[Pages H1163-H1171]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

PROTECTING AMERICANS FROM FOREIGN ADVERSARY CONTROLLED APPLICATIONS ACT

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules
and pass the bill (H.R. 7521) to protect the national security of the
United States from the threat posed by foreign adversary controlled
applications, such as TikTok and any successor application or service
and any other application or service developed or provided by ByteDance
Ltd. or an entity under the control of ByteDance Ltd., as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 7521

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Americans from
Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF FOREIGN ADVERSARY CONTROLLED
APPLICATIONS.

(a) In General.--
(1) Prohibition of foreign adversary controlled
applications.--It shall be unlawful for an entity to
distribute, maintain, or update (or enable the distribution,
maintenance, or updating of) a foreign adversary controlled
application by carrying out, within the land or maritime
borders of the United States, any of the following:
(A) Providing services to distribute, maintain, or update
such foreign adversary controlled application (including any
source code of such application) by means of a marketplace
(including an online mobile application store) through which
users within the land or maritime borders of the United
States may access, maintain, or update such application.
(B) Providing internet hosting services to enable the
distribution, maintenance, or updating of such foreign
adversary controlled application for users within the land or
maritime borders of the United States.
(2) Applicability.--Subsection (a) shall apply--
(A) in the case of an application that satisfies the
definition of a foreign adversary controlled application
pursuant to subsection (g)(3)(A), beginning on the date that
is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(B) in the case of an application that satisfies the
definition of a foreign adversary controlled application
pursuant to subsection (g)(3)(B), beginning on the date that
is 180 days after the date of the relevant determination of
the President under such subsection.
(b) Data and Information Portability to Alternative
Applications.--Before the date on which a prohibition under
subsection (a) applies to a foreign adversary controlled
application, the entity that owns or controls such
application shall provide, upon request by a user of such
application within the land or maritime borders of United
States, to such user all the available data related to the
account of such user with respect to such application. Such
data shall be provided in a machine readable format and shall
include any data maintained by such application with respect
to the account of such user, including content (including
posts, photos, and videos) and all other account information.
(c) Exemptions.--
(1) Exemptions for qualified divestitures.--Subsection
(a)--
(A) does not apply to a foreign adversary controlled
application with respect to which a qualified divestiture is
executed before the date on which a prohibition under
subsection (a) would begin to apply to such application; and
(B) shall cease to apply in the case of a foreign adversary
controlled application with respect to which a qualified
divestiture is executed after the date on which a prohibition
under subsection (a) applies to such application.
(2) Exemptions for certain necessary services.--Subsections
(a) and (b) do not apply to services provided with respect to
a foreign adversary controlled application that are necessary
for an entity to attain compliance with such subsections.
(d) Enforcement.--
(1) Civil penalties.--
(A) Foreign adversary controlled application violations.--
An entity that violates subsection (a) shall be subject to
pay a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed the amount
that results from multiplying $5,000 by the number of users
within the land or maritime borders of the United States
determined to have accessed, maintained, or updated a foreign
adversary controlled application as a result of such
violation.
(B) Data and information violations.--An entity that
violates subsection (b) shall be subject to pay a civil
penalty in an amount not to exceed the amount that results
from multiplying $500 by the number of users within the land
or maritime borders of the United States affected by such
violation.
(2) Actions by attorney general.--The Attorney General--
(A) shall conduct investigations related to potential
violations of subsection (a) or (b), and, if such an
investigation results in a determination that a violation has
occurred, the Attorney General shall pursue enforcement under
paragraph (1); and
(B) may bring an action in an appropriate district court of
the United States for appropriate relief, including civil
penalties under paragraph (1) or declaratory and injunctive
relief.
(e) Severability.--
(1) In general.--If any provision of this section or the
application of this section to any person or circumstance is
held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect the other
provisions or applications of this section that can be given
effect without the invalid provision or application.
(2) Subsequent determinations.--If the application of any
provision of this section is held invalid with respect to a
foreign adversary controlled application that satisfies the
definition of such term pursuant to subsection (g)(3)(A),
such invalidity shall not affect or preclude the application
of the same provision of this section to such foreign
adversary controlled application by means of a subsequent
determination pursuant to subsection (g)(3)(B).
(f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act may be
construed--
(1) to authorize the Attorney General to pursue
enforcement, under this section, other than enforcement of
subsection (a) or (b);
(2) to authorize the Attorney General to pursue
enforcement, under this section, against an individual user
of a foreign adversary controlled application; or
(3) except as expressly provided herein, to alter or affect
any other authority provided by or established under another
provision of Federal law.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Controlled by a foreign adversary.--The term
``controlled by a foreign adversary'' means, with respect to
a covered company or other entity, that such company or other
entity is--
(A) a foreign person that is domiciled in, is headquartered
in, has its principal place of business in, or is organized
under the laws of a foreign adversary country;
(B) an entity with respect to which a foreign person or
combination of foreign persons described in subparagraph (A)
directly or indirectly own at least a 20 percent stake; or
(C) a person subject to the direction or control of a
foreign person or entity described in subparagraph (A) or
(B).
(2) Covered company.--
(A) In general.--The term ``covered company'' means an
entity that operates, directly or indirectly (including
through a parent company, subsidiary, or affiliate), a
website, desktop application, mobile application, or
augmented or immersive technology application that--
(i) permits a user to create an account or profile to
generate, share, and view text, images, videos, real-time
communications, or similar content;
(ii) has more than 1,000,000 monthly active users with
respect to at least 2 of the 3 months preceding the date on
which a relevant determination of the President is made
pursuant to paragraph (3)(B);
(iii) enables 1 or more users to generate or distribute
content that can be viewed by other users of the website,
desktop application, mobile application, or augmented or
immersive technology application; and
(iv) enables 1 or more users to view content generated by
other users of the website, desktop application, mobile
application, or augmented or immersive technology
application.
(B) Exclusion.--The term ``covered company'' does not
include an entity that operates a website, desktop
application, mobile application, or augmented or immersive
technology application whose primary purpose is to allow
users to post product reviews, business reviews, or travel
information and reviews.
(3) Foreign adversary controlled application.--The term
``foreign adversary controlled application'' means a website,
desktop application, mobile application, or augmented or
immersive technology application that is operated, directly
or indirectly (including through a parent company,
subsidiary, or affiliate), by--
(A) any of--
(i) ByteDance, Ltd.;
(ii) TikTok;
(iii) a subsidiary of or a successor to an entity
identified in clause (i) or (ii) that is controlled by a
foreign adversary; or
(iv) an entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly,
by an entity identified in clause (i), (ii), or (iii); or
(B) a covered company that--
(i) is controlled by a foreign adversary; and
(ii) that is determined by the President to present a
significant threat to the national security of the United
States following the issuance of--

