[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                ENSURING SAFETY AND RELIABILITY: EXAMINING 
                 THE REAUTHORIZATION NEEDS OF THE PIPE-
                 LINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY 
                 ADMINISTRATION

=======================================================================

                                (118-57)

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES,
                        AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                              MAY 7, 2024

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
             
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     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation
                             
                               __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
56-572 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
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             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

  Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
 Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking 
              Member
Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, 
  District of Columbia               Arkansas
Grace F. Napolitano, California      Daniel Webster, Florida
Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Thomas Massie, Kentucky
John Garamendi, California           Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaian Babin, Texas
Andre Carson, Indiana                Garret Graves, Louisiana
Dina Titus, Nevada                   David Rouzer, North Carolina
Jared Huffman, California            Mike Bost, Illinois
Julia Brownley, California           Doug LaMalfa, California
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Mark DeSaulnier, California          Brian J. Mast, Florida
Salud O. Carbajal, California        Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Greg Stanton, Arizona,                 Puerto Rico
  Vice Ranking Member                Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Colin Z. Allred, Texas               Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Sharice Davids, Kansas               Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire            Vice Chairman
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts      Tracey Mann, Kansas
Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Burgess Owens, Utah
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana            Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Patrick Ryan, New York               Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska         Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Robert Menendez, New Jersey          Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon                 Eric Burlison, Missouri
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio            Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan        Brandon Williams, New York
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina   Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Vacancy                              Mike Collins, Georgia
                                     Mike Ezell, Mississippi
                                     John S. Duarte, California
                                     Aaron Bean, Florida
                                     Celeste Maloy, Utah
                                     Kevin Kiley, California
                                     Vacancy

     Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials

  Troy E. Nehls, Texas, Chairman
  Frederica S. Wilson, Florida, 
          Ranking Member
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Brian Babin, Texas
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana            David Rouzer, North Carolina
Andre Carson, Indiana                Mike Bost, Illinois
Mark DeSaulnier, California          Doug LaMalfa, California
Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina,  Pete Stauber, Minnesota
  Vice Ranking Member                Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Grace F. Napolitano, California      Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Tracey Mann, Kansas
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiady Yakym III, Indiana
Jared Huffman, California            Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Eric Burlison, Missouri
Robert Menendez, New Jersey          Brandon Williams, New York,
Vacancy                                Vice Chairman
Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio) Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
                                     John S. Duarte, California
                                     Vacancy
                                     Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)

                               CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................   vii

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Troy E. Nehls, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, 
  and Hazardous Materials, opening statement.....................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. Frederica S. Wilson, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, opening 
  statement......................................................     3
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     6
    Prepared statement...........................................     7

                               WITNESSES

Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous 
  Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of 
  Transportation, oral statement.................................    10
    Prepared statement...........................................    11
Christina Sames, Senior Vice President, Safety, Operations, 
  Engineering, and Security, American Gas Association, oral 
  statement......................................................    20
    Prepared statement...........................................    21
Robin Rorick, Vice President of Midstream Policy, American 
  Petroleum Institute, oral statement............................    24
    Prepared statement...........................................    26
Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust, oral 
  statement......................................................    31
    Prepared statement...........................................    32

                       SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Statement of Rob Benedict, Vice President, Petrochemicals and 
  Midstream, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, 
  Submitted for the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls.................    61
Letter of May 21, 2024, to Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and Hon. 
  Rick Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, and Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and Hon. 
  Frederica S. Wilson, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads, 
  Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, from Hon. Chrissy Houlahan, 
  Member of Congress, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Frederica 
  S. Wilson......................................................    62

                                APPENDIX

Questions to Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and 
  Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of 
  Transportation, from:
    Hon. Troy E. Nehls...........................................    65
    Hon. Frederica S. Wilson.....................................    70
    Hon. David Rouzer............................................    71
    Hon. Bruce Westerman.........................................    72
    Hon. Tracey Mann.............................................    73
Questions to Christina Sames, Senior Vice President, Safety, 
  Operations, Engineering, and Security, American Gas 
  Association, from:
    Hon. Troy E. Nehls...........................................    79
    Hon. Frederica S. Wilson.....................................    80
Questions to Robin Rorick, Vice President of Midstream Policy, 
  American Petroleum Institute, from Hon. Troy E. Nehls..........    81
Questions to Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety 
  Trust, from:
    Hon. Troy E. Nehls...........................................    82
    Hon. Frederica S. Wilson.....................................    82

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                              May 3, 2024

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, 
and Hazardous Materials
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and 
Hazardous Materials
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Ensuring Safety and 
Reliability: Examining the Reauthorization Needs of the 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration''
_______________________________________________________________________


                               I. PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous 
Materials of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
will meet on Tuesday, May 7, 2024, at 10:15 a.m. ET in 2167 of 
the Rayburn House Office Building to receive testimony at a 
hearing entitled, ``Ensuring Safety and Reliability: Examining 
the Reauthorization Needs of the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration.'' The hearing will discuss 
current legislative proposals to reauthorize the pipeline 
safety programs at the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) 
Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) 
and review outstanding congressional mandates at PHMSA. The 
hearing will provide Members with the opportunity to hear 
testimony from pipeline stakeholder organizations and PHMSA on 
critical pipeline safety issues at the agency and how 
reauthorization legislation can address those concerns. Members 
will receive testimony from Tristan Brown, Deputy 
Administrator, PHSMA, DOT; Christina Sames, Senior Vice 
President, Operations, Engineering & Security, American Gas 
Association; Robin Rorick, Vice President, Midstream Policy, 
American Petroleum Institute; and Bill Caram, Executive 
Director, Pipeline Safety Trust.

                             II. BACKGROUND

ABOUT PHMSA

    PHMSA was created under the Norman Y. Mineta Research and 
Special Programs Improvement Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-426) (2004 
Act). Prior to enactment of the 2004 Act, DOT's Research and 
Special Programs Administration administered the DOT's pipeline 
and hazardous materials safety programs.\1\ PHMSA's mission is 
to protect people and the environment by advancing the safe 
transportation of natural gas and hazardous liquids through 
roughly 3.4 million miles of pipelines, which account for the 
transportation of 65 percent of the energy commodities consumed 
in the United States.\2\ PHMSA also is charged with the safe 
and secure movement of over one million daily shipments of 
hazardous materials by all modes of transportation.\3\
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    \1\ Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs Improvement Act 
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-426, 118 Stat. 2423 [hereinafter the 2004 
Act].
    \2\ PHMSA, Pipeline Safety Program Budget and Grants Presentation 
(Jan. 25, 2023) (on file with Comm.) [hereinafter PHMSA Budget and 
Grants Presentation].
    \3\ See Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, 
135 Stat. 429; see also PHMSA Budget and Grants Presentation.
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    The first statute regulating pipeline safety was the 
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, which Congress amended 
in 1976.\4\ Congress added hazardous liquid pipelines to the 
statute in the Pipeline Safety Act of 1970.\5\ Recent enacted 
legislation regulating the safety of natural gas and hazardous 
liquid pipeline facilities and that reauthorize pipeline safety 
programs at PHMSA include the Protecting our Infrastructure of 
Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2016, and the Protecting 
our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety (PIPES) 
Act of 2020.\6\ The current authorization for PHMSA's pipeline 
safety programs expired at the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 on 
September 30, 2023.\7\ The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2024 (P.L. 118-42) provided PHMSA with $371.2 million in total 
budgetary resources for FY 2024.\8\ PHMSA requested $400.6 
million in its FY 2025 request.\9\
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    \4\ Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-481 
(amended by the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-477, 90 Stat. 2073).
    \5\ Pipeline Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 96-129, 93 Stat. 989.
    \6\ Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
561, 102 Stat. 2805; Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-508, 
106 Stat. 3289; Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-304, 110 Stat. 3793; Pipeline Safety Improvement 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-355, 116 Stat. 1757; The 2004 Act; 
Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement and Safety Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-468, 120 Stat. 3486; Pipelines Safety, Regulatory 
Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, 125 Stat. 
1904; the Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing 
Safety Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-183, 130 Stat. 514; Protecting Our 
Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020, Pub. L. 
No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 2210 [hereinafter PIPES Act of 2020].
    \7\ PIPES Act of 2020, supra note 6, Sec.  101.
    \8\ Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-42, 137 
Stat. 112.
    \9\ DOT, Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2025, PHMSA, available at 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2024-03/
PHMSA_FY_2025_CJ_508_
Compliant.pdf.
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    PHMSA sets Federal minimum safety standards for pipeline 
safety functions, including developing, issuing, and enforcing 
regulations for the safe transportation of natural gas 
(including liquefied natural gas) and hazardous liquids by 
pipeline through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS).\10\ 
Pipelines are one of the safest and most efficient methods of 
transportation for gas and hazardous liquids, and account for 
some of the lowest greenhouse gas emissions in the 
transportation sector.\11\ However, according to PHMSA data, in 
the past 20 years 12,722 pipeline incidents, 278 fatalities, 
and $11.4 billion in property damage have occurred.\12\ The 
Agency's regulatory programs are focused on the design, 
construction, operation, and maintenance or abandonment of 
pipeline facilities, and in the construction, operation, and 
maintenance of LNG facilities.\13\ PHMSA has jurisdiction over 
transportation-related facilities; not drilling, siting, or 
production facilities.\14\
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    \10\ PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/offices/office-pipeline-safety (last 
updated Dec. 13, 2018).
    \11\ PHMSA, Pipeline Safety Regulations, available at https://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/SafetyStandards.htm; PHMSA, PHMSA Climate 
Considerations, (last updated Jul. 24, 2023), available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/planning-and-analytics/environmental-policy-and-
justice/phmsa-climate-considerations.
    \12\ PHMSA, Serious Incident 20 Year Trends, (last updated Dec. 11, 
2023), available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/
pipeline/pipeline-incident-20-year-trends.
    \13\ PHMSA, Pipeline Safety Regulations, available at https://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/SafetyStandards.htm?nocache=8847.
    \14\ See PHMSA, PHMSA Regulations, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulations (last updated May 5, 2021); see also Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Commission, Natural Gas Pipelines, available at 
https://www.ferc.gov/industries-data/natural-gas/overview/natural-gas-
pipelines (last updated Feb. 10, 2021); see also Library of Cong., Oil 
and Gas Industry: A Research Guide, available at https://
guides.loc.gov/oil-and-gas-industry/laws/agencies.
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H.R. 6494, THE PROMOTING INNOVATION IN PIPELINE EFFICIENCY AND SAFETY 
                    (PIPES) ACT OF 2023

    Prior to introduction of the PIPES Act of 2023, the 
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials 
held a hearing on March 8, 2023, entitled, ``Pipeline Safety: 
Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and Examining 
Future Safety Needs.'' \15\ The hearing reviewed PHMSA's 
progress on implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and 
examined future needs in pipeline safety. In the Spring of 
2023, the Transportation and Infrastructure (T&I) Committee 
solicited input from Members of the Committee and pipeline 
safety stakeholders to help inform the development of the 
bill.\16\ The T&I Committee received 89 requests from 23 
Members of the Committee and over 100 requests from 
stakeholders.
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    \15\ Pipeline Safety: Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act of 
2020 and Examining Future Safety Needs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on 
Transp. and Infrastructure, 118th Cong. (Mar. 8, 2023).
    \16\ Email from Staff, H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure to 
Comm. Legislative Assistants (Mar. 10, 2023, 9:18 a.m. EST) (on file 
with Comm.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On November 29, 2023, Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO-6), Ranking 
Member Rick Larsen (D-WA-2), Subcommittee on Railroads, 
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Chairman Troy Nehls (R-TX-
22), and Ranking Member Donald M. Payne, Jr. (D-NJ-10) 
introduced H.R. 6494, the Promoting Innovation in Pipeline 
Efficiency and Safety (PIPES) Act of 2023, which reauthorizes 
the pipeline safety activities at PHMSA and provides the 
legislative foundation for the continued safety improvement of 
the United States natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline 
network.\17\
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    \17\ H.R. 6494, the Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and 
Safety (PIPES) Act of 2023 [hereinafter PIPES Act of 2023].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 6, 2023, the T&I Committee held a full 
Committee markup to consider the PIPES Act of 2023 and reported 
the bill out of Committee by voice vote.

OTHER LEGISLATIVE ACTION

    The House Committee on Energy and Commerce (E&C Committee) 
shares jurisdiction of pipeline safety reauthorization 
legislation with the T&I Committee pursuant to House Rule 
X(1)(f), which gives E&C jurisdiction over the regulation of 
energy resources, conservation of energy resources, and 
National energy policy generally.\18\
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    \18\ See Rules of the House of Representatives, 118th Cong., 
(2023), Rule X(1)(f). and Rule X(1)(r).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 25, 2023, E&C Committee Chair Cathy McMorris 
Rodgers and Energy, Climate, and Grid Security Subcommittee 
Chair Jeff Duncan released a discussion draft of pipeline 
safety reauthorization legislation, the Pipeline Safety, 
Modernization, and Expansion Act.\19\ On January 18, 2024, the 
Energy, Climate, and Grid Security Subcommittee held a 
legislative hearing on the discussion draft, and on March 6, 
2024, the Subcommittee held a markup, including the discussion 
draft bill.\20\ The discussion draft bill was favorably 
reported to the full Committee by a roll call vote of 14 yeas 
to 10 nays.\21\
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    \19\ H. Comm on Energy and Commerce, Chairs Rodgers and Duncan 
Unveil Draft Legislation to Modernize and Expand U.S. Pipeline 
Infrastructure, available at https://energycommerce.house.gov/posts/
chairs-rodgers-and-duncan-unveil-draft-legislation-to-modernize-and-
expand-u-s-pipeline-infrastructure.
    \20\ Fueling America's Economy: Legislation to Improve Safety an 
Expand U.S. Pipeline Infrastructure Before the Subcomm. on Energy 
Climate and Grid Security of the H. Comm on Energy and Commerce, 118th 
Cong. (Jan. 18, 2024); Memorandum from Majority Staff, H. Comm on 
Energy and Commerce to Members of the Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, 
and Grid Security (March 4, 2024), available at https://
energycommerce.house.gov/events/energy-climate-and-grid-security-
subcommittee-markup-of-six-bills.
    \21\ United States House of Representatives Committee Repository, 
Markup of Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, and Grid Security, available 
at https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/
ByEvent.aspx?EventID=116937.
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    On March 13, 2024, Energy, Climate, and Grid Security 
Subcommittee Chair Jeff Duncan introduced H.R. 7655, the 
Pipeline Safety, Modernization, and Expansion Act of 2024. On 
March 20, 2024, E&C held a full Committee markup, including 
H.R. 7655.\22\ The bill was favorably reported out of Committee 
by a roll call vote of 27 yeas to 18 nays.\23\
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    \22\ Full Committee Markup of 28 Bills: Markup Before H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 118th Cong. (March 20, 2024), available at https:/
/energycommerce.house.gov/events/full-committee-markup-of-28-bills.
    \23\ United States House of Representatives Committee Repository, 
Markup of Committee on Energy Commerce Markup, available at https://
docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20240320/117014/HMKP-118-IF00-20240320-
SD023.pdf.
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    In the Senate, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation (Commerce Committee) has legislative 
jurisdiction over pipeline safety at PHMSA.\24\ The Commerce 
Committee has yet to introduce any legislation on pipeline 
safety reauthorization.
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    \24\ Standing Rules of the Senate Rule, (Revised Jan. 24, 2013), 
Rule XXV.
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         III. H.R. 6494, THE PIPES ACT OF 2023: KEY PROVISIONS

    The PIPES Act of 2023 reauthorizes PHMSA's Office of 
Pipeline Safety for four years through FY 2027.\25\ The bill 
supports the reliability and safety of American energy 
infrastructure and PHMSA's pipeline safety mission through 
rulemaking direction, studies, and programs that increase 
pipeline safety, transparency, and stakeholder engagement. 
These provisions will improve the performance and safety record 
of the United States natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline 
network.
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    \25\ PIPES Act of 2023, supra note 17, at Sec.  2.
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SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS AND SUPPORTING PHMSA'S MISSION

    The pipeline safety program at PHMSA is responsible for 
carrying out a National program to ensure the safe, reliable, 
and environmentally-sound operation of the Nation's natural gas 
and hazardous liquid pipeline transportation system.\26\ The 
PIPES Act of 2023 supports and improves upon these efforts. 
Section 24 of the bill directs PHMSA to establish a voluntary 
information sharing system that encourages pipeline operators 
and stakeholders to share pipeline safety data through a 
confidential platform to be analyzed and reported, so that 
pipeline safety lessons learned can be shared with 
stakeholders.\27\
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    \26\ PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/offices/office-pipeline-safety (last 
updated Dec. 13, 2018).
    \27\ PIPES Act of 2023, supra note 17, Sec.  24.
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    The bill also works to reduce the number of excavation 
damage incidents, which, according to PHMSA data, in the past 
20 years accounted for over 1,400 incidents, 66 fatalities, and 
$665.5 million in property damage to pipelines, representing 11 
percent of all pipeline incidents.\28\ Section 18 of the PIPES 
Act of 2023 updates the assessment criteria for State Damage 
Prevention programs and requires adoption of leading practices 
for state one-call programs.\29\ These best practices include 
requiring states to limit exemptions to one-call program 
participation and increasing the use of commercially available 
technology to locate underground facilities.\30\ The bill 
ensures PHMSA and state pipeline safety programs have necessary 
resources to conduct pipeline safety oversight, including $56 
million over four years for increases to state pipeline safety 
program budgets.\31\
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    \28\ PHMSA, Serious Incident 20 Year Trends, (last updated Dec. 11, 
2023), available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/
pipeline/pipeline-incident-20-year-trends.
    \29\ PIPES Act of 2023, supra note 17, Sec.  18.
    \30\ Id.
    \31\ Id. at Sec.  2.
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INCREASES TRANSPARENCY

    The PIPES Act of 2023 works to improve pipeline safety by 
promoting information sharing among pipeline safety 
stakeholders. It requires PHMSA to review industry safety 
standards every four years and incorporate into existing 
regulations as needed and improves public access to such 
standards.\32\ Section 7 of the bill directs PHMSA to report on 
its inspection and enforcement priorities, as well as report on 
the number of inspections completed and violations found.\33\ 
Section 8 of the bill requires PHMSA to provide notification to 
Congress of the reasons when it does not to follow the 
recommendations of the external technical safety standards 
advisory committees.\34\ Further, Section 29 directs PHMSA to 
assess how pipeline operators engage and share information with 
the public and state or local emergency response organizations 
and issue updated guidance if necessary.\35\
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    \32\ Id. at Sec.  6.
    \33\ Id. at Sec.  7.
    \34\ Id. at Sec.  8.
    \35\ Id. at Sec.  29.
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EMERGING FUELS AND TECHNOLOGIES

    PHMSA is responsible for setting and enforcing safety 
standards for the safe operation of the Nation's gas and 
hazardous liquid pipelines, including those that may transport 
new and emerging fuels, such as hydrogen and carbon dioxide 
pipelines.\36\ As such, the PIPES Act of 2023 supports these 
efforts so PHMSA can provide efficient regulatory oversight of 
the transportation of any such fuels. Section 20 of the bill 
requires the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to study 
existing natural gas pipelines systems that blend hydrogen at a 
volume greater than five percent and use that information to 
inform rulemaking if necessary.\37\ Additionally, Section 14 of 
the bill requires PHMSA to study the potential and existing use 
of pipelines constructed with composite materials to safety 
transport hydrogen and hydrogen blended with natural gas, and 
issue a rulemaking allowing for the use of such materials 
following the completion of the study.\38\ Lastly, the bill 
directs PHSMA to update its regulations that govern the 
transportation of carbon dioxide, including the requirement 
that operators utilize dispersion modeling in high consequence 
areas.\39\
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    \36\ 49 C.F.R. Sec.  100-199 (2024).
    \37\ PIPES Act of 2023, supra note 17, Sec.  20.
    \38\ Id. at Sec.  14.
    \39\ Id. at Sec.  25.
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                        IV. OUTSTANDING MANDATES

    Pipeline safety reauthorization legislation provides 
legislative authority to the pipeline safety programs at PHMSA 
and typically includes Congressional mandates to issue 
regulations to improve pipeline safety. PHMSA has experienced 
delays meeting the mandates included in previous pipeline 
safety reauthorization laws.\40\
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    \40\ PHMSA, PIPES Act 2020 Web Chart, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2024-03/
2024%20March%20PIPES%20Act%20Chart.pdf.
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    The PIPES Act of 2023, permanently continues the 
requirement that PHMSA publicly post the status of each 
outstanding mandate and includes authorization increases to 
address PHMSA's workforce needs.\41\ The current status of 
outstanding mandates can be found here: https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/legislative-mandates/pipes-act-web-chart. At 
the time of this SSM's publication, PHMSA has five outstanding 
rulemaking mandates from previous reauthorization laws, with 
the longest outstanding mandate originating from the Pipelines 
Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011.\42\ 
Of the five outstanding items, PHMSA has issued two proposed 
rules, and plans to do so for the remaining three by the end of 
the year.\43\ The PIPES Act of 2023 includes two provisions for 
PHMSA to address class location and idled pipeline 
rulemakings.\44\
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    \41\ PIPES Act of 2023, supra note 17, Sec. Sec.  4, 5.
    \42\ PHMSA, PIPES Act Web Chart, (last updated Mar. 7, 2024), 
available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/legislative-mandates/pipes-act-
web-chart.
    \43\ Id.
    \44\ PIPES Act of 2023, supra note 17, Sec. Sec.  11 and Section 
12; see also PIPES Act of 2020, supra note 6.
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                              V. WITNESSES
      Mr. Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, United States Department of 
Transportation
      Ms. Christina Sames, Senior Vice President, Safety, 
Operations, Engineering, and Security, American Gas Association
      Mr. Robin Rorick, Vice President, Midstream Policy, 
American Petroleum Institute
      Mr. Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust
                                ADDENDUM
    Section-by-section of the House Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure-passed pipeline safety reauthorization bill, the PIPES 
Act of 2023.
Sec. 1. Short Title; Table of Contents; Definition.
    This Act may be cited as the ``Promoting Innovation in Pipeline 
Efficiency and Safety Act of 2023'' or the ``PIPES Act of 2023''. This 
section also contains the table of contents.
Sec. 2. Authorization of Appropriations.
    This section authorizes $1.065 billion over four years in total 
budgetary resources for pipeline safety programs administered by the 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). PHMSA 
is authorized to collect fees paid by operators and owners of pipelines 
and underground natural gas storage facilities. Of these total 
budgetary resources, this section authorizes the following amounts over 
four years: $804 million for the pipeline safety programs, which is 
funded by fees; $123 million from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund 
for safety programs; $130 million from the General Fund for PHMSA's 
operating expenses; $8 million from the General Fund for the State 
Damage Prevention program and authorizes set-asides for recruitment and 
retention and several grant programs.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
    This section defines terms referenced in the underlying bill 
applicable to pipeline safety, pursuant to Section 60101 of title 49, 
United States Code.
Sec. 4. Workforce Development.
    This section authorizes an increase in the number of PHMSA 
employees with certain subject matter expertise to develop and 
implement pipeline safety policies and regulations and fulfill 
congressional rulemaking mandates. This section also includes a one-
year reporting requirement on PHMSA's progress and challenges to hiring 
and retaining employees, and any additional workforce needs.
Sec. 5. Regulatory Updates.
    This section directs the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to 
publish a status update on the completion of outstanding congressional 
mandates on PHMSA's website every 30 days.
Sec. 6. Incorporation By Reference.
    This section directs the Secretary to review and update as 
necessary, every four years, incorporated industry safety standards 
that have been partially or fully adopted as part of the Federal 
pipeline safety regulatory program. This section also requires adopted 
industry standards to be made publicly available, as well as a list of 
standards considered and PHMSA's reasoning for not adopting a standard. 
Further, it directs the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to 
review and report on compliance with the public access requirements of 
this section.
Sec. 7. Inspection Activity Reporting.
    This section directs PHMSA to make a report on inspection and 
enforcement priorities of the Office of Pipeline Safety for fiscal year 
(FY) 2024 through FY 2027 publicly available and open for public 
comment.
Sec. 8. Technical Safety Standards Committees.
    This section requires PHMSA to hold two meetings annually of the 
Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) and the Liquid Pipeline Advisory 
Committee (LPAC).
Sec. 9. Sense of Congress on PHMSA Engagement Prior to Rulemaking 
        Activities.
    This section encourages the Department of Transportation (DOT) to 
engage with pipeline stakeholder groups, including state pipeline 
safety programs certified by PHMSA, during the pre-drafting stages of 
rulemaking activities.
Sec. 10. Office of Public Engagement.
    This section designates the existing Community Liaison Services as 
the Office of Public Engagement and assigns specific duties to engage 
with the public, government officials, public safety organizations, and 
pipeline operators, and assist with inquiries regarding pipeline safety 
best practices and regulations. The Office will also promote the 
adoption and increased use of safety programs.
Sec. 11. Class Location Changes.
    This section requires the Secretary to finalize a rule on class 
location changes due to population shifts around pipelines within 90 
days of enactment.
Sec. 12. Pipeline Operating Status.
    This section requires the Secretary to advance a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM) establishing safety requirements for idled pipelines 
within 180 days of enactment.
Sec. 13. Rights-of-Way Management.
    This section provides pipeline operators the opportunity to 
voluntarily develop alternative methods of maintaining rights-of-way 
for pipelines and pipeline facilities, including methods that 
incorporate conservation or habitat management practices for 
pollinators, that ensure equivalent levels of pipeline safety.
Sec. 14. Study on Composite Materials for Pipelines.
    This section requires the DOT to complete a study within 18 months 
on the safety of composite pipeline material for the transportation of 
hydrogen and hydrogen blended with natural gas and issue a regulation 
allowing for use of such pipeline material not later than 18 months 
following the study's completion and a public meeting.
Sec. 15. Competitive Academic Agreement Program.
    This section improves the ability of small and mid-sized 
institutions to participate in PHMSA's Competitive Academic Agreement 
Program (CAAP) grant program, which supports student academic research 
on pipeline safety challenges, by permitting PHMSA to waive the current 
cost share requirement for these institutions.
Sec. 16. Geohazard Mitigation Study.
    This section requires a GAO study on Federal and state requirements 
relating to geohazards, including seismicity, land subsidence, erosion, 
and other potential natural hazards that could impact pipeline safety.
Sec. 17. Special Permit Program.
    This section requires that any terms placed on safety waivers 
(special permits) are specific to the pipeline safety regulation being 
waived and establishes timelines for the consideration of special 
permit applications. It also mandates a report to Congress on the 
status of safety waivers sought under the special permit program and 
directs the GAO to provide a report on PHMSA's implementation of this 
provision.
Sec. 18. Excavation Damage Prevention.
    This section updates PHMSA's assessment criteria for state damage 
prevention programs and describes additional leading practices state 
one-call programs shall implement to prevent excavation damage to 
pipelines and other underground utilities and requires PHMSA to report 
to Congress on such implementation.
Sec. 19. Integrity Management Study.
    This section requires a National Academies study on the 
effectiveness of integrity management regulations and their impact on 
safety.
Sec. 20. Hydrogen Study.
    This section directs the GAO to study existing natural gas pipeline 
systems in the United States and overseas that are blending hydrogen 
into natural gas pipeline systems that can inform a potential future 
rulemaking related to the safety of hydrogen-natural gas blending.
Sec. 21. Penalty for Causing a Defect in or Disrupting Operation of 
        Pipeline Infrastructure.
    This section extends existing criminal penalties to those who 
knowingly and willfully damage a pipe, pump, compressor, or valve under 
construction or disrupt the operation of a pipeline by the unauthorized 
turning of a valve.
Sec. 22. Civil Penalties.
    This section increases the maximum civil penalty for a pipeline 
safety violation by 25 percent to $2,500,000.
Sec. 23. Liquefied Natural Gas Regulatory Coordination.
    This section creates a working group of Federal agencies with 
regulatory jurisdiction and oversight of liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
facilities to assess each agency's area of jurisdiction to ensure 
safety regulations are in the public interest, and to reduce or 
eliminate duplicative oversight of LNG facilities.
Sec. 24. Pipeline Safety Voluntary Information-Sharing System.
    This section establishes a confidential voluntary information 
sharing (VIS) system to encourage the sharing of pipeline safety data 
and information and authorizes $31 million over four years for this 
purpose. This section also requires PHMSA to issue a report on the 
effectiveness of the VIS and recommendations to ensure sufficient 
funding to continue VIS activities beyond the initial stand-up period 
for the program.
Sec. 25. Carbon Dioxide Pipelines.
    This section requires the Secretary to complete a rulemaking to 
establish minimum safety standards for the transportation and temporary 
storage incidental to transportation of carbon dioxide in a gaseous 
state. This provision also makes conforming changes to the United 
States Code to facilitate the regulation of carbon dioxide pipelines.
Sec. 26. Opportunity for Formal Hearing.
    This section provides operators the opportunity to obtain a formal 
hearing before a DOT Administrative Law Judge on certain notice of 
probable violation enforcement actions. This section also requires 
publishing protocols for hearings that are open to the public.
Sec. 27. State Pipeline Safety Grants Reporting.
    This section requires the Secretary to include a summary of funding 
for the preceding three fiscal years and estimated funding necessary to 
fund 80 percent of the costs of personnel, equipment, and activities 
for the State Pipeline Safety Grant program in the agency's annual 
budget estimate.
Sec. 28. Inspection of In-Service Breakout Tanks.
    This section permits the Secretary to amend safety regulations to 
allow for risk-based inspections that would determine the schedule of 
inspection of storage tanks based on safety risk, if the Secretary 
determines an equivalent level of safety will be provided.
Sec. 29. Disclosure of Safety Information Assessment.
    This section directs the Secretary to assess how pipeline facility 
owners and operators engage with, and provide safety information to, 
the public and state or local emergency response organizations. It also 
allows the Secretary to issue guidance to improve pipeline safety 
information sharing with the public and other interested parties.
Sec. 30. Assessment of Certain Pipeline Safety Definitions.
    This section directs the Secretary to evaluate the definitions of 
buildings and occupied outdoor facilities, to determine whether the 
definition of the occupancy counts of these areas should be revised. It 
further provides the Secretary with the ability to issue regulations to 
modify the definitions.
Sec. 31. Report Assessing the Costs of Pipeline Failures.
    This section requires a National Academies study on the direct and 
indirect costs related to the failure or shutdown of a pipeline 
facility.
Sec. 32. Study on Localized Emergency Alert System for Pipeline 
        Facilities Incidents.
    This section directs the GAO to issue a study on the need and 
ability to create a localized emergency alert system to provide the 
public with alerts related to pipeline accidents or incidents.
Sec. 33. Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure.
    This section defers PHMSA enforcement of regulations that require 
gas transmission pipeline operators to reconfirm the maximum allowable 
operating pressure of previously tested pipelines for 180 days until 
the report of a working group's recommendations on the minimum pressure 
and contemporaneous records that are sufficient to confirm the material 
strength of a pipeline and any subsequent rulemaking or technical 
correction to previous rulemaking.

 
ENSURING SAFETY AND RELIABILITY: EXAMINING THE REAUTHORIZATION NEEDS OF 
       THE PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

                              ----------                              


                          TUESDAY, MAY 7, 2024

                  House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous 
                                         Materials,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:21 a.m. in 
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Troy E. Nehls 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Nehls. The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and 
Hazardous Materials will come to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that the Members not on the 
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 
today's hearing and ask questions.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    And as a reminder, if Members want to insert a document 
into the record, please email it to DocumentsTI@mail.house.gov.
    Before we discuss today's hearing, I would like to take a 
moment to remember our colleague, Congressman Donald Payne, 
Jr., who passed away a few weeks ago. It was a privilege to 
work with Donald as my counterpart on this subcommittee. It was 
clear to all who knew him how strong his commitment to public 
service was and to his constituents. I am grateful for the 
opportunity to have worked alongside Donald, especially with 
his leadership in putting together our bipartisan pipeline 
safety legislation. He will be deeply missed here on the 
committee, and I want to send my condolences and prayers to his 
family, friends, and staff as they deal with this great loss.
    I will now recognize myself for the purpose of an opening 
statement for 5 minutes.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TROY E. NEHLS OF TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, 
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

    Mr. Nehls. In today's hearing, we will examine the need to 
reauthorize the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration, or PHMSA, including providing it new direction 
and authority over emerging energy sources.
    This past fall, myself, Chairman Graves, Ranking Member 
Larsen, and Ranking Member Payne introduced H.R. 6494, the 
Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety Act of 
2023, or the PIPES Act of 2023. Last December, the committee 
passed H.R. 6494 out of committee on a bipartisan basis. In 
crafting this bill, the committee solicited input from a wide 
range of parties and, in turn, received about 90 priorities, 90 
of them, from Members and over 100 requests from pipeline 
safety stakeholders. I am grateful for the support from members 
of this committee in putting together this important piece of 
bipartisan legislation.
    In our country, roughly 3.3 million miles of onshore 
pipelines safely and efficiently carry natural gas, crude, 
hydrogen, hazardous liquids, and other energy sources vital for 
our Nation's energy independence, making it of the utmost 
importance for Congress to ensure PHMSA is focused on its core 
mission of advancing the safe transportation of these 
resources.
    The PIPES Act of 2023 reauthorizes PHMSA for 4 years and 
provides the necessary resources and direction for the agency 
to fulfill its pipeline safety oversight responsibilities in an 
efficient and effective manner. The bill contains several 
provisions to accomplish this, including an authorization for 
additional pipeline safety technical experts to complete 
outstanding congressional mandates.
    Over the past 20 years, more than 1,400 excavation damage 
incidents have occurred. H.R. 6494 includes measures to 
strengthen State programs to reduce the number of excavation 
damage incidents, promoting the public's safety.
    The PIPES Act of 2023 will also support PHMSA's efforts to 
oversee the safe transportation of new and emerging fuels by 
directing PHMSA to update regulations for the safe 
transportation of carbon dioxide and to study the use of 
hydrogen blending in natural gas. These and other provisions in 
the PIPES Act of 2023 will ensure the safety and reliability of 
the United States pipeline network and the transportation of 
our critical energy resources.
    It is more important than ever for PHMSA to receive a 
regular reauthorization from Congress. This will provide both 
the agency and regulated community much needed certainty in 
Federal pipeline safety policy and also provide legislative 
direction to addressing pressing areas of concern in pipeline 
safety.
    I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and 
sharing their perspectives on pipeline safety reauthorization 
and what it means for PHMSA, the industry, and the communities 
where the transportation of our energy products take place.
    I will also note that my colleagues on the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee have also passed pipeline safety 
reauthorization legislation through committee based on their 
jurisdiction. Despite such action in the House, we have yet to 
see any movement in the Senate from Leader Schumer and his 
majority. As the House has shown, it is possible to legislate 
in a bipartisan manner in the name of pipeline safety. I call 
on the Senate to follow suit, and I hope to work with them in 
the near future.
    [Mr. Nehls' prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Hon. Troy E. Nehls, a Representative in Congress 
   from the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Railroads, 
                   Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
    Today's hearing will examine the need to reauthorize the Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, including providing it 
new direction and authority over emerging energy sources. This past 
fall, myself, Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and Ranking 
Member Payne introduced H.R. 6494, the Promoting Innovation in Pipeline 
Efficiency and Safety (PIPES) Act of 2023.
    Last December, the Committee passed H.R. 6494 out of Committee on a 
bipartisan basis. In crafting this bill, the Committee solicited input 
from a wide range of parties, and in turn received about 90 priorities 
from Members and over 100 requests from pipeline safety stakeholders. I 
am grateful for the support from Members of this committee in putting 
together this important piece of bipartisan legislation.
    In our country, roughly 3.3 million miles of onshore pipelines 
safely and efficiently carry natural gas, crude, hydrogen, hazardous 
liquids, and other energy sources vital for our nation's energy 
independence, making it of utmost importance for Congress to ensure 
PHMSA is focused on its core mission of advancing the safe 
transportation of these resources.
    The PIPES Act of 2023 reauthorizes PHMSA for four years and 
provides the necessary resources and direction for the agency to 
fulfill its pipeline safety oversight responsibilities in an efficient 
and effective manner. The bill contains several provisions to 
accomplish this, including an authorization for additional pipeline 
safety technical experts to complete outstanding congressional 
mandates.
    Over the past 20 years, more than 1,400 excavation damage incidents 
have occurred. Therefore, H.R. 6494 includes measures to strengthen 
state programs to reduce the number of excavation damage incidents, 
promoting the public's safety.
    The PIPES Act of 2023 will also support PHMSA's efforts to oversee 
the safe transportation of new and emerging fuels by directing PHMSA to 
update regulations for the safe transportation of carbon dioxide and to 
study the use of hydrogen-blending in natural gas. These and other 
provisions in the PIPES Act of 2023 will ensure the safety and 
reliability of the U.S. pipeline network and the transportation of our 
critical energy resources.
    It is more important than ever that PHMSA receive a regular 
reauthorization from Congress to provide both the agency and regulated 
community much needed certainty in federal pipeline safety policy and 
to provide legislative direction to address pressing areas of concern 
in pipeline safety.
    I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and for sharing 
their perspectives on pipeline safety reauthorization and what it means 
for PHMSA, industry, and the communities where the transportation of 
our energy products takes place.
    I will also note that my colleagues on the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee have also passed pipeline safety reauthorization 
legislation through Committee based on their jurisdiction. Despite such 
action in the House, we have yet to see any movement in the Senate from 
Leader Schumer and his majority. As the House has shown, it is possible 
to legislate in a bipartisan manner in the name of pipeline safety. I 
call on the Senate to follow suit and hope to work with them in the 
near future.

