian alignment, and working together
14 closely on planning ahead for reconstruction of
15 Ukraine;

16 (19) as earlier PRC investments in Ukraine
17 targeted strategic sectors, any post-war PRC invest-
18 ments in Ukraine would give the PRC access to val-
19 uable military technology and know-how, as Ukraine
20 inherited roughly one-third of the Soviet Union's de-
21 fense-industrial base and 15 percent of Soviet mili-
22 tary research and development facilities, and during
23 its war against Russia, has made great strides in the
24 development of certain defense items; and

1 (20) given the PRC’s documented track record
2 on corruption, a role for the PRC in Ukraine’s re-
3 construction would likely undercut extensive ongoing
4 United States and European efforts to align Ukrain-
5 ian governance and anti-corruption standards with
6 those of Western institutions, as well as the Euro-
7 pean Union’s (EU) progress in helping Ukraine ad-
8 here to the standards required for its eventual entry
9 into the EU.

10 **SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT**
11 **FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PA-**
12 **CIFIC.**

13 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
14 gress that—

15 (1) the United States alliances in the Indo-Pa-
16 cific provide a unique strategic advantage to the
17 United States and are among the United States’
18 most vital relationships, enabling the United States
19 Government to advance its vital national interests,
20 defend its territory, expand its economy through
21 international trade and commerce, establish endur-
22 ing cooperation among like-minded countries, pre-
23 vent the domination of the Indo-Pacific by a hostile
24 power or powers, and ensure the region’s sea, skies,

1 and other shared domains remain free and open and
2 are lawfully governed;

3 (2) the United States, Japan, the Republic of
4 Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are
5 critical allies in advancing a free and open order in
6 the Indo-Pacific region and tackling challenges with
7 unity of purpose, and have a strong record of col-
8 laboration on shared interests in areas such as de-
9 fense and security, economic prosperity, infrastruc-
10 ture connectivity, and fundamental freedoms;

11 (3) the United States greatly values other part-
12 nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with
13 India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand,
14 Taiwan, and Vietnam as well as regional architec-
15 ture such as the Quad, the Association of Southeast
16 Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Eco-
17 nomic Cooperation (APEC), which are essential to
18 further shared interests;

19 (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific
20 region demands consistent United States and allied
21 commitment to strengthening and advancing our al-
22 liances so that they are postured to meet key chal-
23 lenges, and will require sustained political will, con-
24 crete partnerships, economic, commercial, and tech-
25 nological cooperation, consistent and tangible com-

1 mitments, high-level and extensive consultations on
2 matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared co-
3 operation in the acquisition of key capabilities im-
4 portant to allied defenses, and unified mutual sup-
5 port in the face of political, economic, or military co-
6 ercion;

7 (5) fissures in the United States alliance rela-
8 tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad-
9 versaries and weaken collective ability to advance
10 shared interests;

11 (6) the United States must work with allies to
12 prioritize human rights, good governance, and anti-
13 corruption throughout the Indo-Pacific region;

14 (7) the Indo-Pacific region is vulnerable to nat-
15 ural shocks and stresses, making humanitarian and
16 disaster relief, stewardship of natural resources, and
17 food and water security important areas of coopera-
18 tion between the United States and partner coun-
19 tries; and

20 (8) the United States should continue to engage
21 and deepen cooperation with allies and partners of
22 the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, in the
23 areas of—

24 (A) disaster risk reduction, including ef-
25 forts to enhance effective forecasting, reduce

1 vulnerability, and build resilience to natural
2 shocks and stresses;

3 (B) disaster response and early recovery;

4 (C) humanitarian assistance and food secu-
5 rity;

6 (D) sustainable uses of forest and water
7 resources with the goal of promoting economic
8 security while preserving biodiversity and access
9 to safe drinking water; and

10 (E) fisheries and marine resource con-
11 servation.

12 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
13 of the United States—

14 (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and secu-
15 rity cooperation between and among the United
16 States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the
17 Philippines, and Thailand, including, as appropriate,
18 through diplomatic engagement, regional develop-
19 ment, energy security and development, scientific
20 and health partnerships, educational and cultural ex-
21 changes, missile defense, intelligence-sharing, space,
22 cyber, and other diplomatic and defense-related ini-
23 tiatives;

24 (2) to uphold United States multilateral and bi-
25 lateral treaty obligations, including—

1 (A) defending Australia under article IV of
2 the Australia, New Zealand, and United States
3 Security Treaty (ANZUS);

4 (B) defending Japan, including territories
5 under the administration of Japan, under arti-
6 cle V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
7 Security Between the United States of America
8 and Japan;

9 (C) defending the Republic of Korea under
10 article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Be-
11 tween the United States and the Republic of
12 Korea;

13 (D) defending the Philippines under Arti-
14 cle IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between
15 the United States and the Republic of the Phil-
16ippines; and

17 (E) defending Thailand under Article IV of
18 the 1954 Manila Pact and the Thanat-Rusk
19 communique of 1962;

20 (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States
21 regional and multilateral partnerships, including
22 with ASEAN, and to support ASEAN centrality in
23 the region;

24 (4) to cooperate with Australia, Japan, the Re-
25 public of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand to

1 promote human rights bilaterally and multilaterally,
2 including through regional fora;

3 (5) to support the continued development and
4 implementation of an enhanced trilateral security
5 partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom,
6 and the United States under the auspices of
7 “AUKUS”; and

8 (6) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco-
9 nomic, and security cooperation with regional part-
10 ners, such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zea-
11 land, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

12 **SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH**
13 **THE QUAD.**

14 It is the sense of Congress that—

15 (1) the United States should continue to reaf-
16 firm its commitment to quadrilateral cooperation
17 among Australia, India, Japan, and the United
18 States (the “Quad”) to enhance and implement a
19 shared vision to meet shared regional challenges and
20 to promote a free, open, inclusive and resilient Indo-
21 Pacific that is characterized by democracy, rule of
22 law, and market-based economic growth, and is free
23 from undue influence and coercion;

24 (2) the United States should seek to expand
25 collaboration with Quad partners to bring concrete

1 benefits to the Indo-Pacific region, including benefits
2 with respect to the rule of law, freedom of naviga-
3 tion and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes,
4 democratic values, economic prosperity and security,
5 infrastructure development, energy access and secu-
6 rity, technological advancement, territorial integrity,
7 peace and prosperity, and democratic resilience;

8 (3) the United States should seek to expand
9 avenues of cooperation with the Quad, including
10 more coordinated policies related to such shared in-
11 terests as protecting cyberspace and advancing mari-
12 time security;

13 (4) the cooperation under the Indo-Pacific Part-
14 nership for Maritime Domain Awareness, announced
15 at the fourth Quad leaders meeting on May 24,
16 2022, will contribute to the region's shared maritime
17 domain awareness picture, which is a critical compo-
18 nent to achieving peace, stability, and prosperity in
19 the maritime domain;

20 (5) Quad commitments to address shared chal-
21 lenges in new areas such as resilience in the Pacific
22 Islands region, space, cyberspace, and critical and
23 emerging technologies, and to continue to work to
24 address pandemic preparedness, to provide quality
25 infrastructure investment, humanitarian assistance,

1 and disaster relief, and to enhance people-to-people
2 ties, including through the announcement of a Quad
3 Fellowship in September 2021, further advance the
4 important cooperation among Quad nations that is
5 so critical to the Indo-Pacific region;

6 (6) the United States and other Quad nations,
7 including through partnerships with multilateral de-
8 velopment banks, should work together to finance
9 and otherwise cooperate on development and infra-
10 structure projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are
11 sustainable and offer a viable alternative to the in-
12 vestments of the PRC in that region under the Belt
13 and Road Initiative and the Global Development Ini-
14 tiative; and

15 (7) in consultation with other Quad countries,
16 the President should continue to prioritize clear,
17 concrete deliverables related to Quad priorities, par-
18 ticularly for leader-level working groups, to increase
19 the Quad's operational effectiveness and strategic
20 value by demonstrating that the Quad can deliver
21 tangible results while remaining agile enough to ad-
22 just as needs and conditions change.

23 **SEC. 204. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENHANCING UNITED**
24 **STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.**

25 It is the policy of the United States—

1 (1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the
2 United States Indo-Pacific strategy;

3 (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its
4 democracy as key elements for the continued peace
5 and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and
6 a vital national security interest of the United
7 States;

8 (3) to secure United States interests and pre-
9 serve the ability of the people of Taiwan to deter-
10 mine their own future, and to strenuously oppose
11 any action by the PRC to use force to change the
12 status quo of Taiwan;

13 (4) to strengthen cooperation with the military
14 of Taiwan under the framework of the Taiwan Rela-
15 tions Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.)
16 and the Six Assurances, with consideration of the
17 ongoing military buildup in the PRC and the mili-
18 tary balance in the Taiwan Strait, and to transfer
19 defense articles to Taiwan to enhance its capabili-
20 ties, including to advance its ability to contribute to
21 denying the PRC coercion and potential invasion;

22 (5) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its
23 asymmetric defense strategy;

24 (6) to encourage Taiwan to continue increasing
25 its defense spending and undertaking defense re-

1 forms that enable the full resourcing and effective-
2 ness of its defense strategy;

3 (7) to support Taiwan's vibrant democracy and
4 free and fair elections, and promote dignity and re-
5 spect for the democratically elected leaders of Tai-
6 wan, who represent more than 23,000,000 people, by
7 using the full range of diplomatic and other appro-
8 priate tools available to promote Taiwan's inter-
9 national space;

10 (8) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's
11 meaningful participation in the United Nations and
12 its specialized agencies, the World Health Assembly,
13 the International Criminal Police Organization, and
14 other international bodies as appropriate;

15 (9) to advocate for information sharing with
16 Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on
17 Cancer;

18 (10) to promote meaningful cooperation among
19 the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded
20 partners;

21 (11) to enhance bilateral trade, including
22 through new agreements and the United States-Tai-
23 wan 21st Century Trade Initiative;

24 (12) to include Taiwan as a partner in the
25 Indo-Pacific Economic Framework;

1 (13) to actively engage in negotiations in pursu-
2 ance of a bilateral free trade agreement and tax
3 agreement to avoid double taxation and promote
4 trade and investment;

5 (14) to expand bilateral economic and techno-
6 logical cooperation, including improving supply chain
7 security;

8 (15) to support United States educational and
9 exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro-
10 moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his-
11 tory, and politics in Taiwan;

12 (16) to expand people-to-people exchanges be-
13 tween the United States and Taiwan;

14 (17) to ensure that distinctions in practice re-
15 garding United States relations with Taiwan are
16 consistent with the longstanding, comprehensive,
17 strategic, and values-based relationship the United
18 States shares with Taiwan, and contribute to the
19 peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues; and

20 (18) to further enhance United States relations
21 with Taiwan by forming a robust partnership that—

22 (A) meets current geopolitical challenges;

23 (B) fully accounts for Taiwan’s democratic
24 status; and

1 (C) remains faithful to United States prin-
2 ciples and values, consistent with the Taiwan
3 Relations Act and the Six Assurances.

4 **SEC. 205. EXPANDING EXPERTISE ON TAIWAN MATTERS.**

5 (a) PERMANENT PERSONNEL REALIGNMENT.—Not
6 later than the end of fiscal year 2024, the Secretary of
7 State shall realign up to twelve full-time equivalent per-
8 sonnel to the American Institute in Taiwan.

9 (b) ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL.—

10 (1) AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN.—The
11 American Institute in Taiwan should increase staff-
12 ing by not less than four additional full-time equiva-
13 lent personnel at the American Institute in Taiwan
14 in Washington.

15 (2) OFFICE OF TAIWAN COORDINATION.—There
16 is authorized to be appropriated \$800,000 for four
17 additional full-time equivalent personnel at the Of-
18 fice of Taiwan Coordination at the Department of
19 State.

20 (c) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days after the
21 Secretary of State carries out the requirement in sub-
22 section (a), the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate
23 committees of Congress a notification that includes a de-
24 scription of the role of each realigned full-time equivalent
25 personnel and how such realignment addresses gaps in the

1 American Institute in Taiwan’s ability to advance United
2 States interests with respect to Taiwan.

3 **SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-SOUTH KOREA ALLIANCE.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
5 ings:

6 (1) On October 1, 1953, the United States and
7 the Republic of Korea signed the Mutual Defense
8 Treaty between the United States and the Republic
9 of Korea.

10 (2) First agreed to in 1991, the “Agreement
11 between the United States of America and the Re-
12 public of Korea Concerning Special Measures Relat-
13 ing to Article V of the Agreement under Article IV
14 of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United
15 States of America and the Republic of Korea Re-
16 garding Facilities and Areas and the Status of
17 United States Armed Forces in the Republic of
18 Korea” (referred to in this section as the “SMA”),
19 established the sharing of non-personnel stationing
20 costs associated with the presence of United States
21 forces in the Republic of Korea.

22 (3) After eight rounds of consultations, the
23 United States and the Republic of Korea reached
24 consensus on *ad ref* texts for a renewed SMA on Oc-
25 tober 3, 2024.

1 (4) The renewed SMA and the accompanying
2 Implementing Arrangement for the Special Measures
3 Agreement (“SMA IA”) were signed in Seoul, South
4 Korea, on November 4, 2024, becoming the 12th
5 iteration of the SMA.

6 (5) Under the renewed SMA and consistent
7 with United States objectives, the United States and
8 the Republic of Korea agreed to a topline 8.3 per-
9 cent increase in the contribution from the Republic
10 of South Korea as compared to the calendar year
11 2025 contribution.

12 (6) The renewed SMA meets additional United
13 States priority objectives, including maintaining the
14 United States position of protecting the authority of
15 the United States Forces Korea (USFK) Com-
16 mander to allocate funds within and between the
17 three cost categories in accordance with operational
18 and mission requirements.

19 (7) The renewed SMA and IA entered into
20 force on November 29, 2024, following notification
21 in writing by the United States and the Republic of
22 South Korea that their respective domestic proce-
23 dures necessary for the agreement’s entry into force
24 had been completed.