[[Page H1164]]

(I) a public notice proposing such determination; and
(II) a public report to Congress, submitted not less than
30 days before such determination, describing the specific
national security concern involved and containing a
classified annex and a description of what assets would need
to be divested to execute a qualified divestiture.

(4) Foreign adversary country.--The term ``foreign
adversary country'' means a country specified in section
4872(d)(2) of title 10, United States Code.
(5) Internet hosting service.--The term ``internet hosting
service'' means a service through which storage and computing
resources are provided to an individual or organization for
the accommodation and maintenance of 1 or more websites or
online services, and which may include file hosting, domain
name server hosting, cloud hosting, and virtual private
server hosting.
(6) Qualified divestiture.--The term ``qualified
divestiture'' means a divestiture or similar transaction
that--
(A) the President determines, through an interagency
process, would result in the relevant foreign adversary
controlled application no longer being controlled by a
foreign adversary; and
(B) the President determines, through an interagency
process, precludes the establishment or maintenance of any
operational relationship between the United States operations
of the relevant foreign adversary controlled application and
any formerly affiliated entities that are controlled by a
foreign adversary, including any cooperation with respect to
the operation of a content recommendation algorithm or an
agreement with respect to data sharing.
(7) Source code.--The term ``source code'' means the
combination of text and other characters comprising the
content, both viewable and nonviewable, of a software
application, including any publishing language, programming
language, protocol, or functional content, as well as any
successor languages or protocols.
(8) United states.--The term ``United States'' includes the
territories of the United States.

SEC. 3. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

(a) Right of Action.--A petition for review challenging
this Act or any action, finding, or determination under this
Act may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.
(b) Exclusive Jurisdiction.--The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over any challenge to this Act or any
action, finding, or determination under this Act.
(c) Statute of Limitations.--A challenge may only be
brought--
(1) in the case of a challenge to this Act, not later than
165 days after the date of the enactment of this Act; and
(2) in the case of a challenge to any action, finding, or
determination under this Act, not later than 90 days after
the date of such action, finding, or determination.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from
Washington (Mrs. Rodgers) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
Pallone) each will control 20 minutes.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in actual opposition to the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from New Jersey opposed to
the motion?
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, no.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New Jersey is not opposed
to the motion.
The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Massie) will control 20 minutes in
opposition.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Washington (Mrs. Rodgers).