    Mr. Nehls. I will yield back and now recognize Ranking 
Member Wilson for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

   OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FREDERICA S. WILSON OF FLORIDA, 
   RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND 
                      HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

    Ms. Wilson of Florida. Thank you, Chair Nehls, for holding 
this hearing today. And thank you, Ranking Member Larsen, for 
your faith in me.
    It is with a heavy heart that I take on the role of ranking 
member of this subcommittee. Congressman Donald Payne, Jr., was 
not just a colleague, but a cherished friend whose legacy I am 
dedicated to honoring and advancing. His exemplary leadership 
on the railroad subcommittee sets a standard of excellence that 
I am committed to upholding and building upon.
    For many years, we were soldiers in the army to uplift 
Black men and boys, whether that be Trayvon Martin or fighting 
for health disparities among Black men and boys.
    He fought the good fight to bring back our girls from 
Africa. I sat next to him in committee for years, and we were 
table-mates every year at the Congressional Black Caucus gala, 
and he shared many memories with me.
    He was so proud to be the father of triplets and to let me 
know that he married a Florida girl.
    I will miss him, and I am committed to honoring his legacy 
and continuing his work on this committee.
    As we all know, part of his mission was to ensure the 
safety of all people, and he had a goal of never wanting to 
miss a vote, regardless of his health, and speaking every day 
on the floor to honor his constituents. He loved his 
constituents. He was a man for all seasons, and we will miss 
him dearly.
    Before coming to Congress, I was a school principal, and 
nothing is more important to me than the safety and education 
of our children. I do not want to see any pipeline incidents, 
but I am particularly concerned when they occur at or near a 
school. At least two recent incidents in the last year happened 
at or near schools. One was near an elementary school in 
Conway, Washington, and another was at a school in the 
Mississippi Delta in Merigold, Mississippi.
    Yes, believe it or not, just last month in Merigold, there 
was a pipeline explosion at Hayes Cooper Center, a pre-K 
through eighth-grade school. Although no children were injured, 
two school staff members were injured and taken to the hospital 
for treatment.
    I want to know how pipeline operators work with communities 
and schools to prevent such incidents. Are they working with 
the impacted schools for additional tutoring or student support 
for those children's lost instruction time? What about their 
mental health? How does having to evacuate impact students' 
learning?
    With regard to the PIPES 2023 bill, I supported the bill 
because it has essential provisions that Mr. Payne championed, 
and I associate myself with his work on these efforts. Among 
them, the bill includes increased funding for the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to support the Office 
of Pipeline Safety for its critical safety mission. I am proud 
that this bipartisan pipeline safety bill strongly focuses on 
pipeline safety.
    This bill also makes changes to the Competitive Academic 
Agreement Program to provide funding for academic research and 
develop the pipeline safety workforce of the future. The 
changes will help most Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities and other minority-serving institutions 
participate in the program. These are positive changes, and I 
urge Congress to adopt them.
    Lastly, I want to say to Mayor Kaag of West Reading, who is 
leading her city through the aftermath of the deadliest 
pipeline explosion the country experienced in 2023, thank you 
for watching today. I am so sorry for your loss. Seven people 
died after showing up for work to make chocolate, 10 people 
were injured, and I understand in your volunteer firefighting 
capacity, you also showed up to help with the immediate 
emergency response. We hear you, we see you, and we will never 
forget.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I 
yield back my time.
    [Ms. Wilson of Florida's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Frederica S. Wilson, a Representative in 
Congress from the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
             Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
    Thank you, Chair Nehls, for holding this hearing today and thank 
you, Ranking Member Larsen, for your faith in me.
    It is with a heavy heart that I take on the role of Ranking Member 
of this Subcommittee.
    Congressman Donald Payne, Jr. was not just a colleague but a 
cherished friend whose legacy I am dedicated to honoring and advancing. 
His exemplary leadership on the Railroads Subcommittee sets a standard 
of excellence that I am committed to upholding and building upon.
    For many years, we were soldiers in the army to uplift Black men 
and boys, whether that be Trayvon Martin or fighting for health 
disparities among Black men and boys.
    He fought the good fight to bring back our girls from Africa. I sat 
next to him in committee for years and we were table mates every year 
at the Congressional Black Caucus gala, and he shared many memories 
with me.
    He was so proud to be the father of triplets and to let me know he 
married a Florida girl.
    I will miss him, and I am committed to honoring his legacy and 
continuing his work on this committee.
    As we all know, part of his mission was to ensure the safety of all 
people, and he had a goal of never wanting to miss a vote, regardless 
of his health.
    And speaking on the floor every day to honor his constituents. He 
loved his constituents, and he was a man for all seasons, and we will 
miss him dearly.
    Before coming to Congress, I was a school principal, and nothing is 
more important to me than the safety and education of our students.
    I do not want to see any pipeline incidents, but I am particularly 
concerned when they occur at or near a school.
    At least two recent incidents in the last year happened at or near 
schools--one was near an elementary school in Conway, Washington, and 
another was at a school in the Mississippi Delta in Merigold, 
Mississippi.
    Just last month in Merigold, there was a pipeline explosion at 
Hayes Cooper Center, a pre-K through 8th grade school. Although no 
children were injured, two school staff members were injured and taken 
to the hospital for treatment.
    I want to know how pipeline operators are working with communities 
and schools to prevent any such incidents. Are they working with the 
impacted schools for additional tutoring or student support for those 
children's lost instruction time? What about their mental health? How 
does having to evacuate impact students' learning?
    With regard to the PIPES 2023 bill, I supported the bill because it 
has important provisions that Mr. Payne championed, and I associate 
myself with his work on these efforts.
    Among them, the bill includes increased funding for the Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to support the Office of 
Pipeline Safety for its important safety mission. I am proud that this 
bipartisan pipeline safety bill has a strong focus on pipeline safety.
    The bill also makes changes to the competitive academic agreement 
program to provide funding for academic research and develop the 
pipeline safety workforce of the future. The changes will help most 
historically black colleges and universities and other minority-serving 
institutions participate in the program.
    These are positive changes, and I urge Congress to adopt the 
measures.
    Lastly, I want to say to Mayor Kaag of West Reading, who is leading 
her city through the aftermath of the deadliest pipeline explosion the 
country experienced in 2023, thank you for watching. I am sorry for 
your loss. Seven people died after showing up for work to make 
chocolate, 10 people were injured, and I understand in your volunteer 
firefighting capacity, you also showed up to help with the immediate 
emergency response.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and I yield back my 
time.

    Mr. Nehls. The gentlelady yields. I now recognize the 
ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Larsen, for 5 minutes 
for an opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING 
     MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Chair Nehls, for 
calling this hearing on pipeline safety and for your kind words 
about our colleague and friend, Representative Donald M. Payne, 
Jr. And we continue to mourn today after his death just 2 weeks 
ago.
    Don was a leader on the PIPES Act of 2023 that our 
committee voted unanimously to advance in December. He strongly 
supported ensuring PHMSA and the State pipeline safety programs 
have the funding they need to do their work. Don also helped 
lay the groundwork for strong rail funding in the Bipartisan 
Infrastructure Law. Because of Don's work, we will see 
replacements of century-old rail bridges and tunnels on the 
Northeast Corridor, including the suite of Gateway projects.
    He was a friend and advocate for rail workers, supporting 
their bid for sick leave, higher wages, and improved working 
conditions. His efforts helped support a historic agreement 
that would strengthen the safety and quality of life for 
essential rail workers. Don's work to advance rail safety 
legislation, especially in the wake of the derailment in East 
Palestine, will remain an important part of his legacy that 
Congress must continue to realize.
    On June 10, 1999, an Olympic pipeline explosion in 
Bellingham, Washington, in my district claimed the lives of two 
10-year-old boys and an 18-year-old young man. The explosion 
also released 237,000 gallons of gasoline into a creek that 
flowed through Whatcom Falls Park in Bellingham. This explosion 
at the time spurred my commitment, which has been steadfast for 
over 20 years, to the highest level of pipeline safety. For my 
entire tenure in Congress, I have fought to reduce the risk of 
pipeline incidents, promote transparency of pipeline safety 
information for local communities, and increase accountability 
for pipeline operators.
    According to PHMSA data, in the past 20 years, there have 
been 12,722 pipeline incidents claiming 278 lives and causing 
$11.4 billion in property damage. So, while we work on the 
PIPES 2023 bill, the pipeline industry continues to experience 
deadly accidents causing damage to the environment.
    According to the Pipeline Safety Trust, 2023 was the 
deadliest year for pipelines in two decades.
    On March 24, 2023, a UGI pipeline explosion in West 
Reading, Pennsylvania, killed 7 people, injured 11, displaced 3 
families from a neighboring apartment building, and evacuated 
many more from the area.
    In November 2023, as well, Third Coast Infrastructure 
released 1.1 million gallons of crude oil from an underwater 
pipeline into an ``unusually sensitive area'' in the Gulf of 
Mexico about 20 miles southeast of Venice, Louisiana.
    More recently, in January 2024, two homes less than 1 mile 
from each other in Jackson, Mississippi, exploded 3 days apart 
from Atmos Energy pipeline leaks. The first home explosion 
resulted in one fatality and one injury. The resulting fire 
from the second explosion spread to a neighboring home. These 
incidents happened after Atmos had identified leaks in their 
pipelines in the area, but failed to repair them.
    Putting safety first means greater oversight and 
accountability of the activities of pipeline operators. It also 
means greater transparency for local communities and the 
public. PIPES 2023 accomplishes this by creating an Office of 
Public Engagement, an idea championed by my Washington State 
colleague, Representative Strickland. It requires PHMSA to 
review operator emergency management response plans.
    Improving safety means preventing incidents. PHMSA and the 
State pipeline safety programs need the resources and staff to 
inspect pipelines, conduct investigations when incidents occur, 
and take appropriate enforcement actions. PIPES 2023 does this 
by increasing the authorizations for both PHMSA and State 
pipeline safety organizations. I am pleased that our bill 
includes $56 million for State pipeline safety programs over 4 
years.
    I appreciate each of our witnesses being here today to talk 
about the PIPES Act of 2023. I want to welcome PHMSA Deputy 
Administrator Tristan Brown, who visited my district to tour 
the Olympic pipeline site in Bellingham, and Bill Caram of the 
Pipeline Safety Trust, whose organization was created in 
response to that tragedy and is headquartered in my district in 
Bellingham.
    I also want to thank PHMSA and their response to the 
Conway, Washington, pipeline leak that happened last year. And 
cleanup continues, but nears the end for that.
    In addition to its safety initiatives, the BIL created the 
first-ever Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and 
Modernization grant program. PHMSA has announced $588 million 
for 167 projects from the $1 billion made available to 
municipalities and community-owned utilities to repair or 
replace natural gas pipelines and help reduce incidents and 
improve safety.
    Pipelines play a critical role in the Nation's 
infrastructure and the daily lives of Americans. We are here 
today to make sure the national pipeline network safely 
delivers energy across the country.
    I look forward to today's discussion.
    And with that, I yield back.
    [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress 
    from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chairman Nehls, for calling this hearing on pipeline 
safety and for your kind words about our colleague and friend, 
Representative Donald M. Payne, Jr. We continue to mourn today after 
his death just two weeks ago.
    Don was a leader on the PIPES Act of 2023 that our Committee voted 
unanimously to advance in December.
    He strongly supported ensuring PHMSA and the state pipeline safety 
programs have the funding they need to do their work.
    Don also helped lay the groundwork for strong rail funding in the 
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL). Because of Don's work, we will see 
replacements of century-old rail bridges and tunnels on the Northeast 
Corridor, including the suite of Gateway projects.
    He was a friend and advocate for rail workers, supporting their bid 
for sick leave, higher wages and improved working conditions.
    His efforts helped support a historic agreement that would 
strengthen the safety and quality of life for our essential rail 
workers.
    Don's work to advance rail safety legislation, especially in the 
wake of the derailment in East Palestine, will remain an important part 
of his legacy that Congress must continue to realize.
    On June 10, 1999, an Olympic pipeline explosion in Bellingham, 
Washington, in my district, claimed the lives of two 10-year-old boys 
and an 18-year-old young man. The explosion also released 237,000 
gallons of gasoline into a creek that flowed through Whatcom Falls Park 
in Bellingham, Washington.
    This explosion spurred my commitment, which has been steadfast for 
over 20 years, to the highest level of pipeline safety.
    For my entire tenure in Congress, I have fought to reduce the risk 
of pipeline incidents, promote transparency of pipeline safety 
information for local communities and increase accountability for 
pipeline operators.
    According to PHMSA data, in the past 20 years there have been 
12,722 pipeline incidents claiming 278 lives and causing $11.4 billion 
in property damage.
    While we work on the PIPES 2023 bill, the pipeline industry 
continues to experience deadly accidents causing damage to the 
environment.
    According to the Pipeline Safety Trust, 2023 was the deadliest year 
for pipelines in two decades.
    On March 24, 2023, a UGI pipeline explosion in West Reading, 
Pennsylvania killed seven people, injured 11, displaced three families 
from a neighboring apartment building and evacuated many more from the 
area.
    In November 2023, Third Coast Infrastructure released 1.1 million 
gallons of crude oil from an underwater pipeline into an ``unusually 
sensitive area'' in the Gulf of Mexico about 20 miles southeast of 
Venice, Louisiana.
    More recently, in January 2024, two homes less than a mile from 
each other in Jackson, Mississippi, exploded three days apart from 
Atmos Energy pipeline leaks. The first home explosion resulted in one 
fatality and one injury. The resulting fire from the second explosion 
spread to a neighboring home.
    These incidents happened after Atmos had identified leaks in their 
pipelines in the area but failed to repair them.
    Putting safety first means greater oversight and accountability of 
the activities of pipeline operators. It also means greater 
transparency for local communities and the public.
    PIPES 2023 accomplishes this by creating an Office of Public 
Engagement--an idea championed by my colleague Representative 
Strickland--and requires PHMSA to review operator emergency response 
plans.
    Improving safety means preventing incidents. PHMSA and the state 
pipeline safety programs need the resources and staff to inspect 
pipelines, conduct investigations when incidents occur, and take 
appropriate enforcement actions.
    PIPES 2023 does this by increasing the authorizations for both 
PHMSA and state pipeline safety organizations. I am pleased our bill 
includes $56 million for state pipeline safety programs over four 
years.
    I appreciate each of our witnesses being here to talk about the 
PIPES Act of 2023.
    I want to welcome PHMSA Deputy Administrator Tristan Brown, who 
visited Washington's Second District to tour the Olympic pipeline site 
in Bellingham, and Bill Caram of the Pipeline Safety Trust whose 
organization was created in response to that tragedy and is 
headquartered in my district in Bellingham. I also want to thank PHMSA 
and their response to the Conway, Washington pipeline leak that 
happened last year. Cleanup continues but nears the end for that.
    In addition to its safety initiatives, the BIL created the first 
ever Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and Modernization 
grant program.
    PHMSA has announced $588 million for 167 projects from the $1 
billion made available to municipalities and community-owned utilities 
to repair or replace natural gas pipelines and help reduce incidents 
and improve safety.
    Pipelines play a critical role in the nation's infrastructure and 
the daily lives of Americans. We are here today to make sure the 
national pipeline network safely delivers energy across the country. I 
look forward to today's discussion.

    Mr. Nehls. Mr. Larsen yields.
    Thank you, sir. I would like to welcome our witnesses and 
thank them for being here today. Briefly, I would like to take 
a moment to explain our lighting system to our witnesses.
    There are three lights in front of you. Obviously, green, 
go; yellow, you are running out of time; and red is conclude 
your marks, please.
    I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements 
be included in the record.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that the record of today's 
hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses have 
provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to them 
in writing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open 
for 15 days for any additional comments and information 
submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record 
of today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    As your written testimony has been made part of the record, 
the subcommittee asks that you limit your oral arguments to 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Brown, I appreciate you handing me the book, the ``2024 
Emergency Response Guidebook,'' 2 million of these going to 
first responders. Well done, but I have an issue. And before I 
recognize you for 5-minute testimony, I would like to take a 
moment of personal privilege.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    The committee notified you on April 15 of 2024--that is 21 
days ago--that today's hearing was taking place. You also have 
been asked for feedback on the PIPES Act far longer than that. 
And we, on a bipartisan basis, re-asked for this on February 7, 
so that is 90 days ago, 3 months. Yet, you were unable to 
provide your written testimony to this committee in a timely 
fashion, denying all of the members of this subcommittee the 
ability to adequately review your testimony. Your agency was 
also unable to share feedback on the bill until last night 
after 10 p.m. I find it completely, completely unacceptable and 
inexcusable.
    Now, due to your delay on both fronts, many Members may 
have questions following the hearing, as well, and I want to 
make sure it expects a full answer. We want a full answer from 
you to all Members' questions today.
    I would also like you to commit to responding to all 
Members' questions for the record. So, give me a reasonable 
expectation here. Can you commit to providing an answer, what, 
2 weeks, 3 weeks? Could you give me a number?
    Mr. Brown. Well, as you may know, both the TA and the 
testimony does go through an interagency review process, which 
does take time. So, I will commit to working as fast as 
possible.
    Mr. Nehls. Two weeks or three weeks? Just kind of--come on, 
give me an idea.
    Mr. Brown. You----
    Mr. Nehls [interrupting]. OK, so, we are not going to--OK, 
here we go.
    I look forward to your responses. We here on the 
subcommittee are interested in what you have to share. You 
can't come up with a time. I look forward to a productive 
hearing. I hope we can have a productive hearing.
    With that, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Go ahead, sir.

TESTIMONY OF TRISTAN BROWN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND 
 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION; CHRISTINA SAMES, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, SAFETY, 
      OPERATIONS, ENGINEERING, AND SECURITY, AMERICAN GAS 
ASSOCIATION; ROBIN RORICK, VICE PRESIDENT OF MIDSTREAM POLICY, 
    AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE; AND BILL CARAM, EXECUTIVE 
                DIRECTOR, PIPELINE SAFETY TRUST

TESTIMONY OF TRISTAN BROWN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND 
 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                         TRANSPORTATION