1 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
2 United States to uphold and reinforce the United States
3 alliance with the Republic of Korea, including by—

4 (1) maintaining the presence of approximately
5 28,500 members of the United States Armed Forces
6 deployed to the Republic of Korea;

7 (2) affirming the United States extended deter-
8 rence commitment using the full range of United
9 States defense capabilities, consistent with the Mu-
10 tual Defense Treaty Between the United States and
11 the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington, Octo-
12 ber 1, 1953, in support of the shared objective of a
13 peaceful and stable Korean Peninsula; and

14 (3) upholding the renewed SMA agreement
15 reached and signed on November 4, 2024, between
16 the United States and the Republic of Korea.

17 **SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES-JAPAN-**
18 **REPUBLIC OF KOREA COOPERATION.**

19 It is the sense of Congress that it is in the national
20 interest of the United States—

21 (1) to support Japan and the Republic in Korea
22 (ROK) in building on the steps taken to address
23 major issues in their bilateral relations, including
24 the ROK's plan to resolve a World War II forced

1 labor dispute announced in March 2023 and follow-
2 on bilateral leaders summit;

3 (2) to encourage Japan and the ROK to in-
4 crease engagement in security cooperation on a bi-
5 lateral and trilateral basis with the United States;

6 (3) to emphasize the shared threats that Japan
7 and the ROK face as the Democratic People's Re-
8 public of Korea (DPRK) accelerates its provocative
9 missile tests with a tempo and diversity of missiles
10 that suggests it is simulating wartime use to signal
11 to United States allies that it can control escalation
12 in a conflict;

13 (4) to prioritize the exchange of information
14 among the three militaries, particularly in the area
15 of theater missile defense;

16 (5) to encourage Japan and the ROK to resolve
17 their history-related disputes with mutually accept-
18 able and durable solutions that allow cooperation to
19 continue without interruption;

20 (6) to encourage and facilitate Japan and the
21 ROK deepening cooperation on cyber defense, in-
22 cluding through the NATO Cooperative Cyber
23 Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), which
24 Japan joined in 2018 and the ROK joined in 2022;

1 (7) to participate in trilateral inter-parliamen-
 2 tary exchanges with Japan and the ROK, including
 3 through efforts like the Japan-U.S. Friendship Com-
 4 mission Thomas S. Foley Legislative Exchange pro-
 5 gram; and

6 (8) to promote trilateral development and hu-
 7 manitarian assistance cooperation to collectively en-
 8 hance the stability, security, and democratic norms
 9 of partner countries through an affirmative and sov-
 10 ereign development model.

11 **SEC. 208. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED FOR THE**
 12 **SENATE TO GIVE ITS ADVICE AND CONSENT**
 13 **TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED NA-**
 14 **TIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE**
 15 **SEA.**

16 It is the sense of Congress that—

17 (1) it is in the national interest for the United
 18 States to become a formal signatory of the United
 19 Nations Convention on the law of the Sea
 20 (UNCLOS), done at Montego Bay December 10,
 21 1982;

22 (2) the United States Senate should promptly
 23 give its advice and consent to the ratification of the
 24 UNCLOS; and

1 (3) joining the UNCLOS should remain a top
2 priority for the United States, the importance of
3 which was most recently underscored by the stra-
4 tegic challenges the United States faces in the Indo-
5 Pacific, the Arctic, and the Black Sea regions.

6 **SEC. 209. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM**
7 **OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER-**
8 **WAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC**
9 **AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE**
10 **SOUTH CHINA SEA.**

11 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—

12 (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions
13 or the use of force by the PRC to impede operations
14 or freedom of overflight in international airspace by
15 military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo,
16 or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region;

17 (2) urges the Government of the PRC to refrain
18 from implementing the declared East China Sea Air
19 Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in
20 the South China Sea, and to refrain from taking
21 similar provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pa-
22 cific region;

23 (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court
24 of Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on
25 both the Philippines and the PRC and that the

1 PRC's claims to offshore resources across most of
2 the South China Sea are unlawful; and

3 (4) urge the PRC to abide by the 2016 Perma-
4 nent Court of Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC's
5 obligations as a state party to the United Nations
6 Convention on the Law of the Sea.

7 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
8 of the United States to—

9 (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al-
10 lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-
11 ing longstanding United States policy regarding Ar-
12 ticle IV of the United States-Philippines Mutual De-
13 fense Treaty, and restate its position that the Japa-
14 nese-administered Senkaku Islands fall within the
15 scope of Article V of the United States-Japan Mu-
16 tual Defense Treaty;

17 (2) oppose claims that impinge on lawful use of
18 the sea, or the airspace above it, and oppose the
19 militarization of new and reclaimed land features in
20 the South China Sea;

21 (3) continue certain policies with respect to the
22 PRC's claims in the South China Sea, namely—

23 (A) that the PRC claims in the South
24 China Sea, including claims to offshore re-

1 sources across most of the South China Sea,
2 are unlawful;

3 (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a
4 maritime claim vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas
5 that the Permanent Court of Arbitration found
6 to be in the Philippines' Exclusive Economic
7 Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;

8 (C) to reject any claim by the PRC to
9 waters beyond a 12-nautical mile territorial sea
10 derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Is-
11 lands; and

12 (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial
13 or maritime claim to James Shoal;

14 (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
15 destabilizing activities, including occupation or ef-
16 forts to unlawfully assert administration over areas
17 subject to disputed claims;

18 (5) encourage disputes to be managed without
19 intimidation, coercion, or force;

20 (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust
21 claims in accordance with international law;

22 (7) uphold the principle that territorial and
23 maritime claims, including claims to territorial
24 waters or territorial seas, must be derived from land

1 features and otherwise comport with international
2 law;

3 (8) oppose the imposition of unilateral fishing
4 regulations covering disputed areas in the South
5 China Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in
6 the region;

7 (9) support a Code of Conduct only if that Code
8 of Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian
9 claimant states and does not serve as a vehicle for
10 the PRC to advance its unlawful maritime claims
11 and keep the United States out of the Indo-Pacific
12 region;

13 (10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter-
14 national rules and guidelines, including the Inter-
15 national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
16 Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs),
17 is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation be-
18 tween the United States Armed Forces and the
19 forces of other countries, including the PRC;

20 (11) support the development of regional insti-
21 tutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional
22 Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting
23 Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded
24 ASEAN Maritime Forum, to increase practical co-

1 operation in the region and reinforce the role of
2 international law;

3 (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships
4 with other countries in the region for maritime do-
5 main awareness and capacity building, as well as ef-
6 forts by the United States Government to explore
7 the development of appropriate multilateral mecha-
8 nisms for a “common operating picture” in the
9 South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries
10 that would serve to help countries protect their sov-
11 ereignty in a manner consistent with international
12 law and deter risky and dangerous activities;

13 (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent
14 another country from lawfully exercising its sov-
15 ereign rights related to the resources of its exclusive
16 economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by mak-
17 ing claims to those areas in the South China Sea
18 that are not consistent with international law; and

19 (14) assure the continuity of operations by the
20 United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including,
21 when appropriate, operations in cooperation with
22 partners and allies, to reaffirm the principle of free-
23 dom of operations in international waters and air-
24 space in accordance with established principles and
25 practices of international law.

1 **SEC. 209A. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNIVERSAL**
2 **IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS**
3 **SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.**

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—

5 (1) condemns Russia’s March 2024 veto of, and
6 the PRC’s abstention on, the United Nations Secu-
7 rity Council Resolution renewing the mandate of the
8 Panel of Experts tasked with monitoring United Na-
9 tions sanctions against the Democratic People’s Re-
10 public of Korea (DPRK) as irresponsible and dan-
11 gerous actions that undermine international efforts
12 to counter the threat posed by the DPRK’s unlawful
13 nuclear and ballistic missile program;

14 (2) despite the expiration of the mandate of the
15 Panel of Experts, remains committed to working
16 with relevant United Nations agencies, members of
17 the Security Council, and all United Nations Mem-
18 ber States, to uphold the United Nations sanctions
19 regime against the DPRK’s unlawful nuclear and
20 ballistic missile program, and to advance the global
21 nonproliferation regime; and

22 (3) supports the establishment of new multilat-
23 eral mechanisms to monitor United Nations Member
24 State implementation of United Nations Security
25 Council resolutions targeting the DPRK to shine a
26 light on Member States who are evading sanctions

1 and abetting the DPRK regime’s unlawful weapons
2 program.

3 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
4 United States to sustain economic pressure on the Govern-
5 ment of the DPRK until the regime undertakes actions
6 toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible
7 denuclearization, including by—

8 (1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to
9 implement and enforce existing United Nations
10 sanctions with regard to the DPRK and its nuclear
11 and missile programs;

12 (2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and
13 in accordance with United Nations Security Council
14 resolutions, to end the practice of hosting DPRK
15 citizens as guest workers, recognizing that such
16 workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit
17 source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nu-
18 clear ambitions;

19 (3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to
20 pursue rigorous interdiction of shipments to and
21 from the DPRK, including ship-to-ship transfers,
22 consistent with United Nations Security Council res-
23 olutions;

24 (4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities—

1 (A) to cease business activities with United
2 Nations-designated entities and their affiliates
3 in the DPRK; and

4 (B) to expel from the PRC individuals who
5 enable the DPRK to acquire materials for its
6 nuclear and ballistic missile programs;

7 (5) working with likeminded partners, think
8 tanks, research organizations, and civil society to de-
9 velop and implement alternative, independent mecha-
10 nisms to monitor United Nations Member State ad-
11 herence to United Nations sanctions targeting the
12 unlawful DPRK weapons program and publicly shine
13 a light on Member States that evade and violate
14 those sanctions; and

15 (6) implementing and enforcing United Nations
16 Security Council resolutions with respect to the
17 DPRK and United States sanctions, including those
18 pursuant to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
19 Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–122),
20 the Countering America’s Adversaries Through
21 Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44), the Otto
22 Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and En-
23 forcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of Public Law
24 116–92), and relevant United States executive or-
25 ders.

1 **SEC. 209B. ESTABLISHING A SENIOR OFFICIAL FOR THE**
2 **COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIATION AT THE**
3 **DEPARTMENT OF STATE.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall designate a
5 senior official at the Department of State responsible for
6 administering the Compacts of Free Association at the
7 Department of State (in this section referred to as the
8 “Senior Official”). The Senior Official shall report to the
9 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
10 Affairs.

11 (b) DUTIES.—The Senior Official shall—

12 (1) be responsible for the conduct of United
13 States foreign policy with respect to the countries
14 affiliated with the United States Government under
15 the Compacts of Free Association (in this section re-
16 ferred to as the “Compacts”), namely the freely as-
17 sociated states of—

18 (A) the Republic of Palau;

19 (B) the Marshall Islands; and

20 (C) the Federated States of Micronesia;

21 (2) assist the Assistant Secretary of State for
22 East Asian and Pacific Affairs in providing overall
23 direction, coordination, and supervision of inter-
24 departmental activities of the United States Govern-
25 ment in these countries, including ensuring the time-
26 ly transfer of assistance and provision of benefits

1 through the United States Department of the Inte-
2 rior, as laid out in the Compacts;

3 (3) oversee and evaluate the adequacy and ef-
4 fectiveness of United States policy with respect to
5 these countries as well as of the plans, programs, re-
6 sources, and performance for implementing that pol-
7 icy, including programs and other activities imple-
8 mented by the Department of the Interior;

9 (4) directly supervise the policy and operations
10 of the Compacts and provide guidance to relevant
11 United States missions within the Indo-Pacific re-
12 gion;

13 (5) ensure the provision of an adequate, regular
14 flow of information to posts abroad on United States
15 Government policies, policy deliberations, and diplo-
16 matic exchanges in Washington, DC; and

17 (6) ensure the continuity of implementation of
18 commitments and Compact obligations and benefits,
19 consistent with United States national interests in
20 the Indo-Pacific region.

21 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
22 authorized to be appropriated \$250,000 to support the
23 Senior Official in the conduct and discharge of the duties
24 described in subsection (b).

**PART II—ENHANCING DIPLOMATIC
ENGAGEMENT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH**

**SEC. 211. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND
ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH PACIFIC IS-
LAND COUNTRIES.**

(a) **AUTHORITY.**—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire Locally Employed Staff in Pacific Island countries for the purpose of providing increased diplomatic support and promoting increased economic and commercial engagement between the United States and Pacific Island countries.

(b) **AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.**—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State and the Department of Commerce for fiscal year 2025, not more than \$10,000,000 to each agency to carry out the purposes of this section.

(c) **EXCEPTION FOR AMERICAN SAMOA.**—The Secretary of State may, as appropriate, treat the territory of American Samoa as a foreign country for purposes of carrying out this section.

**SEC. 212. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State \$12,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the International

1 Military Education and Training Program for Latin
2 America and the Caribbean.

3 (b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall
4 take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs re-
5 ceiving funding pursuant to subsection (a) to ensure that
6 such programs are rigorous, substantive, and the pre-
7 eminent choice for international military education and
8 training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.

9 (c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred
10 to in subsection (a) shall—

11 (1) provide training and capacity-building op-
12 portunities to Latin American and Caribbean secu-
13 rity services;

14 (2) provide practical skills and frameworks
15 for—

16 (A) improving the functioning and organi-
17 zation of security services in Latin America and
18 the Caribbean;

19 (B) creating a better understanding of the
20 United States and its values; and

21 (C) using technology for maximum stra-
22 tegic impact and effective operations; and

23 (3) promote and ensure that security services in
24 Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian
25 authority and operate in compliance with inter-

1 national human rights law and international human-
2 itarian law.

3 (d) LIMITATION.—Security assistance under this sec-
4 tion is subject to the limitations of section 620M of the
5 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).