General Leave

Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend
their remarks and include extraneous material in the Record on the
bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Washington?
There was no objection.
Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as
I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 7521, the Protecting
Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act.
Foreign adversaries, like the Chinese Communist Party, pose the
greatest national security threat of our time. TikTok's access to 177
million American users makes it a valuable propaganda tool for the CCP
to exploit.
Over the past week, we saw in real time how CCP-controlled TikTok
used its influence and power to force users to contact their
Representatives if they even wanted to continue using the app. This is
just a small taste of how the CCP weaponizes applications it controls
to manipulate tens of millions of people to further its agenda.
Today's legislation will end this abuse by preventing apps controlled
by foreign adversaries from targeting, surveilling, and manipulating
the American people. We have given TikTok a clear choice: Separate from
your parent company, ByteDance, which is beholden to the CCP, and
remain operational in the United States, or side with the CCP and face
the consequences. The choice is TikTok's.
Companies controlled by a foreign adversary, like the CCP, will never
embrace American values like the freedom of speech, human rights, the
rule of law, and a free press. If given the choice, they will always
choose the path of more control, more surveillance, and more
manipulation. In the case of TikTok, we wouldn't even know it.
Today, we send a clear message that we will not tolerate our
adversaries weaponizing our freedoms against us.
Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support this bill, and I
reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I know the sponsors of this bill are sincere in their
concerns and in their effort to protect Americans. They have described
the TikTok application as a Trojan horse, but there are some of us who
feel that, either intentionally or unintentionally, this legislation to
ban TikTok is actually a Trojan horse. Some of us are concerned that
there are First Amendment implications here.
Americans have the right to view information. We don't need to be
protected by the government from information. Some of us just don't
want the President picking which apps we can put on our phones or which
websites we can visit. We don't think that is appropriate.
We also think it is dangerous to give the President that kind of
power, to give him the power to decide what Americans can see on their
phones and on their computers. To give him that sort of discretion, we
also think, is dangerous.
People say that this TikTok ban will only apply to TikTok or maybe
another company that pops up just like TikTok, but the bill is written
so broadly that the President could abuse that discretion and include
other companies that aren't just social media companies and that
aren't, as some people would believe, controlled by foreign
adversaries. Again, we are giving the President that discretion to
decide whether it is controlled by a foreign adversary.
There were some people who were legitimately concerned that this was
an overly broad bill, and they got an exclusion written into the bill
that I want to read. It says: ``The term `covered company' does not
include an entity that operates a website . . . or . . . application
whose primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews,
business reviews, or travel information and reviews.''
Why is this exception in the bill? Why did somebody feel like they
needed this exception if the bill itself only covers social media
applications that foreign adversaries are running? These and other
questions we hope to answer in the course of this debate, and I reserve
the balance of my time.
Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone) and ask unanimous consent that
he be permitted to control that time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Washington?
There was no objection.
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 7521, the Protecting Americans
from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act.
Big Tech has transformed social media platforms into modern-day media
companies. Unfortunately, these networks engage in invasive
surveillance practices by collecting Americans' most sensitive personal
data.
Foreign adversaries also see access to Americans' data communication
networks, devices, and applications as the entry points to disrupt our
daily lives and conduct espionage activities. All of this endangers our
national security interests.

We have a long history of restricting our television and radio
airwaves from ownership by foreign governments and

[[Page H1165]]

individuals due to the national security concerns that these
arrangements pose. Social media companies should also face similar
scrutiny. After all, while technology has evolved, the threats are very
much the same.
I also take the concerns raised by the intelligence community very
seriously. They have asked Congress to give them more authority to act
in narrowly defined situations. I believe this bill would do just that
by addressing the national security risks posed by applications
operated by companies controlled by foreign adversaries.
While this bill establishes a national security framework that could
apply to other applications, much of the public attention has focused
on TikTok. The combination of TikTok's Beijing Communist-based
ownership and the fact that over 170 million Americans use it
exacerbates its dangers to our country and our privacy.
Laws in China allow the Chinese Communist Party to compel companies
like TikTok to share data with them whether the companies want to or
not. This means the CCP has the ability with TikTok to compromise
device security, maliciously access Americans' data, promote pro-
Communist propaganda, and undermine our Nation's interests.
This is extremely troubling. Beijing, China, should not have the
control over Americans that TikTok gives them. It is my hope that, if
enacted, this legislation will force divestment of TikTok so that
Americans will be able to continue to use this platform without the
risk that it is being operated and controlled by Beijing, China.
However, even if TikTok is divested, China and other foreign
adversaries will still be able to acquire vast amounts of Americans'
data. That is because we place no restrictions on who data brokers can
sell data to, and that must stop as well. I look forward to the House
considering next week legislation that I introduced with Chair Rodgers
that would stop this from happening.
We must begin to hold Big Tech accountable for transforming the
information superhighway into a superspreader of harmful content,
invasive surveillance practices, and addictive and damaging design
features, all with the goal of collecting more data. We must enact a
comprehensive data privacy bill so that we finally give Americans
control over how their data is used and collected.
I thank Representatives Krishnamoorthi and Gallagher for their
bipartisan work on this bill, which unanimously passed out of the
Energy and Commerce Committee last week, and I urge my colleagues to
support H.R. 7521.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to
the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Gallagher).
Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, TikTok is a threat to our national
security because it is owned by ByteDance, which does the bidding of
the Chinese Communist Party. We know this because ByteDance leadership
says so and because Chinese law requires it.
This bill, therefore, would force TikTok to break up with the Chinese
Communist Party. It does not apply to American companies. It only
applies to companies subject to the control of foreign adversaries
defined by Congress. It says nothing about election interference and
cannot be turned against any American social media platform.
It does not impact websites in general. The only impacted sites are
those associated with foreign adversary apps, such as TikTok.com.
It can never be used to penalize individuals. The text explicitly
prohibits that.
It cannot be used to censor speech. It takes no position at all on
the content of speech, only foreign adversary control, foreign
adversary control of what is becoming the dominant news platform for
Americans under 30.
Mr. Speaker, this is a commonsense measure to protect our national
security, and I urge my colleagues to support this critical bipartisan
legislation.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Krishnamoorthi), who is the Democratic sponsor of the
bill.
Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Mr. Speaker, I thank Ranking Member Pallone; Mr.
Gallagher, my partner on this bill; Chairwoman McMorris Rodgers; and
all the members of the select committee.
First, this bill is not a ban, and it is not about TikTok. It is
about ByteDance. Let me tell you about ByteDance. ByteDance is a 100-
percent owner of TikTok. ByteDance is controlled by the Chinese
Communist Party.
In fact, the editor in chief of ByteDance is the secretary of the
Chinese Communist Party cell embedded at the very highest ranks of the
company. He has been charged with making sure that TikTok and all
products of ByteDance adhere to ``correct political direction.''
This particular bill ensures that ByteDance divests itself of the
vast majority of the ownership of TikTok. Our intention is for TikTok
to continue to operate but not under the control of the Chinese
Communist Party.
Secondly, this divestment requirement is not new. It is not without
precedent. When the app Grindr, a popular LGBTQ app, was acquired by a
Chinese company and the United States Government determined that
sensitive data of LGBTQ members of the military and U.S. Government
officials got into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, they
required divestment.
This happened quickly. Why? Because Grindr was a very valuable social
media company. The same is true with regard to TikTok. There will be no
disruption to users, just as there was with Grindr.