    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 
Member Wilson, Ranking Member Larsen, members of the 
subcommittee, for the invitation to discuss the Office of 
Pipeline Safety at PHMSA and our work, as well as the 
reauthorization legislation that you have put together.
    I just wanted to start by echoing the sentiments and 
condolences to the Payne family to those of you who were 
colleagues, to those of you who were friends, to the Payne 
office and staff members who I know were all as saddened as I 
was to learn of his passing. It is a testament to his legacy 
that he worked across the aisle this past year to help advance 
legislation to improve pipeline safety and to keep his 
constituents and all Americans safe from hazardous materials 
transportation.
    As I testified last year before this subcommittee, safety 
is and remains the top priority of the Department of 
Transportation and of PHMSA. Specifically, PHMSA is responsible 
for overseeing the safe transport of hazardous materials 
through pipelines and via other modes of transportation. That's 
trucks, trains, planes, vessels, automobiles, drones, among 
others. We oversee the safe design, operation, and maintenance, 
as the chairman mentioned, of nearly 3.3 million miles of 
pipelines, as well as nearly 1 in 10 goods that are classified 
as a hazardous material transported commercially in the United 
States, everything from nuclear waste to lithium-ion batteries 
to spacecraft being transported to spaceports around the United 
States and around the world.
    Nearly two-thirds of the energy we consume in the U.S. is 
transported via pipeline, and over the past few decades, 
especially the last few years, in conjunction with America's 
red hot economic growth, energy production in the United States 
has continued to increase to record levels. Concurrently, U.S. 
transportation of these products has necessarily increased, and 
exports of energy products have also reached record levels. 
This means heightened demand on our pipelines and refined 
product storage infrastructure, as well as export facilities, 
liquefied natural gas terminals, which PHMSA also regulates.
    The volume of work before PHMSA and the challenges in 
carrying out our safety and environmental mission have never 
been greater. Aging infrastructure requires more maintenance 
and greater safety scrutiny. A significant portion of the 
cross-country pipeline infrastructure was built shortly after 
World War II, meaning pipelines are over 80 years old. There 
are even a few gas distribution segments that were installed 
during the Civil War era, more than 150 years ago, which, 
thanks to the President's Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, we are 
finally modernizing through our first-of-its-kind, as the 
ranking member mentioned, natural gas modernization grant 
program that we stood up last year, which included grants in 
multiple districts of multiple members of this subcommittee.
    With the increasing challenges and broader demands on our 
agency, clear direction and resources from Congress are 
important, and particularly as we close out the final few 
congressional mandates from the 2020 PIPES Act. PHMSA is 
grateful for the work that this subcommittee has done in 
advancing bipartisan legislation, including increased 
authorization levels.
    In closing, I would like to thank you again for the 
opportunity to discuss with you the critical issues facing our 
agency, as well as our State partners, in the largest, most 
sophisticated pipeline system and hazardous materials 
transportation system in the world.
    Each of the areas I outlined in the written testimony are 
areas in which the rest of the world looks to America for 
leadership: leadership in the marketplace of products for which 
we are the most efficient in the world; leadership for 
establishing safety rules that countries around the world have 
told me they often adopt in whole to improve their own pipeline 
safety and environmental protection; leadership in the rule of 
law when it comes to disputes and compliance; leadership in 
research, innovation, and new technologies to improve safety 
and environmental performance that are sold domestically and 
exported around the world; leadership in transparency and 
engagement with affected communities which other countries also 
look to as a new standard; and leadership in efficiencies for 
all the work that we do.
    This work is the result of our collaboration with the 
congressional committees that authorize and fund our agency, as 
well as the stakeholders represented here. But the kudos, most 
of the kudos, for all the achievements of our agency go to the 
nearly 650 full-time Federal employees and nearly 200 
contractors that make up what I always say is the most unsung 
agency in the Government.
    Thank you for your efforts to advance bipartisan 
reauthorization legislation. I look forward to working with you 
and your colleagues as Congress considers a pipeline safety 
reauth bill and honors the efforts of your colleague, Mr. 
Payne. I look forward to your questions.
    [Mr. Brown's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and 
     Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of 
                             Transportation
                              Introduction
    Good morning, Chairman Nehls, and members of the Subcommittee. Let 
me begin by expressing my sincere condolences to the Payne family, to 
those of you who were friends and colleagues of Ranking Member Payne, 
and to his office and staff members, who I know are all as saddened as 
I was to learn of his passing. It is a testament to his legacy that he 
worked across the aisle this past year to help advance legislation to 
improve pipeline safety and to keep his constituents and all Americans 
safe from hazardous materials transportation.
    Thank you for inviting me to testify today on the U.S. Department 
of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration's (PHMSA) pipeline safety program. As I testified last 
year before this Subcommittee--Safety is, and remains, the top priority 
for DOT and PHMSA. Specifically, PHMSA is responsible for overseeing 
the safe transport of hazardous materials--through pipelines and also 
via other modes of transportation--aviation, rail, motor carrier, and 
marine. PHMSA oversees the safe design, operation, and maintenance of 
the Nation's nearly 3.3 million miles of oil, gas, and other hazardous 
materials pipeline and storage facilities, including for hydrogen, 
carbon dioxide, and other emerging fuels. Additionally, PHMSA's 
oversight of hazardous materials transport via other modes includes 
nearly 1 in 10 goods that are transported commercially in the U.S., 
everything from nuclear waste to lithium-ion batteries, to spacecraft 
being transported to spaceports around the world.
    Nearly two-thirds of the energy we consume in the U.S. is 
transported via pipeline. Over the past few decades--and especially 
over the last few years in conjunction with America's red-hot economic 
growth--energy production in the United States has continued to 
increase to record levels. Concurrently, U.S. transportation of these 
products has necessarily increased, and exports of energy products 
have--according to the Energy Information Administration--also reached 
record levels. This means heightened demands on our pipeline and 
refined products storage infrastructure, as well as export facilities, 
such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, the safety and 
environmental risks over which PHMSA also oversees.
    Put simply: the volume of work before PHMSA, and the challenges in 
carrying out our safety and environmental mission established by 
Congress, have never been greater. Aging infrastructure requires more 
maintenance, and, greater safety scrutiny. A significant portion of the 
cross-country pipeline infrastructure was built shortly after World War 
II--meaning many pipelines are over 80 years old. Furthermore, there 
are even a few gas distribution segments that were installed during the 
Civil War era, more than 150 years ago--which, thanks to the 
President's Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, we are finally modernizing 
through our first-of-its kind community natural gas modernization grant 
program.
    With increasing challenges and broader demands on our agency, clear 
direction and resources from Congress are important, particularly as we 
close out the final few congressional mandates from the 2020 PIPES Act. 
PHMSA is grateful for the work that this Subcommittee has done in 
advancing bipartisan legislation--particularly increased authorization 
levels--and I look forward to providing additional feedback on the 
reauthorization needs of the agency during this hearing.
              Bipartisan Infrastructure Law Grant Program
    After enactment of the PIPES Act of 2020, Congress also enacted the 
2021 Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. So as PHMSA has worked to implement 
the 2020 PIPES Act, PHMSA has also awarded three rounds of funding for 
our first-ever infrastructure grant program--a substantial undertaking 
for our agency. Congress created the Natural Gas Distribution 
Infrastructure Safety and Modernization (NGDISM) Grant Program, 
providing $1 billion over five years to improve the safety of high-
risk, leak-prone, legacy natural gas distribution infrastructure with a 
specific emphasis on benefiting disadvantaged rural and urban 
communities. Municipality- or community-owned utilities are eligible, 
and funds are available to these entities seeking assistance in 
repairing, rehabilitating, or replacing high-risk, leak-prone natural 
gas distribution infrastructure, or acquiring equipment to assist in 
identifying and reducing natural gas incidents and fatalities. This 
grant funding is helping communities of all sizes make their 
infrastructure safer, creating good jobs, reducing heat-trapping 
methane from the atmosphere, and saving residents and businesses money 
on their energy bills. As previously mentioned, there is plenty of 
aging infrastructure across the country that can benefit from this 
program. For example, PHMSA awarded funding to multiple projects--in 
both Massachusetts and Nebraska--where the pipeline systems date back 
to the 1890s. Additionally, for the past two funding rounds, 
Congressman Burlison's district was awarded a total of over $30 million 
for the City Utilities of Springfield to acquire methane leak detection 
equipment, as well as to replace over 38 miles of legacy plastic 
natural gas lines and around 3,400 legacy plastic gas services and 
meter sets. Communities neighboring Congressman Burchett's district 
also received funds this year totaling over $4 million for pipe 
replacement and equipment needs. Congressman Troy Carter joined Senator 
Cassidy and me in his district to announce more than $27 million for 
community owned systems throughout Louisiana last year. We have been 
delighted to see the interest and excitement from grant applicants and 
recipients and are happy to say that the NGDISM program is working. 
During our first year of project solicitations, the program attracted 
nearly $1.8 billion worth of applications for $200 million in funding. 
We had similar interest when we announced the FY23 and FY24 round of 
funding. This year we were able to issue grants to Texas, North 
Carolina, Kentucky, and New York (among others) for the first time. 
Last year we issued first-time grants to Kansas, Tennessee, Georgia, 
Indiana, Massachusetts, and Florida (among many others). And this week, 
we are issuing another Notice of Funding Opportunity for the FY25 round 
of funding, which I know applicants are eager to apply for.
    Although the program is funded through 2026, PHMSA anticipates the 
work in carrying out and overseeing the infrastructure projects from 
the NGDISM program won't be completed until 2033. In anticipation of 
this, and to address burdens on underserved community applicants, PHMSA 
has streamlined its National Environmental Policy Act review process--
establishing a first-of-its-kind, tiered approach to conduct 
environmental assessments of these important projects. Utilizing the 
administrative funding granted to us by Congress in the Bipartisan 
Infrastructure Law, PHMSA took on the financial and administrative 
burden of conducting a tier 1 programmatic review of potential 
environmental impacts from this new grant program--instead of placing 
that burden on grant recipients. PHMSA, along with our partners at the 
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center in Massachusetts, as well 
as the White House Council on Environmental Quality, created a tier 2 
template that community grant recipients can use to identify project-
specific impacts for these pipe repair/replacement projects and 
streamline the project-specific environmental review process--saving 
months of time, as well as saving communities and taxpayer money that 
would otherwise need to be spent on these potentially lengthy reviews. 
PHMSA was honored to be asked by the White House Council on 
Environmental Quality to present our work last year as an example for 
other agencies to replicate to help get projects completed faster and 
more efficiently, without sacrificing important environmental values.
                               Rulemaking
    As I noted in my March 2023 testimony before this Subcommittee, our 
regulatory agenda over the past several years has been extraordinarily 
full. In addition to closing out a record number of long-awaited rules 
related to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations, and older 
congressional mandates, we've also published two important new proposed 
rulemakings from the 2020 PIPES Act and issued a final rule for 
Periodic Updates of Regulatory References to Technical Standards and 
Miscellaneous Amendments.
    The 2020 PIPES Act directed us to address the methane leak 
detection and repair rule, which covers both gas and hazardous liquid 
pipelines, in an effort to improve public safety and protect our 
environment. The broad bipartisan support in Congress for this new 
directive, as signed into law by President Trump, demonstrated that 
America is serious about addressing methane emissions. The private 
sector has shown, too, that America is the leading innovator when it 
comes to methane mitigation and we have a workforce of pipeline workers 
and skilled tradesmen who are the most skilled and efficient in the 
world at finding and fixing methane leaks--keeping Americans safe, 
reducing harmful and costly pollution, and ultimately saving consumers 
money when a valuable commodity is not leaked into the atmosphere.
    The consequences of failing to address methane leaks can be tragic. 
Just a few weeks ago, I joined Congressman Bennie Thompson and NTSB 
Chair Jennifer Homendy for a community meeting in Jackson, MS, where 
the community is still recovering from a tragic pipeline leak on Atmos 
Energy Corporation's gas distribution system that led to the death of a 
beloved community member, Ms. Clara Barbour. PHMSA is a party to and 
supporting the NTSB's investigation into this matter. The NTSB's 
preliminary report indicated that ``Before these explosions, Atmos 
identified and classified leaks on their distribution system near 
locations 1 and 2. The leak nearest to location 1 was discovered on 
November 11, 2023, and classified as a grade-2 leak, meaning that it 
was nonhazardous but would require repair in the future. The leak 
nearest to location 2 was discovered on December 1, 2023, and was 
classified as a grade-3 leak and therefore nonhazardous. Neither leak 
was repaired before the explosions.'' In addition to PHMSA being a 
party to the NTSB investigation, Atmos Energy recently, and 
voluntarily, agreed to an independent safety review by PHMSA of their 
processes and operations--which NTSB and our state partners are also 
participating in. We anticipate sharing the results of this review with 
the public.
    Last May, PHMSA proposed the Gas Pipeline Leak Detection and Repair 
Rule (LDAR Rule), which seeks to enhance public safety and lower 
methane emissions and other air pollution by significantly improving 
the requirements for the detection and repair of leaks from natural gas 
distribution, gas transmission, and gas gathering pipelines. The Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) updates decades-old, Federal leak 
detection and repair standards in favor of new requirements that add an 
additional layer of safety by deploying commercially available, 
advanced technologies to find and fix gas leaks that previously may 
have gone unrepaired in perpetuity. This rule would ensure that leaks--
each of which involves a loss of pipeline integrity--are discovered and 
repaired before they can degrade into more serious ruptures or 
explosions and to limit the atmosphere's exposure to methane. This rule 
also encourages innovation in technologies that help keep natural gas 
in our pipes instead of leaking into the atmosphere, which can be 
unsafe, costly for consumers, and harm our environment.
    PHMSA held a Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) meeting on the 
proposed LDAR Rule in November of 2023, and held a second public 
advisory committee meeting on the proposed rule in March 2024--after 
the initial meeting extended beyond the full scheduled week of day-long 
discussions. PHMSA is in the process of considering and addressing all 
GPAC recommendations, and will address comments received within the 
comment period, prior to finalizing this rule. In addition to 
discussing the LDAR NPRM at the November meeting, PHMSA also planned to 
address the proposed Class Location Change rule--of interest to many 
members of this Subcommittee. Due to the extended proceedings on the 
LDAR rule, the Class Location Rule was taken up at the March 2024 GPAC 
meeting and recommendations were completed and received from the GPAC. 
At the request of many stakeholders representing entities directly 
affected by the Class Location Rule, PHMSA has granted an extension of 
comments for that rule, which we will review upon submission to inform 
our final rulemaking.
    The PIPES Act of 2020 also directed PHMSA to promptly complete the 
``Safety of Gas Distribution Pipelines and Other Pipeline Safety 
Initiatives'' Rulemaking. This NPRM was published in September 2023, 
and received comments from over 200 commenters. The NPRM proposes to 
require operators of gas distribution pipelines to update their 
distribution integrity management programs, emergency response plans, 
operations and maintenance manuals, and other safety practices as 
envisioned in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline Safety Act, and which is 
informed by NTSB recommendations aimed at preventing catastrophic 
incidents resulting from overpressurization of low-pressure gas 
distribution systems similar to that which occurred on a gas 
distribution pipeline system in Merrimack Valley on September 13, 
2018--tragically taking the life of young Leonel Rondon. In this rule, 
PHMSA has also proposed codifying use of its State Inspection 
Calculation Tool, which is used to help our state pipeline inspection 
partners determine the base-level amount of time needed for inspections 
to maintain an adequate pipeline safety program. Further, PHMSA 
proposes other pipeline safety initiatives for all part 192-regulated 
pipelines in this NPRM, including gas transmission and gathering 
pipelines, such as updating emergency response plans and inspection 
requirements. We are currently preparing for a future GPAC meeting on 
that NPRM.
    In addition to Congressionally mandated rules, many of PHMSA's 
rulemakings underway address important recommendations from NTSB, 
resulting from safety issues identified during investigations in the 
aftermath of some tragic accidents. PHMSA's rules also address 
recommendations from the GAO, the DOT Inspector General, and the 
agency's own safety findings. As a result, PHMSA continues to work on 
updates to the LNG facilities regulations, and we also recognize the 
need to address emerging issues, like the design and operation of 
pipelines transporting carbon dioxide in different physical states. We 
understand that these priorities are in line with this Committee's 
expectations, based on the Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency 
and Safety (PIPES) 2023 bill that was introduced and moved through 
Committee on a bipartisan basis by Chairman Graves, Ranking Member 
Larsen, Chairman Nehls, and the late-Ranking Member Payne.
                       Enforcement and Compliance
    While the number of PHMSA's administrative enforcement cases has 
remained relatively steady, continued diligence of PHMSA staff to hold 
responsible parties accountable has resulted in the agency setting 
records for our civil penalties in 2021, 2022, and 2023. In 2023, PHMSA 
issued over $12.5 million in proposed civil penalties against operators 
who violated safety regulations. Additionally, recognizing that timely 
enforcement is important to increase deterrence and shorten the time 
unsafe conditions are allowed to persist, PHMSA has substantially 
expedited its enforcement processes. From 2019 to 2023, for 
administrative enforcement cases involving civil penalties or proposed 
compliance actions, PHMSA reduced its average time to initiate and 
fully close an enforcement case by approximately 40 percent.
    Additionally, as a mandate of the PIPES Act of 2020, PHMSA 
inspected implementation of the Act's self-executing mandate requiring 
operators to update their inspection and maintenance plans to address 
the elimination of hazardous leaks and minimizing releases of natural 
gas (including intentional venting during normal operations) from their 
pipeline facilities. In 2022, PHMSA conducted 380 inspections of 
operators' plans, covering 803 PHMSA-identified pipeline inspection 
systems, 39 Federally inspected gas distribution systems, 37 Federally 
inspected LNG units, and 178 Federally inspected underground natural 
gas storage facilities, to ensure they addressed the congressional 
directive to assess the need to replace or remediate pipeline 
facilities that are known to leak based on their material, design, or 
past operating and maintenance history. In addition to the number of 
PHMSA-performed inspections, PHMSA's state partners conducted an 
additional 4,724 inspections. This is the first time PHMSA completed 
inspections of each operator that it regulates within a calendar year--
and was a tremendous undertaking by our dedicated field personnel 
across the country and the dedicated field personnel of our state 
partners.
    Additionally, sections 205(a) and (b) of the PIPES Act of 2020 
directed PHMSA to assess the implementation of Pipeline Safety 
Management Systems (PSMS) by gas distribution operators and provide 
guidance and recommendations to encourage voluntary implementation of 
PSMS by gas distribution pipeline operators. PHMSA conducted a 
voluntary information collection among gas distribution operators on 
the current state of PSMS implementation. To collect this data 
efficiently, PHMSA designed a new information collection form and 
online reporting portal. PHMSA and our state partners encouraged 
operators to submit their PSMS data and, though it took longer than 
anticipated, we received a statistically adequate number of responses 
to allow for reasonable inference to the entire gas distribution 
operator community. The accompanying report to Congress is expected to 
be completed and transmitted to you and shared publicly on our website 
in the coming months. In the meantime, PHMSA continues to work with 
regulated entities in promoting the use of PSMS, as also directed by 
section 205(c), and notes that further evaluation of PSMS frameworks 
will commence following issuance of the report. It's also worth noting 
that PSMS was included in a recent NTSB recommendation, so we look 
forward to working with NTSB to address the relevant aspects of their 
recommendation as well.
            Research, Development, and Inter-Agency Efforts
    While PHMSA continues to advance pipeline safety by strengthening 
its regulations and enhancing its inspector training, inspections, and 
enforcement programs, research and technological innovation is 
essential to aid in the design, construction, operation, and 
maintenance of pipelines and to address the root causes of incidents.
    PHMSA's Pipeline Safety Research Program works with academia, the 
regulated community, private research consortiums and Federal partners 
to sponsor research and development (R&D) projects focused on providing 
near-term solutions for pipeline transportation infrastructure issues 
that will improve safety, reduce environmental impact, and enhance 
reliability. PHMSA periodically holds public R&D forums to help 
generate a national research agenda that identifies technical 
challenges and fosters solutions to improve pipeline safety and protect 
the environment. PHMSA's most recent forum was held in the fall of 
2023, and included five working groups focusing on carbon dioxide, 
hydrogen, leak detection/monitoring, threat prevention, and anomaly 
detection and repair. The forum discussions regarding both carbon 
dioxide and hydrogen drew extended interest as more projects are being 
proposed for CCUS and hydrogen blending of natural gas pipelines. Both 
of these research areas are necessary and timely as we look towards 
transportation of gaseous carbon dioxide and varying hydrogen blending 
of natural gas pipelines, both of which may involve additional 
rulemaking efforts at PHMSA.
    PHMSA issued its solicitations for its Cooperative Academic 
Agreement Program (CAAP) on March 18, 2024, and it Core Program on 
April 15, 2024. PHMSA's solicitation topics included Carbon Dioxide and 
Hydrogen Safety, Leak Detection, Liquefied Natural Gas, Threat 
Prevention, Anomaly Detection and Characterization, and Hazardous 
Liquids Tanks. Based on PHMSA's review of data and trends, there is a 
continued need to fund research activities intended to evaluate and 
mitigate threats to prevent damage to our Nation's infrastructure. The 
most present risks center around geohazard monitoring, data 
integration, and corrosion control, all of which are included in the 
research solicitations for 2024. Of note for the Subcommittee--PHMSA's 
2023 appropriations bill directed PHMSA to utilize a significant 
portion of its existing research funding as part of the creation of a 
National Center of Excellence for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). PHMSA 
has been working to partner with other Federal agencies in the creation 
of this National Center of Excellence--to leverage broader Federal 
resources to advance LNG safety.
Hydrogen/Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
    In FY 2023, PHMSA awarded approximately $4 million in research 
investments on hydrogen projects. Specifically, under the Core Program, 
PHMSA awarded two projects: 1) to Investigate Damage Mechanisms for 
Hydrogen and Hydrogen/Natural Gas Blends to Determine Inspection 
Intervals for In-Line Inspection Tools, and 2) to Investigate the 
Integrity Impacts of Hydrogen Gas on Composite/Multi-Layered Pipe. In 
addition, PHMSA entered into an Interagency Agreement with the 
Department of Energy (DOE) to ``Establish the Technical Basis for 
Enabling Safe and Reliable Underground Hydrogen Storage Operations.'' 
PHMSA currently has twelve active hydrogen projects from FYs 2021, 
2022, and 2023 awards, totaling approximately $11 million in research 
investments. These projects will research how to safely transport and 
store hydrogen and hydrogen blends by repurposing existing 
infrastructure used for natural gas transport and underground storage, 
improving hydrogen leak detection, and characterizing hydrogen specific 
pipeline integrity threats.
    PHMSA also collaborates with the DOE's Office of Fossil Energy and 
Carbon Management to establish partnerships on R&D and safety 
associated with the transport of carbon dioxide via pipelines. 
Currently, PHMSA has four active projects involving the potential 
impact radius for carbon dioxide, innovative leak detection methods, 
and material testing and qualification for repurposing pipelines and 
underground storage facilities for carbon dioxide transport and 
storage. The results of these may help inform a current rulemaking 
related to carbon dioxide pipelines.
    PHMSA's limited funding for its Pipeline Safety-related R&D program 
is divided between pipeline and LNG research. For 2023 and 2024, PHMSA 
was provided $12.5 million for research, and the 2025 President's 
Budget requests a total of $14 million for these important research 
activities.
    In terms of PHMSA's efforts on carbon dioxide (CO2) infrastructure, 
while PHMSA does not have siting authority, it is PHMSA's 
responsibility to help make sure that newly approved pipeline 
facilities are designed, constructed, operated, and maintained with a 
high level of safety. In an effort to further a one-Federal-government 
approach to the oversight of decarbonization infrastructure, PHMSA 
continues to seek ways to enhance its coordination with other Federal 
agencies in the overall carbon capture, utilization, and storage space 
to help track projects, anticipate safety and environmental risks, and 
provide more public-facing information. PHMSA is in the process of 
developing a specific CO2-focused website that will provide cross-
references to other agencies in an effort to help clarify the roles the 
various agencies play in oversight of CO2 transportation and storage. 
While most proposed CO2 pipeline projects are dense phase pipelines, 
some proposals are considering converting existing natural gas 
transmission pipelines to transport gaseous CO2. As noted in my 
response to your letter on the subject last year, Mr. Chairman, PHMSA 
is working to issue a proposed rule on CO2 pipeline safety as soon as 
possible, as updated on a monthly basis in our public rulemaking chart.
Liquefied Natural Gas
    Global fluctuations in natural gas supplies and its availability 
continue to spark investments in LNG. Currently, there are eight LNG 
export terminals with a total LNG production capacity of approximately 
14 billion standard cubic feet per day (bcf/d) in the United States. 
There are also 17 new facilities expected to be built within the next 
five years and seven more currently seeking Federal approval, according 
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the agency which oversees 
approval and siting of these facilities) \1\. As the demand is expected 
to continue to increase, PHMSA continues to fund LNG safety-related 
research projects; with eleven completed/closed and five currently 
active projects, all totaling $5.7 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See https://www.ferc.gov/media/us-lng-export-terminals-
existing-approved-not-yet-built-and-proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As I noted, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 provided up 
to $8.4 million to PHMSA for the creation of a National Center of 
Excellence for LNG Safety (the Center), as authorized in Section 111 of 
the PIPES Act of 2020. The Center aims to ensure United States remains 
the leader and foremost expert in LNG operations, globally--including 
safety and environmental performance, and to improve collaboration 
across Federal agencies and with relevant stakeholders. For the last 
few months, PHMSA has been working to engage other relevant Federal 
agencies with the goal of establishing a center that leverages 
agencies' expertise to address the most pressing issues and ensure we 
continue to raise the bar for the global LNG sector when it comes to 
safety and environmental performance. We have thus far received broad 
interest from other relevant agencies.
                  Increased Engagement with the Public
    PHMSA is committed to enhancing all stakeholder engagement and has 
increased the number of public meetings and information briefings it 
hosts--holding three major public meetings and information briefings in 
2023, as well as the week-long November GPAC meeting that was open to 
public participation. As mentioned before, in March 2024, PHMSA held 
another week-long GPAC meeting that was open to public participation. 
Personally, I have visited community members and victims, on-site, 
where pipeline facilities have failed (e.g., Marshall, MI; Bellingham, 
WA; Satartia, MS; Freeport, TX, and Jackson, MS). In March 2024, I met 
with stakeholders in Bent Mountain, Virginia, near Roanoke, to listen 
to concerns about the impact that the Mountain Valley Pipeline 
construction project has had on their community.
    PHMSA has also increased its engagement with public interest 
groups, in addition to the Pipeline Safety Trust, to include pipeline 
worker labor unions, and environmental groups, as well as relevant 
trade associations actively participating in conferences and meetings 
to hold a two-way dialogue on important pipeline safety issues, 
emphasizing that pipeline safety is a shared responsibility.
    In 2023, PHMSA's Community Liaisons participated in nearly 195 
public meetings, events, and conferences to educate our stakeholders on 
pipeline safety and damage prevention initiatives and to address 
questions about the Federal pipeline safety regulations or concerns 
about pipeline-related matters. Of the 195 events, 56 events were held 
in transportation disadvantaged and underserved communities which 
included Tribal Nations, and 16 were engagements with individual 
landowners and local community representatives. In addition to engaging 
with Tribal Nations to exchange information and address questions, 
PHMSA continues to perform advanced communications with Tribes prior to 
performing inspection activities that may take inspectors through 
Tribal lands. PHMSA continues to promote the Call 811 Program through 
participation in events as well as through social media and digital 
campaigns encouraging safe digging practices.
    With increased production and transportation of energy products, we 
have also seen an increase in engagement from the public in both the 
work our agency performs as well as the operations of the facilities 
that we oversee. Currently, there are no requirements in PHMSA's 
governing statutes for operators to engage the public with information 
after a major incident occurs. This has often meant that PHMSA 
personnel have had to fill the gap by explaining what our agency is 
doing to address safety risks but leaving the public eager to better 
understand what operators are doing to mitigate risk in the wake of an 
incident. PHMSA has worked with representatives from the regulated 
community, public interest organizations like the Pipeline Safety 
Trust, and industry representatives from the American Petroleum 
Institute to advance a recommended practice for pipeline public 
engagement (RP 1185)--which was recently adopted. But more work is 
necessary to ensure the public receives information about safety and 
environmental risks--especially in the aftermath of a major incident.
Efficiencies in Oversight, Taxpayer Stewardship, and Focus on Employees
    From 2020 to 2022, the number of PHMSA safety regulated miles for 
gas distribution, gas transmission, hazardous liquids, and carbon 
dioxide pipeline systems increased by 36,000 miles, and an estimated 
400,000 miles of gas gathering lines are newly regulated. PHMSA also 
has increasing responsibility for LNG facilities, as new facilities are 
proposed and come online, and underground natural gas storage. 
Consequently, PHMSA continues to strive to operate effectively and 
efficiently to our expanded universe of regulated facilities. We are 
grateful for the congressional authorities given in the PIPES Act of 
2020 to improve efforts to attract and retain a talented pool of 
professionals. PHMSA has undertaken new recruitment and retention 
efforts--in coordination with the Office of Personnel Management--
including, developing new tuition reimbursement efforts and utilizing 
new online recruitment methods, expanding the pool of colleges and 
universities from which we recruit, engaging alma maters of our 
existing team members, and broadening the public outreach of our 
agency. New special pay rates for pipeline inspectors were approved in 
2023 and PHMSA continues to implement programs to take advantage of all 
available hiring flexibilities, to continue to try to meet Congress' 
hiring directives.
    Although PHMSA faces fierce hiring competition from the private 
sector and other Federal agencies who are also competing with the same 
limited talent pools, PHMSA is focused on increasing the number of 
vacancies filled in inspection and enforcement roles. PHMSA continues 
to explore ways to continue to improve the agency's hiring and 
recruitment to make it both more efficient and effective in recruiting 
and retaining talented applicants, including obtaining approval from 
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in April 2023 of a new Special 
Rate Table covering PHMSA 0801 Engineering series employees in various 
locations; using Direct-Hire Authority to quickly employ qualified 
candidates; and promoting the use of student loan repayment benefits, 
as appropriate. Just last year, PHMSA onboarded a new Human Resources 
director who has implemented several changes to attract the best 
qualified candidates. PHMSA has actively used recruitment, relocation, 
and retention incentives for the most qualified employees. PHMSA's 
Student Loan Repayment Plan has been created and will be ready for 
implementation in the next 60-days and employees have also taken 
advantage of the generous student loan forgiveness program. PHMSA 
employees has sent over 200 letters to their alma maters inviting their 
engineering students and alumni to apply for open positions. In the 
last several months, our team has engaged with the Department of 
Veterans Affairs and OPM to continue to staff our positions with 
veterans and their spouses. Moreover, the team has implemented a multi-
channel marketing plan that includes LinkedIn, Handshake, X (Twitter), 
and email to engage with schools of engineering and college career 
centers. Additionally, in the past few months, the team has visited 
approximately 25 schools designated as Minority Serving Institutions 
and Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and participated in 
the Federal government's Workforce Recruitment Program, and other 
Federal events dedicated to hiring staff with disabilities--all to 
expand our pool of potential hires beyond where we've recruited 
historically.
Looking Forward: Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety 
                              Act of 2023
    PHMSA has followed with interest the efforts of all of its 
congressional oversight committees as they craft reauthorization 
language for our pipeline safety program, and particularly the 
Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety (PIPES) Act of 
2023. I applaud the work of the Committee and Subcommittee leadership 
and staff in working to reach a bipartisan consensus on important 
safety topics that move pipeline safety, accountability, and 
information sharing efforts forward.
State Oversight
    As previously mentioned, our universe of pipelines that are subject 
to state and Federal jurisdiction continues to expand. To accomplish an 
ever-expanding mission, PHMSA relies heavily on its extremely important 
partnership with state pipeline safety programs. New pipeline safety 
regulations and new--or newly regulated--infrastructure (such as 
certain gas gathering lines) have required state pipeline safety 
programs to increase staff to handle the additional infrastructure 
oversight responsibilities--or in many cases simply expanded the 
obligations of existing state pipeline inspection teams, which are 
already lean. These state pipeline safety programs employ approximately 
450 inspectors who are responsible for inspecting over 85 percent of 
the Nation's pipeline infrastructure through certification with PHMSA. 
State programs experience nearly all of the same challenges PHMSA has 
experienced in terms of hiring inspectors--but they usually have fewer 
resources to deal with such challenges.
    Therefore, as reflected in the President's Budget, we very much 
appreciate the efforts of this Subcommittee to increase the vital 
funding that goes to PHMSA to support state pipeline inspection 
programs. While statute allows PHMSA to reimburse up to 80 percent of 
the total cost of the personnel, equipment, and activities reasonably 
required by the state agency for the conduct of its pipeline safety 
program during a given calendar year, for fiscal years 2021 to 2023 
State Base Grant Federal funding covered less than 70 percent of the 
actual total state program costs. The 2023 Federal funding is estimated 
to be only 56 percent of the total state program costs--due, in part, 
to the increasing workload placed on states because of the increase in 
regulated pipelines and expansion of pipeline safety regulations. The 
2024 appropriation, consistent with the 2024 President's budget, 
included an additional $21.50 million for State Pipeline Safety Grants 
to increase the reimbursement rate to states to nearly 80 percent of 
their pipeline safety program cost, in order to address this need and 
more robustly support States' vital role in implementing many of the 
new regulations previously discussed--representing a bipartisan 
consensus for this need. The 2025 President's Budget once again 
requests a total of $82 million for State Pipeline Safety Grants, which 
would continue to reimburse state pipeline inspection programs at the 
authorized level. We are very much supportive of this Subcommittee's, 
and the President's, effort to increase funding to the states 
commensurate with the increase in their and our oversight 
responsibilities.
Resource Levels
    For this same reason, PHMSA appreciates the action of this 
Subcommittee in allowing an increase in personnel for the Office of 
Pipeline Safety to support development and implementation of pipeline 
safety policies and regulations, and to fulfill existing congressional 
rulemaking mandates. As I have testified previously, it takes a broad 
group of personnel to complete our rulemaking efforts, including 
engineering subject matter experts but also economists, attorneys, and 
environmental staff to ensure compliance with governing laws. To this 
point, we have provided technical assistance asking the Subcommittee to 
consider clarifying this allowance for an increase in personnel to 
ensure the 30 positions specified can include the variety of experts 
required to carry out our program who work at PHMSA, although they may 
not be within the Office of Pipeline Safety. This is to ensure we are 
authorized to hire the personnel needed to focus on the directive to 
develop pipeline safety policies and regulations, and to fulfill 
existing congressional rulemaking mandates.
Emerging fuels and opportunities.
    As has been mentioned throughout this testimony, the anticipated 
expansion of pipeline infrastructure to transport CO2 has made PHMSA's 
update of current CO2 pipeline regulations a top priority for the 
agency. PHMSA's proposed rule on Carbon Dioxide and Hazardous Liquid 
Pipeline Safety will aim to cover operational and maintenance safety 
issues relevant to different phases (e.g., supercritical, gaseous, 
etc.) of CO2 transportation via pipeline--and to address each of the 
issues identified by PHMSA in its investigation and enforcement 
activities involving its investigation of the 2020 pipeline failure in 
Satartia, Mississippi.
    Additionally, PHMSA is appreciative of this Subcommittee's efforts 
to understand more about the pipeline industry's use of hydrogen and 
natural gas blending and the safety impact to existing gas pipeline 
infrastructure. As previously noted, PHMSA has been studying this 
topic, and other hydrogen blending related safety impacts for several 
years, spending approximately $4 million in research investments on 
hydrogen projects in 2023. Importantly, PHMSA recently published in the 
Federal Register a draft information collection to allow PHMSA to 
collect and identify trends related to the blending of hydrogen gas and 
natural gas within gas pipelines from operator-reported data.
    PHMSA understands the Committee's interest in the implementation of 
a voluntary information-sharing system (VIS) comprised of PHMSA, other 
Federal and state agencies, the regulated industry (i.e., pipeline and 
facility owners and operators), and general public safety or 
environmental advocacy organizations. The VIS concept is one that is 
used successfully in other industries, particularly in the aviation 
field. PHMSA has worked for years on developing a VIS concept for the 
pipeline sector since the initial congressional mandate in the PIPES 
Act of 2016 to study the feasibility of such a system. PHMSA looks 
forward to Congress's guidance for implementing a program that seeks to 
encourage collaborative efforts to improve information sharing with the 
purpose of improving natural gas, hazardous liquid, and carbon dioxide 
pipeline facility integrity and safety.
   Conclusion: Continued Exceptional American Leadership in Pipeline 
                                 Safety
    In closing, I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to 
discuss with you the critical issues facing PHMSA, our state partners, 
and the largest, most sophisticated hazardous materials transportation 
system in the world. Each of the areas I outlined above are areas in 
which the rest of the world looks to America for leadership: leadership 
in the marketplace of products for which we are the most efficient in 
the world; leadership for establishing safety rules, that countries 
around the world have told me they often adopt in whole to improve 
their own pipeline safety and environmental protection and harm 
mitigation; leadership in the rule of law when it comes to disputes and 
compliance; leadership in research, innovation, and new technologies to 
improve safety and environmental performance that are sold domestically 
and exported around the world; leadership in transparency and 
engagement with affected communities, which other countries also look 
to as a new standard; and leadership in efficiencies, for all the work 
that we do.
    This work is the result of our collaboration with the congressional 
committees that authorize our agency and fund our agency, but the kudos 
for all of the achievement of our agency go to the nearly 650 full-time 
Federal employees and nearly 200 contractors that make up what I always 
say is the most unsung agency in the Federal Government.
    Thank you again for your efforts to advance bipartisan 
reauthorization legislation. I look forward to working with you and 
your colleagues as Congress considers a pipeline safety reauthorization 
bill that honors the efforts of your colleague, Mr. Payne.

    Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
    Next, Ms. Sames, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your 
testimony.

 TESTIMONY OF CHRISTINA SAMES, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, SAFETY, 
OPERATIONS, ENGINEERING, AND SECURITY, AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION

    Ms. Sames. Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Wilson, and 
members of the subcommittee, I am Christina Sames, senior vice 
president for safety, operations, engineering, and security at 
the American Gas Association.
    Prior to AGA, I worked in research and development at 
Pipeline Research Council International and spent 12 years in 
public service working for DOT's Office of Pipeline Safety. I 
get to officially retire next month after a 34-year career 
dedicated to pipeline safety. I am proud to have made a 
difference, and I guess I should thank you all for this 
retirement gift of putting me in front of a hearing. Thank you.
    AGA represents more than 200 utilities that deliver natural 
gas to 74 million customers. Natural gas pipelines deliver 
essential energy to 177 million Americans through 2.5 million 
miles of pipeline system, including 2.2 million miles of local 
distribution system operated by natural gas utilities. The 
natural gas utility distribution pipelines are the last 
critical link in the delivery chain that brings natural gas 
from the wellhead all the way to the burner tip.
    So, basically, AGA's members are the face of the industry. 
They live in the communities that they serve. They interact 
daily with their customers and State regulators who oversee 
pipeline safety. And their customers are their neighbors, their 
family, and their friends. As such, pipeline safety is and must 
be our number-one priority.
    The primary safety tool that gas distribution operators use 
is DIMP, Distribution Integrity Management Program. DIMP is a 
regulatory process that allows an operator to develop a safety 
plan that addresses the unique operating characteristics of the 
individual pipeline system and prioritizes the work to 
strengthen that particular system.
    Upgrading distribution pipeline systems is also an 
important pipeline safety component. Currently, 43 States and 
the District of Columbia have expedited pipeline replacement 
programs, and in just the last 17 years, these replacement 
programs have allowed operators to reduce the amount of cast 
iron and bare steel by over 50 percent, replacing those lines 
with plastic which will increase safety, reliability, and limit 
methane release.
    The natural gas distribution industry has proven it can 
simultaneously increase natural gas delivery and improve 
safety. But more needs to be done. AGA believes that the 
provisions within the committee-passed bipartisan Promoting 
Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety, PIPES, Act of 
2023 will substantially improve pipeline safety by limiting 
deaths, serious injuries, property damage, and environmental 
impacts caused by unintended excavation damage; strengthening 
criminal penalties for those who sabotage and intentionally 
damage pipeline operations; studying how natural gas, hydrogen 
blending, and distribution systems worldwide are safely 
operated; creating a voluntary information safety system to 
collect and share best practices and lessons learned with 
sufficient legal and regulatory safe harbors to guarantee 
industry participation; and establishing a 4-year 
reauthorization period so that PHMSA and the industry have 
sufficient time to complete work authorized in previous 
reauthorizations.
    While not in the bill, AGA strongly supports creating a 
regulatory process to identify technology alternatives that, if 
utilized, will meet the intent of existing pipeline safety 
regulations and provide equal, if not greater, levels of 
safety.
    AGA and its members support fact-based, reasonable, and 
practical updates to pipeline safety legislation that build 
upon the lessons learned and the evolving technologies. And in 
that spirit, AGA looks forward to our continued work with this 
committee, as well as the House Energy and Commerce Committee 
and the Senate Commerce Committee, to finalize pipeline safety 
reauthorization.
    Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this 
hearing.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [Ms. Sames' prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Christina Sames, Senior Vice President, Safety, 
    Operations, Engineering, and Security, American Gas Association
    The American Gas Association (AGA) is pleased to provide our input 
for the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's Subcommittee on 
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials pipeline safety hearing 
on May 7, 2024. AGA shares the same goals as safety advocates, the 
public, pipeline sector industry partners, and Congress: Ensuring 
America's pipeline system remains the safest, most secure, and most 
reliable in the world. To that end, we applaud the Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee's bipartisan work to draft, negotiate, and 
pass the Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety (PIPES) 
Act of 2023 (H.R. 6494). We look forward to working with the Committee, 
and all other House and Senate congressional partners, as pipeline 
safety reauthorization makes its way through the legislative process.
    AGA, founded in 1918, represents more than 200 local energy 
companies that deliver clean natural gas throughout the United States. 
There are more than 77 million residential, commercial, and industrial 
natural gas customers in the U.S., of which 96 percent--more than 74 
million customers--receive their gas from AGA members. AGA advocates 
for natural gas utility companies and their customers and provides a 
broad range of programs and services for member natural gas pipelines, 
marketers, gatherers, international natural gas companies, and industry 
associates. Today, natural gas meets more than one-third of the U.S.' 
energy needs. Natural gas pipelines are an essential part of the 
nation's energy infrastructure. Indeed, natural gas is delivered to 
customers through a safe, approximately 2.7-million-mile underground 
pipeline system, including 2.3 million miles of local utility 
distribution pipelines, 100,000 miles of gathering lines, and 300,000 
miles of transmission pipelines providing service to more than 189 
million Americans.
                Our Number One Priority: Pipeline Safety
    Distribution pipelines are operated by natural gas utilities, or 
``local distribution companies (LDCs).'' The gas utility's distribution 
pipes are the last, critical link in the natural gas delivery chain 
that brings natural gas from the wellhead to the burner tip. AGA member 
utilities are the ``face of the gas industry,'' embedded in the 
communities they serve, and interact daily with customers and the state 
regulators who oversee pipeline safety locally. The distribution 
industry takes very seriously the responsibility of continuing to 
deliver natural gas to our families, neighbors, and business partners 
as safely, reliably, and responsibly as possible.
    The domestic shale revolution has resulted in an abundant supply of 
clean, affordable, and reliable natural gas. This robust supply has 
translated into stable natural gas prices and an increasing number of 
utility customers who use this resource for residential and commercial 
applications like cooking, space and water heating, and manufacturing. 
Last year alone, natural gas utilities added 730,000 customers and 
20,700 miles of pipeline to serve these new customers. Alongside this 
tremendous opportunity comes the absolute necessity of operating safe 
and reliable pipeline infrastructure to help ensure dependable natural 
gas delivery to homes, businesses, and essential facilities like 
hospitals. Every year, the industry invests $33 billion on the safety 
of our natural gas pipeline systems. Unquestionably, pipeline safety is 
our industry's number one priority, and through critical partnerships 
with state and federal regulators, legislators, and other stakeholders, 
AGA members are constantly working to improve pipeline safety, 
integrity, and resiliency.
Integrity Management
    LDCs use ``Distribution Integrity Management Programs'' (DIMP) to 
manage systems that consist of many different types of material, of 
different ages, at different pressures, and in different environments. 
DIMP is a comprehensive and risk-based regulation that provides an 
added layer of protection to the prescriptive federal regulations, 
state regulations that go beyond federal regulations, and voluntary LDC 
operated safety programs. DIMP takes into consideration the wide 
differences that exist between natural gas LDCs and allows an operator 
to develop a safety plan that is appropriate for the unique operating 
characteristics of its individual distribution delivery system. DIMP 
requires all LDCs to understand their system (design, material, 
operating conditions, environment, maintenance, operating history, 
etc.); manage the threats that could affect the integrity of the system 
(excavation damage, corrosion, natural force damage, material defects, 
etc.); assess, prioritize, and mitigate risks; evaluate and alter as 
necessary program standards to ensure effectiveness; and report on 
performance to regulators.
    DIMP helps LDCs prioritize pipeline replacement work and other 
measures that strengthen gas system safety. Industry, state regulators, 
commissioners, and the U.S. Department of Transportation's Pipeline & 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) have collectively 
prioritized pipeline replacement. Currently, 43 states and the District 
of Columbia have established rate mechanisms that allow operators to 
replace pipe faster. As a result, in the past 17 years alone, cast iron 
pipeline use has declined nearly 60 percent, and cathodically 
unprotected and bare steel pipelines have decreased over 50 percent. 
These systems have been replaced by modern plastic pipelines which 
provide increased gas utility system safety, resiliency, affordability, 
and environmental protection.
    LDCs have demonstrated they can increase natural gas delivery while 
simultaneously improving safety. PHMSA data shows that significant 
distribution incidents, those resulting in death, injury or significant 
property damage, and serious incidents, those that result in a death or 
injury, have declined over the past 20 years. Significant incidents on 
natural gas distribution pipelines have declined 41 percent and serious 
incidents have declined nearly 47 percent. Notably, the primary cause 
of these incidents is excavation damage, which accounted for 34 percent 
of significant incidents and 25 percent of serious incidents in the 
past 20 years. While we have seen improvement, one incident is one too 
many. We look forward to working with all relevant partners to enhance 
pipeline safety and further reduce incidents.
Pipeline Safety Management Systems (PSMS)
    LDCs are at the forefront of voluntarily implementing PSMS, a 
``Plan-Do-Check-Act'' cycle that helps operators continuously and 
comprehensively track and improve their safety performance within 10 
specific areas. These actions help the industry drive towards its zero-
incident goal. Operators that implement PSMS have better information on 
the safety of their systems, learn where they can improve safety, and 
measure their progress toward improved safety performance. Industry and 
other stakeholders, including PHMSA, believe that voluntary adoption of 
PSMS will enhance pipeline safety and improve safety culture. AGA 
supports the voluntary adoption of PSMS and the development of systems 
that promote self-disclosure and a collaborative culture between 
regulators and operators. The AGA Board of Directors has recommended 
that all AGA members implement PSMS in their organizations.
    AGA provides various resources to help operators in their PSMS 
journey. This includes a PSMS Executive Steering Committee, PSMS 
Discussion Group, PSMS annual workshop, PSMS Portal which contains 
materials and lessons learned from incidents and near misses, an 
Operational Risk Data Committee, Quality Management technical 
committee, and an annual Operations Conference. AGA also has various 
initiatives related to PSMS. This includes AGA's in-person Peer Review 
Program and Virtual Assessment Program which allows natural gas 
utilities to observe their peers, share leading practices, and identify 
opportunities to better serve customers and communities. Each review 
involves AGA staff and subject matter experts from member utilities who 
are dedicated to helping the host utility improve.
Demonstrated Commitment to Safety
    Safety is a joint effort which engages customers, regulators, and 
policymakers at every level. The natural gas industry invests over 
$60,000 every minute to enhance the safety of natural gas distribution 
and transmission systems. Furthermore, AGA and its member companies 
have adopted a Commitment to Enhancing Safety, a public declaration 
that LDC's are committed to collaborating with federal and state 
officials, emergency responders, excavators, consumers, safety 
advocates and the public to improve the industry's already longstanding 
record of safe, reliable, and efficient operation. This document 
reflects LDCs' willingness to make safety an intrinsic part of their 
core business functions, including pipeline design and construction, 
operations, maintenance and training, and more public facing programs 
like workforce development, pipeline stakeholder engagement, and first 
responder outreach. Implementing these priorities has enhanced pipeline 
safety, improved LDC operations, lowered utility costs (particularly on 
low-income customers), increased public accountability, and reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions. Overall, our commitment underscores the steps 
LDCs take every day to ensure America's 2.3 million miles of natural 
gas distribution pipeline operate safely and reliably.
               Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Priorities
    AGA and its members support fact-based, reasonable, flexible, and 
practicable updates to pipeline safety regulation that build upon 
lessons learned and evolving improvements to pipeline safety and 
related programs and technology. In that spirit, AGA wishes to 
highlight 5 high-level principles, 4 of them included in the Promoting 
Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety (PIPES) Act of 2023 (H.R. 
6494), as the House-Senate reauthorization process continues.
    Support Limiting Pipeline Excavation Damage Incidents (Section 18). 
Excavation damage is the primary cause of distribution pipeline 
incidents. According to PHMSA data, in the past 20 years, excavation 
damage incidents on all pipelines have resulted in 66 deaths, 248 
injuries, and $666 million in property damage. 42 of these deaths, 199 
of the injuries, and $269 million in property damage was due to 
excavation damages on distribution pipelines. These often tragic 
incidents are preventable. States that have healthy excavation damage 
prevention and enforcement programs typically experience lower rates of 
damages to pipelines. AGA supports directing PHMSA to incentivize 
states to adopt One Call program leading practices, derived from the 
best state excavation damage programs, and condition their grants to 
State One Call programs based upon adoption of these best practices. We 
are confident this program will save lives.
    Support Pipeline Technology Alternatives. Modern pipeline safety 
technologies--not contemplated when many pipeline safety regulations 
were first implemented--can, if deployed, meet the intent of these 
older existing regulations and improve the overall safety of the 
natural gas, hazardous liquid, underground storage, and liquefied 
natural gas infrastructure. For example, satellite technology has 
advanced to the point where it can be used comply with leak detection 
regulation and breakaway meter technologies and excess flow valves can 
stop the flow of gas if a meter is hit, eliminating the need for 
physical meter protection barriers. AGA supports a PHMSA regulatory 
process to identify technology alternatives that, if utilized, will 
meet the intent of existing pipeline safety regulations and provide an 
equal or greater level of pipeline safety. This concept is not 
addressed in H.R. 6494 and we hope it will be included at a later 
stage.
    Strengthen Criminal Penalties for Damage to Pipelines (Section 21). 
Natural gas utilities are experiencing an uptick in criminal attacks to 
property, equipment and facilities. These activities range from 
gunshots targeting pipeline equipment, IEDs placed on gas delivery 
equipment, and the damaging of facilities and equipment necessary for 
safe natural gas delivery. These activities are not only hazardous to 
the safety and property of the public and member company employees, 
they threaten an LDC's ability to deliver natural gas to thousands of 
homes, hospitals, schools, government and military facilities, and 
other critical infrastructure customers. AGA supports increased 
criminal penalties on bad actors who intentionally damage, destroy or 
impair pipelines and pipeline facilities, including those under 
construction.
    Hydrogen-Natural Gas Blending R&D Study (Section 20). Hydrogen is 
an emerging solution for achieving gas LDC energy storage and 
decarbonization goals. Natural gas projects in North America and 
worldwide demonstrate successful blending of hydrogen into the existing 
natural gas distribution network, or utilizing natural gas that has a 
naturally occurring higher hydrogen content. Hawai'i Gas has 
successfully utilized a natural gas hydrogen blend of 15% for decades 
and many systems overseas are operating at approximately a 20% blend. 
It is important to understand how companies operating natural gas 
distribution systems with a higher hydrogen content are operating these 
systems safely. As such, we suggest GAO conduct a review of natural gas 
distribution systems worldwide that utilize hydrogen-natural gas 
blending applications, or utilize gas with a higher hydrogen content, 
to identify processes, materials, and standards the operators have 
implemented to operate safely. The results of this study will help 
underpin the safety of ongoing domestic hydrogen R&D and blending 
operations.
    Authorize a Pipeline Safety Voluntary Information-Sharing System 
(Section 24). Congress should authorize a Voluntary Information-sharing 
System (VIS) based on the recommendations of the public advisory 
committee formed pursuant to the 2016 pipeline safety reauthorization 
law. A VIS will engage multiple stakeholders (e.g., government, 
industry, and pipeline safety NGOs) to collect and share best practices 
and lessons learned, promote improved pipeline safety, and will 
importantly include sufficient legal and regulatory safe harbors for 
information sharing to guarantee industry participation. VIS will 
support industry's implementation of Pipeline Safety Management Systems 
by encouraging information sharing and facilitating understanding and 
management of pipeline safety risks.
    4-Year Reauthorization for PHMSA's Pipeline Safety Program (Section 
2). PHMSA's Pipeline Safety program was reauthorized most recently in 
the PIPES Act of 2016 and PIPES Act of 2020. With PHMSA's Pipeline 
Safety program expiring again in 2023, the frequency of reauthorization 
has been squeezed to just 3 years. This interval is inappropriate given 
the significant time it takes to conduct studies, publish reports, and 
move reauthorization priorities from legislation to Proposed 
Rulemaking, address comments, and develop and publish Final Rules. In 
acknowledgment of the time required to conduct studies, publish 
reports, and develop a feasible, reasonable, cost effective, and 
practical rulemaking (including stakeholder input), and in keeping with 
reauthorization intervals that preceded the PIPES Act of 2016 (1996, 
2002, 2006, 2011), Congress should reauthorize PHMSA's Pipeline Safety 
program for not less than 4 years.
                               Conclusion
    America's gas utilities' commitment to pipeline safety relies on 
sound engineering principles and best in class technology, a trained 
professional workforce, effective community relationships, and a strong 
partnership with state pipeline safety authorities and PHMSA. As 
pipeline safety reauthorization legislation is drafted this year, AGA 
encourages Congress to work in a bipartisan fashion to move reasonable 
and consensus changes to pipeline safety law and regulation, support 
PHMSA's primary role as pipeline safety regulator, and recognize the 
great strides in pipeline safety engineering and operating practices 
that pipeline companies are putting into practice across the country. 
Pipeline sector companies and their trade associations stand ready to 
assist in this process with real world operations, engineering and 
safety data and experience. Please use us as a resource.

    Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
    Mr. Rorick, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your oral 
testimony.

TESTIMONY OF ROBIN RORICK, VICE PRESIDENT OF MIDSTREAM POLICY, 
                  AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

    Mr. Rorick. Thank you, Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member 
Larsen, Ranking Member Wilson, and esteemed members of the 
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify this 
morning.
    I would like to start by offering my condolences on the 
loss of Ranking Member Payne. My thoughts are with his family.
    My name is Robin Rorick, and I am the vice president of 
midstream policy at the American Petroleum Institute. On behalf 
of API, we appreciate the opportunity to testify as part of 
this important hearing addressing pipeline safety and the 
reauthorization of the Department of Transportation's Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.
    Every day, our Nation's network of more than 500,000 miles 
of transmission pipelines transports the oil, natural gas, 
refined product, and low-carbon energy that fuel American life. 
America has led the world in reducing carbon dioxide emissions 
over the past two decades, even as our industry has made the 
United States the world's leading producer of oil and natural 
gas.
    The air Americans breathe is cleaner because of innovative 
improvements to the way energy is produced, transported, 
refined, and consumed. But we need pragmatic, bipartisan energy 
policies that support the reasonable development of our 
Nation's oil and natural gas resources, including policymaking 
that encourages investment in critical energy infrastructure 
like pipelines.
    Pipelines, one of the safest, most environmentally 
responsible ways to transport energy to consumers, are in every 
U.S. State, and our industry is committed to zero incident 
safety culture. Even as barrels delivered in pipeline mileage 
continues to increase, this strong safety record is improving. 
Over the last 5 years, total liquid pipeline incidents 
decreased 23 percent, with 87 fewer incidents in 2023 compared 
to 2019, while incidents impacting people or the environment 
decreased 7 percent. We welcome effective policymaking to 
continue to build upon this progress and further improve 
pipeline safety.
    We applaud this committee's passage of a comprehensive 
bipartisan bill, the Promoting Innovation in Pipeline 
Efficiency and Safety, or PIPES, Act of 2023. The bill the 
committee passed in December of last year contains many 
important policy measures that API is confident will make our 
Nation's pipeline network safer and more reliable.
    In particular, we are pleased the bill requires PHMSA to 
execute a more timely and frequent review process for industry 
standards that are incorporated by reference into PHMSA 
regulations. There are more than 650 references to API 
standards in Federal regulations. These standards are revised 
and improved every 5 years, at a minimum, through API's 
American National Standards Institute-accredited process, and 
regulators struggle to keep pace with the advances in pipeline 
safety, technology, and modern engineering practices that are 
regularly incorporated into these standards.
    Today, approximately 50 percent of the instances where 
PHMSA cites API standards are out of date and do not reference 
the most recent edition. If passed, this bill would ensure that 
PHMSA is responsive to industry standards updates to maximize 
safety and ensure regulations keep pace with advances in 
engineering and technology.
    The bill also directs the Secretary of Transportation to 
allow pipeline operators to establish storage tank inspection 
frequency on risk-based engineering principles, advances 
pipeline safety through the creation of a voluntary 
information-sharing system, strengthens protections for 
pipeline infrastructure by criminalizing activities that cause 
a defect in or disrupt operation of a pipeline, and encourages 
innovation and investment in a cleaner energy future by 
requiring PHMSA to promulgate rulemakings for CO2 pipelines, as 
well as the safe use of composite pipe materials.
    The bill also recognizes the important conservation efforts 
that pipeline operators have embraced.
    API believes this bill would make our Nation's pipelines 
safer and more reliable, but we know you share jurisdictions 
with other committees, and conversations on reauthorization are 
ongoing. We urge you to continue advocating for the provisions 
I have mentioned, but also to consider supporting language 
introduced by other committees that would reauthorize the 
technology pilot program and provide clarity as to what agency 
regulates in-plant piping at refineries.
    As a final matter, our industry is actively engaged in the 
regulatory process to help PHMSA craft a workable final leak 
detection and repair rule, but we believe the initial proposal 
went beyond the scope of what Congress intended. We appreciated 
the letter Chairman Graves and Chairman Nehls sent to PHMSA 
last year, raising many similar concerns. And as we await the 
final rule, I urge you to continue to conduct oversight of this 
process. This rulemaking demonstrates the significance and 
impact of the reauthorization process, and we appreciate the 
opportunity to participate in the discussion of the bill on the 
table today.
    In closing, let me stress that pipeline safety is not a 
partisan issue, and our industry needs effective legislation to 
meet the challenge of answering ever-growing energy demand 
while advancing safety and leading the world in emissions 
reductions. API appreciates the opportunity to engage in 
today's hearing and the committee's important work to advance a 
bipartisan pipeline safety bill.
    Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Larsen, Ranking Member 
Wilson, and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my 
prepared statement, and I look forward to the conversation that 
we are going to have today.
    [Mr. Rorick's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Robin Rorick, Vice President of Midstream Policy, 
                      American Petroleum Institute
                              Introduction
    Chairman Graves, Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Larsen and esteemed 
members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 
this morning. My name is Robin Rorick, and I am the Vice President of 
Midstream Policy at the American Petroleum Institute (API). On behalf 
of API \1\, we appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony as part 
of this important hearing addressing pipeline safety and the 
reauthorization of the U.S. Department of Transportation's Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ API represents all segments of America's oil and natural gas 
industry, which supports more than 11 million U.S. jobs and is backed 
by a growing grassroots movement of millions of Americans. Our nearly 
600 members produce, process, and distribute the majority of the 
nation's energy, and participate in the API Energy Excellence  
program, which is accelerating environmental and safety progress by 
fostering new technologies and transparent reporting. API was formed in 
1919 as a standards-setting organization and has developed more than 
800 standards to enhance operational and environmental safety, 
efficiency, and sustainability. Through the API Climate Action 
Framework and related initiatives such as The Environmental 
Partnership, significant efforts are being conducted by the oil and 
natural gas industry to balance the increasing demand for affordable 
and reliable energy products with environmental performance and 
stewardship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Every day, our nation's network of more than 500,000 miles of 
transmission pipelines transports the energy products we rely on. The 
oil, natural gas, refined products and low carbon energy transported by 
pipelines fuel modern life. America has led the world in reducing 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions over the past two decades--even as our 
industry has made the United States the world's leading producer of oil 
and natural gas. The air Americans breathe is cleaner because of 
innovations to the way energy is produced, transported, refined and 
consumed. These improvements have driven significant declines in 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and criteria air pollutants, including 
nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. We are also 
tackling the methane challenge head on. But we need pragmatic, 
bipartisan energy policies that support the responsible development of 
our nation's oil and natural gas resources, including policymaking that 
encourages investment in critical energy infrastructure like pipelines.
    Fully harnessing American energy, including bringing the benefits 
of oil, natural gas and low carbon energy to all parts of the country, 
depends on new and existing infrastructure. Pipelines--one of the 
safest, most environmentally responsible ways to transport energy to 
consumers--are in every U.S. state, totaling roughly three million 
miles of largely underground gathering, transmission and distribution 
pipelines. Our industry is committed to achieving an operating standard 
of zero incidents through comprehensive safety management systems and 
robust safety programs, including the deployment of advanced inspection 
and leak detection technologies. Over the last five years, total 
liquids pipeline incidents decreased 23%, with 87 fewer incidents in 
2023 compared to 2019, and liquids pipeline incidents impacting people 
or the environment decreased seven percent. Operations and maintenance 
incidents impacting people or the environment declined 54% between 2019 
and 2023. Total equipment failure incidents impacting people or the 
environment decreased 50% between 2019 and 2023. These safety 
improvements come as our country has built more pipelines and moved 
more energy resources, with liquids pipeline mileage and barrels 
delivered both increasing five percent since 2018.\2\ As our industry 
continues to work with federal, state and local policymakers and 
regulators to protect the environment and communities where we live and 
work, we welcome effective and efficient policymaking to help 
continuously improve pipeline safety while unleashing the power of 
America's oil and natural gas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 2023-2025 Pipeline Excellence Strategic Plan & 2022 Performance 
Report, 2023, https://www.api.org/-/media/APIWebsite/oil-and-natural-
gas/primers/API_Pipeline_Report-NRS-Spreads.pdf
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             API Applauds the Bipartisan PIPES Act of 2023
    As Congress considers the reauthorization of PHMSA and pipeline 
safety programs over the coming year, we encourage policymakers to 
enact legislation that maximizes our industry's investments in people 
and technology to effectively advance pipeline safety. To that end, we 
applaud this Committee's passage of a comprehensive, bipartisan bill, 
the Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety (PIPES) Act 
of 2023.The bill the Committee passed in December of last year contains 
many important policy measures that API is confident will make our 
nation's pipeline network safer and more reliable.
    Importantly, the bill requires PHMSA to execute a more timely and 
frequent review process for industry standards that are incorporated by 
reference into PHMSA regulations. Since 1924, API has been the leader 
in developing voluntary, consensus-based, internationally recognized 
standards covering all segments of the oil and natural gas industry. 
Our standards are the most widely cited petroleum industry standards by 
state regulators, with 240 API standards cited over 3,800 times in 
state-based regulations. There are more than 650 references to API 
standards in federal regulations.\3\ These standards are revised and 
improved every five years at a minimum through API's American National 
Standards Institute-accredited process, and regulators struggle to keep 
pace with the advances in pipeline safety technology and modern 
engineering practices that are regularly incorporated into these 
standards. Today, approximately 50% of the instances where PHMSA cites 
API standards are out of date and do not reference the most recent 
edition. Thus, critical regulations do not reflect advances in safety, 
technology and engineering, and pipeline operators must comply with the 
often-antiquated practices referenced in federal regulations. If 
passed, this bill would ensure that PHMSA is responsive to industry 
standards updates to maximize safety and ensure regulations keep pace 
with advances in engineering and technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ OGP Report No. 426, Regulators' Use of Standards, March 2010
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The bill also directs the Secretary of Transportation to allow 
pipeline operators to establish storage tank inspection frequency on 
risk-based engineering principles. Current regulations cite outdated 
practices and industry standards, requiring internal inspections to be 
conducted more often than may be necessary to maintain them safely. 
This unnecessarily puts workers in harm's way, generates undesirable 
emissions, requires operators to take tanks out of service and fails to 
reflect current industry leading approaches. Directing PHMSA to update 
its regulations concerning tank inspections will maintain the current 
level of safety while minimizing safety risks for workers and 
environmental impacts.
    The legislation will also help improve pipeline safety through the 
creation of a voluntary information-sharing system operators can use to 
gather incident data and share lessons learned in a confidential 
environment. We appreciate the information protections established in 
the bill, which are critical to encourage operator participation, so 
the voluntary system can function as Congress intends. The Act also 
strengthens protections for pipeline infrastructure by criminalizing 
activities that cause a defect in or disrupt operation of a pipeline. 
Finally, the bill encourages innovation and investment in a cleaner 
energy future by requiring PHMSA to promulgate a rulemaking within one 
year of enactment on pipeline transportation of carbon dioxide, which 
is critical to our energy future, and directing PHMSA to complete a 
study and rulemaking on the safe use of composite pipe materials. The 
unique properties of composite pipeline materials could be useful for 
retrofitting existing systems for conversion of service from 
transporting hydrocarbons to new fuels as well as to support the 
buildout of new infrastructure, but PHMSA must allow for broader 
acceptance and application without requiring use of the special permit 
program. We commend the Committee for taking these critical steps.
    In addition to these important pipeline safety policy measures, API 
appreciates the Committee's recognition of the important conservation 
efforts that pipeline operators have embraced. Many API members are 
using non-traditional methods, such as conservation and habitat 
management programs, to support pollinators and native species while 
maintaining their pipeline rights of way. Clarifying in statute that 
these alternative approaches to maintaining pipeline rights of way are 
safe and encouraged could lead to broader adoption.
          Proposals to Further Improve Safety and Reliability
    This legislation is a strong starting point, but we also encourage 
members of this Committee to consider supporting additional provisions 
as you work towards final passage of a bill. In particular, we would 
like to note two provisions that are included in other pipeline safety 
legislation passed by your counterparts at the Energy and Commerce 
Committee, which we believe will complement your draft bill and work to 
improve pipeline safety.
    API encourages this Committee to consider supporting language 
clarifying who has jurisdiction over short segments of pipe within gas 
processing and refining facilities, also known as ``in-plant'' piping. 
These pipelines are operated by plant personnel, run between facility 
buildings and are less than one mile in length. Liquid in-plant piping 
is regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) through its Process Safety Management program as directed by 
Congress in statute. However, Congress failed to provide similar clear 
instructions when it comes to gas in-plant piping. Historically, PHMSA 
has deferred to OSHA as the primary regulator given its expertise on 
the liquid side, but the lack of statutory clarity has created a vacuum 
that certain regional PHMSA offices have tried to exploit to expand 
their jurisdiction. This regulatory grey area has led to confusion 
among pipeline operators who need certainty when it comes to what 
standards apply and what inspection schedule to follow. We recommend 
the Committee create an exemption for gas processing facilities that 
mirrors the one for liquid pipelines to provide operators with 
regulatory certainty and consistency while still ensuring safety.
    API also urges this Committee to support efforts to reauthorize 
PHMSA's technology pilot program, which was created by the PIPES Act of 
2020. The program was intended to give operators a chance to 
demonstrate and apply proven technologies and engineering practices 
through a time limited process distinct from the special permit 
program. Unfortunately, no operators have applied since the program was 
created because PHMSA imposed numerous application requirements that 
made the process too burdensome to warrant participation. Reauthorizing 
the program with clarifying language to ensure it is run as Congress 
intended and gives operators the opportunity to prove the use case for 
new technologies could produce significant safety benefits by proving 
out new technologies for broader use.
    As the Committee works with other authorizers towards a final bill, 
we encourage you to support inclusion of these important provisions 
that would complement your bill.
                Related Critical Pipeline Safety Issues
    As Congress considers legislation to reauthorize PHMSA, we urge 
this Committee to conduct diligent oversight of the agency's efforts to 
issue new regulations related to leak detection and repair (LDAR). In 
particular, ensuring PHMSA conducts a thorough analysis of the costs 
and benefits of its regulations is critical to sound policymaking. 
While API supports PHMSA's goal of addressing methane emissions--our 
industry is constantly innovating and investing in new technologies to 
prevent leaks and reduce our emissions--we believe the current proposed 
rule was written such that the benefits in certain instances do not 
justify the costs. Our industry is actively engaged in the regulatory 
process to help PHMSA craft a workable final LDAR rule that is more 
effective and efficient by considering the latest technology and 
management systems to reduce emissions. However, as written, there are 
significant hurdles that must be overcome to reach that result.
    This rulemaking is a direct result of the Protecting Our 
Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety (PIPES) Act, a 
pipeline safety bill Congress passed in 2020. Unfortunately, PHMSA 
chose to go beyond the scope of what Congress originally intended by 
extending the application of LDAR requirements to gas gathering lines 
in Class 1 locations and liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities, 
setting the leak detection threshold so low as to risk being triggered 
by emission sources unrelated to the pipeline system.
    PHMSA's attempt to expand their proposed LDAR rule to include 
gathering lines illustrates the importance of PHMSA conducting accurate 
cost-benefit analyses. In the rulemaking process, PHMSA relied on a 
flawed cost-benefit analysis that failed to include significant 
compliance costs that would be imposed on the industry resulting in a 
highly inaccurate justification for the proposed rule. If enacted, 
these regulations would result in limited emissions reductions in 
comparison to the billions of dollars in compliance costs on the 
gathering line industry, costs disproportionately borne by small 
companies that operate some of the lowest risk pipelines in the U.S.
    API supports the agency's desire to make gathering lines safer, but 
PHMSA should be obligated to consider more practical alternatives that 
would still achieve the stated pipeline safety objectives and would 
remain true to Congressional intent. Section 113 of the PIPES Act of 
2020, which directed PHMSA to issue an LDAR rule, does not apply to 
Type C gathering lines in Class 1 locations. These gathering lines only 
recently became subject to the basic leak survey and repair 
requirements in Part 192. API remains committed to maintaining 
gathering line safety through a risk-based approach, but we believe the 
decision to include gathering lines in the LDAR rule was premature and 
goes beyond the scope of what Congress directed the agency to do in the 
PIPES Act of 2020. In addition to failing to consider all the rule's 
costs, PHMSA failed to demonstrate any benefits that could justify some 
portions of the rule. PHMSA has not offered a legitimate safety or 
environmental rationale for establishing a highly conservative and 
overly burdensome leak detection threshold that could potentially be 
triggered by non-pipeline, human-caused sources of emissions. This 
dovetails with PHMSA's decision to conflate all leaks with hazardous 
leaks. The proposed leak detection standards impose a detectability 
threshold far more conservative than comparable EPA requirements under 
the New Sources Performance Standards, prohibit the use of many proven 
technologies and do not advance safety or environmental protection.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ As explained in the comments submitted by API and other 
industry stakeholders, PHMSA's preliminary risk assessment for the LDAR 
rule contains many of the same defects that led to the invalidation of 
the rupture-mitigation valve requirements for gathering lines in GPA 
Midstream Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Transp., 67 F.4th 1188 (D.C. 
Cir. 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    PHMSA' s current efforts to promulgate an LDAR rule provide 
multiple lessons for its authorizing Committees to consider as work 
continues on a reauthorization bill. PHMSA has held two meetings of its 
Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee to discuss this important rule, but 
industry has seen little indication that the final rule will take into 
account the feedback that API and other stakeholders provided to make 
the final rule more aligned with the agency's statutory mandate. It is 
vital that Congress offers as much clarity as possible for PHMSA when 
directing them to issue regulations to ensure that the final outcomes 
are achievable and implementable. In addition, PHMSA must continue to 
be held accountable for complying with the cost-benefit requirements 
included in the risk assessment provision of the Pipeline Safety Act to 
ensure the agency's rulemakings are implementable and achieve the 
intended improvements in safety.
    With the LDAR example in mind, API urges the Committee to pay close 
attention to the agency's CO2 pipeline safety proposal, which is 
currently under review at the Office of Management and Budget. Your 
bill includes important guidance and guard rails for the contents of 
such a rule, but it appears likely that PHMSA will publish an NPRM 
prior to passage of the bill.
    Currently, there are more than 5,000 miles of CO2 pipeline 
nationwide, transporting approximately 80 million metric tons of CO2 
each year. Industry has been operating CO2 pipelines safely for more 
than four decades, with no fatalities associated with a CO2 pipeline 
incident. This safety record is possible because of the comprehensive 
existing regulatory framework for CO2 pipelines. 49 CFR Part 195 
regulates the design and construction, operation and maintenance, and 
corrosion prevention and mitigation of supercritical CO2 pipelines. In 
addition to these regulations, there are many existing industry 
standards and response guidance documents that can be applied by CO2 
pipeline operators. Last year, API and the Liquid Energy Pipeline 
Association, with input from the National Association of State Fire 
Marshals, published an emergency response guide for first responders. 
Research and standards development are ongoing as industry looks to 
build out CO2 pipeline infrastructure to help reach climate goals.
    Given CO2 pipelines' safety record and the robust existing body of 
regulations and best practices, API recommends that this new rulemaking 
focus on expanding the existing regulatory program to encompass gas 
phase transportation of CO2 as well as supercritical. PHMSA should also 
ensure that the rule is technically feasible, risk based and scalable 
to reflect the diverse range of CO2 pipeline projects and applications 
that operators are considering.
    Carbon capture and sequestration will play a critical role in 
reducing emissions and meeting climate goals. Pipelines to transport 
captured CO2 will be integral, and PHMSA's rulemaking should support 
rather than hinder the buildout of additional infrastructure. API will 
provide comments and engage in the rulemaking process, and we urge 
PHMSA's authorizing committees to engage in this process as well to 
ensure the rule is fit for purpose and aligns with policymakers' goals.
             Safely Maintaining America's Energy Leadership
    The United States is now the largest producer of oil and natural 
gas, which are critical energy resources here at home as well as for 
our allies abroad. And we continue to lead the world in reducing 
emissions.
    These advances come not from government intervention but through 
industry innovation and investment. For America to seize upon this 
moment of energy leadership with its abundant natural resources, 
Congress must enact pipeline safety policy that is fit-for-purpose and 
based on sound science and engineering principles. Pipelines are an 
essential cog in the energy supply chain. They have enabled our 
country's record-breaking energy production by transporting oil, 
refined products, low carbon energy sources and natural gas in one of 
the safest and most environmentally friendly modes possible. While the 
industry is proud of its safety record, it remains committed to 
continual safety improvements as it strives to meet the shared goal of 
zero incidents.
    Pipeline safety is not a partisan issue, and API is eager to 
partner with legislators and regulators at both the state and federal 
levels to ensure pipelines are regulated effectively and operated 
safely. Importantly, though, any regulations must be balanced to ensure 
that the industry can achieve these objectives while continuing to 
bring affordable, reliable energy to American families and businesses 
to meet growing energy demand, support our domestic economy and provide 
good-paying jobs. Only with effective legislation like the Promoting 
Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety Act of 2023 can our 
industry meet the dual challenge of answering ever-growing energy 
demand while leading the world in emissions reductions.
    Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member and distinguished members of the 
Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I look forward to 
the continued bipartisan efforts to address critical issues of pipeline 
safety that I have outlined today, and I would be happy to answer any 
questions you may have at this time.

    Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
    Mr. Caram, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your 
testimony.

   TESTIMONY OF AND BILL CARAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PIPELINE 
                          SAFETY TRUST

    Mr. Caram. Thank you, Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member 
Wilson, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the subcommittee, 
for inviting me to speak today.
    I also want to take a moment to acknowledge the passing of 
Ranking Member Payne. Representative Payne was a great leader 
with whom I feel lucky to have worked. He will be missed, and 
my heart goes out to his family, friends, and colleagues.
    My organization was formed after the Olympic pipeline 
tragedy stole the lives of three boys in Bellingham, 
Washington, in 1999. The U.S. Justice Department was so aghast 
at the negligence of the pipeline company and the lack of 
oversight from the Government that they asked the courts to set 
aside money from the settlement to create the Pipeline Safety 
Trust as an independent national watchdog. Our vision is for no 
other community to endure the senseless grief that Bellingham 
had to experience from a pipeline tragedy, though sadly, there 
have been many pipeline tragedies and disasters since 
Bellingham.
    Since this subcommittee held its last pipeline safety 
hearing about 14 months ago, 24 people have died from pipeline 
failures in the United States. In fact, 2023 was the deadliest 
year for pipeline safety in America in at least a decade. I 
stated before this subcommittee that we were not making 
progress on pipeline safety, and I repeat that statement today. 
Total fatalities, total incidents, and significant incidents 
show a statistically flat trend line with no real progress. I 
would like to share a few stories of recent pipeline failures 
that highlight some of the roadblocks towards safer pipelines.
    In Bellingham, Washington, we are planning, along with the 
families of the three boys who died in the Olympic pipeline 
tragedy almost exactly 25 years ago, a commemoration of that 
horrendous day. Just a few months ago, amid this planning, the 
pipeline failed again, this time spilling 25,000 gallons of 
gasoline just 500 feet from an elementary school. Thank 
goodness it wasn't during school hours and didn't ignite. The 
failure was likely due to corrosion, which an effective 
integrity management program should eliminate.
    Over the past 20 years, regulators and industry have 
focused on reducing failures through integrity management in 
high-consequence areas. The theory is sound: focus efforts 
where the most harm to people and the environment could occur 
by identifying all potential risks in those areas, and mitigate 
those risks. Unfortunately, integrity management programs do 
not seem to have lived up to their promise. Incident rates 
within high-consequence areas are as high or higher than those 
outside HCAs.
    Just last month, the same carbon dioxide pipeline that 
ruptured in Satartia, Mississippi, and sent nearly 50 people to 
the hospital in 2020 failed again, this time in Sulphur, 
Louisiana. Luckily, this happened when residents who live less 
than 500 feet from the failure were not home, or this could 
have been another tragic story. It took Denbury, now owned by 
ExxonMobil, more than 2 hours to arrive and close the manual 
valves, which is entirely too long.
    Beyond the regulatory shortfalls of carbon dioxide 
pipelines, which I included in my previous testimony, this 
incident raises another important pipeline safety priority: 
rupture mitigation valves and the ability to promptly close 
valves. The NTSB began calling for rupture mitigation valves in 
1970, continuing with a formal recommendation after the fatal 
PG&E pipeline tragedy in San Bruno, California, in 2010, and 
that recommendation remains open today because PHMSA is unable 
to require existing pipelines to upgrade their equipment due to 
congressional limitations.
    Congress needs to require operators to install these valves 
in high-consequence areas. There have been many pipeline 
failures turned to tragedies by an operator's inability to 
close valves promptly.
    And just weeks after last year's hearing on pipeline safety 
before this subcommittee, a pipeline explosion at a chocolate 
factory in West Reading, Pennsylvania, killed 7 people, 
hospitalized 11. According to a preliminary report by the NTSB, 
the point of failure was likely a service tee made from DuPont 
Aldyl A plastic. The NTSB published a report highlighting 
problems with Aldyl A plastic service tees in 1988. PHMSA 
listed these problematic components in a voluntary advisory 
bulletin in 2007. At what point do we go beyond voluntary 
recommendations and make it explicitly illegal for this 
material to be part of our Nation's pipelines?
    The common theme among the pipeline disasters I have shared 
today is Congress and the regulators leaving too much up to 
voluntary or performance-based efforts. It is important to 
offer flexibility to enable industry leaders to make new 
advancements. However, the regulations also need to ensure that 
the entire industry is operating safe pipelines.
    Please remember the 24 people who have died from pipeline 
failures since the last time I testified before this 
subcommittee 14 months ago, and think of the empty seats at 
their family dinner tables. I can tell you from working with 
the families in Bellingham who lost their sons in 1999, the 
pain never goes away. Thank you.
    [Mr. Caram's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety 
                                 Trust
    Good morning, Subcommittee Chair Nehls, Committee Chair Graves, 
Committee Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank 
you for inviting me to speak today on the vital subject of pipeline 
safety. My name is Bill Caram, and I am the Executive Director of the 
Pipeline Safety Trust.
    I want to take a moment to acknowledge the passing of Ranking 
Member Payne. Representative Payne was a great leader with whom I feel 
lucky to have worked. He will be missed, and my heart goes out to his 
family, friends, and colleagues.
    The Pipeline Safety Trust was created after the Olympic Pipe Line 
tragedy in Bellingham, Washington in 1999. That entirely preventable 
failure spilled nearly a quarter-million gallons of gasoline into a 
beautiful salmon stream in the heart of our community which eventually 
ignited and killed three boys. The U.S. Justice Department was so 
appalled at the operations of the pipeline company and equally appalled 
at the lax oversight from the federal government, that they asked the 
federal courts to set aside money from the settlement to create the 
Pipeline Safety Trust as an independent national watchdog organization 
over the pipeline industry and its regulators.
    We work to ensure that no other community must endure the senseless 
grief that Bellingham has had to experience from a pipeline tragedy. 
Sadly, there have been many senseless pipeline tragedies and disasters 
since Bellingham. I am here today, hoping that we can continue to work 
together to help move towards our shared goal of zero incidents.
    Since this subcommittee held its last pipeline safety hearing, 
about 14 months ago on March 8, 2023, at least 23 people have died from 
pipeline failures in the United States. In fact, 2023 was the deadliest 
year for pipeline safety in America in 20 years. I stated before this 
subcommittee 14 months ago that we were not making progress on pipeline 
safety, and I repeat that statement today.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    While everyone on today's panel supports the goal of zero 
incidents, unfortunately, we have a long way to go. Total fatalities 
for all systems show a mostly flat trend line going down very slightly. 
Total incidents for all pipeline systems also show a trend line going 
down very slightly--a basically flat line with no real progress over 
the past thirteen years.
    Filtering for only those incidents deemed ``significant'' by PHMSA, 
we see a trend that is slightly increasing. For all the progress the 
industry touts on technological advancements and safety management 
systems, we are not moving towards our target of zero incidents.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Also of concern is the fact that approximately two-thirds of all 
incidents and significant incidents are from causes that are under the 
operator's direct control such as corrosion, incorrect operations, 
equipment failures, and problems with materials, welds, and equipment.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    I'd like to share a few stories of recent pipeline failures, each 
of which occurred after the last Subcommittee hearing on pipeline 
safety March 8, 2023, that highlight some of the roadblocks toward 
safer pipelines.
                  Olympic Pipeline Spill in Conway, WA
A failure of Integrity Management
    In my town of Bellingham, WA, the community, along with the 
families of the three boys who died in the Olympic pipeline tragedy 25 
years ago, are planning a remembrance of that horrendous day--June 
10th, 1999. And just a few months ago, the pipeline failed again, this 
time spilling 25,000 gallons of gasoline, just 500 feet from an 
elementary school and into a tributary of a critical salmon river. 
Thank goodness it wasn't during school hours and didn't ignite. This 
failure was likely due to corrosion, a cause that an effective 
integrity management program is supposed to eliminate.
    Over the past twenty years, regulators and industry have focused on 
reducing pipeline incidents through Integrity Management (IM) in High 
Consequence Areas (HCAs). The theory behind Integrity Management 
programs makes perfect sense--focus efforts in those areas where the 
most harm to people and the environment could occur, identify all 
potential risks in those areas, put into place programs to test for and 
mitigate those risks, and implement a continuous improvement program to 
drive down the number of failures.
    Unfortunately, for both hazardous liquid and gas transmission 
pipelines these Integrity Management programs do not seem to have lived 
up to their promise. Incident rates within High Consequence Areas as 
compared to outside HCAs continue to climb in the case of hazardous 
liquid pipelines and generally do no better with regards to gas 
transmission pipelines. However, it's important to note that 2023 was a 
very strong year for gas transmission pipeline safety in HCAs and we 
hope this is the start of a string trend. However, one year does not 
yet make a trend. These two graphs, generated from PHMSA's Integrity 
Management Data, demonstrate our concern with current IM programs. Some 
in the industry argue that older, prescriptive class location rules can 
now be relaxed because of the implementation of Integrity Management, 
but as the graphs show: It is too early to go to a performance-based 
Integrity Management system until the industry can prove that Integrity 
Management works as it should over a meaningful length of time.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

       Denbury/ExxonMobil Carbon Dioxide Pipeline in Sulphur, LA
Require prompt closure of valves
    Just last month, the same carbon dioxide pipeline that ruptured and 
sent nearly 50 people from the town of Satartia, MS to the hospital in 
2020 failed again. This time, in Sulphur, LA. Luckily, this happened 
during the day and the residents who live less then 500 feet from the 
failure site were not home or this could have been another tragic 
story. According to initial reports Denbury was unaware of the failure. 
It was the residents in the area who discovered the plume. It took 
Denbury, now owned by ExxonMobil, more than two hours to arrive on site 
and close the manual valves, which is entirely too long. A shelter-in-
place order was largely communicated via Facebook. We hoped that 
Satartia would be a wake-up call for Denbury, but initial reports from 
Sulphur show many operational shortcomings have not yet been addressed 
to ensure the safety of those who live around its pipelines.
    Beyond the regulatory shortfalls of carbon dioxide pipelines which 
I included in my previous testimony, this incident raises another 
important pipeline safety priority--Rupture Mitigation Valves (RMVs) 
and an operator's responsibility to promptly close valves and shut in a 
pipeline in and near High Consequence Areas (HCAs). The NTSB began 
calling for rupture mitigation valves in 1970.\1\ It continued with a 
formal recommendation \2\ after the investigation into the fatal PG&E 
pipeline tragedy in San Bruno, CA in 2010. That recommendation remains 
open \3\ because PHMSA is unable to require existing pipelines to 
upgrade their equipment due to Congressional limitations. There have 
been countless pipeline tragedies and disasters made worse by an 
operators' inability to close valves and shut-in the pipeline quickly. 
While PHMSA now requires new and replaced pipelines to have RMVs, it is 
the existing, aging pipelines that need this safety technology the 
most.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/
PSS7101.pdf
    \2\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/accidentreports/reports/
par1101.pdf
    \3\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/phmsa-ntsb-recommendations/phmsa-
ntsb-recommendations
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A recent National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 
(National Academies) report recommended PHMSA leave the decision up to 
operators' Integrity Management (IM) programs. With due respect for the 
National Academies Committee and its process and rigor, I believe this 
gives the effectiveness of IM programs too much credit and it's time to 
set a definitive standard. The National Academies report points out 
many of the shortcomings of IM under the current regulatory regime yet 
does not convince me that the suggested improvements would lead to 
better results with regard to RMVs. I believe the best path forward 
towards safety involves requiring operators to install RMVs in and near 
HCAs. In cases where that might not be practical, establishing a 
minimum requirement that the operator demonstrate the ability to close 
valves within 30 minutes of a failure. Looking back at some of the 
worst pipeline tragedies and disasters in recent history, this safety 
standard would have gone a long way in mitigating the loss and damage 
suffered.
          UGI Utilities Factory Explosion in West Reading, PA
Ban problematic materials
    Just weeks after last year's hearing on pipeline safety before this 
subcommittee, an explosion at a chocolate factory in West Reading, 
Pennsylvania killed seven people, injured 11 people, displaced three 
families, destroyed one building, caused significant structural damage 
to several others, and forced the evacuation of many people. According 
to a preliminary report by the NTSB, the cause of the explosion was a 
leak from a natural gas pipeline distribution system. The point of 
failure was likely a service tee made from Dupont Aldyl A plastic. This 
pipe material has been known to be susceptible to failure for decades.
    In 1988, the NTSB published a special investigative report on 
``Brittle-Like Cracking in Plastic Pipe for Gas Service,'' \4\ which 
included information pertaining to Aldyl A and other polyethylene pipe. 
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) 
added Aldyl A service tees to a list of pipe materials with ``poor 
performance histories relative to brittle-like cracking'' in a 
voluntary advisory bulletin on September 6, 2007. Pipeline industry-
developed standards also call attention to the integrity problems with 
this particular type of service tee, though these standards are also 
voluntary. A recent PHMSA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking would 
specifically add Aldyl A pipe to distribution pipeline operator's 
integrity management programs, asking operators to consider the risk of 
the presence of this material in their system. At what point do we go 
beyond recommending operators remove problematic materials from their 
systems and make it explicitly illegal for this material to be part of 
our nation's pipelines? Please remember that there are 7 dinner tables 
have had an empty seat since that day. And that's just one of the 24 
serious pipeline failures that led to fatalities or serious injuries 
last year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/
SIR9801.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The common themes among the pipeline disasters I've shared today 
are Congress and the regulators leaving too much up to voluntary or 
performance-based efforts from the industry. It's great to offer 
flexibility for industry leaders to demonstrate how to accomplish 
pipeline safety and make new advancements. However, the regulations 
also need to ensure that the industry's laggards are also operating 
safe pipelines.
    Please, remember the 23 people who have died from pipeline failures 
since the last time I testified before this subcommittee 14 months ago. 
I can tell you, from working with the families in Bellingham who lost 
their sons in 1999, the pain never goes away.

