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**U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE**

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ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 26, 2023.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:32 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order.

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and their service to our Nation. It's been over a year since Vladimir Putin launched his illegal and brutal invasion into Ukraine.

The cost of the war has been staggering. Tens of thousands dead, including over 8,000 innocent civilians. Over 13 million Ukrainians driven from their homes. Nearly 72,000 alleged Russian war crimes including indiscriminate killings, torture, kidnappings, and sexual assaults. Tens of billions of civilian infrastructure are destroyed, including half of Ukraine's energy supply.

But despite the relentless and appalling attacks against them, the Ukrainian people have held strong. Through innovation and grit, they've driven Putin's war machine back, reclaiming much of the territory lost in the early days of the invasion.

The American taxpayer has been a key enabler to that success. We have approved over \$100 billion in military, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies.

This unprecedented level of support requires an unprecedented level of oversight. As we move toward the markup of the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], this committee will ensure that oversight is in place and is robust.

This war has lasted longer than many of us thought it would, but that's because many of us thought the Ukrainians were no match for Putin's forces. We couldn't have been more wrong.

I'm hopeful the coming counteroffensive will provide a final, stinging defeat for Putin. But that will require the President to stop being so reluctant to provide Ukraine with the capabilities it needs to be successful.

His hesitation over being too escalatory has only prolonged the war and driven up cost in terms of dollars and lives. Continued reluctance and indecision only empowers Vladimir Putin and it sends

all the wrong signals to [President] Xi and the Chinese Communist Party [CCP].

Xi is watching how America responds to this conflict very closely. If America loses its resolve in Ukraine, it sends a clear message that we won't be there to defend Taiwan. That is not the message we should be sending the CCP.

Finally, the war in Ukraine has opened Europe's eyes to the threats they face. Some countries like Poland, Romania, Finland, and the Balts are stepping up to meet that threat. Others are not.

The awakening in Germany that so many thought was coming has yet to materialize and in France the denial runs even deeper. France has not met the minimum levels of NATO spending and it ranks at the very bottom of countries providing military assistance to Ukraine. And President Macron's recent knee bending before President Xi has been shameful.

Old Europe needs to learn the lessons of Nord Stream 2 and not become dependent on adversaries, especially those that commit genocide and look to remake global borders through force.

I believe the time has come for U.S. forces in Europe to move further east into the countries that are investing more heavily into their own security. Poland, Romania, and the Baltics truly understand the threat from Putin.

Unlike others, they've invested in their own defense and are real partners in our collective security. It's also where our troops will be the most useful and have the largest impact on deterrence.

I look forward to our discussion today and hearing more from our witnesses about the best way we can adjust our posture in Europe, and with that I yield to the ranking member for any opening statement he may have.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES**

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is just over 1 year since Putin's illegal invasion of Ukraine. I think that the message from the Biden administration and the message from the alliance has been incredibly strong in that year and that is that we will stand together, we will stand up against Russian aggression, and we will make sure that a sovereign democratic Ukraine remains.

I think it's important to think back to where we were in January of 2022, and as the chairman alluded to, pretty much everyone thought that Ukraine was toast. Most everyone thought that there's no way that NATO would come together. You know, it was a bickering, divisive—I think, you know, President Macron just a year before had said that it was basically brain dead.

The overall assumption was that we would fail in Ukraine and the alliance would be weakened. As we stand here today, I think everybody has to say that the alliance has been unbelievably successful in preserving Ukraine and turning back Russia, not only stopping the invasion but recapturing territory in Ukraine, and NATO has never been stronger in terms of standing together as an alliance.

Not just on Ukraine, but throughout Eastern Europe we have rallied. We are working with our partners across that portion of

Europe to make sure that they have a strong defense to deter Russia. We have added Finland to NATO. We're close on Sweden, not quite then.

So I think it's important for all of us to have the proper perspective on this. We are being successful because of the leadership of the Biden administration, the leadership of NATO, and most importantly because of the courage of the Ukrainian people in standing up to Russia.

So what we need to do is build on that success and continue to support it and not threaten to cut it off for any of a variety of different reasons, and there's a lot of different reasons for that threat to be floated around.

One of them is the accountability issue, but we have talked about that in this committee before. Clearly, the Ukrainians are using the aid and the weapons that we are giving them to maximum effect. If they weren't they would have lost by now.

There is oversight, and to challenge the existence of that oversight is, (A), to undermine the overall effort and, (B), not to be, you know, unsubtle here but it is to restate Russian propaganda, because the one thing that the Russians have continued to be very good at in this whole process is to spread every story that they can imagine to divide our alliance. That is their mission—is to get us to back down from the united front that we have shown on Ukraine by sowing seeds of discord.

So we have to be really careful about which stories that we go ahead and spread. China, by the way, is very aggressive about that as well.

China is one of the main places that is spreading the story that this aid is somehow not being used properly or is being—you know, fostering corruption, none of which is true, all of which advances their interests and undermines ours.

So, first of all, let's recognize the success we have had and continue to build on it and be very careful about doing anything to undermine it. The next few months are going to be incredibly important.

I think that alliance has stepped up incredibly well in the last couple of months as Ukraine prepares to try and retake even more territory, providing more weapons, more training, the systems that they need.

I think we're in a strong position and we need to build on that. But we will want to hear from our two witnesses about what we need to do—not just in the next couple of months but, certainly, in those next couple of months and beyond—in order to make sure that we continue to build on those successes.

What we want is we want a sovereign democratic Ukraine and we want peace. We want to force President Putin to the bargaining table to show him that he is not going to succeed. He must make peace. That is the plan and I know our two witnesses before us today have had a lot to do with making sure that that plan has gotten as far as it has and I thank them for that.

And then just two more issues, more broadly, European security going forward. This is a huge opportunity in that the NATO alliance has been strengthened, as I just described. How do we take advantage of that opportunity? How do we resource it?

How do we strike our balance working with our partners in Europe to make sure that we have a strong defense posture across Eastern Europe and that we're as close to on the same page as possible?

It would be great if we could, you know, finally get Sweden into NATO. Curious about your thoughts about how we can negotiate through that.

So how do we strengthen Europe, and then to the Chairman's last point on China, the role that China is playing. And I think it was very clear from President Macron's visit and discussion after his visit with President Xi that this is a tough question.

Europe wants to figure out how to sort of have, you know, a decent relationship with China while at the same time is aware of the challenges. But how do we strike that? How do we work with our European partners to make sure that we're on the same page in trying to deal with the threat that China presents?

So I look forward to your testimony. Again, I thank you for where we're at and where we're going forward. It has been remarkable. I think it's 54 nations that have come together that are providing support to Ukraine.

And, again, let us remind ourselves that if we'd been having this conversation in January of 2022, how many people in this room would have predicted that Ukraine would have been as successful as they have been or that the alliance would have held together as strongly as it has?

And with that, I yield back and I look forward to the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Ranking Member makes a great point and I would remind everybody that one of the reasons Ukraine has been so successful is we have been over there with our NATO allies since 2014 training their military how to be a professional military and those dividends we are seeing today.

Now I'd like to recognize our witnesses. The Honorable Celeste Wallander is Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. General Christopher Cavoli is the Commander of U.S. European Command and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Ms. Wallander, we'll start with you.

STATEMENT OF HON. CELESTE A. WALLANDER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you.

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify.

I would like to express my appreciation for the continued support from Congress and this committee in informing and enabling the Department of Defense's work in this region. It is an honor to appear alongside General Cavoli, who is an outstanding colleague.

Russia's unprovoked war of aggression has created the worst security crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War. For over a year this war has threatened Ukraine, the security of Europe, the global economy, and the rules-based international order.

Yet, thanks to the courage of the Ukrainian people, supported by the United States and a broad coalition of allies and partners from

around the world, Russia has failed to achieve its objectives. An independent Ukraine endures.

In Europe, NATO is more unified than ever. Just this month, Finland joined the alliance as its 31st member. We hope Sweden will follow soon.

Our goal is a free, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine able to defend its sovereignty and deter further aggression. The substantial commitment of the U.S. military assistance to Ukraine reflects the American interests and values at stake.

As Secretary Austin has said, our support for Ukraine's self-defense is an investment in our own security and prosperity. And the United States is not alone. The Secretary's Ukraine Defense Contact Group has rallied over 50 allies and partners to commit more than \$20 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, including in the critical areas of air defense, armor, and artillery.

Ukraine has leveraged this assistance to deal Russia significant blows on the battlefield. Although Russia's conventional military capabilities are diminished, Russia continues to present serious risk as it retains capabilities in nuclear, cyber, information operations, counterspace, and undersea warfare, among others.

These capabilities, combined with Russia's intent to undermine the independence of its neighbors and will to use force, mean that Russia remains an acute threat. The Department remains focused on deterring Russian attacks on the United States and our NATO allies.

But it is not the United States alone strengthening defense in Europe. European allies and partners have responded to Russia's invasion by investing in their defense capabilities at an accelerated pace.

We are working with our NATO allies to ensure that the alliance is prepared for modern challenges and can deter aggression from any adversary. Allies have deployed land and air defense forces in the eastern part of the alliance and maritime assets across the NATO area.

For the first time in history NATO has activated its defense plans and deployed portions of the NATO Response Force. Even as we focus on deterring the primary threat of Russian aggression, we remain vigilant and attuned to other threats to EUCOM [U.S. European Command].

The PRC [People's Republic of China] and China—the PRC, China, and Russia collaborate across a variety of arenas to undermine the international rules-based order. We recognize the PRC is taking lessons from our support for Ukraine and we continue to monitor their cooperation with Russia.

It is clear that the PRC's influence in Europe has waned in recent years, in part due to its close alignment with Russia. We also advance work with allies and partners to address the interconnected challenges in Europe and beyond, which the United States cannot address alone.

These include complications posed by climate change, cyber and hybrid threats, and terrorism. To address both these challenges and threats the Department will continue to pursue novel approaches for deterrence and defense that create advantages for our

selves and our allies and partners and pose dilemmas for our competitors.

Congressional support for U.S. forces deployed in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility, as well as funding for defense initiatives across Europe and Ukraine's security assistance, have been and will remain critical to achieving U.S. national security objectives.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Wallander can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Wallander.

I now recognize General Cavoli for 5 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF GEN CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI, USA,
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND**

General CAVOLI. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee. It's a privilege to testify before you today.

First of all, on behalf of the men, women, and the families of U.S. European Command, I thank you for your steadfast support to their mission, to their safety, and to their well-being.

I'd also like to personally thank members for supporting the rescheduling of today's session so that I can remain focused on my area of responsibility during a time of operational significance. I thank you very much for that. It's a very busy spring.

It's a pleasure to appear next to Dr. Wallander, whose professionalism and expertise is well known to this committee and, indeed, to this whole city.

So this is an unprecedented time in the Euro-Atlantic area. Fourteen months ago, Russia's illegal unprovoked invasion of Ukraine dramatically shifted perceptions of European stability and broader global security and galvanized European governments' resolve.

Last year's NATO summit in Madrid was a turning point for the alliance. Nations committed to a new strategic concept that put collective territorial defense at the top of the alliance's task list and, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, set into motion a series of efforts that will profoundly change the military structure and the activity of NATO.

We have been creating new plans for the general defense of the alliance and these will drive higher levels of readiness and more targeted national defense investments. Nations agreed to accelerate defense spending increases, to establish enhanced force posture on the eastern flank of NATO, to take an unprecedented number of troops and weapons and turn them over to NATO command, and, critically, to bring two new members into the alliance, and I'm happy, as Dr. Wallander noted, that one of them, Finland, has already joined.

Over time, these efforts will lead to significantly increased European military capabilities and will continue to deter Russian aggression against the alliance. That deterrent posture has allowed us to work intensively in the past year to assist Ukraine.

In the past year, thanks to your support, U.S. donations of arms, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, and supplies have enabled

Ukraine to halt Russia's invasion. We have not been alone in this effort. The DOD [U.S. Department of Defense] and USEUCOM lead an international effort to identify, transport, and deliver equipment and ammunition to Ukraine, along with the training to use that equipment in combat.

The material support and training provided by international donors—over 50 of them—has been huge and fundamental to the Ukrainian military success. Over the winter, our coalition has enabled the Ukrainian military to generate capabilities necessary to defend and to regain parts of their sovereign territory.

We're confident our Ukrainian partners are good stewards of donated aid. Our embassy team in Kyiv and the Security Assistance Group in Wiesbaden, Germany, work diligently to monitor and to keep a close eye on all lethal aid and to ensure that it's getting to and staying in the right hands.

Although we remain optimistic for Ukraine's future, this war is far from over. Russia will remain an acute threat to Euro-Atlantic security and the National Defense Strategy rightly calls our attention to that.

Russia, of course, is not the only problem in Europe. The People's Republic of China continues to increase its access and influence in our theater and its activities pose risk to U.S., allied, and partner interests.

The PRC uses foreign direct investment, government-backed business ventures, and loans to gain access to technology and to get control over vital European infrastructure and transportation routes.

Finally, Europe continues to face transnational challenges such as violent extremist organizations, uncontrolled migration, organized crime, climate change. EUCOM, of course, trains and cooperates with allies and partners to help counter those challenges as well.

Our strategic approach fortifies our allies and our partners. It strengthens alliance interoperability and enhances our collective combat credibility, which deters our adversaries.

And of course, as always, should deterrence fail, USEUCOM, alongside our allies and partners, is ready to fight and win.

Congress, your continued support for numerous funding initiatives remains absolutely critical to our strategy. These authorities and fundings strengthen the U.S. and NATO ability to rapidly respond in crisis or conflict and your support demonstrates our Nation's continued commitment to defend the homeland and to protect the peace for 1 billion people living in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, on behalf of the entire U.S. European Command thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today. I very much look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Cavoli can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General Cavoli. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.

General Cavoli, it appears that the Putin-Xi bromance has blossomed into a full-blown alliance. Earlier this month, President Xi

traveled to Moscow where they reached agreements on expanded military cooperation with Russia.

We know that Russia is providing China with highly enriched uranium that China is turning into plutonium for a strategic nuclear breakout.

Can you please explain how you see the China-Russia alliance evolving and why defeating Russia in Ukraine has ramifications for China in Taiwan?

General CAVOLI. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the question, which is one of the big questions of the current situation in the globe.

Clearly, during this conflict Russia and China have grown closer together. China's diplomatic and political and moral support for Russia's illegal invasion has been notable and has assisted the Russians in their position and their domestic political position as well.

It appears increasingly to be an uneven bromance, as you put it, in which Russia could become the junior partner. But it is nevertheless a dangerous development, or development of significant concern.

We see military cooperation. We see economic cooperation. We see political cooperation. There are bright spots in this, though, Mr. Chairman.

Our European allies have spotted this, have noticed this, and with the encouragement of the United States, and their own observations, are taking significant actions to limit the increasing influence, and malign influence where it exists, of the PRC inside Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I spoke in my opening statement about the administration not giving Ukraine the weapons it needs to win. Chief among them are the cluster munitions. The U.S. military has over 3 million cluster munitions that can be fired from 155 [millimeter] currently—current howitzers in Ukraine's possession.

We are going to spend millions of dollars destroying this if we don't use them and Russia is using these munitions right now against the Ukrainians. Can you please explain the battlefield military utility that giving the Ukraine the DPICMs [dual-purpose improved conventional munitions] that we have would have in particular in places like Bakhmut?

General CAVOLI. Yes, Chairman Rogers. So the munition in question here is dual purpose improved conventional munitions.

We call it dual-purpose because it releases bomblets, some of which are antipersonnel fragmentation grenades and some of which are shaped charges that attack vehicles from above. It's a very effective munition. It's very effective against mixed targets of personnel and equipment, especially when those targets are gathered into dense formations.

The CHAIRMAN. And that's what's happening in Bakhmut, as I understand it?

General CAVOLI. It is happening in Bakhmut.

The CHAIRMAN. The Russians are sending waves of troops.

General CAVOLI. It is happening in Bakhmut, sir, and it happens on most battlefields when one force goes into the offense. So as a strictly military matter it is a useful and very effective munition.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Chair yields to the ranking member for any questions he may have.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Looking forward as we're looking at our posture in Europe in light of the changes, the—you know, certainly the addition of Finland to NATO, hopefully the addition of Sweden, and the new threat that Russia poses, you know, given their invasion of Ukraine, what should our posture be in Eastern Europe and how do we have the budget to support that?

How do we coordinate with our allies? You know, what does the new force posture look like, going forward? Either one of you can take a stab at that.

General CAVOLI. Sir, I can start that from the military perspective and where we stand right now and perhaps defer to Dr. Wallander for her additional comments.

So we have changed both allied and U.S. force posture significantly during this conflict. In fact, even before the conflict began, we began to flow forces from inside Europe eastward and from the U.S. into Europe. Fairly significant uplift right now.

We have about just shy of 20,000 deployed service personnel who are not normally stationed in Europe, forward in Europe. For the most part, those organizations we now have in the ground domain. We have all of the V Corps headquarters forward.

We have two division headquarters and we have five brigade combat teams forward. The vast majority of that force is postured forward specifically in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, a limited amount in Slovakia, a large amount in Poland and each of the three Baltic countries.

We move them around for a certain amount of training purpose.

Mr. SMITH. [Inaudible]

General CAVOLI. I'm sorry?

Mr. SMITH. Are you satisfied that we're adequately resourced to meet the needs?

General CAVOLI. Right now in the ground domain, yes, absolutely. We're resourced against the requirement we have right now. Should the situation change we're prepared to recommend different levels of posture.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Dr. Wallander.

Dr. WALLANDER. I would—in addition I would highlight that the United States is leading under General Cavoli's leadership at EUCOM but we are not alone, that allies have reinforced their forward posture.

There are eight battle groups, one in each of the front-line eastern flank countries and each one of those battle groups is led by a different framework nation. The United States is the framework nation for Poland, but other allies have taken up leadership to ensure that there is the right mix of capabilities across the entire eastern flank.

So this is a whole-of-alliance achievement and what we will be doing at the Vilnius summit is reinforcing further that enhanced posture and the multinational nature of that commitment, which is enhancing the credibility in the eyes of the Russian leadership. It

is not only the United States alone. It is the alliance of 31, soon to be 32 members.

Mr. SMITH. And on that alliance, you know, there are ranges of concerns about, you know, the degree to which particularly Germany and France, you know, that early on were, you know, traditionally trying to get along with Russia or would they step up.

You know, what—sort of both of your assessments as to where that alliance is at in terms of adequately understanding the threat from Russia and from China as well and actually stepping up to help us in meeting those challenges?

Dr. WALLANDER. Well, Germany has stepped up to lead—to be the framework nation of the battle group in Lithuania, and France has stood up to be the lead of the battle group in Romania. I believe I've got that right.

So they are—they are leading and supporting the forward posture, and on the—on reliance on Russia it was unwelcome, a cold shower of recognition, that vulnerability to Russian coercion and influence had left some countries in Europe at risk.

But Europe as a whole has responded quickly and has reduced dependence on both Russian gas and Russian oil, has imposed strict sanctions on Russian banking, on individuals of influence in Putin's Russia.

And so Russia has—Europe has responded both militarily and—

[Simultaneous speaking.]

Mr. SMITH. So I've just got a few seconds left here. I want to give General Cavoli a quick chance to comment on that as well.

General CAVOLI. So their initial moves were extremely positive, sir. France was first out of the gate to form a new battle group, is prepared to raise it up to brigade size if necessary.

The Germans had already been running the battle group in Lithuania and immediately put a brigade command element there to facilitate further reinforcement of it.

Both nations have contributed significantly to Ukraine with lethal aid, and I should note that the French, in their return to large-scale operational capability, have just staged the largest exercise, Exercise Orion, that they've done in over 30 years.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank both of you for being here today and, General Cavoli, I want to particularly commend you. A proficiency in Italian very appropriate but add to that French and Russian, and I particularly identify.

My number-two son was a Navy doctor serving under your command at Naples, Italy, and now I've got three grandchildren who speak perfect Italian. So they'd be happy to be with you.

But, no, what you all are doing is so important and then, General, I particularly appreciate you raising the issue with Chairman Mike Rogers about the cluster bombs. Those should be provided with the—with war criminal Putin sacrificing young Russians for his personal aggrandizement of oil, money, power—the human-wave tactics, this could help stop that and certainly would deter their effectiveness.

And so I hope every effort will be made to look into providing the cluster bombs. That we have 2 million available. I mean, that's just inconceivable that we don't do more, Madam Secretary. So please look into that.

The European Command, General, under your command has been outstanding, increasing our readiness along with increasing support of our allies and partners, and NATO has stepped up, bolstered in its forward defenses and enhanced posture to the border countries of Ukraine to deter war criminal Putin's regime.

And then it's really significant that NATO is growing, and an unintended consequence of war criminal Putin and his mass murder is for Finland and Sweden to join NATO and so they're how—and what that means to the Baltic republics. I mean, just—it's just inconceivable how positive some things are.

But what is your summary of the combined forces and capabilities and foreign military sales, specialized training opportunities? What more can we do to assist the people of Ukraine?

General CAVOLI. Thank you, sir.

First of all, I'd like to underline your comments about the reaction of the alliance on this. It's been—it's been very, very significant. The alliance has reacted very, very quickly. I have about—in my NATO role I have over 40,000 troops turned over to my command right now and nations are prepared to add more.

With regard to what else we can do to help Ukraine, I think staying the course that we're on right now is very important. We are in a position where we're moving into a period where the Ukrainians will conduct offensive operations. We have good solid plans to continue to support them but we'll need to continue with those plans, sir.

Mr. WILSON. And we must. Chairman Mike Rogers is correct again, pointing out the danger of the Chinese Communist Party, the relationship of the military aid being provided by Xi, and then we have seen the pictures of Iran providing the weaponry to be provided across the Caspian Sea to war criminal Putin.