The third point, unfortunately, when TikTok has appeared before
Congress, whether it is before the House Energy and Commerce Committee
or otherwise, it has not been candid.
First, TikTok has said its data is not accessible to China-based
ByteDance employees. False. China-based employees routinely access this
data, even unbeknownst to employees of TikTok USA.
In addition, TikTok said its data will not be weaponized and has not
been weaponized against American citizens. Again, false. Published
reports have shown that TikTok data, geolocation data, has been used to
surveil American journalists who reported on problems with Chinese-
based employees having access to American user data.
Finally, last week, under the leadership of the chairwoman and the
ranking member, they brought up for consideration our bill before the
House Energy and Commerce Committee. On the morning of that vote,
TikTok delivered a push notification and a popup to thousands of user
across the country. They used geolocation data targeting minor children
to then force them to call congressional offices in order to continue
using the app. In doing so, these children called and asked the
question: What is Congress, and what is a Congressman? This influence
campaign illustrates the need for this bill.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Davidson), a data privacy champion.
Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time.
Mr. Speaker, I think it is important we solve the right problem. The
gentleman from New Jersey, who isn't actually opposed to the bill,
seems to have identified the real issue, which is data privacy. I think
it is important that we solve the correct problem.
Our problem with all these companies, social media and otherwise--
your car, your phone, you name it--is surveillance. The spying that
goes on of American citizens does need to be addressed, and it should
be addressed by the Energy and Commerce Committee.

{time} 0930

I have long pleaded with Members of both sides of the aisle to pass
H.R. 4639 to reclaim the privacy rights that are so deeply infringed in
our country, and by avoiding that problem, we take away the energy and
momentum to address the root issue.
Frankly, the people sponsoring this bill today claim that the real
issue is ownership.
Nonetheless, who owns this company?

[[Page H1166]]