    Mr. Nehls. Thank you. I would like to thank you all for 
your testimony. We will now turn to the panel for questions. I 
will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    Last December, this committee passed the PIPES Act of 2023 
on a bipartisan basis, which provides PHMSA with a 4-year 
authorization and congressional direction for Federal pipeline 
safety policy. Unfortunately, while we continue to work to 
advance this legislation, the authorization for PHMSA expired 
in September of 2023.
    Can you each briefly describe the effects of a lack of 
authorization, and what benefits does reauthorization provide?
    And I will start with you, Deputy Administrator Brown, and 
then we will go down the panel.
    Mr. Brown. I will be real brief, just to make sure you get 
to everybody. There are no direct effects. But obviously, 
having the requisite resources to oversee the additional 
product moving that we oversee and the direction that we get 
every few years of what is most important to this body, this 
subcommittee, and the larger Chamber and body of Congress is 
very important to our work.
    Mr. Nehls. Ms. Sames?
    Ms. Sames. Thank you. In my opinion, not putting forward 
reauthorization actually limits PHMSA in some regards. They are 
in a holding pattern, waiting to see what occurs with 
legislation, and I believe are a little hesitant to move 
certain things forward until they get the full direction of 
Congress.
    There are some great things in reauthorization, at least 
that this committee proposed, that I truly believe will improve 
pipeline safety, especially in regards to excavation damage 
prevention and additional grant funding that will incentivize 
States to enact leading practices.
    I think, with the change of direction, PHMSA can continue 
its great role of moving pipeline safety forward. We are hoping 
it comes soon.
    Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
    Mr. Rorick?
    Mr. Rorick. Similarly, we hear from our members regularly 
that certainty is absolutely critical so that they can make the 
investments that they need and then operate their businesses. 
Having regular reauthorizations and making sure that PHMSA 
fulfills the obligations from past authorizations provides that 
level of certainty so that our companies know where to invest, 
what kind of technologies to invest in, what kind of practices 
to invest in.
    So, providing that certainty and that clarity is critical 
to ensuring that we have the reliability and efficiency that 
customers expect from us.
    Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
    Mr. Caram?
    Mr. Caram. Well, prompt reauthorization of the agency is, 
of course, important. I think what is more important is the 
safety advancements that are made in that legislation, more 
than the promptness of the reauthorization.
    Mr. Nehls. I think it is fantastic. The House did their 
will. I mean, we had a bipartisan bill that has been sitting on 
Chuck Schumer's desk for months, and he has done nothing with 
it, and I don't know when he is going to do anything, if 
anything at all. They seem to be very dysfunctional over there.
    So, I would probably--I would like to ask--excuse me--where 
is my--Ms. Sames, we talked a little bit about the PIPES Act of 
2023, and you mentioned it a little bit about the--reduce the 
excavation damage incidents. Talk about that. What is the 
impact of excavation damage incidents on the gas distribution 
systems?
    Ms. Sames. It is the leading cause of our incidents. Well, 
that and vehicles hitting pipelines, if you look at the 
statistics. And unfortunately, excavation damage, it is going 
in the wrong direction.
    Mr. Nehls. Yes.
    Ms. Sames. So, if I look at, like, the 20-year trend for 
serious incidents: 20-year trend, we were at 24.6 percent of 
all incidents being excavation damage. If I jump to the 3-year 
trend, it goes up to 28 percent. If I go to significant 
incidents, the 20-year trend is 33.6 percent. If I jump to 3 
years, it is now 42.4 percent.
    So, for the distribution industry, our focus is really on 
how do we reduce these excavation incidents. I believe PHMSA 
has done a great job with helping to create the Common Ground 
Alliance, and implementing 811 Call Before You Dig, and 
providing grants, but it is not enough.
    So, we really need some additional incentives for States to 
adopt leading practices. And then honestly, we need really good 
enforcement at the State level for those that aren't--where it 
is cheaper for them to hit the pipeline instead of calling 
before digging.
    Mr. Nehls. And I agree with you, and I think the PIPES Act 
of 2023 addresses some of those issues.
    Thank you, I yield back. I now recognize the ranking member 
for 5 minutes for questions.
    Ms. Wilson of Florida. Thank you.
    Mr. Caram, do you think that pipeline operators are doing a 
good job of supporting the communities where there are 
accidents and incidents?
    Mr. Caram. No operator wants their pipeline to fail, and 
so, nothing is intentional. But I think, when we look at the 
long-term trends, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, on 
fatalities, on total incidents, on significant incidents, and 
the fact that those trend lines are statistically flat, I don't 
think that we are making sufficient progress in keeping our 
communities safe.
    Ms. Wilson of Florida. Do you know how they engage with 
schools and other members of the public?
    Mr. Caram. Yes. There is--I think public engagement has 
been an area where the industry, the regulators have all fallen 
a bit short. But there has been progress made recently. There 
has been a new recommended practice on public engagement that 
was put together by a working group under API. And it has just 
recently been adopted, and it outlines some great best 
practices for operators to share information in how to engage 
with the people around the pipeline, with schools, and everyone 
affected by the pipelines.
    I hope that operators will incorporate that, and that we 
will see an improvement in public engagement. But right now, I 
think we are seeing a lot of poor public engagement across the 
country.
    Ms. Wilson of Florida. OK. The National Transportation 
Safety Board identified that at the tragic UGI pipeline 
explosion in West Reading, Pennsylvania, there was an older 
service tee erroneously still in use made from a material, 
Aldyl A, that PHMSA identified in 2007 as having a poor 
performance history. Is this PHMSA's way of saying that 
pipeline operators should get rid of pipelines with that 
material?
    Mr. Caram. Yes, yes, but it is a voluntary advisory 
bulletin, and it was also recently incorporated into a proposed 
rule on distribution systems to look at Aldyl A's service tees 
in the DIMP program, in the Distribution Integrity Management.
    But again, that is performance-based and leaving it up to 
operators, so, there has been a lot of encouragement to find 
all of the Aldyl A in systems and the service tees and remove 
them, but it has not been mandatory.
    Ms. Wilson of Florida. Do you know what operators said they 
would do about using this material, and what have they done 
about it?
    Mr. Caram. I think operators have been looking for it. This 
product was installed in pipelines many decades ago, and 
recordkeeping may not have been what it is required to be now. 
And so, there is a challenge in finding every instance of this 
service tee in a system. But I believe it is the operator's 
responsibility to find it and remove it.
    Ms. Wilson of Florida. Thank you.
    Mr. Brown, Mr. Caram outlined the devastating personal 
impact to the loss of life from pipeline incidents and 
accidents. What is the economic impact to communities where 
there are pipeline accidents and incidents?
    I am particularly thinking of West Reading, where the 
chocolate factory was one of the town's largest employers. That 
loss will have a severe long-term economic impact to the 
community. What is the economic impact?
    Mr. Brown. Well, I know everybody here has seen the tragedy 
that can occur like the one that you referenced, and the 
impacts can be myriad. Of course, first and foremost, is the 
impact on families and loved ones and community members.
    I was just in Jackson, Mississippi, with Congressman 
Thompson and meeting with the community there that was affected 
by a tragic fatality. There is a lot of concern, and people 
wonder if their systems are safe. Businesses can lose access to 
energy supplies. The impacts are myriad.
    So, I applaud the committee's work in trying to identify 
those impacts. Certainly, when we see a loss of a system that 
people rely on for energy, there are many direct and indirect 
impacts.
    Ms. Wilson of Florida. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentlelady yields. I now recognize my 
colleague from the great State of Texas, Mr. Babin, for 5 
minutes.
    Dr. Babin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want to 
thank the witnesses for being here.
    Deputy Administrator Brown, PHMSA is far behind schedule in 
completing the idle pipeline rulemaking which, as you know, is 
required by Congress to be promulgated by the end of December 
of 2022. PHMSA should not continue to regulate idle and fully 
active pipelines the same. Idle pipes do not carry hazardous 
materials, as you know, and they are disconnected from sources 
that allow for transporting hazardous materials. So, the 
regulations should be appropriately tailored to reflect the 
reduced risk of incident. Regulating idle pipelines the same as 
active pipelines means that PHMSA is directing precious and 
limited resources here, when the funds could be much better 
used implementing other regulations.
    So, you joined us, Administrator Brown, for a hearing on 
reauthorization last year. And in your responses to questions 
for the record, you indicated that PHMSA intends to issue a 
proposed rule in the first quarter of this year. This has come 
and gone. I ask you, why has PHMSA still not completed this 
rule?
    Is there an updated timeline for completion that you might 
be able to share with us?
    Mr. Brown. Yes.
    Dr. Babin. Briefly.
    Mr. Brown. At the committee's direction and the Congress' 
direction, we update on a monthly basis all of our rulemakings 
from the 2020 PIPES Act. I believe that one is slated for later 
this year.
    I will be perfectly honest with you, though. We have got--
you gave us 36 mandates in the last reauthorization bill. That 
is compared to 19 mandates in the previous reauthorization 
bill. So, we had almost double the number of directives from 
you. And so, we continue to triage the directives with the 
highest safety impact to reduce safety risk to the American 
people first. And so, that one is on the list of priorities, it 
is just lower than the high-risk rulings that we are working 
through.
    Dr. Babin. Mr. Rorick, would you elaborate on the impact 
that the idle pipe rule will have on our industry and is having 
on our industry?
    Mr. Rorick. Yes, sir, and we have been very vocal as an 
association, and you have heard quite a bit from our industry, 
I am sure, Representative Babin, about the challenges 
associated with permitting for new pipelines, even doing some 
work on existing pipelines. Those permitting challenges are not 
going away.
    This--being able to--right now there are two categories, as 
you pointed out, active and abandoned pipe, and that abandoned 
pipe has to be pulled out. Getting this classification for idle 
pipe would allow companies to leave the pipe in the ground so 
that they can come back and use it together.
    From a safety perspective, they purge the line, they clean 
it, they fill it with inert gas so that it rests there 
harmless. And it is monitored, but it doesn't take the same 
required resources that you pointed out earlier.
    But if we are going to continue to operate this 
infrastructure in this country without building more, then we 
are going to need all the pipe that we have gotten.
    Dr. Babin. Amen. Thank you.
    One more question for you, Mr. Brown. In the 2020 PIPES 
Act, Congress mandated that PHMSA update its safety regulations 
governing large-scale LNG export facilities. The last time you 
appeared before us here at the committee, you mentioned that it 
was a high priority, and yet the proposed rule has still not 
been released yet. Again, timeliness seems to be a problem with 
you and PHMSA.
    Why has PHMSA still not completed this rule, and what is 
the status of this regulation?
    Mr. Brown. Well, I would echo my earlier answer, but I will 
just add that in your home State, we had one of the largest 
exporters of LNG experience a 400-foot-high fireball, an 
explosion at that facility. Luckily, no one was killed. We want 
to learn what went wrong there and include it in the updates. 
And that is part of the reason we are continuing our 
investigation of that incident. But we want to include the 
lessons learned from that incident in that rulemaking.
    Dr. Babin. OK, last question. As you know, PHMSA may 
reimburse States for up to 80 percent of costs incurred by 
States in enforcing pipeline safety laws and regulation. Given 
that Texas is far and away the leading State in terms of total 
pipeline miles, we are spending more than any other State to 
meet these safety standards.
    Unfortunately, Texas is receiving significantly less than 
the authorized 80-percent reimbursement. I just want to put 
this on your radar as an issue if you are not already aware of 
that. I would also like to encourage your team to work with 
both the Railroad Commission of Texas and Texans on this 
subcommittee, myself and Chairman Nehls, to ensure that we can 
get this fixed with a long-term solution that doesn't leave the 
Nation's number-one energy producer in an unsustainable 
financial situation.
    And so, if you can get in touch with our team, send us the 
requested information about the things that I have asked, I 
certainly would appreciate it.
    Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.
    And Mr. Chairman, if I can just respond with a thank you to 
Congress, just a few weeks ago, the fiscal year 2024 
appropriations bill included a big boost for the State program 
grants. So, we anticipate getting a boost in funding to the 
State of Texas, along with the rest of your States. So, thank 
you for that.
    Dr. Babin. Thank you, and I yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. I now recognize a valued 
member of this subcommittee, Mr. Moulton, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Back in May of 2018, the Merrimack Valley, homes just 
started exploding across several towns. The gas pipeline was 
overpressurized, dramatically overpressurized, and literally, 
explosions started coming out of people's houses. An 18-year-
old, Leonel Rondon, was killed. And I worked with my 
Massachusetts colleagues to update pipeline regulations.
    My colleague from Texas has just made the same point, but 
why is it taking so long to just get these rules finalized? I 
mean, any day another accident could happen. You just talked 
about a 400-foot fireball in Texas. Why the delay?
    Mr. Brown. We follow the Administrative Procedure Act, and 
then we also follow the statutes that govern us, which includes 
an additional advisory committee review which includes five 
public interest representatives, five industry representatives, 
five State government representatives. That takes an extra many 
months to work through the highly technical issues involved in 
these regulations.
    The other thing is that we regulate thousands of operators, 
each with unique systems. So, creating a one-size-fits-all rule 
is very difficult. It usually means we end up in the courts 
because one entity doesn't like what we do, or a small group of 
entities doesn't like how we are directing operators to 
operate.
    So, those are just a few of the big challenges we have. But 
the obvious one is resources that--we had--we started off with 
two regulatory attorneys working on rules like the one that you 
directed us to do, Congressman. We have doubled that as soon as 
the administration took office, and we have set a record number 
of rules in the first year that we got here. But there is still 
a backlog. And so, we appreciate this committee's support for 
additional resources for additional rulemaking team members.
    Mr. Moulton. OK. The last PHMSA reauthorization included a 
provision requiring the Secretary of Transportation to submit a 
report to Congress about the need for an independent pipeline 
testing facility under DOT. My understanding is that PHMSA is 
the only--essentially, pipelines are the only major mode of 
transportation that does not have a dedicated research, 
testing, and evaluation facility.
    Has PHMSA finalized the report, and do you know when it 
will be delivered to Congress?
    Mr. Brown. We are part of the way through in that report. 
It has not been finalized. We do fund nonprofits that do some 
of that pipeline research testing through the funds you 
authorize, as well.
    Mr. Moulton. Can you give us any idea of what the timeline 
is? Because partway through does not sound encouraging.
    Mr. Brown. Yes, I would suggest a matter of months. We have 
had discussions with folks on both sides of the aisle in 
multiple committees on that, and I think there is varying 
interest in the subject of creating a facility.
    But we look forward to getting you that report.
    Mr. Moulton. Can you give us some indication of what the 
findings or recommendations will be?
    Mr. Brown. I have not seen a draft yet.
    Mr. Moulton. That is not encouraging.
    Mr. Brown. But I will be glad to provide you an update as 
soon as we can.
    Mr. Moulton. OK. Shifting topics for a second, integrity 
management programs are the primary tool that pipeline 
operators use to ensure the safety of their pipelines. Does 
this work? Is it a good system?
    Mr. Brown. We have got thousands of operators, and it is 
certainly working well with some, and I think certainly not 
with others. And so, coupled with our push, this committee's 
push, the stakeholders here's push for pipeline safety 
management systems where you are constantly looking and 
challenging your own presumptions in where risks may be, I 
think there is a lot of promise.
    I think we heard some--we welcome the constructive 
criticism of where it might not be working. That is really 
fundamental to a safety management system, is that you are 
always looking for, well, what are we missing here? And with 
integrity management, because systems are so different, it is 
hard to write a single rule, prescriptive rule for the 
disparate systems across the country.
    Mr. Moulton. Do you feel that it is the right approach, or 
should we be taking an entirely different approach?
    Mr. Brown. I would say all--that is just one approach that 
we have, but we are investing in research. We issue safety 
advisories, we issue directives when--emergency orders when 
needed. So, I think there is promise. It is what--I think the 
rest of the world does use a lot of this--a similar 
nonprescriptive regulatory scheme, but we want to use just any 
tool in our toolbelt to address safety risks.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. Rouzer 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Rouzer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Brown, with regard to the leak detection and repair 
rule, when will the agency release the final rule, do you 
anticipate?
    Mr. Brown. Our monthly update suggests, I think, by the end 
of the year.
    Mr. Rouzer. Will the White House and CEQ be involved in 
reviewing this rule, the rulemaking?
    Mr. Brown. Through the interagency process, every agency 
will have an opportunity to provide feedback in doing that. In 
the proposal stage, I think there was minimal involvement. 
Really, the input comes at the advisory committee stage, where 
we have got input from a lot of the stakeholders here to try to 
build consensus around that rule, which we have largely been 
able to do.
    Mr. Rouzer. Is the agency working with the EPA to harmonize 
this rule with new EPA methane regulations, since there will be 
overlapping requirements?
    Mr. Brown. Yes, we did that at the proposed rule stage. As 
you know, sometimes the rules don't align perfectly from a time 
standpoint, where you have a proposed rule that you might be 
working on but you are waiting on another agency to propose 
their rule. So, we are harmonizing, though, to try to minimize 
overlap between our agencies.
    Mr. Rouzer. Yes. Is it the position of the agency that all 
leaks are hazardous?
    Mr. Brown. I was just in Jackson, Mississippi, where a 
nonhazardous leak resulted in the death of Clara Barbour. So, 
we are highly concerned about the potential for a nonhazardous 
leak to become hazardous. But not all nonhazardous leaks are 
hazardous.
    Mr. Rouzer. Mr. Rorick, in your written testimony you 
highlight concerns that API and the industry have with the 
PHMSA's leak detection and repair notice of proposed 
rulemaking. Specifically, I noted that your testimony explained 
that PHMSA exceeded the scope of the language in section 113 of 
the 2020 PIPES Act. Can you elaborate on that?
    Mr. Rorick. So, we believe that PHMSA, in the proposed 
rule, went beyond what Congress mandated them to do, 
specifically going into rural gathering lines in LNG 
facilities, in those two particular areas.
    And then consequently, by doing that, particularly for the 
rural gathering lines, you are pulling in areas that would then 
dilute--someone mentioned the concern earlier about PHMSA 
diluting their limited resources. That would certainly do it. 
And there is a potential of missing more significant releases 
in more densely populated areas.
    Mr. Caram. May I address that question?
    Mr. Rouzer. Sure, absolutely.
    Mr. Caram. Briefly? Thank you very much. I just want to add 
that at the advisory committee meeting just last month, there 
was a unanimous vote on the inclusion of those rural gathering 
lines that included the industry vote, and with a lot of nuance 
around how that would impact those lines.
    Mr. Rouzer. I note that PHMSA is required to conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis for all its rulemakings. Any comment on 
how you think that will play out?
    Mr. Rorick. Yes, sir. If you look at both--and I think that 
we would probably disagree with the Deputy Administrator a 
little bit on the overlap with EPA. Where EPA looks at flow 
rate, this proposed rule would look at concentration threshold. 
So, there is some conflict there with the EPA rule.
    But if you add in the low threshold, it would effectively 
remove a lot of the opportunities that current operators use to 
maintain and look for these leaks. So, they would effectively 
have to walk their lines with handheld meters. And then, if you 
pull in those rural gathering lines, that is an extra cost and 
burden there. And I don't know that their cost-benefit analysis 
looked at the safety and environmental benefits associated with 
items such as those.
    Mr. Rouzer. With that, I will yield back. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. Garcia 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 
Member, for holding this very important and timely hearing.
    I, too, want to take a moment to recognize the passing of 
the former ranking member of this subcommittee, Congressman 
Payne. I hold the utmost respect for him and his leadership 
displayed time and time over the years. He will be missed.
    Moving to the topic of today's hearing, we have heard from 
my colleagues about the importance of pipeline safety. Indeed, 
safety should be the number-one priority when transporting 
materials like CO2 and odorless asphyxiant that can be deadly 
if improperly managed. And that is exactly what we should be 
concerned about as we look to the future, especially as 
industry looks to dramatically expand our network of carbon 
dioxide pipelines.
    Mr. Rorick, American Petroleum Institute's testimony boasts 
about the safety of pipelines. Your testimony states that the 
industry `` . . . has been operating CO2 pipelines safely for 
more than four decades, with no fatalities . . .'' But a CO2 
pipeline rupture in Satartia, Mississippi, caused 45 people to 
be hospitalized from CO2 poisoning, where people lay on the 
ground shaking and unable to breathe. It was lucky that this 
tragedy didn't end worse.
    Mr. Rorick, yes or no, does that sound safe to you?
    Mr. Rorick. There are certainly risks associated with that, 
it was a tragic incident. No, that is an incident that we would 
like to have avoided, sir. I would like to go into more 
details, but you asked for a yes or no.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you. Let me give you another 
example. Just a month ago in Sulphur, Louisiana, an estimated 
107,000 gallons of CO2 leaked from a pipeline owned by 
ExxonMobil. Local police and firefighters could do nothing than 
set up roadblocks and wait for the pipeline's owner to repair 
it. It took more than 2 hours to repair, and many residents 
were never notified of the leak. Yes or no, does that sound 
safe?
    Mr. Rorick. The incident occurred, but that doesn't 
necessarily mean the pipeline wasn't safe, sir.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. My final question, Mr. Rorick, how 
much do CO2 pipeline developers stand to profit from these 
pipelines?
    Mr. Rorick. I am not in a position to answer that, sir. You 
would have to ask those individual operators.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Well, since you are not sure, I 
will tell you that in the Midwest, Summit Carbon Solutions, the 
largest proposed network of CO2 pipes in the Nation, could be 
eligible for up to $18 billion in tax benefits for their 
project. That is just one company.
    It is apparent that there are dangerous gaps in Federal 
regulations that keep people safe, and huge economic 
motivations for the companies that want to see these pipelines 
built. Leak notification systems, detection methods for 
odorless CO2, and emergency response plans are nowhere near 
built out. We should be putting a moratorium on all CO2 
pipelines until we can ensure that people, especially ones in 
vulnerable communities where these are built, will be 
protected.
    Thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Stauber for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Stauber. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Brown, the class location rule allows pipeline 
companies to employ modern inspection technologies to prove the 
safety of existing pipelines when population changes occur 
nearby instead of outdated, expensive, and environmentally 
unhelpful methods.
    We have talked about the Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee 
that convened a meeting on the class location rule and voted 
overwhelmingly to meet again on the rulemaking within 12 
months. Can PHMSA commit to holding the next GPAC meeting on 
the class location rule before March of 2025?
    Mr. Brown. We were able to hold that meeting, Congressman, 
a few weeks ago, and we completed the work on that rule.
    Mr. Stauber. Thank you. So, Mr. Brown, how many barrels of 
oil--I am from Minnesota--how many barrels of oil do we produce 
annually in Minnesota?
    Mr. Brown. I am not familiar with the State level of that.
    Mr. Stauber. Zero. That was--I just wanted to share with 
you something that concerns me.
    How many total miles of pipelines in the United States, 
totally?
    Mr. Brown. Roughly a little over 3 million.
    Mr. Stauber. How many miles of those pipelines are 
involving oil and gas?
    Mr. Brown. Involve oil or gas? Roughly 3 million.
    Mr. Stauber. Total?
    Mr. Brown. Total.
    Mr. Stauber. So, if the Biden administration gets their way 
of removing the oil and gas industry, would that be down to 
zero pipelines, then?
    Mr. Brown. I am not sure I follow. Could you repeat the 
question?
    Mr. Stauber. If the Biden administration gets their way of 
removing oil and gas industry from the United States, would we 
be down to zero pipelines?
    Mr. Brown. I am not familiar with any proposal to do such a 
thing. And in fact, the number of pipelines has increased, I 
believe, 17 percent in the transmission space over just the 
last few years, 13 percent overall in just the last few years.
    So--and then, with record investments in new, emerging 
technologies--hydrogen, CO2--there is potentially a continued 
expansion there.
    Mr. Stauber. Right. You have a very impressive background. 
So, would you say the technology in the pipeline safety and the 
enhancements thereof have done very well in the last 10 years?
    Mr. Brown. Absolutely. The technologies are incredible.
    Mr. Stauber. Ms. Sames, congratulations on your retirement.
    Ms. Sames. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Stauber. This may be one of your last meetings with 
testifying but, again, thanks for your service and thanks for 
your knowledge.
    Would you agree that the--because, really, the safety for 
the pipelines is a bipartisan issue, and we want that--would 
you agree that the technology involving the safety within the 
pipelines has greatly been enhanced in the last 10 years?
    Ms. Sames. It has greatly enhanced over the decades I have 
been in service.
    Mr. Stauber. Mr. Rorick?
    Mr. Rorick. Yes, sir, by leaps and bounds.
    Mr. Stauber. Mr. Caram?
    Mr. Caram. Yes, there has been a lot of great technological 
advancement on pipeline safety.
    Mr. Stauber. So, one of my concerns I have is we always 
talk about pipeline safety on both sides of the aisle. And we 
have what I would say are unlawful people, valve turners trying 
to damage pipelines and what have you. Does everybody on the 
panel agree that those terrorists that damage pipelines and 
cause union members to be in danger and the public to be in 
danger, do you all agree that they should be prosecuted to the 
full extent of the law because of the danger they are putting 
us all in?
    Mr. Brown, and we will just go right down the line.
    Mr. Brown. Should--terrorists who threaten or damage 
pipelines should be prosecuted.
    Mr. Stauber. To the full extent of the law?
    Mr. Brown. To the full extent of the law.
    Mr. Stauber. Ms. Sames?
    Ms. Sames. I absolutely agree.
    Mr. Stauber. Mr. Rorick?
    Mr. Rorick. Oh, we would absolutely agree, sir.
    Mr. Stauber. Mr. Caram?
    Mr. Caram. Yes, we don't support any creation of an unsafe 
condition like that on a pipeline.
    Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much. And I just want to thank 
you all for coming and sharing your testimony. Being on the 
full committee of T&I, this really--a lot of these issues are 
bipartisan. And I think that we need to recognize the safety 
issue. It affects us all. And I am really thankful that the 
chairman brought this meeting together today to talk about the 
safety issue, which is the number-one issue that we are 
discussing today.
    And Mr. Chair, I thank you for your leadership and I yield 
back.
    Mr. Nehls. Thank you, sir. And just for note, our bill that 
we passed here does strengthen the penalties for those that 
want to create that terrorist act on our pipelines.
    So, the gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. Huffman, Mr. 
Huffman for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Huffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 
the witnesses.
    Thank you in particular to Mr. Caram for speaking some 
important truths about the inherent dangers and risks of this 
spider web of combustible infrastructure that we rely on to 
power the fossil fuel economy.
    I think there is too much fossil fuel business as usual in 
this country, certainly in this conversation about continuing 
to build out this system that is, frankly, a disaster waiting 
to happen every day, and it does happen just about every day. I 
heard about a fireball in an LNG facility just now that I had 
never heard about before. It pretty much doesn't even make news 
because it is just the cost of fossil fuel business as usual 
that we have come to accept. I feel like, by passing a bill 
that doesn't do nearly enough to acknowledge this, much less do 
anything about it, we are sleepwalking further into the climate 
crisis and further and further into tragedies and disasters.
    Now, you don't have to look far to find examples of this. 
Over the last 12 years, the Keystone pipeline has had 22 
oilspills, including 2 large spills between 2017 and 2019. Then 
again in 2022, it spilled an estimated 14,000 barrels in 
Nebraska. And because of these issues, the GAO issued a report 
in July of 2021 regarding Keystone pipeline's safety record, 
which included a shocking revelation. The Keystone, with this 
terrible record, was not an outlier. It has about the same 
safety level, on average, as pipelines all over the country.
    This, taken with Mr. Caram's testimony showing that 2023 
was the deadliest year for pipeline safety in America in 20 
years, should be a red flag. It is a clear sign of how 
concerned we should be by the state of our pipeline 
infrastructure, and especially by this increased build-out that 
we are sleepwalking toward in this committee and in this 
Congress.
    Now, sadly, another example of the significant threat 
pipelines pose can be seen with the failure of the Denbury gulf 
coast pipeline in 2020. This exposed the community of Satartia, 
Mississippi, to dangerous levels of CO2. When it ruptured, it 
took just a few minutes for residents to feel the effects. 
Fifty of them went to the hospital. A significant number are 
still suffering effects today.
    Now, these accidents and failures are not outliers. We are 
continuing to see the same problems from the same entities 
everywhere we look. Just last month, there was another CO2 
pipeline leak from a pipeline owned by Denbury, this time in 
Sulphur, Louisiana.
    So, Mr. Brown, after Satartia and that CO2 pipeline 
disaster, PHMSA found that Denbury made a lot of mistakes. They 
significantly underestimated the size of the affected area, did 
inadequate monitoring, took too long to notify officials. One 
would hope that Denbury would have been closely monitored and 
scrutinized by PHMSA to make sure that these findings were 
corrected for. But sadly, it appears that many of the same 
failures occurred with the Sulphur, Louisiana, leak. 
Apparently, Denbury was unaware of the failure, took hours to 
arrive on scene. And if this leak had occurred when residents 
were in the area during the day, it could have been 
catastrophic.
    So, are there any failures or lessons learned that PHMSA 
identified and informed Denbury about--now they are owned by 
ExxonMobil, of course--to correct after Satartia?
    And in reviewing the aftermath now of the second incident 
in Sulphur, Louisiana, which of these seem to have gone ignored 
or unaddressed?
    Mr. Brown. I can note that there are numerous directives 
that we provided to Denbury after the first incident. We are 
still in the investigative phase of the second incident, which 
can take some time.
    We also applied those lessons learned, which I know you had 
asked me the last time I was here about, to a proposed rule 
that we hope to have out in the next few weeks to create the 
strongest standards for CO2 pipeline----
    Mr. Huffman [interrupting]. Right, I think we all look 
forward to seeing that rule.
    Look, we have only about 5,000 miles of CO2 pipelines right 
now, most of it in rural areas. Thankfully, when something 
terrible happens, as it will continue to do, we have not yet 
seen major population centers affected. However, there is 
tremendous pressure now to build out this network. I think it 
is inevitable that incidents like Satartia and like Sulphur, 
Louisiana, are coming to more populated areas in the near 
future. And this committee, unfortunately, is sleepwalking into 
that fate.
    With all of this pipeline boosterism not only worsening the 
climate crisis but taking us further to these tragedies, we 
haven't even talked about the blending of hydrogen into natural 
gas pipelines. I don't have time to go into it, but there is 
far more that needs to be talked about, that needs to be 
addressed, and we need to be worried about in this committee if 
we are going to be serious about pipeline safety.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Johnson from South Dakota.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Brown, as you know, the PIPES Act of 2020 implemented a 
new technology pilot program. This was to allow people to try 
some new technological innovations, obviously, to increase 
safety. I can imagine all kinds of situations where inline 
inspection or leak detection innovations, we would want those 
brought to market or to the field, rather, in some sort of a 
pilot program.
    When you were here last, I thought we had a good, 
productive conversation. I just want to pick up where we left 
off there. It is my understanding that we still don't have 
anybody utilizing that pilot program. So, have you all had any 
applications?
    Mr. Brown. Yes, well, thank you for your constructive 
question last time and directive, really, and offer to work 
together. We had some constructive discussions after that with 
stakeholders.
    The goal is to get new technologies deployed that produce 
environmental benefits. We have laws that still apply to us--
unless you tell us they don't apply--to consider environmental 
benefits. As far as I have heard, there is no interest in 
avoiding consideration of environmental benefits, right? 
Everybody wants that because new technologies tend to produce 
environmental benefits. So, the--really, it is just making sure 
the laws align and how to do it efficiently to consider those 
environmental----
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota [interrupting]. So, do we have 
any applicants to use the pilot program?
    Mr. Brown. Well, the program hasn't changed. We sought 
feedback from the public. We didn't get feedback from the 
public, but we did get feedback in this committee that said, 
you know what, from stakeholders we don't find this sufficient 
because we have to consider the National Environmental Policy 
Act analysis in the utilization of that program.
    And so, really, we are just discussing, well, is there 
another way to consider those environmental impacts so that we 
can more quickly adopt technologies? We are glad to work with 
you to address that.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. So, you are saying that the 
pilot program, as currently outlined in law, does not provide 
any meaningful benefits to operators.
    Mr. Brown. Nobody has used it yet, correct.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. So, what do we need to--I 
mean, we know that there are these innovations. Presumably, we 
would want to test them in the field in a pilot program so we 
could get good data about their efficacy. How do we get that 
done, if not through this pilot program?
    Mr. Brown. Well, I think I would leave it up to some of my 
colleagues here to answer, but our goal is the same goal that 
you have. We don't want to just use the American people as 
guinea pigs here, right? We want to make sure there is an 
equivalent level of safety, and that there are not new 
environmental costs to the public, right?
    So, I think everybody is on the same page of what we are 
trying to get at, and the question is just how to do it. We----
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota [interrupting]. So, how--I 
mean, and again, that is why it is great we have got this panel 
of experts.
    And Mr. Rorick, I will go to you next to kind of get a 
sense from you, number one, if innovations do exist, and number 
two, how best for us to deploy them in a manner as Deputy 
Administrator Brown said.
    But Mr. Brown, so, how do we get that done? You said that 
is the question. That is the question I am asking.
    Mr. Brown. Well, how you currently do it is you demonstrate 
an equivalent level of safety to us, and then we could issue a 
special permit that would allow you to deviate from existing 
standards or regulations. So, there is actually a current way 
to do it, and then Congress devised a third way, which is this 
pilot program.
    But using that pilot program, you still have to analyze the 
potential environmental impacts.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Sure.
    Mr. Brown. Right? And the question was, well, do you have 
to analyze those environmental impacts? And I think we heard--
and maybe Mr. Rorick's testimony says, no, you don't have to 
examine the environmental impacts.
    Well, actually, I think most of your members say, well, we 
want positive environmental impacts----
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota [interrupting]. So, you talked 
about people making these filings to be able to get clearance 
to put into place a new practice. How common are those filings 
with PHMSA?
    Mr. Brown. They vary widely. So----
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota [interrupting]. I mean, would 
they be monthly, quarterly, annually?
    Mr. Brown. For specific technologies? They are not 
frequent.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. OK. Mr. Rorick?
    Mr. Rorick. So, I think that, right now, the way the 
program is designed is just too onerous and too cumbersome for 
companies to participate. So, if we are going to be able to 
bring these technologies into the testing phase, as you 
identify, Representative Johnson, I think we are going to have 
to--Congress is going to have to provide a pathway for PHMSA to 
deviate away from their special permit process so that we don't 
get bogged down in NEPA and some of these other procedural 
processes that PHMSA currently has with the program.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. I would just say this--and 
thanks for the colloquy, sir.
    But Deputy Administrator, I mean, for 4 years, Congress has 
been saying that they want to make it--that they want these new 
technologies brought to bear so that we can get a safer and 
better system. The fact that for 4 years PHMSA has not figured 
out a way to work with partners to get that done obviously 
means we have got some work to do. And I guess I would ask for 
urgency within the agency and within the Hill for us to get 
that done.
    And with that, I would yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. Mr. Kean, you are 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you to all of our witnesses for being here today.
    And before I begin, I just want to add my voice to those 
who mourn the loss of Congressman Payne. He was a tremendous 
leader on this subcommittee and also for all things New Jersey. 
So, my prayers are with him and with his family.
    My first question is to Ms. Sames. Pipeline safety 
technology is continually adapting and improving. However, 
sometimes it takes a while for Federal agencies to catch up and 
allow new operations or technology to be used. What challenges 
have you seen with getting new technology approved?
    Ms. Sames. Well, I think we just discussed some of them. 
With the current program at PHMSA, it is unbelievably 
burdensome for new operators to apply for the use of new 
technology.
    The other issue that I see, though, is when a new 
technology comes to the market and is proven, but isn't allowed 
due to the current regulations. Let me explain, and I will give 
an example.
    So, right now, PHMSA's regulations require an operator to 
put a bollard or, basically, a device in front of a meter to 
protect that meter. And that was appropriate back in the 1970s, 
when the regulations were created. However--and the reason you 
put that in place is so that, if the meter is hit, it doesn't 
release gas. You don't want gas to be released.
    But we now have breakaway technologies that--and excess 
flow valves that, if that meter is hit, it immediately shuts 
off the flow of gas. But an operator can't use that technology 
because PHMSA's current regulation requires an obstacle be put 
in place to protect the meter. I would love to see PHMSA look 
at how can current technologies really be used to meet the 
intent of a regulation in a different way. Use these new 
technologies. They are already proven.
    Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you.
    Deputy Administrator Brown, the PIPES Act of 2020 required 
PHMSA to issue safety regulations for pipelines considered in 
an idled pipeline status by December 2022. Now, the PIPES Act 
of 2023 follows up on this mandate and requires its completion 
within 180 days. What is the status of this regulation, and 
when does PHMSA anticipate completing this ruling?
    Mr. Brown. Congressman, we provide monthly updates on the 
status. I believe that one is slated for the end of the year.
    But as I stated earlier, we have more rules than we have 
people working on them. We had twice the number of directives 
in the PIPES Act of 2020 than we had in 2016. So, the 
additional resources in the bipartisan legislation you are 
considering will be very helpful in helping us get that rule 
completed.
    Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Do you believe that an updated 
idled pipeline rule will increase pipeline safety?
    Mr. Brown. I think we had some good commentary that 
addressed that. I have not looked at--we haven't--I can't 
really comment on a rule we haven't written yet. We would have 
to lay out that justification.
    Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Mr. Rorick, the PIPES Act of 2023 
includes authorization of a voluntary information-sharing 
system at PHMSA. From your perspective, how much participation 
would a VIS system see from pipeline operators?
    Mr. Rorick. If designed appropriately, Congressman, which 
means proper information protections, providing a system where 
companies can submit information and there is no reach-back 
authority in a punitive fashion, I believe companies would 
actively participate in it. I think this committee was wise to 
design a program that was modeled after other successful 
programs like the program that exists for pilots and with the 
FAA. So, I think you would get good participation, sir, if 
designed appropriately.
    Mr. Kean of New Jersey. And what pipeline safety outcomes 
do you envision once a VIS system is established and 
operational?
    Mr. Rorick. Yes, sir. We do a lot of work right now looking 
at data, whether it is prevention data or what have you, 
investing in technologies. This would provide some data of both 
incidents and near-misses that may occur so that we can, as an 
industry and working with the regulator, monitor trends, but 
then also look at individual reporting data to see what sort of 
learnings we can gain from those, as well.
    Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Menendez for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Chairman. I want to join my 
colleagues in recognizing the loss of our colleague, Donald 
Payne, Jr. He was an incredible warrior for the city of Newark, 
the county of Essex, the State of New Jersey, and for so many 
across this country. To me, he was not just a colleague, not 
just a friend, he was a mentor and a big brother on both T&I, 
on Homeland Security, and in this institution. And I will miss 
him dearly. And I trust that our colleague, Representative 
Wilson, will do an incredible job picking up the torch and 
carrying it forward, as we will all strive to do on the work 
that my friend had done for so long. So, I just appreciate that 
opportunity.
    Today marks 3 years since the ransomware attack on Colonial 
Pipeline. This attack led to a temporary disruption in the 
delivery of gasoline and other petroleum products across a 
large swath of the country. As cyber attacks continue to become 
more sophisticated, the need for a strong, coordinated effort 
to reinforce our Government and key asset cybersecurity remains 
a top priority. We have a particular interest in this topic, as 
we also say on the cybersecurity subcommittee of the Homeland 
Security Committee.
    Mr. Caram, can you discuss how cyber attacks impact our 
pipeline network, the safety of our pipelines, and the security 
of our country overall?
    Mr. Caram. Yes, thanks for the question. I will say that 
cybersecurity, I think, poses more of a risk to reliability 
than safety, but there are safety issues at play any time a 
system is taken over by someone outside the operator who can 
close valves, which leads to pressure waves and things like 
that. It could create unsafe conditions.
    Mr. Menendez. And would you want to elaborate on the 
reliability component that you mentioned?
    Mr. Caram. Well, reliability is outside the scope of the 
Pipeline Safety Trust. I think the operators could probably 
speak to reliability better than I could.
    Mr. Menendez. Fair enough. And just expanding on that, how 
can Congress ensure the security of our Nation's pipeline 
network, specifically with respect to cybersecurity?
    Mr. Caram. Sure. I mean, there are a lot of best practices 
out there, and agencies doing that kind of work.
    Again, it is beyond the scope of the Pipeline Safety Trust 
to work a lot on cybersecurity, but it does, as I mentioned, 
pose safety risks, and so, we are concerned. But yes, I believe 
there are agencies out there outlining best practices, and we 
would hope that they are regulated in that way.
    Mr. Menendez. Sure, thank you.
    Mr. Brown, last time you testified before this committee, 
we discussed PHMSA's coordination with other agencies, such as 
TSA, to address cyber threats. You mentioned that PHMSA was 
seeking to hire cyber experts, despite the lack of jurisdiction 
over cybersecurity. How has that process been going in terms of 
onboarding, hiring cybersecurity experts?
    Mr. Brown. Yes, we do train the TSA. We actually engage at 
a senior leaders level. In fact, we have an upcoming meeting 
with the TSA Administrator and leadership from CISA, as well as 
the pipeline sector leadership.
    We don't have specific authorization--so, that may be 
something worth considering for the committee--to hire in that 
space, but that is something that we would like to continue to 
make sure we are on top of. Even though we don't have direct 
jurisdiction in cybersecurity, it obviously--the nexus, really, 
is that a cyber incident can affect operations, or it has the 
potential to.
    And so, as you mentioned the Colonial incident, that was 
what we were most worried about, both on the startup or restart 
of the pipeline, as well as in the current--when a pipeline is 
already operating. In that case, they voluntarily shut down.
    So, we provide that training to the TSA and provide input 
on their directives, and we just want to continue to work as 
closely as possible. I am glad to work with you, if that is 
something of interest to the committee as you consider 
reauthorization.
    Mr. Menendez. Great, thank you. And is PHMSA pursuing any 
additional steps to ensure our pipeline network is prepared for 
future attacks?
    Mr. Brown. We engage on a voluntary basis with the 
regulated entities to discuss--we do regulate control room 
management, which are highly IT-focused operations. And so, we 
have robust engagement post-Colonial Pipeline incident.
    Mr. Menendez. I appreciate that.
    Thank you, and I yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Burchett for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, miss our 
friend who has passed away. I always enjoyed being down and 
doing my 1 minute, and he was always there, dressed very 
dapper, and I told him multiple times if I had his wardrobe, I 
would have burned mine. So, he will be missed.
    Mr. Brown, would you agree that pipelines are the safest 
mode of transportation for natural gas and petroleum products?
    Mr. Brown. When you factor in the volume of product moved, 
I would say so. Obviously, the discussion here today involved a 
lot of tragic incidents. And so, for those individuals, it 
certainly is not. But when you just talk about it in the 
context of volume.
    Mr. Burchett. Overall, yes, sir. I mean, there is an 
immense number that is moved. Would you agree that these 
pipelines provide a lot of jobs and opportunities for some very 
hard-working Americans?
    Mr. Brown. There are a lot of jobs associated with the 
pipeline sector.
    Mr. Burchett. And it is hard work. It is not an easy kind 
of thing. Would you agree with that, as well?
    Mr. Brown. Could you repeat that?
    Mr. Burchett. I said--yes, they shut the door on me. They 
do that a lot of times on me.
    Would agree that this is very hard work?
    Mr. Brown. It is very hard work, yes. I have been out 
there, and we have got the best workers in the world.
    Mr. Burchett. Yes, we do, and thank you for saying that.
    According to the Liquid Energy Pipeline Association, 
pipelines are the most environmentally protective way to 
deliver energy. Earlier this year, the Biden administration 
halted new export permits for liquefied natural gas because of 
climate change. Did you or anyone at the Department of 
Transportation tell President Biden this was an unwise 
decision?
    Mr. Brown. I did not have any involvement in the pause that 
the Department of Energy recently announced.
    Mr. Burchett. Would you say that is not you all's 
responsibility at TDOT?
    Mr. Brown. We do not have any jurisdiction in that space, 
no.
    Mr. Burchett. OK, I said TDOT, I am used to saying that, 
Tennessee Department--I always----
    Mr. Brown [interposing]. Yes.
    Mr. Burchett. That is where I usually direct most of my 
anger.
    According to DOT's website, you serve on President Biden's 
Carbon Dioxide Capture Task Force. Moving forward, when the 
Federal Government makes decisions regarding liquefied natural 
gas, I hope that we put American people first and not these 
ridiculous climate initiatives.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back 2 minutes and 34 
seconds. Please use it wisely.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
DeSaulnier for 5 minutes.
    Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
this hearing. I will start with Mr. Brown and transition to 
anyone else who would like to address this. It is sort of a 
good segue for my colleague.
    In the context of the times changing, I represent an area 
in the San Francisco Bay area that is the densest in terms of 
hazardous materials, because of refineries and chemical plants 
in the proximity of one of the few deepwater ports on the west 
coast. So, it is changing, and a lot of it is because of our 
policy in California that I firmly support and have been 
leading for many years. But we don't focus as much 
collectively, I don't think, on your issues around the 
transportation, around the refineries and the chemical plants.
    And my question, Mr. Brown, is of those--it used to be six 
refineries, there are now five, one of them shut--two of them 
have been shut down for an extended period of time to 
transition to biofuels, as the California Renewables Portfolio 
Standard continues to be implemented, and the market changes 
for their product. So, how do we work with the private sector 
and anticipate? And to your point about resources and 
transparency, how do we make these numbers as transparent as 
possible, and the oversight and inspections as transparent as 
possible so that we actually are more efficient as we look at 
the marketplace change?
    Not a comment on--well, our energy resources in California 
are changing dramatically. We are leading the country. We are 
proud of that. It is more efficient, if you ask me, even 
separate from the issues of the damage to the planet. So, how 
does your agency--and I will leave these--we have a diverse 
panel to talk about that, about being fairly agnostic as to 
what my colleague was just talking about, but also being driven 
by evidence-based research on how we transition--allow the 
local community transition as they see fit, consistent with 
State statute?
    And again, if you look at a map of the area I represent, 
there are just red lines of hazardous materials pipelines all 
over. And then, compared to rail and truck transport for these 
facilities--and a lot of them think they are going to be 
producing hydrogen for many decades to come, so, they are going 
to still need that infrastructure. But the transition, it seems 
to me, if we get it right, would be really efficient and 
transparent, and everyone could follow it. But if we don't, 
there is going to continue to be risk to the public and to the 
national economy.
    And again, lastly, as a Pacific Rim part of the dynamic, 
our competitors to the--in China, as they change more 
dramatically than we do when they have certain advantages in 
their access to raw materials, how do we look at the 
comparisons and the global changing thing in terms of 
transport? We get a lot of our fuel that is refined in the bay 
area still from the North Slope, which is very heavy crude and 
requires transport that is specific to that product, both going 
into the plant and coming out of it.
    Mr. Brown. Well, I couldn't agree more that transparency is 
really critical at this stage, and we are in an age of data 
where there is just so much data that didn't exist years ago, 
and so, voluntarily sharing that information, that is something 
our agency tries to do. We report on our website all of our 
incident data, enforcement data, which is somewhat unique for 
Government agencies.
    But also, we recently mapped incidents across the country, 
and we are continuing to do that to provide direct data on the 
types of incidents that are occurring so that academics or the 
public can engage in--I know the Pipeline Safety Trust has 
been--that has been a big focus of theirs.
    As part of the reauthorization legislation and voluntary 
information-sharing system, we have voluntarily tried to create 
a space for, when an incident occurs, a sharing of that 
information so that other operators can learn from that. I know 
Ms. Sames' organization provides an audit of companies 
voluntarily.
    But basically, opening the books, and sharing information, 
and acknowledging where risks exist helps us all try to tackle 
those risks collectively.
    Mr. DeSaulnier. Mr. Rorick, could you respond, having 
worked with the Western States Petroleum Association?
    And they described it once as a love-hate relationship. 
That may have changed more to the latter. Your industry is 
changing a lot.
    Mr. Rorick. It is, and we very much view ourselves as both 
part of the solution for technological advances for current 
activities that we are doing on oil and natural gas, but then 
also in the transition. We are going to be part of that, as 
well.
    I could agree with the Deputy Administrator that regular 
engagement, transparency, wherever we can--it doesn't mean we 
agree all the time, but certainly the collaboration and the 
coordination wherever we can is absolutely critical.
    I think you appropriately identified the interaction, the 
dependency, if you will, that you have on the North Slope 
crude. So, it has to be more than just pipelines. We have to 
make sure that we recognize that the infrastructure system is 
intertwined and complicated. So, coordination across Federal 
agencies and even between the States is critical, as well.
    Mr. DeSaulnier. And transparency.
    Mr. Rorick. Yes, sir.
    Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Nehls. You bet. The gentleman yields. I now recognize 
Mr. Molinaro for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Molinaro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad Mr. Brown 
referenced the need to share data as it relates to safety 
concerns.
    One provision that we were able to include in the PHMSA 
reauthorization from this body--and I am very grateful--in a 
bipartisan way again, this committee produced an outcome--the 
House, of course, produced an outcome, and we are still waiting 
on the Senate to take action, which, for many of us, is not 
only concerning, it is just a consistent waste of time and 
resources when there are major advancements that need to 
happen.
    But one provision we did include that I helped draft in the 
reauthorization bill passed in December with my colleague, Mr. 
Cohen, was the creation of a voluntary information-sharing 
system. This would allow and encourage the sharing of pipeline 
safety data and information. We did that with the industry. And 
Mr. Brown referenced the value of this kind of sharing of data.
    I was not going to start with this question, but it seems 
to me, if any of the other witnesses could speak to the value 
of that, it would, I think, highlight the need to move the bill 
forward.
    Mr. Rorick. So, we--the voluntary information-sharing 
system, as we discussed a little bit earlier, it could be 
incredibly valuable if it is designed appropriately. And what I 
mean by that is, so long as the information that is submitted 
to the Federal agencies is protected, and then the information 
is used in such a manner where it would allow companies a level 
of comfort that that information--there is no reach-back 
authority in a punitive fashion----
    Mr. Molinaro [interposing]. Of course.
    Mr. Rorick [continuing]. Then you would get great 
participation. It would give us a great dataset to not only 
look at trends, but then also identify individual reportings so 
that we can share the lessons learned more broadly across the 
industry.
    Ms. Sames. And I fully agree. I mean, we do something 
similar within the American Gas Association. We have a plastic 
pipe database. It has over 150,000 failures. It is evaluated by 
Government and industry and manufacturers. And we create a 
status report about three times a year showing what we know 
about failures. And it works.
    So, if this is done correctly, it now gives you this wealth 
of information that the industry and Government can utilize to 
improve safety. On the other hand, if it is done incorrectly, 
if there are fines and penalties for the submission, no one is 
going to submit.
    Mr. Molinaro. Agreed. And another provision I drafted and 
we were able to secure in the reauthorization with my 
colleague, Mr. Allred, directs PHMSA to complete a study and 
rulemaking on how operators can use composite pipe safely to 
transport new fuels like hydrogen. That will help us meet some 
of our climate goals.
    Mr. Rorick, could you just speak to the potential uses for 
composite pipe and why it is important to get this rulemaking 
accomplished?
    Mr. Rorick. Yes, sir. So, as we discussed with 
Representative DeSaulnier, we were part of the solution going 
forward, and we certainly see hydrogen as having a role there. 
Composite pipe has been used for decades now for repair jobs 
and sleeves, et cetera, so, that piece of technology in 
particular stands to be of particular benefit as we talk about 
moving greater quantities of hydrogen.
    Mr. Molinaro. Thank you. Thank you both.
    Just to shift gears slightly, I have spent my entire life 
in the Hudson River Valley, which means just by birth, we are 
natural resource conservationists. But it always strikes me as 
a bit comical that there are those who oppose the construction 
of pipelines for the safe transportation of CO2 and natural gas 
and other fuels, given that greenhouse gas emissions are 
avoided altogether, transporting via pipeline rather than other 
more traditional transportation methods.
    Mr. Caram, could you just speak a little bit to that? I 
always like to remind my friends back in New York why some of 
the regulatory restrictions in New York for pipeline and the 
distribution via pipelines is probably not the best policy.
    Mr. Caram. I am sorry. Could you repeat the question?
    Mr. Molinaro. Rather than--so, rulemaking in States like 
New York limit--and of course, there are those who oppose the 
use of pipeline for transportation of CO2, natural gas, instead 
relying on the alternative transport options, which usually 
lead to higher greenhouse gas emissions.
    Mr. Caram. Got you. Yes, I think there are certainly lower 
incident rates on pipelines per mile, as Deputy Administrator 
Brown referenced earlier.
    I think one thing that gets missed in that data is just how 
devastating a failure can be from a pipeline just because of 
the quantity that is released when there is a failure on a 
pipeline. And so, I think that needs to be taken into account.
    But my organization works very hard on ensuring the safety 
of pipelines that are in the ground, and making sure that the 
pipeline that is in someone's backyard is as safe as possible, 
and that the community around it can feel that--not live in 
fear of a failure.
    Mr. Molinaro. Thank you.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Graves, who does not serve on this committee, but he was waived 
on this subcommittee.
    So, you have 5 minutes, Mr. Graves. Good to see you.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. You, too. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here today.
    Mr. Brown, I want to follow up on Congressman Burchett's 
question. The National Research Council did an evaluation 
looking at different modes of transportation, and Congressman 
Burchett asked you a question related to that. So, I just want 
to make sure I understand. Are pipelines the safest mode of 
transportation when compared to other modes?
    Mr. Brown. It is sort of a complicated question, but I 
think, to your point, as far as the fewest number of incidents, 
if you look at the volume, you would say yes, you would say 
yes. But to Mr. Caram's point, the severity of an incident can 
be tragic and, obviously, very severe.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I absolutely agree with that.
    Mr. Brown. Yes.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I just--I want to make sure I 
understand my reading of the National Research Council's 
evaluation that, compared to truck and train and barge and 
other things, it is the safest mode of transportation.
    Mr. Brown. Yes. Those----
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. We should never 
stop striving to further and further improve safety. I want to 
be clear on that.
    Do you agree that the State of California uses oil and gas?
    Mr. Brown. Yes, I have used it in the State of California.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Yes, I thought so. I am not sure I 
understand why some folks will sit here and talk about 
pipelines as this evil. Whenever their State uses it, science 
shows it is the safest mode of transportation.
    Let me be clear. I agree that we need to continue striving, 
using technology, get better and better at safety and 
perfecting this. But let's compare this to alternatives. I was 
just looking up--I pulled up an article. Just for the city of 
New York--just for the city of New York--according to the Fire 
Department of New York, in 2023, lithium-ion batteries caused 
267 fires, 150 injuries, and 18 deaths. That is just in New 
York, just in 2023.
    We can't sit here and pretend like--that by stopping 
pipelines, there are all these other alternatives that are that 
much better. That doesn't even include the fact that many of 
the energy solutions that my friends from California are 
talking about include mining--that have been proven, as Mr. 
Stauber has talked about, slave labor, child labor, safety 
infractions, deaths across the globe.
    So, I think we need to be very thoughtful and careful about 
pretending as though there are all of these other safer, better 
options out there, and instead focus on what math and science 
shows are the safest options, and make sure we are continuing 
to learn from successes and failures, and continue to perfect. 
Is that fair?
    Mr. Brown. That is exactly what our agency does, because we 
also regulate the hazardous materials transportation via truck, 
train, plane, vessel, automobile, and drone.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. It sounds like it is the first 
time you have ever said that. Thank you, I appreciate it.
    Mr. Rorick, I would like to ask you a question. PHMSA 
hasn't really made substantial changes in some of the class 
location regulations in over 50 years. Can you talk a little 
bit about how perhaps some updates or modernization there could 
result in actual better safety outcomes?
    Mr. Rorick. Yes, sir. So, the class location rules, or the 
way they are currently designed in an outdated fashion, 
essentially says that once a population, a certain population 
is reached, that companies automatically have to pull those 
pipelines out, regardless of whether or not they are safe or 
they need to be pulled out.
    First and foremost, we look out for the workers of the 
communities in which we--we look out for the safety of the 
communities in which we operate in, but also for the workers 
that do our work. So, if we can avoid doing work where we don't 
have to, particularly with heavy machinery, we want to do that.
    Secondly, if we can use existing technologies, integrity 
management technologies to maintain the same level of safety 
and oftentimes find pipelines that don't need to be pulled out, 
we don't need to purge that gas and spend hundreds of millions 
of dollars pulling out pipe unnecessarily that we can then 
redivert to integrity management programs.
    And then lastly, sir, I would say that if we--that 
annually, the amount of gas that occurs from blowdowns just to 
do these pipe replacements exceeds 800 million standard cubic 
feet of natural gas a year, which is the same amount of gas 
that 10,000 homes use. If we can avoid that and still maintain 
the same level of safety----
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. It could prevent 
the emissions.
    Mr. Rorick. That's true.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Another quick question, and I 
apologize I am running out of time, but could you talk briefly 
about the regulation of in-plant pipelines, as opposed to those 
external to the boundaries?
    Mr. Rorick. Yes. So, when the statute was originally 
created, it was very specific in giving PHMSA the authority to 
waive its authority over in-plant piping for liquid pipelines, 
but it didn't provide the same level of clarity for natural gas 
pipelines.
    What we would look to see, or hope to see, is a 
harmonization so that PHMSA has that same level of authority to 
let OSHA, which currently manages the refineries, have that 
same authority over the natural gas.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. In some cases we are seeing 
regional PHMSA managers exercise jurisdiction whenever PHMSA 
has headquarters, effectively----
    Mr. Rorick [interrupting]. Yes, sir, and it is starting to 
create some confusion in the industry.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time, 
but I just want to thank you.
    Mr. Brown, I am concerned about what Mr. Rouzer brought up 
about some of the deadlines in the law. I don't think your 
agency has the discretion to determine when they are going to 
complete something. If we write a law, our citizens don't have 
the ability to choose when they are going to comply and when 
they don't. And I think we need to work on better strategies to 
actually comply.
    I am out of time, I apologize and yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. I now recognize Mr. 
Johnson for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
holding this very important hearing, and thank you to the 
witnesses for appearing today.
    Mr. Brown, pipelines often route hazardous materials 
through densely populated areas, which can become public safety 
emergencies in the event of a pipeline failure. In some events, 
communities are not made aware of pipelines until something 
goes wrong.
    What obligation do pipeline operators have to inform the 
public about location and likely risks of pipelines?
    Mr. Brown. We have a host of requirements that we impose on 
those operators to inform. So, there are signs, signage 
requirements, there's emergency planning requirements, 
emergency notification requirements, and those we are 
constantly updating. Just last year--I am sorry, in 2022--we 
updated those, we are working on further updates, as well. So, 
that is something that we stay very focused on for precisely 
the reasons you mentioned.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you. Are pipeline operators 
required to hold public meetings after a pipeline incident?
    Mr. Brown. No, and that is something we have really taken 
on as an agency. When the public doesn't have the information 
and a serious incident occurs in their community, we have tried 
to provide information that we have, but of course, we don't 
operate the pipeline. We only oversee the operations. And so, 
that is something that I think an operator, when there is an 
incident that affects a community, that they should communicate 
to the community and give a chance to the community to ask 
those types of questions.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you.
    Mr. Caram, the bipartisan pipeline safety reauthorization 
bill focuses on the safety of the millions of miles of gas and 
hazardous liquid pipelines that are currently in use and the 
new pipelines required for hydrogen and carbon dioxide. The 
bill asks for a study by the Government Accountability Office 
on the need and ability to create a localized emergency alert 
system in the event of pipeline accidents.
    What information is needed for first responders when 
responding to a pipeline incident?
    Mr. Caram. Yes. The type of pipeline that failed, the 
product that was in the pipeline that failed, the potential 
impacted area of that failure, which homes and places could be 
impacted by that failure. What kind of emergency efforts are 
best? Is it shelter in place? Is it an evacuation?
    And I think the need for such a system is made even more by 
CO2 pipelines, because they can move so far away from a 
pipeline, the plume after a failure, because sometimes people 
should evacuate and sometimes maybe they should shelter in 
place. And it is not a kind of a one-size-fits-all. The weather 
affects what direction it could move, things like that.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Is the information needed by first 
responders that you just outlined, is that information always 
readily available? And where is it obtained from?
    Mr. Caram. It is not always readily available. Some of that 
information about the type of pipeline it is and some physical 
characteristics of the pipeline and the location can be found 
on the National Pipeline Mapping System, but other information 
that might be particular to that specific failure would not be.
    And first responders would need to rely on communication 
from the operators to get that kind of information, and I think 
that the two Denbury failures, one in Satartia and one in 
Sulphur, shows what can happen when there is a breakdown there.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you. Engaging with local 
communities and stakeholders is crucial to raising awareness 
about pipeline safety risks, and also building trust in 
pipeline operators and regulators. The PIPES Act of 2023 even 
creates a new Office of Public Engagement to educate local 
governments, public safety organizations, pipeline operators, 
and the public about pipeline safety, best practices, and 
regulations. The goal is to ensure access to information by 
facilitating conversations and addressing community concerns.
    To promote transparency and accountability, how are you 
able to bridge the gaps between industry stakeholders, 
including public safety officials, smaller companies, and local 
communities?
    Mr. Caram. Well, I think there is still a big need for 
public engagement, especially after failures. I think PHMSA has 
made some real improvements there over the last few years, and 
has visited communities both after a failure and where there is 
a proposed new project, and that has been great to see. But I 
think there is a lot of progress still to be made, and there is 
definitely an appetite for it from the public.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, and I yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. Are there any further 
questions from any members of the committee that have not been 
recognized?
    Seeing none, this concludes our hearing today. I want to 
thank you all for being here today.
    I look forward, Mr. Brown, any questions that need to be 
answered, I hope you can be timely with that in the next couple 
of weeks. You should be able to do so.
    This committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                      Submissions for the Record