It's really clear to me that we have—what we're—what you're doing is so important to deter the Chinese Communist Party from threats to Taiwan and then to deter the regime in Tehran from its plans of death to Israel, death to America. And so what you're doing is so critical.

And then to Madam Secretary, the Ukraine invasion by war criminal Putin continues that we must expedite foreign military sales and to our allies and it's so incredible—I don't think the American people know that 10 countries actually exceed the United States in terms of military equipment being provided to Ukraine based on per capita GDP [gross domestic product], including a wonderful country called Bulgaria.

And so it's—but we need to backfill foreign military sales to our allies, but in addition I'd also—we need to look into what happened—it's not in your—it's in your purview, providing aid that's already been paid for by Taiwan.

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you, Congressman.

Thank you for the opportunity to thank Congress for providing heightened amounts of foreign military financing authorities and appropriations in order for us to do exactly what you rightly point

to, which is so many allies and partners have been so quick and so generous in contributing capabilities to Ukraine, that flexibility and higher amounts you have given us will allow us to backfill those allies and partners.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I want to thank Chairman Mike Rogers and Chairman Mike McCaul. They have been working with the Ranking Members, too. It's been—hey, this is bipartisan. Amazing. And so let's work together.

Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, for 5 minutes.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to both witnesses for your outstanding work at this time of, again, the biggest security challenge since the end of World War II.

I'd like to actually, General, shift the topic a little bit to not the—well, out of the eastern flank and more to the western flank. You know, in light of—even in the midst of all of Russia's degradation of its military force because of the conflict, its navy continues to operate and we heard from General VanHerck, your colleague, when he testified that the patrols in the Atlantic which used to be sort of sporadic by the—their submarine patrols are now becoming persistent and I wonder if you could just sort of talk about that as much as you can in terms of, you know, what we're doing in terms of anti-submarine warfare to track this and address this because, again, despite everything that's going on in your other portfolio, this is different than it was even, you know, 5 or 6 years ago.

General CAVOLI. Yes, sir. Thanks for the opportunity, and this is very much inside my portfolio. I share it with Glen VanHerck, of course. Defense of the homeland starts forward.

First of all, sir, if I could, I'd like to underline your comment about the specificity of the degradation of the Russian forces. Much of the Russian military has not been affected negatively by this conflict.

One of those forces is their undersea forces. It's hard to talk in public as you well know, sir, about undersea warfare and our efforts in that regard. But I can say that the Russians are more active than we have seen them in years and their patrols into the Atlantic and throughout the Atlantic are at a high level most of the time—at a higher level than we have seen in years and this is, as you pointed out, despite all of the efforts that they're undertaking inside Ukraine.

Mr. COURTNEY. So one development which, again, maybe you could comment on is just, again, with the admission of Finland to NATO and, hopefully, you know, shortly after with Sweden, that, you know, that brings to the table or to the sea another sort of, you know, valuable ally and you mentioned some of the naval exercises—I think it was on page 15 of your testimony—that have been ongoing despite, again, in the midst of the Ukraine war.

Again, can you talk about where you see, you know, what they will add to those efforts to, again, strengthen the western flank?

General CAVOLI. Yes, sir. Absolutely.

So the accession of Finland is very important to us. Finland brings a large army at full mobilization, 280,000 ground troops.

Brings a very competent navy. Brings a large and growing air force.

They're in the process of acquiring 64 F-35s, which will create 250 fifth-generation fighters across the northern three Scandinavian countries. So the accession of Finland is very strong. The future, we hope, accession of Sweden brings much of the same.

The Swedish navy is very active, very confident, and very powerful in the Baltic Sea area, and this will give us a huge additional capability to control all three domains—classical domains in the High North.

And finally, I would point out that just the geography alone in a military sense of bringing those two huge borders of the Baltic Sea into the alliance while we're adding 1,300 kilometers of NATO border to the Russian Federation, those are very powerful in and of themselves, sir.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. Well, again, your point about in answer to the first question regarding the increased patrols, I mean, it's a team sport in terms of all our allies working together to sort of—you know—hopefully manage that and keep it under control.

So and, again, as you pointed out, these are two countries with very advanced capability. So I think it is going to be a force multiplier.

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for 5 minutes.

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Wallander, General Cavoli, thanks so much for joining us.

Listen, I think we're all very, very steadfastly in support of Ukraine and their effort to maintain independence from this unprovoked and inhumane and barbaric invasion by Russia.

I'm very focused on making sure that every weapon, every round of ammunition that we send to Ukraine, is tracked and that we are accountable for every bit of that. The challenges we face today in the United States are many.

Our constituents look at us very carefully and say, what are you doing to make sure that we are on track with that, and we know we're sending a number of items over there from tanks to HIMARS to Javelins and Stingers, small arms, ammunition, across the whole spectrum.

Can you give us an idea about what are we doing in making sure the tracking and accountability of every bit of what we send over there is very focused, making sure too we track any potential for waste, fraud, and abuse as well as do we gather intelligence to understand who might be trying to intercept those weapons, whether it's in Ukraine or even somehow on tracks and in transportation in Ukraine?

General CAVOLI. Thank you, sir. Yeah, of course. So starting with the monitoring of where the—where the equipment goes, we perform a variety of things. First of all, we inventory everything that comes through U.S. hands on the way into Ukraine and we do that in a couple of different locations that you're already familiar with, sir.

So we believe we have a very, very solid understanding of what goes into Ukraine, first of all.

Second, we, over the last few months, have fielded to Ukraine a NATO standard logistics tracking system and they give us access to their networks to monitor that. So as we inventory stuff we ingest it into LOGFAS [Logistics Functional Area Services] and then they track it as it goes forward. This is their system of tracking and we watch over their shoulder.

Of course, that's not enough so we do inspections, enhanced end use monitoring. In fact, those are done by the Defense Attaché Office in Kyiv under Brigadier General Garrick Harmon.

There's an—today's Wednesday—there's an on-site inspection going on in Odessa right now today. There's another one scheduled next Thursday. Those go based on the security situation, however, sir.

So sometimes we don't get those off. When we're unable to get to a location we have barcoded the critical pieces of equipment and issued handheld scanners that project onto a network that we control and the Ukrainians will inventory by a handheld scanner.

So that's how we look at things inside Ukraine. As far as our efforts outside of Ukraine to make sure that we're doing a good job we have had in our security assistance enterprise I believe it's nine DOD IG [Inspector General] evaluations for audits and numerous visits. So I'm pretty confident we're doing the best we can there.

And then, finally, yes, of course, we do gather intel on it and I'd be delighted to talk to you about it in closed session, sir.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you.

Let me ask questions about munition stockpiles. As we know, we are at incredible burn rates on munitions that we are sending to Ukraine, many times having to ask our friends around the world if they can help with that.

Give me your perspective on where we are today with burn rates on critical munitions, especially those that hold utility in the INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command], and what are we doing to address when those stockpiles, those magazine depths, are at critical rates in regenerating that and then modernizing some of those weapons systems that—many of those like Stinger are circa-1960s weapon systems?

Dr. WALLANDER. Well, let me start with when we work on a package of security assistance to Ukraine there is a cross-department working group that includes the services. It includes input from other COCOMs [combatant commands] to address exactly the issue you raise that our contributions to Ukraine are done in light of our own readiness requirements and priorities to support other allies and partners, not least Taiwan.

So that is baked into our process as we decide how we are best able to supply Ukraine with its requirements.

Mr. WITTMAN. Are we calling upon our friends and allies to help in that effort, especially when we are critically low on some of those munitions?

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes, Congressman, we are, and the main structure for that is the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which meets monthly.

But in between those meetings we are in constant contact with allies and partners, not just in Europe but globally, to source those capabilities and they really have stepped up. A lot of the artillery

ammunition is coming from other countries at this point, not directly from the United States, to support Ukraine.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. KELLY [presiding]. I now recognize Mr. Gallego.

Mr. GALLEGGO. Thank you, Mr. Kelly.

Dr. Wallander, in your written remarks I was pleased to see you highlight the Baltic states and the important work that they're doing to enhance security in the face of an increasingly aggressive Russia.

In fact, one of my proudest moments in Congress was introducing the Baltic Security Initiative, which provides targeted security assistance to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, three of our most critical and crucial allies.

Could you describe any particular areas where you would like to see the United States deepen cooperation with the Baltic states and do you think there's more that we can do and should be doing to support our Baltic allies?

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you, Congressman, and I share your support for assisting the Baltic countries, given their position and given how forward leaning they have been on security assistance to Ukraine.

I think that one of the most important aspects of the Baltic Security Initiative has been the resources to build infrastructure for the three countries because now we have commitments from NATO allies and we have an American persistent rotational presence in all three of the Baltic countries.

But in order to support those troop presences and in order to make sure that they are at a high readiness, the Baltic countries need to have training ranges, they need to have storage facilities.

They need to have the infrastructure to support the substantial number of allied forces as well as their own, and they have been focused on spending their own national defense resources to build that infrastructure.

But the fact that the United States has been willing to put money to that requirement and also there is NATO money on that requirement is—helps them to plan but it also then helps General Cavoli when he is planning those rotational presences, when he's planning the exercises, to know that U.S. troops will remain at a high level of readiness and really interoperable with our allies.

Mr. GALLEGGO. Thank you.

Speaking of Lithuania, we're a few months away from the NATO summit that will take place in Vilnius this summer. The administration has done an impressive job to further strengthen our alliance cohesion, and I also look forward eventually for Sweden to joining Finland and other allies.

Could you share your expectations going into that upcoming summit and what in your mind would signal a successful summit?

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you, Congressman.

I think the most—the most important aspect of the summit that I want to point to is something that General Cavoli referred to, which is that the work that's going on building into the summit is our NATO plans, which will then enforce the new—the new plans, given the new security environment, will be approved in the run-up to the summit and then defense ministers and foreign ministers

ahead of the summit will agree on what kinds of resources, what kinds of capabilities, and what kinds of defense spending are required to make sure that all of the NATO allies have the capabilities to resource those plans and it is at the Vilnius summit that heads of state and government will endorse those appropriate resources in order to make those plans real and make them credible. That's number one.

Number two is that what will be important is a NATO statement on the importance of Ukraine as a European country and its right to exist within its internationally recognized borders as a sovereign and independent state, and a NATO commitment to help in the areas of defense institution building and sort of the host of activities that NATO has invested in Ukraine over the past 30 years, which has contributed to Ukraine's ability to defend itself and remain an independent country.

So I would point to those two. From a defense point of view, those would be the two highlights that we need to focus on for Vilnius.

Mr. GALLEG. Thank you, Doctor.

General Cavoli, thanks for your testimony. I want to ask about Russia's actions in the gray zone. I remain deeply concerned by this threat and believe that irregular warfare training with allies and partners is crucial to counter that.

Recognizing that we're in this setting, what insights can you share about how EUCOM is approaching this challenge?

General CAVOLI. Thank you, Congressman.

Yeah, I share your concern in that regard and the—our cooperation with our allies and our partners, I should point out, in terms of irregular warfare training and preparation is an important part of our overall defense plans both in EUCOM and through NATO.

We have NATO Special Operations Headquarters and we have U.S. Special Operations Command Europe. Both of them work intensively on a bilateral basis and multilateral bases to prepare countries for resilience, resistance, and irregular warfare in general.

There are some real, real great cases that I'd love to talk to you about in closed session, of course. But in general, it's a big success story and it, importantly, includes nonaligned partners.

Mr. GALLEG. Yeah. Irregular warfare, I think, is something that we have not recognized as being a very important approach to Ukraine's resiliency against Russia.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.

Mr. KELLY. The gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Chairman.

General Cavoli, throughout this conflict we have had the specter of tactical nuclear weapons looming over us by the Russians and, frankly, Putin has put these threats to effective use in restraining our policymakers and leaders from involving themselves more thoroughly in this conflict on the Ukrainians' behalf.

In my opinion, the Russians know they're overmatched when it comes to the big guns in our respective nuclear arsenals. However, it seems to me that they feel they have an advantage when it comes to the low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.

So first, do you believe that there is a gap in our nuclear deterrent at present, and also knowing that Chairman Milley, General Cotton, and your predecessor, General Wolters, supported the continued development of the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile [SLCM-N], do you share their position that this system would fill a key deterrence in that gap?

General CAVOLI. First to your second question, sir.

Yes, I think that the SLCM-N is an important weapon.

To your first question, I don't think we have significant gaps in our nuclear deterrent capability. I'm very confident in our nuclear deterrence as well as our extended nuclear deterrence.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. In an open setting, can you give us an estimate of how many tactical or nuclear low-yield weapons Russia has?

General CAVOLI. Not in an open setting, sir, but I'd be delighted to in a classified—

Dr. DESJARLAIS. I've seen unclassified estimates around 2,000 warheads. Does that sound about correct?

General CAVOLI. I haven't seen those, sir. So—

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. Dr. Wallander, one area that I think the administration has kind of failed the American people is its communication surrounding the conflict in Ukraine.

I don't think they've done a satisfactory job in communicating the reason why we are supporting Ukraine or what our desired end goal in this conflict is.

So I'd like to give you a minute to communicate why you believe it's imperative that we take the fight to Russia at this moment, what interest does the United States have in this conflict and, you know, how are we doing and how do we expect to do? What's the end game?

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you, Congressman.

First of all, the stakes are European security. Of course, our values and our interests are connected to Ukraine as a sovereign independent country. But European security in the 21st century is built on a foundation of respect for international law and the resilience of the U.N. [United Nations] Charter. And Russia's assault in Ukraine is an attempt to change that rules-based international order, which is to say that sovereignty is contingent, borders can be changed through the use of force, and big countries get to decide what the foreign and security policies of their neighbors are.

So the stakes are larger than Ukraine. But they go beyond Europe as well because China is engaging in similar kinds of probes and attempts to erode that same rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific. And China we know is watching very closely to see if the international community will allow Russia to get away with this and would take the wrong lessons from our failure to ensure Russia's strategic failure in Ukraine.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Yeah, and I think that's a good explanation. I wish we could get it out to the American people in a more effective manner.

General Cavoli, less than about a third of our NATO allies remain compliant with their commitment to maintain defense spending at a minimum of 2 percent GDP. With this going on literally in the European backyard, what is it going to take to get them to step up?

General CAVOLI. Sir, I think this is one of the things it's taken to get them to step up. So in 2014 the average expenditure per GDP inside NATO was 1.4 percent. Today, it's 1.8 percent. Not yet at the target but closing in on it.

We have come up to nine nations meeting the—meeting the 2 percent goal to include one nation, Poland, which spends more per GDP as of this year than the United States does.

With the accession of Finland that number has grown to 10 that spend 2 percent or more and there are 11 more nations that are on a very definite glide path to get to 2 percent by 2024, which was the Wales summit pledge.

That's not all the nations in NATO, however, sir, and so we continue to have work to do to get all our—all our allies sharing the burden equally.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. I think that's really important considering our looming debt crisis, our exponential debt we have in this country.

I think Americans are definitely wanting to see other countries step up and do their fair share and it's extremely important that we build these alliances, strengthen these alliances, especially with the looming threats, as we have mentioned, with China and Taiwan.

So I thank you both for being here today. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Moulton, for 5 minutes.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for being here.

Your statements both discussed the practice of the People's Republic of China in creating agreements with individual European nations that ostensibly are for improving trade but create dependencies on China, and we have seen this same strategy in Africa.

It's been much maligned by us because we say these are bad deals. But even if they are bad deals for the host nations they work well for China because they create this dependency.

Have you seen any change in this trend in light of the war in Ukraine, Dr. Wallander?

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you, Congressman.

Yes, we have seen a change. Three of the countries who've been members of the 17+1 arrangement by which China was seeking to build those kinds of dependencies through trade, investment, have actually—and it's not surprisingly the three Baltic countries—have quit that structure, recognizing the challenge that China poses and the vulnerabilities that it seeks to create and successfully often creates through technology, through problematic investment contracts, through acquisition of companies, of ports.

And so there is a greater awareness among European countries that even as they trade with China, that they need to not allow themselves to become vulnerable to coercion and—

Mr. MOULTON. Well, we certainly hope that that trend expands and continues.

General Cavoli, we are very much anticipating the Ukrainian counteroffensive, anticipating it will be much more successful than the Russian offensive of the past several months. But are the Ukrainians going to get all the weapons they need in time for this offensive?

General CAVOLI. Congressman, thank you.

Yes. So we sat down with the Ukrainians—with our Ukrainian colleagues and we calculated the amount of materiel they would need for this offensive.

We checked it a couple of times and we gathered it from our allies, who were very generous especially with regard to tanks and armored fighting vehicles, and we have been shipping it into the country.

We are—over 98 percent of the combat vehicles are already there and I'd hesitate to describe too much more in an open setting. But I am very confident that we have delivered the materiel that they need and will continue a pipeline to sustain their operations as well.

Mr. MOULTON. Well, that's good to hear and I certainly hope that we hear from the Ukrainians that they agree with you.

Dr. Wallander, someday, hopefully sooner than later, this war is going to end and we can all imagine that Russia will go back home, assess their truly dramatic losses, and then start to rebuild their military.

How do we think about deterrence in the future—5, 10 years from now—where we don't want Russia to simply get back to where they were before this war started and start another war in Europe?

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you, Congressman. Well, first, I would note that Russia will—I share your assessment that Russia will seek to rebuild and will be able to rebuild to some extent.

But the international community has imposed export restrictions, technology restrictions, and sanctions on Russia and those restrictions will likely make it very difficult—make it very difficult for Russia to achieve all of the objectives that the leadership might have in the military sphere.

That said, they will rebuild.

Mr. MOULTON. And so how do you structure those sanctions so that the allies who put them together are willing to continue them, to your point, to prevent them from rebuilding while also showing Russia that if they're to change their behavior they have an off-ramp and can be welcomed back into the world community if they significantly change their approach?

Dr. WALLANDER. Well, many of the most important restrictions are American export control restrictions; and while it is good to do them in concert with allies, we have the lead on many of the technologies that Russia seeks and has benefitted from.

But it is our close alliance relationship and our constructive relationship with the European Union, because it is the European Union that is the organization that agrees upon and enforces sanctions on Russia in cooperation with us, that will enable us to maintain that unity. And awareness of the threat that Russia poses to Europe remains high and I believe—

[Simultaneous speaking.]

Mr. MOULTON. And I hope we have a way of communicating to the Russian people that there is a choice here when they get to their next leader.

General Cavoli, what do we need to do for Ukraine on this front post-war?

General CAVOLI. I'm sorry. On what front post-war? On their future force?

Mr. MOULTON. Yes, their future force.

General CAVOLI. We are working hard on the question of what their future force needs to be look like. One thing we know right up front, Congressman, is that the—

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 83.]

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Kelly.

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield my time to the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Alford.

Mr. ALFORD. Thank you for ceding your time, Chairman Kelly. Thank you, Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Smith and our witnesses here today. I appreciate you being here.

The war in Ukraine has exposed some big gaps in our defense industrial base and I, along with Mr. Wittman, have some deep concerns about our ability to replenish and keep up with our weapon stockpiles. We must accelerate munitions productions capacity to be prepared for a potential conflict with China.

We all know Xi is watching what's happening in Ukraine, supporting Russia through its no limits partnership with Putin, and I also want to make sure that our European allies are carrying their weight through burden sharing.

General Cavoli, as you mentioned, the majority of our allies are not meeting NATO's 2 percent GDP defense spending target. In fact, as you said, only 9 of our NATO 30 member states met its 2 percent in 2022.

Dr. Wallander, considering the recent NATO report that these nations just are not living up to their obligations, what is the administration doing to put pressure on these nations to pay their fair share?

Dr. WALLANDER. Congressman, the first—the most important is that we are making meeting the 2 percent commitment a deliverable of the Vilnius summit.

In other words, we are not letting up on the focus on the requirement of meeting 2 percent and, as I suggested, going beyond 2 percent if that is required to actively and correctly build the capabilities required by the NATO regional plans.

So we are—we are pressuring and working with allies to take seriously the capabilities requirements to make those plans more than just plans on paper but actual real capabilities and that's going to require defense spending—increased defense spending by many, if not all, NATO allies.

Mr. ALFORD. In particular, Germany only contributed 1.44 percent. That's a big disappointment. What type of pressure specifically are you putting on Germany?

Dr. WALLANDER. We are expecting Germany to live up to this government's commitment to meet 2 percent. They have already increased their defense spending over a 5-year period, which should get them to near 2 percent if not above, but we continue to emphasize to German leadership the importance of Germany to fulfill its commitment.

Mr. ALFORD. Are there any real consequences if they do not meet that and meet it soon?

Dr. WALLANDER. I think the consequences for European countries that don't meet that commitment is that they—their standing as leaders in Europe is predicated on the—in part on the seriousness with which they undertake to fulfill the commitments they've made to other allies and we hold them accountable for that.

Mr. ALFORD. Thank you. General Cavoli, I have a very simple question for you. What happens if Russia wins and Ukraine loses?

General CAVOLI. Well, sir, from a military perspective it depends on what wins means, where the force ends up—where the Russian force ends up geographically, what its composition is, what capabilities they have left.

But it would certainly mean that we have to change our deterrent posture if they ended up significantly farther west than they've managed to get so far.

Mr. ALFORD. Who would be next?

General CAVOLI. Sir, that's a—that's a great question. We think about that a lot and we work with the nations that we think would be vulnerable.

Clearly, geographically speaking, the ones on their immediate periphery of the Russian Federation would be the first but they wouldn't be the only ones. The Russians are active globally, very, very active in Africa, for example. So I think it would depend on a lot of things.

We do spend quite a bit of time working with partners and allies who are in the immediate periphery of Russia to make them resilient and defensible.