It is not 100 percent owned by ByteDance. Mr. Speaker, 60 percent of
it is owned by investors, including American investors; 20 percent is
owned by the founders; and 20 percent is owned by employees, over 7,000
employees. The company's headquarters is not in China, it is in
Singapore. The American user data isn't housed in China, it is housed
in Texas controlled by a database owned by Oracle.
The administration seems to believe that they can ban the export of
Americans' sensitive data not just on TikTok but on all platforms
because they just issued an executive order banning the export.
Now, I wish this were the bill that Pramila Jayapal and I have
sponsored that we were moving, the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale
Act. It passed Judiciary, but its complement to prevent foreigners from
buying it would also address the privacy concerns.
So if we think we can address the privacy concerns, then what is left
to address?
Frankly, it is content moderation.
Mr. Speaker, do you remember before Elon Musk bought the crime scene
at Twitter? It was all a conspiracy theory that these algorithms were
silencing and canceling people. You guys are crazy.
No. When Elon Musk bought Twitter he did keep it operating with 80
percent fewer employees, but what we found is a lot of the employees
were trying to do content moderation, shape who sees what and how they
see it, which algorithms are used, and how does it promote certain
people and filter others.
So, really, Mr. Speaker, what you are saying here is that if you are
not fully engaged with America's three-letter agencies in content
moderation, we plan to TikTok you.
Moreover, this bill isn't just limited to TikTok. It is a coercive
power that can be applied to others, apps like Telegram and TUR. Things
that provide privacy would be targeted by this bill--perhaps Tether,
one of the things that they can't control as a monetary system.
When you look at companies, Mr. Speaker, if it enables one user to
see content that isn't approved, it is subject to a $500 million fine
per user.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the
gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. DAVIDSON. Mr. Speaker, this is meant to be able to take out
anything, including email where its one user sees it. So it could
target an infinite number of companies, but not an infinite number of
places.
So, for that, I do applaud the work that was done to back off from
the dystopian RESTRICT Act, but this is essentially a downpayment on
the RESTRICT Act. I encourage everyone to look up the RESTRICT Act.
This is what the administration really wanted to do. What Members of
Congress on both sides of the aisle wanted to do is to create a bigger
surveillance state, and that is what the Intel Committee wants to do
with FISA, is to make it bigger. We have to shrink it and protect our
Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, it is not true that this is
a downpayment on the RESTRICT Act--not interested in the RESTRICT Act.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Latta).
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, the CEO of TikTok appeared before the Energy
and Commerce Committee and admitted to me during questioning that
ByteDance has access to U.S. user data.
This should be an alarm to every TikTok user. There is no reason why
the Chinese Communist Party should be in control of an app that can
access information on a user's phone. Moreover, because companies who
are owned or linked to the Chinese Communist Party are forced to comply
with their laws, ByteDance and its employees are taking orders from
this Communist regime.
This is not a ban, but it provides Communist China-controlled
ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, a choice. If ByteDance divests
their ownership of TikTok, then TikTok would be available to its U.S.
users.
Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi), the Speaker Emerita.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and for
his leadership on this very important issue. I thank the distinguished
chairwoman of the Energy and Commerce Committee and associate myself
with her remarks as well as with Mr. Pallone. I thank Mr.
Krishnamoorthi and Chairman Gallagher of the Select Committee on China
for their great leadership bringing this legislation forward to the
committee of legislative jurisdiction.
Mr. Speaker, I have a few points to make, and it is interesting to
hear this respectful debate.
First of all, this is not a ban on TikTok. I am a grandmother of
teenagers. I understand the entertainment value, the educational value,
the communication value, and the business value for some businesses on
this. This is not an attempt to ban TikTok. It is an attempt to make
TikTok better, tic-tac-toe, a winner.
Here is what I have to say: The people of China have come forth. The
Tibetans have come forth and said on TikTok that in China they are
suppressed. They cannot put their message out. Not only that, but the
Chinese Government misrepresents the situation in Tibet.
Let me just tell you about Hong Kong, Mr. Speaker. During the Hong
Kong election, TikTok TikToked into Taiwan that the Uyghurs on whom
there is a genocide exercised by the Chinese Government, they have told
the people in Taiwan that the Uyghurs like that genocide, and they told
them that the people of Hong Kong liked the destruction of their
democracy. They don't frame it that way, but that is their message.
Again, they are suppressing the communications from Tibet.

Then, just yesterday on the steps, we heard from the Taiwan people,
we heard from the Tibetans, we heard from Hong Kong, and we heard from
a woman whose husband was arrested because of his communications with
somebody with a shared view.
So this is controlled by the Chinese Communist Government. I can't
forget this.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the
gentlewoman from California.
Ms. PELOSI. Forgetting that, if you can--Mr. Speaker, I can't--think
of this: The Chinese Government will control the algorithm, and they
can change it any time in the United States.
Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``yes'' vote.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
North Carolina (Mr. Bishop), who is my friend and fellow colleague on
the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. BISHOP of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, this is not the first time
that restricting speech has been pursued in the interests of national
security. In fact, in 5 days' time, next Monday, I will go to the
Supreme Court for the first time where I will attend an oral argument
in the case of Murphy v. Missouri.
It is a case where agents from the White House, the Department of
Justice, and other Federal agencies embedded themselves with American
social media companies to manipulate what could appear on social media:
expression by the American people.
It has been described by the lower court as the most massive attack
on free speech in U.S. history.
Even as that pends for a decision by the Supreme Court, Congress
would in this legislation say, in effect: Hold my beer.
I don't use TikTok. I think it is ill-advised to do so. Members of
this body are famous on TikTok, and I think that is unwise. Be that as
it may, I respect the choices of 170 million users in the United
States.
The Trump administration attempted to ban TikTok in 2020. It was held
that it couldn't do so in two court decisions because under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, he is subject to the
Berman amendment, passed in 1988 by this body, to provide that in the
interest of dealing with hostile foreign powers, the President can do
all sorts of things