                              ----------                              


     Statement of Rob Benedict, Vice President, Petrochemicals and 
 Midstream, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, Submitted for 
                    the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls
    The American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) is a trade 
association representing high-tech American refiners, petrochemical 
manufacturers, and pipeline operators. AFPM members produce and deliver 
the fuels and petrochemicals that make modern life possible and enable 
people and the U.S. economy to thrive.
    AFPM members rely on pipelines to transport feedstocks to their 
facilities and products to consumers. Liquid fuel and natural gas are 
the lifeblood of the American economy, pipelines are the veins. 
Pipelines continue to be the safest and most efficient means of 
transporting natural gas and petroleum products. The safety and 
security of pipelines are important not only to the American economy, 
but to the men and women who work to keep America moving. AFPM supports 
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) 
mission ``to protect people and the environment by advancing the safe 
transportation of energy and other hazardous materials that are 
essential to our daily lives.''
    Enhancing pipeline safety and security continue to be top 
priorities for AFPM. We encourage efforts to ensure our nation's 
pipeline system continues to operate safely and efficiently and 
appreciate the Committee's introduction and passage of H.R. 6494, the 
Promoting Innovation in Pipeline Efficiency and Safety (PIPES) Act of 
2023. AFPM stands ready to support the development of this five-year 
reauthorization of PHMSA's pipeline safety programs as it continues to 
move through the legislative process.
    We believe that H.R. 6494 could be improved with the creation of a 
``safety zone'' around pipeline construction and repair operations to 
protect pipeline workers and the general public. The pipeline safety 
authority in Chapter 601 of title 49 does not contain any authority 
concerning worker and public safety where pipeline construction or 
repair activities are occurring, which could lead to potentially unsafe 
conditions.
    AFPM supports strengthening penalties and clarifying PHMSA's 
existing authority for damaging, destroying, or impairing the 
operations of pipeline facilities. Under current PHMSA authority, there 
are inadequate penalties for vandalism of pipeline facilities, and 
those in place are unused by PHMSA. Pipelines are critical assets that 
must be protected.
    Additionally, we support PHMSA establishing a voluntary information 
sharing (VIS) system to gather, evaluate, and quantify critical 
pipeline safety data and information to improve safety. This type of 
system has proven beneficial in other sectors. Importantly, any VIS 
system must include appropriate safe harbor provisions, that ensure 
data are only used for the intended purpose of improving pipeline 
safety.
    While current federal pipeline safety standards already regulate 
the design, construction, operation, maintenance and emergency response 
for CO2 and hydrogen pipelines, the regulations could be updated to 
ensure they reflect industry advancements. PHMSA should ensure these 
regulations address specific safety concerns for these materials but 
not be so burdensome that they stifle development of this critically 
important infrastructure. Carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS) has 
been demonstrated to be an effective tool in reducing CO2 emissions. 
Hybrid capture systems employed at ethanol facilities in the Midwest 
can capture CO2 from the bioprocessing stream as well as from the heat 
production stream to achieve further lower emissions. For CCUS to reach 
its potential, we must have a modern regulatory framework.
    Lastly, AFPM supports increased frequency of meetings of the 
Technical Safety Standards Committees and the development of pipeline 
safety enhancement programs. Technical Safety Standards Committees are 
integral to the advancement of pipeline safety and have proven to 
result in good policy. AFPM has long been a supporter of pilot programs 
as they are important in testing the efficacy of safety innovations and 
advanced technologies. Though they can be useful, it is important that 
pilot programs are not overly restrictive, and that they encourage 
industry to use them.
    We appreciate your leadership on this critical issue and look 
forward to working with lawmakers as the legislative process moves 
forward.