6 **SEC. 213. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIA-**
7 **TIVE.**

8 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
9 gress that—

10 (1) the Young African Leaders Initiative,
11 launched in 2010, is a signature effort to invest in
12 the next generation of African leaders;

13 (2) Africa is a continent of strategic importance
14 and it is vital for the United States to support
15 strong and enduring partnerships with the next gen-
16 eration of African leaders;

17 (3) the United States Government should
18 prioritize investments to build the capacity of emerg-
19 ing young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, in-
20 cluding through efforts to—

21 (A) enhance leadership skills;

22 (B) encourage entrepreneurship;

23 (C) strengthen public administration and
24 the role of civil society;

1 (D) enhance peace and security in their re-
 2 spective countries of origin and across Africa;
 3 and

4 (E) connect young African leaders con-
 5 tinentially and globally across the private, civic,
 6 and public sectors;

7 (4) youth in Africa have a positive impact on
 8 efforts to foster economic growth, improve public
 9 sector transparency and governance, and counter ex-
 10 tremism, and should be an area of focus for United
 11 States outreach on the African continent; and

12 (5) the Secretary of State should increase the
 13 number of fellows from Africa participating in the
 14 Mandela Washington Fellowship above the estimated
 15 700 fellows who participated during fiscal year
 16 2021.

17 (b) YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is established the
 19 Young African Leaders Initiative, (“YALI”).

20 (2) PURPOSE.—YALI shall seek to build the ca-
 21 pacity of young African leaders in sub-Saharan Afri-
 22 ca in the areas of business and entrepreneurship,
 23 civic leadership, or public administration, including
 24 through efforts to—

1 (A) support young African leaders by of-
2 fering professional development, training, and
3 networking opportunities, particularly in the
4 areas of leadership, innovation, civic engage-
5 ment, elections, human rights, entrepreneur-
6 ship, good governance, peace and security, and
7 public administration;

8 (B) provide increased training to young
9 African leaders to promote economic growth,
10 strengthen ties between United States and Afri-
11 can businesses, build resilience to predatory
12 lending practices, and improve capacity in stra-
13 tegic sectors, including critical minerals extrac-
14 tion, technology and media; and

15 (C) identify additional ways to connect all
16 YALI alumni to United States public and pri-
17 vate resources and institutions.

18 (3) FELLOWSHIPS.—

19 (A) IN GENERAL.—YALI shall support the
20 participation in the United States in the
21 Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young Af-
22 rican Leaders of fellows from Africa who—

23 (i) are between 25 and 35 years of
24 age;

1 (ii) have demonstrated strong capa-
2 bilities in entrepreneurship, innovation,
3 public service, and leadership; and

4 (iii) have had a positive impact in
5 their communities, organizations, or insti-
6 tutions.

7 (B) OVERSIGHT.—The fellowships de-
8 scribed in paragraph (1) shall be overseen by
9 the Secretary of State through the Bureau of
10 Education and Cultural Affairs.

11 (C) ELIGIBILITY.—The Secretary of State
12 shall establish and publish—

13 (i) eligibility criteria for participation
14 as a fellow under paragraph (1); and

15 (ii) criteria for determining which eli-
16 gible applicants will be selected.

17 (4) RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES.—Subject to the
18 approval of the Secretary of State, United States
19 citizens may—

20 (A) engage in reciprocal exchanges with
21 alumni of the fellowship described in paragraph
22 (3); and

23 (B) collaborate on projects with such fel-
24 lowship alumni.

1 (5) YALI REGIONAL LEADERSHIP CENTERS AND
 2 NETWORKS.—The Administrator of the United
 3 States Agency for International Development shall
 4 establish not fewer than 4 regional leadership cen-
 5 ters in sub-Saharan Africa to offer in-person and on-
 6 line training throughout the year on business and
 7 entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public man-
 8 agement to young African leaders between 18 and
 9 35 years of age who have demonstrated strong capa-
 10 bilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, public serv-
 11 ice and leadership, and peace-building and conflict
 12 resolution, and who have had a positive impact in
 13 their communities, organizations, or institutions.

14 (6) ACTIVITIES.—

15 (A) UNITED STATES-BASED ACTIVITIES.—

16 The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
 17 heads of relevant Federal departments and
 18 agencies, shall oversee all United States-based
 19 activities carried out under YALI, including—

20 (i) the participation of Mandela
 21 Washington Fellows in a six-week Leader-
 22 ship Institute at a United States edu-
 23 cational institution in business, civic en-
 24 gagement, or public management, includ-
 25 ing academic sessions, site visits, profes-

1 sional networking opportunities, leadership
2 training, community service, and organized
3 cultural activities; and

4 (ii) the participation by Mandela
5 Washington Fellows in an annual Mandela
6 Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide
7 such Fellows the opportunity to meet with
8 United States leaders from the private,
9 public, and non-profit sectors.

10 (B) AFRICA-BASED ACTIVITIES.—The Ad-
11 ministrator for the United States Agency for
12 International Development, in coordination with
13 the Secretary of State and the heads of other
14 relevant Federal departments and agencies,
15 should continue to oversee and support YALI
16 activities in sub-Saharan Africa, including—

17 (i) continued leadership training and
18 other professional development opportuni-
19 ties for Mandela Washington Fellowship
20 for Young African Leaders alumni upon
21 their return to their home countries, in-
22 cluding online courses, training, and access
23 to funding;

24 (ii) training for young African leaders
25 at regional leadership centers established

1 in accordance with paragraph (5), and
2 through online and in-person courses of-
3 fered by such centers; and

4 (iii) opportunities for networking and
5 engagement with—

6 (I) alumni of the Mandela Wash-
7 ington Fellowship for Young African
8 Leaders;

9 (II) alumni of programs at re-
10 gional leadership centers established
11 in accordance with paragraph (5);

12 (III) United States and like-
13 minded diplomatic missions, business
14 leaders, the diaspora, and others as
15 appropriate; and

16 (IV) where practicable and ap-
17 propriate, other United States-funded
18 regional leadership programs, includ-
19 ing the Young Southeast Asian Lead-
20 ers Initiative (YSEALI), the Young
21 Leaders of the Americas Initiative
22 (YLAI), the Young Pacific Leaders
23 (YPL), and the Young Transatlantic
24 Innovation Leaders Initiative
25 (YTILI), and through Department of

1 State programs such as the Commu-
2 nity Engagement Exchange Program
3 and other initiatives.

4 (C) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this
5 subsection, the Secretary of State and the Ad-
6 ministrator for the United States Agency for
7 International Development, in coordination with
8 the heads of other relevant Federal depart-
9 ments and agencies, shall seek to partner with
10 the private sector to pursue public-private part-
11 nerships, leverage private sector expertise, ex-
12 pand networking opportunities, and identify
13 funding opportunities as well as fellowship and
14 employment opportunities for YALI.

15 **SEC. 214. STRENGTHENING DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN AFRI-**
16 **CA.**

17 (a) BOLSTERING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC
18 PRESENCE IN AFRICA.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
20 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
21 retary of State shall submit to the appropriate com-
22 mittees of Congress a plan to strengthen United
23 States diplomatic presence in Africa, including to en-
24 sure that United States embassies in Africa have

1 sufficient personnel to focus on the activities, poli-
2 cies, and investments of the PRC.

3 (2) ELEMENTS.—The plan required under sub-
4 section (a) shall include the following elements:

5 (A) A review of the incentives available for
6 United States diplomatic personnel who serve in
7 posts in Africa, which includes proposals to pro-
8 vide additional incentives for hard-to-fill posts
9 in Africa, including those that leverage relevant
10 talent in the Department, including talent with-
11 in the civil service, and which addresses require-
12 ments for promotions and onward assignment
13 for the Foreign Service.

14 (B) An identification of—

15 (i) the number and average duration
16 over the last 5 years of vacancies in the
17 political and economic sections of United
18 States embassies relative to the full-time
19 equivalent positions allocated for the eco-
20 nomic and political sections in such embas-
21 sies; and

22 (ii) the number of Foreign Service Of-
23 ficers who are working in “stretch” posi-
24 tions in the political and economic sections
25 of United States embassies in Africa and a

1 list of proposals to reduce those vacancies
2 and stretch positions.

3 (C) An assessment of whether United
4 States embassies in Africa have adequate staff
5 to implement initiatives such as Prosper Africa
6 and those emanating from the African Leaders
7 Summit and a proposal to better meet the staff-
8 ing needs to implement those and other high-
9 priority initiatives.

10 (b) AFRICA HEADS OF STATE SUMMIT.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year
12 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and bi-
13 ennially thereafter, the President shall convene a
14 United States-Africa Leaders Summit (in this sub-
15 section referred to as the “Summit”) in order to es-
16 tablish stronger bilateral and multilateral diplomatic,
17 economic, security, and cultural ties between the
18 United States and African countries.

19 (2) PARTICIPATION.—Each Summit convened
20 pursuant to this subsection shall have participation,
21 including in meetings with United States officials,
22 from—

23 (A) leaders of civilian-led governments of
24 African countries in good standing with the Af-

1 rican Union, each of which the President has
2 determined—

3 (i) has held a credible election associ-
4 ated with the current head of government
5 or state; or

6 (ii) is the head of a transitional gov-
7 ernment, is implementing a roadmap to
8 hold credible elections, and is unaffiliated
9 with actions that were related to an uncon-
10 stitutional change of administration; and

11 (B) civil society from each of the African
12 countries represented at the Summit.

13 (3) UNIT TO PLAN AND IMPLEMENT.—

14 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State
15 shall establish a dedicated unit within the Bu-
16 reau of African Affairs of the Department of
17 State to coordinate, plan, and implement the
18 Summit on a biennial basis, which should in-
19 clude robust interagency consultation and may
20 include, on a temporary basis, personnel sec-
21 onded from the United States Agency for Inter-
22 national Development and other Federal agen-
23 cies as appropriate, and which shall be led by
24 an individual who has previously been appointed
25 by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

(B) PLANNING EFFORTS.—The unit established under this paragraph shall—

(i) use lessons learned from the 2022 African Leaders Summit and subsequent Summits to inform planning of future Summits;

(ii) lead interagency efforts to provide guidance to United States embassies in African countries related to planning each Summit and engagement with governments and civil society in advance of each Summit;

(iii) lead efforts to implement commitments made at previous Summits; and

(iv) consult regularly with the appropriate committees of Congress on the planning in advance of, and follow-up for, each Summit.

SEC. 215. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

1 (1) the Government of the PRC is exporting its
2 model for internal security and state control of soci-
3 ety through advanced technology and artificial intel-
4 ligence; and

5 (2) the inclusion of communication networks
6 and communications supply chains with equipment
7 and services from companies with close ties to or
8 that are susceptible to pressure from the Govern-
9 ment of the PRC or security services without reliable
10 legal checks on governmental powers can lead to
11 breaches of citizens' private information, increased
12 censorship, violations or abuses of human rights,
13 and harassment of political opponents.

14 (b) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief
15 Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global
16 Media, working through the Open Technology Fund, and
17 the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of De-
18 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor, shall expand and
19 prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship and anti-sur-
20 veillance technology and services to journalists in Latin
21 America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their abil-
22 ity to safely access or share digital news and information.

23 (c) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of
24 State, through the Assistant Secretary of State for De-
25 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and in coordination

1 with the Administrator of the United States Agency for
2 International Development, shall work with civil society
3 partners to—

4 (1) support and promote programs that support
5 internet freedom and the free flow of information
6 online in Latin America and the Caribbean;

7 (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli-
8 able access to internet in Latin America and the
9 Caribbean;

10 (3) provide integrated support to civil society
11 for digital safety and related technology programs in
12 Latin America and the Caribbean;

13 (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in
14 Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative
15 techniques necessary to ensure public accountability
16 and prevent government overreach in the digital
17 sphere;

18 (5) assist independent media outlets and jour-
19 nalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build
20 their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth
21 news reports covering governance and human rights
22 topics;

23 (6) provide training for journalists and civil so-
24 ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to

1 improve transparency and accountability in govern-
 2 ment and the private sector;

3 (7) provide training on investigative reporting
 4 of incidents of corruption, unfair trade, and coercive
 5 and anti-competitive business and commercial prac-
 6 tices perpetrated by the PRC, including the role of
 7 the Government of the PRC in such practices;

8 (8) assist civil society organizations to strength-
 9 en their capacity to monitor the activities described
 10 in paragraph (7); and

11 (9) identify local organizations to support the
 12 activities to be carried out under this subsection.

13 **Subtitle B—International** 14 **Organizations**

15 **SEC. 221. SAFEGUARDING THE INTEGRITY OF THE UNITED** 16 **NATIONS SYSTEM.**

17 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Con-
 18 gress that—

19 (1) the United Nations system is critical to ad-
 20 vancing peace and security, human rights, and devel-
 21 opment;

22 (2) the United States benefits from opportuni-
 23 ties at the United Nations to engage in multilateral
 24 diplomacy to advance its own interests and to work

1 with other members of the international community
2 to address complex and shared challenges; and

3 (3) the United States therefore has an interest
4 in safeguarding the integrity the United Nations
5 System.

6 (b) PRIORITIZING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.—

7 The Secretary of State, in coordination with the United
8 States Ambassador to the United Nations as appropriate,
9 shall prioritize and instruct the senior leadership of the
10 United States Mission to the United Nations and other
11 United States Missions to the United Nations to—

12 (1) promote United States participation in the
13 United Nations System, and that of United States
14 allies and partners who are committed to upholding
15 the integrity of the United Nations;

16 (2) ensure that United Nations employees are
17 held accountable to their obligation to uphold the
18 United Nations charter, rules, and regulations;

19 (3) hold United States citizens and lawful per-
20 manent residents serving within the United Nations
21 accountable for conduct, or conspiring or attempting
22 to engage in conduct, outside of the United States
23 that would constitute a crime if the conduct had oc-
24 curred within the United States;

1 (4) monitor and counter undue influence, espe-
2 cially by authoritarian governments, within the
3 United Nations System;

4 (5) promote meaningful participation and inclu-
5 sion of Taiwan throughout the United Nations Sys-
6 tem and its affiliated agencies and bodies; and

7 (6) advance other priorities deemed relevant by
8 the Secretary of State and the United States Rep-
9 resentative to the United Nations to safeguard the
10 integrity of the United Nations System.