Mr. ALFORD. I've got a minute left. I wanted to talk about the CCP and their investments in Europe right now. What are some of the projects that they are doing that you can talk about in this setting and how are we countering those measures?

Dr. WALLANDER. I think the areas of our greatest concern are when China is, largely through technology companies—Huawei is the kind of poster child for that—and so we work closely in sharing intelligence and our information about the risks that that creates for countries in Europe and, more broadly, globally, for them to be able to control their infrastructure, to control their communications. So that is one major line of effort.

But the other major concern is when we see China seeking majority control of ports, and while there were some instances in Europe some time ago where countries did not take that seriously, they are now very much attuned to that and have taken steps to make sure that even if there is investment it does not allow—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The greatest strength that the U.S. Government has security-wise, militarywise, is something that Russia doesn't have, something that China doesn't have. That's our coalition of allies.

That's our strength, and foremost among our allies are our transatlantic allies. They've had, however, a soft underbelly in terms of

their own security, surrounding an issue that is of concern to us too domestically here and that's the energy issue.

Energy and our security, energy and the security of our allies, you can't separate them. They're intertwined and they're important, and we see how important it is with Saudi Arabia's recent change in the position with Iran. We see Russia's influence in OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries].

We have seen Putin use it as a weapon of war and the strength of the Ukrainian people to withstand this winter. But the targeting of the energy infrastructure and how important that is strategically.

So given everything that's happening, one of the things that's not, I don't think, fully appreciated that we should be looking at very much in terms of our own U.S. self-interest is the miscalculation of Putin when he thought the using weapon—the weapon of energy with Europe and our allies how that would be a strategic advantage and the changes that have occurred, changes that would have taken decades to get to where they are now.

Can you comment on—because it's so important to our security—can you comment on those changes and how Putin's miscalculation has dramatically changed the energy posture of our allies that have—that has such a dramatic effect domestically here in the U.S. as well?

General CAVOLI. If I could start, Dr. Wallander, because there's a military quotient to this and a legal equity that's important, Congressman.

First of all, the change has been dramatic. So, in general, Europe's dependence on Russian gas has gone from 40 percent to just under 10 percent overnight in a year. It wasn't without pain and some of the pain was shared by U.S. service men and women because the prices increased by several fold.

In Germany, the gas prices increased 600 percent for a period there. They've leveled back out now. But, nevertheless, it was not without pain that they did this. Why is that important for us?

As you know, there's legislation that requires us not to—us, the U.S. military—not to depend on Russian gas and oil and in the operational energy field that was easy for us. That's the gas and petroleum that we buy to fuel ships, to drive tanks, and things like that.

We could control where we got that from. But our installations overseas were dependent on the local systems and so we were unable to comply. But in Germany where we have 39,000 Americans and their families, we actually went from being 40 percent dependent to zero percent dependent on Russian gas.

The only exceptions would be countries where we really don't have a lot of people so countries that still receive gas from Russia would include Hungary. We have very limited presence—

Mr. KEATING. Dr. Wallander, if I could, looking at the future, this is a tremendous shift and it's advantageous to our own security interests and defense interests in this country. Can you just comment also along with the General Cavoli?

Dr. WALLANDER. Absolutely, and it's not just the dependence. It's the fact that Russia has a longstanding track record of using dependence for political coercion and that was the vulnerability that

was created by investing or accepting Russian investment particularly in gas pipelines.

By diversifying to LNG [liquefied natural gas], by diversifying to new sources, by moving away from carbon-based fuels, Europe is reducing that vulnerability that Russia could use the turning off or the metering of energy for political effects and that is a very welcome development.

Mr. KEATING. And getting back to my primary point, that makes this coalition stronger because Putin had thought that this would be a wedge.

So, looking forward, how important has it been in the decades to come to our greatest strength that this is something that's being dealt with so dramatically, as the general said?

Dr. WALLANDER. I will just point—I fully agree and I'll point to another element, which is in 2014 when we first looked at sanctioning Russia for its initial invasion of Ukraine, one of the limitations on strong sanctions was exactly that energy dependence.

Going forward, sustaining sanctions, tightening them when necessary, will be easier for Europe because they are not dependent and that will be a long-term disadvantage for the Putin leadership.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. Thank you for your work.

The CHAIRMAN. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Gallagher.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The phrase lessons learned from the war in Ukraine has become one of the most popular or perhaps overused phrases and in sort of the DC national security community.

I guess in simplest terms, Dr. Wallander, what lessons do you believe the Department of Defense has learned from the war in Ukraine?

Dr. WALLANDER. Three lessons. One is needing to pay close attention to readiness and supply chains. We neglected that as a country in the last 30 years and we have learned that lesson and we're taking action to remedy those—that neglect.

Number two is the importance of allies and partners, a global network of allies and partners. It's not just NATO, although it's importantly NATO. It is the G-7 [Group of Seven]. It is other like-minded countries who care about that international rules-based order.

And I think the third lesson is that we need to make investments in partners that we did make in a country like Ukraine to build basic defense institution capabilities, to build relationships, because all of the work that EUCOM has been able to do to surge support to Ukraine would not have been possible without those relationships that were built over several decades.

Mr. GALLAGHER. And when it comes to our sort of initial inability to deter Russia from invading and miscalculation therein, what lessons are to be derived from that?

Dr. WALLANDER. Well, I think there the lessons are the positive lessons of how we successfully deter Russia every single day because Russia, despite potential incentives to, have not threatened NATO, have not threatened the U.S. homeland.

We know how to create credible deterrence that works and that's a lesson I know that EUCOM is taking and that the Defense De-

partment wants to continue forward as we think about the importance of the Vilnius summit and making sure we have a credible deterrent for NATO.

Mr. GALLAGHER. But as a matter of fact, on February 24th we obviously did not have a credible deterrent or we failed to deter, notwithstanding what's happened afterwards and that's sort of not a positive development anytime you have, you know, hundreds of billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives lost.

I guess I'm sort of honing in on that failure of deterrence. Is it mirror imaging? Is there something about Putin we fail to understand?

Dr. WALLANDER. I think tactically we underestimated the stakes that the Russian leadership—well, I don't know if it's tactically but we miscalculated and believed that Russia—this Russian leadership would be daunted by the international costs that it would pay.

But I think the other lesson learned is one we are—we are already implementing, which is to take seriously the actual defense capabilities of partners like Ukraine so that they can mount a credible deterrent.

And while work was done—bipartisan work was done on that in the last decade, clearly we didn't do enough, and that we have definitely learned that lesson and are carrying it forward.

Mr. GALLAGHER. General Cavoli, same question on sort of Putin and deterrence failure, what was our central miscalculation, and then an added question about, you know, a lot of people refer to Ukraine as a sort of test bed for technology in modern warfare. How are we capturing that innovation on the battlefield and importing it into DOD?

General CAVOLI. So, sir, starting with your second question, while we have a ton of different initiatives and activities to observe from the technical level to the operational level and to the institutional level what's working in Ukraine, what's not working in Ukraine, and we're importing those.

We have at all echelons talks with the services about what we're seeing. They have questions for us. We talk with the Ukrainians. They are evolving very quickly because, you know, they're under selective pressure, as it were.

So they're developing new techniques. Sometimes we develop them together in consultation with each other. But all of this is permeating back into the services as they generate future forces.

Just as important we're in consultation constantly with the other combatant commands. Admiral Aquilino in U.S. INDOPACOM is paying great attention to this, has had many teams come out and visit.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I have 18 seconds. Is there, like, an obvious battlefield innovation in Ukraine that could be exported to the Indo-Pacific for Aquilino?

General CAVOLI. Yes. I think our method of equipping and advising from afar.

Mr. GALLAGHER. My time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Houlahan.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you both for your testimony both here and in the closed setting as well.

I have a couple of questions and I want to pull on a couple of threads. One is we spoke about the addition of Finland to NATO and the power of their capabilities, and one of the things you spoke about was their air power and their plans to have I think 60 F-35s at least. Is that correct? Or around then?

General CAVOLI. Sixty-four, Congresswoman.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Sixty-four. And then we have also spent a lot of time, of course, talking about Ukraine and what we would expect would be offensive operations that are forthcoming and you, sir, General, talked about staying the course. Good solid plans that are outlined.

But I and a number of other people bipartisan-ly have been asking of you all whether or not it would be appropriate to allow for Ukraine to have access to aircraft as well, whether they're A-10s or F-16s or MiGs. I think the Polish have been in the press recently talking about that.

What is the latest thought on that? Why is that not something that we would want in an active war zone to be providing for an ally of ours?

Dr. WALLANDER. Our focus has been on—with its generous support of the American people through Congress—focused on Ukrainian priorities for the fight and aircraft while on the list—Western modern aircraft is about eighth on the list. And so we have focused with resources on the highest priority capabilities and that has been air defense, artillery, and armor.

I think General Cavoli can speak to this better than I. There's also a timing issue—what do they require right now, which is what we have been focused on for the battles they are facing, what can we deliver that will be timely and effective. And in that regard, the contributions that some NATO allies have made of legacy Soviet aircraft have been helpful to the Ukrainians because their pilots are trained on those aircraft. They know how to use them. They know how to maintain them.

General CAVOLI. Thanks, Celeste.

Ma'am, in the near term and into the midterm what Ukraine really needs to do is control the airspace over its country and over its forces, right, and they've been doing that very effectively with ground-based air defense and we spoke a little bit about our efforts to introduce more ground-based air defense recently.

So that's, like, the thing that's most imperative right now and it's being very well served by ground-based air defense. They've also got some capabilities that we have married to their Soviet-era airframes for offensive operations that I'd best talk about in closed session.

And finally, I would note that there are countries that have given airframes, and Slovakia and Poland specifically have given a significant number just in the past couple of weeks and they were readily integrated into operations.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Yes, and I've been following that and I appreciate that.

I'm just going to leave that part of my questioning with saying that what—I'm curious to know if there is any point in time where it makes sense to continue that conversation because the Congress has at least been asking that question officially since last April.

So it's been more than a year, and I understand that these timelines are long and it's very expensive and prioritization. But we have no indication necessarily that this is going to abate anytime soon and so it just feels as though it's still an appropriate conversation to continue to ask and to continue to have.

With what remains of my time I would like to follow up on what Mr.—I think it was Keating was asking about our efforts in the DOD within EUCOM to make sure that we are helping our allies be less reliable on Russian energy sources and I was wondering if you could specifically comment on the Energy Resilience and Conservation Investment Program and whether or not any of those funds have been particularly useful in being less dependent, as you mentioned, sir, in our own use of energy or our allies being less dependent?

Dr. WALLANDER. Congresswoman, I would have to take that question for a response in the record. I would—I have not been tracking whether we have been able to use that funding for—specifically for allies. It's a great question and I would like to get you a good answer.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. I appreciate it. I'm going to go ahead and yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, General Bacon, for 5 minutes.

Mr. BACON. Chairman Rogers, thank you, and I thank, Dr. Wallander, for you being here and, General Cavoli, appreciate your perspective.

I have a series of questions on the Baltics. Then I also want to talk a little about energy to our own bases in Europe. So if we could be concise I'd be very grateful. So I'm on the Baltic Security chair—I'm the co-chair for the Baltic Security Caucus. I also served in NATO for a few years.

You know, the Baltics deserve a lot of our focus. They are on the front lines. They've embraced democracy, our free markets, and they are shining bright. They're prosperous. But they're on the front lines and, I think, very vulnerable.

So, first of all, Dr. Wallander, are we doing enough to create deterrence in the three Baltic states?

Dr. WALLANDER. I think that we are—we have really stepped up, the United States and allies, and have heard their concerns and in particular one of the achievements there was the Madrid summit decision to focus on credible defense, forward defense, and you've seen that then materialized through the battle groups but also with persistent U.S. rotational presence, persistent air policing, and we have prioritized all three countries in some of their FMS [foreign military sales] cases and FMF [foreign military financing].

Mr. BACON. I appreciate that. We have dedicated about \$250 million a year for the Baltic Security Initiative and we're going to try to—at least I'm proposing to raise it this following year but we'll see how well we do.

General Cavoli, I know that at the last NATO conference there was talk about putting a ground division in the Baltics. Not necessarily all American. Could be a blend of various countries.

What's your opinion of that? I mean, I personally think it's needed for deterrence. But where do you lie and what's the—where are we going with us?

General CAVOLI. Thank you, Congressman. So the new plans that we have put together—the regional plans that we put together are a pretty big advance in a number of ways. One of the ways is that they incorporate for the first time in years national defense forces and national defense planning.

When you put the Baltics' national forces together and when you put the multinational forces, those three battle groups that can come up to brigade level, and when you put the U.S. unilateral contributions of special enablers together and then you put the multi-national division northeast on top of that, which is a NATO force that I control, you have well over a NATO division in the Baltics right now and this is all baked into the plans that I was discussing earlier, sir.

Mr. BACON. I think that's a big step forward for deterrence. Russia needs to know they're fighting with us when they pick on the Baltics. It doesn't appear to me that the Baltics have a very modern air defense capability.

I know we have fighters that move in and out. But surface-to-air missiles, what can we do about that?

General CAVOLI. Sir, so we are in year three of a 5-year special security cooperation initiative for integrated air and missile defense [IAMD] in the Baltics. I know you're familiar with it already, sir. And so the first phase of that was to lay down the communications networks and the secure communications necessary. That's been done.

We're now in the phase where we lay out more sensors and, importantly, integrate those sensors. We're doing pretty well with that. Phase three will be the last year of the 5-year plan and that is to put actual weapon systems in.

Separately from that, sir, I would say that those battle groups that NATO has put out there do come with ground-based air defense that we have been integrating with the overall air picture.

And then, finally, for the Vilnius summit we have created a special air defense plan that will help us drive forward the rest of the Baltic IAMD program.

Mr. BACON. I think that's good news for the Baltic states and the more we can build on that is great because they are very vulnerable.

Switching gears a little bit, I served at Ramstein. I'm very familiar with the Landstuhl hospital. I was part of putting that together as a base commander years ago. But the one thing I was told, Ramstein and Landstuhl were always reliant on Russian gas.

You know, I've tried to chip away at that over the last few years but last NDAA we finally said no ands or buts—you cannot be using Russian gas. How are we doing on this, to either one, if you have the information?

General CAVOLI. Sir, we're doing great on that right now and it's because of the conversation that we were having earlier with a cou-

ple of other Representatives. So we were unable to comply because we were dependent on German infrastructure and German energy infrastructure.

That has changed dramatically over the last 14 months. The Germans went from 39.6 percent of their energy use coming from Russia to zero. I mean, I think it's .1 [0.1] percent and I can't even figure out what that is.

So we're no longer reliant on Russian gas in those locations.

Mr. BACON. Thank you very much. I thank you both. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Escobar.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and many thanks to our witnesses. Thank you for your service and for the incredible work that you've done.

I think context is so important and I wanted to share with you all when I attended the 2019 Munich Security Conference the conversations at that conference were alarming and jarring when it came to Western unity, when it came to our commitment to NATO.

I was at this year's conference and it was radically different, and I am so proud of the work that our country and that our administration has done in order to shore up those alliances and to ensure that we are together, especially in this very important fight to support Ukraine.

So I want to focus a little bit on lessons that we have learned, actually, General Cavoli, from Russian readiness failures. What readiness lessons, particularly regarding sustainment, supplies, and logistics, have you learned thus far from Russian operational failures?

Where have Russian forces vastly improved on their early failures and what problems continue to plague them? How are our support efforts preventing Ukrainian forces from making similar mistakes?

General CAVOLI. Thank you, ma'am. And, first of all, I was at both of those security conferences also and I share your observations and the sense of gratification that you have about that.

I think the theme of the 2019 one was "Westlessness" —

Ms. ESCOBAR. That's right.

General CAVOLI [continuing]. If I remember correctly. That was not the theme this year.

[Simultaneous speaking.]

General CAVOLI. Two lessons learned specifically with regard to logistics—first, stockpiles and consumption rates. They are just off the charts and I think that we in the DOD have taken note of that.

I know that we in NATO have taken note of that and have incorporated that lesson into our new plans and that will be part of driving defense spending higher in Europe and among our allies.

Second, logistics is an end-to-end system, and the Russians have proven extremely adept at operational level logistics. They can move large amounts of stuff long distances quickly.

But once it gets off the train, that last mile, as it were, that is part of the system too and they were not ready for that and that is shown over the days. Part of the system also is the operational design of your operation.

One of the key weaknesses of the initial Russian plan was the fact that it attacked from five different directions at once converging.

So the Russian army was operating on what we call exterior lines, that is, from outside and you had to really work hard to shift an effort from one access to another. So those are three or four lessons, I think, that we could draw from their logistic experience.

On the other hand, our logistic experience has been extremely successful. Jackie Van Ovost in USTRANSCOM's [U.S. Transportation Command's] ability to move things, huge amounts of stuff, strategically overnight is unmatched on the globe.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Excellent. Thank you.

Dr. Wallander, I have a follow-up question for you. I want to pick up on some of the concerns that Mr. Wittman and Alford raised regarding munition stockpiles. I've urged integrating additive manufacturing into this process in the past.

I think it is where we can have tremendous success and we can really capitalize on the innovation and brilliance of it. You referenced the cross-department working group to oversee munition expenditures and backfill efforts. Is this group also tasked with exploring innovative ways to meet those backfill requirements?

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you, Congresswoman.

The main focus of work on those issues is led by the acquisition and sustainment part of OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and is led by Under Secretary Bill LaPlante. And he is so busy, so focused, so active in finding ways to solve bottlenecks, to use exactly the kind of creativity and innovation advantages that U.S.—the U.S. economy and U.S. companies have. And they've already solved some of the creative solutions that—they've already come up with some creative solutions that we can't talk about in public for Ukraine but also have managed to go far beyond what we expected a year ago in now being able to count on enhanced artillery ammunition production over the coming years.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Thank you both so much.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Banks, for 5 minutes.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Wallander, since the war began in Ukraine the DOD has deployed or extended the deployment over 20,000 additional U.S. troops to Europe.

This surge included—includes additional air, land, and naval capabilities and now we have 100,000 U.S. service members who are stationed in Europe.

Given the depleted state of the Russian military and the increasing defense spending of our NATO allies, does the United States need those surge forces in the EUCOM area of operation after the war passes?

Dr. WALLANDER. Congressman, I believe that the DOD, in close support with the Joint Staff and EUCOM, will take exactly that assessment when the time comes. It's premature to make that assessment right now because we do not know precisely how the conflict ends, how the battles over the next couple of months will resolve. But I assure you we will look carefully at exactly that issue.

Mr. BANKS. So you don't know. The surge forces might be permanent?

Dr. WALLANDER. We don't know what the requirements will be for credible defense and deterrence after the next couple of months because we're still in the middle of this hot war and a high level of Russian activity in Ukraine.

Mr. BANKS. Okay. So do you think the Department should redeploy temporary surge forces to other theaters like the Indo-Pacific or back to the continental United States based on other priorities?

Dr. WALLANDER. My support is for—

Mr. BANKS. It sounds like a surge is permanent, a permanent surge.

Dr. WALLANDER. Let me be clear. The surge is by no means assumed to be permanent. There is a process for sourcing global employment of the force and at this point the surge was—is assessed to be sustainable and to not come at the cost of forces elsewhere on the globe.

Mr. BANKS. Okay. Let me move on.

According to a recent study conducted by CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies], the U.S. military would run out of certain munitions in a potential conflict with China in less than a week, in part because of what we have sent of our stockpile to Ukraine.

Is it possible for the DOD to replenish crucial U.S. weapon stockpiles for items like Javelins, Stingers, 155-millimeter artillery shells to what they were a year ago while maintaining security assistance to Ukraine at the current rate?

Dr. WALLANDER. I'm not aware of that study but I will reinforce something I spoke to earlier, which is all decisions to provide security assistance to Ukraine are taken in light of U.S. readiness requirements and that input includes all COCOMs, including INDO-PACOM.

Mr. BANKS. So even given the surge in munitions funding and the expansion of production lines, what's the soonest that it would take to replace our stocks of Javelins, Stingers, and 155-millimeter?

Dr. WALLANDER. I would have to take that question for the record. I don't know a date, sir.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. BANKS. Does the DOD consider the strength of U.S. stockpiles when deciding which munitions that we provide to Ukraine?

Dr. WALLANDER. Yes, sir. That is part of the readiness assessment.

Mr. BANKS. And does the DOD consider the need for Taiwan to receive some of these weapons to defend themselves before we supply aid to Ukraine?

Dr. WALLANDER. Assessing Taiwan's requirements is part of that process in making decisions.

Mr. BANKS. And if the DOD considers the danger that supplying particular munitions to Ukraine poses to U.S. stockpiles, as you said, why did it take the Department so long to ink deals to boost the production of these systems after the war in Ukraine began?

Dr. WALLANDER. I don't believe that it—we might disagree about what was a quick response to the requirement. Those new contracts and those new advances on supply lines and defense industrial base came within months.

Mr. BANKS. Is that quick enough? You just told us that we haven't replaced the stockpile. Studies prove it. So is it quick—can we replace them quick enough?

Dr. WALLANDER. We can replace stockpiles as required by readiness input from the services and the COCOMs.

Mr. BANKS. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Jacobs.

Ms. JACOBS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you both for being here and for testifying. As you may know, even well before the war in Ukraine I was focused a lot on adequate end-use monitoring of our weapons around the world and I want to commend the administration for the admirable work you all have done to do end-use monitoring and enhanced end-use monitoring in Ukraine.

I saw it for myself firsthand when I was out there in December and I know it's incredibly hard to do end-use monitoring in a place like Ukraine that has active conflict where we rightly do not have boots on the ground. But we also know even outside of war zones, as the GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office] has recently detailed in two different reports this year, that end-use monitoring can be challenging and that we have had challenges with it.