                                 
  Letter of May 21, 2024, to Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick 
Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
and Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and Hon. Frederica S. Wilson, Ranking 
Member, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, 
   from Hon. Chrissy Houlahan, Member of Congress, Submitted for the 
                   Record by Hon. Frederica S. Wilson
                     Congress of the United States,
                                House of Representatives,  
                                          Washington, DC 20515,    
                                                    May 21, 2024.  
The Honorable Sam Graves,
Chairman,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of 
        Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Rick Larsen,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of 
        Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Troy Nehls,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, U.S. 
        House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Frederica S. Wilson,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, U.S. 
        House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
    Dear Chair Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, Chair Nehls, and Ranking 
Member Wilson:
    Thank you for your continued leadership and work to make our 
nation's systems of pipelines safer and more reliable. In March 2023, 
my community experienced the devastating natural gas-fueled explosion 
at the R.M. Palmer Company chocolate factory in West Reading, 
Pennsylvania, which took the lives of seven workers, injured eleven 
people, displaced three families, and destroyed property. On account of 
this tragedy, I am writing in follow up to the Subcommittee on 
Railroad, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials' May 7th hearing on the 
reauthorization of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration (PHMSA). Specifically, I want to emphasize testimony 
regarding action that Congress must take to regulate ``Aldyl A,'' which 
is the pipeline material identified by the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) to have leaked natural gas at the West Reading 
explosion site. Accordingly, I urge you to take requisite action to 
protect lives from future Aldyl A-related incidents as outlined in 
bipartisan legislation I have proposed as you advance your Committee's 
pipeline safety reauthorization legislation.
    As you know, the NTSB is conducting a comprehensive investigation 
into the R.M. Palmer factory explosion. On May 2, 2023, NTSB issued its 
preliminary findings report, which indicated ``that natural gas was 
leaking from a DuPont Aldyl A service tee that was installed in 1982.'' 
\1\ Unfortunately, this is not a new issue. In 1999, 2002, and again in 
2007, PHMSA identified Aldyl A as a pipe material with ``poor 
performance histories relative to brittle-like cracking.'' \2\ It is 
far past time that Congress take action to regulate this dangerous 
material to prevent any future loss of life and devastation to our 
communities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/PLD23LR002.aspx
    \2\ Federal Register: Notification of the Susceptibility To 
Premature Brittle-Like Cracking of Older Plastic Pipe [https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2002/11/26/02-30055/notification-of-
the-susceptibility-to-premature-brittle-like-cracking-of-older-plastic-
pipe] and
    https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2007-09-06/pdf/07-4309.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the May 7th Subcommittee hearing, key testimony was given to 
emphasize the importance of action to regulate Aldyl A.\3\ In his 
written testimony, Mr. Bill Caram, Executive Director of the Pipeline 
Safety Trust, stated, ``Pipeline industry-developed standards also call 
attention to the integrity problems with this particular type of 
service tee, though these standards are also voluntary. A recent PHMSA 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking would specifically add Aldyl A pipe to 
distribution pipeline operator's integrity management programs, asking 
operators to consider the risk of the presence of this material in 
their system. At what point do we go beyond recommending operators 
remove problematic materials from their systems and make it explicitly 
illegal for this material to be part of our nation's pipelines? Please 
remember that there are 7 dinner tables have had an empty seat since 
that day.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rLpY883vjjA (see: 42:50 and 
51:21)
    \4\ https://democrats-transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/
bill_caram_-_testimony.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While we cannot fix the past, Congress has a responsibility to take 
action to prevent disasters like the one in my community from ever 
happening again. That is why I introduced my bipartisan legislation, 
the Aldyl A Hazard Reduction and Community Safety Act (H.R.5638) \5\, 
with my fellow Berks County colleague Rep. Dan Meuser. If enacted, our 
bill would direct PHMSA to require operators in high consequence areas 
to identify existing Aldyl A and then submit documentation about its 
usage to PHMSA. It directs PHMSA to issue standards for the removal of 
Aldyl A at pressurized locations in high consequence areas within 5 
years, including consideration for minimizing costs and service 
disruptions. This will undoubtedly save lives and help prevent another 
deadly Aldyl A-related tragedy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/
5638?s=1&r=1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I appreciate your attention to the critical testimony on the 
circumstances surrounding the tragic explosion in West Reading 
delivered during the Subcommittee hearing. Once again, I urge you to 
take action to prevent another Aldyl A-related incident and stand ready 
to work with you to advance my bipartisan legislation.
            Sincerely,
                                          Chrissy Houlahan,
                                                Member of Congress.

                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


    Questions to Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and 
     Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of 
                Transportation, from Hon. Troy E. Nehls

    Question 1. Deputy Administrator Brown, your written testimony for 
this hearing was not provided to Members until after 10:00 p.m. the 
night before the hearing, denying Members of this Committee time to 
adequately review your testimony in preparation for this hearing.
    Question 1.a. Why did PHMSA take so long to provide the testimony 
to Members of the Committee?
    Answer. Preparing testimony involves an extensive departmental and 
interagency review process. These steps are essential to ensure the 
accuracy and comprehensiveness of the information included in the 
testimony of a witness from the Executive Branch. Unfortunately, this 
took longer than anticipated for my testimony, affecting the timeliness 
of its submission to the Committee.

    Question 1.b. Given the extremely late submission of your 
testimony, do you commit to providing responses to Members' questions 
for the record in two weeks?
    Answer. It is always PHMSA's intent to provide information 
requested by individual members of Congress and our oversight 
committees within the timeframes specified. As stated during the 
hearing, PHMSA is also available and responsive to requests for 
information via phone calls, briefings, and email to ensure Congress 
has the information it needs to complete its legislative activities. 
Responding to Questions for the Record involves an extensive 
departmental and interagency review process. These steps are essential 
to ensure the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the information 
included in responses from an agency within the Executive Branch. 
Unfortunately, this took longer than anticipated, affecting the 
timeliness of submitting these responses to the Committee.

    Question 2. Adequate staffing for PHMSA has always been a concern 
for Congress. That is why the PIPES Act of 2020 mandated PHMSA maintain 
a certain number of pipeline inspectors on staff.
    Question 2.a. Has PHMSA met these numbers?
    Answer. As noted in my testimony, with a red-hot economy and 
historically competitive job market, PHMSA faces fierce hiring 
competition from the private sector and other Federal agencies who are 
also competing with the same limited talent pools. In 2023, 43% of 
pipeline inspection and enforcement job offers were declined and in 
2024, the percentage increased to 44%. PHMSA's safety inspections 
require engineers or technical staff that are willing to spend up to 
50% of their time traveling to remote parts of the U.S. and perform 
physically demanding work. Regardless, PHMSA continues to explore ways 
to continue to improve the agency's hiring and recruitment to make it 
both more efficient and effective in recruiting and retaining talented 
applicants.
    PHMSA is grateful for the PIPES Act of 2020, which supported the 
use of incentives to improve efforts to attract and retain a talented 
pool of professionals. PHMSA has undertaken new recruitment and 
retention efforts--in coordination with the Office of Personnel 
Management--including developing new tuition reimbursement efforts and 
utilizing new online recruitment methods. Specifically, special salary 
rates were implemented in 2023 and PHMSA continues to implement 
programs to take advantage of all available hiring flexibilities.

    Question 2.b. How many pipeline inspectors are currently employed 
by PHMSA?
    Answer. As of June 3, there are 224 inspection and enforcement 
staff onboard with an additional 10 candidates going through the 
security process.

    Question 3. The PIPES Act of 2023, which this Committee passed on a 
bipartisan basis, authorizes PHMSA to hire up to 30 additional 
employees who have advanced technical expertise to complete rulemakings 
and Congressional mandates. How might these additional positions 
address PHMSA's backlog of outstanding rulemakings?
    Answer. The additional positions could enable PHMSA to develop and 
implement rulemaking mandates more expeditiously. Effective rulemaking 
requires many different technical skills. Engineers and Physical 
Scientists provide technical support and analysis in support of 
rulemaking and improvement of reliability and serviceability of the 
pipeline transportation network. Transportation Specialists perform 
research and analysis related to the development of regulatory changes 
and interpretation of regulations, as well as in the development of 
proposed and final rulemaking documents, including environmental 
reviews and economic impact statements, evaluation of public comments, 
and incorporation of legal input on proposed regulatory changes. 
Attorneys provide legal advice in the development of rulemaking, 
implementation guidance, and defense of the same from administrative 
and appellate litigation. Economists conduct economic research to 
understand economic and industry trends that influence risks to 
pipelines, transportation of hazardous materials, and related 
industries, as well as develop data models to evaluate safety risks and 
assess costs, benefits, efficiency, and impacts of PHMSA's regulatory 
and safety programs. Technical Writers provide writing and editorial 
support in the development of materials to respond to congressional 
reports, mandates, and rulemaking requirements. All of these positions 
work together to ensure rulemakings are technically sound and are 
developed in consideration of existing regulatory requirements, will 
achieve the desired result, and are defensible against litigation. 
PHMSA could utilize additional positions to address outstanding and 
upcoming rulemakings as expeditiously as possible.

    Question 4. In May 2023, PHMSA published a proposed rule on leak 
detection and repair requirements for pipeline operators. What is the 
status of this proposed rule and when does PHMSA expect it to be 
published?
    Answer. In order to meet its statutory obligation, PHMSA held two 
gas pipeline advisory committee (GPAC) meetings on the proposed rule 
for leak detection and repair requirements. Following the last GPAC 
meeting in March 2024, stakeholders were given 30 days to provide 
public comments on the GPAC proceedings related to the proposed rule. 
The comment period for the proposed rule closed on April 29, 2024, and 
PHMSA is now working to consolidate and respond to all GPAC 
recommendations and public comments received and is on track to publish 
the final rule by January 2025. The schedule for all outstanding 
congressionally mandated rulemakings can be found on the PIPES Act 2020 
Web Chart, located on PHMSA's website.

    Question 5. Please detail how PHMSA has worked with the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to harmonize its proposed Leak 
Detection and Repair Rule with similar regulations at EPA.
    Answer. PHMSA has met with different offices within EPA to better 
understand their published leak data associated with pipeline 
infrastructure and the technology solutions they considered to address 
methane abatement in order to synchronize our rulemakings and to 
minimize or eliminate all inconsistencies and duplication.
    PHMSA also notes that this rulemaking is subject to the interagency 
review process set forth in Executive Order 12866. As part of that 
process, PHMSA provided briefings on the NPRM for personnel from EPA 
and other agencies on the content of the rulemaking and responded to 
multiple rounds of comments on the draft rulemaking package from 
Executive Branch agencies (including, but not limited to, EPA). Further 
opportunity for input from EPA and other agencies will be provided as 
part of the Executive Order 12866 review of the final rule.

    Question 6. The proposed Leak Detection and Repair Rule includes a 
requirement for gathering line operators to participate in the national 
pipeline mapping system (NPMS), despite the PIPES Act of 2020 providing 
no such authorization.
    Question 6.a. Please detail where in the PIPES Act of 2020 PHMSA 
draw its authorization for including gathering lines in the NPMS.
    Answer. In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the Gas 
Pipeline Leak Detection and Repair rulemaking (RIN2137-AF51), PHMSA 
states that it has statutory authority pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60117(c) 
to extend NPMS reporting requirements at 49 CFR 191.29 to offshore, 
Type A, Type B, and Type C gas gathering pipelines so as to better 
inform PHMSA's regulatory oversight of those facilities. See 88 FR at 
31946-47, 31964-65. PHMSA also notes that, insofar as the NPRM 
identifies safety and environmental benefits from its proposed 
extension of the NPMS to those gas gathering facilities, PHMSA's broad 
safety authority at 49 U.S.C. 60102 could provide an alternative 
statutory basis for such an extension. See 88 FR at 31946-47.

    Question 6.b. Does PHMSA intend to keep this directive in the final 
rule?
    Answer. PHMSA has received numerous comments--both in opposition to 
and in support of--its proposed extension of NPMS reporting 
requirements at 49 CFR 191.29. PHMSA is carefully reviewing the 
entirety of the administrative record on this issue in evaluating 
whether to codify this proposal in its forthcoming final rule in the 
Gas Pipeline Leak Detection and Repair rulemaking (RIN2137-AF51).

    Question 7. PHMSA's authority to administer the NPMS is codified at 
49 U.S.C. Sec.  60132. Subsection (a) of Sec.  60132 states that ``the 
operator of a pipeline facility (except distribution lines and 
gathering lines)'' shall submit geospatial data and other information 
to the NPMS. Do you believe this statute gives PHMSA authority to 
require gathering and distribution operators to submit information for 
the NPMS?
    Answer. Section 60132(a) does not give PHMSA authority, it is a 
self-executing mandate requiring operators of certain pipeline 
facilities to submit geospatial information to PHMSA ``[n]ot later than 
6 months after the date of enactment of this section.'' Section 
60132(a) does not preclude PHMSA from requiring operators of 
distribution or gathering facilities to submit geospatial data under 
Sec.  60117(c).
    As explained in response to Chairman Nehls' question 6(a), PHMSA 
understands it has the authority under several provisions of the 
Pipeline Safety Laws to extend NPMS reporting requirements at 49 CFR 
191.29 to gas gathering pipelines. Similarly, PHMSA understands that 
neither of the statutory provisions referenced in that earlier response 
prohibit PHMSA from extending the NPMS to gas distribution lines as 
well if PHMSA determines such an extension is necessary for public 
safety or environmental protection (49 U.S.C. 60102) or to ensure 
compliance with standards or orders issued by PHMSA (49 U.S.C. 60117).

    Question 8. Since the creation of the NPMS, has PHMSA ever required 
distribution or gathering lines to submit information for the NPMS? If 
so, please detail when PHMSA collected that information.
    Answer. PHMSA has never required operators to submit geospatial 
information for gas distribution or gas gathering pipeline facilities 
but does require submission of NPMS data for regulated rural onshore 
hazardous liquid gathering lines.
    PHMSA first regulated hazardous liquid gathering pipeline 
facilities in Docket PHMSA-RSPA-2003-15864, RIN 2137-AD98, Protecting 
Unusually Sensitive Areas from Rural Onshore Hazardous Liquid Gathering 
Lines and Low-Stress Lines. In the 2008 final rule, operators of 
regulated rural onshore hazardous liquid gathering lines were required 
to comply with 49 CFR part 195 subpart B reporting requirements no 
later than January 3, 2009. In Docket PHMSA-2010-0026, RIN 2137-AE59, 
Miscellaneous Changes to Pipeline Safety Regulations, a 2015 final rule 
amended PHMSA regulations to require operators of hazardous liquid 
pipeline facilities to submit geospatial data to PHMSA each year by 
June 15. The earliest date PHMSA required operators of regulated rural 
onshore hazardous liquid gathering lines to submit geospatial data was 
June 15, 2016.

    Question 9. 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60117(c) states that ``The Secretary 
may require owners and operators of gathering lines to provide the 
Secretary information pertinent to the Secretary's ability to make a 
determination as to whether and to what extent to regulate gathering 
lines.''
    Do you believe 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60117(c) gives PHMSA authority to 
require gathering lines to submit information to the NPMS? Please 
explain your position.
    Answer. As explained in the response to Chairman Nehls' question 
6(a), PHMSA understands it has the authority under several provisions 
of the Pipeline Safety Laws to extend NPMS reporting requirements at 49 
CFR 191.29 to gas gathering pipelines, including 49 U.S.C. 60117(c).

    Question 10. Do you believe PHMSA would require new statutory 
authority to require gathering and distribution lines to submit 
information to be included in the NPMS? Please explain your position.
    Answer. As explained in responses to Chairman Nehls' questions 6(a) 
and 7, PHMSA understands it has the authority under several provisions 
of the Pipeline Safety Laws to extend NPMS reporting requirements at 49 
CFR 191.29 to gas gathering and distribution pipelines.

    Question 11. Do you believe the PIPES Act of 2020 provides 
authority to PHMSA to include liquified natural gas (LNG) facilities to 
be included in the proposed Leak Detection and Repair rule? If so, 
please detail where in the PIPES Act of 2020, or in statute, this 
authorization is located?
    Answer. In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the Gas 
Pipeline Leak Detection and Repair rulemaking (RIN2137-AF51), PHMSA 
states that several of its proposed amendments to 49 CFR part 193 
requirements governing liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities codify a 
self-executing statutory mandate within section 114 of the PIPES Act of 
2020 for operators of those and other gas pipeline facilities to update 
their inspection and maintenance procedures to ``minimize releases of 
natural gas.'' See 88 FR at 31947-48. PHMSA also has broad authority 
under 49 U.S.C. 60102(a) (reinforced in 49 U.S.C. 60103(d)) to 
promulgate operating and maintenance safety standards for LNG 
facilities, including the enhanced leakage survey standards proposed in 
the NPRM.

    Question 12. PHMSA held two Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) 
meetings in November 2023 and March 2024 on the Leak Detection and 
Repair proposed rule. GPAC meetings are required by statute to help 
provide PHMSA guidance on writing highly technical rules. Given the 
length of these meetings and complicated nature of this proposed rule, 
will PHMSA provide an extension of the comment period? If not, please 
justify PHMSA's position.
    Answer. PHMSA provided the public a 90-day comment period after 
publication of the Leak Detection and Repair proposed rule. The public 
had close to 150 additional days to comment following the GPAC meeting 
in November of 2023, where the most difficult issues relative to the 
rulemaking were addressed. PHMSA believes that the 30 days provided for 
the public to comment following the March 2024 GPAC meeting was ample 
time to comment on the issues discussed at that meeting.
    Additionally, PHMSA received comments from the public opposing the 
extension of the comment period for GPAC proceedings pertaining to the 
Leak Detection and Repair NPRM. Noting that the rule is urgently needed 
to improve safety and reduce methane emissions across the millions of 
miles of pipelines in the Unites States and that the Protecting Our 
Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 directed 
PHMSA to finalize advanced leak detection and repair standards by 
December 2021, commenters urged PHMSA to swiftly finalize the proposed 
measures to improve public safety, arguing that extending the comment 
period for GPAC proceedings pertaining to the Leak Detection and Repair 
NPRM could further delay PHMSA's finalization of that rule.

    Question 13. After Congress reached bipartisan agreement on a 
technology pilot demonstration program in the PIPES Act of 2020, 
additional conditions PHMSA imposed through guidance subsequently 
resulted in no technology pilots proposed or undertaken.
    Question 13.a. What changes or actions has PHMSA taken since our 
last hearing to improve this program?
    Answer. As mandated by 49 U.S.C. 60142(c)(2), the Pipeline Safety 
Enhancement Program (PSEP) expired three years after enactment of the 
PIPES Act of 2020, December 2023. Prior to expiration of the program, 
PHMSA expressed a willingness, including at the March 2023 T&I hearing, 
to work with committee members and stakeholders to improve the 
application process. However, no applicants came forward to participate 
in the program prior to its expiration. PHMSA stands ready to work with 
operators to advance modern technological advancements which can 
continue to be explored through the special permit process and through 
other provisions of the pipeline safety regulations using 49 CFR part 
192.18.

    Question 13.b. Pipeline safety deserves the benefits of modern 
technological advances. What can PHMSA do to reduce barriers to 
demonstrating the benefits of pipeline safety technology?
    Answer. PHMSA agrees new technologies can improve pipeline safety. 
However, use of unproven technology cannot be allowed to expose the 
public or the environment to unreasonable risk.
    49 U.S.C. 60142 authorized PHMSA to allow testing of innovative 
technologies and operational practices and required under subsection 
(d) that any testing program approved must provide more robust 
protection of public safety and the environment than the existing 
Federal pipeline safety regulations. PHMSA followed congressional 
direction by utilizing the review process of the existing special 
permit (waiver) program (see 49 U.S.C. 60142(d)(2)(A)), and PHMSA 
remained amenable to working with interested operators to alleviate 
some of the application requirements while ensuring that an equivalent 
level of public and environmental safety was being maintained by any 
new technologies or operational practices being implemented on in-
service, or active, pipelines.
    PHMSA remains open to working with interested operators to 
establish the safety of modern technological advances.

    Question 14. The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
advanced a pipeline safety reauthorization bill, H.R. 6494, that 
contains an important provision that will increase pipeline safety and 
reduce methane emissions. The provision would address maximum allowable 
operating pressure records for older pipelines. Please elaborate on the 
importance of this provision, given its safety and environmental 
benefits.
    Answer. In October 2019, PHMSA issued the Pipeline Safety: Safety 
of Gas Transmission Pipelines: MAOP Reconfirmation, Expansion of 
Assessment Requirements, and Other Related Amendments. This rule, 
addressing several congressional mandates from the Pipeline Safety, 
Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, requires operators 
of certain onshore steel gas transmission pipeline segments to 
reconfirm the maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of those 
segments where the records needed to substantiate their current MAOP 
are not traceable, verifiable, and complete. Records to confirm, or 
reconfirm, MAOP include pressure test records or material property 
records that verify the MAOP is appropriate for the pipeline. Having 
accurate and reliable asset data (records) is important to ensuring 
safe and reliable operations.
    PHMSA has worked with stakeholders on determining a process to 
address the issues regarding identifying acceptable records for older 
pipelines. PHMSA has worked collaboratively with stakeholders on this 
process since implementation of the rulemaking and continues to do so.

    Question 15. Is PHMSA considering an update to the potential impact 
radius, which remains a highly effective tool to prioritize risk and 
ensure the safety of our Nation's natural gas pipeline system, as 
reported by Government Accountability Office (GAO) earlier this month?
    Question 15.a. Did the agency hold a public meeting on the 
potential impact radius (PIR) in December 2022 where PHMSA reaffirmed 
its efficacy and application?
    Answer. PHMSA conducted a public meeting on December 13-15, 2022, 
that included discussion of the PIR. More details about the public 
meeting can be found on PHMSA's website at this link: https://primis-
meetings.phmsa.dot.gov/archive/MtgHome.mtg@mtg=161.html

    Question 15.b. What new data or engineering analyses support a 
change in the PIR?
    Answer. During PHMSA's December 13-15, 2022, public meeting 
(https://primis-meetings.phmsa.dot.gov/archive/
MtgHome.mtg@mtg=161.html) in Houston, Texas, there were two 
presentations that touched on and provided information related to 
potential impact radius (PIR), including one related to the National 
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) recommendation for PHMSA to 
consider a revision to the calculation methodology used in the pipeline 
safety regulations to determine PIR (see NTSB Safety Recommendation P-
22-001); and a second presentation that provided information on the 
background for development and validation of the PIR.
    Following the public meeting PHMSA established a team to review the 
current potential impact radius (PIR) calculation methodology, the 
available accident data, and the human response data to determine if 
revisions to the pipeline safety regulations are required. PHMSA has 
completed its review of data and is in the process of discussing 
options regarding methodology to respond to the NTSB's recommendation. 
If a rulemaking initiative is established, all data reviewed by PHMSA's 
team will be included in the docket.

    Question 16. Section 25 of H.R. 6494, the PIPES Act of 2023 
includes direction for PHMSA to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM) on the transportation of gaseous state carbon dioxide by 
pipeline and includes other direction for such rulemaking.
    Question 16.a. PHMSA is in the process of issuing an NPRM on carbon 
dioxide transportation. Does the NPRM incorporate provisions of H.R. 
6494? If so, which provisions? Are there any provisions excluded?
    Answer. PHMSA notes that its draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM) for its Safety of Carbon Dioxide and Hazardous Liquid Pipelines 
rulemaking (RIN2137-AF60) is currently in interagency review pursuant 
to Executive Order 12866. PHMSA is therefore constrained by regulation 
(49 CFR part 5.5) and Departmental policy (see https://
www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-04/Guidance-on-
Communication-with-Parties-outside-of-the-Federal-Executive-Branch-
%28Ex-Parte-Communications%29.pdf) from disclosing the content of that 
forthcoming NPRM to persons outside the Executive Branch.

    Question 16.b. Assuming this legislation is enacted into law, how 
will PHMSA incorporate the bill's direction into a NPRM or Final Rule?
    Answer. PHMSA seeks to comply with applicable law and will 
endeavor--consistent with the procedural requirements of the Pipeline 
Safety Laws (49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq.) and the Administrative Procedure 
Act (5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.)--to reconcile the contents of its 
forthcoming NPRM and any final rule with Congressional statute.

    Questions to Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and 
     Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of 
             Transportation, from Hon. Frederica S. Wilson

    Question 1. For the record, could you state what has been the 
leading cause of serious, significant, and all pipeline incidents over 
the last 20 years, and the last 3 years? Where do excavation damage 
incidents rank among leading causes?
    Answer. Excavation damage is a leading cause of serious pipeline 
incidents for all pipeline system types, as of 6/18/24. Below is a 
breakdown for all incidents. Serious Incidents are the most impactful 
to people and include fatalities or injuries requiring inpatient 
hospitalization. Significant incidents are a broader category of 
incidents, including all serious incidents and events with additional 
economical or environmental consequences. More specifically, 
significant incidents include the following:
    1. Fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization
    2. $50,000 or more in total costs, measured in 1984 dollars
    3.  Highly volatile liquid releases of 5 barrels or more or other 
liquid releases of 50 barrels or more
    4. Liquid releases resulting in an unintentional fire or explosion

                           All Pipeline Types
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Excavation
                                         Leading Cause         Damage
                                                               Ranking
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Years.................................................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serious Incidents..................  Incorrect Operation..          2nd
Significant Incidents..............  Equipment Failure....          3rd
All Incidents......................  Equipment Failure....          4th
========================================================================
20 Years................................................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serious Incidents..................  Excavation Damage....          1st
Significant Incidents..............  Corrosion............          3rd
All Incidents......................  Equipment Failure....          4th
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                   Natural Gas Distribution Pipelines
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Excavation
                                         Leading Cause         Damage
                                                               Ranking
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Years.................................................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serious Incidents..................  Excavation Damage....          1st
Significant Incidents..............  Excavation Damage....          1st
All Incidents......................  Excavation Damage....          1st
========================================================================
20 Years................................................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serious Incidents..................  Other Outside Force..          2nd
Significant Incidents..............  Excavation Damage....          1st
All Incidents......................  Excavation Damage....          1st
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Questions to Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and 
     Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of 
                 Transportation, from Hon. David Rouzer

    Question 1. How long has PHMSA investigated both thermite and 
thermite technology?
    Answer. PHMSA began formally investigating thermite and thermite 
technology on September 27, 2018, with the first Task Order to 
Southwest Research Institute. Although PHMSA had previously received 
questions relating to thermite classifications dating back to when the 
agency was the Research and Special Projects Administration (RSPA), the 
impetus leading to formal research efforts was an email PHMSA received 
from one of our third-party explosive testing agencies on March 4, 
2016. Subsequently PHMSA had discussions with other explosive testing 
agencies, Federal agencies including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Department of Defense (DOD), and 
international transport regulators regarding how thermites should be 
considered under the definitions for explosives and pyrotechnics and 
ultimately how such materials should be classed.

    Question 2. On September 22, 2023, PHMSA released an interim 
thermite policy stating it does not have the force and effect of law. 
Why did PHMSA not follow the Administrative Procedure Act when 
generating this policy?
    Answer. On September 22, 2023, PHMSA issued a Notice of Explanation 
of how it has reviewed and classified previous thermite mixtures. Since 
initiating its research into thermite classification, PHMSA has sought 
to provide regulatory relief by reclassifying certain thermite 
substances, which meet PHMSA's definition of Class 1 explosives, as 
Division 4.1 flammable solids pursuant to the Associate Administrator's 
existing authority under 49 CFR Sec.  173.56(i). This notice explained 
what data PHMSA has analyzed and found convincing when reclassifying 
thermite substances. This notice was only intended to provide clarity 
for how PHMSA has treated and reviewed previous requests while we 
complete the ongoing research to determine proper testing and criteria 
required to address the safe transportation of thermite formulations. 
While PHMSA did not issue its policy through the notice and comment 
period, its actions were still consistent with the Administrative 
Procedure Act.

    Question 3. Will domestic manufacturers of thermite be held 
accountable for the policy?
    Answer. PHMSA applies the same standards for classification of 
explosives, including the thermite policy, to all applicants, whether 
domestic or foreign.

    Question 4. Why would PHMSA, with the September 2023 Safety 
Management Service (SMS) research, state that all thermites are 
provisionally considered explosive?
    Answer. Thermites meet the regulatory definition of an explosive 
under the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) at 49 CFR 173.50(a) and 
the United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods 
Section 2.1.1. The SMS research report confirmed this, stating ``It is 
the recommendation of SMS that thermite powders, which are manufactured 
with the view to producing a pyrotechnic effect, be classed into Class 
1 in the condition and form in which they are offered for transport . . 
.''
    As noted above, PHMSA has also been engaged with other foreign 
competent authorities to promote an internationally harmonized approach 
toward thermite regulation. In discussion with several of these 
competent authorities, it was the unanimous opinion that thermite 
materials are appropriately placed within the class of explosives 
(Class 1) as they meet both of the HMR and UN definitions of 
explosives.

    Question 5. If you believe thermites meet the definition of a 
pyrotechnic substance, wouldn't this necessitate all Class 4 flammable 
solids also meet the definition ( . . . create light, heat, smoke . . 
.)?
    Answer. While pyrotechnic substances and flammable solids are both 
capable of creating light, heat, smoke, etc., they differ in that 
pyrotechnic substances contain a combination of both fuel and oxidizer 
and are thus self-sustaining and will continue to react without an 
external oxygen source, whereas flammable solids are merely fuels that 
require external supplies of oxygen to sustain combustion. Once 
thermites are initiated, they cannot be extinguished by most 
traditional means.

    Question 6. If a thermite manufacturer can produce a stable mixture 
that can be proven through UN testing, why are you penalizing 
innovation over a definition (pyrotechnic substance)?
    Answer. PHMSA is not penalizing any manufacturer of pyrotechnic 
substances, only seeking to apply the hazardous materials 
transportation regulations safely andconsistently. All substances that 
have a pyrotechnic effect remain in Class 1 by definition unless they 
are diluted or desensitized from their pure state. This approach has 
been harmonized internationally across foreign competent authorities to 
ensure accurate, fair, and consistent classification of explosives. 
Under the current PHMSA interim thermite policy, manufacturers of 
certain thermite substances that have been properly examined can 
request regulatory relief to be shipped as a Division 4.1, flammable 
solid.

    Question 7. Why did you allow a foreign company (SPEX), which does 
not conduct business in the U.S., to impact your view of thermites when 
you have domestic manufacturers with decades of experience?
    Answer. No single company influenced PHMSA's view of thermites or 
their classification. In February 2022, SPEX reached out to PHMSA 
technical staff to discuss thermite classification, testing, and the 
relationship of the interim policy and the published letters of 
interpretation. SPEX received responses to their inquiries on how 
explosive definitions and testing schemes apply to thermite substances 
and articles that were commensurate with how PHMSA regularly responds 
to outside stakeholders requesting insight or guidance on how the HMR 
applies to specific situations. SPEX's inquiries did not impact PHMSA's 
technical opinion or guidance, and PHMSA did not provide information to 
SPEX specific to any particular manufacturer or product. PHMSA has also 
had informational meetings with domestic manufacturers (i.e., MCR Oil 
Tools, Chammas Plasma Cutters, Goldschmidt, etc.) to discuss their 
process, materials, and articles.

    Question 8. How many injuries and/or deaths have occurred in the 
U.S. due to commercial thermites within the last 30 years?
    Answer. PHMSA only collects data on incidents involving the 
commercial transportation of hazardous materials. Of those, there are 
approximately 10 transportation incidents per year involving thermite 
or thermite-like materials, each causing on average about $7,000 in 
damages. Ninety percent of these incidents occurred on the highway, and 
none in the last thirty years resulted in injury or death.

    Question 9. Only 3 of the 8 mixtures were commercial products in 
the SMS report about thermites. Do you believe it's a sound decision to 
make a blanket ruling on thermite technology based on test results of 
non-commercial grade thermites?
    Answer. The SMS research included some worst-case scenarios for 
thermite formulations to delineate how particle size, morphology, 
packaging, and chemical composition impact behavior. Their results 
confirmed the ability for some thermite formulations to detonate, and 
it was important that SMS design the study materials to explore how 
these variables interact in either accelerating or slowing the relative 
reactivity for those thermite formulations. SMS also performed several 
large-scale tests with commercially produced thermites in shipping 
containers and aircraft fuselage to understand the behavior and hazards 
of palletized transport of thermites subjected to credible accident 
scenario initiation methods (e.g., external fire).

    Question 10. Have you contacted the U.S. manufacturers of thermite 
technology to understand how a Class 1 explosive classification would 
affect their business and industry?
    Answer. The agency does routinely, and frequently, engage with 
regulated stakeholders through public meetings, industry trade groups, 
specialized consultants, and by request from individual stakeholders. 
The agency also provides letters of interpretation, on request, on how 
the regulations should be interpreted to specific cases and takes 
consideration of public comments made on all rulemakings. PHMSA has 
also had informational meetings with domestic manufacturers (i.e., MCR 
Oil Tools, Chammas Plasma Cutters, Goldschmidt, etc.) to discuss their 
processes, materials, and articles.

    Questions to Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and 
     Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of 
               Transportation, from Hon. Bruce Westerman

    Question 1. Mr. Brown, my understanding is the Gas Pipeline 
Advisory Committee met in March to discuss PHMSA's proposed leak 
detection and repair rulemaking. The GPAC recommended several changes 
to the proposed rule to ensure it is technically feasible, reasonable, 
cost-effective, and practicable.
    Will you commit to the Committee that you and your staff will 
seriously consider the GPAC's recommendations as you revise the 
proposed rule?
    Answer. PHMSA will consider all of the GPAC's recommendations and 
the comments received during the open comment periods, as we prepare 
the final rule.

    Question 2. The EPA has finalized several rules recently that apply 
to emissions in the oil and natural gas sector. I am concerned that 
inconsistent regulations between EPA and PHMSA will place undue burden 
on the industry and smaller independent companies in particular.
    At the very least, will you commit to ensuring consistency between 
EPA's regulations and PHMSA's ultimate leak detection and repair final 
rule?
    Answer. PHMSA is committed to ensuring consistency between EPA 
regulations and our final rule. PHMSA also notes that this rulemaking 
is subject to the interagency review process set forth in Executive 
Order 12866; as part of that process, PHMSA provided briefings on the 
NPRM for personnel from EPA and other agencies on the content of the 
rulemaking, and responded to multiple rounds of comments on the draft 
rulemaking package from the Office of Management and Budget, and 
diverse Executive Branch agencies (including, but not limited to, EPA). 
Further opportunity for input from EPA and other agencies will be 
provided as part of the Executive Order 12866 review of the final rule.

    Questions to Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and 
     Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of 
                 Transportation, from Hon. Tracey Mann

    Question 1. Representative Pete Stauber (R-MN) asked Deputy 
Administrator Brown during the hearing about PHMSA holding an 
additional Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) meeting regarding the 
Class Location Rule. Deputy Administrator Brown answered that the GPAC 
had already completed its work on the rule. However, Representative 
Stauber was referencing a consensus reached during the March 2024 Class 
Location GPAC meeting where the advisory committee voted by 
supermajority threshold to meet again on the rulemaking within one 
year.
    Question 1.a. Can PHMSA commit to holding the next GPAC meeting on 
the Class Location Rule before March 2025?
    Question 1.b. If not, what is preventing PHMSA from doing so?
    Question 1.c. Will this second GPAC meeting require a supplemental 
notice and comment period?
    Answer to 1.a., 1.b., & 1.c. During the Class Location GPAC meeting 
in March 2024, the GPAC provided the following recommendation to PHMSA:
    i  PHMSA should continue to review the class location change 
requirements for possible future rulemaking action.
    ii  PHMSA, within 12 months, hold a GPAC meeting on the concepts 
and history of the class location change requirements and how they 
interact with 49 CFR subpart O.

    The meeting request from the GPAC was not directly related to the 
notice of proposed rulemaking discussed during the advisory committee 
meeting, ``Pipeline safety: Class Location Change Requirements.'' The 
request was, however, related to the concepts and history of the class 
location change requirements and how they interact with existing 
regulatory requirements. PHMSA fully intends to adhere to the GPAC 
request and hold a meeting.

    Question 2. Industry recently calculated that the Class Location 
Rule will reduce 28 times the amount of released methane as the 
proposed Leak Detection and Repair Rule would across the gas 
transmission sector. In addition to eliminating up to 800 million cubic 
feet of natural gas releases annually due to class change pipe 
replacements, the rule will significantly increase safety by applying 
integrity management, the highest standard of care, to thousands of 
miles of additional pipe.
    Question 2.a. What assurances can PHMSA provide that the agency is 
prioritizing completion of this important rulemaking, which advances 
safety and environmental objectives?
    Question 2.b. How soon can the agency issue a final rule?
    Question 2.c. With the significant improvement in safety and 
environmental impacts, why isn't the Class Location Rule being 
prioritized over other rulemakings?
    Answer to 2.a., 2.b., & 2.c. The 2020 PIPES Act had nearly double 
the number of mandates as the 2016 PIPES Act. Nevertheless, PHMSA has 
swiftly worked to complete these directives. A final Class Location 
Rule needs to be very carefully considered to provide protection 
against risks to life and property posed by pipeline transportation.

