

nuclear program and begin a substantive denuclearization process.

I once again urge North Korea to cease its provocations and take the right path. Korea, with the U.S., will continue to work for North Korea's denuclearization.

North Korea's obsession with nuclear weapons and missiles is throwing its population into a severe economic crisis and human rights abuses.

We must raise global awareness of the dire human rights situation in North Korea. We must not shy away from our duty to promote freedom for North Koreans.

Last month, my government published a report on North Korean human rights. We released it to the public for the first time.

The report documents a wide range of abuses in North Korea. It is based on the testimonies of 508 North Korean defectors collected over the past 5 years. It records many cases of serious violations of international norms such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights agreements.

Unspeakable and horrendous incidents took place: men and women being shot and killed for violating COVID-19 prevention measures; some being publicly executed for watching and sharing South Korean shows; and people being shot in public for possessing the Bible and having faith.

We need to raise awareness. We must inform the world of the gravity of North Korea's human rights violations. I ask for your help in improving North Korea's grim conditions.

My friends, freedom and democracy are once again under threat. The war against Ukraine is a violation of international law. It is an attempt to unilaterally change the status quo with force. Korea strongly condemns the unprovoked armed attack against Ukraine.

When North Korea invaded us in 1950, democracies came running to help us. We fought together and kept our freedom. The rest is history.

Korea's experience shows us just how important it is for democracies to uphold solidarity. Korea will stand in solidarity with the free world. We will actively work to safeguard the freedom of the people of Ukraine and support their efforts in reconstruction.

Honorable Members of Congress, so far six Korean Presidents spoke at this important Chamber. The first Korean President, Dr. Rhee Syngman, delivered his speech in 1954. After 35 years, in 1989, President Roh Tae-woo standing at this podium said the following:

"The nations of the Pacific have made open society and market economy the engines that drive the fastest growing region in the world. The Pacific will become even more important to the U.S., and Korea will begin to contribute more to the prosperity and peace of the region. . . . I look forward to the day when some future Korean Presidents may be invited to address

this distinguished assembly and describe the vision I spoke of today as an achievement fulfilled, not as tomorrow's hope."

President Roh's vision has become a reality.

We are currently living in the Indo-Pacific era. This region is home to 65 percent of the global population and 62 percent of the world GDP. It accounts for half of global maritime transportation.

Last year, Korea announced its first comprehensive Indo-Pacific Strategy. Korea is committed to fostering a "free, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific" based on inclusiveness, trust, and reciprocity.

We will strengthen the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. We will take a comprehensive and multilayered approach in expanding cooperation with key partners.

This also means that the stage for the alliance is expanding.

Korea used to receive assistance from USAID. It is now sharing its experience with developing countries in partnership with the U.S. Korea has greatly increased its ODA budget. It is providing tailored programs in tune with the needs of its partners.

Yesterday, President Biden and I adopted a joint statement. It presents a vision of the "alliance in action towards the future."

Together, our two countries will broaden our alliance.

Together, we will lead in innovation beyond security and foreign policy. We will work closely on artificial intelligence, quantum technology, bio-science, and Open RAN.

Our partnership in the cutting-edge semiconductor industry will contribute to establishing stable and resilient supply chains. It will also address economic uncertainties.

Together, we will open another new successful chapter. We will explore new frontiers in outer space and cyberspace.

Korea and the U.S. are the world's top technological powers leading innovation and creativity. Together, we will create a great synergy.

Mr. Speaker, Madam Vice President, and Honorable Members of Congress, our alliance is an alliance of universal values. Freedom, human rights, and democracy are the very foundations of our bonds.

Our alliance is for justice.

Our alliance is for peace.

Our alliance is for prosperity.

Together, our alliance will continue to move towards the future.

We will build the world of tomorrow that opens endless opportunities for our future generations.

I look forward to everyone being on board for our new journey together.

God bless you, God bless the United States of America, and may God bless our great alliance.

Thank you.

(Applause, the Members rising.)

At 12 o'clock and 3 minutes p.m., His Excellency Yoon Suk Yeol, President

of the Republic of Korea, accompanied by the committee of escort, retired from the Hall of the House of Representatives.

The Acting Sergeant at Arms escorted the invited guests from the Chamber in the following order:

The Acting Dean of the Diplomatic Corps.

JOINT MEETING DISSOLVED

The SPEAKER. The purpose of the joint meeting having been completed, the Chair declares the joint meeting of the two Houses now dissolved.

Accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 4 minutes p.m.), the joint meeting of the two Houses was dissolved.

The Members of the Senate retired to their Chamber.

The SPEAKER. The House will continue in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

□ 1230

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. BUCSHON) at 12 o'clock and 30 minutes p.m.

PRINTING OF PROCEEDINGS HAD DURING RECESS

Mr. FRY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the proceedings had during the recess be printed in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

DIRECTING THE PRESIDENT, PURSUANT TO SECTION 5(C) OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, TO REMOVE ALL UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES, OTHER THAN UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ASSIGNED TO PROTECT THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY, FROM SOMALIA

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the order of the House of April 26, 2023, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 30) directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove all United States Armed Forces, other than United States Armed Forces assigned to protect the United States Embassy, from Somalia, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of Wednesday, April 26, 2023, the concurrent resolution is considered read.

The text of the concurrent resolution is as follows:

H. CON. RES. 30

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That, pursuant to section

5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)), Congress directs the President to remove all United States Armed Forces, other than United States Armed Forces assigned to protect the United States Embassy, from Somalia by not later than the date that is 365 days after the date of the adoption of this resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The concurrent resolution shall be debatable for 80 minutes, with 20 minutes controlled by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MCCAUL), 20 minutes controlled by the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS), and 40 minutes controlled by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GAETZ), or their respective designees.

The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. JAMES) will control 20 minutes, the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS) will control 20 minutes, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GAETZ) will control 40 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the resolution under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I will start by commending both gentlemen from Florida for their concern about our Nation's ongoing military engagements. It is one I share as a veteran of the global war on terrorism.

Unfortunately, there are no silver bullets in policymaking, and when we try to make one, we usually end up shooting ourselves in the foot. It is for this reason and this reason alone that I stand in opposition.

I served in Operation Iraqi Freedom as an attack helicopter pilot. As a combat veteran, Mr. Speaker, I can assure you that no one hates war more than those who have come face-to-face with it. I do not look back on the days of American military overreach and intervention in the Middle East with nostalgia.

That said, as a West Point graduate, I understand history and the lessons it teaches. The siren song of isolationism is tempting, but allowing vacuums of American influence around the world to be filled by terrorists and exploited by communists is a direct threat to Americans at home.

While each Presidential administration has made errors in the conduct of its foreign policy since the tragedies of 9/11 22 years ago, the most egregious of these errors is continuing to concede America's diplomatic leverage and allowing our agricultural, manufacturing, and energy independence to erode.

It is Congress, this body, that has lazily conceded its constitutional duty to

guard its war powers jealously from the executive branch. Congress' failure to hold each administration this century accountable for their vague, broad, and failing foreign policies may force Congress to exercise our war powers again in my lifetime.

That is why I agree with Mr. GAETZ, in large part, that war should never be on autopilot nor open-ended. Americans have the right and Congress has the responsibility to understand and approve of the sacrifice that we will be asking our country to make.

Our servicemembers are real people with families. They are sons and daughters. Many weren't even born when 9/11 occurred.

Congress needs to do its job, but it needs to do its job the right way. That is why, rather than continuing an open-ended, 22-year-old law, I believe we must work together to first replace it with an Authorization for Use of Military Force that focuses on today's critical terrorist threats and requires Congress to stay engaged.

We must prioritize first building an America that is strong at home, or we will never have hope of being strong abroad.

Regrettably, my friends, today's resolution does little toward those ends. It will merely direct the removal of U.S. forces from Somalia. That will not work.

Less than 2 years ago, we saw what happens when we pull troops with no plan. Joe Biden's botched Afghanistan withdrawal forced our troops to abandon billions of dollars in taxpayer-funded military equipment. It resulted in 13 young American servicemembers dead. It left hundreds of thousands of American veterans who served in Afghanistan wondering if their efforts were in vain. It embarrassed America on the world stage and left a gaping hole that China and the Taliban rushed to fill in.

What have we learned? The Biden administration responded with the Commander in Chief checking his watch during a dignified transfer of servicemembers killed, and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin claiming he had no regrets about the withdrawal.

What have we learned?

Lest my argument be debased or derided as petty partisanship, let me flip the script.

Mr. Speaker, I ask you, what happened the last time Republicans tried to repeal something without a plan to replace it?

I tell you the truth: What happened then will pale in comparison to the consequences of ceding the global strategic high ground of the future to those who mean to harm us.

I will be the first to argue that we have become overdependent on the military rather than investing in ourselves, in our industrial base at home, wielding diplomacy, and harnessing economic statecraft as our tools of first resort.

There is no global stability when America is economically weak and

militarily impulsive and has a reputation of retreat. The most devastating effect of abandoning our allies—even now, thousands of our fellow Americans are on the battlefield—is that our friends don't trust us and our enemies no longer fear us. If we want nations around the world to choose America instead of dictators and despots, we must give them a reason to do so.

This premature withdrawal from Somalia will be a great victory for a dangerous al-Qaida affiliate that seeks the death of America.

There is another group of adversaries to keep in mind, as well. Russia and the Communist Party of China would like nothing more than to see the U.S. take a foreign policy of isolationism. There is already a Chinese military base on the east coast of Djibouti. There are reports of more coming to the west coast of Africa, which will pose a direct threat to America.

If we cavalierly withdraw from Africa, the CCP will rush to fill in the void like they did in Afghanistan. By emboldening terrorists, Russia, and Communist China, this resolution would harm the national security of the United States.

Again, Mr. Speaker, I applaud the gentleman from Florida's initiative for forcing this long-overdue debate. I also applaud leadership for allowing it to come to the floor.

I invite the gentleman to work with me to end this executive overreach of over two decades, to pull back our war powers and Article I authority under the Constitution in a way that truly puts America first. As it stands today, regrettably, this resolution will not strengthen America at home or keep her safe abroad.

It is for that reason, and again, that reason alone, that I urge my colleagues to join me in opposition.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H. Con. Res. 30.

This resolution was drafted in such a way that it is simultaneously overbroad and underinclusive. The resolution fails to end our involvement in hostilities in the region while preventing crucial security cooperation with local partners in Somalia.

The resolution states that the United States forces must withdraw from Somalia, unless they are there for the purposes of protecting the Embassy.

Historically, war powers resolutions such as this are thought of as attempting to force the President to withdraw American troops from a foreign country that are actively engaged in combat, but our forces on the ground in Somalia are there to provide security training and intelligence support.

Our footprint in Somalia is not large. We have several hundred troops stationed in the country primarily to train host-nation troops in countering terrorism.

The sponsor of this legislation sometimes references the lost blood and

treasure from our overseas engagements. These are obviously essential considerations. It is why I supported President Biden's decision to end the war in Afghanistan. But no American has been killed in Somalia in over 4 years, and our security cooperation and assistance to the country amounts to a rounding error in the Federal budget.

It is a fact that Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations like ISIS control large swaths of territory in Somalia, but local forces from the Somali Government and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia have made steady gains the past several years. United States forces have been instrumental in some of these changes because of the very training and intelligence support we provide to local forces on the ground.

By mandating that our forces cease security cooperation in Somalia, this resolution would roll back some of the gains that have been made to take back territory from terrorist organizations in the past several years.

This measure doesn't end American hostilities in the region. It includes nothing about removing American forces from other nations in the region where groups like Al-Shabaab operate, and it does nothing to address over-the-horizon strikes.