[[Page H1167]]

with respect to commerce, but he cannot ban the free flow of
information across international boundaries.
I have heard that described as a gap in the law, but it is a feature.
It is not a bug.
This legislation cannot be described as other than receding from the
Berman amendment. That principle in American law--which did not, by the
way, emerge from the brow of Representative Berman in 1988--was
predicated on a much earlier principle of First Amendment law
established in 1965 by the United States Supreme Court in the case
Lamont v. Postmaster General which said the American people have a
First Amendment right of access to foreign propaganda.
At first, it may be remarkable or strike one as odd to hear that.
However, it is because the proper relationship between government and
citizen in the United States is that the citizen decides what to be
exposed to and what ideologies to embrace and consider and is always
free to engage in expression including across international boundaries.
That remains the prevailing constitutional law today.
It begs this question: How could it be that Congress should be
working hard to devise a means to circumvent that prevailing principle
of the First Amendment against the use of a particular means of
expression by 170 million Americans?
Isn't it ironic that the technical advisers in the construction of
this legislation to design it so that it can get around legislation
challenges, including isolating litigation challenges to 180 days and
only in the court of appeals in the District of Columbia, those
technical advisers are the same folks at the Department of Justice who
devised that plan to embed agents of the Department of Justice and
other Federal agencies with social media platforms in the United States
to restrict what Americans could say online.
Mr. Speaker, America confronts a grave challenge in China, and it
will not prevail by becoming more like them.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the
gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Guthrie).
Mr. GUTHRIE. Mr. Speaker, I want to emphasize this bill does not ban
TikTok. It simply would require the Chinese Communist Party-affiliated
ByteDance to sell TikTok and divest their interest.
I was asked: Does this affect TikTok?
No. It is any foreign adversary or any app that is owned, controlled,
or unduly influenced by any foreign adversary.
We must protect our national security and help keep America's private
data out of the hands of our foreign adversaries.
Mr. Speaker, I urge support of this bill.
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Eshoo), who is a member of the committee.
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member of the Energy and
Commerce Committee for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 7521, the Protecting
Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act.
This bill will ensure the divestiture of TikTok from its People's
Republic of China-controlled parent company, ByteDance.
Why is it essential for Congress to do this?
It is because the PRC controls ByteDance, and this presents a serious
national security threat to our country.

TikTok has 170 million-plus U.S. users, and it collects tremendous
amounts of sensitive data. They also collect substantial background
data that may be proprietary which may only be available to TikTok.
The national security law of the PRC requires all Chinese
organizations to ``support, assist, and cooperate with national
intelligence efforts.'' Under this law, ByteDance could be compelled by
the Chinese Government to provide data on every American TikTok user.
They can weaponize this data to exploit and manipulate Americans
through surveillance and disinformation.
This legislation separates TikTok's data, algorithms, and source code
from ByteDance.
Importantly, this bill does not ban TikTok, something I do not
support.
I support divestiture because our first and most important
responsibility as Members of Congress is to defend our Constitution and
protect and defend the United States of America. The bill would also
give Americans secure ownership of their data, including posts, photos,
and videos, and give this administration and future administrations the
authority to respond to future national security threats.
For all these reasons, I urge all my colleagues to vote for this
legislation in the name of our national security.

{time} 0945

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New Jersey's time has
expired.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Georgia (Ms. Greene).
Ms. GREENE of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as the only Member
of Congress that has ever been banned by social media.
On January 2, 2022, Twitter banned me, banned my personal account on
which I was campaigning for Congress, raising money, and using my free
speech to inform the voters in my district they can vote for me.
This was not done by a company owned by China. That was done by
American-owned Twitter. This came on the heels of our own United States
Government working with Big Tech and working with social media
companies to censor and ban Americans' free speech.
I believe that this bill can cause future problems. It is opening
Pandora's box, and I am opposed to this bill.
Most Americans don't trust the United States Government because of
our experience dealing with it. Never forget that the United States
Government also was the one that provided the Russia hoax to Americans.
It also worked to ban Americans' free speech. It also has worked in so
many ways to illegally spy on Americans through FISA without a warrant.
If we wanted to be serious about stopping a foreign adversary, if we
wanted to be serious about stopping China, we would stop China from
buying our U.S. farmland. We would raise up our American energy
independence. We would also stop the Green New Deal and not rely on
China who owns and operates 85 percent of the battery market worldwide.
There are dangers that lie ahead in this. This is really about
controlling Americans' data. If we cared about Americans' data, then we
would stop the sale of Americans' data universally, not just with
China.
There is some further issues. This is a Pandora's box. What is to
stop Congress or the United States Government in the future from
forcing the sale of another social media company claiming that it is
protecting Americans' data from foreign adversaries.
I think we can see in the future another Russia, Russia, Russia, and
possibly force the sale of X as many Members in this body claim that
Elon Musk is altering the algorithms of X.
By the way, it was Elon Musk's purchase of X that restored my social
media account on Twitter and allowed me to have my free speech back on
Twitter.
There are also Democrat Members of this body claiming that election
meddling can happen on social media.
Well, we can never forget Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook. We can never
forget the election meddling that happened there. By the way, American-
owned Facebook and Instagram is where most of the garbage like the
gender lies and the woke lies exist.
Many Americans and many teenagers believe awful things and they don't
just see them on TikTok, they see them on Facebook and Instagram, too.
I don't think this will accomplish what the goal is to accomplish.
The other concern is that when the government moves in to force the
sale of TikTok, who is going to buy it? That is the question that we
should be asking. Who is going to buy it? Who will be the next to
control the data of over 170 million Americans? Are we going to trust
Mark Zuckerberg to control their data? I certainly don't.
By the way, most of the time, my posts on Facebook are shadow banned,
and I certainly don't have the reach on that social media account.