    Question 3. Representative David Rouzer (R-NC) asked Deputy 
Administrator Brown during the hearing several questions about the Leak 
Detection and Repair (LDAR) proposed rule. Please provide more detail 
regarding the following questions.
    Question 3.a. Deputy Administrator Brown stated that the agency 
will likely complete the rule at the end of the year. Can PHMSA please 
be more specific on timing? Are there certain milestones PHMSA is 
working to achieve?
    Answer. PHMSA is on track to publish a final rule by January 2025. 
As shown in the PIPES Act Web Chart (see: https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/
legislative-mandates/pipes-act-web-chart), PHMSA anticipates delivering 
the final rule to the Office of the Secretary of Transportation this 
summer and to the Office of Management and Budget by the fall.

    Question 3.b. Deputy Administrator Brown stated that the White 
House and the Council on Environmental Quality had minimal involvement 
in the proposed rule but expected the standard interagency review 
process for other governmental bodies to provide feedback on the final 
rule. Can PHMSA please share who will be reviewing the final rule 
including, but not limited to the following agencies and offices: the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of the Secretary, the Office 
of Management and Budget, the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the White House?
    Answer. Consistent with Department of Transportation Order 2100.6A 
and the interagency review process established in Executive Order 
12866, PHMSA expects its forthcoming draft rulemaking package for the 
Gas Pipeline Leak Detection and Repair rulemaking (RIN2137-AF51) will 
be reviewed by personnel in the DOT Office of the Secretary (OST), and 
across the Executive Branch--including (but not limited to) personnel 
from the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of 
Management and Budget, and other Executive Branch offices and agencies.

    Question 3.c. On April 15, 2024, PHMSA recently denied a reasonable 
request from the entire gas pipeline industry to extend the comment 
period following the GPAC meeting for the LDAR rule. Given that this is 
one of the largest rulemakings PHMSA has undertaken in years and 
considering there were only about two weeks to review all the required 
materials from the recent GPAC meeting on the LDAR Rule, can PHMSA 
please explain this decision? Is PHMSA concerned about the potential of 
substantive errors with the final rule since it appears the comment 
process was being rushed and the rulemaking expedited? If PHMSA is not 
concerned, what is the basis?
    Answer. PHMSA provided the public a 90-day comment period after 
publication of the Leak Detection and Repair NPRM. The public was 
provided nearly 150 additional days to comment following the GPAC 
meeting in November of 2023, where the most difficult issues relative 
to the NPRM were addressed. PHMSA believes the 30 days provided for the 
public to comment on the March 2024 GPAC meeting was ample time to 
comment on the issues discussed at that meeting.
    Additionally, PHMSA received comments from the public opposing the 
extension of the comment period for GPAC proceedings pertaining to the 
Leak Detection and Repair NPRM. Noting that the rule is urgently needed 
to improve safety and reduce methane emissions across the millions of 
miles of pipelines in the United States, and that the Protecting Our 
Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 directed 
PHMSA to finalize advanced leak detection and repair standards by 
December 2021; commenters urged PHMSA to swiftly finalize the proposed 
measures to improve public safety, arguing that extending the comment 
period for GPAC proceedings pertaining to the Leak Detection and Repair 
NPRM could further delay PHMSA's finalization of that rule.

    Question 3.d. Deputy Administrator Brown stated that PHMSA has been 
working with EPA to harmonize the LDAR rule from the proposal stage to 
the final stage with new EPA methane regulations since there will be 
overlapping requirements. Can PHMSA please share the dates of all 
meetings between PHMSA and EPA, including the names of the EPA offices, 
for each meeting? Please list other agencies and other stakeholders who 
may have been included in these meetings as well.
    Answer. PHMSA primarily met with representative from EPA's Office 
of Air and Radiation. PHMSA also notes that this rulemaking is subject 
to the interagency review process set forth in Executive Order 12866; 
as part of that process, PHMSA provided briefings on the NPRM for 
personnel from EPA and other agencies on the content of the rulemaking, 
and responded to multiple rounds of comments on the draft rulemaking 
package from the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the 
Office of Management and Budget, and diverse Executive Branch agencies 
(including, but not limited to, EPA). Further opportunity for input 
from EPA and other agencies will be provided as part of the Executive 
Order 12866 review of the final rule.

    Question 4. Representative Seth Moulton (D-MA) asked Deputy 
Administrator Brown about PHMSA's perspective on integrity management 
programs. Deputy Administrator Brown responded that integrity 
management is working for some operators and not others. Additionally, 
when asked if integrity management was the right approach, Deputy 
Administrator Brown discussed other PHMSA programs without mentioning 
the efficacy of the integrity management regulations.
    Question 4.a, According to an industry review of PHMSA gas 
transmission incident data in high consequence areas from 2010-2023, 
there have been zero incidents due to external corrosion in 10 of 14 
years, there have been zero incidents due to internal corrosion in 12 
of 14 years, and there have been zero incidents due to stress corrosion 
cracking in 12 of 14 years. These three threats are directly managed by 
integrity management programs. Does PHMSA agree that these statistics 
show that integrity management programs have made a positive impact on 
safety in high consequence areas?
    Answer. PHMSA is not familiar with analysis of incidents the 
question refers to and is unable to provide comment on the analysis 
without seeing it. In general, integrity management programs are 
comprised of many individual measures and responses. Over the past 
decade, the mileage of integrity assessments has increased, and we have 
observed a decrease in all types of corrosion incidents across both gas 
transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines for high consequence areas 
(HCAs) and non-HCAs. Additionally, during the same period, there has 
been a steady reduction in the number of repaired leaks and known leaks 
scheduled for repair in gas transmission pipeline across all areas and 
zones. It is encouraging to see the positive trends, but we remain 
vigilant in our focus on how to improve integrity management.

    Question 4.b. Given the statistics above, does the agency support 
the expansion of integrity management principles on the nation's 
pipeline systems beyond high consequence areas and moderate consequence 
areas?
    Answer. PHMSA supports consideration of initiatives that improve 
pipeline safety, including consideration of the expansion of integrity 
management principles beyond currently covered pipelines. It should be 
noted that the Pipeline Safety Laws establish the minimum federal 
pipeline safety regulations, operators are able to expand integrity 
management principles to pipelines outside of their identified HCAs as 
part of their safety programs without approval from PHMSA, and some 
currently do so.

    Question 4.c. Does the agency have measures or metrics, other than 
incident reports or enforcement actions that it uses to track and 
evaluate safety performance?
    Answer. PHMSA uses a variety of measures to evaluate the safety 
performance of operators. Incident rates (e.g., number of incidents per 
1,000 miles) and enforcement actions are important measures, but PHMSA 
has many others. Leaks and repair rates are used to track operator 
issues that do not rise to the level of reportable incidents. PHMSA 
also tracks miles of pipe composed of higher risk materials such as 
cast iron, wrought iron and bare steel that merit additional scrutiny. 
In addition, PHMSA evaluates operators' implementation of integrity 
management, including the types and miles of in-line inspection tool 
runs conducted each year and the results of those tool runs.
    Serious incidents, onshore significant incidents in HCAs, and 
additional metrics normalized per miles assessed by operator are also 
analyzed and shared publicly on the PHMSA National Pipeline Performance 
Measures page available to the general public here: https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/national-pipeline-
performance-measures. Based on input from stakeholders, including 
industry and public advocacy groups, PHMSA is considering revisiting 
these measures and potentially adding others.
    Besides these standard measures, PHMSA inspectors consider 
information specific to overall company performance as well as 
individual pipeline segments when preparing and conducting inspections. 
This information varies based on the specific segment, but can include 
factors such as special permits, river crossings, natural force 
threats, time since last inspection, any operational changes, and 
attached components.

    Question 5. Recently, PHMSA informed the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) that the agency is considering regulatory changes to 
improve the accuracy of its potential impact radius (PIR) formula.
    Question 5.a. Why is PHMSA considering an update to the PIR, which 
remains a highly effective tool to prioritize risk and ensure the 
safety of our nation's natural gas pipeline system, as reported by GAO 
earlier this month?
    Question 5.b. The agency held a public meeting on the PIR in 
December 2022 where PHMSA and the developer of the methodology (CFER) 
reaffirmed its efficacy and application. The PIR was developed to 
systematically define reasons to apply integrity management. It was not 
intended to be a model for accurately determining the extent of damage 
from a rupture. Can PHMSA please share why after the December 2022 
meeting the agency is considering a shift in its belief that the 
current PIR is an effective tool in prioritizing work to manage safety 
threats?
    Question 5.c. Can you please share the data, research, or analysis 
that supports a change in the PIR?
    Answer to 5.a., 5.b., & 5.c. On August 15, 2022, the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued Safety Recommendation P-22-1 
to PHMSA. NTSB recommended that PHMSA ``Revise the calculation 
methodology used in your regulations to determine the potential impact 
radius of a pipeline rupture based on the accident data and human 
response data discussed in this report.'' In response to NTSB's 
recommendation, PHMSA conducted a public meeting December 13-15, 2022, 
in Houston, Texas. There were two presentations that touched on and 
provided information related to potential impact radius (PIR): one 
related to the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) 
recommendation for PHMSA to consider a revision to the calculation 
methodology used in the pipeline safety regulations to determine PIR 
(see NTSB Safety Recommendation P-22-001); and the second was 
information on the background for development and validation of the 
PIR.
    Following the public meeting PHMSA established a team to review the 
current potential impact radius (PIR) calculation methodology, the 
available accident data, and the human response data to determine if 
revisions to the pipeline safety regulations are required. PHMSA has 
completed its review of data and is in the process of discussing 
options regarding methodology to respond to the NTSB's recommendation. 
If a rulemaking initiative is established, all data reviewed by PHMSA's 
team will be included in the docket.

    Question 6. In prior presidential election years, DOT, including 
PHMSA, has barred major rulemaking activity and grant awards from being 
released several months prior to a presidential election.
    Question 6.a. Will DOT and PHMSA be under a similar prohibition 
this year?
    Answer. PHMSA is not aware of any historical prohibitions along the 
lines of those suggested. Rather, in advance of the most recent 
presidential election, PHMSA issued a final rule on LNG by Rail 
(RIN2137-AF40) in late July 2020, and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
on Class Location (RIN2137-AF29) in October 2020. Similarly, before the 
2016 presidential election, PHMSA issued each of the following 
rulemaking actions: a final rule on FAST Act Requirements for Flammable 
Liquids and Rail Tank Cars (RIN2137-AF17) in August 2016; a final rule 
on Expanding the Use of Excess Flow Valves in Gas Distribution Systems 
to Applications Other Than Single-Family Residences (RIN2137-AE71) in 
October 2016; and an Interim Final Rule on Enhanced Emergency Orders 
for Pipelines (RIN2137-AF26) in October 2016.

    Question 6.b. If so, what dates will DOT and PHMSA bar major 
rulemaking activity and grant funding from being released?
    Answer. PHMSA is not aware of any prohibitions for either 
rulemaking activity or grant funding in the nature described.

    Question 7. Concerns have been raised about instances of certain 
PHMSA inspectors, in several regional offices, acting in an 
unprofessional manner during audits and inspections.
    Question 7.a. Can the agency please provide details on what 
trainings and/or programs PHMSA institutes to ensure its inspectors are 
acting professionally and abiding by the Department of Transportation's 
Standards of Ethical Conduct? Are any of these programs recurrent?
    Answer. PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) takes the conduct 
of our staff very seriously. We encourage all operators to bring issues 
to the Region Directors and PHMSA/OPS leadership. Every year OPS 
leadership conducts a planning meeting with the Region Directors and 
Operations Supervisors. In the most recent two planning meetings we 
have invited representatives from the regulated community and other 
public interest stakeholders to come in and speak freely about their 
observations on topics ranging from regulatory oversight and newly 
issued regulations to inspection conduct. The attendees have not raised 
the topic of federal inspector conduct as a concern in these meetings. 
Additionally, several operators meet with PHMSA and OPS leadership 
throughout the year, usually at their request. If a conduct issue were 
to be raised, it would be investigated thoroughly.
    With regard to training, every new inspector goes through an 
``orientation'' with their supervisor. During this time the new 
inspector is introduced to the various programs and policies at OPS. 
The supervisor and new inspector discuss the various program objectives 
and expectations. One policy in particular is the ``Conducting 
Inspection Policy.'' Within this policy is section 3.2.2 ``Practical 
and Behavioral Guidance for OPS Inspectors'' which describes OPS's 
expectations for inspector conduct and behavior. PHMSA provides an 
ethics orientation to every new employee during onboarding that reviews 
the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch. 
Additionally, PHMSA also provides ethics training annually for all its 
employees.
    Additionally, our inspectors are trained on performing an 
inspection exit briefing with operator personnel. Our inspectors are 
required to identify potential noncompliances to personnel who may face 
company chastisement for failing to ensure the company meets minimum 
safety requirements. These exit briefings are constructive, and 
inspectors are trained to identify the issues as potential, not final 
findings. Potential findings are discussed with Operations Supervisors 
and Region Directors. Region Directors make the final determination of 
whether an enforcement case will be initiated.
    Continuing on with the new inspector's training and development, 
all inspectors attend several formal classroom training classes at 
OPS's Training and Qualification center in Oklahoma City, OK. In their 
initial class PL1250 Introduction to Pipeline Safety Inspections, there 
is a block of instruction ``Standards of Ethical Conduct'' which 
discusses conducting inspections in a professional manner and about 
their interactions with operators.
    Finally, OPS is continuing to improve its programs and 
communication. Underway in 2024 is the updating and improvement of 
OPS's On-the-job Training (OJT) policy. Within this update we are 
emphasizing the introduction or orientation of new inspectors to better 
ensure the culture of OPS is introduced to new staff from the beginning 
of their career with OPS. Continuing with the inspectors' OJT, all 
inspectors are evaluated as they progress through OJT. Their supervisor 
will accompany them on inspections to observe their performance. A 
specific portion of that evaluation is the behavior and conduct of the 
inspector.

    Question 7.b. If none have been created, can PHMSA commit to 
holding nationwide training for its inspection personnel in 2024? 
Furthermore, can PHMSA establish a frequency with which inspectors must 
be re-trained?
    Answer. OPS believes it has adequate policies and programs to 
address the conduct and behavior of its inspection staff and conducts 
ongoing training for its inspection staff on various topics including 
required annual PHMSA ethics training. OPS leadership holds regular 
meetings with inspection staff throughout the year, and this topic is 
one that will be raised to continue to impress on staff the importance 
of ethical and professional behavior.

    Question 7.c. How does PHMSA address reports from operators that 
inspectors have acted unprofessionally and/or violated the DOT's 
Standards of Ethical Conduct? What measures does PHMSA have in place to 
ensure that no retaliation occurs against an operator for making such a 
report?
    Answer. PHMSA encourages operators to contact PHMSA management with 
any concerns about the performance or conduct of its inspectors; PHMSA 
cannot act to correct behavior it is not informed of. While conduct 
complaints are rare, allegations are taken seriously and thoroughly 
investigated. If possible and appropriate, PHMSA will maintain the 
anonymity of the complainant. All reports related to misconduct are 
immediately elevated throughout the PHMSA management chain for 
appropriate follow-up action.

    Question 7.d. Concerns have also been raised about instances where 
PHMSA audits can take months to complete when they are scheduled to be 
completed in one week. Can PHMSA please explain why this occurs?
    Answer. Pipeline inspections are rarely, if ever, scheduled to be 
completed in one week. A routine inspection will include a 1-2 day 
virtual scoping meeting with the operator, followed by a week or two of 
preparation as inspectors review operator incident data and compliance 
histories. This is generally followed by several days (or weeks 
depending on the size of the system) reviewing company procedures, 
maintenance manuals and records, and when appropriate, some of the 
procedural and record review are performed virtually. Some companies 
operate only a few hundred miles of pipeline and others many thousands 
of miles. A typical pipeline inspection includes evaluation of hundreds 
of pipeline miles and associated facilities, hundreds of pages of 
procedures and multiple years of records. PHMSA physically inspects the 
system's compressor or pump stations, overpressure protection devices, 
manifolds, breakout tanks, as well as drive hundreds of miles verifying 
adequate cathodic protection (corrosion prevention) readings and right-
of-way maintenance. Inspecting this quantity of facilities and 
materials generally occur over many weeks. In consideration of the 
impact to company staff, PHMSA will often spread the inspection weeks 
out over multiple months. For example, PHMSA may schedule a one-week 
inspection along an operator's right-of-way and then return a month 
later for a one-week examination of the operator's records at its 
office. Additionally, if an inspector identifies safety concerns, they 
may request additional information to better understand the 
circumstances. If this occurs, a scheduled inspection timeframe may be 
extended.

    Question 7.e. What can PHMSA do differently to ensure that audits 
are completed efficiently going forward?
    Answer. PHMSA crafts each inspection to focus on the known risks of 
the pipeline based on the company and pipeline history--as well as 
other risk-based factors. This means that all other things being equal, 
pipeline companies with better safety and compliance histories, as well 
as those that are situated in lower risk areas (e.g., not near schools, 
population centers) will experience relatively fewer inspections topics 
and a potentially shorter inspection time. During each of the last two 
years, PHMSA has invited stakeholders to its annual inspection planning 
meeting and asked they provide insight into what PHMSA is doing well in 
its inspection program and what can be improved. In 2024, PHMSA will 
again seek input from the regulated industry on ways to improve our 
efficiency and effectiveness.
    As resources are available, PHMSA will explore opportunities to 
leverage machine learning to enhance our ability to focus inspection 
resources on the riskiest aspects of pipeline systems and perhaps 
lessen time spent evaluating less risky aspects. However, our number 
one priority continues to be the safe operation of the nation's 3.3 
million miles of regulated pipelines that we oversee.

    Question 7.f. Ensuring consistent auditing and understanding of the 
code is important to avoid ambiguity, misinterpretation, and confusion 
during PHMSA audits. How is the agency working to ensure that PHMSA 
inspectors are objectively and consistently auditing to the code 
language as opposed to incorporating their opinions or interpretations 
of the code?
    Answer. As noted previously, PHMSA requires all federal and state 
inspectors to undergo rigorous training, provides continuous 
opportunities for various training, and is enhancing its OJT program to 
help ensure national consistency. PHMSA also provides its inspectors 
training and enforcement guidance, as well as access to agency 
decisions, interpretations, and consensus standards--many of these 
resources are also made publicly available by PHMSA.
    Inspectors are not authorized to independently determine non-
compliance and all proposed enforcement actions are reviewed by at 
least one supervisor and a region attorney prior to issuance. As 
mentioned, Region Directors make the final determination of whether an 
enforcement case will be initiated. This ensures that the enforcement 
action is not based on inaccurate or inconsistent interpretations of 
the pipeline safety regulations.
    If a company disagrees with an enforcement action, it has a 
multitude of response options, including requesting a hearing, 
settlement discussions, and petitioning for reconsideration of any 
final order. Ultimately, a challenge to a final PHMSA determination may 
be brought in federal court. PHMSA works to be clear and effective in 
its oversight and companies have many opportunities to contest PHMSA 
citations in both informal and formal settings.

    Question 8. Representative Dusty Johnson (R-SD) asked Deputy 
Administrator Brown about PHMSA's technology pilot program and why the 
agency has not made modifications to it since, to date, no industry 
members have applied. In Deputy Administrator Brown's testimony, he 
stated that PHMSA sought feedback from stakeholders prior to the 
program being finalized, as well as after it was determined the program 
needed modifications.
    Question 8.a. In testimony to the Committee on May 7, 2024, Deputy 
Administrator Brown stated PHMSA gathered public comment on the 
Pipeline Safety Enhancement Program (PSEP) before it issued program 
guidance. On what date(s) prior to February 2, 2022, did PHMSA request 
public input on the PSEP and how did it make this request?
    Question 8.b. On February 2, 2022, PHMSA issued a Notice (87 Fed 
Reg 5939) outlining how PHMSA would review and process PSEP requests. 
The Notice makes no mention of PHMSA gathering public comments or 
description of how PHMSA incorporated public comments into the Notice. 
How did PHMSA reflect in the February 2, 2022 Notice any public 
comments it may have gathered?
    Question 8.c. In testimony to the Committee on May 7, 2024, Deputy 
Administrator Brown stated PHMSA gathered feedback from stakeholders 
after the Committee's 2023 hearing and questioning on this topic. On 
what dates did PHMSA meet with stakeholders to discuss PSEP 
improvements? With which groups did PHMSA meet?
    Question 8.d. What actions has PHMSA taken to make changes to its 
PSEP request review process to improve program participation?
    Answer to 8.a., 8.b., 8.c., & 8.d. 49 U.S.C. 60142 authorized PHMSA 
to allow innovative technologies and operational practices that may 
provide more robust protection of public safety and the environment 
than the existing Federal pipeline safety regulations. PHMSA issued 
program guidance on February 2, 2022, and on February 9, 2022, met with 
representatives of the industry (i.e., Association of Oil Pipelines) to 
discuss possible improvements to the PSEP process. During the hearing 
it was mentioned that PHMSA did not receive any public comment 
regarding the PESP process.
    Prior to the issuance of a Federal Register notice (Notice) 
regarding the establishment of the PSEP (87 FR 5939), PHMSA held 
virtual gas and liquid pipeline advisory committee meetings, and the 
industry submitted comments to the docket for PHMSA's consideration in 
the development of the PSEP guidance materials. Following the issuance 
of the Notice, PHMSA met with industry representatives to discuss 
potential candidates for participation; however, none of the projects 
moved forward.

     Questions to Christina Sames, Senior Vice President, Safety, 
 Operations, Engineering, and Security, American Gas Association, from 
                           Hon. Troy E. Nehls

    Question 1. The PIPES Act of 2023 includes authorization of a 
voluntary information sharing system (VIS) at PHMSA. I understand the 
American Gas Association (AGA) has its own internal confidential 
reporting system.
    Question 1.a. What are the benefits of PHMSA establishing such a 
program compared to AGA's internal system or separate system created by 
industry?
    Answer. AGA's voluntary information sharing program only collects 
data from AGA members and is only available to AGA's members. If PHMSA 
is authorized to create a VIS, it (or a designated organization) could 
collect information from all of its regulated pipeline operators, as 
well as others willing to share pipeline safety data and lessons 
learned from events. It could also collect information broader in scope 
than that currently collected by AGA, such as pipeline integrity threat 
and risk analysis information. This would provide a more wholistic view 
of pipeline safety challenges, remediation measures, and lessons 
learned from incidents, near misses, and other events.
    Standing up a VIS under PHMSA's purview could also leverage the 
data entry interface that the agency already uses for incidents and 
other mandatory reporting. A familiar user interface could help drive 
data consistency and encourage participation from operators.

    Question 1.b. From your perspective, how much participation would a 
VIS system see from pipeline operators?
    Answer. I believe that it will depend on how the VIS is set up and 
managed. I believe that operators will voluntarily submit data to the 
VIS only if the VIS is created with the proper legal protections and 
assurances of confidentiality, if PHMSA is clear on how it will collect 
the data and protect the confidentiality of those submitting the data, 
if PHMSA and state regulators make it clear that data submitted to the 
VIS cannot be used as evidence for enforcement or litigation (unless 
there is evidence of a criminal violation), and if PHMSA is clear on 
how it will utilize the data to work with others to improve pipeline 
safety. If any element is missing, I believe that operators will be 
hesitant to submit information. AGA believes there may be value in 
contemplating an independent organization to collect this information 
on behalf of the industry.

    Question 1.c. What pipeline safety outcomes do you envision once a 
VIS system is established and operational?
    Answer. The VIS provisions in the T&I bill are similar to voluntary 
information collection systems AGA has established. As an example, one 
of the voluntary collection systems AGA manages is the Plastic Pipe 
Database. The database contains approximately 150,000 reports on 
plastic pipe failures and the data is analyzed several times each year 
by a group of representatives from government (PHMSA, the NTSB, state 
regulators and commissioners) and industry (natural gas operators and 
manufacturers). After each meeting, the committee publishes a status 
report of its analysis. These status reports have been used by--
      Natural gas distribution operators when they are revising 
their distribution integrity management programs, determining if 
changes need to be made to pipeline replacement practices or risk 
models, and for safety updates to employees and field crews
      Manufacturers to determine if changes need to be made to 
their installation instructions
      Contractors to help identify materials they encounter 
when conducting pipe repair and replacement
      Government when analyzing data from incidents, conducting 
audits, or issuing advisories

    I envision that the VIS reports will be used in a similar fashion, 
highlighting potential trends or findings that enable industry 
stakeholders to make more informed decisions that can lead to improved 
pipeline safety.

     Questions to Christina Sames, Senior Vice President, Safety, 
 Operations, Engineering, and Security, American Gas Association, from 
                        Hon. Frederica S. Wilson

    Question 1. For the record, could you state what has been the 
leading cause of serious, significant, and all pipeline incidents over 
the last 20 years, and the last 3 years? Where do excavation damage 
incidents rank among leading causes?
    Answer. Over the last 20 years, based on PHMSA data \1\ analyzed 5/
29/2024:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Data on Serious, Significant, and All Reported Incidents can be 
found on the following website: Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trends--PHMSA 
(dot.gov) [https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/
pipeline-incident-20-year-trends]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Serious Pipeline Incidents:
      +  Natural gas distribution systems: The leading cause of serious 
incidents is ``Other Outside Force''--24.8%; 124 incidents. Most 
``Other Outside Force'' incidents were vehicles hitting natural gas 
distribution infrastructure. The second leading cause of serious 
incidents is ``Excavation Damage''--24.6%; 123 incidents.
      +  All systems (natural gas and hazardous liquid transmission/
distribution/gathering, LNG, underground storage): The leading cause of 
serious incidents is ``Excavation Damage''--23.8%; 148 incidents. The 
second leading cause of all serious incidents is ``Other Outside 
Force''--22.9%; 142 incidents.
      Significant Pipeline Incidents:
      +  Natural gas distribution systems: The leading cause of 
significant incidents is ``Excavation Damage''--33.6%; 449 incidents. 
The second leading cause of significant incidents is ``Other Outside 
Force''--23.2%; 311 incidents.
      +  All systems: The leading cause of significant incidents is 
``Material/Weld/ Equipment Failure''--31.9%; 1841 incidents. The second 
leading cause of significant incidents is ``Corrosion''--20.5%; 1182 
incidents. The third leading cause ``Excavation Damage''--15.1%; 874 
incidents.
      All Pipeline Incidents:
      +  Natural gas distribution systems: The leading cause of all 
reported incidents is ``Excavation Damage''--33.7%; 794 incidents. The 
second leading cause of all reported incidents is ``Other Outside 
Force''--31.4%; 739 incidents.
      +  All systems: The leading cause of all reported incidents is 
``Material/Weld/ Equipment Failure''--40.3%; 5123 incidents. The second 
leading cause of significant incidents is ``Corrosion''--18.4%; 2337 
incidents. The third leading cause ``Excavation Damage''--11.2%; 1427 
incidents.

    Over the last 3 years, based on data analyzed 5/29/2024:
      Serious Pipeline Incidents:
      +  Natural gas distribution systems: The leading cause of serious 
incidents is ``Excavation Damage''--28.0%; 14 incidents. The second 
leading cause of serious incidents is ``Incorrect Operation''--24.0%; 
12 incidents. The third leading cause of serious incidents is ``Other 
Outside Force''--22.0%, 11 incidents.
      +  All systems: The leading cause of serious incidents is 
``Incorrect Operation''--29.7%; 19 incidents. The second leading cause 
of all serious incidents is ``Excavation Damage''--21.9%; 14 incidents.
      Significant Pipeline Incidents:
      +  Natural gas distribution systems: The leading cause of 
significant incidents is ``Excavation Damage''--42.1%; 72 incidents. 
The second leading cause of significant incidents is ``Other Outside 
Force''--21.1%; 36 incidents.
      +  All systems: The leading cause of significant incidents is 
``Material/Weld/Equipment Failure''--34.4%; 276 incidents. The second 
leading cause of significant incidents is ``Corrosion''--24.0%; 193 
incidents. The third leading cause ``Excavation Damage''--14.3%; 115 
incidents.
      All Pipeline Incidents:
      +  Natural gas distribution systems: The leading cause of all 
reported incidents is ``Excavation Damage''--42.8%; 95 incidents. The 
second leading cause of all reported incidents is ``Other Outside 
Force''--24.8%; 55 incidents.
      +  All systems: The leading cause of all reported incidents is 
``Material/Weld/Equipment Failure''--43.6%; 818 incidents. The second 
leading cause of significant incidents is ``Corrosion''--23.9%; 447 
incidents. The third leading cause is ``Incorrect Operation''--10.9%; 
204 incidents and ``Excavation Damage'' is the fourth leading cause--
8.5%; 159 incidents.

    When viewing the leading cause of deaths resulting from a pipeline 
event:
      20-year average:
      +  Natural gas distribution systems: ``Other Outside Force'' was 
the leading cause of death (47 fatalities) followed by ``Excavation 
Damage'' (42) and ``Unknown'' (34)
      +  All systems: ``Excavation Damage'' was the leading cause of 
death (66 fatalities) followed by ``Other Outside Force'' (55) and 
``Unknown'' (35)
      3-year average:
      +  Natural gas distribution systems: ``Unknown'' was the leading 
cause of death (12) followed by ``Other Outside Force'' (9) and 
``Excavation Damage'' (1) and ``Incorrect Operations'' (1)
      +  All systems: ``Unknown'' was the leading cause of death (12) 
followed by ``Other Outside Force'' (10) and ``Material/Weld/Equipment 
Failure'' (4). ``Excavation Damage'' resulted in 1 fatality.

    When viewing the leading cause of injuries requiring in-patient 
hospitalization from a pipeline event:
      20-year average:
      +  Natural gas distribution systems: ``Excavation Damage'' was 
the leading cause of injuries (199) followed by ``Other Outside Force'' 
(158) and ``Incorrect Operation'' (139)
      +  All systems: ``Excavation Damage'' was the leading cause of 
injuries (248) followed by ``Incorrect Operation'' (181) and ``Other 
Outside Force'' (180)
      3-year average:
      +  Natural gas distribution systems: ``Excavation Damage'' was 
the leading cause of injuries (25) followed by ``Incorrect Operation'' 
(12) and ``Material/Weld/Equipment Failure'' (10) and ``Unknown'' (10)
      +  All systems: ``Excavation Damage'' was the leading cause of 
injuries (25) followed by ``Incorrect Operation'' (19) and ``Material/
Weld/Equipment Failure'' (15) and ``Unknown'' (15)

Questions to Robin Rorick, Vice President of Midstream Policy, American 
              Petroleum Institute, from Hon. Troy E. Nehls

    Question 1. The PIPES Act of 2023 includes authorization of a 
voluntary information sharing system (VIS) at PHMSA.
    Question 1.a. What are the benefits of PHMSA establishing such a 
program compared to a system created by industry?
    Answer. A government run Voluntary Information Sharing (VIS) 
program is a proven model that has had success at the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and shown positive results in safety performance 
for the aviation industry. This committee has wisely chosen to take a 
similar approach. The VIS program is intended to be a new paradigm for 
analyzing pipeline safety data that is separate and apart from, but 
complementary and additive to, existing PHMSA pipeline safety programs, 
which is why it is important that PHMSA play a leadership role. PHMSA 
has an Accident Investigation Division (AID) that is well positioned to 
lead this effort and build on the current programs and initiatives 
being implemented at AID.
    Like the program established for the airline industry, a federal 
agency-led initiative will provide a vehicle for operators to safely 
and securely submit any related safety information. This information 
can then be aggregated and redistributed back out to the industry for 
consideration and, where appropriate, action.

    Question 1.b. From your perspective, how much participation would a 
VIS system see from pipeline operators?
    Answer. If designed properly to ensure the information is protected 
and not used punitively, as is the case with your bill, API believes 
that its member companies that operate pipeline systems are likely to 
participate in the program. However, participation would be more likely 
if there is a robust process for data transfer and management and 
appropriate confidentiality protection is provided for all information 
submitted to the VIS. Without such assurance and incentives, operators 
would be concerned that the information could be used punitively, and 
therefore operators would be less inclined to voluntarily share 
information. Using the information punitively would inhibit the shared 
objectives of industry, government and public advocacy groups to 
advance safety and reach our goal of zero pipeline incidents.
    The model established for the aviation industry, which this 
language reflects, provides appropriate levels of information 
protection and has seen great success with regard to information and 
data submittal.

    Question 1.c. What pipeline safety outcomes do you envision once a 
VIS system is established and operational?
    Answer. As an industry, we are constantly working to improve our 
safety record. Having access to as much information and data as 
possible helps ensure that the industry can take appropriate action to 
accurately target potential threats or risks of incident.
    The VIS program's collaborative approach to collecting and 
analyzing safety-related information has the potential to further 
enhance safety through timely and meaningful sharing of trends and 
potential risks across our industry, while enhancing safety management 
systems and strengthening safety culture.
    Ultimately, proactively reducing and eliminating pipeline releases 
will minimize personal injuries and damage to the environment while 
ensuring that the industry can continue to deliver the benefits of 
affordable and reliable energy to the public.

  Questions to Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust, 
                        from Hon. Troy E. Nehls

    Question 1. Does the Pipeline Safety Trust support this Committee's 
bipartisan legislation to reauthorize the pipeline safety programs at 
PHMSA?
    Answer. The Pipeline Safety Trust appreciates the bipartisan spirit 
in creating this legislation and does not oppose the bill. But because 
we still have a long way to go to eliminate the hazards from our 
nation's pipelines, we hope the Senate can produce legislation that 
includes more of our priorities that will lead to more progress on 
pipeline safety. We are a long way from our shared goal of zero 
incidents, and much more must be done to make meaningful progress. 
Strong legislation is a powerful and resilient path towards that goal.

    Question 2. Does the Pipeline Safety Trust support the creation of 
a voluntary information sharing system (VIS) at PHMSA?
    Answer. The Pipeline Safety Trust does not oppose the creation of a 
voluntary information sharing (VIS) system, though we do have concerns 
with the makeup of the governing board as outlined in the legislation. 
Specifically, we have concerns with ``public safety-focused research 
institutions'' being included in the public caucus rather than the 
industry caucus.

Question to Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust, from 
                        Hon. Frederica S. Wilson

    Question 1. Integrity management programs are the primary tool that 
pipeline operators use to ensure the safety of their pipelines. For the 
record, is integrity management working as intended?
    Answer. The Pipeline Safety Trust does not believe the Integrity 
Management (IM) program is working as intended. IM asks operators to 
identify all potential threats in High Consequence Areas (HCAs) and 
create and implement a plan to mitigate against those threats. 
Regulations do not require operators to perform IM on pipelines outside 
of HCAs. We would expect, after about 20 years of IM, to see lower 
incident rates within HCAs versus outside HCAs if the program was 
working effectively. However, we generally see the exact opposite.
    PHMSA itself has pointed out problems with IM regulations. The NTSB 
has detailed the issues. A recent NAS report on rupture mitigation 
valves detailed problems with IM. We don't believe the program needs to 
be thrown out, but stakeholders need to figure out what is and isn't 
working, create an improvement plan, and implement that plan.

                                 [all]