While I disagree with this measure, let me say that what I do agree with is that we are having this debate. It is one that is long overdue. American forces have been in Somalia and other parts of the world without proper engagement from the United States Congress.

While I understand the logic that both Republican and Democratic administrations have used to include groups like Al-Shabaab under the 2001 AUMF, I can tell you that Members of Congress did not believe that they were authorizing force against Al-Shabaab when we passed the legislation decades ago. I can tell you this not just because I was here when Congress voted on that AUMF but because Al-Shabaab didn't even exist in September 2001.

I believe, though, that the proper way to address the issues of matters of war and peace in Somalia is not through a legally dubious resolution such as this. I agree with Representative JAMES in this, and we should work together, all three of us, I believe, because the right way to address this issue is through a repeal of the 2001 AUMF and its replacement with a narrow force authorization that provides the President authority to combat selected terrorists in selected countries where the United States' national security is at stake.

Mr. Speaker, I have introduced just such a resolution, and I look forward to working with my colleagues on that. H.J. Res. 52, which narrows the list of terrorist organizations the executive branch can strike, limits the number of countries in which we could engage in hostilities, places curbs on executive

branch additions of associated forces and successor groups, and includes a sunset requiring Congress to reauthorize the legislation.

□ 1245

Reasserting Congress' proper role over matters of war and peace while ensuring that the President has the necessary authorities to strike those who mean to do us harm can be and is a tough balance to strike. I believe wholeheartedly it is our responsibility to make some of those hard decisions. We cannot punt it or give it off just to the executive. I am willing to work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to strike a balance.

Let's take a look at H.J. Res. 52. From the debate we are having today, I think that we have some of the basics of what we agree with, that it is this body that the Constitution empowered to make sure there are checks and balances on the executive.

Unfortunately, I cannot say that about H. Con. Res. 30 before us today. Therefore, I must oppose this legislation, urge my colleagues to do the same. Let's come together as Members of the United States House of Representatives and take our responsibility. Let's repeal and replace the 2001 AUMF and move forward.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

It is a great honor to participate in this debate with my esteemed colleague, Mr. MEEKS, of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and with a great patriot such as Mr. JAMES of Michigan.

I welcome the American people to the second part in a legislative series we are conducting about all of the places on the planet Earth where Congress still believes that 9/11 justifies current U.S. troop presence in 2023.

The first in that series was Syria. I came to this floor, only got about 103 votes, but I made the argument that our troops were essentially sitting ducks, guarding oil extraction operations where their presence was known and where their location was easily identifiable. I called for a withdrawal. That withdrawal was defeated. Then what happened is precisely what I predicted, more U.S. casualties from Iranian drones, exactly what I said would occur. It is with no joy I say that.

I know all of us would take any policy decision we could to reduce U.S. casualties, and I think this debate will present an excellent opportunity to reflect on Somalia in that light.

There are currently 900 U.S. troops in Somalia, give or take, and this resolution would bring them home.

Somalia is a country of 17 million who have been tortured at times by Al-Shabaab, a group of roughly 7,000 hardened fighters and even more sympathizers. But to logically believe any of the arguments that my colleagues are making, you have to believe that 900 U.S. troops is what is going to save a

country of 17 million from a hardened group of 7,000. I think that strains not only logic but understanding of the history of Somalia, a country that has oscillated between failed state and just absolute coup revolution over and over again, civil war, and sectarian violence.

The future of Somalia must be determined by Somalia. To the extent that foreign influences could be helpful, I would argue that the African Union is far better positioned to build a stronger sense of national identity and national unity among clans that have been warring in Somalia for generations than U.S. troops. I have yet to see the evidence that U.S. troops are the essential element to fusing relationships among warring African warlords, clans, and tribes.

Now, the British controlled Somalia, and in nearly half a century since, we have seen a constant state of despair.

So what is the end state for our military presence in Somalia?

Are we going to be the block captain of Mogadishu, presumably forever, until we beat the last sympathy for Al-Shabaab out of the last heart of the last Somali?

That was the argument with Syria and ISIS; we have to stay in Syria because there are still people who believe the ISIS ideology.

Mr. Speaker, I would argue that the U.S. military is not an effective capability to deploy to defeat an ideology. We are not able to permanently stabilize countries by having a presence that can at times be the very basis for the terrorism recruitment that we seem to work against.

There is also an opportunity cost to being in Somalia that I would like to share with the body. I represent constituents who are part of these missions, these train, equip, and advise missions throughout Africa. Increasingly, they are having to enter the INDOPACOM to get analysis and research on the best communication skills, tactical skills and strategic skills that would be necessary if conflict were to erupt in the INDOPACOM theater.

What I have observed firsthand is that at times, some of our best and brightest are having to go split squad, where some are wandering about Africa on train-and-equip missions. Then there is less of a focused capability in places where I think America must hold the high ground to ensure the enduring success of our Nation.

My colleague from the other side of the aisle made mention of the training that America does in Africa and how critical it is. The problem is, far too often, we are training the next generation of coup leaders. We haven't figured that out yet. I got to ask the question of the leader of AFRICOM: Why so many people who are leading coups in Africa were trained by Americans? He was unable to identify even current leaders of African countries, that they were trained by Americans or that they participated in coups.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the RECORD a piece from The Intercept: “AFRICOM Chief to Congress: We share ‘core values’ with coup leaders.”

[From The Intercept, April 10, 2023]

AFRICOM CHIEF TO CONGRESS: WE SHARE
“CORE VALUES” WITH COUP LEADERS

(By Nick Turse)

In Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire last month, 1,300 U.S., NATO, and African troops met for tactical and mock raids as part of Flintlock 2023, an annual exercise sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command Africa, or SOCAFRICA. Among the countries participating was Burkina Faso, which has been restricted from receiving substantial U.S. security aid since an officer trained by Americans at previous Flintlock exercises overthrew his democratically elected government in a coup last year.

U.S. military officials have spent the last month trying to explain this curious state of affairs to Congress and the press. Flintlock provides a “critical training opportunity” for special operations forces from the U.S. and Africa and a chance to “exchange best practices,” Rear Adm. Milton “Jamie” Sands, the chief of SOCAFRICA, told The Intercept and other reporters on a conference call last month. He didn’t mention that, by the Pentagon’s own assessments, militant Islamist attacks in the Sahel have spiked and security has plummeted across West Africa since SOCAFRICA began Flintlock trainings in 2005. “The Sahel now accounts for 40 percent of all violent activity by militant Islamist groups in Africa, more than any other region in Africa,” reads a recent report by the Defense Department’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

The four-star general in charge of U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, meanwhile, told the House Armed Services Committee that only a small percentage of U.S.-trained officers overthrow their governments—while admitting he didn’t know the exact number. This prompted farright Rep. Matt Gaetz, R-Fla., to ask, “Why should U.S. taxpayers be paying to train people who then lead coups in Africa?”

Flintlock attendees have conducted at least five coups in the last eight years. Since 2008, in fact, U.S.-trained officers have attempted at least nine coups (and succeeded in at least eight) across five West African countries, including Burkina Faso (three times), Guinea, Mali (three times), Mauritania, and the Gambia.

Before he toppled Burkina Faso’s democratically elected president in 2022, for example, Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba attended Flintlock exercises in 2010 and 2020, according to AFRICOM. A fellow Flintlock 2010 attendee, Gen. Gilbert Diendéré, overthrew the government of Burkina Faso in 2015.

Just a year after he attended Flintlock 2019, Col. Assimi Goïta headed the junta that overthrew Mali’s government. After staging that coup, Goïta stepped down and took the job of vice president in a transitional government tasked with returning Mali to civilian rule. But nine months later, he seized power for a second time.

Another alum of Flintlock 2019, Col. Mamady Doumbouya, served as a Guinean unit commander during the exercise, according to AFRICOM. In 2021, members of Doumbouya’s unit took time out from being trained in small unit tactics and the law of armed conflict by Green Berets to storm the presidential palace and depose their country’s 83-year-old president, Alpha Condé. Doumbouya soon declared himself Guinea’s new leader. The U.S. ended the training and distanced itself from the coup.

“Core values is what we start off with,” Gen. Michael Langley, the AFRICOM chief, told the House Armed Services Committee last month.

“Do we share those values with Col. Doumbouya?” asked Gaetz.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, in this piece, it highlights five countries—Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Gambia—where the very people who led the coups were the very people who received this training from the United States.

I would note that any comparison here to Afghanistan is sorely misplaced. This legislation provides one year to remove 900 people. That is far different than unwinding the double helix that was our multidecade engagement with Afghanistan.

I agree with the sentiment that my colleague Mr. JAMES stated, that our friends must trust us and our enemies must fear us. But what I have observed, after 20 years of American war in the Middle East and in North Africa, is that our enemies often mock us when we try to be the world’s policeman and the world’s piggy bank. That should not be the goal of our country. We should not be engaged in nation-building in Somalia, the Middle East, or elsewhere.

These 900 U.S. troops have no end state. They are engaging in largely police force operations. I suggest they should come home, and a vote for this resolution would do that.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I agree with my colleague, Mr. GAETZ. He makes a series of great points. The greatest, I believe, is our military cannot be used to fight an ideology. Unlimited war without checking by Congress is unconstitutional, and we must come up with a better solution, which is why the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and me, as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, recognizes that the DOD doesn’t exist in a vacuum. We recognize that the State Department and USAID are present in building civilian leaders and institutions. We understand these institutions must work together with different mandates, and we are not shooting our way out of Somalia. We must provide additional ways to fix the problem.

I agree we cannot fight ideology with military. I look forward to working with all sides to figure out exactly how we can strengthen our ties to make sure that we have partners and move from aid to trade with a long-term partner.

We had a rousing speech from the President of South Korea just an hour ago where he mentioned the great aid that the United States taxpayers and the great investment that we have made over decades and years in South Korea. Now as a shining example, they are the 10th most wealthy country in the world because of America, our

great generosity, and because we are exceptional.

I think we have a remarkable opportunity to do that and show that America truly should be the first choice and first option for folks around the world.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Montana (Mr. ZINKE).

Mr. ZINKE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition, but I agree with my distinguished colleague from Florida that Congress has an obligation to review it. Congress should not abdicate our responsibility. We should ask the tough questions. Ultimately, we should provide the funding necessary and the resources to win. That is our job, and I agree with you 100 percent.

But as a commander, they are doing more than just guarding an embassy. A force structure of 900 may seem like a large footprint, but those of us who remember Black Hawk Down would suggest otherwise.

A force requires medevac. Those medevacs require people that service those aircraft. In case we get in trouble, we need a quick reaction force, a force large enough to defend our troops. I, like my colleagues, know that if you were to put any American servicemen in harm’s way, you want to ensure we have the adequate force to make sure they are recovered safely. They also have to be fed and have communications. In order to have an effective force, you need a footprint that can do its mission.

I also agree that we should have a plan. Before we unplug our obligations, we should know what unplugging it does and when, and also we should have a plan on what our obligations are.

So much of this discussion is a discussion among similar views. We do have an obligation for freedom. We have a commitment to democracy that when we provide a force to defend that democracy, and it is American force and our allies, that we provide them with a force package that can win.

Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to oppose this well-intended resolution. I do ask that we work as a body to uphold our duty as Congress to make sure that the authorizations we give the executive are both appropriate, timely, and do so to win.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, let me just say, this debate is long overdue. We happen to be talking about the AUMF. I would hope that we end up having more debates on this floor talking about the continent of Africa, who has long been left off the debate in the United States Congress, which is a continent that we have got to focus on. I look forward to working with Mr. JAMES as the chair of that subcommittee.

We need to focus on the stability of Africa, the stability of its governments and its institutions, because if we don’t, it is at our own danger. We should be doing it because it is the right thing. We should be listening to those allies that we have on the continent and to those Presidents, because

they are the ones who are at threat and in danger of being destroyed by terrorist groups who have now moved over the continent.