11 **SEC. 222. UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN UNITED NA-**
12 **TIONS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND RE-**
13 **LATED ORGANIZATIONS.**

14 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
15 ings:

16 (1) Congress and the executive branch share re-
17 sponsibility for the foreign relations of the United
18 States pursuant to Article I and Article II of the
19 Constitution of the United States.

20 (2) While the executive branch has a unique
21 role in speaking for the United States with other
22 governments, it is not unconstrained under United
23 States law in doing so.

24 (3) The Senate has a constitutional role in the
25 treaty-making process, and when the Senate ex-

1 pressly imposes limitations or requirements that the
2 executive branch must satisfy before withdrawing
3 from or terminating a treaty relationship, the execu-
4 tive branch must adhere to those limitations or re-
5 quirements.

6 (4) The Senate has provided advice and consent
7 to ratification of various agreements for the United
8 States to join United Nations bodies, and Congress
9 has authorized United States participation in other
10 United Nations bodies where treaty ratification was
11 not required, including the World Health Organiza-
12 tion.

13 (5) Congress therefore has a clear role—con-
14 sistent with its constitutional responsibilities in for-
15 eign affairs, advice, and consent to ratification of
16 treaties, and the making of Federal law—in whether
17 and how the United States participates in the
18 United Nations, including whether it seeks to with-
19 draw from such participation.

20 (6) Robust United States engagement in inter-
21 national organizations, including the World Health
22 Organization, is critical in countering efforts by the
23 PRC to bolster its influence around the world.

24 (b) WITHDRAWAL FROM WORLD HEALTH ORGANI-
25 ZATION.—Section 4 of the Joint Resolution entitled, “Pro-

1 viding for membership by the United States in the World
2 Health Organization and authorizing an appropriation
3 therefor,” approved June 14, 1948 (22 U.S.C. 290c), is
4 amended by inserting before the period at the end the fol-
5 lowing “: *Provided further*, That not less than 180 days
6 before providing notice to withdraw the United States
7 from the World Health Organization, the President and
8 Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committee
9 on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
10 on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a noti-
11 fication that such withdrawal is in the national interests
12 of the United States”.

13 (c) WITHDRAWAL FROM OTHER SPECIALIZED AGEN-
14 CIES OR RELATED ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED NA-
15 TIONS.—Not less than 180 days before taking formal ac-
16 tion to initiate the United States withdrawal from a
17 United Nations specialized agency or related organization,
18 the President and Secretary of State shall jointly submit
19 to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
20 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
21 resentatives a notification that such withdrawal is in the
22 national interests of the United States.

1 **SEC. 223. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE ON MULTILATERAL**
2 **STRATEGY AND PERSONNEL.**

3 There is established within the Bureau of Inter-
4 national Organizations of the Department of State an Of-
5 fice on Multilateral Strategy and Personnel (MSP) with
6 the following responsibilities:

7 (1) Developing, coordinating, and maintaining a
8 whole-of-government strategy to strengthen United
9 States engagement and leadership with multilateral
10 institutions and international organizations, to in-
11 clude managing efforts to counter third-countries
12 seeking to undermine the integrity of the United Na-
13 tions.

14 (2) Coordinating whole-of-government efforts
15 related to the United Nations Junior Professional
16 Officer (JPO) program, including—

17 (A) recruiting qualified individuals who
18 represent the rich diversity of the United States
19 to apply for United States-sponsored JPO posi-
20 tions;

21 (B) collecting and collating information
22 about United States-sponsored JPOs from
23 across the United States Government;

24 (C) establishing and providing orientation
25 and other training materials with United States
26 agencies sponsoring JPOs;

1 (D) maintaining regular contact with cur-
2 rent and former United States-sponsored JPOs,
3 including providing career and professional ad-
4 vice to United States-sponsored JPOs;

5 (E) making, informing, and advising on
6 strategic decisions, including about the location
7 and duration of United States-sponsored JPO
8 positions to strengthen United States national
9 security interests and the competitive advantage
10 of United States-sponsored JPOs for future em-
11 ployment; and

12 (F) sponsoring events, including represen-
13 tational events as appropriate, to support
14 United States-sponsored JPOs.

15 (3) Coordinating and overseeing a whole-of-gov-
16 ernment United States strategy and efforts in rela-
17 tion to promoting qualified United States candidates
18 for elected or appointed senior positions at multilat-
19 eral institutions and international organizations, in-
20 cluding—

21 (A) creating a whole-of-government strat-
22 egy that identifies and prioritizes upcoming
23 openings of leadership positions at multilateral
24 institutions and international organizations;

1 (B) developing and executing processes to
2 identify and recruit qualified candidates to
3 apply or run for these offices;

4 (C) consulting across the Department and
5 interagency as they implement selection proc-
6 esses; and

7 (D) creating and implementing a strategy
8 to obtain the support necessary for United
9 States candidates for priority leadership posi-
10 tions including—

11 (i) liaising and coordinating with
12 international partners to promote United
13 States candidates; and

14 (ii) working with embassies to engage
15 officials and other entities needed to sup-
16 port relevant United States candidates.

17 (4) Promoting detail and transfer opportunities
18 for qualified United States personnel to multilateral
19 organizations including by—

20 (A) liaising with multilateral institutions to
21 promote and identify detail and transfer oppor-
22 tunities;

23 (B) developing and maintaining a database
24 of detail and transfer opportunities to multilat-
25 eral organizations;

1 (C) promoting these detail and transfer op-
 2 portunities within the United States Govern-
 3 ment and making the database available to
 4 those eligible for details and transfers; and

5 (D) facilitating any relevant orientation,
 6 trainings, or materials for detailees and trans-
 7 ferees, including debriefing detailees and trans-
 8 ferees upon their return to the United States
 9 Government.

10 (5) Promoting internship and volunteer oppor-
 11 tunities at multilateral institutions and international
 12 organizations and coordinating orientation and ca-
 13 reer development opportunities, as relevant.

14 (6) Promoting and entering into partnership ar-
 15 rangements with multilateral institutions and inter-
 16 national organizations to encourage United States
 17 nationals participation in such organizations.

18 **SEC. 224. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS TO PRO-**
 19 **MOTE UNITED STATES CITIZEN EMPLOY-**
 20 **MENT AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTER-**
 21 **NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should direct
 23 United States departments and agencies to, in coordina-
 24 tion with the Secretary of State—

1 (1) fund and recruit Junior Professional Offi-
2 cers for positions at the United Nations and related
3 specialized and technical organizations; and

4 (2) facilitate secondments, details, and trans-
5 fers to agencies and specialized and technical bodies
6 of the United Nations.

7 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
8 authorized to be appropriated an additional \$50,000,000
9 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2031 for the Sec-
10 retary of State to support Junior Professional Officers,
11 details, transfers, volunteers, and interns that advance
12 United States interests at multilateral institutions and
13 international organizations, including to recruit, train, and
14 host events related to such positions, and to promote
15 United States citizen candidates for employment and lead-
16 ership positions at multilateral institutions and inter-
17 national organizations.

18 **SEC. 225. UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP AND REPRESENTA-**
19 **TION IN STANDARDS-SETTING BODIES.**

20 (a) ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP
21 OF UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS-
22 SETTING BODIES.—The President shall—

23 (1) establish an interagency working group to
24 provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance
25 the representation and leadership of the United

1 States at international bodies that set standards for
2 equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined
3 networks that support 5th and future generation
4 mobile telecommunications systems and infrastruc-
5 ture, such as the International Telecommunication
6 Union and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project;
7 and

8 (2) work with allies, partners, and the private
9 sector to increase productive engagement with re-
10 spect to the standards described in paragraph (1).

11 (b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The inter-
12 agency working group described in subsection (a) shall—

13 (1) be chaired by the Secretary of Commerce or
14 a designee of the Secretary at the Deputy Assistant
15 Secretary level or above;

16 (2) be vice-chaired by the Secretary of State or
17 a designee of the Secretary at the Deputy Assistant
18 Secretary level or above to focus on cooperation with
19 allies and partners with respect to international
20 standards-setting bodies; and

21 (3) consist of the head (or designee) of each
22 Federal department or agency the President deter-
23 mines appropriate.

1 **Subtitle C—South China and East**
2 **China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024**

3 **SEC. 231. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This part may be cited as the “South China Sea and
5 East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024”.

6 **SEC. 232. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PRC PERSONS RE-**
7 **SPONSIBLE FOR THE PRC’S ACTIVITIES IN**
8 **THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE EAST CHINA**
9 **SEA.**

10 (a) INITIAL IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—On and
11 after the date that is 120 days after the date of the enact-
12 ment of this Act, the President may impose the sanctions
13 described in subsection (b) with respect to any PRC per-
14 son, including any senior official of the Government of the
15 PRC, that the President determines—

16 (1) is responsible for or significantly contributes
17 to large-scale reclamation, construction, militariza-
18 tion, or ongoing supply of outposts in disputed areas
19 of the South China Sea;

20 (2) is responsible for or significantly contributes
21 to, or has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions,
22 including the use of coercion, to inhibit another
23 country from protecting its sovereign rights to ac-
24 cess offshore resources in the South China Sea, in-
25 cluding in such country’s exclusive economic zone,

1 consistent with such country's rights and obligations
2 under international law;

3 (3) is responsible for or complicit in, or has en-
4 gaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that signifi-
5 cantly threaten the peace, security, or stability of
6 disputed areas of the South China Sea or areas of
7 the East China Sea administered by Japan or the
8 Republic of Korea, including through the use of ves-
9 sels and aircraft by the PRC to occupy or conduct
10 extensive research or drilling activity in those areas;

11 (4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or pro-
12 vided financial, material, or technological support
13 for, or goods or services to, or in support of, any
14 person subject to sanctions pursuant to paragraph
15 (1), (2), or (3); or

16 (5) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for
17 or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person
18 subject to sanctions pursuant to paragraph (1), (2),
19 or (3).

20 (b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions that
21 may be imposed with respect to a person described in sub-
22 section (a) are the following:

23 (1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President
24 may, in accordance with the International Emer-
25 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et

seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.

(2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—

(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—In the case of an alien, the alien may be—

- (i) inadmissible to the United States;
- (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and
- (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

(i) IN GENERAL.—An alien described in subparagraph (A) may be subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or

1 other entry documentation is or was
2 issued.

3 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca-
4 tion under clause (i) may—

5 (I) take effect immediately in ac-
6 cordance with section 221(i) of the
7 Immigration and Nationality Act (8
8 U.S.C. 1201(i)); and

9 (II) cancel any other valid visa or
10 entry documentation that is in the
11 alien's possession.

12 (3) EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.—

13 The President may direct the Secretary of State to
14 deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
15 rity to exclude from the United States, any alien
16 that the President determines is a corporate officer
17 or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling
18 interest in, the person.

19 (4) EXPORT SANCTION.—The President may
20 order the United States Government not to issue
21 any specific license and not to grant any other spe-
22 cific permission or authority to export any goods or
23 technology to the person under—

24 (A) the Export Control Reform Act of
25 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.); or

1 (B) any other statute that requires the
2 prior review and approval of the United States
3 Government as a condition for the export or re-
4 export of goods or services.

5 (5) INCLUSION ON ENTITY LIST.—The Presi-
6 dent may include the entity on the entity list main-
7 tained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of
8 the Department of Commerce and set forth in Sup-
9 plement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Adminis-
10 tration Regulations, for activities contrary to the na-
11 tional security or foreign policy interests of the
12 United States.

13 (6) BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT
14 OF SANCTIONED PERSON.—The President may, pur-
15 suant to such regulations or guidelines as the Presi-
16 dent may prescribe, prohibit any United States per-
17 son from investing in or purchasing equity or debt
18 instruments of the person.

19 (7) BANKING TRANSACTIONS.—The President
20 may, pursuant to such regulations as the President
21 may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or
22 payments between financial institutions or by,
23 through, or to any financial institution, to the extent
24 that such transfers or payments are subject to the

1 jurisdiction of the United States and involve any in-
2 terest of the person.

3 (8) CORRESPONDENT AND PAYABLE-THROUGH
4 ACCOUNTS.—In the case of a foreign financial insti-
5 tution, the President may prohibit the opening, and
6 prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintain-
7 ing, in the United States of a correspondent account
8 or a payable-through account by the foreign finan-
9 cial institution.

10 (c) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

11 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-
12 ercise all authorities provided under sections 203
13 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic
14 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out
15 this section.

16 (2) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in
17 subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter-
18 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
19 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates,
20 attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a
21 violation of regulations prescribed under subsection
22 (b)(1) to the same extent that such penalties apply
23 to a person that commits an unlawful act described
24 in subsection (a) of such section 206.

25 (d) EXCEPTIONS.—

1 (1) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMER-
2 GENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements of section
3 202 of the International Emergency Economic Pow-
4 ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply for pur-
5 poses of subsection (b)(1).

6 (2) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE, LAW EN-
7 FORCEMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIVI-
8 TIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply
9 to any authorized intelligence, law enforcement, or
10 national security activities of the United States.

11 (3) COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
12 MENTS.—Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b)
13 shall not apply if admission of an alien to the United
14 States is necessary to permit the United States to
15 comply with the Agreement regarding the Head-
16 quarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Suc-
17 cess, June 26, 1947, and entered into force, Novem-
18 ber 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the
19 United States and other international obligations of
20 the United States.

21 (4) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF
22 GOODS.—

23 (A) IN GENERAL.—The authority or a re-
24 quirement to impose sanctions under this sec-
25 tion shall not include the authority or a require-

1 ment to impose sanctions on the importation of
2 goods.

3 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,
4 the term “good” means any article, natural or
5 manmade substance, material, supply, or manu-
6 factured product, including inspection and test
7 equipment, and excluding technical data.

8 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

9 (1) ACCOUNT; CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAY-
10 ABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms “account”,
11 “correspondent account”, and “payable-through ac-
12 count” have the meanings given those terms in sec-
13 tion 5318A of title 31, United States Code.

14 (2) ALIEN.—The term “alien” has the meaning
15 given that term in section 101(a) of the Immigration
16 and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)).