So, Assistant Secretary Wallander, I was hoping you could speak to, one, the challenges of conducting enhanced end-use monitoring in a context like Ukraine or an active war zone and how what we're doing in Ukraine compares to other previous and current conflict-affected countries, and how we're thinking about end-use monitoring, moving forward, given what we're learning in the context of Ukraine.

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you, Congresswoman.

I want to reinforce General Cavoli's presentation of the processes as being innovative, comprehensive, and providing a high level of confidence that we know how much we've—what has happened to all of the capabilities that we have provided to the Ukrainians, that the Ukrainians have been very forward leaning and cooperative and provide a lot of transparency. That leads to the high confidence of our reports about end-use monitoring and that we can—we have not detected diversion of capabilities that we have provided.

In particular, it's extraordinary what EUCOM has been able to do, given that it is a combat environment and U.S. military forces cannot be towards the front lines to do the end-use monitoring or American citizens, and the innovations using technology that General Cavoli provided is something extraordinary.

And to your question about how does that compare to previous instances, I don't believe we had those in place and this is going to be one of the lessons learned. We can now do this in other areas where we're assisting partners in ways that we didn't think we could do before.

Ms. JACOBS. Well, thank you. Thanks for all of your innovative work on that and please let us know what you need from our end to be able to continue improving our end-use monitoring of weap-

ons not only in Ukraine but all over the world and particularly as we're looking at sort of moving forward, further equipping partner forces.

Assistant Secretary Wallander, I wanted to also ask you a question about war powers. As you know, Congress is who the Constitution gives the power to declare war and fund and regulate the military.

Are you aware of any legal analysis produced within the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, or any other part of government that would allow the President to use force against Russia without congressional authorization, and that includes force applied through foreign surrogates?

Dr. WALLANDER. Being clear, I am not a lawyer and not speaking from a legal perspective. I am not aware of such discussions because our—in supporting Ukraine because we are not at war or involved in combat or hostilities with Russia.

We are supporting Ukraine and providing capabilities to Ukraine. The Russia contingency from an American point of view would be inherent right of self-defense were Russia to attack the United States or our allies.

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you. I ask because there was a concerning article in The Washington Post that said that DOD was working on plans to potentially do kinetic strikes against Wagner Group outside the EUCOM AOR [area of responsibility], and so I just hope that you will notify Congress and this committee if ever there is—starts to be discussion about, you know, directly attacking Russia or its proxies with us or one of our surrogate forces.

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you, Congresswoman. I will—I will be mindful of your question and take that back.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Waltz.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for coming today.

I just wanted to add to some other members' questions and conversations about burden sharing. And I just wanted to draw your attention to where we are at this point in terms of the United States and the taxpayer providing military assistance compared with our allies.

Notably there, you have Germany at \$2.5 billion—these are pledges—compared to the United States at 46. You have the United Kingdom a little over 5. Poland, despite having an economy a fourth the size of France, has contributed more.

Secretary Wallander, would you call this burden sharing? Do you think this is fair to the American people and taxpayer?

Dr. WALLANDER. Congressman, I think your chart illustrates American leadership and we are very concerned about burden sharing. I will note that there are eight countries that contribute a larger percentage of their GDP and security assistance to Ukraine than the United States, Poland among them.

Mr. WALTZ. No, absolutely, and I don't want to take away from what our Eastern European allies are doing and contributing. But

Germany, France, Italy, Spain, some of the largest economies in Europe, this is—have contributed a pittance compared to the United States even though the EU [European Union] economy is the same as the United States, collectively.

So one of my other colleagues asked what are the consequences. I mean, listen, the American people—and this is what I need you to take away and I made this same point to Secretary Austin.

The American people are sick and tired of this. If I had \$100 for every speech that a Defense Secretary has written in the last 20 years begging our European allies to step up, I'd be a very rich man. But they haven't. I mean, they just haven't.

The United States has subsidized European security and social programs for the last 20 years. So when does this end? When do they actually get to the point and what are the consequences if they don't?

Dr. WALLANDER. We continually push NATO allies to do their part, both in the NATO context and in support of Ukraine.

Mr. WALTZ. But Madam Secretary, we have been pushing for decades across multiple administrations, and sending strongly worded memos over tea and crumpets in Europe isn't getting the job done.

So here's what I need you to take away. This continued support is at risk domestically, politically, here if we don't see the administration getting results—not asking forcefully, getting results in terms of this pathetic contribution here. And you need to understand that there is a domestic issue here with continued support to Ukraine, given everything that we have done.

That said, we have done a lot and we have been very effective post facto after deterrence failed and after thousands and thousands of Ukrainians are dead and suffering. But you agree and you've testified the Russian military is devastated, correct?

Dr. WALLANDER. Its conventional forces, ground forces, that are in Ukraine has been devastated.

Mr. WALTZ. Unlikely for them to take the entire country of Ukraine at this point. Fair to say?

Dr. WALLANDER. Very unlikely.

Mr. WALTZ. I think fair to say that the 31 most modern militaries in the world and a strengthened NATO alliance that many people in this room have celebrated, could handle the remnants of the Russian military should it decide to take action in a NATO country or be aggressive in a NATO country.

Fair to say? I mean, they can't—they can't take all of Ukraine. I don't see how they could take a modern European military.

Dr. WALLANDER. I don't think I would agree with you, with respect, Congressman, because Russia still retains strategic capabilities, an air force, cyber, underwater—

Mr. WALTZ. Its air force can't establish air superiority in Ukraine. I can't imagine it establishing air superiority in Poland. Fair?

Dr. WALLANDER. I think we have to take—we should not—

Mr. WALTZ. So I think—

Dr. WALLANDER [continuing]. We should not make the mistake of underestimating Russia's military capabilities because the stakes of getting it wrong are too high.

Mr. WALTZ. But I think at the end of the day we have a very serious threat in Western—in the Western Pacific and the INDO-PACOM theater, and I noted that you would not commit to the surge being permanent.

Yet we have taken assets from the Indo-Pacific. We have taken Air Force and other assets to put them in Europe. Yet, we have 31 NATO nations that are able to stand their own ground against a diminished Russian military.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. McClellan.

Ms. McCLELLAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary and General.

My staff recently had the opportunity to meet with members of the Ukraine's national emergency services, which is their equivalent of FEMA [U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency], and they mentioned that one of the tools that would be most helpful for them is the provision of remotely controlled mine protection and removal equipment such as MV-4s and MV-10s to decontaminate areas heavily mined with unexploded ordnances.

There are currently only two of these machines in the Ukraine, despite multiple cities being littered with unexploded ordnances. Is EUCOM working to ensure that more of this life-saving technology is being provided?

General CAVOLI. Yes, absolutely. A lot of it's being provided by allies, ma'am, and a lot of it's being provided by other international organizations that are—go beyond a single country.

The whole question of demining and demilitarizing the landscape at the end of this is a big one. The Ukrainians have been doing it as they go along when they recapture territory. But it is a large task that's going to—that's going to have a lot to do with Ukraine's recovery from this.

Ms. McCLELLAN. One of—sorry, I didn't know if you—

Dr. WALLANDER. I was just going to point exactly to the fact that that is actually a major focus of a number—there's a consortium of European countries contributing to that capability.

Ms. McCLELLAN. I'm glad to hear that because one of the key takeaways we took was the number of people lost in the emergency services through these unexploded ordnances. At least 53 have been injured and 13 dead as of March 24th, and so I think doing all we can to assist in that endeavor would definitely be appreciated by them.

Assistant Secretary Wallander, Russia has targeted several of our allies using irregular warfare tactics such as strengthening separatist sentiments and planning coup attempts in nations like Montenegro and Moldova.

Can you all talk about what EUCOM is doing to help partner nations to thwart these efforts?

Dr. WALLANDER. Well, I'll start. From a from a whole-of-government approach the United States has focused on combating corruption, improving transparency, rule of law, good governance, because one of the main vectors by which Russia is able to undermine al-

lies, undermine countries in Europe, and try and influence their political leadership is through corruption, poor governance.

And so that is a major focus of our efforts as well as the European Union's efforts as well to build that resilience against that kind of Russian influence.

Ms. McCLELLAN. General.

General CAVOLI. Ma'am, we also take a number of efforts in the information space. We work with our allies and our partners very carefully to identify misinformation and then rapidly to counter it.

Critically, we help to train the governmental organs of our allies how to do that as well so that they can go into the future. And then, finally, we work with them on cyber defense quite a bit so they maintain an awareness of some of the various ways that Russia can manipulate the public conversation on things. We do all of those under authorities from the Department of Defense.

Ms. McCLELLAN. Thank you. You anticipated my next question on disinformation and propaganda. In February of this year Russia suspended its participation in New START, one of the few remaining nuclear arms control treaties that remain following the disastrous foreign policy of the previous administration in this area.

Does this make nuclear weapons a more prescient threat should Russia seek to escalate its illegal war in Ukraine further?

Dr. WALLANDER. Congresswoman, we share your concern that Russia is no longer implementing and in compliance with the New START Treaty.

The immediate loss is a loss of transparency and sharing data, which helps to create reassurance and stability and is a main function of arms control, and it's something that we would want to prioritize in discussions with Russia about them coming back into compliance.

At this point, they've shown no interest or willingness and that is a matter of concern. It's less of a concern in the near term because we have a pretty good understanding of Russian strategic nuclear forces and capabilities. But it becomes a greater concern over time and it's something we're going to have to work on.

Ms. McCLELLAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

Chair now recognizes another great member from Virginia, Mrs. Kiggans, for 5 minutes.

Mrs. KIGGANS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I just wanted to kind of piggyback off of my Republican colleagues, some of their comments today that have been about accountability and spending in Ukraine. And I will say that I was definitely very much with them at the beginning of this process and I'm new to Congress, but over the course of the past 100 or so days and listening to some of these briefings that we have received, I am understanding more the importance of the U.S. involvement in the Ukraine fight.

So I guess, Dr. Wallander, I'd just ask that maybe you go back to Secretary Austin and administration, and I think it's really messaging. You know, we are privy to a lot of information in this committee that the general public is not.

So when we talk about, you know, our constituents that care about how much we're spending compared to how much the rest of

the world is spending, I just think we're not doing a great job of informing them about the importance of what might happen if Russia was to succeed and was to be victorious in that fight—what would then happen with China and Taiwan.

You know, these are important issues that I think we have just not done a great job with messaging of the importance of our role in the Russia-Ukraine fight and of Ukraine coming out on the right side and winning.

So because of that, you know, I'm a supporter of what we are doing there. You know, you talked earlier about trying to increasing access and interest in Russia and then you mentioned that we have seen the PRC diminishing ties with some of our NATO allies in Europe in favor of strengthening ties with Russia.

Can you expand on that a little bit and just in what ways is the PRC diminishing those ties with allies?

Dr. WALLANDER. As the EU as a structure has got—has become more attuned to the risk of being dependent on China, the EU has taken a more active role in implementing its oversight over contracts, over investments, and sometimes pushing against individual countries, which maybe don't prioritize that as much.

But the EU has played a—as a structure has played a constructive role. But mostly it's happened at the level of individual countries that have decided they are not willing to take the risk and I mentioned some of them.

But we—it is something we need to continue to work on as Americans in talking to our European allies and partners so that they understand the risks they create when they make themselves vulnerable to coercion and influence.

Mrs. KIGGANS. Very much so, and along those lines we talked a little bit about the French president—you know, Macron's visit to the—visit, you know, with the PRC and his comments, and I'm concerned that our European allies are not taking the threat of the PRC as seriously as they should.

So do you believe that European leaders understand and appreciate the significant threat posed by the PRC and their aggressive posture towards Taiwan?

Dr. WALLANDER. Europe has come a long way. NATO, for example, now has in its strategic concept a recognition of the dangers that the PRC poses to global security and, therefore, to European security.

But it is something we need to continue to work on and make sure that that—as that challenge evolves, as it remains acute, as it maybe changes shape in different aspects of China's activities, that we share that information with our allies and partners.

Mrs. KIGGANS. And I guess, General Cavoli, along those lines are we doing—on the military side are we working on those relationships?

General CAVOLI. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely. The—an example would be the way we use ports. So it's not a surprise to you that China has been investing heavily in an effort to gain control of critical transportation infrastructure, transportation infrastructure that we, both the U.S. and the alliance, rely on.

So the way we run our exercises and the ports we choose to exercise is a very strategic choice. It allows us to see things, and when

we reveal limitations in our port usage, for example, countries take action very quickly. They spot it.

We have opened new ports. We have worked with countries to establish new port capabilities and that's just one example. Earlier Dr. Wallander talked about 5G capabilities and other things. So we are able to use the military instrument to open eyes.

Mrs. KIGGANS. Good. Those are all good things. And then just thinking about that relationship between China—between the PRC and Russia and they're meeting more and, you know, there's a part of me that thinks they are more aligned than we know.

But do you feel like Russia will fall in line behind China? Because it kind of seems like China is leading the way and kind of dictating, you know, or that they're certainly more of a world power, in my mind, than Russia. But do you think that Russia would fall in behind China or is there some just controversy between the two?

General CAVOLI. I'll say one thing quickly and then give it to Celeste.

I think they're in danger of that just happening whether they choose it or not, ma'am.

Dr. WALLANDER. I just share that concern. I think that's exactly right. Russia's weakness is actually going to be a strength—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Panetta, for 5 minutes.

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Cavoli, a Ukrainian counteroffensive, as we're hearing, is due in weeks, I guess, is what they're saying. And while an ample supply and replenishment of artillery will clearly be instrumental for the Ukrainian forces to be successful, I would also think that you got to have sort of a surprise attack as well and a successful surprise attack would just be the first half.

If Ukraine can manage this and preserve its command and control, their forces will have to break through Russia's defensive line and quickly mobilize troops forward.

So what capabilities do our Ukrainian partners still need to be successful in this breakthrough, in this surprise attack, including air defense capabilities?

General CAVOLI. Congressman, obviously, any force can always use more of everything. But according to the modeling that we have very carefully done with them the Ukrainians are in a good position.

The Ukrainians are in a good position. They have some weaknesses that I'd prefer not to talk about in public. If I could talk to you in private about those I'd be happy to. But we are confident.

In terms of their surprise and things like that, of course, we have worked on all that with them and, of course, it wouldn't be surprise if we talked about it in public also, sir. So I'd be delighted to have the chance to talk to you in more detail in private.

Mr. PANETTA. I appreciate that. And, obviously, Poland has come up a little bit here in this hearing and, obviously, it provides critical security for the eastern flank of NATO and it's deepened.

Poland has done a good job deepening their defense relationship with the United States, I would say, in response to the growing se-

curity challenges across EUCOM including management of prepositioned equipment.

Now, the U.S. leads the Enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Poland and deploys a rotational armored brigade combat team under Operation Atlantic Resolve.

And at the June 2022 NATO summit in Madrid, Biden announced the first—President Biden announced the first permanently stationed U.S. forces on the eastern flank. As NATO continues to assess the distribution of forces along that flank, can you describe the benefits of stationing a permanent brigade-sized team in Poland?

General CAVOLI. Sir, the benefit is to have a permanent presence of a team forward whether it's permanently assigned or not. There are other service equities that go into that that really General McConville would be better to talk about stress on the force from rotation and things like that.

But it's very important and the U.S. Government has found it very important for us to have an armored brigade combat team forward deployed there. It saves a lot of time.

The second thing is the prepositioned stocks that you mentioned, Congressman. Those have been absolutely critical to our ability to respond quickly to the events of the last year-and-a-half and it was all enabled with EDI [European Deterrence Initiative] funding thanks to the U.S. Congress.

Mr. PANETTA. Great. And, Secretary Wallander, what might that type of permanent, if there was permanent stationing, provide us from a policy standpoint as we continue to work closely with our Polish partners?

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you, Congressman. Well, Poland has been—is an extraordinary ally, reliable, a wonderful host to these American forces.

Poland has also been incredibly stalwart and helpful in our ability to provide security assistance to Ukraine, to support the training of Ukrainian forces so that they can effectively use those capabilities.

And so, you know, Poland has really emerged as a leader among NATO allies in Europe and we're—actually I consider us very lucky that we are the framework nation for the battle group in Poland and have these capabilities because we can count on them.

Mr. PANETTA. Great. Thanks to both of you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman and I wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Panetta on this. I've been very up front about this. We need to be moving more of our troop presence into Poland, Romania, the Baltics, and out of Germany where the real threat is.

With that, Mr. Davis of North Carolina is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair, and to our witnesses who are here today thank you for your service and thank you for your timely presence today.

Russia continues to remain a persistent threat to European security by employing a range of tools to coerce its neighbors and divide the alliance. Could you elaborate on how Russia uses cyber oper-

ations and energy supply manipulation to coerce our allies and partners?

General CAVOLI. Thanks, Congressman. First of all, the energy manipulation; it is reduced dramatically over the last year because of the—our allies' desire to come off of Russian gas. So it's moving in a good trajectory.

Some of our partners, however, have not had the luxury of being able to adjust their economies yet and Russia continues to turn on and off contracts, switches, gas flow, et cetera. Moldova has been a victim of this recently in the last winter. So it remains important.

Cyber—cyber is hard to talk about in public but they use cyber to create disinformation and they also use cyber to delete information, data, and to attack infrastructure and we have to work quite hard across the alliance and with our partners to defend against that.

And, finally, I would say some of the work that Russia does still is with its conventional force. So the Russian air—the Russian ground force has been—has been degenerated somewhat by this conflict, although it is bigger today than it was at the beginning of the conflict. The air force has lost very little. They've lost 80 planes. They have another thousand fighters and fighter-bombers. The navy has lost one ship. So they still use all of that conventional power as well and they mix them all together, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. According to the Department of Defense, since February 2022 the United States has deployed or extended about 20,000 additional Armed Forces to Europe, bringing the total U.S. force posture in Europe, including permanently stationed forces, to approximately 100,000 military personnel or so.

Do you see additional changes to force posture to approximately stand against Russia?

General CAVOLI. Sir, let me just start with current force posture. The figure 100,000 includes Department of Defense civilians as well. The uniformed force posture is about 82,000 this afternoon as we sit here. But, nevertheless, it's all Department of Defense, as you point out.

Force posture is going to depend, from my perspective as a military matter, largely on the outcome of this conflict, sir, and we just don't know where it's going to go.

We don't know what the size, the composition, and the disposition geographically of the Russian military is going to be and that's going to drive a lot of this.

Some of it will be our policies as well and I'll defer to Dr. Wallander for those.

Dr. WALLANDER. Yeah. Decisions about posture will, first and foremost, depend upon military advice and assessments.

They will also, I want to emphasize—this came up earlier—they will be based upon EUCOM's advice, EUCOM's assessments of what's required, but balanced across the global force because the United States has global responsibilities and the Defense Department will make sure that all of the COCOMs are resourced appropriate to the challenges and threats that we face.

Mr. DAVIS. Okay. And can you talk about how the People's Republic of China is threatening U.S. and allied interests in Europe,

including how their technology-related activities are advancing their military capabilities?

Dr. WALLANDER. Congressman, there's, first, the vulnerability that reliant—that for those countries in Europe but also globally create for themselves when they rely exclusively on Chinese technologies, which come in the appearance of private investment but, in fact, have close ties to the PRC and to the government. So that is one vulnerability.

There is also—there are active efforts by different elements of the Chinese government or influencers in the Chinese economy and trade and investment community to seek relationships for—to exploit access to sensitive technology.

It's information that we share constantly with European allies so they can be aware of the need to be careful and to not get bought into those kinds of vulnerabilities.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you so much. And Mr. Chair, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fallon.

Mr. FALLON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Just a couple of questions.

We see the largest land invasion, General, since World War II in Europe and, you know, NATO allies agreed many years ago to spend at minimum 2 percent of our GDP on defense, and some of us do that and some don't.

I'm a big supporter of NATO. Always have. Many people, in fact, the vast majority of this committee is as well. I remember, you know, former President Trump getting on our allies about spending their fair share, and after this invasion what—why is Germany delaying?

You know, have they made a concrete commitment to that 2 percent threshold? Because I haven't seen it and I don't know if I've missed anything. So I wanted to ask you about that.

General CAVOLI. Sure. Thanks, Congressman. Yeah, Germany's made a fairly significant shift. Previously, there was not a roadmap that got them to 2 percent not only by 20—there wasn't one by 2024. There wasn't one. There is now. They have a plan to get to 2 percent by 2024.

Second thing I would point out, the German ministry of defense and the armed forces have new leadership. The leadership is very focused on achieving those goals and on spending the special fund on real capabilities. So I think we see a very different Germany today than we did 14 months ago when it comes to defense.

Mr. FALLON. So maybe one of those silver linings in a pretty awful cloud as far as commitments like from Spain, Italy, Canada, other countries like that and, of course, the small, very wealthy countries like Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, come to mind because they weren't hitting that 2 percent either. Do you agree—are they all on a roadmap to it now?

General CAVOLI. Yes. So we have 10 allies today spend more than 2 percent or 2 percent or greater to include one ally, Poland, which spends more per GDP than the United States does.

We have 11 allies that now have credible plans, detailed, some of them laid out in law, to get to 2 percent by 2024. We do have 20 more allies, however, and we have work to do.

Mr. FALLON. Yeah, and I want to laud Romania, too. When we—I visited them—we had a CODEL [congressional delegation]—they were at, I believe, 2 percent then and they have committed to 2.5, a developing country that's not quite—you know, has the strong economies of some of their Western allies.

General CAVOLI. I agree, sir. Romania is a wonderful ally. Romania is modernizing very quickly and Romania is extremely supportive both of the United States and NATO.

Mr. FALLON. And, General, what are your thoughts on the posture—the force posture of, roughly, 81,000, 82,000 right now as far as moving east?