We have got to have this debate more and more and make sure that Africa is on our front burner, not our back burner. Because if Africa continues to be on our back burner, we will see Russia and China, as Mr. JAMES has indicated, and others jumping in. We will see Wagner coming in to secure these countries. Let's have this debate.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Minnesota (Ms. OMAR), who came to the United States from the continent of Africa.

□ 1300

Ms. OMAR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H. Con. Res. 30, the Somalia war powers resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I agree with the chairman, a real debate about U.S. policy in Somalia and in Africa is long overdue. It is debate that should include a serious discussion of our long-term strategy for supporting stability and self-governance. It should include clear-eyed analysis of U.S. counterterrorism policies, including air strikes and drones, and the consistent problem of civilian casualties of U.S. operations.

Congress is also overdue for a debate about the expansive use of the 2001 AUMF, which the executive branch claims includes operations in Somalia.

Mr. Speaker, the resolution before the House today does not address these significant issues. It is a narrow question of the withdrawal of a few hundred troops.

Given President Hassan's renewed efforts to eradicate Al-Shabaab, the resolution does include a long enough timeline to ensure that operations that we are partnering with can be ended responsibly.

While we should not mistake this poorly crafted resolution for an honest assessment of U.S. policy in Somalia, it is important that we support the question before us.

Mr. Speaker, I and many Somali Americans support this resolution, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I can assure the gentleman from New York that we will have a more fulsome discussion regarding the continent of Africa because the next in our legislative series may very well be Niger. We will have that opportunity, as well.

To my colleague from Minnesota, I think she really hits the nail on the head that the partnerships between the existing government in Somalia and the clans that exist throughout the country is the essential glue to resist the violence and destabilization that we see from Al-Shabaab.

It is my belief that the government's entrees to those groups to get them to not side with Al-Shabaab are not facilitated by extensive U.S. presence. I just don't believe that to get one group of Somalis to stop killing another group of Somalis that the essential ingredient is us.

It may be other African influencers to a positive extent, but there is great wisdom in what the gentlewoman shared regarding the utility of those partnerships and relationships.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MILLS).

Mr. MILLS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished colleague from Florida (Mr. GAETZ) for yielding. I also thank my colleagues, Mr. JAMES and Mr. ZINKE for their service. They, like myself, are combat veterans who understand the total cost of warfare.

Mr. Speaker, before I get into my statement, I will address a couple of things that were mentioned by my colleagues here today. We talked about the idea that we are here to preserve freedoms and we are here to preserve democracy. Let's talk about our role in democracy.

We went into Iraq in 2003 under the auspice that we were there for weapons of mass destruction and to liberate the people of Iraq. Only 2 years later did we supplement this with the 2005 Iraq Constitution, whereby article 76, in its own design, created sectarian democracy that gave rise to the Iranian control which ultimately gave rise to China's domination.

We are not a nation-building element. We are warfighters. We are there to conduct counterterrorism operations when needed, but only at the expense that it is to the benefit of the American national security and U.S. interests.

He talked about timely. I ask you, Mr. Speaker, we started our operations in Mogadishu in the early 1990s. We started the operations in Afghanistan in 2001, and we started the operations in Iraq in 2003. So by what definition do we determine is timely?

The idea that my colleague—and rightfully so, and I agree with him—Mr. JAMES said about the repeal and replace piece of the AUMF, which I do view as an abdication of our roles and responsibilities as legislators under the Constitution in Article I, Clause 8, it does have a replacement, and I just stated it. It is called the United States Constitution war authorities.

At no point in time can you find in the Constitution whereby it says we can repeal our rights as legislators under the Constitution to put in something which abdicates our roles and responsibilities for 20-plus years on an AUMF that was designed, and now being abused, by Presidents on the left and the right, who have been using it for its unintended purposes.

While I agree with my colleague, Mr. GAETZ, that Afghanistan is completely not relevant to the discussion that was made, we are talking about an area whereby President Biden utilized political optics over military strategy, endangering the lives of our military, when we know that it was a conditions-based withdrawal.

One thing was actually stated that is correct, which is the threat in which China possesses when it comes to the

African Continent and that a vacuum could be created. Let's go ahead and focus on what China's ultimate goal is because it is not kinetics. It is not about the bomb-to-bomb, gun-to-gun, or bullet-to-bullet mechanism.

It is about the economic and resource warfare impact. It is about the Belt and Road Initiative, which expands out the Eurasian border, takes over Africa, Oceania, cuts off the Western Hemisphere's supply chain in an effort to utilize the WHO, WEF, and OPEC to eliminate the U.S. dollar from the global currency.

Let us address that issue. It is not one that is done by kinetics and warfighters, but by a whole-of-nation approach that deals with Treasury, that deals with the economic build-out, that deals with strengthening the industrial base at home, which stops the reliance on the very adversaries that we pay to slap us around every day.

The idea that we are going to play this terrorist whack-a-mole where every time one pops, we send a new force, it does nothing to actually try and help with stabilization. Let's talk about our interactions.

We had a terrorist organization known as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, which was based in a small portion in the Gulf of Aden out in Yemen. It wasn't until our drone strikes that caused numerous civilian casualties did we not play right into the ideology that Americans are here to destroy us and kill us due to our religious beliefs.

We were actually the reason that al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula continued to grow. My colleague on the left—who I have a great deal of respect for and we sit on the Foreign Affairs Committee—Mr. MEEKS, he talks about the fact that we have had no Americans killed in Somalia. That is absolutely false.

In fact, we just had another soldier killed in 2018 as a result of an explosion that resulted in three more. Also in 2017, we had three more killed that were there. As someone who has had to go visit Arlington Cemetery on many occasions to see my brothers that are no longer here with me today, I don't think that we need to spare one more life of American bloodshed in an effort that we don't have a clear, strategic military objective to begin with.

Mr. Speaker, I ask that we look at not being isolationists, as we are always called and considered, but also not interventionists. Our goal is to be protectionists; protection of our constitutional rights, our sovereignty, and the American people. That is our role.

We keep talking about this 2001 AUMF that we are to repeal. Let's go through this. In 2019, the amendment to the 2020 NDAA to repeal the 2002 AUMF was stripped out in its final version. On November 14, 2018, the resolution introduced to assert Congress' war power authorities in Yemen, the Rules Committee stripped the resolution and its procedural privilege.

Soon after, the Rules Committee stripped privilege from all war power resolutions for the remainder of the 115th Congress.

We keep talking about what we are going to do, but I have seen very little action. This is one of the reasons I ran for Congress because there are too many politicians who like to talk and not enough statesmen who are willing to act.

I know a little thing about action, considering that between my military and government experience I spent over 7 years of my life in Iraq, almost 3 years of my life in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Pakistan, and guess what, northern Somalia and the Puntland areas of Hargeisa and Berbera.

I can tell you very clearly that what we are doing right now in our procedures is not making us safer. We must start to look at a real change in order to protect America, stop abdicating our roles and responsibilities, and start leading from the front.

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, I think this is what we call a violent agreement. We need to fix the ills of the past with a solution for the future.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. MCCORMICK).

Mr. MCCORMICK. Mr. Speaker, this is one of my favorite debates. In my short time in Congress, and even in observing Congress, here you have people from both sides of the aisle actually taking opposition to each other so we can have a real conversation. There are people that I respect on my side of the aisle and people that I respect and disagree with on the other side of the aisle having a real debate that has little to do with partisanship but really about principle. It is refreshing.

Much like H.R. 21, which was probably the most fascinating vote we have taken to date since I have been in Congress, we actually had a Republican, somebody whose credentials as a conservative are not questioned at all, who had more people from the Democratic Party vote for his bill than from the Republican Party. He had the squad vote for him and his bill. That is bipartisanship in a certain way.

Yet, we have this debate right now in a similar fashion on Somalia. This is not a place that is unknown to me. I was there during part of the U.N. withdrawal in 1994 off the coast on the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. I spent time in Entebbe, Uganda, as part of Operation Restore Hope when we had our problem with Rwanda. Africa is a place of many troubled nations. There is no doubt about it.

The question we have today is: What is good for America?

This isn't about nation-building. This is about protecting our Nation. This is a debate over whether we are going to save lives or lose lives that are American by what our actions are in the near future; and into the future of how we plan our force structure and what we deploy with around the world.

I am very much concerned that if we are not in these regions, especially in Somalia, which is one of the most war-torn areas we know of, that we will have an increase in terrorist activities. When you see a country like Afghanistan and the way it is deteriorating right now—you have 27 terrorist cells training there—because of the lack of presence of good guys trying to make sure that bad guys don't propagate and proliferate and making sure they are not recruiting people and sending people over here to do harm to us, it is a minor miracle that we haven't had another 9/11 in so long.

If you think about it, the incredible work that we have had done by our intel community and our Special Forces and other Americans around the world to circumvent that from happening is nothing short of Herculean.

I would make the case that because we have forces all around the world, we have been a safer place. We have saved American lives. This isn't about building a nation of 17 million people. This is about protecting the Nation of 330 million people.

I want to make sure that we are clear in this argument that this is not about seeking war. No one who spent time in the military wants war. I spent over 20 years in the military myself. I spent years away from my family, as well. I served with three different forces: Marine Corps, Army, and Navy. Nobody wants war less than I do.

Nobody wants to see Americans killed more than any military commander. As a matter of fact, when we send these people, it is not because a politician wants to go over there. Usually it is because a general or an area commander has requested these troops in collaboration with each other. We are talking about decades of experience in the region, and they understand what is at stake. They don't want war. They don't want American troops to lose their lives.

As a matter of fact, they are judged historically on how many American lives they save, on how many American troops that they don't put in harm's way. This isn't about seeking war. This is about avoiding war. This isn't about protecting their nation. It is protecting our Nation.

We have an obligation to watch over this great Nation of ours. I think it is not by pulling back, but engaging in other countries in a way we can work together to protect American lives, both civilian and military.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I want to clarify for Mr. MILLS that when I mentioned we had not had any deaths in Somalia, I said in the last 4 years. I was acknowledging what happened before. In the last 4 years we have not lost any American troops in Somalia.

Let me also say, as I said earlier, I am happy that we are having this debate and talking about the continent of Africa. If we do that, we have to listen to the African—I can just recall, and sometimes many of my colleagues, es-

pecially on the other side of the aisle, argue that we don't get the votes we need at times in the U.N. from African countries.

I recall when we were trying to get votes in regard to Russia's illegal invasion into Ukraine, and I had to call on African ambassadors. They said: Now you are calling? We haven't heard from the United States for a while. Now you want something from me?

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We have been asking for assistance in regard to security, and then I watched to see what was taking place when we looked at our diplomacy. It took over two decades before, in the 117th Congress, we passed a State Department authorization bill, and we had to do that through the NDAA as opposed to saying we were going to stand strongly on diplomacy.

Guess what China did during that period of time? They doubled their diplomacy budget.

Guess what else is happening? For the first time, China has more consulates than the United States of America.

General Kelly said that either we do and get engaged in more diplomacy, or we are going to have to spend more money on bullets.

We have an opportunity to engage and listen to allies and work with our allies. Many allies have more, and should have more, responsibility on the continent because they colonized it and are working with us collectively to try to make sure that the Chinas and the Russias of the world are not invested and that we are invested, and we are not.

It is our challenge, and I hope that when we get past this debate, we will be able to have another one. I look forward to doing it, particularly in our committee, so that we can figure out collectively, as Ms. ILHAN OMAR said, how we can work together and listen to make sure that we have an overall strategy.

I say this in regard to both parties. I say this to the administration that should be doing more on the continent of Africa.