17 (3) PRC PERSON.—The term “PRC person”
18 means—

19 (A) an individual who is a citizen or na-
20 tional of the PRC; or

21 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
22 the PRC or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction
23 of the Government of the PRC.

24 (4) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term “fi-
25 nancial institution” means a financial institution

1 specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E),
2 (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (K), (M), (N), (P), (R), (T),
3 (Y), or (Z) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United
4 States Code.

5 (5) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The
6 term “foreign financial institution” has the meaning
7 given that term in section 1010.605 of title 31, Code
8 of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar
9 regulation or ruling).

10 (6) PERSON.—The term “person” means any
11 individual or entity.

12 (7) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
13 “United States person” means—

14 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
15 fully admitted for permanent residence to the
16 United States;

17 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
18 the United States or of any jurisdiction within
19 the United States, including a foreign branch of
20 such an entity; or

21 (C) any person in the United States.

1 **SEC. 233. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PORTRAYALS**
2 **OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA OR THE EAST**
3 **CHINA SEA AS PART OF CHINA.**

4 It is the sense of Congress that the Government Pub-
5 lishing Office should not publish any map, document,
6 record, electronic resource, or other paper of the United
7 States (other than materials relating to hearings held by
8 committees of Congress or internal work product of a Fed-
9 eral agency) portraying or otherwise indicating that it is
10 the position of the United States that any part of the terri-
11 tory or airspace in the South China Sea that is disputed
12 among two or more parties, or of the territory or airspace
13 of areas administered by Japan or the Republic of Korea,
14 including in the East China Sea, is part of the territory
15 or airspace of the PRC.

16 **SEC. 234. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON 2016 PERMANENT**
17 **COURT OF ARBITRATION'S TRIBUNAL RUL-**
18 **ING ON ARBITRATION CASE BETWEEN PHIL-**
19 **IPPINES AND PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

20 (a) FINDING.—Congress finds that on July 12, 2016,
21 a tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration found
22 in the arbitration case between the Philippines and the
23 PRC under the United Nations Convention on the Law
24 of the Sea that the PRC's claims, including those to off-
25 shore resources and “historic rights”, were unlawful, and

1 that the tribunal's ruling is final and legally binding on
2 both parties.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) the United States and the international
6 community should reject the unlawful claims of the
7 PRC within the exclusive economic zone or on the
8 continental shelf of the Philippines, as well as the
9 maritime claims of the PRC beyond a 12-nautical-
10 mile territorial sea from the islands it claims in the
11 South China Sea;

12 (2) the provocative behavior of the PRC, includ-
13 ing coercing other countries with claims in the South
14 China Sea and preventing those countries from ac-
15 cessing offshore resources, undermines peace and
16 stability in the South China Sea;

17 (3) the international community should—

18 (A) support the ruling described in sub-
19 section (a) in compliance with international law;
20 and

21 (B) take all necessary steps to support the
22 rules-based international order in the South
23 China Sea; and

24 (4) all claimants in the South China Sea
25 should—

1 (A) refrain from engaging in destabilizing
2 activities, including illegal occupation or efforts
3 to unlawfully assert control over disputed
4 claims;

5 (B) ensure that disputes are managed
6 without intimidation, coercion, or force;

7 (C) clarify or adjust claims in accordance
8 with international law; and

9 (D) uphold the principle that territorial
10 and maritime claims, including over territorial
11 waters or territorial seas, must be derived from
12 land features and otherwise comport with inter-
13 national law.

1 **TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR**
2 **VALUES**
3 **Subtitle A—Promoting Human**
4 **Rights in People’s Republic of**
5 **China**

6 **PART I—PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS FOR CITI-**
7 **ZENS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**
8 **AND FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN**
9 **CHINA**

10 **SEC. 301. PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE’S**
11 **REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall carry out pro-
13 grams, including through nongovernmental organizations,
14 that prioritize the protection and advancement of the free-
15 doms of association, assembly, religion, and expression for,
16 democracy and human rights activists, women, and ethnic
17 and religious minorities in the PRC.

18 (b) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.—In carrying out
19 this section, the Assistant Secretary of Democracy,
20 Human Rights, and Labor shall consult with the appro-
21 priate committees of Congress regarding—

22 (1) strengthening the capacity of the organiza-
23 tions referred to in subsection (a);

24 (2) protecting members of the groups referred
25 to in subsection (a) who have been targeted for ar-

1 rest, harassment, forced sterilizations, coercive abor-
2 tions, forced labor, intimidation, or subject to
3 transnational repression, including members residing
4 outside of the PRC; and

5 (3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest pos-
6 sible audiences within the PRC about United States
7 Government efforts to protect freedom of associa-
8 tion, expression, assembly, and the rights of women
9 and ethnic and religious minorities.

10 **SEC. 302. REPORT ON CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF SENIOR OF-**
11 **FICIALS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S**
12 **REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

13 (a) ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
15 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
16 nually thereafter through 2028, the Secretary of
17 State, in consultation with the Secretary of the
18 Treasury and any other relevant United States Gov-
19 ernment official, shall submit to the appropriate
20 committees of Congress a report identifying those
21 senior PRC officials who are responsible for, or
22 complicit in, or who have directly or indirectly en-
23 gaged in, significant corruption.

24 (2) ELEMENTS.—

1 (A) IN GENERAL.—The report required
2 under paragraph (1) shall include the following
3 elements:

4 (i) A general description of the cor-
5 rupt sources of wealth of senior PRC offi-
6 cials.

7 (ii) A description of corruption, in-
8 cluding activities taking place outside of
9 China, engaged in by senior PRC officials.

10 (iii) A description of any gaps in the
11 ability of the intelligence community to col-
12 lect information described in clauses (i)
13 and (ii).

14 (iv) The names of other individuals
15 and entities who facilitate or benefit from
16 significant corruption by senior PRC offi-
17 cials, both inside and outside of the PRC.

18 (B) SCOPE OF REPORTS.—The first report
19 submitted under paragraph (1) shall include
20 comprehensive information on the matters de-
21 scribed in subparagraph (A). Each succeeding
22 report submitted under paragraph (1) may con-
23 sist of an update or supplement to the pre-
24 ceding report submitted under that paragraph.

1 (3) FORM.—The report required under para-
2 graph (1) shall include an unclassified executive
3 summary of the elements described in clauses (i)
4 and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A), and may include a
5 classified annex.

6 (4) ASSESSMENT OF APPLICABILITY OF SANC-
7 TIONS.—

8 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180
9 days after submission of each report required
10 by paragraph (1), the Secretary of State, in co-
11 ordination with the Secretary of the Treasury,
12 as appropriate, shall—

13 (i) evaluate whether any foreign per-
14 son identified under this section may meet
15 the criteria for the potential imposition of
16 sanctions under existing sanctions authori-
17 ties, including—

18 (I) the Global Magnitsky Human
19 Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C.
20 10101 et seq.); and

21 (II) section 7031(c) of the De-
22 partment of State, Foreign Oper-
23 ations, and Related Programs Appro-
24 priations Act, 2023 (division K of

1 Public Law 117–328; 8 U.S.C. 1182
2 note); and

3 (ii) submit to the appropriate commit-
4 tees of Congress a report, in writing, set-
5 ting forth the results of that assessment.

6 (B) FORM.—The report required by sub-
7 paragraph (A)(ii) shall be submitted in unclas-
8 sified form, but may include a classified annex.

9 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
10 gress that the United States should undertake every effort
11 and pursue every opportunity to expose the corruption and
12 related practices of senior PRC officials, including General
13 Secretary of the Communist Party and President Xi
14 Jinping.

15 (c) CORRUPTION DEFINED.—In this section the term
16 “corruption” includes, among other activities—

- 17 (1) the misappropriation of state assets;
18 (2) the expropriation of private assets for per-
19 sonal gain;
20 (3) abuse of an official position related to gov-
21 ernment contracts or the extraction of natural re-
22 sources; and
23 (4) bribery.

1 **SEC. 303. CHINA EXIT BANS.**

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall col-
3 lect and analyze available information on the application
4 of exit bans by the PRC, including trends with respect
5 to the application of such exit bans to United States na-
6 tionals. Such data shall be—

7 (1) used to update of travel warnings as appro-
8 priate, and in disseminating such information to rel-
9 evant State and local authorities, with a special em-
10 phasis on domestic jurisdictions with large numbers
11 of at-risk populations;

12 (2) shared, as appropriate, with allies and part-
13 ner nations about potential risks and vulnerabilities
14 their citizens may face in traveling to the PRC;

15 (3) used to inform United States actions to
16 hold the PRC accountable for these actions; and

17 (4) submitted to the appropriate committees of
18 Congress.

19 (b) EXIT BAN DEFINED.—In this section the term
20 “exit ban” means a restriction imposed by the Govern-
21 ment of the PRC that prevents foreign nationals, includ-
22 ing United States nationals, including legal permanent
23 residents of the United States, from leaving the PRC with-
24 out a fair and transparent legal cause or recourse for the
25 impacted party.

1 **PART II—MATTERS RELATED TO HONG KONG**

2 **SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO-**
3 **MOTION OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,**
4 **AND CIVILIAN SECURITY IN HONG KONG.**

5 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
6 authorized to be appropriated \$5,000,000 for fiscal year
7 2025 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
8 Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy,
9 human rights, and civilian security in Hong Kong.

10 (b) ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of State shall
11 designate an office within the Bureau of Democracy,
12 Human Rights, and Labor to administer and coordinate
13 the provision of the funds described in subsection (a) with-
14 in the Department of State and across the United States
15 Government.

16 **SEC. 306. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET**
17 **FREEDOM AND CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS FOR**
18 **THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.**

19 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
20 ings:

21 (1) The PRC has repeatedly violated its obliga-
22 tions under the Joint Declaration by suppressing the
23 basic rights and freedoms of Hong Kongers.

24 (2) On June 30, 2020, the National People’s
25 Congress passed a “National Security Law” that

1 further erodes Hong Kong's autonomy and enables
2 authorities to suppress dissent.

3 (3) The PRC continues to utilize the National
4 Security Law to undermine the fundamental rights
5 of the people of Hong Kong through suppression of
6 the freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the
7 press.

8 (4) Article 9 of the National Security Law au-
9 thorizes unprecedented regulation and supervision of
10 internet activity in Hong Kong, including expanded
11 police powers to force internet service providers to
12 censor content, hand over user information, and
13 block access to platforms.

14 (5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong
15 Broadband Network blocked public access to HK
16 Chronicles, a website promoting pro-democracy view-
17 points, under the authorities of the National Secu-
18 rity Law.

19 (6) On February 12, 2021, internet service pro-
20 viders blocked Hong Kong users' access to the Tai-
21 wan Transitional Justice Commission website in
22 Hong Kong.

23 (7) Major tech companies, including Facebook,
24 Twitter, WhatsApp, and Google have stopped review-

1 ing requests for user data from Hong Kong authori-
2 ties.

3 (8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy
4 activists in Hong Kong were arrested and charged
5 under the National Security Law on the charge of
6 “conspiracy to commit subversion”.

7 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
8 gress that the United States should—

9 (1) support the ability of the people of Hong
10 Kong to maintain their freedom to access informa-
11 tion online; and

12 (2) focus on investments in technologies that
13 facilitate the unhindered exchange of information in
14 Hong Kong in advance of any future efforts by the
15 Chinese Communist Party—

16 (A) to suppress internet access;

17 (B) to increase online censorship; or

18 (C) to inhibit online communication and
19 content-sharing by the people of Hong Kong.

20 (c) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAM.—

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
22 establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program
23 in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
24 Labor of the Department of State which shall in-
25 clude a working group dedicated to developing a

1 strategy to bolster internet resiliency and online ac-
2 cess in Hong Kong (in this subsection, the “Pro-
3 gram”). The working group shall consist of—

4 (A) the Under Secretary of State for Civil-
5 ian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;

6 (B) the Assistant Secretary of State for
7 East Asian and Pacific Affairs;

8 (C) the Chief Executive Officer of the
9 United States Agency for Global Media;

10 (D) the President of the Open Technology
11 Fund;

12 (E) the Administrator of the United States
13 Agency for International Development; and

14 (F) the Ambassador-at-large for Cyber-
15 space and Digital Policy;

16 (2) INDEPENDENCE.—During the period begin-
17 ning on the date of the enactment of this Act and
18 ending on September 30, 2027, the Program shall
19 be carried out independent from internet freedom
20 programs focused on the rest of the PRC.

21 (3) CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF
22 STATE PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2026,
23 the Secretary of State may—

1 (A) consolidate the Program with the
 2 mainland China initiatives in the Bureau of De-
 3 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor; or

4 (B) continue to carry out the Program in
 5 accordance with paragraph (2).

6 (d) SUPPORT FOR INTERNET FREEDOM TECH-
 7 NOLOGY PROGRAMS.—

8 (1) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.—The Secretary of
 9 State, working with the Administrator of the United
 10 States Agency for International Development and
 11 the President of the Open Technology fund as ap-
 12 propriate, are authorized to award grants and con-
 13 tracts to private organizations to support and de-
 14 velop programs in Hong Kong that promote or ex-
 15 pand—

16 (A) open, interoperable, reliable, and se-
 17 cure internet; and

18 (B) the online exercise of human rights
 19 and fundamental freedoms of individual citi-
 20 zens, activists, human rights defenders, inde-
 21 pendent journalists, civil society organizations,
 22 and marginalized populations in Hong Kong.

23 (2) GOALS.—The goals of the programs devel-
 24 oped with grants authorized under paragraph (1)
 25 should be—

1 (A) to support unrestricted access to the
2 internet in Hong Kong;

3 (B) to increase the availability of internet
4 freedom tools in Hong Kong;

5 (C) to scale up the distribution of such
6 technologies and tools throughout Hong Kong;

7 (D) to prioritize the development of tools,
8 components, code, and technologies that are
9 fully open-source, to the extent practicable;

10 (E) to conduct research on repressive tac-
11 tics that undermine internet freedom in Hong
12 Kong;

13 (F) to ensure information on digital safety
14 is available to human rights defenders, inde-
15 pendent journalists, civil society organizations,
16 and marginalized populations in Hong Kong;
17 and

18 (G) to engage private industry, including
19 e-commerce firms and social networking compa-
20 nies, on the importance of preserving unre-
21 stricted internet access in Hong Kong.