When we went on—moving east, moving more toward Eastern Europe—we talked and visited with the prime minister of Romania as well and I said that, boy, I think we probably need to ensure that the troops we have there now remain and make it permanent, and his response was very telling. One sentence—he said, I don't think you all have any choice.

So I just wanted to visit with you on that as well.

General CAVOLI. Absolutely. Prime Minister Ciucă and I have known each other for a few years and he's made that point clear to me frequently.

I hope he pointed out to you, however, that there's a U.S. division headquarters in Romania right now. There's a U.S. brigade combat team in Romania. There's a U.S. helicopter battalion in Romania right now and there are periodically U.S. fighters.

With regard to the rest of our posture, we have moved east significantly since just before the beginning of this conflict and throughout it. That's a lot of the surge forces that have come forward.

Some of it's a little bit limited by capacity to house and to train all those forces [if] we go forward and we're working closely with our allies on that, sir.

Mr. FALLON. Yeah. I think it would be great to have a plan in place where we can continue that and moving east.

Madam Secretary, myself and Representative Panetta have introduced the Ukrainian Human Rights Policy Act and we want to shed light on the war atrocities.

I mean, there's been mass killings, deportations, et cetera. You know the drill. And as the war rages on what do you think we can do to better hold Russia accountable for these actions today and in the future?

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you, Congressman. We—the Defense Department fully supports holding Russia accountable. In February of 2023 Vice President Harris spoke out and made clear that U.S. policy is that what Russia is doing in Ukraine constitute crimes against humanity.

So we will support—there are multiple proposals for developing international fora for supporting Ukraine's domestic capability to hold Russians accountable. But the first step is the kind of work that so many have done to publicize these actions and document them publicly and the U.S. Government has supported those.

Mr. FALLON. Well, I want to thank you all and my time has expired. Thank you for coming and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I thank the witnesses for their testimony today.

And with that, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 26, 2023

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 26, 2023

Opening Statement by
Celeste A. Wallander
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Before the 118th Congress
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives

April 26, 2023

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee,

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on policy matters related to the U.S. European Command area of responsibility in my capacity as Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

Before I begin, I would like to express my appreciation for the continued support from Congress, and this Committee, in informing and enabling the Department of Defense's efforts in this region. It is an honor to appear alongside General Cavoli, who is an outstanding colleague.

It has been more than a year now since Russia launched a full-scale invasion to destroy Ukraine as a sovereign state. This war of aggression created the worst security crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World War. This war not only violates not only the territorial integrity of Ukraine, it also threatens the security of Europe, the global economy, and the stability of the global community. Yet Russia's aggression has also galvanized the free world in response. Today, thanks to the courage of the people of Ukraine, supported by the United States and a broad coalition of Allies and partners from around the world, Russia has failed to achieve its objectives, and an independent Ukraine endures. In Europe, NATO is more unified than ever and just this month, Finland joined the Alliance as its thirty-first member. We hope Sweden will follow soon.

Our goal is to ensure that a free, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine is able to defend itself and deter further aggression. The President has been clear that we will support Ukraine for as long as it takes. To succeed, continued bipartisan support in Congress will be vital. The military assistance that the United States has committed to Ukraine is substantial—now more than \$32 billion worth since February 2022—but those resources reflect the American interests and values at stake. As Secretary Austin has said, our support for Ukraine's self-defense is an investment in our own security and prosperity.

In a crisis of this magnitude, which implicates our national interests and values, our security and prosperity, the United States must lead. We have done so, providing a bit more than \$35 billion in security assistance since Russia's full-scale invasion of 2022. When we do so with the necessary determination and purpose, our friends also respond. The truth of that principle is demonstrated by the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, the forum where we have rallied more than 50 Allies and partners to commit more than \$19 billion in security assistance to Ukraine—

including in the critical areas of air defense, armor, and artillery. Our Allies and partners have stepped up – indeed, when you look at security assistance for Ukraine as a percentage of GDP, the United States is just about in the middle among the top 20 donors.

In today's hearing, I would like to put the urgent priority of the Ukraine war into a broader regional context and describe how the Defense Department approaches Europe as a whole. It's an approach informed by our assessment of the threats posed by Russia now and over the longer term.

Russia seeks to degrade the independence of its neighbors and will use force to impose territorial changes and reimpose an imperial sphere of influence. Russia also seeks to fracture the NATO Alliance. Instead, its war against Ukraine has backfired by prompting greater Allied cohesion and a reversal of Sweden's and Finland's historical policies of non-alignment. Still, as the National Defense Strategy describes, Russia remains an acute threat to the United States and our Allies.

Despite the setbacks that Russia's ground forces have faced on the battlefield in Ukraine, and Russia's diminished stature around the world, I want to underscore that Russia continues to present serious risks in many areas. These include threats posed by Russia's nuclear arsenal, its malign cyber and information operations, and its capabilities in counterspace and undersea warfare, among others. And while its conventional ground forces will be degraded for years, Russia's air force and navy retain substantial capability. As a result, the Department remains focused on deterring Russia from attacks on the United States and NATO Allies, including conventional aggression, which would carry the potential for further escalation. While we respond to Russia's war against Ukraine, we are also working with Allies to modernize capabilities, increase interoperability, improve resilience against attack or coercion, share intelligence, and strengthen extended nuclear deterrence.

The United States maintains considerable combat power in Europe and its surrounding waters through a combination of stationed and rotational forces. These forward-deployed forces deter aggression against NATO and work closely with our Allies to maintain security and stability in the Alliance.

After Russia's invasion and purported annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Department, with the support of Congress, embarked on substantial changes to our posture in Europe. This involved billions of dollars of investments in

infrastructure improvements, building partner capacity, rotational presence, exercises and training with Allies, and prepositioned equipment.

We also expanded our access, basing, and overflight permissions in Europe, especially on NATO's eastern flank. Put simply, congressional support made it possible for the United States and Allies to respond quickly to Russia's further aggression in 2022, and reinforce our Allies.

In addition, Congress has supported increased security assistance funding to our eastern flank Allies. Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and our response, has validated the significant investments and changes we have made since its initial invasion in 2014.

In response to Russia's February 2022 aggression against Ukraine, these investments enabled the United States to reinforce NATO's security faster and with more combat capabilities than any other NATO Ally. This included both repositioning stationed and rotational forces already in Europe, temporarily extending some rotational forces beyond their planned redeployment dates, and deploying additional forces from outside Europe. DoD also placed the entire U.S. commitment to the NATO Response Force on heightened readiness. DoD's force levels in USEUCOM will fluctuate as rotations and scheduled exercises continue, yet remain significantly higher than our already robust pre-crisis levels.

We are also engaging with our NATO Allies to ensure that the Alliance is prepared for modern challenges and can deter aggression from any adversary. In response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Allies have deployed defensive land and air forces in the eastern part of the Alliance, and maritime assets across the NATO area. For the first time in history, NATO has activated its defense plans and deployed portions of the NATO Response Force in a deterrence and defense role. The Department will also continue working with NATO Allies and partners to build capacity along Europe's eastern flank, strengthening defensive capabilities to bolster deterrence.

NATO's eastern flank, and Poland in particular, is a linchpin of our work to strengthen European deterrence and defense. Since 2017, the Department has maintained an enduring rotational presence in Poland and the United States continues to serve as the framework nation for the NATO Battlegroup in Poland. In addition, as announced by the President at the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, the United States has forward-stationed a Corps Forward Command Post as well as

an Army Garrison and sustainment capabilities in Poland, the first permanent stationing of U.S. forces on NATO's eastern flank.

With our planned level of rotational and forward-stationed forces and pre-positioned equipment, Poland will continue to host the majority of U.S. forces along the Eastern Flank, providing substantial host-nation infrastructure and logistical support.

In the Baltics, while our Allies have enhanced their contributions to NATO Battlegroups in the region, DoD has enhanced its rotational deployments to each Baltic country to provide a persistent presence, demonstrating the flexibility and combat credible nature of U.S. forces.

As announced at the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, DoD will maintain a rotational Brigade Combat Team (BCT) headquartered in Romania. This additional rotational BCT will maintain the ability to deploy its subordinate elements across NATO's Eastern Flank to defend the Alliance.

In the South Caucasus, Russia continues its belligerent occupation of parts of Georgia and maintains a force presence in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgia is a key partner and NATO-aspirant and we remain committed to helping reform its military and strengthen its deterrence and defensive capabilities. The United States works with all three regional partners to strengthen ties, build resilience against Russia's aggression, advance Euro-Atlantic integration, and support ongoing efforts to achieve peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

In countries with historic ties to Russia, there has been a significant shift as a result of Russia's war against Ukraine -- possibly the greatest geopolitical shift since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the election of President Maia Sandu in December 2020, Moldova has taken brave steps toward Europe, and recently has committed to robust, accelerated defense reforms in light of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Armenia has sought to decouple itself from Russia's traditional influence and align more with the transatlantic community. The Republic of Cyprus has bravely denied Russia's warships the ability to replenish or refuel at its port facilities. With regard to these and other countries, the Department welcomes their partnership, intends to engage and listen to their security needs, and help develop ways to address their challenges.

The Black Sea region is also a focus for enhancing U.S. and NATO presence to strengthen deterrence and defense. In recognition of the strategic importance of the region, we are continuing to explore ways to promote political engagement,

regional security coordination, and democratic resilience among our Allies and partners. We must work to uphold international norms, and advance economic development and trade among the regional states. Turkiye has demonstrated its geostrategic significance as an important NATO Ally, including by scrutinizing passage of Russia's warships through the Turkish Straits, maintaining its strict adherence to the Montreux Convention. Turkiye also has significant modernization and acquisition requirements for its air force, which are needed to maintain NATO interoperability in order to support NATO and U.S. security objectives.

In the Western Balkans, we are closely watching Russia intensifying its efforts to increase instability and to stymie NATO's influence, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina through its support for Republika Srpska entity President Milorad Dodik.

In Belarus, Russia has co-opted the current regime as a key enabler of its war against Ukraine. Russia used Belarusian territory as a launching pad for its full-scale invasion, continues to deploy its forces for training missions, and recently announced plans to deploy nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. As long as the Lukashenka regime continues to facilitate the Kremlin's aggression against Ukraine and violently represses the Belarusian people's democratic aspirations and human rights, the United States will continue to impose costs on regime institutions and elites.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is also active in the region, pressuring NATO Allies and partners alike to accept infrastructure and telecommunications deals that could threaten their security. We are mindful that the PRC and Russia collaborate across a variety of arenas to undermine the global stability. We recognize the PRC is taking lessons from our support of Ukraine, and we continue to monitor its cooperation with Russia. However, it is clear that PRC influence in Europe has waned significantly in recent years, due in part to its support for Russia's war against Ukraine. We continue to work closely with European Allies and partners to share information and best practices on countering the threat posed by the PRC.

We also continue to develop policies surrounding the interconnected challenges in Europe and beyond, which the United States cannot address alone. These include complications posed by climate change, cyber and hybrid threats, terrorism and violent extremism, and rapid developments in technology; combined with acute and distinct threats emanating from state and non-state actors alike. The

Department will think differently about the requirements for deterrence and defense, including how to create advantages for ourselves and our Allies and partners, and dilemmas for our competitors.

This work is only possible with consistent congressional backing and stable funding. Congressional support for U.S. forces deployed in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility, as well as funding for defense initiatives across Europe, and Ukraine's security assistance have been, and will continue to, remain critical to achieving U.S. national security objectives.

Russia has used brutal force in an attempt to rewrite history, and change the face of Europe. In the process, Russia's actions have brought to light the stark contrast between our democratic values and the Kremlin's autocratic, violent vision. The Department of Defense, in conjunction with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, NATO Allies and partners, in close consultation with Congress, will continue to work for a secure and stable Europe.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I appreciate your continued support to the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, and civilians in the Department of Defense who work every day in service of the American people.

Celeste Wallander
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Celeste Wallander is Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense. She previously served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia/Central Asia on the National Security Council (2013-2017), as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia (2009 to July 2012), Outside government, she served as President and CEO of the U.S.-Russia Foundation (2017-2022), professor at American University (2009-2013), visiting professor at Georgetown University (2006-2008), Director for Russia/Eurasia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2001-2006), Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (2000-2001), and professor of Government at Harvard (1989-2000). She is the author of over 80 publications on European and Eurasian security issues, focused on Russian foreign and defense strategy. She received her Ph.D. (1990), M.Phil. (1986) and M.A. (1985) degrees from Yale University, and her B.A. (1983 – summa cum laude) from Northwestern University. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Atlantic Council of the United States, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

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UNITED STATES HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI, UNITED STATES ARMY
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
26 April 2023

UNITED STATES HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

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Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, on behalf of the dedicated men, women, and their families preserving stability in the European theater, it is a privilege to testify before you as the Commander, United States European Command (USEUCOM). It is my distinct honor to serve alongside our Allies and partners, Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, Coast Guardsmen, civilians, and defense contractors as we work to deliver peace and secure U.S. interests.

This is an unprecedeted time for Euro-Atlantic security. Russia's illegal, unprovoked, brutal invasion of Ukraine upended many aspects of European security. It has forced us to recognize the imperative of collective territorial defense, which has altered North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) force posture requirements. In this dynamic and uncertain environment, U.S. leadership remains indispensable; our actions must signal strong and unwavering resolve. We must maintain and build upon our existing commitment to NATO and ensure the Alliance remains the foundation of European security and deterrence.

Russia is not the only challenge in the USEUCOM AOR, however. The People's Republic of China is working to weaken democratic processes and undermine the rules-based international order. Violent extremist organizations also foster instability, while transboundary challenges, such as climate change, affect the operational environment. To address these challenges, we campaign in all domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyber—to deter aggression and build enduring strategic advantage.

The National Security Strategy states that a free and prosperous Europe, defended by NATO, remains fundamental to U.S. national security. Further, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) describes mutually-beneficial alliances and partnerships as the United States' greatest strategic advantage. The NATO Alliance is more unified now than it has been in its 74 years of existence. The combined response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated this.

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USEUCOM's strategic approach strengthens Alliance interoperability, fortifies Alliances and partnerships, and thereby enhances all-domain combat credibility. Should deterrence fail, USEUCOM, alongside our Allies and partners, is ready to fight and win.

Congress has provided authorities and funding for security assistance to Ukraine on an unprecedented scale. Presidential Drawdown (PD) Authority and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USA) have proven key to Ukraine's success. Coupled with the bravery and ingenuity of the Ukrainian people—and robust support from our NATO Allies and other partners—security assistance has changed the course of the conflict. We remain committed to supporting Ukraine's urgent needs and increasing their combat capabilities over the long-term. Specifically, USEUCOM supports Department of Defense (DoD) efforts to transition Ukraine towards a western-style military with advanced and interoperable equipment. We appreciate the supplemental funding from Congress that has enabled our progress towards this goal. Ensuring accountability of U.S. security assistance remains a top priority and we continue to work with Ukrainian authorities to ensure appropriate end-use monitoring.

Congress has also provided critical support to the full range of investments in our posture and activities in Europe. We will continue to build on successes funded by the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) as associated operations, activities, and investments are rolled from the former Overseas Contingency Operations budget to the base budget. These operations, activities, and investments allow us to deter Russia, assure our Allies, and strengthen NATO interoperability. Congressional appropriations support rotational forces, infrastructure, and prepositioned stocks, all of which increase operational efficiency and speed. These investments improve U.S. and NATO readiness by enabling exercises, training, and building partner capacity across all domains in the Euro-Atlantic area. We appreciate continued Congressional support for our posture and activities in Europe; this funding is critical to the deterrence and defense of U.S. interests in Europe.

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RISKS AND CHALLENGES IN THE USEUCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR)

The USEUCOM AOR encompasses 50 countries, each with varying strategic aims. The theater contains vast maritime and air domains, including a large part of the Arctic region; the north and central Atlantic Ocean; the Mediterranean, Black, and Baltic Seas; and multiple strategic chokepoints. The European Union (EU) is the world's largest trading bloc and accounts for over 16 percent of global imports and exports. We continue to address security challenges across the AOR through force presence, pre-positioned stocks, and engagement and exercises with Allies and partners.

Russian Federation

Russia remains Europe's core security challenge. Russia continues to wage its brutal war on Ukraine, target critical infrastructure, and threaten escalation. The Kremlin seeks to outlast the West by manipulating energy markets and influencing states to curb support to Kyiv. Due to the resilience and heroism of the Ukrainian people, with assistance from like-minded nations, Russian ground forces have suffered significant losses in Ukraine. Despite these setbacks, and their diminished stockpiles of equipment and munitions, Russian ground forces still have substantial capability and capacity, and continue to possess the ability to regenerate their losses.

Russia remains a formidable and unpredictable threat that will challenge U.S. and European interests for the foreseeable future. Russian air, maritime, space, cyber, and strategic forces have not suffered significant degradation in the current war. Moreover, Russia will likely rebuild its future Army into a sizeable and more capable land force, all while suspending its implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, as it has done since 2007. Russia retains a vast stockpile of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, which present an existential threat to the U.S. Homeland, our Allies, and partners,

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and is failing to comply with several of its legal obligations under the New START Treaty. President Putin's dangerous nuclear rhetoric introduces strategic uncertainty. All of these factors indicate that Russia remains an immediate and persistent threat to American interests in Europe and around the world.

Russia pursues a military modernization program that prioritizes a range of advanced conventional, hybrid, and nuclear capabilities to coerce the West. Its primary focus is on development of six specific systems: a nuclear-powered cruise missile; a nuclear-armed hypersonic boost glide vehicle; a more capable heavy Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (Sarmat); a nuclear-armed, nuclear powered underwater drone (Poseidon); hypersonic cruise missiles; and lasers. These weapons provide Russia asymmetric threats to NATO and present new challenges to Western response options.

Russia employs a range of tools to advance its foreign policy objectives to coerce neighboring states, divide the Alliance, and expand its global influence. Beyond its war of aggression in Ukraine, Russia also retains a military presence in 20% of Georgia's sovereign territory, and in Moldova against the will of those states. Russia also uses disinformation, cyber operations, and energy supply manipulation to coerce our Allies and partners. Russian private military contractors operate in Syria, Ukraine, and multiple African nations, working to advance Russian state interests.

People's Republic of China (PRC)

The PRC seeks to increase its access, presence, and influence in Europe to refashion the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences. The PRC threatens enduring U.S., Allied, and partner interests in Europe through its foreign direct investment, government-backed business ventures, and infrastructure deals. Of particular concern are the PRC's investments in European ports, transportation nodes, and other critical infrastructure,

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which provide potential dual-use functions for the PRC. The PRC pursues bilateral engagement in these ventures through PRC-led forums such as the 14+1 Cooperation Framework with Central and Eastern European nations. These and other PRC activities have created dependencies and sources of leverage to influence our Allies and partners.

PRC leaders remain focused on using both licit and illicit means to seize a dominant position in critical and emerging dual-use technology sectors—artificial intelligence, advanced robotics, quantum technologies, directed energy, and hypersonic systems—and using that dominant position to advance their authoritarian agenda. To increase adoption of PRC developed technology, the PRC is pursuing acceptance of its national technology standards across the globe. The PRC's efforts to expand Huawei 5G networks throughout Europe via PRC state-sponsored firms pose security risks to our Allies and partners. These activities allow the PRC to access and exploit intellectual property, sensitive information, technology, and private personnel information. Beyond economic impacts, these technology-related activities provide the PRC a military capacity that put U.S. national interests in the USEUCOM AOR at risk. We must remain vigilant, and work with our Allies and partners, to combat the PRC's activities related to critical and emerging technologies.

We are also concerned about the destabilizing effects of deeper alignment between the PRC and Russia. Beijing's continued diplomatic support for Russia's illegal war against Ukraine is detrimental to European peace and stability. The PRC's amplification of Russian disinformation on the war in Ukraine undermines trust in Europe's democratic institutions. There are indications that Beijing is considering materially supporting Russia's war effort, while at the same time, Beijing and Moscow are deepening their defense engagements and interoperability, including joint maritime and air patrols. This increased cooperation has implications for European security as both Beijing and Moscow seek to change the existing rules-based structure in their favor.

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USEUCOM coordinates with our European defense counterparts to establish a common understanding of PRC actions and the associated risks. We support the U.S. whole-of-government effort to highlight the Trans-Atlantic shared values, interests, and transparent business practices of the current rules-based international order. NATO's Strategic Concept recognizes that the PRC's ambitions and coercive policies challenge NATO's interests, security, and values. Several European countries have removed Huawei from their networks, imposed investment screening mechanisms, reversed investment authorizations, and avoided investments by PRC-based companies due to the threats to European security. Together, the U.S. and Europe must continue to call out and work to counter the PRC's predatory and unfair practices.

Eastern Flank

NATO's Eastern Flank—which USEUCOM defines as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary—remains a strategic focal point. The closer cooperation of the "Bucharest Nine"—Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia—has been a welcome outcome of the current crisis. Many have provided both lethal and non-lethal assistance to Ukraine, opened their borders to refugees, closed airspace to Russia, and supported economic sanctions against Russia. We remain encouraged by the positive actions of our Allies along the Eastern Flank, but these countries remain at risk for Russian coercion and aggression.

The Baltic States continue to face a chronic threat from Russia. Russian ground forces from the Western Military District retain a size advantage over regional military and NATO forces on the eastern flank. Furthermore, Russia has substantial air and maritime capabilities in the region. The Baltic States lack the geographic depth of Ukraine—meaning these states cannot trade space for time in the event of a Russian attack. These factors underline the

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importance of maintaining the capability to get timely indications and warnings, and of posturing combat-credible forces, joint capabilities, and stocks to support the Eastern Flank.

The NATO Alliance is renewing its focus on collective territorial defense. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, NATO bolstered its posture on the Eastern Flank by establishing four new Battle Groups in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. NATO also expanded air policing operations and air defense exercises. NATO continues to assess the distribution of forces along the Eastern Flank to identify the appropriate posture for collective defense.