So, yes, this is not a partisan debate. This is an American debate. This is an opportunity to be attentive to a continent that is the fastest growing and the youngest on this planet but that we have ignored for far too long.

We have to wake up and do more for the continent of Africa and figure out diplomacy, figure out how we can help protect them from being victimized by terrorism, and figure out how we can strengthen institutions.

We have a lot of work to do. We have to figure out how we reauthorize AGOA, figure out how we work with the African Union, and figure out how we work with the African organizations. That is our challenge because, if not, we imperil ourselves.

I could agree that this is not just an investment in the continent; it is an

investment for America and America's leadership.

Let's lead.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. JACKSON LEE).

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, let me thank the gentleman for his distinguished leadership as the manager on this floor and, certainly, the proponent of this resolution. I know it came with good intentions.

Let me indicate the wisdom of a young college student some many years ago when I offered to my college for my winning traveling fellowship that I would go to the continent of Africa. Everyone else would go to places well defined and well recognized. I told them that I wanted to take the fellowship that I had received to travel to West Africa, and I did, from then-Togo-and-Dahomey—obviously, changed names to Cote d'Ivoire—to Ghana and Nigeria, and I studied, seeing the potential even then.

I am gratified to be in this Congress to be able to have the leadership of our chairman and our ranking member on the Foreign Affairs Committee to recognize the cruciality of our purpose on the continent.

It was members of the Congressional Black Caucus who organized to say how important it was under the George W. Bush administration that the Africa Command be set up. It was crucial in the bloody fight in Liberia for that command to be set up, and only without shooting one gun were they able to begin to bring peace.

So, I rise with great concern and opposition to H. Con. Res. 30 because I have realized the importance of the Africa Command because it has elements of diplomacy.

I am glad that President Biden reversed Trump's get-out-of-town and get-out-of-Dodge-quick resolution to, in fact, leave a footprint of 500, who are helping us bring down Al-Shabaab, bring down al-Qaida, and boost up the Somali partners of which our soldiers are working through and working to degrade Al-Shabaab's ability to plot external operations while building the capacities of our partner.

The rest of Africa is watching. If they try to be peaceful and to stand up a democratic entity, do they have a powerful force like the United States?

I, too, want a full debate on the Authorization for Use of Military Force. I have been here for 9/11 and afterward, and I, too, believe that it is our duty.

What I will say at this time is that we should not remove those troops from Somalia.

I ask my colleague to join with his committee and engage in debate on the AUMF, but I want to protect the Somali people, Africa, and I want to protect the interests of democracy and the United States of America.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.Con. Res. 30—Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove all United States Armed

Forces, other than United States Armed Forces assigned to protect the United States Embassy, from Somalia.

This concurrent resolution directs the President to remove all U.S. Armed Forces from Somalia, other than those assigned to protect the U.S. embassy in Somalia, within 365 days of the adoption of this concurrent resolution.

Premature withdrawal would risk reversal of critical counterterrorism and governance gain.

Al-Shabaab is al-Qaida's largest and best-financed affiliate in the world and has repeatedly demonstrated its intent and capability to launch lethal and complex attacks against U.S. citizens in east Africa and beyond.

Al-Shabaab has killed more than a dozen U.S. citizens since 2014—more than all of al-Qaida's other affiliates combined during the same period.

U.S. forces, 500–900 working through Somali partners, seek to degrade Al-Shabaab's ability to plot external operations while building the capacities of our partners.

The small but effective U.S. military presence supports a critical counterterrorism mission by working with partners forces.

There is no legal basis for this legislation.

The resolution is based on section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution. But section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution applies only when our forces are engaged in hostilities without statutory basis.

In this case, there a statutory basis for U.S. actions in Somalia, as U.S. forces are supporting hostilities against Al-Shabaab and al-Qaida in Somalia—both of which are covered by the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force.

Since July 2022, the Federal Government of Somalia has retaken more territory than the previous five years combined.

U.S. military presence is a vital component of efforts to improve local partners capacity and local conditions to the point that our presence is no longer needed.

The persistent presence of a modest number of U.S. forces increases the effectiveness of the DoD's training efforts and bolsters its credibility as a consistent and durable partner for Somali forces.

The DoD's presence in Somalia forms the backbone of a whole-of-government approach that layer's diplomacy, security assistance, stabilization programing, and intelligence operations to counter Al-Shabaab and address the conditions that have allowed it to thrive.

I urge all my colleagues to oppose H.Con. Res. 30.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, if what it takes to protect the 17 million people in Somalia is 900 U.S. troops forever, then I don't have high hopes for them. I have far more confidence in the strategy that Congresswoman OMAR laid out, which was the Somali Government working to create some sense of national identity among Somali clans, and no one has made a compelling argument that we are essential to that process.

I take some exception to my colleague from Texas calling this a get-out-quick resolution. It gives us a year. Can't we move 900 people in a year?

My colleague from Georgia argued that Somali troop presence was essential to keep America safe. Let me be

clear: I fear China and some crazy Russian general with nuclear codes far more than I fear Somali warlords fighting over who controls aid streams.

It is not just my opinion. It is the opinion of our military leaders at AFRICOM. It was Brigadier General Bailey who said recently:

What we have seen is not necessarily holding land or territory. It is more extortion, closer to an organized crime organization.

That was on February 27, 2023, on "Nightly News with Lester Holt."

Even General Bailey doesn't view this as a way to get land, seize land, and keep it away from Al-Shabaab. He is saying that they are not really holding land. They are just engaged in low-level thuggery, and it seems unworthy of a sustained U.S. troop presence.

Let's make clear that while the debate was elegant and compelling about the need to engage Africa, the vote on this resolution is whether 900 U.S. troops should stay in Somalia or come home.

Those who vote against my resolution are functionally taking the position that the 2001 AUMF, which was voted on when 89 percent of us who are currently in the House were not even here to vote on it and which was voted on before Al-Shabaab even existed, has become a global permission slip for U.S. interventionism everywhere.

Al-Shabaab had nothing to do with 9/11. The fact that they have co-branded with al-Qaida is not indicative of any interoperability.

Mr. Speaker, as we are evaluating whether or not we have to keep 900 troops in Somalia for the safety and security of Americans, the principal goal of Al-Shabaab is to rule greater Somalia under sharia law and overthrow the government.

That is not my opinion. That is a February 2023 Congressional Research Service conclusion. That very same CRS report indicates that Al-Shabaab does not have the capability to attack the United States.

I guess it is easy to stand up and say that we should be the police force everywhere because anywhere some bad person could harbor the desire to kill us, but the best research we have says that that is not in line with their existing capabilities.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the RECORD the February 2023 Congressional Research Service report.

[From Congressional Research Service, updated Feb. 14, 2023]

AL SHABAAB

Al Shabaab (Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidin, Mujahidin Youth Movement) is a Somalia-based insurgent and terrorist group that U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2022 labeled "the largest, wealthiest, and most lethal Al Qaeda affiliate in the world today." AFRICOM reports that the group poses the greatest danger to U.S. citizens and interests in East Africa, and is a threat to the United States.

BACKGROUND

Al Shabaab emerged in the mid-2000s amidst a vacuum of state authority in Somalia. It evolved out of a militant wing of the

federation of Islamic Courts that took control of Mogadishu and much of southern Somalia in 2006. When Ethiopia, which backed Somalia's nascent transitional government, intervened militarily—with U.S. support—to oust the Courts, Al Shabaab used historical anti-Ethiopian sentiment among Somalis to draw recruits and support, including among the diaspora in the United States.

Al Shabaab held much of south-central Somalia, including the capital, from the late 2000s until African Union (AU) forces gained momentum against the insurgency in 2011–2012 and reclaimed some territory from the group. Shabaab has nevertheless retained control over parts of the country, despite international recognition of Somalia's federal government in 2012 and a range of multilateral efforts to degrade its capacity. The group also maintains influence and the ability to conduct attacks in government-held areas.

RELATIONSHIP WITH AL QAEDA

Some of Al Shabaab's founding members trained with Al Qaeda (AQ) in Afghanistan, and senior AQ operatives in East Africa, including Fazul Mohammed—the late mastermind of the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania—have been associated with the group. After expressions of allegiance to Al Qaeda in Al Shabaab's early years, the groups announced a formal affiliation in 2012.

While Al Shabaab's leaders appear to broadly share Al Qaeda's transnational agenda, the group operates independently. Among other AQ affiliates, the group maintains ties with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), with which it runs a smuggling network.

In 2015, some Al Shabaab members pressed for a shift in allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Al Shabaab leadership rejected the proposal and launched a deadly crackdown against IS supporters. A small IS faction in northern Somalia survived the purge. Al Shabaab remains the dominant group and appears to view the IS cell as a rival.

THE THREAT

Al Shabaab has waged an asymmetric campaign against the Somali government, AU forces, and foreign targets in Somalia. Per UN data, 2022 was its deadliest year since 2017, when a truck bomb in Mogadishu killed over 500 people (Al Shabaab's deadliest single attack to date).

While the group has focused primarily on Somalia, it is also threatening the countries participating in the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, previously known as AMISOM) and has conducted attacks in neighboring countries and Uganda. Al Shabaab has been most active in Kenya, which launched a military operation in Somalia against the group in 2011 (Kenya joined AMISOM in 2012). The group has killed hundreds of Kenyans, many through hit-and-run attacks near the Somali border. Its 2015 assault on a university in northeast Kenya, which killed at least 147 people, was the deadliest terrorist attack in Kenya since Al Qaeda's 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy.

Al Shabaab's July 2022 incursion into Ethiopia is its largest operation outside Somalia to date, reportedly involving some 2,000 Al Shabaab fighters. UN experts estimate that as many as 1,000 fighters remain in Ethiopia, giving it a foothold, despite Ethiopian claims of routing the group.

Al Shabaab has threatened U.S. and Western targets in the region and called for attacks against the United States. Attacks on international targets in Kenya's capital—the 2013 Westgate Mall siege and the 2019 DusitD2 hotel assault—raised the group's international profile. Over 50 U.S. citizens were reportedly in the Westgate mall when

the attack started—all escaped but six were injured. In 2020, Al Shabaab killed a U.S. soldier and two U.S. contractors during a raid on Manda Bay Airfield, a Kenyan military facility used by the U.S. military near the Somali border.

The group has not claimed any attacks in the United States. It has, however, encouraged lone-wolf attacks in its propaganda, and in 2015, it produced a video identifying shopping malls in Europe and the United States as potential targets. In 2019, a Kenyan national was arrested in the Philippines and later extradited to the United States on charges of conspiring to hijack an aircraft on behalf of Al Shabaab to conduct a 9/11-style attack in the United States.

OBJECTIVES

Al Shabaab rejects democracy, broadly ascribing to a vision of uniting ethnic Somali-inhabited areas of Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia in an Islamic state under its version of Sharia law. It characterizes the Somali government as an illegitimate apostate authority that is beholden to foreign powers. Al Shabaab leaders have repeatedly expressed their commitment to global jihad. They justify attacks outside Somalia as retaliation against countries conducting military operations in Somalia and as retribution for alleged abuses against Muslims. Al Shabaab described the Manda Bay and DusitD2 attacks in Kenya as consistent with Al Qaeda directives to target U.S. and Israeli interests, and referred to the airfield as one of the “launch pads for the American crusade against Islam in the region.” Al Shabaab activities in Kenya more broadly appear focused on sowing internal dissent and fomenting an insurgency. Its fighters have specifically targeted non-Muslims in some attacks there.

LEADERSHIP

Ahmed Diriye (aka Abu Ubaidah), a Somali national, has led Al Shabaab since 2014. He succeeded Ahmed Abdi Godane, who was killed in a U.S. airstrike that the Obama Administration described as responding to an “imminent threat,” citing Godane's oversight of “plots targeting Westerners, including U.S. persons in East Africa.” Godane's predecessor was killed in a U.S. strike in 2008.