[[Page H1168]]

I think that there are many other ways to protect data, and I think
this body is capable of it if we choose to do it.
Mr. Speaker, I oppose the bill.
Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Roy).
Mr. ROY. Mr. Speaker, we are in a cold war with China and some of my
colleagues want to ignore this fact. We have legislation before us that
is 12 pages long.
The bill is not a ban. It forces foreign adversaries, including
Chinese Communists, to divest. The bill is not a bill of attainder; it
is prospective, not retrospective.
The bill does not violate the First Amendment. It focuses on conduct,
not content. It requires both being controlled by a foreign adversary
and conduct that itself is espionage. If you just had one alone, it
might be debatable, as the gentleman from North Carolina or Senator
Paul notes, in that it might protect Americans' rights to seek out and
obtain foreign propaganda. However, again, that is not this case
because we have, and have as a trigger in the bill, demonstrated
national security conduct harm.
To be clear, we have properly taken action at the device layer by
banning Huawei and ZTE spy gear. We have taken action at the carrier
level, prohibiting China Mobile and China Telecom from connecting to
our networks based on a determination they are controlled by the CCP
and a national security threat.
We now need to take action at the application level when malign CCP
control has been demonstrated lest we render meaningless our past
actions to protect the United States of America.
We should ban Chicom ownership of our farmland or drug manufacturing,
but we should fight them here and ban the foreign ownership and control
of American data and stop apologizing for the Chinese Communists.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Robert Garcia), my friend on the other side of the
aisle.
Mr. ROBERT GARCIA of California. Mr. Speaker, I have enormous respect
for the efforts of my colleagues to focus on security and data
protection and I share many of their concerns; however, I disagree with
this approach and this bill that could impact 170 million Americans who
use TikTok.
One-third of all U.S. adults use the app and millions of
entrepreneurs and small business owners use the platform to support
their family.

Yes, just like every other social media platform, there is
misinformation and privacy concerns on TikTok, and I share those;
however, it is important that we don't treat TikTok differently than
other platforms.
If we are going to address this issue, we have to take the same
approach to all social media platforms. We can't just single out one.
I join many of my colleagues and the ACLU in voicing concern over the
freedom of expression. I am a strong supporter of ensuring that TikTok
remains an open marketplace. There is no guarantee in this bill that
there won't be an interruption of service that could lead to an end of
this app. I don't think we fully appreciate the impact this is going to
have. Mr. Speaker, I am a strong ``no.''
Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Bucshon).
Mr. BUCSHON. Mr. Speaker, one of the most important duties the
Constitution assigns to Congress is to protect the American people and
to safeguard our national security.
After hearing from national security experts last week, it is clear
the prolific use of media platforms controlled by the Chinese Communist
Party and other foreign adversaries poses a danger to our country.
I am grateful to my bipartisan colleagues for moving this
legislation, showing we will take action to protect the American people
by protecting their personal data and security from foreign
interference and manipulation. We took an oath to do so.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Kamlager-Dove), my friend on the other side of the
aisle.
Ms. KAMLAGER-DOVE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to oppose H.R. 7521.
Banning TikTok is an insufficient Band-Aid solution to the genuine
national security concerns the app raises and exposes. The bill
seriously undermines civil liberties by essentially banning a platform
that 150 million Americans use to engage in free speech and expression.
A statewide TikTok ban has already been paused by a Federal judge on
First Amendment grounds.
Even without TikTok, the PRC could still be able to conduct influence
operations on other social media platforms and obtain sensitive U.S.
user data through hacking or data brokers.
Finally, this bill would greatly expand the executive's authority to
ban tech companies with zero congressional oversight. I cannot sign a
blank check to some future President who would easily and dangerously
weaponize this legislation to profit and silence.
The creatives, artists, content creators, and businesses in my
district will get caught in the cross fire of this bill, and deserve
better than Federal overreach as a substitute for a thoughtful and
incisive solution to this complicated national security challenge.
Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 40 seconds to the
gentlewoman from Iowa (Mrs. Hinson).
Mrs. HINSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this simple
bill. It forces TikTok to cut ties with the CCP or lose American users.
The day after we introduced our bill, TikTok went into panic mode.
They lied to their users saying Congress was going to ban TikTok, using
young kids as political pawns.
TikTok's gross stunt proved our point. What if on election day,
TikTok sent out an alert saying our elections were canceled. We must
act now.
Today, we are sending a message to the CCP that we are going to
deflate the 140 million spy balloons that they have installed on
American phones. We must act and pass this bill today.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Cammack).
Mrs. CAMMACK. Mr. Speaker, today, we take a stand against the Chinese
Communist Party and their efforts to turn content creators in America
into foot soldiers for the CCP.
We aren't banning a company, as the highest paid lobbyist for
ByteDance, which is owned by China, would lead you to believe. We
aren't infringing on constitutionally protected speech or growing the
size of government.
All we are saying is break up with the Chinese Communist Party. As a
constitutional conservative, I don't want my government or Big Tech to
have unfettered access to my private data, so why in the hell would we
want and allow the Chinese Communist Party to have access to our
private data?
The CCP is an adversary of the United States, and this legislation
narrowly, thoughtfully, and directly addresses the national security
threat and protects Americans' data and, by extension, their First
Amendment rights, because let us not pretend for one second that TikTok
is not infringing on our First Amendment rights.
I would say, as Representative Roy from Texas said, this bill is
about conduct, not content.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mrs. CAMMACK. There is no restriction mentioned on content in this
bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mrs. CAMMACK. But I will mention, Mr. Speaker, that the espionage is
not covered or protected as one of the five tenets of the First
Amendment.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman is no longer recognized.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to my good friend from
Arizona (Mr. Schweikert).
Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Speaker, I actually am about to try to make
everyone mad. I actually believe data is a private property right. It
belongs to you as an American citizen. The problem with our design
here, it is really well-meaning, but it doesn't get at the
structural problem.