22 (3) GRANT RECIPIENTS.—Grants authorized
23 under this subsection shall be distributed to multiple
24 vendors and suppliers through an open, fair, com-
25 petitive, and evidence-based decision process—

1 (A) to diversify the technical base; and

2 (B) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad ac-
3 tors.

4 (4) SECURITY AUDITS.—New technologies de-
5 veloped using grants authorized under this sub-
6 section shall undergo comprehensive security audits
7 to ensure that such technologies are secure and have
8 not been compromised in a manner detrimental to
9 the interests of the United States or to individuals
10 or organizations benefitting from programs sup-
11 ported by these funds.

12 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

13 (1) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—There is au-
14 thorized to be appropriated to the Open Technology
15 Fund \$2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025
16 through 2029 to carry out this section. This funding
17 is in addition to the funds authorized for the Open
18 Technology Fund pursuant to section 309A of
19 United States International Broadcasting Act of
20 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6208a).

21 (2) BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
22 AND LABOR.—In addition to the funds authorized to
23 be made available pursuant to paragraph (1), there
24 is authorized to be appropriated to the Office of
25 Internet Freedom Programs in the Bureau of De-

1 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Depart-
2 ment of State \$2,000,000 for each of fiscal years
3 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section.

4 **PART III—MATTERS RELATED TO XINJIANG**

5 **SEC. 311. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF**
6 **UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES**
7 **IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE-**
8 **GION.**

9 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
10 ings:

11 (1) Uyghurs are one of several predominantly
12 Muslim Turkic groups living in the Xinjiang Uyghur
13 Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the northwest of the
14 PRC.

15 (2) Following Uyghur demonstrations and un-
16 rest in 2009 and clashes with government security
17 personnel and other violent incidents in subsequent
18 years, PRC leaders began a campaign of large-scale
19 atrocities in the XUAR including arrests and ex-
20 treme security measures, under the pretext of com-
21 batting alleged terrorism, religious extremism, and
22 ethnic separatism.

23 (3) In May 2014, the PRC launched its “Strike
24 Hard Against Violent Extremism” campaign, which
25 resulted in additional human rights violations

1 against minorities in the XUAR under the pretext of
2 fighting terrorism.

3 (4) In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party
4 (CCP) Politburo member Chen Quanguo, former
5 Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Secretary,
6 known for overseeing intensifying security operations
7 and human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed
8 as Party Secretary of the XUAR.

9 (5) Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities
10 sought to forcibly “assimilate” Uyghurs and other
11 Turkic minorities into Chinese society through a pol-
12 icy of cultural erasure known as “Sinicization”.

13 (6) Since 2018, credible reporting, including
14 from the BBC, France24, and the New York Times,
15 has shown that the Government of the PRC has
16 built mass internment camps in the XUAR, which it
17 calls “vocational training” centers, and detained
18 Uyghurs and other groups in them and other facili-
19 ties.

20 (7) Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbi-
21 trarily detained an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs—
22 12.5 percent of the XUAR’s official Uyghur popu-
23 lation of 12,000,000—and a smaller number of
24 other ethnic minorities in the “vocational training”

1 centers and other detention and pre-detention facili-
2 ties.

3 (8) In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than
4 two percent of the PRC's total population but 21
5 percent of all arrests in China.

6 (9) The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other
7 sources have revealed that detainees are forced to re-
8 nounce many of their Islamic beliefs and customs
9 and repudiate Uyghur culture, language, and iden-
10 tity.

11 (10) Investigations by Human Rights Watch
12 and other human rights organizations have docu-
13 mented how detainees are subject to political indoc-
14 trination, forced labor, crowded and unsanitary con-
15 ditions, involuntary biometric data collection, both
16 medical neglect and intrusive medical interventions,
17 food and water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence,
18 and torture.

19 (11) Research by the Australian Strategic Pol-
20 icy Institute suggests that, since late 2019, many
21 detainees have been placed in higher security facili-
22 ties and convicted of formal crimes.

23 (12) Human Rights Watch has reported that
24 the PRC uses data collection programs, including fa-
25 cial recognition technology, to surveil Uyghurs in the

1 XUAR and to identify individuals whom authorities
2 may detain.

3 (13) PRC authorities have placed countless
4 children whose parents are detained or in exile in
5 state-run institutions and boarding schools without
6 the consent of their parents.

7 (14) New York Times reporting revealed that
8 numerous local PRC officials who did not agree with
9 the policies carried out in XUAR have been fired
10 and imprisoned.

11 (15) Associated Press reporting documented
12 widespread and systemic efforts by PRC authorities
13 to force Uyghur women to take contraceptives or to
14 subject them to sterilization or abortion, threatening
15 to detain those who do not comply.

16 (16) PRC authorities prohibit family members
17 and advocates inside and outside China from having
18 regular communications with relatives and friends
19 imprisoned in the XUAR, such as journalist and en-
20 trepreneur Ekpar Asat.

21 (17) PRC authorities have imposed pervasive
22 restrictions on the peaceful practice of Islam in the
23 XUAR, to the extent that Human Rights Watch as-
24 serts the PRC “has effectively outlawed the practice
25 of Islam”.

1 (18) Individuals who are not detained in camps
2 have been forced to attend political indoctrination
3 sessions, subjected to movement restrictions, mass
4 surveillance systems, involuntary biometric data col-
5 lection, and other human rights abuses.

6 (19) International media, nongovernmental or-
7 ganizations, scholars, families, and survivors have
8 reported on the systemic nature of many of these
9 abuses.

10 (20) On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 inde-
11 pendent United Nations experts jointly expressed
12 alarm over China’s deteriorating human rights
13 record, including its repression in Xinjiang, and
14 called on the international community “to act collec-
15 tively and decisively to ensure China respects human
16 rights and abides by its international obligations”.

17 (21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations
18 member countries issued a public statement con-
19 demning human rights violations by PRC authorities
20 and calling on the PRC to allow the United Nations
21 High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered
22 access to Xinjiang.

23 (22) United States Congress passed the Uyghur
24 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–
25 145).

1 (23) United States Congress passed the Global
2 Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (sub-
3 title F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22
4 U.S.C. 2656 note), which has been used to sanction
5 PRC officials and entities for their activities in the
6 XUAR.

7 (24) United States Congress passed the Uyghur
8 Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law 117–78.)

9 (25) The United States Government has imple-
10 mented additional targeted restrictions on trade with
11 Xinjiang and imposed visa and economic sanctions
12 on PRC officials and entities for their activities in
13 the XUAR.

14 (26) The United States Government has docu-
15 mented human rights abuses and violations of indi-
16 vidual freedoms in the XUAR, including in the 2019
17 Department of State Report on International Reli-
18 gious Freedom.

19 (27) On January 19, 2021, then-Secretary of
20 State Michael Pompeo “determined that the PRC,
21 under the direction and control of the CCP, has
22 committed crimes against humanity, genocide
23 against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and
24 other ethnic and religious minority groups in
25 Xinjiang” and that these crimes are ongoing.

1 (28) On January 19, 2021, during his con-
2 firmation hearing, Secretary of State Antony
3 Blinken testified that “forcing men, women, and
4 children into concentration camps, trying to in effect
5 reeducate them to be adherents to the Chinese Com-
6 munist Party—all of that speaks to an effort to
7 commit genocide”.

8 (29) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the
9 Treasury Janet L. Yellen, during her confirmation
10 hearing, publicly stated that China is guilty of “hor-
11 rendous human rights abuses”.

12 (30) On January 27, 2021, in response to a
13 question from the press regarding the Uyghurs, Sec-
14 retary Blinken stated that his “judgement remains
15 that genocide was committed against the Uyghurs”.

16 (31) On March 10, 2021, in response to a ques-
17 tion on Xinjiang during his testimony before the
18 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
19 resentatives, Secretary Blinken reiterated, “We’ve
20 been clear, and I’ve been clear, that I see it as geno-
21 cide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and
22 we’ll continue to make that clear.”

23 (32) The 2020 Department of State Country
24 Reports on Human Rights Practices: China states
25 that “[g]enocide and crimes against humanity oc-

1 curred during the year against the predominantly
2 Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious mi-
3 nority groups in Xinjiang”.

4 (33) United Nations High Commissioner for
5 Human Rights Michelle Bachelet traveled to China
6 in May 2022 and during this mission visited the
7 XUAR, but the PRC did not provide her with the
8 unfettered and unmonitored access that would have
9 been needed to make a fulsome assessment of the
10 conditions and experiences of those most affected by
11 the PRCs repressive policies.

12 (34) On August 31, 2022, the United Nations
13 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
14 (OHCHR) issued its “Assessment of the Human
15 Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autono-
16 mous Region, People’s Republic of China” and in
17 this report noted that the human rights abuses being
18 committed against the Uyghurs and other predomi-
19 nantly Muslim groups in the XUAR “may constitute
20 international crimes, in particular crimes against hu-
21 manity”.

22 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
23 gress that—

24 (1) the atrocities, including genocide, committed
25 by the PRC against Uyghurs and other predomi-

1 nantly Muslim Turkic groups in Xinjiang, including
2 forced labor, sexual violence, the internment of over
3 1,000,000 individuals, and other horrific abuses
4 must be condemned;

5 (2) the President, the Secretary of State, and
6 the United States Ambassador to the United Na-
7 tions should speak publicly about the ongoing atroc-
8 ities in the XUAR, including in formal speeches at
9 the United Nations and other international fora;

10 (3) the President, the Secretary of State, and
11 the United States Ambassador to the United Na-
12 tions should appeal to the United Nations Secretary-
13 General to take a more proactive and public stance
14 on the situation in the XUAR, including by sup-
15 porting calls for an investigation and accountability
16 for individuals and entities responsible for abuses
17 against the people of the XUAR;

18 (4) the United States should continue to use
19 targeted sanctions and all diplomatic tools, including
20 the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act and the
21 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, available to
22 promote accountability for those responsible for the
23 atrocities in Xinjiang;

24 (5) United States agencies engaged with China
25 on trade, climate, defense, or other bilateral issues

1 should include human rights abuses in the XUAR as
2 a consideration in developing United States policy;

3 (6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia
4 Uyghur, the only Uyghur-language news service in
5 the world independent of PRC government influence;

6 (7) United Nations High Commissioner for
7 Human Rights Bachelet's visit to China in May
8 2022 may have inadvertently lent credence to the
9 PRC's narrative that its actions in the XUAR were
10 part of a legitimate counter-terrorism operation
11 given the PRC;

12 (8) in any future visits to China senior United
13 Nations officials, and in particular the United Na-
14 tions High Commissioner for Human Rights, should
15 insist on unfettered and unmonitored access, includ-
16 ing to XUAR; and

17 (9) the Secretary of State, working with the
18 United States Ambassador to the United Nations,
19 and the United States Ambassador-at-Large for
20 Global Criminal Justice should outline a strategy to
21 work with international partners to promote justice
22 for the PRC's crimes in the XUAR and investigate
23 the atrocity crimes and other human rights abuses
24 that have taken place in the XUAR, collect, pre-
25 serve, and analyze this evidence, so that it can be

1 used by a future competent court to adjudicate these
2 cases.

3 **SEC. 312. SENSE OF CONGRESS CALLING ON ORGANIZA-**
4 **TION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION MEMBERS**
5 **TO TAKE ACTION ON ATROCITIES IN**
6 **XINJIANG.**

7 It is the sense of Congress that—

8 (1) the United States is committed to the right
9 to freedom of religion or belief and the principle that
10 all persons should be free to practice or not practice
11 the religion or belief of their choice without fear of
12 persecution;

13 (2) the international community plays an im-
14 portant role elevating awareness when countries are
15 discriminating against, persecuting, or committing
16 atrocities, including genocide, or other abuses
17 against persons based on their religion or ethnicity;

18 (3) countries that are home to significant popu-
19 lations of religious communities being persecuted
20 and abused elsewhere are uniquely positioned to take
21 a leadership role in exerting diplomatic pressure and
22 promoting accountability with respect to such
23 abuses; and

24 (4) the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
25 (OIC) and its member states should, as “The Collec-

1 tive Voice of the Muslim World”, which “endeavors
2 to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim
3 world in the spirit of promoting international peace
4 and harmony among various people of the world,” be
5 the leading global voice in—

6 (A) advocating, including with respect to
7 Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minori-
8 ties in the PRC, for Article 18 of the Universal
9 Declaration of Human Rights, which provides,
10 “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
11 conscience and religion; this right shall include
12 freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief
13 of his choice, and freedom, either individually or
14 in community with others and in public or pri-
15 vate to manifest his religion or belief in wor-
16 ship, observance, practice, and teaching.”;

17 (B) seeking to raise awareness about the
18 plight of the Uyghurs and other ethnic and reli-
19 gious minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Auton-
20 omous Region and elsewhere in the PRC;

21 (C) calling on the PRC to stop committing
22 atrocities, including genocide, against Muslims
23 and other religious and ethnic minorities in the
24 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and else-
25 where in the PRC;

1 (D) taking action to support justice for
 2 Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minori-
 3 ties in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-
 4 gion and elsewhere in the PRC; and

5 (E) safeguarding against the refoulement
 6 of Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious mi-
 7 norities back to the PRC.

8 **SEC. 313. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE UYGHUR HUMAN**
 9 **RIGHTS POLICY ACT.**

10 Section 6(h) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act
 11 of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is
 12 amended by striking “5 years after” and inserting “10
 13 years after”.

14 **SEC. 314. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
 15 **SYSTEMATIC RAPE, COERCIVE ABORTION,**
 16 **FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY**
 17 **CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE**
 18 **XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.**

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur
 20 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145;
 21 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended—

22 (1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as sub-
 23 paragraph (G); and

24 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the fol-
 25 lowing new subparagraph:

1 “(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion,
2 forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive
3 implantation policies and practices.”.