Al Shabaab faced infighting under Godane, who consolidated power by assassinating rivals, reportedly including American jihadist Omar Hammami in 2013. Some prominent commanders left the group or surrendered to Somali authorities in exchange for amnesty during that time. Former deputy leader Mukhtar Robow defected, and later ran for state office, drawing on support from his clan. He was detained during his 2018 campaign and held without charge until 2022. He was released by Somalia's new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and appointed Minister of Religious Affairs. In his new role, Robow is tasked with countering Al Shabaab's extremist ideology.

AREA OF OPERATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

AMISOM and neighboring militaries pushed Al Shabaab from Mogadishu and other urban centers and ports between 2011 and 2014. Al Shabaab's control of large areas of south and central Somalia, however, remained largely unchanged from 2015, when AMISOM's major offensive operations ceased, until 2022, when the Somali government launched a new offensive in coordination with local militias and a grassroots uprising. Al Shabaab has since lost significant territory in central Somalia, but it continues to conduct reprisal attacks there.

While Al Shabaab's loss of Mogadishu and other port cities initially restricted its revenue, the group has developed an extensive

taxation system covering all aspects of the Somali economy, per UN and other reporting. Al Shabaab extorts businesses even in government areas. It generates between \$50 and \$100 million annually, according to UN monitors, and uses at least 25 percent on military purchases; Al Shabaab also supports Al Qaeda directly with its tax proceeds.

UN monitors report that Al Shabaab is estimated to have 7,000–12,000 fighters. The group capitalizes on grievances and distrust of the government in parts of Somalia and fills local governance roles, providing basic services and resolving disputes. It also forcibly recruits fighters, including children. Al Shabaab uses various propaganda tools to spread its message in multiple languages. In Kenya, reportedly its largest source of foreign fighters, Al Shabaab plays on narratives of collective punishment by the Kenyan government against Muslims, among other themes. Kenyan nationals of non-Somali descent led the DusitD2 attack.

Despite territorial losses, Al Shabaab maintains the ability to conduct frequent attacks in Mogadishu and other areas beyond its control, including through complex vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). In 2016, an Al Shabaab suicide bomber on a Somali airliner detonated a bomb concealed in a laptop computer. (It did not destroy the plane.) Advances in Al Shabaab's explosives-making capacity led the UN Security Council to ban the transfer of explosive precursors to Somalia in 2019.

U.S. RESPONSES

The United States named Al Shabaab a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2008 and has designated over two dozen related persons for sanctions, either under Executive Order (E.O.) 13536 (on Somalia) or as under E.O. 13224 (on terrorism). Among those designated are several Kenyan clerics implicated in fundraising and recruiting for the group and members of its smuggling and weapons trafficking network in Yemen. The United States has prosecuted several U.S. citizens for fundraising on Al Shabaab's behalf.

The United States provides security assistance to AU and Somali forces, and has supported counter-radicalization programs in the region. In addition to airstrikes, U.S. forces have engaged in “advise, assist, and accompany” missions with Somali and AU forces since 2016.

In late 2016, the Obama Administration publicly named Al Shabaab an “associated force” of Al Qaeda in the context of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107–40). U.S. airstrikes in Somalia were limited until 2015, when President Obama broadened the justification for U.S. military action in the country—previously “to counter Al Qaeda and associated elements of Al Shabaab”—to cover support for AU, Somali, and U.S. forces operating there. The tempo of airstrikes rose. President Trump changed the rules of engagement for U.S. operations in Somalia in 2017, authorizing offensive airstrikes and designating parts of the country as an “area of active hostilities.” Airstrikes have continued, after a brief pause, under President Biden: AFRICOM conducted over a dozen airstrikes in Somalia in 2022, citing most as “collective self-defense,” in support of the Somali army.

In late 2019, three months before the Manda Bay attack, Al Shabaab launched an unsuccessful assault on an airfield used by the U.S. military in central Somalia—it was the largest attack on U.S. forces in the country in nearly thirty years. No U.S. or Somali forces were killed. Trump ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces—then estimated at 700—from Somalia at the end of his term; Biden authorized the redeployment of U.S. troops to Somalia in May 2022.

OUTLOOK

After over 15 years of counterinsurgency operations against it, Al Shabaab still poses a serious threat in Somalia and East Africa, despite the ongoing deployment of 18,000 AU troops. Airstrikes have eliminated some “high-value” targets and supported partner operations, but Al Shabaab maintains the capacity to conduct complex, asymmetric attacks in Somalia and assaults in neighboring countries.

Over the past decade, political infighting and corruption have hampered the Somali government’s ability to extend state authority. Donor fatigue and frustration has reduced support for the AU mission, which is due to withdraw by the end of 2024. The “total war” Somalia’s new government launched against Al Shabaab in 2022 could be a turning point, but Somalia has struggled to “clear and hold” when AU forces have managed to gain ground in the past. For more, see CRS In Focus IF10155, Somalia.

Mr. GAETZ. Moreover, Mr. Speaker, we are seeing the government in Somalia achieve gains in large part because of local discontent with Al-Shabaab.

Because of climate change, we are not seeing the same amount of agricultural and livestock opportunities for people in Somalia, so many of the groups that were paying extortion money to Al-Shabaab are not able to pay it anymore because a lot of the land is dried up. That resulted in Al-Shabaab being incredibly brutal to those local clans and tribes. They poisoned the water, killed family members, and publicly executed people. Then what happened was a lot of those local tribes pushed back and said they would rather align with the government.

That is not a victory delivered at the end of a U.S. missile or weapon. That is a victory that is occurring as a consequence of the conditions in Somalia and the choices that Somalis are making.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I include in the RECORD the ACLED piece that details how the government is making gains in ground and Al-Shabaab is losing them. It is titled: “Somalia: Counterinsurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase Two as Al-Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist.”

[From ACLED, Apr. 21, 2023]

SOMALIA: COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATION GAINS REGIONAL SUPPORT IN PHASE TWO AS AL-SHABAAB ATTACKS AND POLITICAL DIFFERENCES PERSIST

SOMALIA AT A GLANCE: 18 MARCH–14 APRIL 2023
Vital Trends

ACLED records more than 180 political violence events and over 420 reported fatalities from 18 March to 14 April 2023. Most political violence centered in Banadir region, where al-Shabaab launched attacks targeting Somali security forces and civilians.

Middle Shabelle region had the highest number of reported fatalities, with over 120 recorded during the reporting period. Sool region followed, with more than 80 reported fatalities. Violence involving al-Shabaab was linked to over 74 percent of total fatalities. Clashes between Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) militia and Somaliland security forces around Laascaanood town resulted in most of the remaining fatalities.

The most common event type was battles, with over 100 events, followed by explosions/

remote violence, with nearly 60 events. Over 46 percent of explosion/remote violence events occurred in Banadir region, a nearly 70 percent increase compared to the previous four weeks.

COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATION GAINS REGIONAL SUPPORT IN PHASE TWO AS AL-SHABAAB ATTACKS AND POLITICAL DIFFERENCES PERSIST

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud announced the second phase of the military offensive against al-Shabaab at the end of March. The new phase reportedly aims to flush out al-Shabaab from the remaining parts of the country under its control, following the first phase that began in August 2022. While the operation initially focused on central Somalia, starting in Hirshabelle and then expanding to Galmudug state, the second phase aims to expand to southern regions—Southwest and Jubaland states.

In the first phase, the government sought support from clan militias from the Hawiye clan, and regained substantial territory from al-Shabaab. Subsequently, clan militias have played a vital role in the government-led operation. Since August 2022, these groups have been involved in more than 155 political violence events against al-Shabaab. Additionally, they have supported security forces in nearly 60 percent of events where government forces have regained territory from al-Shabaab. During the first phase of the offensive against al-Shabaab, Somali security forces regained control of over 215 locations previously under al-Shabaab’s control, mostly in Hirshabelle and Galmudug states. However, Somali security forces, who failed to fully drive out al-Shabaab militants from both states, still lack the military capacity to hold newly liberated areas. Al-Shabaab, in turn, took advantage of this weakness to maintain bases and launch complex attacks against government troops. In particular, they regained lost territories in Hirshabelle as the government expanded the offensive to Galmudug state.

As the federal government anticipates a lack of support from clans in the south for the second phase of operations, it is seeking more support from neighboring states who are already present in Somalia under the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)—possibly indicating a plan to scale down the role of clan militias in the operation. Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya have reportedly promised over 30,000 soldiers to support the offensive in the coming months. This situation update analyzes the activities of al-Shabaab and the security forces during the second phase of the offensive and assesses the risk that political differences between the federal government and some of member states, like Jubaland and Puntland, may undermine the operations.

Al-Shabaab Aims for Hirshabelle While Continuing Attacks in Banadir

After the counter-insurgency operation against al-Shabaab expanded to Galmudug state in early 2023, Hirshabelle state became a vulnerable target for al-Shabaab attacks. These vulnerabilities have forced Somali security forces to stay focused on Middle Shabelle and Hiiraan regions in the second phase of the offensive rather than expanding to Jubaland and Southwest states. From 18 March to 14 April, ACLED records 19 political violence events involving al-Shabaab in Hirshabelle state, resulting in at least 145 reported fatalities (see map below). Over 68 percent of these incidents were remote violence events, which record an increase of 30 percent compared to the previous four weeks.

In Middle Shabelle region, al-Shabaab launched several attacks in Adan Yabaal district—in most instances using explosives. On

25 March, al-Shabaab detonated three under-vehicle IEDs (UVIED), targeting security forces and Abgal clan militias at a base in Run-nirgod village. The explosion and heavy gunfire exchange that followed resulted in over 50 reported fatalities. A few days earlier, on 20 March, another al-Shabaab attack at a base in Daarul-

Nacimi village reportedly killed at least 55 people from both sides. The attacks came before the visit of the Somali President on 26 March to Adan Yabaal town, where he announced the launch of the second phase of the offensive against al-Shabaab. The same day, a high-level Ethiopian delegation that included the head of the Ethiopian National Defense Force and senior government officials arrived in the capital of Hiiraan region, Belet Weyne town, to help Somali forces plan the next phase. Ethiopian troops have been fighting Islamist militants in Somalia since 2006 independently, and as part of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since January 2014. AMISOM was eventually replaced by ATMIS in 2022.

Meanwhile, security forces continued offensive operations in Hiiraan to avert al-Shabaab attacks. The government deployed troops from Mogadishu to the region, traveling along the main supply route that connects Mogadishu to Hiiraan. On 25 March, security forces captured Jibiley village in Jalalaqsi district and Quracley village in Bulo Burto district from al-Shabaab. While militants peacefully vacated those villages, they continued to launch attacks on security forces and clan militias’ new bases near Belet Weyne town. On 29 March, an al-Shabaab suicide vehicle-borne IED attack targeted security forces and Hawadle clan militias at a base-in Baardheere village, followed by clashes.

Further, al-Shabaab continued measures to end the alliance between government forces and the Hawadle sub-clan in the second phase of the offensive. The Hawadle sub-clan of the Hawiye clan is the largest and most prominent sub-clan in Hiiraan. There are four main clans in Somalia: Hawiye, Darod, Dir, and Rahanweyn, with each having several sub-clans and those sub-divisions, some supporting al-Shabaab, and others supporting the government operation against al-Shabaab. Since al-Shabaab controls several remote villages in Hiiraan and other regions, sub-clans consider it necessary to reach an agreement with al-Shabaab for their safety, and in return for their support or neutrality, al-Sahabab offers them peace deals. On 5 April, al-Shabaab claimed to have signed an agreement with Hawadle Galibbe Hassan Agoon sub-clan in Buqda Caqable village, Bula Burto district. The agreement stipulates that the sub-clan would not be part of the ongoing offensive in Hiiraan region. Similar agreements were reportedly signed between al-Shabaab and at least seven other sub-divisions of the Hawadle sub-clan in Buqda Caqable village this year. Al-Shabaab also reached an agreement with clan elders from Habar Gedir Salebaan sub-clan in Xarardheere town, Mudug region, in December 2022.