Poland is a critical Ally in deterring and responding to Russian aggression. Poland has annually increased its defense budget and is undertaking a significant modernization program. This Ally is buying Abrams tanks, Patriot air defenses, and F-35s. Poland contributes critical infrastructure and logistics support to the joint force through an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Additionally, Poland hosts the U.S. Army's Fifth Corps forward headquarters. This first-ever permanent basing of U.S. forces in Poland provides command and control for U.S. and multi-national tactical units in Europe. Our continued close collaboration with Poland strengthens NATO activities along the entire Eastern Flank.

EUCOM has also built U.S. capacity in the AOR to support deterrence of Russian aggression. The United States deployed fourth and fifth generation aircraft, a carrier strike group, a Corps and Division headquarters, and two additional Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) to assist in NATO's defense at the outset of this conflict. In addition, we deployed our USEUCOM organic forces to the Eastern Flank, including the 2d Cavalry Regiment, 173d Airborne Infantry BCT, Patriot forces and 12th Combat Aviation Brigade. Collectively, these forces bolstered the Alliance and demonstrated the United States' commitment to collective defense.

Black Sea Region

The countries of the Black Sea Region—which USEUCOM defines as Bulgaria,

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Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine—have long pushed back against Russian aggression. NATO Allies Romania and Bulgaria invited NATO Battle Groups to their territories, increased defense spending, and invested in military and logistics infrastructure. USEUCOM continues to work with Bulgaria and Romania to increase regional security, including the improvement of maritime domain awareness. Important work remains to strengthen regional security, increase economic prosperity, and reduce vulnerabilities to Russian manipulation. Moldovan President Sandu called for the withdrawal of the 1,500 Russian so-called “peacekeepers” in the Transnistria region who have been present on Moldovan land without consent or a United Nations mandate since 1990. We support peaceful resolution to the Transnistria conflict without Russian interference.

Türkiye

Türkiye's military capability and unique geographic location make it a key member of the NATO Alliance and vital to U.S. responses to regional events. We applaud Türkiye's strong support to Ukraine during Russia's invasion and will continue to increase our cooperation with Türkiye bilaterally and within the Alliance. We recognize Türkiye's critical leadership role in hosting U.S. service members who conduct a wide array of NATO, bilateral, and unilateral missions including missile defense. Türkiye contributes forces to NATO missions in Iraq, Kosovo, Baltic Air Policing, and Standing NATO Maritime Group Two in the Mediterranean Sea. Additionally, Türkiye supports U.S. Bomber Task Force missions in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean regions with tanker and fighter assets. Our longstanding relationship enabled USEUCOM to respond to Türkiye's devastating earthquakes this year with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief forces. USEUCOM continues to execute valuable security cooperation activities with Türkiye such as Professional Military Education, exercises, and F-16 Fleet Modernization and F-16 Viper acquisition via Foreign Military Sales. These actions will

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strengthen NATO interoperability and enable U.S. force projection.

South Caucasus Region

In the South Caucasus Region—which USEUCOM defines as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—Putin’s military and political failures in Ukraine have spurred states to reassess their relationships with Russia. Moscow has long employed economic levers, pervasive information activities, and “frozen” military conflicts to exert influence over South Caucasus countries. However, we have observed a marked shift in the relationships of Armenia and Azerbaijan with Russia. Both Yerevan and Baku appear to be making progress—albeit uneven—toward a peace settlement in the decades-old Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia has criticized Moscow’s and the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s failure to come to their aid against Azerbaijani attacks in September. In Georgia, however, we are concerned about the pace of Euro-Atlantic integration. Moscow continues to use domestic political division between the population at large and powerful oligarchs to its advantage. However, we continue to see the benefit of strong military-to-military relations in Georgia and support the Embassy’s efforts to showcase the benefits of transparent governance. As these states take action to pursue independent goals, we will continue to foster positive momentum in this region.

Western Balkans

In the Western Balkans we continue to see Russian malign activities and observe emerging PRC influence among our Allies—Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Slovenia. Our regional partners—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia—remain most at risk. Russia continues to fan existing ethnic tensions to impede Euro-Atlantic alignment and integration. The PRC has emerged as an alternative for economic and defense cooperation. PRC loans and investment in the Western Balkans focus on large-scale

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transportation, energy, and information infrastructure, which contribute further to disruption in the region. Despite these vulnerabilities, Balkan nations have joined Western efforts to provide support and assistance to Ukraine. The Western Balkans will require our continued commitment to address these vulnerabilities to Russian and PRC malign influence.

The security environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains unstable. Russian influence fuels political and ethnic instability. Ethno-nationalist politics prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from adopting much-needed political, rule of law, and economic reforms that would advance its Euro-Atlantic integration. Bosnia and Herzegovina's Serb-majority entity, Republika Srpska, seeks to weaken state authorities and prevent further alignment with the EU and NATO while maintaining close ties to Russia. We will continue to work with Bosnia and Herzegovina to counter Russia's malign activities. The United States maintains robust ties with the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the country progresses towards NATO-standard capability targets.

In Kosovo, Russia promotes uncertainty and seeks to block Kosovo's path to joining international organizations. Since 2008, Russia, the PRC, and other regional states have not recognized Kosovo's independence. We support the EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia to work towards the normalization of relations and enable enduring peace and stability. NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), a peacekeeping effort since 1999 under a United Nations Security Council mandate, retains a small but significant U.S. contribution that bolsters deterrence on the Southern Flank. KFOR enhances security, which helps set the conditions for a political solution and normalized Serbia-Kosovo relations. USEUCOM continues security cooperation activities that assist the Kosovo Security Force's transition to a limited territorial defense force, which will allow Kosovo to assume responsibility for its own territorial security.

Serbia maintains its strategic goal of joining the EU and trending towards stronger Euro-Atlantic relations. Serbia joined 140 other nations of the United Nations General Assembly in

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condemning Russia's aggression in Ukraine. Serbia historically seeks to balance between East (Russia and the PRC) and West, so its willingness to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a positive step. However, Russia continues to foster malign activity and leverage tensions between ethnic Serbs and other groups in Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The PRC is expanding its influence into the defense and security sectors through arms sales and exercises. Economic challenges in the region render nations vulnerable to the PRC's predatory lending practices, which put at risk critical strategic infrastructure security for EU and NATO member states. The United States and our Allies have improved bilateral defense ties with Serbia in recent years, and increased cooperation in military exercises, training, and international peacekeeping to combat Russia's influence. Serbia's movement away from Russia towards our European Allies and partners is promising.

The Arctic Region / High North

In the Arctic Region—which USEUCOM defines as the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Canada and Russia—we use operations, activities, and investments to support the U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region. Collaboration with adjacent combatant commands and our Arctic Allies and partners is critical to Homeland defense and NATO collective defense. USEUCOM coordinates with U.S. Northern Command on Homeland Defense threats originating in or transiting through the Arctic region. USEUCOM co-chairs the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable with Norway, a forum where the Arctic nations plus the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Germany discuss Arctic challenges. These meetings enable shared understanding, and demonstrate Arctic nations' resolve to commit capable and credible forces to deter aggression. We also train alongside our Allies in this region to enhance NATO's ability to operate in cold environments. For example, U.S. Marines train in the Arctic and High North with our NATO Allies, and the Army's 11th Airborne Division

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deployed forces from Alaska over the North Pole to Finland. The accession of Finland and potentially Sweden to NATO would bring added capabilities and experience to the Alliance.

Climate Change

Climate change presents a growing challenge to U.S. national security interests and defense objectives in the AOR. Climate change affects states with already strained governments, which increases the probability for internal instability and conflict. It exacerbates security risks due to additional stress on populations and infrastructure. Climate hazards can displace people and increase the number of refugees seeking asylum in Europe. We are observing the effects of the warming Arctic, from thawing permafrost to fish migration further north. Europe is already affected by climate change—increased wildfires, reduced agricultural production, and flooding—which could worsen over time. Widespread droughts in Europe last summer elevated cross-border wildfire risks, depleted fresh water supplies, and limited inland river mobility. The changing climate may impact access to training areas vital to readiness due to flooding or erosion. Along with our Allies and partners, we continue to monitor these changes to assess the impacts in the security environment.

USEUCOM collaborates with our interagency partners to enhance Ally and partner resilience to climate change, reduce the requirement for military assets during humanitarian emergencies, and ensure access to critical training areas. In Southwestern Europe, USEUCOM partnered with the U.S. Forest Service to address regional firefighting vulnerabilities, improve regional emergency response, and deliver first responder training. In partnership with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Army Geospatial Center, USEUCOM analyzes the climate impacts and resiliency of key routes needed for troop and material mobilization. To ensure long-term access to training areas in Poland, Romania, Albania, Slovenia, and Croatia, USEUCOM is partnering with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction Engineering Research laboratory

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(CERL) to analyze climate impacts and environmental management options. These efforts will pay long-term dividends to regional stability and Ally and partner ability to generate credible combat readiness.

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)

NATO Heads of State codified terror groups as a threat to the Alliance in the newest NATO Strategic Concept. With decentralized command and control and facilitation networks, VEOs spread from conflict zones into Europe. Isolated refugee and migrant communities increase the possibility for VEO recruitment. VEOs capable of external operations threaten to attack the U.S. from Europe. The actions of lone actors inspired by VEO ideology present the primary terrorist threat in Europe. Successful VEO-inspired or organized attacks in Europe complicate NATO integration efforts; these attacks force our Allies and partners to focus on internal security, driving resource competition for domestic security forces instead of NATO collective security force commitments. USEUCOM supports U.S. interagency counter-VEO initiatives and those of our NATO Allies and partners. Through security cooperation events such as key leader engagement and foreign military sales and financing, we help our Allies and partners balance domestic security requirements and meet NATO capability targets.

USEUCOM STRATEGY

USEUCOM deters aggression in the AOR and—should deterrence fail—we remain ready to respond alongside our Allies and partners to prevail in conflict across all domains. Our strategy strengthens the Alliance's interoperability, fortifies Alliances and partnerships, and enhances all-domain combat credibility. We advance NDS priorities by implementing integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages in Europe. As the coordinating authority for the Russia Problem Set, the Commander of USEUCOM advises the Secretary of

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Defense on force structure, resources, and synchronization of DoD activities to deter Russia and counter its global malign activities. Through collaborative planning, we contribute to NATO's ability to respond in crisis and conflict. Ultimately, USEUCOM's strategy supports national strategic guidance and advances U.S. policy goals.

Enhance All-Domain Combat Credibility

USEUCOM's combat credibility in all domains is the foundation of our deterrence of Russia. In the land domain, improvements in key capabilities, posture, and partnerships improve our ability to deter future Russian aggression. USEUCOM ground forces are serving in NATO Battle Groups on the Eastern Flank, and rotational Brigades have led Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE since 2014. USEUCOM posture additions include a forward Corps headquarters (HQ), an air defense artillery brigade HQ, an engineer brigade HQ, and a combat sustainment support HQ. These forward headquarters provide command and control of assigned and rotational forces in the USEUCOM AOR, and also serve to integrate Allies' contributions to large scale operations. Additional enablers such as a short-range air defense battalion, U.S. Army Garrison Poland, and the 405th Army Field Support Battalion Poland provide key defense, force protection, and sustainment capacity. Continued investment in Army Prepositioned Stocks equipment and facilities enables rapid integration of rotational combat units into USEUCOM and NATO operations.

USEUCOM exercises ground forces to demonstrate combat credibility. During Exercise DEFENDER-Europe 21, U.S. Army Europe and 26 participating nations demonstrated the ability to conduct large-scale operations at the battalion and brigade levels. In Exercise DEFENDER-Europe 24, we will assemble a division-level formation on NATO's eastern flank for the first time since the end of the Cold War. USEUCOM's enhanced posture with combat credible forces are essential for theater deterrence and our readiness to respond to crises alongside our Allies and

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partners.

In the maritime domain, we execute integrated, all-domain naval operations and theater security cooperation alongside our Allies and partners. In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, USEUCOM conducted the unprecedented Transfer of Authority of two carrier strike groups from the U.S. to NATO in support of NATO enhanced Vigilance Activities. In addition to our Forward Deployed Naval Forces, we continue to leverage Carrier Strike Group and Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Units to contribute to the maritime force. The U.S. Sixth Fleet provides maritime command and control capability while the U.S. Second Fleet complements and contributes to reinforce NATO's western flank. With exercises FORMIDABLE SHIELD, NORTHERN CHALLENGE, and BALTOPS, we enhance partner capabilities and further deter Russian aggression. Additionally, we are committed to a robust prepositioning program in coordination with our Allies to build agility and resilience for the combined and joint force. Our operational maritime forces provide an essential capability in strategic competition.

In the air domain, we continue to improve our sensors, fighter aircraft, and ground-based air defense systems. These advanced systems enhance Integrated Air and Missile Defense, support Allies' collective air defense, and increase long-range strike capability. The Aegis Ashore program highlights a key U.S. contribution to NATO's missile defense. With a site in Romania and one under development in Poland, this capability protects the continent from Iranian ballistic missile attack. U.S. Air Force bombers launched from bases in the U.S. and Europe integrate with Ally and partner forces in Bomber Task Force missions. USEUCOM continues to build the first U.S. multi-role 5th Generation F-35 capability in-theater at RAF Lakenheath. Our air component is implementing the U.S. Air Force's Agile Combat Employment concept which, supported by Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control, demonstrate a credible, networked combat force from potential airfields across the continent. Through this model, we enhance posture, complicate adversary decision-making, and impose

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costs. This expansion of European air operations and deployable air bases enhances our forces' survivability. These capability enhancements are critical to our deterrence posture.

In the space domain, maintaining assured access to space capabilities is vital to USEUCOM and NATO operations. USEUCOM coordinates with U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) to leverage space capabilities that ensure our ability to execute multi-domain operations and protect Allied space capabilities from malign actors. We host a USSPACECOM Joint Integrated Space Team and coordinate USSPACECOM posture initiatives at five locations in Europe. USEUCOM coordinates space-related activity with our Allies and partners to expand space partnerships within our AOR and integrate space capabilities into joint and combined operations. We reinforce the Secretary of Defense's Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space and continue work with the U.S. Space Force, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense to establish a space service component to USEUCOM. A networked joint, combined space architecture is critical to all-domain combat credibility for the Alliance.

In the cyber domain, USEUCOM coordinates with Joint Forces Headquarters - Cyber and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to counter malign cyber activity and enhance Allied and partner capabilities. Recognizing the worldwide cyberspace capabilities of Russia, the PRC, Iran, and North Korea, USEUCOM works to enhance global cyber defenses and impose costs on malicious adversary behavior. USEUCOM identifies cyber options for USCYBERCOM to complement operations, activities and investments, and support response operations. USEUCOM also invests in sharing information on foreign malign and cyber activities with the interagency, Allies, and partners to improve our collective cyber defense. Persistent USCYBERCOM engagement activities, synchronized with USEUCOM operations, enhance warning of adversary actions, enable defense, and build trust with Allies and partners.

Enhance All-Domain Combat Credibility: Functional Areas

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As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. The nuclear capability of NATO-member Nuclear Weapons States deters aggression, prevents coercion, preserves peace, and instills confidence in the Trans-Atlantic bond. The U.S. continues to make available its strategic nuclear forces to defend NATO, serving as the Alliance's supreme guarantor of security. With key Allies, we maintain the capability to deploy strategic nuclear forces that support Alliance security. In addition to strategic forces, the United States forward deploys nuclear weapons to Europe. These weapons, combined with U.S. and Allied dual-capable aircraft and supporting infrastructure, demonstrate Alliance cohesion and resolve. NATO continues to adapt its nuclear posture to ensure these capabilities remain credible, resilient, and adaptable. USEUCOM supports modernization and recapitalization of our nuclear forces. Sustained Congressional funding for these programs demonstrates commitment to our operations and NATO solidarity.

USEUCOM conducts activities in the information environment to promote both deterrence and assurance, contest Russian malign narratives, and build resilience among foreign audiences to counter disinformation. We coordinate with interagency and regional partners to execute targeted messaging activities in NDS-prioritized countries. USEUCOM leverages industry-leading assessment techniques to monitor and analyze malign foreign influence across the AOR, including tracking areas where Russian and PRC narratives converge. The Russia Influence Group, co-led by USEUCOM and the State Department, is a key enabler of our Information Operations and focuses on countering Russian malign influence. Through the Russia Influence Group, we synchronize U.S. government efforts to challenge adversary malign narratives and disinformation. Congressional funding enables several efforts for unique cybersecurity and hybrid warfare programs (i.e., electromagnetic warfare, special operations, and operations in the information environment) through the State Department's Countering Russian Influence Fund - Foreign Military Financing. USEUCOM continues to work

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across Allies and partners to build capability and capacity to gain better understanding and deliver effects in the information environment.

Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) provides a persistent special operations presence throughout Europe that works with European Allies and partners to build capacity; identify, attribute, and counter malign activity; and improve resilience. SOCEUR leads and participates in bilateral and multilateral exercises to improve interoperability with Allies, build partner capacity and resilience, and strengthen deterrence messaging. AOR-wide exercises like TROJAN FOOTPRINT set conditions for better integration between SOF and conventional forces during combined, joint, and multi-domain warfare. Our Special Operations personnel also provide invaluable sensing capabilities in the operational environment, which enhances our ability to deter through indications and warnings. Our SOF delivers exquisite capabilities that provide unique options to counter malign activity and increase our Allies' and partners' resilience.

Our Joint Interagency Counter Trafficking Center supports whole-of-government efforts to combat Russian malign activities by assisting federal law enforcement activities. USEUCOM leverages a range of interagency-driven efforts—criminal investigations, convictions, seizures, sanctions, and designations through these programs. These actions help vulnerable Allies and partners resist Russia's malign activity, reinforce the rule of law, and strengthen self-governance without Russian influence. We appreciate Congress and the Department for the continued support of the counter-narcotics funding that supports this activity.

Strengthen Alliance Interoperability

NATO's approved strategic framework for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area, abbreviated as "DDA", has sparked the largest transformation of the Alliance's military in the post-Cold War period. DDA resets the Alliance for Collective Defense after two decades of

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out-of-area deployments by our Allies. Domain-specific plans are being developed to better organize Alliance forces for multi-domain collective defense against Russia and terror groups. DDA also calls for geographic-specific regional plans to describe how and where the Alliance will defend. These plans together will drive force structure and readiness requirements—the first time in over 30 years that the Alliance will have an objective, plans-based guide for national defense investments.

The Alliance continues to invest in critical military capabilities contributing to collective defense and support. For the past seven years, Allies have increased their total defense spending, and future projections remain positive. Although munitions stocks have decreased with donations to Ukraine, Allies and partners are increasing interoperable combat power through major acquisitions. These acquisitions include cyber capabilities; M1 Abrams and Patriot missiles in Poland; fourth and fifth-generation aircraft in Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, and Switzerland; Patriot air defense batteries in Switzerland and Sweden; and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) capability in Romania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Ultimately, these capabilities are the key to combat credibility. Going forward, national governments will face competing priorities, but the importance of the capabilities required for collective defense cannot be overstated.

Military exercises with Allies develop NATO's interoperability and remain essential elements of deterrence. USEUCOM deployed assigned Army forces to the Eastern Flank during exercises SABER STRIKE, SWIFT RESPONSE, and DEFENDER beginning in February 2022. U.S. Marines trained alongside 26 militaries during COLD RESPONSE in Norway to enhance NATO's ability to operate in cold environments in March 2022. USEUCOM deployed naval forces to the Baltics Sea to train on maritime security operations during exercise BALTOPS in June 2022. Additionally, enhancements to multinational information sharing

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systems enable our coordination with our Allies and partners. These exercises provide a key deterrent effect in our dynamic security environment and demonstrate Alliance combined and joint interoperability.

The proposed increase in funding for the Joint Training, Exercise, and Evaluation Program (JTEEP), both in the near-term and across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), are a key enabler of USEUCOM campaigning. USEUCOM's joint exercise program integrates advanced capabilities, demonstrates freedom of maneuver, and increases interoperability with our Allies and partners to showcase the Alliance's strength. Additional JTEEP resources allow USEUCOM more flexibility to campaign, enhance integrated deterrence, and demonstrate U.S. commitment to Euro-Atlantic security.

USEUCOM participation in NATO operations directed by the North Atlantic Council demonstrates U.S. commitment to the Alliance. The U.S. "dual hatted" the U.S. Army Europe-Africa Commander as Commander, NATO LANDCOM. This change allows for seamless Transfer of Authority of U.S. Forces in support of NATO operations. U.S. ground forces are serving in Battle Groups in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. U.S. Air Forces in Europe support NATO Enhanced Air Policing and Icelandic Air Surveillance missions to safeguard the sovereignty of Allied airspace against Russian incursions. A U.S. Navy Rear Admiral has commanded Standing NATO Maritime Group Two, with attached U.S. naval capabilities, to counter challenges in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Baltic Sea since July 2022. Operation ATLANTIC SENTRY—conducted by U.S. Aegis destroyers based in Rota, Spain and the Aegis Ashore system in Romania—provides the foundation of NATO's ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. Participating in NATO operations demonstrates USEUCOM leadership and commitment to the Alliance.

Additionally, rotational Army, Marine, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) further demonstrate United States commitment to NATO interoperability. These forces work alongside

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Allies and partners to deter aggression, counter malign activities, build host nation defense capabilities, and enhance interoperability. In Eastern Europe, three rotational Brigade Combat Teams and a Combat Aviation Brigade lead land force efforts to support ATLANTIC RESOLVE. Deliberate deployments of U.S. Marines to Norway reinforce the Alliance's northern periphery and provides exceptional training opportunities. Force commitments outside USEUCOM assigned forces enhance deterrence and hone the Alliance's warfighting skills.

