[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 106 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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118th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. J. RES. 106
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against the Islamic
Republic of Iran for threatening the national security of the United
States through the development of nuclear weapons.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
July 31, 2024
Mr. Graham introduced the following joint resolution; which was read
twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
JOINT RESOLUTION
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against the Islamic
Republic of Iran for threatening the national security of the United
States through the development of nuclear weapons.
Whereas, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has
engaged in acts of international terrorism and continuously threatened
the United States, Israel, and partners and allies;
Whereas, on January 19, 1984, the United States designated the Islamic Republic
of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism for repeatedly providing support
for acts of international terrorism;
Whereas, on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had
enriched uranium for the first time to a level close to 3.5 percent at
the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz, Iran;
Whereas, on December 23, 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 1737 (2006), which imposed sanctions with respect to the
Islamic Republic of Iran for its failure to suspend enrichment
activities;
Whereas, the United Nations Security Council subsequently adopted Resolutions
1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 (2010), all of which targeted the
nuclear program of and imposed additional sanctions with respect to the
Islamic Republic of Iran;
Whereas, on February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had
launched its first satellite, which raised concern over the
applicability of the satellite to the ballistic missile program;
Whereas, in September 2009, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France
revealed the existence of the clandestine Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, years after construction started on the
plant;
Whereas, on January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted a test of a
medium-range ballistic missile, which traveled an estimated 600 miles
and provides the Islamic Republic of Iran the capability to threaten
military installations of the United States in the Middle East;
Whereas, in 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the nuclear archive of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, which contained tens of thousands of files
and compact discs relating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design,
development, and manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of Iran;
Whereas, on September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the existence of a secret
warehouse housing radioactive material in the Turquz Abad district in
Tehran, and an inspection of the warehouse by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) detected radioactive particles, which the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to adequately explain;
Whereas, on June 19, 2020, the IAEA adopted Resolution GOV/2020/34 expressing
``serious concern... that Iran has not provided access to the Agency
under the Additional Protocol to two locations'';
Whereas, on April 17, 2021, the IAEA verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran
had begun to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity;
Whereas, on August 14, 2021, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Hassan
Rouhani stated that ``Iran's Atomic Energy Organization can enrich
uranium by 20 percent and 60 percent and if one day our reactors need
it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity'';
Whereas, on April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran confirmed the
relocation of a production facility for advanced centrifuges from an
aboveground facility at Karaj, Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz
Enrichment Complex;
Whereas, on April 19, 2022, the Department of State released a report stating
that there are ``serious concerns'' about ``possible undeclared nuclear
material and activities in Iran'';
Whereas, on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran
had achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms, equivalent to 95.5 pounds,
of 60 percent highly enriched uranium, roughly enough material for a
nuclear weapon;
Whereas, on June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran turned off surveillance
cameras installed by the IAEA to monitor uranium enrichment activities
at nuclear sites in the country;
Whereas, in the July 14, 2022, joint declaration entitled ``The Jerusalem U.S.-
Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration'', the United States
stressed its commitment ``never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear
weapon, and that it is prepared to use all elements of its national
power to ensure that outcome'';
Whereas, on July 22, 2022, Director General of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi, stated
that the IAEA had ``very limited visibility'' into the nuclear program
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is ``galloping ahead'';
Whereas, on July 27, 2022, the Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
Mohammad Eslami announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran is building
a new nuclear reactor at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, one of
the largest nuclear facilities in the country;
Whereas, on September 7, 2022, the IAEA reported that the stock of 60 percent-
enriched uranium of the Islamic Republic of Iran had increased to an
estimated 55.6 kilograms, equivalent to 122.58 pounds, which is an
amount that if enriched further could be sufficient enough to produce a
nuclear bomb;
Whereas, on December 2, 2022, Director General Grossi stated ``Iran informed us
they were tripling, not doubling, tripling their capacity to enrich
uranium at 60 percent, which is very close to military level, which is
90 percent'';
Whereas, on January 25, 2023, Director General Grossi stated, ``One thing is
true: They [the Islamic Republic of Iran] have amassed enough nuclear
material for several nuclear weapons'';
Whereas, on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of
Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7 percent, which is just short of the 90
percent threshold for weapons-grade fissile material;
Whereas, on September 4, 2023, an IAEA report estimated the total uranium
stockpile of the Islamic Republic of Iran to be 3795.5 kilograms,
equivalent to 8367.65 pounds, and that the Islamic Republic of Iran has
enough fissile material, that if further enriched, would be sufficient
to produce several nuclear weapons;
Whereas, on October 18, 2023, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231
(2015) lapsed and many proliferation-related penalties and restrictions
were lifted, meaning the Islamic Republic of Iran is legally permitted
to test or transfer ballistic missiles, which may contribute to the
further development of a nuclear weapon delivery system;
Whereas, on November 13, 2023, the quarterly report published by the IAEA on the
uranium enrichment program of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that
due to the amount of stockpiled enriched uranium and centrifuge
capacity, the Islamic Republic of Iran could produce its first quantity
of 25 kilograms, equivalent to 55.11 pounds, of weapons grade uranium in
as little as 7 days;
Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the governments of the United States, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom released a joint statement in response
to the report by the IAEA, which stated, ``The production of high-
enriched uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification [and
these] decisions demonstrate Iran's lack of good will towards de-
escalation and represent reckless behavior in a tense regional context.
. .Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA to enable it to provide
assurances that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.'';
Whereas, on February 27, 2024, a spokesperson for the Department of State
stated, ``We remain seriously concerned about Iran's continued expansion
of its nuclear program in ways that have no credible civilian purpose,
including its continued production of highly enriched uranium'';
Whereas, on March 4, 2024, Director General Grossi stated ``Iran's stockpile of
enriched uranium continues to increase, including that enriched up to
60%. The agency has lost continuity of knowledge about the [Islamic
Republic of Iran's] production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and
bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate'';
Whereas, on April 23, 2024, Director General Grossi stated the Islamic Republic
of Iran is ``weeks rather than months'' away from having enough enriched
uranium to develop a nuclear bomb;
Whereas, on June 3, 2024, Director General Grossi stated, ``Many countries have
said if Iran gets nuclear weapons, they will do the same. Adding nuclear
weapons to the cauldron of the Middle East is a very bad idea.'';
Whereas, on June 5, 2024, by a vote of 20 to 2, the United States joined other
nations in formally censuring the Islamic Republic of Iran for advances
in their nuclear program and failure to cooperate with the IAEA;
Whereas, on June 18, 2024, news agencies reported that intelligence agencies of
the United States and Israel were looking into information that the
Islamic Republic of Iran may have developed a computer model that could
be used for research and development of nuclear weapons; and
Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
published an assessment, in accordance with Iran Nuclear Weapons
Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note;
Public Law 117-263), which stated, ``Iran continues to increase the size
of its uranium stockpile, increase its enrichment capacity, and develop,
manufacture, and operate advanced centrifuges. Tehran has the
infrastructure and experience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium,
at multiple facilities, if it chooses to do so.'': Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN.
The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against the Islamic Republic of Iran if the President determines
that the Islamic Republic of Iran--
(1) is in the process of possessing a nuclear weapon that
threatens the national security interests of the United States;
or
(2) possesses uranium enriched to weapons-grade level,
possesses a nuclear warhead, or possesses a delivery vehicle
capable of carrying a nuclear warhead that threatens the
national security interests of the United States.
SEC. 2. WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Specific Statutory Authorization.--Consistent with section
8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1547(a)(1)), the
Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War
Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(b)).
(b) Applicability of Other Requirements.--Nothing in this
resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution (50
U.S.C. 1541 et seq.).
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