Meanwhile, al-Shabaab continues its efforts to destabilize the government operation by launching attacks in urban towns. The capital Mogadishu records the highest number of al-Shabaab attacks compared to other urban areas in Somalia, with 49 political violence events and at least 21 reported fatalities. Al-Shabaab’s use of explosions and remote violence increased in the capital by over 87 percent during the reporting period compared to the same time period prior; the group’s use of grenades, in particular, increased more than four-fold.

On 5 April, al-Shabaab carried out coordinated hand grenade attacks in all 17 districts

of Mogadishu. The grenade attacks targeted security force checkpoints, the house of the mayor of Mogadishu and governor of Banadir, the house of former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, and the house of a federal senator. Further, the militants launched mortar shells targeting the presidential palace, with some striking the house of the petroleum minister, reportedly killing a security officer.

Political Differences Undermine the Offensive

As part of the second phase of the offensive, the federal government plans to expand the offensive to Jubaland and Southwest states in southern Somalia. Political differences due to power-sharing disputes in Jubaland and Puntland, however, undermine the operation.

Amid an ongoing dispute with the Jubaland administration based in Kismayo, Gedo region politicians and government officials unilaterally announced the recruitment and mobilization of local clan militias to participate in the military operation against al-Shabaab in the region. On the other hand, Jubaland State Minister of Security Yusuf Hussein Dhuumal reportedly rejected such plans to involve local clan militias. The most prominent sub-clan in Gedo region is the Marehan sub-clan of the Darod clan, which opposes Jubaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam—also known as ‘Madobe’—from the Ogaden sub-clan of the Darod clan. Marehan and Ogaden sub-clans have been fighting over the control of Kismayo since the 1990s. The current dispute between Gedo politicians, who are mostly from the Marehan sub-clan, and the Madobe administration escalated in 2020 when a leadership dispute led to the federal government’s decision to deploy troops in the region. Jubaland administration fears that arming Marehan clan militias in Gedo would trip the balance of power in favor of the Marehan sub-clan. Nevertheless, Jubaland security forces continued conducting military operations against al-Shabaab despite the lack of support from local communities. Further, on 3 April, Ethiopian security forces deployed troops in Doolow town, Gedo region, as part of Ethiopia’s commitment to increase its military presence in Somalia during the second phase of the counter-insurgency operation.

Political differences between the Puntland administration and the federal government have also complicated plans for the counter-insurgency operation. In mid-March, the federal government and member states held a national consultative council meeting in Baidoa town to discuss the fight against al-Shabaab and to foster cooperation between the federal and member state governments. Puntland state president did not attend the meeting citing political differences with the federal government, including the appointment of the new special envoy for Somaliland affairs. On 9 January, Puntland state suspended cooperation with the federal government after skipping the signing of two outcomes of a national consultative council meeting held in Mogadishu in late December. Although al-Shabaab activity decreased in Puntland during the reporting period compared to the previous four weeks, fighting between al-Shabaab and IS militants led to the reported deaths of at least 40 al-Shabaab militants, including senior members. The fighting erupted after several al-Shabaab militants moved to the mountainous Bari region, likely fleeing from the government’s offensive.

Different administrations in Somalia have adopted distinct approaches to the fight against al-Shabaab, often deeply tied to the clan affiliations of Somali leaders. The pre-

vious government—in power from 2017 to 2022—focused on foreign policy, rebuilding security forces, and leading reconciliation between clans. Meanwhile, the current administration has enlisted support, first from clan militias and now from neighboring countries, in an intensive offensive to flush out al-Shabaab militants. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is from the Hawiye clan that has sub-clans supporting the government operation against al-Shabaab, including Hawadle and Abgal in Hirshabelle and Habar Gedir in Galmudug. Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as ‘Farmajo,’ who is from the Marehan sub-clan of the Darod clan, failed to get support from the Majerteen sub-clan in Puntland, and Ogaden sub-clan in Jubaland, with the latter intensifying the dispute between Gedo and Kismayo administration.

The progress made through the government operation has put Somalia in a more positive position compared to the last six years. These efforts could help the country recover the decades-long political and security instability, but only if effectively managed through power sharing, reconciliation, and integration of clan militias into security forces. Nonetheless, the greater role of forces from neighboring countries in the offensive might lead to a divide between clan militias and government forces, and claims of a ‘foreign invasion’ may be used by al-Shabaab in its propaganda in order to recruit fighters. Consequently, military support from Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya might not be a solution but rather a setback in the fight against al-Shabaab. The regional countries are already present in Somalia under ATMIS, although they have not participated in the ongoing offensive due to funding issues and have only offered logistical support and medical evacuation. The Abgal, Habar Gedir, and Hawadle clan militias have played an important role in the security forces’ success since August 2022, and scaling down their involvement will likely undermine the government’s efforts to defeat al-Shabaab. For the government to claim ownership of the offensive, integrating clan militias into security forces should be considered a priority.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MILLS).

Mr. MILLS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding those 2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I want to approach a couple of things here. We keep talking about the idea that our presence and these 900 people in Somalia are somehow leading to a stabilization effort. However, the reality is this: When was our actual presence required for stabilization as opposed to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operational tactics?

We talk about the threats, but the real threat is China, which is existential to all of us. We allow them to go into Ghana, into the Ashanti belt, and completely pillage resources with no U.S. response.

Where were our 900 troops that were there to help with this stabilization when our greatest adversary was there robbing and pillaging?

By the way, where are we with regard to: If we are there to fight and combat Al-Shabaab, then why are we not taking a greater presence when it comes to the oil resource protection in Lake Turkana out in Kenya? It is a place I

know very well because I spent time in Nairobi and also in Karen.

We continue to try to act as if we are stabilizers, but do we not remember what took place in Libya, where we actually helped with supporting the destabilization that now has led to the Misrata militia, the Sirte militia, and further economic turmoil?

Mr. Speaker, you can’t point to a single agenda, whether it was Afghanistan, Iraq, or Somalia, or whether it was Libyan support—you can’t point to a single one where our presence has actually led to greater stability.

What it has led to is more U.S. lives being lost, more economic deficiency for America, and more of us trying to be the world’s police and creating more adversaries and enemies throughout the world stage.

Again, I continue to ask the same question to every one of my colleagues on the left and the right: How does our presence actually strengthen us from stabilization, provide us stronger allies, and give us the actual economic strength that we need to outpace China, which is our greatest existential threat? How does this 2001 AUMF that is being misused and abused for an open, carte blanche of warfare support America’s goals?

Mr. JAMES. Again, Mr. Speaker, I believe we are in violent agreement.

The gentleman from Georgia mentioned, I believe, and it is extremely appropriate, that this isn’t about protecting another nation. It is about protecting ours.

Today, I think that we are just standing here, and I think if we were to take the vote on the floor, I am pretty sure that most of our colleagues would agree that the executive branch is abusing its power and that we as Congress have ceded our constitutional authority to hold them to account.

We should absolutely hold the executive branch to account for their two decades of missteps, but a number of my colleagues and I in the freshman class have been here but a mere 110 days. I am sure I can speak for most of us that we refuse to be held bound to the mistakes of the past.

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We are inspired and excited to make sure that we correct those mistakes of the past with strong policy to benefit the American people and our allies in the future.

That requires not repealing something without a replacement.

That requires the executive branch to come to us for permission, as they are constitutionally obligated to do.

It is our duty to retain these authorities, but not proceeding without an event-based strategy rather than a time-based strategy.

Regrettably, I restate that this resolution does nothing toward those ends. It merely directs the removal of U.S. forces from Somalia within a time frame without regard for what may be going on on the ground.

Again, I applaud and appreciate forcing this debate. It is long overdue. I respect and thank the gentlemen, Representative MILLS for his service and Representative GAETZ for forcing this very important debate.

I am looking forward to taking this up with the help of the gentleman from New York (Mr. MEEKS), my friend, in the House Foreign Affairs Committee to make sure that we can satisfy our obligations, first to the American people and also to our allies who count on us to take up the mantle and use global leadership not to be isolationist and also not to be imperialist but to make sure that we are staying strong at home first.

Mr. Speaker, I have no additional speakers. I have the right to close, and I will continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to my remaining time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida has 19½ minutes remaining.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

In response to the argument of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. JAMES), who says that our withdrawals must be event based rather than time based, I would ask: What events are we waiting for in Somalia exactly?

Are we waiting for a Jeffersonian democracy to emerge there?

Are we waiting for the sectarian violence that has dominated to automatically just dissolve into the sands?

Are we waiting for some other foreign power?

I would suggest that in many of these places what we are actually waiting for is for these countries to take care of themselves and to demonstrate their own capabilities because the only way you form a nation is if your own fellow countrymen fight for and win that peace. That is how you develop national heroes, like those we see throughout this great Capitol. That is what a nation makes.

A nation is not a bunch of Europeans drawing lines in Africa and then saying this is what is what. We did that after World War II, and it is why Africa has been in some degree of turmoil since. I continue to present to the body that the government in Somalia is actually on the upswing. They are gaining territory. They are unifying people, and it is not as a consequence of U.S. presence.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the RECORD a piece from the International Crisis Group, “Sustaining Gains in Somalia’s Offensive against Al-Shabaab,” and it is from 21 March 2023.

[From International Crisis Group, Mar. 21, 2023]

GAINS IN SOMALIA’S OFFENSIVE AGAINST AL-SHABAAB

What’s new? The Somali government has gained ground in its war with the Islamist

insurgency Al-Shabaab, mainly in central Somalia. Most of the progress is due to Mogadishu’s leveraging of local discontent with Al-Shabaab to form alliances with clan militias.

Why does it matter? The joint campaign has dislodged militants from a swathe of territory in the centre of the country, reestablishing the government’s presence in regions that Al-Shabaab had controlled for a decade or more. Troops are now planning to move into the insurgency’s southern bastions.

What should be done? Mogadishu must consolidate its gains in central Somalia as it goes on the offensive elsewhere. It should establish holding forces, work for communal reconciliation and, to the greatest degree possible, meet local expectations around service delivery.

OVERVIEW

Starting in August 2022, the Somali government launched a fresh offensive against Al-Shabaab, capitalising on mounting discontent with the Islamist insurgency, particularly among the politically dominant Hawiye clan. The operation has yielded the most comprehensive territorial gains since the mid-2010s, as soldiers fighting alongside clan militias dislodge Al-Shabaab militants from significant parts of central Somalia. Emboldened by clan backing and foreign support, Mogadishu now aims to send soldiers into Al-Shabaab’s southern strongholds. As it proceeds, it should bear in mind the need to consolidate its hold on places it has recaptured from the insurgency. The government should assign holding forces to provide security in recovered areas, support local reconciliation efforts and step up service delivery, while carefully managing residents’ expectations. If it does not take these measures, it may give Al-Shabaab, which has proven resilient, a chance to rebound.

The government’s push marks a breakthrough in a war that has raged for more than fifteen years. Historically, overstretched Somali and partner forces have hunkered down in urban locales, while Al-Shabaab secured a firm foothold in rural areas. International forces, in particular the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)—which was rebranded as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022—, have led the fight with Al-Shabaab. In contrast, the new offensive is spearheaded by the Somali military, in conjunction with local clans.