Fortify Alliances and Partnerships

Europe and the United States remain the foundation for upholding a free and open international order. The shared ideals, values, and longstanding relationships we have in Europe strengthen integrated deterrence and enable worldwide operations in support of shared national interests. USEUCOM's unique geographic location enables global operations, including U.S. interagency and multinational operations. We work within a whole-of-government framework to maintain essential access, basing, and overflight permissions under bilateral agreements and resist Russian and PRC strategic investment. These agreements enable the United States to protect our vital national interests and meet treaty obligations.

Allies and partners bolster U.S. initiatives through national contributions and provide critical host nation support to U.S. forces operating across the region. Allies and partners contribute forces to ongoing NATO and U.S.-led coalition missions in order to advance our common interests in Kosovo, Iraq, and Syria. Allies underwrite infrastructure investments and defray costs of U.S. military construction through the NATO Security Investment Program. The EU, in consultation with NATO, committed to invest 1.69 billion euros over the next seven years for civilian and military dual-use transportation infrastructure improvements. This infrastructure investment will enhance military mobility, increase individual nations' crisis response, and improve Alliance combat capability. Our Allies and partners continue to be critical in supporting

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USEUCOM while we defend U.S. interests in Europe.

U.S. National Guard forces maintain vibrant relationships and unique access with Allies and partners through the State Partnership Program (SPP). USEUCOM now has 25 active programs with the addition of the Cyprus—New Jersey and Norway—Minnesota partnerships. The SPP conducts over 500 engagements a year in USEUCOM's AOR. These engagements cultivate regional expertise, strengthen personal relationships and improve readiness across the AOR. Programs such as the Black Sea Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative and enhancing Baltic Integrated Air and Missile Defense represent potent, regionally-focused components of a resilient theater posture developed from SPP relationships.

The accession of Finland and potentially Sweden to NATO would represent the most significant expansion of the Alliance since the 1990s. The U.S. Senate backed the expansion by an overwhelming 95-1 vote and President Biden signed instruments of ratification endorsing Finland and Sweden's accession. Finland's accession to NATO brings added capabilities and experience to the Alliance, and so would Sweden's. The U.S. and Sweden have a long history together in training, bilateral and multilateral security cooperation, and operations. USEUCOM recognizes the significant capability this nation would bring to NATO and we look forward to deeper planning and coordination in the future.

CONCLUSION

U.S. leadership in Europe remains indispensable, and our commitment to NATO ensures the Alliance continues to serve as the foundation of Transatlantic security. Russia remains a chronic threat to European security despite its losses in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the West is more united than it has been in years. We have demonstrated our commitment to European stability through our collective support to Ukraine in response to Russia's brutal war of aggression. Maintaining an all-domain combat credible U.S. presence in Europe is the

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foundation of our deterrence of Russia, strengthens Alliance interoperability, and supports NATO's collective defense.

The PRC also challenges Transatlantic security. The PRC aims to supplant the rules-based international order to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences. Such efforts threaten enduring U.S., Allied, and partner interests, security, and values in Europe. PRC investment in critical infrastructure, and acquisitions in emerging technology sectors, allows access to our Allies and partners and provides the PRC a military capacity that places U.S. and Alliance interests in the AOR at risk. USEUCOM, alongside our Allies and partners, will continue to resist the PRC's malign influence and activity to preserve a secure, prosperous, and free Europe.

We appreciate Congress' active engagement and support to address these challenges through funding and authorities. European Deterrence Initiative-associated investments supported the U.S. response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The United States reinforced NATO members' security more quickly than any other Ally because of our forward presence, repositioning of theater forces, and prepositioned stocks. Your continued support for our posture investments in Europe, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, Presidential Drawdown Authority, Foreign Military Sales and Financing, and International Security Cooperation Programs remains critical to USEUCOM's strategy. These authorities and funding enhance U.S. and NATO and strengthen our ability to respond in crisis or conflict. Together with the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, Coast Guardsmen, civilians, and defense contractors of USEUCOM, your support demonstrates our Nation's continued commitment to defend the Homeland and protect the peace for the one billion people living in the Euro-Atlantic region.

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**General Christopher G. Cavoli
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and
Commander, U.S. European Command**

General Christopher G. Cavoli assumed duties as Commander, U.S. European Command, July 1, 2022 and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), July 4, 2022. Gen. Cavoli previously served as Commander of the consolidated U.S. Army Europe and Africa October 2020 through June 2022. From January 2018 until the consolidation, Gen. Cavoli served as the commander of U.S. Army Europe.

Commissioned into the Infantry in 1987, Gen. Cavoli has served in a wide variety of positions throughout the United States, Europe and Asia. He's commanded the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment; 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division; 7th Army Training Command; and 25th Infantry Division. He also served as the Deputy Commander of Regional Command West in Herat, Afghanistan, and as the Deputy Commanding General for Operations at the 82nd Airborne Division. Gen. Cavoli's staff experience includes service as the Director for Russia on the Joint Staff; Deputy Executive Assistant for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Director of the Chief of Staff of the Army's Coordination Group. He has held fellowships at National Defense University, the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies and the Army Chief of Staff's Strategic Studies Group.

Gen. Cavoli is a Foreign Area Officer with a concentration on Eurasia, and speaks Italian, Russian and French. He holds degrees from Princeton University and Yale University. His awards include the Combat Infantryman's Badge, the Ranger Tab and Master Parachutist's wings.

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

APRIL 26, 2023

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON

General CAVOIL. The Department of Defense, supported by USEUCOM and in coordination with Ukraine, Allies, and partners, is working to identify Ukraine's future military requirements. Ukraine and Russia are still in an active war, and we do not yet know what war termination will look like. Ukraine's future force requirements will depend in part on how the war concludes. In the meantime, we are continuing with analysis of Ukraine's current military equipment and force structure, projected Ukrainian military capability gaps, and future sustainment requirements. Ultimately, we will need each donor nations' defense industrial base to focus on innovation and agility. Building Ukraine's future force will require a long-term commitment of resources from Ukraine, the U.S., Allies, and partners. [See page 20.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

APRIL 26, 2023

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

1) Mr. TURNER. Since Russia launched its illegal invasion of Ukraine last February, there has been increased demand for state-of-the-art American weapons and materiel from our European allies and partners. What can Congress do to facilitate meeting the demand through the Department's Foreign Military Sales program?

Dr. WALLANDER. The U.S. Department of State supervises and directs the U.S. government's Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and U.S. Department of Defense administers the program through its Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Department is implementing a number of improvements to the processes, policies, and practices under its purview to the FMS system recommended by the FMS Tiger Team. The Tiger Team also identified a number of recommendations that may require Congressional support to implement, including a proposal to establish in law Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU), as well as expanding unique and competitive financing mechanisms, addressing exportability and production capacity issues affecting foreign partners, and reduce bureaucratic burden, which will increase the efficiency of the FMS system.

Mr. TURNER. On 25 March 2023, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would forward base tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, just to the north of Ukraine and to the east of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. The Romania and Poland Aegis Ashore sites are currently focused on a ballistic missile threat from Iran to the South. Would fully enabling the Aegis Ashore sites to their organic capability (at parity with Aegis ships afloat) improve U.S. and NATO security posture in EUHQ?

Dr. WALLANDER. Fully enabling the Aegis Ashore sites to the same extent as an AEGIS ship—which has midcourse and terminal ballistic missile defenses, cruise missile defenses, air defenses, and offensive strike capabilities—would not make cost effective improvements to U.S. and NATO security posture in the USEUCOM AOR. Previous analysis provided to Congress in response to section 1677 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92) indicated that other alternatives could improve integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) at better value.

The Department would welcome an opportunity to provide you with a classified briefing on its analysis and an update on the measures the United States is working with NATO to improve the Alliance's IAMD.

3) Mr. TURNER. The European Phased Adaptive Approach to Ballistic Missile Defense was established almost 15 years ago and focuses specifically on an ICMB threat from Iran. With our adversaries' development of exotic first-strike capabilities such as orbital and boost-glide hypersonic missiles, and with Russia's demonstrated aggression in Ukraine and nuclear saber-rattling rhetoric, isn't it time to work with NATO to establish an integrated missile defense architecture capable of sensing and defeating a full range of threats from any direction? What can Congress do to help accomplish this?

Dr. WALLANDER. NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense (NATO IAMD) is an essential and continuous mission in peacetime, crisis, and conflict, safeguarding and protecting Alliance territory, populations, and forces against any air or missile threat or attack from any direction. NATO fully recognizes the threat posed by Russia, and NATO IAMD accounts for Russia's growing and evolving array of missile capabilities and aggressive use of missiles throughout its brutal invasion of Ukraine. The Alliance has taken several significant steps in recent years to improve the NATO IAMD system (NATINAMDS)—a network of interconnected national and NATO systems comprised of sensors, command and control assets, and weapon systems—which is prepared to employ all necessary measures to deter any air and missile threat, or to nullify or reduce their effectiveness, in times of crisis or conflict.

U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is coordinating with NATO Allies to improve the NATINAMDS through data sharing, the fielding of new and improved detection and tracking sensors, and the deployment of terminal active defense systems such as PATRIOT alongside Ally air and missile defense systems to protect critical assets. The May 2023 USEUCOM-led Formidable Shield 2023 IAMD exercise was an important milestone for improving Alliance IAMD readiness and interoperability. The exercise involved 13 NATO Allied and partner nations, more than 20 ships and

35 aircraft, eight ground units with radars, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), and approximately 4,000 personnel.

The Department also supports Allies in the acquisition and upgrade of their own IAMD capabilities. Sweden, Romania, and Poland have acquired PATRIOT in recent years; Lithuania has acquired NASAMS; and Latvia and Estonia recently agreed to purchase the German IRIS-T medium-range air defense system. The UK, Finland, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and Poland have bought or are in the process of buying the F-35, which has unique sensor capabilities useful for IAMD.

Through engagement with parliamentarians of all NATO nations, Congress has helped raise and sustain support for investment in NATO IAMD as a vital element of NATO's deterrence and defense. In this regard, the Department would welcome the opportunity to provide you with a classified briefing on the broader scope of ongoing activities to strengthen NATO IAMD.

Mr. TURNER. Since Russia launched its illegal invasion of Ukraine last February, there has been increased demand for state-of-the-art American weapons and materiel from our European allies and partners. What can Congress do to facilitate meeting the demand through the Department's Foreign Military Sales program?

General CAVOLI. To meet the demand for American weapons and materiel from Allies and partners, Congress could provide additional authorities and appropriations to increase the speed of the Foreign Military Sales program. Specifically, further capitalization of the Special Defense Acquisition Fund and reevaluation of out-of-date Congressional Notification thresholds would shorten overall timelines.

The U.S. defense industry is clearly strained. The consolidation of our defense industrial base has limited competition and dis-incentivized rapid response to emergent requirements. Congress could grant additional authorities, such as the expansion of multi-year U.S. procurements, which would provide greater predictability and stability to production lines. Additionally, a predictable, timely budgetary cycle would enable the DOD to plan across multiple fiscal years and provide more accurate U.S. demand signals that influence Allied and partner procurement decisions. Congress can also establish a legislative framework to ease restrictions and encourage industrial partnerships with key Allies and partners.

Mr. TURNER. On 25 March 2023, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would forward base tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, just to the north of Ukraine and to the east of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. The Romania and Poland Aegis Ashore sites are currently focused on a ballistic missile threat from Iran to the South. Would fully enabling the Aegis Ashore sites to their organic capability (at parity with Aegis ships afloat) improve U.S. and NATO security posture in USEUCOM?

General CAVOLI. No, altering the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland to enable full Aegis weapons system capability would not improve the overall security posture in the USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Several critical hardware and software differences exist between Aegis afloat and ashore platforms. Both sites' sensor capabilities are limited by terrain, and rely on cueing from specifically placed sensors to improve early ballistic missile threat detection. We are actively encouraging Allies to develop an AOR-wide networked sensor architecture to improve radar coverage and provide cueing for U.S. and Allied Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) systems in Europe.

The Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland continue to be operationally relevant based on the original intent of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase III—to address ballistic missile threats originating outside the Euro-Atlantic region. The Department of Defense's plan remains to complete the Aegis Ashore in Poland as the final piece of the EPAA Phase III commitment to NATO.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. The Black Sea region is of critical importance to both European and global security as evidenced by Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine. How has the ongoing war affected the U.S. Defense Policy towards the Black Sea region? What is Georgia's role in this policy and are we doing enough and what else can be done in cooperation with Georgia to strengthen security and our involvement in the strategically important Black Sea region?

Dr. WALLANDER. The United States has an enduring interest in a Black Sea region that is secure, prosperous, interconnected, and free from territorial integrity threats, economic coercion, and malign influence by Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine highlights growing challenges in the Black Sea region and has deepened our resolve to ensure Putin's war

is a strategic failure. The United States, our NATO Allies, and likeminded partners have responded with greater focus, more security and economic assistance, and additional forces for the Black Sea region. These actions must be part of a synchronized, whole-of-government approach, as our ability to reduce Russian influence and aggression is more effective when defense capabilities are aligned with diplomatic and economic efforts to advance regional cooperation and U.S. priorities.

Georgia remains a significant partner and plays an important role in our Black Sea Strategy. The Department's premier bilateral security program with Georgia remains the Georgia Defense and Deterrence Enhancement Initiative (GDDEI), a five-year, \$110 million program that supports defense reform as well as training and equipment modernization to strengthen the capacity of the Georgian Defense Forces to resist and repel Russian aggression. GDDEI complements regular, robust training and exercise activities such as Exercises Agile Spirit and Noble Partner. As with other Black Sea allies and partners, we work with Georgia to increase maritime domain awareness on a regional level. Georgia is one of four countries that receive Section 333, Title 10 U.S. Code, security assistance as part of a 10-year Black Sea Maritime Domain Awareness initiative to support critical infrastructure capabilities and data sharing. We also maintain a resident Ministry of Defense Advisor in Tbilisi who specifically focuses on the maritime domain awareness mission.

Mr. SCOTT. Should we expect increased military assistance and deeper defense cooperation ties from the United States to Georgia and, if so, how will this be reflected in practical terms?

General CAVOLI. USEUCOM has enjoyed a long, close relationship with our partners in the Republic of Georgia. We have seen the benefit of strong military-to-military relations with Georgia over the years, and would like to strengthen this relationship. The centerpiece of our military relationship is the Georgia Defense and Deterrence Enhancement Initiative. This program is designed to enhance Georgia's capacity for deterrence, territorial defense, resistance, and resilience. It also aims to foster interoperability with NATO and accelerate modernization and institutional reform.

We remain concerned that the pace of Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration could inhibit deeper defense cooperation. USEUCOM fully supports a whole-of-government effort, led by the State Department, to showcase the benefits of transparent governance.

Mr. SCOTT. Section 736 of the FY 23 NDAA established a partnership program between the United States and Ukraine for military trauma care and research. What is the status of this program and what are your expectations for this program in FY 24?

General CAVOLI. The acting Director of Research and Development for Health Readiness Policy and Oversight oversees the implementation of Section 736 in the FY23 NDAA. A Department of Defense contract was awarded to the Henry Jackson Foundation to research military trauma in Ukraine. The Henry M. Jackson Foundation (HJF) assembled a cadre of contracted subject matter experts (SME) to send into Ukraine to collect baseline information on existing trauma care capabilities within the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Health, as they both manage war-injured soldiers. Although HJF has not been able to enter Ukraine yet due to the ongoing war, they continue to bring Ukrainian SMEs into Poland to interact with the team and complete surveys.

The USEUCOM Command Surgeon collects information shared by the Ukraine Surgeon General, partner nations, and non-governmental organizations on the ground in Ukraine to inform the initial direction of this research. We will continue this collaboration in FY24. There are nine symposiums with Ukrainian SMEs scheduled in the coming fiscal year to enhance HJF's collection of casualty care assessment data and to further enable improvements to military trauma care.

Mr. SCOTT. How can the U.S. Coast Guard be better integrated with USEUCOM?

General CAVOLI. The U.S. Coast Guard provides USEUCOM with unique capabilities and authorities which increase the effectiveness of USEUCOM missions and strategic initiatives. U.S. Coast Guard units are particularly useful in Theater Security Cooperation activities with littoral nations working to improve maritime domain awareness in Allies and partners' littoral and exclusive economic zones. The U.S. Coast Guard provides USEUCOM unique perspectives and is fully integrated into USEUCOM planning efforts, particularly through their humanitarian service capabilities and law enforcement, and as a member of the intelligence community.

USEUCOM would welcome more routine deployments of Coast Guard capabilities in the EUCOM AOR, particularly in the Arctic. U.S. Coast Guard authorities provide options otherwise unavailable to DOD platforms.

Mr. SCOTT. Would you like to see the admission of new countries in the National Guard's State Partnership Program be accelerated?

General CAVOLI. Accelerating the admission of new countries into this strategic program is in the best interest of the U.S. and our partners. The current admission process is deliberate and holistic. If the admissions process were to be accelerated, it is imperative that both adequate support and resources are dedicated to the program. In this regard, GEN Hokanson and his team are best suited to address the resource requirements provided to the National Guard for successful execution of the SPP mission.

Mr. SCOTT. How best can Moldova deter Russian aggression?

General CAVOLI. Deepening integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions, reforming defense institutions, and modernizing military capabilities are the most important steps to increase Moldova's ability to deter Russian aggression. Chisinau's willingness to cooperate with Western institutions, in conjunction with internal anti-corruption and reform efforts, are essential to drive systemic change. Building resilient defense institutions helps Moldova to decouple from Russian malign influence. Continued investment in the Moldovan Ministry of Defense's institutional capacity building efforts, alongside NATO, remains Moldova's best path to build sustainable military capacity. Moldova's ambitious modernization effort within their National Army and continued investment in modern military capabilities to build territorial defense capacity are essential to deter Russian aggression. USEUCOM encourages continued Moldovan integration with Western defense institutions through the provision of timely and meaningful security assistance.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the center of gravity of Russia's forces occupying Georgia?

General CAVOLI. Logistical lines of communication are likely the center of gravity for Russian forces within occupied Georgia. Access to Georgia's Russian-occupied territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (de facto South Ossetia) is limited by the road and rail networks due to the terrain. Russian forces require continued sustainment and reinforcement to maintain their presence in Georgia.

Mr. SCOTT. USEUCOM defines NATO's Eastern Flank as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. Why isn't Romania and Bulgaria included as part of NATO's Eastern Flank?

General CAVOLI. The NATO "Eastern Flank" is by definition comprised of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. USEUCOM acknowledges the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria as part of NATO's defined "Eastern Flank," and simultaneously includes both nations in a USEUCOM specific "Black Sea" regional focus area (e.g., Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Turkiye and Ukraine), which includes both NATO and non-NATO nations.

Mr. SCOTT. Based on educational materials from various war colleges, NATO does not have an Eastern Flank. The East is its Front. It has a Northern and Southern Flank and the West is its rear. Why do you refer to NATO's Eastern Flank and not the Eastern Front in your testimony?

General CAVOLI. NATO adaptations to the nature of the Russian threat include a shift from out-of-area operations to collective territorial defense. This shift is captured in a new operational-strategic level Concept for Deterrence & Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA).

Through this new concept, NATO is enhancing its ability to respond to multiple geographic, all-domain threats and malign influence from both the Russian Federation and Terrorist Groups throughout the Euro-Atlantic Area, vice against any specific linear "front."

The Russian Federation seeks to destabilize countries to NATO's East and South. In the Arctic, its capability to disrupt Allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic is a strategic challenge to the Alliance. Moscow's military build-up and increased activities, including in the Baltic, North, Black, and Mediterranean Seas, Atlantic region, as well as continued influence in the Middle East/African continent produce a 360-degree, multi-domain, geographically dispersed challenge to NATO's security and interests.

Mr. SCOTT. Captain Lawson W. Brigham, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), wrote an article in the May 2023 issue of Proceedings entitled "Future Challenges for the Baltic Sea." According to Captain Brigham, "The Baltic Sea is one of the world's most historic and important waterways for trade ... Revised NATO doctrine should call for a credible naval presence in the Baltic Sea for deterrence and territorial defense. Large-scale naval and civil maritime exercises must continue, as well as joint training and intelligence sharing among the NATO Baltic Sea States." Should the United States Navy establish a Baltic Sea flotilla that is homeported in this important region? How else can NATO increase the alliance's maritime presence in the Baltic Sea?

General CAVOLI. A U.S. Baltic Sea flotilla is not necessary to provide the required maritime presence to deter and be postured to defend the U.S. and NATO's interests in the Baltic Sea. Since 2016, the U.S. and NATO have significantly increased our

presence in the Baltic Sea with European homeported U.S., Standing NATO Maritime Group, and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasure Group warships operating and exercising throughout the Baltics. Today, the U.S., individual Allies and partners, and NATO operate a spectrum of aircraft and naval vessels on a near-persistent basis in the Baltic Sea to provide presence and signal a collective commitment to ensure the freedom of navigation and safe passage for international commerce.

Mr. SCOTT. What additional investments in Littoral Warfare do Allied/Partner Baltic and Black Sea Navies need to make to protect sea lines of communication?

General CAVOLI. The most immediate needs for Ally and partner Navies in the Baltic and Black Seas are investments in maritime domain awareness, interoperable communications technology, and coastal defense systems toward a credible sea-denial capability. Some navies, specifically Romania, Estonia and Latvia, are on the path to acquiring coastal defense capabilities within the next five years. Romania has purchased coastal defense systems through the U.S. government, and we are exploring ways to accelerate the deliveries of these critical systems. Bulgaria and Lithuania are still considering coastal defense system acquisition.