4 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.—The amend-
5 ment made by subsection (a)—

6 (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of
7 this Act; and

8 (2) applies with respect to each report required
9 by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Pol-
10 icy Act of 2020 submitted after such date of enact-
11 ment.

12 **PART IV—MATTERS RELATED TO TIBET**

13 **SEC. 317. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.**

14 (a) RANK OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDI-
15 NATOR FOR TIBETAN ISSUES.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—Section 621 of the Tibetan
17 Policy Act of 2002 (subtitle B of title VI of Public
18 Law 107–228; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended—

19 (A) by redesignating subsections (b), (c),
20 and (d), as subsections (c), (d), and (e), respec-
21 tively; and

22 (B) by inserting after subsection (a) the
23 following new subsection:

24 “(b) RANK.—The Special Coordinator shall either be
25 appointed by the President, with the advice and consent

1 of the Senate, or shall be an individual holding the rank
2 of Under Secretary of State or higher.”.

3 (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section
4 616(e)(2) of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 is
5 amended by striking “section 621(d)” and inserting
6 “section 621(e)”.

7 (b) TIBET UNIT AT UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN
8 BEIJING.—

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
10 establish a Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the
11 United States Embassy in Beijing, People’s Republic
12 of China.

13 (2) OPERATION.—The Tibet Unit established
14 under paragraph (1) shall operate until such time as
15 the PRC permits—

16 (A) the United States Consulate General
17 in Chengdu, People’s Republic of China, to re-
18 open; or

19 (B) a United States Consulate General in
20 Lhasa, Tibet, to open.

21 (3) STAFF.—

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary should
23 assign not fewer than 2 United States direct-
24 hire personnel to the Tibet Unit established
25 under paragraph (1).

1 (B) LANGUAGE TRAINING.—The Secretary
 2 shall make Tibetan language training available
 3 to the personnel assigned under subparagraph
 4 (A), consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of
 5 2002 (subtitle B of title VI of Public Law 107–
 6 228; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

7 **SEC. 318. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL EN-**
 8 **GAGEMENT ON THE OR REINCARNATION OF**
 9 **THE DALAI LAMA AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM**
 10 **OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.**

11 (a) REAFFIRMATION OF POLICY.—It is the policy of
 12 the United States, as provided under section 342(b) of di-
 13 vision FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021
 14 (Public Law 116–260), that any “interference by the Gov-
 15 ernment of the PRC or any other government in the proc-
 16 ess of recognizing a successor or reincarnation of the 14th
 17 Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would represent
 18 a clear abuse of the right to religious freedom of Tibetan
 19 Buddhists and the Tibetan people”.

20 (b) INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT RELI-
 21 GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.—The Sec-
 22 retary of State should engage with United States allies
 23 and partners—

(1) to support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders' sole religious authority to identify and install the 15th Dalai Lama;

(2) to oppose claims by the Government of the PRC that the PRC has the authority to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th Dalai Lama; and

(3) to reject interference by the Government of the PRC in the religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.

Subtitle B—Promoting Human Rights Globally

SEC. 321. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL THAT COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

The President shall direct the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to—

(1) reform the process for suspending rights of membership in the United Nations Human Rights Council for states that commit gross and systematic violations of human rights, including—

(A) ensuring information detailing the member country's human rights record is publicly available before a vote on suspension of the rights of membership; and

1 (B) making the vote of each country on
2 the suspension of rights of membership from
3 the United Nations Human Rights Council pub-
4 licly available;

5 (2) reform the rules on electing members to the
6 United Nations Human Rights Council to seek to
7 ensure United Nations members that have com-
8 mitted gross and systematic violations of human
9 rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council;
10 and

11 (3) oppose the election to the Human Rights
12 Council of any United Nations member—

13 (A) currently assessed to engage in a con-
14 sistent pattern of gross violations of human
15 rights pursuant to section 116 or section 502B
16 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
17 U.S.C. 2151n, 2304);

18 (B) currently designated as a state sponsor
19 of terrorism;

20 (C) currently designated as a Tier 3 coun-
21 try under the Trafficking Victims Protection
22 Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);

23 (D) the government of which is identified
24 on the list published by the Secretary of State
25 pursuant to section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers

1 Prevention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b))
2 as a government that recruits and uses child
3 soldiers; or

4 (E) the government of which the United
5 States determines to have committed genocide,
6 crimes against humanity, war crimes, or ethnic
7 cleansing.

8 **SEC. 322. PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AT**
9 **THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER MULTI-**
10 **LATERAL BODIES.**

11 The Secretary of State and the United States Perma-
12 nent Representative to the United Nations shall use the
13 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
14 United Nations and other multilateral bodies—

15 (1) to oppose efforts by the PRC and other au-
16 thoritarian actors to prevent the full participation of
17 civil society actors, including human rights defend-
18 ers, and block the accreditation of non-governmental
19 organizations at the United Nations and other mul-
20 tilateral bodies;

21 (2) to ensure that the United Nations bolsters
22 the protection and safe participation of civil society
23 actors who are subject to transnational repression,
24 state-sponsored harassment, and reprisals by the
25 PRC and other governments;

1 (3) to increase monitoring and reporting to
2 identify and track reprisals against human rights de-
3 fenders, who engage with the United Nations and
4 other multilateral bodies;

5 (4) to oppose efforts by the PRC and other au-
6 thoritarian actors to sponsor the participation of
7 government-organized nongovernmental organiza-
8 tions in the Committee on Non-Governmental Orga-
9 nizations of United Nations Economic and Social
10 Council, which organizations are used as instru-
11 ments of the state, including to repress participation
12 and debate by legitimate civil society actors;

13 (5) to support the use of targeted sanctions,
14 censure of member states, and all diplomatic tools,
15 including working with other foreign governments,
16 available to hold accountable persons that engage in
17 reprisals against human rights defenders; and

18 (6) to oppose efforts by the PRC to reduce
19 funding for human rights monitoring and civilian
20 protection posts within Security Council approved
21 United Nations peacekeeping missions.

22 **SEC. 323. INCLUSION OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY**
23 **ABUSE IN HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT.**

24 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151
25 et seq.) is amended—

1 (1) in section 116 (22 U.S.C. 2151n), by add-
2 ing at the end the following new subsection:

3 “(h) SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY.—

4 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The report required under
5 subsection (d) shall to the extent feasible include a
6 description of the use of foreign commercial spyware
7 by the government of each country in which there
8 are systematic acts of political repression, to conduct
9 surveillance, including passive or active monitoring,
10 against activists, journalists, opposition politicians,
11 or other individuals for the purposes of suppressing
12 dissent or intimidating critics.

13 “(2) DEFINED TERM.—In this subsection, the
14 term ‘foreign commercial spyware’ means the term
15 referred to in section 6318 of the James M. Inhofe
16 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
17 2023 (Public Law 117–263).”; and

18 (2) in section 502B (22 U.S.C. 2304)—

19 (A) by redesignating the second subsection
20 designated subsection (i) as subsection (j); and

21 (B) by adding at the end the following new
22 subsection:

23 “(k) SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY.—

24 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The report required under
25 subsection (b) shall to the extent feasible include a

1 description of the use of foreign commercial spyware
2 by the government of each country in which there
3 are systematic acts of political repression, to conduct
4 surveillance, including passive or active monitoring,
5 against activists, journalists, opposition politicians,
6 or other individuals for the purposes of suppressing
7 dissent or intimidating critics.

8 “(2) DEFINED TERM.—In this subsection, the
9 term ‘foreign commercial spyware’ means the term
10 referred to in section 6318 of the James M. Inhofe
11 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
12 2023 (Public Law 117–263).”.

13 **SEC. 324. STRENGTHENING PUBLIC REPORTING ON COR-**
14 **RUPTION.**

15 It is the sense of the Congress that—

16 (1) the PRC and its representatives are en-
17 gaged in corruption across the globe, targeting pub-
18 lic sector officials with the goal of inducing them to
19 make official decisions that suit the interests of the
20 PRC in exchange for personal financial gain;

21 (2) people across the globe do not want leaders
22 who make deals to enrich themselves and their fami-
23 lies in exchange for their country’s natural resources
24 or agreeing to take on onerous national debts and

1 loans, which the nation will be forced to pay back;
2 and

3 (3) uncovering and bringing to light evidence of
4 this sort of corruption serves the objective of empow-
5 ering people everywhere to bring such practices to
6 end.

7 **SEC. 325. AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDING FOR PUBLIC RE-**
8 **PORTING ON CORRUPTION AND CORRUPT**
9 **PRACTICES.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall sup-
11 port and strengthen media and civil society initiatives to
12 uncover and report on evidence of corruption, with a goal
13 of bringing to light the corrupt practices of the PRC and
14 its representatives in every region, and the local leaders
15 who are accepting these payments.

16 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
17 authorized to be appropriated an additional \$3,000,000
18 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the Sec-
19 retary of State to carry out this section.

1 **TITLE IV—MODERNIZING THE**
2 **DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO**
3 **MEET THE CHINA CHAL-**
4 **LENGE**

5 **SEC. 401. ESTABLISHING AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF**
6 **STATE FOR INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS.**

7 (a) REPEAL.—Section 122 of the Foreign Relations
8 Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (22
9 U.S.C. 2652b) is repealed.

10 (b) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary of State is au-
11 thorized to establish a Bureau for Indo-Pacific Affairs, to
12 be headed by an Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pacific Af-
13 fairs appointed by the President, by and with the advice
14 and consent of the Senate. The Assistant Secretary shall
15 report to the Under Secretary of State for Political Af-
16 fairs.

17 (c) DUTIES.—The Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pa-
18 cific Affairs shall—

19 (1) be responsible for overseeing and coordi-
20 nating diplomatic efforts related to the Indo-Pacific
21 region, and to advance United States interests, pro-
22 mote regional stability, and foster economic growth
23 and development through diplomatic engagement,
24 public affairs, policy coordination, and strategic
25 partnerships within the Indo-Pacific region;

1 (2) advance United States interests with respect
2 to the PRC, especially by advancing a policy of stra-
3 tegic competition to contend with the threats and
4 challenges posed by the PRC to the United States,
5 its allies, and other partners in the Indo-Pacific re-
6 gion;

7 (3) assist the Secretary of State in providing
8 overall direction and coordination of interdepart-
9 mental activities of the United States Government in
10 the countries within the Indo-Pacific region, includ-
11 ing directing United States policies for Indo-Pacific
12 countries, directing and overseeing the effectiveness
13 of the applicable strategies, plans, programs, re-
14 sources, and performance for implementing that pol-
15 icy, and monitoring for and indications of developing
16 crises and initiating appropriate action in a timely
17 manner;

18 (4) provide active direction to chiefs of mission
19 (COMs) in carrying out their official duty to imple-
20 ment U.S. foreign policy and lead their missions ef-
21 fectively, and facilitate supported needed by COMs
22 at their missions;

23 (5) directly supervise the policy and operations
24 of the bureau and provide overall guidance to the
25 United States missions within the region;

1 (6) direct and oversee the provision of an ade-
 2 quate, regular flow of information to posts abroad
 3 on United States Government policies, policy deliber-
 4 erations, and diplomatic exchanges, especially on
 5 matters that may result in negotiations, initiatives,
 6 policy actions, or other official representations of
 7 Department policy abroad; and

8 (7) other responsibilities, as determined by the
 9 Secretary, related to the advancement of United
 10 States foreign policy and national security in the
 11 Indo-Pacific.

12 (d) REALIGNMENT.—The Secretary of State is au-
 13 thorized to realign bureaus and offices within the Depart-
 14 ment of State to implement this provision.

15 (e) DEFINITIONS.—The terms “Indo-Pacific” and
 16 “Indo-Pacific region” mean the following 39 countries and
 17 their surrounding waterways: Australia, Bangladesh, Bhu-
 18 tan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, the People’s Republic of
 19 China, Cook Islands, Democratic People’s Republic of
 20 Korea, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Ma-
 21 laysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia,
 22 Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
 23 Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Sol-
 24 omon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga,

1 Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. The terms also include
2 Taiwan and its surrounding waterway.