A unique set of circumstances aided the government advance. Al-Shabaab overplayed its hand, antagonising clans in central Somalia. Demands that young male children join their ranks spurred local clans to take up arms alongside the Somali military. The insurgents’ taxation of communities under their control hardly helped, as the country suffers impoverishment and food insecurity amid a record drought. Furthermore, terrorist attacks in the capital and along Somalia’s borders appear to have prodded Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to take a tougher line against the group.

The government now plans to continue the offensive in southern Somalia, even though it has not fully consolidated its hold in the centre. Southern Somalia presents a different set of challenges—for one thing, clans in the south have not shown the same discontent with the Islamist movement that prevails in the centre. But even as its plans advance to meet a new set of challenges, the government should not lose sight of needs in the centre, as otherwise these areas could slip back into Al-Shabaab’s hands. Before it launches major new attacks, it should make sure it has adequate holding forces in recovered areas. It should also conduct reconciliation efforts and improve basic services of

which residents have long been deprived. For cash-strapped Mogadishu, that could prove difficult, and international donors will need to step in to provide support.

Even if the government is successful in holding down central Somalia and reclaiming territory in the south, Al-Shabaab will probably survive. The group is playing the long game, exploiting government weaknesses wherever it can. The government should thus keep open the possibility of negotiations as a means of winding down the war for good, as Crisis Group has argued in the past. The government’s recent wins on the battlefield will, if sustained, strengthen its position if it indeed decides to engage in talks.

FROM LOCAL ANGER TO “ALL-OUT WAR”

The Birth of an Offensive

The Somali government’s move to wrest back control from Al-Shabaab in parts of central Somalia is unusual in that the military has joined forces with clan militias. The offensive derives its strength from mounting local frustration with Al-Shabaab’s persistent, onerous demands for money and recruits, as well as the group’s violent measures of collective punishment for non-compliance. Several sub-clans in central Somalia have resisted the militants previously, but later cut deals with them to forge a form of coexistence, finding the cost of fighting Al-Shabaab too high. Still, overall, the government has made headway.

The insurgents themselves contributed to these dynamics. In recent years, Al-Shabaab has extended its influence by taking advantage of political infighting in Mogadishu, which diverted the attention of Somali elites from the task of counter-insurgency. As politicians in the capital squabbled, sub-clans in central Somalia grew increasingly weary of Al-Shabaab’s tactics. The Haber Gedir/Salebaan sub-clan is a case in point. People from this sub-clan, part of the wider Hawiye clan family, of which Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is a member, live in and around the town of Baxdo, situated in the central region of Galgaduud (Galmudug state). They tolerated Al-Shabaab’s presence in their area, for the most part, until 2019, when its commanders ordered families to provide young men to be enrolled as fighters. An influential community member told Crisis Group that this directive proved too much to stomach. Baxdo is a town with strong Sufi roots; the community perceived Al-Shabaab’s demand as a ploy to inculcate the Salafi-jihadist doctrine in the younger generation.

The Salebaan’s refusal to comply with this de facto draft triggered a spiral of retaliation, starting with insurgents confiscating livestock and abducting elders. It culminated in Al-Shabaab assaulting Baxdo on 17 June 2022, which proved to be a tactical misstep: a militia from the sub-clan inflicted heavy casualties among the invading militants, killing an estimated 70 of them. Still, even after its defeat, Al-Shabaab carried out raids on smaller and less protected villages nearby in revenge.

Around the same time, in the eastern part of Hiraan region (Hirshabelle state) west of Galgaduud, the Hawiye/Hawadle sub-clan’s historically uneasy relationship with Al-Shabaab became outright hostile. The roots of the Hawadle’s aggravation can be traced to 2021, when the militants took control of the road connecting Hiraan’s capital Beledweyne to the Galgaduud region. Al-Shabaab had already blocked a southern route linking Beledweyne to Mogadishu, impeding the flow of vital supplies to a part of Somalia that has suffered severe drought for years. Now its checkpoint on the road headed east choked off the area, in effect. Local

anger rose, becoming even more pronounced in May 2022, when the militants killed a Hawadle elder in Beledweyne, reportedly for having participated in government elections.

The community in Hiraan mobilised to push back against the group, emboldened at a crucial moment by Ethiopian military support. Al-Shabaab has long viewed Ethiopia, which invaded Somalia in 2006 to overthrow its precursor group, the Islamic Courts Union, as a major adversary; the insurgents have attempted to infiltrate the country in the past, mostly to no avail. In July 2022, however, the group launched an unprecedented incursion into Ethiopia's Somali region. Alarmed, Addis Ababa beefed up the deployment in the buffer zone it maintains between its border with Somalia and areas where Al-Shabaab is active. Ethiopia struck Al-Shabaab positions in Somalia from the air in late July and early August, while the head of the Ethiopian Army's Somali Command Post, General Tesfaye Ayalew, visited Beledweyne. Interlocutors on both sides of the Ethiopia-Somalia border confirmed to Crisis Group that Addis Ababa gave military supplies to local Hawadle at this time, coordinating with regional officials.

Al-Shabaab responded to the mobilisation by unleashing a wave of repression upon the sub-clan, which generated still more resentment. In early August, Al-Shabaab torched Hawadle villages in Hiraan's Mahas district, destroying wells. Weeks later, on 2 September, militants ambushed a convoy bringing food to the area, killing numerous civilians, including women and children. More clan members joined the militias as a result.

Another Al-Shabaab attack, this time in Mogadishu, provoked a strong reaction from the national government. On 20 August 2022, Al-Shabaab stormed the well-known Hayat Hotel in the Somali capital—a common meeting place for government officials—putting the premises under siege for 30 hours before security forces could dislodge them. The operation—which led to the death of more than twenty people—may have been an attempt to intimidate President Mohamud, who had been elected to a second non-consecutive term that May, out of taking an aggressive posture toward the group.

If so, Al-Shabaab's leadership miscalculated. While Mohamud had struck a somewhat conciliatory tone when he first returned to office—repeatedly talking about the need for “different security strategies and tough negotiations” with Al-Shabaab—his stance changed dramatically after critics accused him of mounting a confused, ineffective response to the siege. He proceeded to declare an “all-out war” on Al-Shabaab that combines military pressure with efforts to rein in the group's extortion rackets in and around Mogadishu. He also committed to undercutting the group's Salafi-jihadist ideology. Previous attempts to combat Al-Shabaab had failed, he claimed, because they tried to contain rather than eradicate the group.

The government deployed armed forces to Hiraan that worked in concert with Hawadle forces to flush militants out of villages and towns in August. The initial focus was on securing the main road from Mogadishu to Beledweyne and a triangular patch of territory between Beledweyne, Mahas and Bulo Burte. By October, the army and militias had freed much of Hiraan east of the Shabelle River from Al-Shabaab's physical control.

Expansion in Central Somalia

The government was eager to replicate the success in eastern Hiraan, based on the template the Somali army and clan militias had used there. It encouraged other clans in central Somalia to mobilise volunteer fighters,

or macawisley (“those who wear the macawis”, a Somali sarong), relying on prominent personalities to rally their clansmen. Somali soldiers, particularly special forces units, still lead the fight with Al-Shabaab, but Mogadishu has provided the clan militias with logistical support such as ammunition, food and medical evacuations. The macawisley participate in joint operations, giving government forces backup from fighters who know the terrain better. They also provide a crucial link to the local population, sparing the government from going it alone or trying to mobilise community support after the fact. The clan participation also reinforces the narrative that sections of Somali society are turning against Al-Shabaab.

Foreign partners have also bolstered the campaign against Al-Shabaab. U.S. airstrikes are helping the Danab, a special unit of the Somali National Army trained by the U.S. as a quick strike force, recapture territory from the insurgents in the regions of Hiraan, Middle Shabelle, Galgaduud and Mudug. The U.S. has also donated military assistance, with its ambassador for Somalia praising the war effort as “historic”. Türkiye has carried out drone strikes in Lower and Middle Shabelle, further boosting the government's firepower. Meanwhile, ATMIS has stayed out of direct combat thus far.

The combined efforts of the Somali army, clan militias and international partners have led Al-Shabaab's footprint in central Somalia to contract. The government seized the insurgency's regional centre of operations at Adan Yabaal in Middle Shabelle in December 2022. The next month, it captured the strategic towns of Ceel Dheere and Xarardheere in Galgaduud—although militants remain on the outskirts. The military is likely planning to uproot Al-Shabaab from its remaining strongholds in the southern Galgaduud districts of Ceel Buur and Galhareeri. If successful, its campaign would essentially dislodge the militants from a swathe of territory east of the Shabelle River.

The playbook from eastern Hiraan has not worked smoothly everywhere, however. While clans in that region rose up spontaneously against Al-Shabaab, in other areas the government had to coax clans to join forces. Military efforts in Middle Shabelle struggled to get off the ground and were side-tracked by clashes between two sub-clans in the Adale district in November. In western Galgaduud, overly enthusiastic pro-government forces marched on the town of Wabxo in early November, only to pull out days later in the face of stiff resistance from Al-Shabaab. They could not hold the area without support from Somali special forces.

Other advances have also stalled. The army had to stop south of Qaayib, in Galgaduud, amid Al-Shabaab outreach to sub-clans to counter government mobilisation. Government efforts to rally clans in Xarardheere, in the Mudug region, floundered because of sub-clan frictions and perceptions that the government had previously failed to support them in fighting the insurgents. The military ultimately moved to capture Xarardheere with limited clan militia participation.

Moreover, a string of recent incidents shows that Al-Shabaab can still inflict severe damage in areas it has lost, even if it is not reoccupying them. In January alone, the insurgents deployed at least twelve suicide car bombs in central Somalia towns, in some cases causing heavy casualties. A 20 January attack in Galcad (Galmudug state) was particularly damaging, with Danab forces taking significant losses, including of a deputy commander. That incident spurred an internal reconsideration of strategy, with the of-

fensive in central Somalia slowing in the ensuing weeks. Additionally, Al-Shabaab militants continue to cross from west of the Shabelle River to attack macawisley positions in smaller settlements in Hiraan. The infiltration raises concerns about the government's ability to hold the territory it recaptures, especially as it takes over more areas. It also demonstrates the peril of measuring success in fighting Al-Shabaab solely with the yardstick of territorial control.

Still, the government has advantages in its current offensive, when compared to previous campaigns. For one thing, the military's collaboration with clan militias is strengthening ties with local communities, while allowing for greater government penetration of rural areas. Previous offensives typically focused on securing cities, inadvertently deepening the rural-urban divide that has played to Al-Shabaab's strengths as a mobile organisation reliant on local communities for recruitment and financing. Secondly, today's campaign is Somali-led, unlike those from 2011 to 2015, when the government's forces played a secondary role to what is now ATMIS. This time around, ATMIS has stayed in the background, essentially serving as the holding force for urban locales while Somali soldiers venture into less densely populated areas.

There is also evidence that both the federal government and the clans are committed to sustaining their momentum. The current government in Mogadishu has arguably staked its reputation on defeating Al-Shabaab. Moreover, several of the operations to date have involved cross-clan collaboration, demonstrating an unusually high degree of consensus among those fighting the insurgents in central Somalia.

Progress, however, should not be chalked up exclusively to Mogadishu or local mobilisation, but rather to the combination of the two. The campaign has been most successful where community resistance to Al-Shabaab is strongest, and the government can be a force multiplier, as in eastern Hiraan. In cases where local engagement is less apparent, the government has struggled to advance. In this sense, the offensive might be characterised as a series of wars between clans and Al-Shabaab, with the government backing the former.

Al-Shabaab Adjusts to the Pressure

Al-Shabaab has suffered important losses in central Somalia, but it continues to put up significant resistance, showing the value it places on the region. An intelligence source told Crisis Group that the insurgency is likely to reinforce its fighters in central Somalia with personnel now stationed in the south, likely sending the wounded south to recuperate. Somali government officials say militants have defected, but not in significant numbers. Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab has sought to increase pressure on the government with large-scale attacks in Mogadishu and other cities, in addition to making regular incursions into areas the government has seized.