Freedom of navigation in the Baltic and Black Seas depend heavily on mine countermeasure capabilities. Although many NATO Allies maintain robust mine countermeasure capabilities organized and deployed as part of two Standing NATO Mine Countermeasure Groups, Romania and Bulgaria have very limited organic mine countermeasure capability. At such time when Russia's war against Ukraine permits warships to transit into the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, NATO intends to re-establish mine countermeasure presence in the Black Sea and the Ukraine Armed Forces intends to homeport the mine countermeasure ships they have received from the United Kingdom (these ships train and exercise from Royal Navy bases in the UK).

Mr. SCOTT. How would a U.S. Navy Black Sea Flotilla enhance credible deterrence?

General CAVOLI. As a non-Black Sea nation, the Montreux Convention does not permit the U.S. to maintain a flotilla in the Black Sea. Despite limitations on warship presence in the Black Sea, prior to the Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. and NATO deployed warships into the Black Sea on a near-persistent basis providing a combat credible deterrent force in this geo-strategic location in southeastern Europe. In consultation with our Black Sea Allies and partners, and when conditions are right, the Department of Defense intends to reestablish presence in international waters in the Black Sea.

Mr. SCOTT. The 6 most critical regional capability gaps in the Baltic States are 1) integrated air and missile defense; 2) maritime situational awareness; 3) Baltic regional long range fires capability; 4) ammunition; 5) C4ISR; and 6) Special Forces. What are the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th regional capability gaps in the Baltic States?

General CAVOLI. Russia remains a persistent threat with a clear size advantage over its Baltic neighbors. Our ability to deter, and if necessary, defeat Russian aggression in the Baltic States is linked to the ability of U.S. and NATO forces to rapidly project power and preemptively mitigate Russia's size advantage. Investments in emerging counter mass systems, enhanced interoperability with our Allies and partners, our ability to conduct forward contested logistics, and multi-domain training in Europe provide the greatest benefit to closing capability gaps in the deterrence and defense posture in the Baltics.

Mr. SCOTT. According to the Estonia's Ministry of Defence, "Unfortunately, NATO's decision-making, conceptualizing and planning processes take years, as do the exercises to train for these plans." Do you agree? If so, how can we shorten these timelines?

General CAVOLI. Since Russia's 2014 occupation of Crimea and the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, NATO has significantly improved decision making timelines in Brussels. NATO Headquarters, Allied capitals, and SHAPE Headquarters practice the streamlined procedures in annual crisis management exercises (CMX). NATO last exercised improved Alliance Article III, Article IV, and Article V procedures in CMX-23 in March 2023.

Stimulated by Russia's provoked Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO's new Strategic Concept from the June 2022 NATO Summit provided the rapid alignment with the 2021 Concept for the Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) and ongoing Allied Command Operations development of a whole family of plans. In August 2022, SHAPE provided Subordinate Strategic Plans for implementation. The Regional Plans, approved in July 2023, are intended to replace the five legacy Graduated Response Plans NATO currently has activated due to Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine. These geographically oriented regional plans describe the architecture, procedures, and arrangements by which NATO con-

ducts rapid, seamless, integrated joint operations. The new subordinate strategic plans and regional plans have been developed to optimize NATO's consensus decision making, advanced crisis planning processes, authorities, rules of engagement, and speed of deployment for Alliance forces allocated to support each of the plans. This novel approach of identifying and allocating resources to threat based plans has not been used by NATO since the end of the Cold War.

Estonian Minister of Defense Hanno Pevkur praised the new family of plans in a July 11 press statement, saying, "These new military plans put in place the NATO collective defense actions across all domains—land, air, water, space and cyber. They also delve into actions in different phases of a conflict—in peacetime, in crisis and in war."

At the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Allied Command Transformation, we are altering our training and assessment programs to synchronize with the new subordinate strategic plans and regional plans to rapidly implement our new plans, C2, and expected resources into NATO's annual exercise program. This fall, we will begin exercising utilizing our new regional plans in NATO's Exercise STEADFAST JAGUAR 23. Additionally, both SHAPE and USEUCOM are aligning the NATO and U.S. bilateral/multi-lateral exercise programs to combine the execution of joint headquarters- level exercises to better integrate and validate the plans and streamline planning timelines.

Mr. SCOTT. Should NATO establish a Baltic Sea Air Defense Mission as an upgrade from the present air policing mission?

General CAVOLI. NATO is in the process of establishing a more robust air defense capability to support the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) for the entire Alliance, including all Baltic Sea Allies. In a modern defense architecture, IAMD capabilities are integral to overall theater command and control in every phase of warfare. As a result, the development of a theater-wide IAMD system is a major NATO capability development objective.

Many Allies have already made substantive commitments to improve IAMD. In October 2022, 15 Allies signed a Letter of Intent to strengthen the European pillar in NATO's IAMD through the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI). ESSI calls for all air and missile defense systems to be integrated through national command and control systems into the NATO IAMD systems architecture. It addresses short-, medium-, and long-range defense layers, as well as upper layer ballistic missile defense. Germany has taken the lead as a primary coordinator of ESSI capability development.

At the July 11 NATO Summit in Vilnius, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to further improve the readiness, preparedness, and interoperability of NATO's IAMD, in particular through regular training and rotational presence of modern air defense systems and capabilities across SACEUR's Area of Responsibility, with an initial focus on the Eastern Flank. This new rotational model is meant to facilitate the deployment of additional IAMD capabilities in areas including the Baltic states, beyond NATO's existing Baltic Air Policing mission.

Mr. SCOTT. The Republic of Moldova has been a target of continuous hybrid war attacks from Russia such as disinformation, propaganda and cyber-attacks, corruption of politicians, as well as weaponization of energy supplies. How can the United States assist Moldova build a comprehensive security strategy and capability to withstand these threats and strengthen their resilience and defense against the hybrid war attacks?"

General CAVOLI. The best approach for the U.S. to strengthen Moldova's resiliency against hybrid attacks is to help Moldovan leaders embrace the Western concept of civilian control of the military, and integrate a comprehensive threat assessment in the National Security Strategy with comprehensive defense plans to defend and deter against the stated threat. We have encouraged Moldova to invest in building robust and resilient governmental institutions, and the Department of Defense, through the George C. Marshall Center, is providing institutional-level advisory support to the Moldovan government for the development of their new National Security Strategy. USEUCOM also supports Moldova in the development of resilient military capabilities to address threats in cyberspace and countering Russian disinformation. These efforts are part of a broader U.S. approach to build robust capabilities and implement comprehensive national defense planning in support of broader societal resilience.

Mr. SCOTT. Are NATO's contingency plans in the Baltic Sea region updated and modernized?

General CAVOLI. Yes. NATO's activated Graduated Response Plans covering the Baltic Sea region provide the day-to-day authorities necessary to adequately command and control NATO forces to deter and be postured to defend in the Baltics. Within the last year, Allied Command Operations (ACO) developed and approved

seven domain-specific Subordinate Strategic Plans (SSPs) covering Land, Air, Maritime, Cyber, Space, SOF, and Reinforcement. Additionally, ACO developed and garnered approval of three geographically oriented Regional Plans. One of these focuses was specifically on a Baltic Sea regional threat from Russia. This recently approved Regional Plan incorporates existing national defense plans into a coherent, single strategic plan to defend a geographical region, and supersedes the legacy Graduated Response Plan in the Baltics region.

Mr. SCOTT. What are the advantages of establishing a permanent U.S. military presence in the Baltic States?

General CAVOLI. President Biden announced in June 2022 that we will maintain a persistent, heel-to-toe presence in the Baltic region through enhanced rotational deployments and intensified training. The U.S. persistent rotational presence in the Baltic States demonstrates U.S. commitment to defending our Baltic Allies, and supports NATO's deterrence and collective defense posture in the Baltic Sea region. The recurring presence of U.S. forces is the most effective and efficient way to maintain a robust U.S. presence in the region and deter threats against the Baltic States. U.S. deployments to the Baltic States complement efforts by both host nation and Allied forces, enhance interoperability, and demonstrate the operational capability of combat credible forces to rapidly respond to threats in the region. The structure of these deployments allows the U.S. to flexibly respond to theater-wide requirements while still providing a credible deterrent in the Baltic Sea region.

Mr. SCOTT. Do you support making large-scale reinforcement exercises in the Baltic Sea region the norm?

General CAVOLI. USEUCOM supports large-scale military exercises with our Allies and partners in order to integrate advanced capabilities, demonstrate freedom of maneuver, and increase our interoperability, all of which showcase the Alliance's strength. We also exercise transportation requirements through various Baltic Sea ports and ground transportation nodes, which support rotational force movements, increase our joint capabilities, ensure access, and maintain our freedom of maneuver.

Mr. SCOTT. What are the areas of deeper defense and security cooperation in the Baltic Sea region that the United States could work with the United Kingdom to leverage this special relationship in the Baltic Sea Region?

General CAVOLI. The United States and United Kingdom work closely together in the planning and execution of force posture adjustments and exercises in the Baltic Sea region. Since its establishment in 2017, the U.K.-led NATO Battlegroup in Estonia has deepened this defense and security cooperation. U.S. forces participating in operations and exercises in Estonia are able to seamlessly integrate into existing U.K. and Estonian activities.

Additionally, the U.K.'s investment in Joint Expeditionary Force activities and its leadership of the NATO Battlegroup in Estonia has enabled the U.S. to prioritize employment of U.S. forces elsewhere in theater and around the globe.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. MACE

Ms. MACE. How are USSOF advancing partnerships and coordination in countries aligned on the side of the Ukrainians? How is the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) creating asymmetric advantages and improving the capabilities of the Ukrainians to resist.

Dr. WALLANDER. U.S. SOF operate alongside allies and partners throughout Europe to support whole-of-nation resilience efforts. Since 2014, U.S. SOF have supported multinational training efforts with Ukrainian SOF forces. U.S. SOF in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility continue to actively support U.S. efforts to bolster Ukraine's defense following Russia's ongoing brutal and unprovoked invasion, working with Security Assistance Group-Ukraine to ensure these activities are fully aligned with training for Ukraine's conventional forces. DOD can provide additional information in a classified setting.

Ms. MACE. Do you believe the DOD has the authorities it needs for USSOF to collaborate with allies and partners in Irregular Warfare and Information Operations, and where should EUCOM further deepen or expand irregular warfare programs with allied or partner forces in Europe?

Dr. WALLANDER. USSOF has a long history of operating alongside allies and partners throughout Europe to bolster resilience and improve irregular warfare (IW) and information operations (IO) capabilities. We utilize a range of security cooperation, IO, and IW authorities, including Section 1202, to support these efforts. We continue to review those authorities to assess gaps and would welcome further discussion at

the classified level. Details of individual programs or efforts, and recommendations for future programs, can also be provided in a classified briefing, if desired.

Ms. MACE. General Cavoli: It's clear to me we're witnessing the future of warfare in Ukraine. The United States Army, SAG-U (Security Assistance Group—Ukraine), and Ukrainians have harnessed commercial technology and successfully integrated and deployed AI-powered software on the battlefield. Can you talk about the critical role software is playing in the current conflict and what lessons the U.S. should learn about adopting and deploying new technology at a pace required by the war-fighter?

General CAVOLI. We are clearly at a turning point in the role Artificial Intelligence (AI) plays on the battlefield. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have incorporated new technology and AI applications with incredible speed and agility. They have employed AI applications to enhance battlefield intelligence and to improve weapons and tactics against Russian forces. At USEUCOM, we also learn new lessons every day and continue to increase our leverage of AI in multiple ways to support Ukraine.

AI technology is advancing rapidly, and our culture must adapt in parallel. We must train our workforce to use these new tools and increase experimentation in order to test and refine new technologies with Allies and partners. Significant investments will likely be needed in the future to upgrade the digital infrastructure necessary to support and leverage these new AI capabilities.

Ms. MACE. General Cavoli, as you know, in addition to the Stryker brigade, airborne brigade, and fires brigade, the EDI (European Deterrence Initiative) provides an armored brigade on rotation every 9 months. With our increased presence of U.S. forces in Europe, I'm curious to know if you think it makes sense to go back to our organizational posture from 1971 and keep an entire armored division or at least brigade in Europe, rather than rotating a tank division from the U.S. to Europe every 9 months? From a strategic standpoint do you think this would contribute to deterrence of Russian aggression or only aggravate tensions?

General CAVOLI. All forces in theater, permanent or rotational, support our combat credible force requirements and contribute to our deterrence and defense posture. Force rotations offer units the opportunity to exercise their ability to deploy and integrate within the theater while remaining at their highest state of readiness. Permanently stationed units in Europe shorten deployment timelines to Europe, provide commitments to NATO in addition to our Allies and partners, and support NATO's deterrence and defense posture.

Ms. MACE. How critical are USSOF contributions to the Ukraine effort? How critical are USSOF contributions to NATO Allies, especially in the Baltics?

General CAVOLI. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) provides support to Ukraine in coordination with the Security Assistance Group—Ukraine. SOCEUR forces, along with Allied and partner SOF, coordinate and execute the training and equipping of the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (UKR SOF) outside Ukraine. SOCEUR continues to strengthen interoperability with key Allies and partners through bilateral and multilateral exercises to build partner capacity and resilience and reinforce deterrence messaging.

Forward presence of our SOCEUR forces with NATO Allies, especially in the Baltics, provide sensing capabilities in the operational environment, enhancing our ability to understand the battlespace through improved indications and warnings.

Ms. MACE. As Congress considers the FY24 budget request and deliberates important regulatory considerations for the use of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AIML), what do you believe are the most important emergent technologies that the U.S. requires in the USEUCOM theatre to not just counter but deter hostile aggression from Russia and other adversaries?

General CAVOLI. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly changing the way wars are fought and provides new options to deter and counter aggression. It is essential we adopt and deploy this new technology responsibly and faster than our adversaries in order to maintain operational and decision advantage. AI's significance and capabilities continue to be developed through increased situational awareness, improved target identification, enhanced cybersecurity and missile defense, and logistics support. AI is essential to support the synthesis of information required to command and control forces across the globe at a speed greater than our adversaries. It is also imperative that we continue to integrate Allies and partners in the development and delivery of AI to facilitate building a modern infrastructure capable of supporting AI applications.

AI and any other emerging technology that assists us to "sense" and "make sense" of disparate U.S. and Allied data sources to achieve decision dominance and create simultaneous dilemmas (below armed conflict) significantly contribute to deterrence

in this theater. Those same technological advances create competitive advantages during a conflict.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TOKUDA

Ms. TOKUDA. How is the Department of Defense working with our NATO allies to exploit innovative and green technologies in our joint capabilities and to sustain our forces and infrastructure in the face of climate threats in Europe?

Dr. WALLANDER. For several years, the Department of Defense has been working with NATO Allies to share its climate resources, tools, and experts. The United States has worked alongside NATO Allies to incorporate a focus on climate change in NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept, adopt a Green Defense framework in 2014, and to highlight climate issues in every NATO Summit Statement since 2010. At NATO's 2022 Summit in Madrid, Allied Heads of State and Government approved the NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan with the aim of increasing Allied awareness, adapting to climate change, contributing to the mitigation of climate change, and enhancing NATO outreach to partner countries, as well as other international and regional organizations. The first Climate Change and Security Progress Report will be delivered at the 2022 Summit in Vilnius. NATO Allies have also agreed to enhance the NATO-EU strategic partnership to also focus on the impact of climate change and security.

Additionally, the Board of Directors of NATO's Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) agreed that energy resilience, among other issues, will be a priority area of focus for DIANA's work on emerging and disruptive technologies in 2023. This work will highlight the importance of energy available to sustain NATO's missions and operations. It will also help develop technological solutions to help Allies better prepare for, minimize, adapt to, and recover from anticipated and unanticipated energy disruptions.

Ms. TOKUDA. How do extreme weather events, especially heat waves and floods, affect military readiness for our troops and those of our allies? What about impacts to military infrastructure?

General CAVOLI. Extreme weather events, including heat waves and floods, affect military readiness through the creation of situations which create regional instability, such as the increase in migrant flows, state terrorism activities, and adversarial malign influence. Although Allies and partners continue to build resilience to resist and recover from extreme weather events, some nations lack the resources and training required to build mature emergency management programs. Additionally, extreme weather has the potential to affect U.S. installation energy infrastructure in Europe, to include the European power grid. Extreme weather events could cause power disruptions, energy supply shortages, and host nation security concerns that present challenges to the energy supply network. Finally, training ranges remain susceptible to erosion, flooding, and wildland fires due to limited or poor quality lands and high utilization from military forces.

Ms. TOKUDA. What additional steps can we take to enhance Baltic security, and how would you respond to the assessment made by some expert observers that additional American combat capability on the front lines of the Baltic States would be ideal for deterring Russian aggression?

General CAVOLI. USEUCOM's persistent combat credible rotational presence in the Baltic region contributes to NATO's eastern European deterrence and defense posture while directly reassuring individual Allies of the U.S. commitment to the region. These deployments, coupled with internal Baltic military modernization investments and

U.S. security cooperation programs, establish the bedrock of our partnership with Baltic Allies and directly enhance Baltic security. Maintaining a persistent U.S. presence in the region, alongside NATO's multinational Battlegroups, and continued investment in Baltic security cooperation programs serves to build partner capacity in the Baltics and deter Russian aggression.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LaLOTA

Mr. LALOTA. To date, the United States has aided Ukraine with approximately \$36.1 billion for security assistance. Meanwhile, our European allies have contributed almost less than half—around \$19 billion. Is the Administration concerned that the Europeans, relatively speaking, are not contributing as much as they should be?

Dr. WALLANDER. Although some countries do need to do more, a close look at security assistance when measured as a share of GDP shows that many European allies and partners have provided an extraordinary amount of capability to Ukraine.

European allies like Estonia and Latvia have donated aid equating to more than 1% of its GDP. Other frontline states such as Lithuania, Poland, and Finland provide a higher percentage of GDP than the United States, which is the 10th largest donor using this metric.

Allies and partners have also provided unique capabilities to Ukraine the United States does not have in its own inventories. This has included Leopard tanks, various infantry fighting vehicles, 152mm ammunition, and certain types of multiple rocket launch systems.

Further, when you consider humanitarian support, including taking in more than 8 million refugees, as well as the European costs of reducing or eliminating Russian supplied energy, our European allies and partners overall have definitely stepped up to support Ukraine.

Mr. LALOTA. To date, the United States has aided Ukraine with approximately \$36.1 billion for security assistance. Meanwhile, our European allies have contributed almost less than half—around \$19 billion. What conversation have you had with our EU allies regarding them contributing more additional aid for Ukraine and what is being discussed regarding our allies increasing their assistance?

Dr. WALLANDER. Since April 2022, Secretary Austin has led the coordination of international support for Ukraine through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which meets on almost a monthly basis. This forum continues to be critical in generating and synchronizing Ally and partner support for Ukraine, regularly bringing together some 50 countries, including European Allies and partners, to coordinate assistance, sustainment efforts, and training. In addition, the Department is in regular contact with European counterparts at multiple levels—Ukraine is regularly the number one agenda topic with our European Allies and partners. When measured as a share of GDP, the United States is in the middle of the pack when it comes to levels of support for Ukraine. Allies and partners have provided the majority of counter-unmanned aerial systems given to Ukraine, as well as the majority of 155mm artillery systems, the majority of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and roughly half the Stinger and Javelin missiles.

We at the Department will continue to work with allies and partners to find ways to augment and expand the much need support for Ukraine as it continues to push back on Russia's unprovoked war of aggression.

Mr. LALOTA. To date, the United States has aided Ukraine with approximately \$36.1 billion for security assistance. Meanwhile, our European allies have contributed almost less than half—around \$19 billion. What is the way forward to ensuring our EU allies can bolster up support for Ukraine, so it is not so heavily relied on by the U.S.?

The Ukraine Defense Contact Group, or UDCG, continues to be the key forum to raise many of these issues in a collective setting. The UDCG has demonstrated results. As a share of GDP, many European allies provide a higher level of security assistance to Ukraine, with some allies like Estonia and Latvia providing more than 1 percent of GDP. Using this metric, the United States currently ranks as the 10th largest donor. The Department will continue to have regular bilateral consultations with European counterparts at multiple levels to encourage their support for Ukraine's pressing capability requirements.

It's also important to note that our European allies and partners are contributing in ways the United States is not. For example, European countries have taken in more than 8 million refugees giving them a more peaceful life during the war in Ukraine. In addition, European countries bear the costs of reducing or eliminating Russian supplied energy. This hurts Russia directly and is yet another way in which our allies and partners in Europe support Ukraine.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. McCORMICK

Dr. McCORMICK. Currently, there are over \$300 billion in frozen Russian central bank assets in western nations, and I'm working with my colleagues to find a way to seize those assets and use them to fund our contributions to Ukraine's war effort so that Putin's the one paying for the war he started instead of the American taxpayer and our allies. Assuming we are able to access these resources, do you think this funding influx could fundamentally shift the conflict in Ukraine's favor?

Dr. WALLANDER. I would defer to the Departments of Treasury and Justice on the mechanics and considerations related to freezing or seizing Russian sovereign assets. I can say though, that over the last year, the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force, a joint collaboration of nine countries and the European Commission, has successfully blocked or frozen more than \$58 billion worth of sanctioned Russians' assets, tracked sanctioned Russian assets across the globe,

and heavily restricted sanctioned Russians from the international financial system. Although it is difficult to say what the immediate impact of such a large influx of funds may be given procurement and production timelines for new capabilities, it would certainly help support Ukraine's longer-term requirements to build a force able to deter and defend against any future Russian aggression.

Irrespective of whether these frozen assets may ultimately be used for Ukraine, the strong and consistent bipartisan support from the United States has enabled Ukraine to make key gains from Kyiv to Kharkiv to Kherson. Ukraine has time and time again demonstrated the results of this important investment with enormous resolve, grit, and ingenuity.