3 **SEC. 402. ENHANCING STRATEGIC COMPETITION AT THE**
4 **DEPARTMENT OF STATE.**

5 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
6 United States—

7 (1) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition
8 with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic,
9 development, military, informational, and techno-
10 logical realms that maximizes the United States
11 strengths and increases the costs for the PRC of
12 harming United States interests and the values of
13 United States allies and partners;

14 (2) to lead a free, open, and secure inter-
15 national system characterized by freedom from coer-
16 cion, rule of law, open markets and the free flow of
17 commerce, and a shared commitment to security and
18 peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, and
19 good and transparent governance;

20 (3) to strengthen and deepen United States alli-
21 ances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific
22 and Europe, by pursuing greater bilateral and multi-
23 lateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared in-
24 terests and values and bolster the confidence of part-

1 ner countries that the United States is and will re-
2 main a strong, committed, and constant partner;

3 (4) to encourage and collaborate with United
4 States allies and partners in boosting their own ca-
5 pabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and pro-
6 tect shared interests and values, free from coercion
7 and external pressure;

8 (5) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and
9 healthy competition in United States-China economic
10 relations by—

11 (A) advancing policies that harden the
12 United States economy against unfair and ille-
13 gal commercial or trading practices and the co-
14 ercion of United States businesses; and

15 (B) tightening United States laws and reg-
16 ulations as necessary to prevent the PRC's at-
17 tempts to harm United States economic com-
18 petitiveness;

19 (6) to demonstrate the value of private sector-
20 led growth in emerging markets around the world,
21 including through the use of United States Govern-
22 ment tools that—

23 (A) support greater private sector invest-
24 ment and advance capacity-building initiatives
25 that are grounded in the rule of law;

1 (B) promote open markets;

2 (C) establish clear policy and regulatory
3 frameworks;

4 (D) improve the management of key eco-
5 nomic sectors;

6 (E) combat corruption; and

7 (F) foster and support greater collabora-
8 tion with and among partner countries and the
9 United States private sector to develop secure
10 and sustainable infrastructure;

11 (7) to lead in the advancement of international
12 rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade
13 and open and integrated markets;

14 (8) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy
15 in support of United States companies and busi-
16 nesses in partner countries that seek fair competi-
17 tion;

18 (9) to ensure that the United States leads in
19 the innovation of critical and emerging technologies,
20 such as next-generation telecommunications, artifi-
21 cial intelligence, quantum information science, semi-
22 conductors, and biotechnology, by—

23 (A) providing necessary investment and
24 concrete incentives for the private sector and

1 the United States Government to accelerate de-
2 velopment of such technologies;

3 (B) modernizing export controls and in-
4 vestment screening regimes and associated poli-
5 cies and regulations;

6 (C) enhancing United States leadership in
7 technical standards-setting bodies and avenues
8 for developing norms regarding the use of
9 emerging critical technologies;

10 (D) reducing United States barriers and
11 increasing incentives for collaboration with al-
12 lies and partners on the research and co-devel-
13 opment of critical technologies;

14 (E) collaborating with allies and partners
15 to protect critical technologies by—

16 (i) crafting multilateral export control
17 measures;

18 (ii) building capacity for defense tech-
19 nology security;

20 (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in sup-
21 ply chains; and

22 (iv) ensuring diversification; and

23 (F) designing major defense capabilities
24 for export to allies and partners;

1 (10) to collaborate with advanced democracies
2 and other willing partners to promote ideals and
3 principles that—

4 (A) advance a free and open international
5 order;

6 (B) strengthen democratic institutions;

7 (C) protect and promote human rights;
8 and

9 (D) uphold a free press and fact-based re-
10 porting;

11 (11) to develop comprehensive and holistic
12 strategies and policies to counter PRC
13 disinformation campaigns;

14 (12) to demonstrate effective leadership at the
15 United Nations, its associated agencies, and other
16 multilateral organizations and defend the integrity
17 of these organizations against co-optation by illiberal
18 and authoritarian nations;

19 (13) to prioritize the defense of fundamental
20 freedoms and human rights in the United States re-
21 lationship with the PRC;

22 (14) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul-
23 tilateral organizations, leveraging their significant
24 and growing capabilities to build a network of like-
25 minded states that sustains and strengthens a free

1 and open order and addresses regional and global
2 challenges to hold the Government of the PRC ac-
3 countable for—

4 (A) violations and abuses of human rights;

5 (B) restrictions on religious practices; and

6 (C) undermining and abrogating treaties,
7 other international agreements, and other inter-
8 national norms related to human rights;

9 (15) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, re-
10 pression, and other malign behavior to attain unfair
11 economic advantages and to pressure other nations
12 to defer to its political and strategic objectives;

13 (16) to maintain United States access to the
14 Western Pacific, including by—

15 (A) increasing United States forward-de-
16 ployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region;

17 (B) modernizing the United States military
18 through investments in existing and new plat-
19 forms, emerging technologies, critical in-theater
20 force structure and enabling capabilities, joint
21 operational concepts, and a diverse, operation-
22 ally resilient and politically sustainable posture;
23 and

24 (C) operating and conducting exercises
25 with allies and partners—

1 (i) to mitigate the Peoples Liberation
2 Army's ability to project power and estab-
3 lish contested zones within the First and
4 Second Island Chains;

5 (ii) to diminish the ability of the Peo-
6 ple's Liberation Army to coerce its neigh-
7 bors;

8 (iii) to maintain open sea and air
9 lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait,
10 the East China Sea, and the South China
11 Sea; and

12 (iv) to project power from the United
13 States and its allies and partners to dem-
14 onstrate the ability to conduct contested lo-
15 gistics;

16 (17) to deter the PRC from—

17 (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, includ-
18 ing by developing more combat-credible forces
19 that are integrated with allies and partners in
20 contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to de-
21 feat any PRC theory of victory in the First or
22 Second Island Chains of the Western Pacific
23 and beyond, as called for in the 2018 National
24 Defense Strategy;

1 (B) using grey-zone tactics below the level
2 of armed conflict; or

3 (C) initiating armed conflict;

4 (18) to strengthen United States-PRC military-
5 to-military communication and improve de-escalation
6 procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the
7 risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-
8 level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian
9 and military officials and other measures, in align-
10 ment with United States interests; and

11 (19) to cooperate with the PRC if interests
12 align, including through bilateral or multilateral
13 means and at the United Nations, as appropriate.

14 (b) ESTABLISHING AND EXPANDING THE REGIONAL
15 CHINA OFFICER PROGRAM.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be es-
17 tablished at the Department of State a Regional
18 China Officer (RCO) program to support regional
19 posts and officers with reporting, information, and
20 policy tools, and to enhance expertise related to stra-
21 tegic competition with the PRC.

22 (2) AUTHORIZATION.—There is authorized to
23 be appropriated \$2,000,000 for each of fiscal years
24 2025 through 2029 to the Department of State to
25 expand the RCO program, including for—

1 (A) the placement of Regional China Offi-
2 cers at United States missions to the United
3 Nations and United Nations affiliated organiza-
4 tions;

5 (B) the placement of additional Regional
6 China Officers in Africa;

7 (C) the hiring of locally employed staff to
8 support Regional China Officers serving abroad;
9 and

10 (D) the establishment of full-time equiva-
11 lent positions to assist in managing and facili-
12 tating the RCO program.

13 (3) PROGRAM FUNDS.—There is authorized to
14 be appropriated \$50,000 for each of fiscal years
15 2025 through 2029 for each Regional China Officer
16 to support programs and public diplomacy activities
17 of the Regional China Officer.

18 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DATA-DRIVEN POLICY
19 MAKING.—It is the sense of Congress that—

20 (1) the Office for China Coordination should
21 employ at least one full-time equivalent Data Offi-
22 cer, who shall not be dual-hatted, focused on stra-
23 tegic competition with the PRC; and

24 (2) the Department should, to the extent pos-
25 sible within existing authorities, prioritize access for

1 the Office for China Coordination to databases, com-
2 mercial software, and other data to support policy-
3 making related to strategic competition with the
4 PRC.

5 **SEC. 403. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROFESSIONAL DEVEL-**
6 **OPMENT AND ROTATIONAL PROGRAM RE-**
7 **LATED TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION.**

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall promote poli-
9 cies that enable greater opportunities for the Department
10 of State workforce to acquire skills, education, training,
11 and work experience relevant to strategic competition with
12 the PRC and to promote the increased effectiveness of the
13 workforce.

14 (b) PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT.—The Secretary
15 shall, to the extent possible and consistent with existing
16 authorities, expand educational and professional develop-
17 ment opportunities for the workforce of the Department
18 related to strategic competition with the PRC.

19 (c) ROTATIONAL PROGRAM.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall, con-
21 sistent with existing authorities and in order to im-
22 prove the Department’s coordination with other Fed-
23 eral departments and agencies with a significant role
24 in the economic, technological, defense, public diplo-
25 macy, information, intelligence, and law enforcement

1 aspects of United States competition with the PRC,
2 establish an interagency rotational program at the
3 Department.

4 (2) SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE OBJECTIVES.—

5 The rotational program shall facilitate rotations for
6 Department personnel to other relevant Federal de-
7 partments and agencies to acquire skills and experi-
8 ence related to—

9 (A) PRC malign influence operations, in-
10 cluding activities and policies designed to sub-
11 vert or undermine open societies, repress funda-
12 mental freedoms in other countries, engage in
13 information operations, shape narratives favor-
14 able to the Chinese Communist Party, or sup-
15 press narratives unfavorable to it, and other-
16 wise use coercive, covert, or corrupt methods to
17 exert improper influence on governments, pri-
18 vate sector, civil society, universities and other
19 academic institutions, State and local legisla-
20 tors, and other relevant actors in the United
21 States and abroad;

22 (B) economic tools relevant to national se-
23 curity, including sanctions, export controls, and
24 investment screening;

1 (C) trade and investment in partner coun-
2 tries;

3 (D) commercial diplomacy and advocacy
4 for United States businesses in emerging mar-
5 kets;

6 (E) energy security;

7 (F) security cooperation;

8 (G) cyber and technology;

9 (H) space;

10 (I) critical minerals and other strategic
11 sectors where the PRC is dominant;

12 (J) supply chain security and cooperation;

13 (K) development and foreign assistance, in-
14 cluding executing high-standard infrastructure
15 development, especially in the transport, energy,
16 and digital sectors;

17 (L) development finance; and

18 (M) other issue areas that the Secretary
19 determines necessary for the Department work-
20 force to develop for the purposes of strategic
21 competition with the PRC.

22 (3) PROGRAM DESIGN, MONITORING, AND EVAL-
23 UATION.—

24 (A) ROTATIONS AND SECONDMENTS.—In
25 designing the rotational program required

1 under this subsection, the Secretary may, if ap-
2 propriate and consistent with existing authori-
3 ties, include rotations or secondments for De-
4 partment personnel to international organiza-
5 tions, private sector entities, or to the govern-
6 ments agencies of United States partners and
7 allies.

8 (B) DATA TRACKING.—The Secretary shall
9 collect and analyze data related to the rota-
10 tional program required under this subsection,
11 including to track the—

12 (i) number of personnel who partici-
13 pate;

14 (ii) the duration of the rotations;

15 (iii) the grade and job series and
16 sending bureau or office;

17 (iv) the receiving department or agen-
18 cy, bureau, and office;

19 (v) information as to whether the ro-
20 tation was reciprocal between the sending
21 and receiving bureau or offices;

22 (vi) information regarding whether a
23 backfill was acquired, and if so, through
24 what mechanism; and

1 (vii) any other information that the
2 Secretary deems necessary to inform ad-
3 justments to program design to meet the
4 objectives described in subsection (a).

5 **SEC. 404. REFOCUSING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY EF-**
6 **FORTS FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION.**

7 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
8 gress that—

9 (1) the size of the United States diplomatic
10 corps and Department of State civil service per-
11 sonnel must be sufficient to meet the current and
12 emerging security challenges of the 21st century,
13 particularly those posed by the PRC and Russia;

14 (2) an increased focus on the PRC in the inter-
15 national security sphere is necessary to achieve De-
16 partment of State objectives in strategic affairs and
17 nonproliferation;

18 (3) this effort must be implemented with a
19 focus on increasing the number of Foreign Service
20 Officers and civil servants at the Department of
21 State to—

22 (A) ensure the Department is resourced at
23 sufficient levels to ensure that diplomatic tools
24 remain central to the implementation of a long-
25 term competitive strategy with the PRC; and

1 (B) coordinate with allies and partners ef-
2 forts to improve the security of United States
3 and allied interests in the face of the PRC's
4 military modernization and expansion;

5 (4) emerging technologies such as cyber, artifi-
6 cial intelligence, quantum technologies, space,
7 hypersonic missiles, fractional orbit bombardment
8 system and advances in missile defense systems will
9 increasingly impact the strategic balance between
10 the United States and its great power adversaries;
11 and

12 (5) strategic threats will be increasingly ad-
13 dressed through risk reduction measures such as the
14 promotion of international norms in multilateral fo-
15 rums, increasing communication and fostering pre-
16 dictability with adversaries, and close cooperation
17 and security integration with allies and partners.

18 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
19 of the United States—

20 (1) to ensure Department of State funding lev-
21 els for international security reflect the importance
22 and significance of the Indo-Pacific region to the po-
23 litical, economic, and security interests of the United
24 States; and

1 (2) to increase funding and the proportion of
2 personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region re-
3 spective to the Department of State's International
4 Security budget.

5 (c) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the
6 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
7 shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress
8 an action plan with the following elements:

9 (1) Identification of requirements to advance
10 United States international security objectives in the
11 Indo-Pacific and the personnel and budgetary re-
12 sources needed to meet them, assuming an uncon-
13 strained resource environment.

14 (2) Identification of offices responsible for man-
15 aging bilateral and multilateral arms control, non-
16 proliferation, and disarmament agreements that are
17 expired, are expiring, or that have not been imple-
18 mented since calendar year 2021 with the objective
19 of revising their mission to focus on competitive
20 strategies and risk reduction initiatives in the Indo-
21 Pacific region.

22 (3) A plan to increase the size of the Depart-
23 ment's international security budget.

24 (4) Budgeting dedicated to the Indo-Pacific, in-
25 cluding the reallocation of personnel and resources,

1 with a focus on the threat posed by PRC military
2 modernization and expansion.

3 (5) A plan to increase the number of positions
4 in bureaus that report to the Under Secretary for
5 Arms Control and International Security and over-
6 seas missions with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific
7 region, including a description of increases and a de-
8 scription of how such increases in personnel will ad-
9 vance United States objectives in the Indo-Pacific
10 region.

11 (6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks
12 that the Department will meet in implementing the
13 action plan.

14 (7) A description of any barriers to imple-
15 menting the action plan.

16 (d) UPDATES TO ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180
17 days after submitting the action plan required under sub-
18 section (c), and every 180 days thereafter for 2 years, the
19 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate commit-
20 tees of Congress an update on the implementation of the
21 action plan, including supporting data and a detailed as-
22 sessment of benchmarks reached.

1 **TITLE V—OTHER MATTERS**

2 **SEC. 501. SAVINGS PROVISIONS.**

3 (a) CONSULTATION AND NOTIFICATION RE-
 4 QUIRED.—The obligation of any funds authorized to be
 5 appropriated by the provisions of this Act shall be subject
 6 to prior consultation with, and consistent with section
 7 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
 8 2394–1), the regular notification procedures of—

9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
 10 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

11 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
 12 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
 13 resentatives.

14 (b) QUALIFYING NON-BINDING INSTRUMENTS.—Any
 15 nonbinding instrument related to the provisions of this Act
 16 shall be considered a qualifying non-binding instrument
 17 for purposes of section 112b of title 1, United States Code.

18 **SEC. 502. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION ON MAINTAINING ONE** 19 **CHINA POLICY.**

20 Nothing in this Act may be construed as a change
 21 to the one China policy of the United States, which is
 22 guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et
 23 seq.), the three United States-People’s Republic of China
 24 Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.

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