Al-Shabaab's flexibility suggests that the organisation is more likely to adapt to the government campaign than be defeated by it. For example, the group already appears to be changing its approach to the population in central Somalia, realising its coercive model for securing obedience has backfired. It has started offering more carrots than sticks, emphasising the need to promulgate the public good (maslaha) in its rhetoric, rather than exhorting communities to seek forgiveness (tauba) for having antagonised the group. This approach has borne fruit: in late December, in a setback for Mogadishu, a group of Salebaan elders in Galmudug reached a fresh agreement with Al-Shabaab

to avoid confrontation, withdrawing support for the government in return for the release of hostages and seized property.

The federal government's collaboration with the macawisley likely prompted Al-Shabaab's shift in tone. In the past, the group has been more willing to offer concessions to clans when it feels weak, only to roll them back later when it is in a stronger position. It remains to be seen if it will renege on its commitments this time, but Al-Shabaab likely realised it needed to change tack in order to maintain community relations.

Al-Shabaab has a track record of turning to guerrilla warfare when it is on the back foot and it has resorted to these tactics of late. Thus far, Somali forces have fought few major battles with the insurgents. The group prefers to preserve its strength, withdrawing from towns before the army's advance in favour of conducting hit-and-run attacks on recovered areas afterward. Sustained military pressure could certainly erode the group's capacity to act as a de facto authority in central Somalia. But Al-Shabaab's ability to exploit government weaknesses leads some observers to believe that the military cannot expect to quash the insurgency, even if it maintains a united front with the clan militias.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, we must continue to bring to this floor areas in the world where U.S. troops are present where there is no clear end game, where there is not an end state that is clearly achievable.

What our generation has learned as a consequence of observing the great patriotism expressed by many of my colleagues who participated in this debate today is that we don't have the ability to beat an ideology out of anyone. We don't have the ability to go into these places that oftentimes have been riddled with bloodshed and violence and somehow convince them that a democracy or a parliamentary system is more beneficial than the greed that has been driving them for far too long.

That is the story of the Middle East. That is the story of North Africa. If my constituents have to go to Somalia and Syria, then I think everyone here should have to vote one way or the other, and I don't expect to win that vote, but I was expecting probably during this discussion to maybe hear a little bit more about what it is that we expect these people to do in Somalia to ultimately get them out.

What we have heard is some version of the argument that we have got to fight them over there so we don't fight them over here, even though all the evidence in the RECORD suggests that they don't have the capability to even strike us here, and that the harboring of terrorism that seems to justify the 2001 AUMF permission slip for American intervention in no way relates to the activities, capabilities, goals, ambitions of this particular group.

What this group wants to do is they want to be able to overthrow the government in Somalia and orient greater Somalia under their sharia law, and they are losing in that fight.

What we see online and what many of us have received in briefings in Congress is that when U.S. troops are

present, that serves as a propaganda vehicle for a lot of these groups to be able to go out and recruit and add folks to their ranks, and that is certainly not what we want to see.

If the African Union had a greater role, if the African Union stepped up and worked to fill that vacuum with greater credibility with particular partners and particular localized clans, then that might achieve this objective in the absence of the death, the danger, and the deployment that has had our military spread far too thin for far too long.

Mr. Speaker, I heard in my colleague's opening that we have to reject the siren song of isolationism. I would observe that globalism is no lullaby. It is often soaked in blood and mired in civil war and violence, resulting in worse conditions than we found ourselves in.

There are 17 million Somalis. I am rooting for them. I hope that when my life ends, Somalia isn't synonymous with famine and failed states and civil wars and coups. I really hope that. However, we must also exercise sufficient humility in this body to understand the capabilities of persuasion for a relatively small batch of American troops given the problem set.

I return to the argument that I made earlier in this discussion. There is an opportunity cost to this in people. There are specific units that call my district home that are having to split between AFRICOM and INDOPACOM when the reality is whether or not our children are speaking Mandarin, our grandchildren are being dominated by the Chinese Communist Party is not going to be the result of who wins the battle of Mogadishu. It is going to be the result of who holds the high ground against our true pacing adversaries. Becoming the neighborhood block captain of Somalia is certainly not the behavior of a serious country engaged in various serious challenges against serious adversaries.

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues for their indulgence. I certainly thank the leadership for permitting me such time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time for the purpose of closing.

I, again, oppose this resolution because it is not an effective or constitutionally sound approach to resolving the war powers questions in Somalia that many of us here are, in fact, looking to address.

This resolution will harm U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa and make the American people less safe.

Mr. Speaker, I say to my colleagues who are serious about asserting Congress' constitutional role on issues of war and peace: I have some encouragement from this debate that we will have further debates talking about Congress' responsibility.

I look forward to joining with the gentleman from Florida where I heard

him talk about how climate change is affecting many of the areas on the continent. I look forward to working with him in that regard.

I look forward to working with him and hope that we can get the Speaker to bring over the repeal of the AUMF of 2002 that the Senate recently has voted on that we passed 2 years ago in the 117th Congress. I will come out of here looking at some areas on which we can work collectively.

I urge the gentleman to join me to talk and work so that we can repeal and replace the 2001 AUMF with a narrower and time-bound scope.

The issues we are discussing here today are pressing and relevant, but there is a better approach. I look forward to undertaking that approach with both of my colleagues on the floor and all of my colleagues on a bipartisan basis and hope that we will have this conversation and work closely together.

Let me also make a correction. I gave credit to General Kelly on the statement of if we don't put more money into diplomacy, we have got to spend more on bullets. That was General James Mattis. I want to make sure I give proper credit to the proper person in our military.

Let's work together. I think we have a real window of opportunity. The President of South Korea, who just gave a wonderful speech here, talked about how we won World War II and the Korean war together with our allies, saving democracies, putting our values first. Let's do it.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this resolution, and let's work together in a bipartisan manner, particularly to help the continent of Africa, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

Mr. Speaker, again, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GAETZ) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MILLS) are both very well-intentioned on this resolution today, and I firmly agree that Congress must reassert its Article I constitutional responsibility to declare war.

This body must replace the 22-year-old counterterrorism AUMF with an authorization that focuses specifically on the threats that we face today. Yes, it must be both time and event based because, frankly, when I heard Representative GAETZ, my colleague and a great patriot as well, mention this may not be a threat, I got shivers down my spine, and I remembered something when I heard former President Obama talk about ISIS as the JV team.

Under this administration, we have wide open borders, and frankly, it is a direct security threat. I am not comfortable taking our eye off the ball with an Al-Shabaab that is well funded that has designs on killing Americans.

This resolution, as a blanket statement, I do not believe accomplishes very specific, targeted time- and event-

based goals to keep Americans at home safe.

Our troop presence in Somalia is small, serving primarily in a training role. It has made critical national security gains. As I will mention again, I am a big Lions fan, and I learned growing up as a Lions fan that the reason we all knew the names of the offensive linemen is because our quarterbacks kept getting sacked. I learned very early that sometimes the best offensive linemen, the best small units are the ones you never know their name.

I believe that those nameless, faceless heroes all over the world in corners that the administration has not justified in 22 years deserve updated AUMFs with congressional authority and approval in order to justify their presence putting their lives on the line, being at risk, and being away from their families.

We all agree that the way we are doing things is wrong and must be fixed. Let's work together to fix it. We would not even be having this conversation if not for the courage of my colleagues to stand up and force the issue, so I personally thank them for forcing this debate. It is long overdue, and I am excited to do well by our servicemen and -women all over the country.

I again call on my colleagues to please join me in opposition to this resolution and commit to working with all of our colleagues to make sure that if the administration wants to send our men and women into harm's way, they better doggone well come to Congress first.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

□ 1345

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to the order of the House of Wednesday, April 26, 2023, the previous question is ordered on the concurrent resolution.

The question is on the adoption of the concurrent resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. GAETZ. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this question are postponed.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Ms. Byrd, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate has passed bills of the following titles in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 418. An act to provide financial assistance to schools impacted by radioactive contaminants, and for other purposes.

S. 1311. An act to reauthorize the Morris K. Udall and Stewart L. Udall Trust Fund, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate has agreed to a joint resolution of the following title in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S.J. Res. 11. Joint Resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Environmental Protection Agency relating to "Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards".

The message also announced that pursuant to Public Law 117-263, the Chair, on behalf of the Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, appoints the following individual to serve as a member of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy:

Mr. Mitchell Waldman of Virginia.

The message also announced that pursuant to Public Law 117-263, the Chair, on behalf of the Republican Leader, appoints the following individual to serve as a member of the National Commission on the Future of the Navy:

Ms. Mackenzie Eaglen of Virginia.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the House by Ms. Deirdre Kelly, one of his secretaries.

AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE READY RESERVE OF THE ARMED FORCES TO ACTIVE DUTY TO ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 118-35)

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and referred to the Committee on Armed Services and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

Effective today, pursuant to the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) and section 12302 of title 10, United States Code, and in order to respond to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14059 of December 15, 2021 (Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit Drug Trade), I am authorizing the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security to order to active duty such units and individual members of the Ready Reserve under the jurisdiction of the Secretary concerned as the Secretary concerned considers necessary, consistent with the terms of section 12302 of title 10, United States Code. The authorities that have been invoked will ensure the Department of Defense can properly sustain its support of the Department of Homeland Security concerning international drug trafficking along the Southwest Border.

A copy of the Executive Order I have issued is enclosed.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
THE WHITE HOUSE, April 27, 2023.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 12(a) of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Accordingly (at 1 o'clock and 46 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess.

□ 1600

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. ROUZER) at 4 p.m.

DIRECTING THE PRESIDENT, PURSUANT TO SECTION 5(C) OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, TO REMOVE ALL UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES, OTHER THAN UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ASSIGNED TO PROTECT THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY, FROM SOMALIA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the unfinished business is the vote on adoption of the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 30) directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove all United States Armed Forces, other than United States Armed Forces assigned to protect the United States Embassy, from Somalia, on which the yeas and nays were ordered.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on adoption of the concurrent resolution.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 102, nays 321, not voting 11, as follows:

[Roll No. 201]

YEAS—102

Auchincloss	Evans	Mooney
Barragan	Frost	Moore (AL)
Bean (FL)	Fry	Nadler
Beyer	Gaetz	Napolitano
Biggs	Garcia (IL)	Nehls
Bishop (NC)	Garcia, Robert	Norman
Blunt Rochester	Gomez	Ocasio-Cortez
Boebert	Good (VA)	Ogles
Bowman	Gosar	Omar
Brecheen	Greene (GA)	Pallone
Buck	Grijalva	Perez
Burchett	Hageman	Perry
Burgess	Harris	Pingree
Burlison	Hern	Pocan
Bush	Horsford	Posey
Cammack	Hoyle (OR)	Pressley
Carter (LA)	Hudson	Ramirez
Casar	Huffman	Rosendale
Chu	Jacobs	Roy
Clarke (NY)	Jayapal	Santos
Cline	Jordan	Scanlon
Cloud	Joyce (PA)	Schakowsky
Collins	Kelly (IL)	Schweikert
Comer	Khanna	Self
Crane	Lee (CA)	Spartz
Davidson	Lee (PA)	Steube
Davis (IL)	Luna	Thanedar
Deluzio	Luttrell	Tiffany
DeSaulnier	Mace	Tlaib
Dingell	Massie	Tokuda
Doggett	McClintock	Tonko
Donalds	McGovern	Trahan
Emmer	Miller (IL)	Van Drew
Espallat	Mills	Velázquez