Let's say you have an entity over here that divests. What makes them
not then take the data, sell it to a data broker, and it gets washed
and ends up still in the bad actors' hands?
You have to understand, there is even articles out this week of even
our

[[Page H1169]]

own three-letter agencies buying their data now from data brokers
instead of doing the tracking.
We need to think dramatically more globally. Your data is a private
property right. That will be the only way we end up protecting
ourselves from bad actors and sometimes even our own selves.
Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Walberg).
Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, last March when I asked about Americans'
data being stored and accessed by China, TikTok CEO stated under oath
that it was not accessible by the CCP. However, this statement was a
lie. As their own internal recording said, ``everything is seen in
China.''
H.R. 7521 gives TikTok and similar apps 6 months to divest from their
parent company ByteDance. It is their choice. TikTok needs to decide
whether they value their users or their ties to the Chinese Communist
Party more. It is as simple as that. I urge a vote for this bill.

{time} 1000

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to
close.
Mr. Speaker, I know the other side is sincere. We have not questioned
that here today, and I won't question their sincerity.
In fact, I think they have identified at least three problems that we
have in America: moral decay of our society, invasion of Americans'
privacy, and our competitiveness with China. However, in this case,
their cure is worse than the diseases.
There are ways to get at these root problems. We just haven't taken
it upon ourselves to address those root problems with actual
legislative solutions that have been put forth here in Congress.
For instance, Mr. Warren Davidson's Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale
Act would put a strong stake in the ground to protect Americans'
privacy, whether it is from our own government or some foreign
governments. That is the kind of thing we need.
We need warrants in the FISA program. Our government shouldn't be
able to spy on Americans without a warrant, yet they are. Let's bring
that to the floor and vote on it.
These are the kinds of cures we need, not the bill that is offered
here today.
The bill that is offered here today, even though I know it is offered
genuinely, could also be named the Facebook protection and enhancement
act because it is not the American people who are going to benefit most
from this. It will be Facebook. Their stock is going to go up if this
bill should pass the Senate.
What are some ways that we could improve this bill? It should at
least have a sunset. That is the only reason we are able to debate
whether FISA should have warrants in it, because it sunsets. What have
we observed? FISA has been abused.
That is my concern with this TikTok ban. It will be abused. If it is
just banning TikTok and ByteDance and copies of that, why does it need
to be 13 pages long?
I know they say it doesn't ban it, but it forces divestiture of the
company. This sounds like when American companies try to do business in
Third World countries and a dictator says: You can do business here.
You just have to give me your company, and now you can continue to do
business.
We wouldn't let another country take over Ford Motor Company for
selling Ford cars in their country, yet that is what we are wanting to
do here.
Again, this is a cure that is worse than the disease. Who is going to
be prosecuted by this bill? Is it ByteDance or TikTok? Will they be
taken to court? No. They are the target of this, but how do you elicit
or effect a ban on them? By prosecuting Americans.
The only way my colleagues can ban TikTok and the other companies
from being here is to say what this bill says, which is the government
will bring a civil action suit against you if you so much as host them
here. If you have an app store that allows them to be here, and you are
an American or an American company, you will be the target of this
bill. Those are the only people who can be pursued under this bill. I
know it is in order to go after TikTok, or so they say.
I close by saying that we are sitting here with phones made in China.
We are wearing suits made in China. We drove cars here with chips that
are made in China.
They are a foreign adversary, and, by golly, we are going to do
something about it. What are we going to do? My colleagues are going to
tell Americans they can't put a piece of software on their computer and
can't go to certain websites that the President designates.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose this well-intentioned
bill because it will have bad consequences, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remainder of my
time to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Crenshaw).
Mr. CRENSHAW. Mr. Speaker, I want to address all of my colleagues who
I think are confused about the First Amendment, confused about the
nature of TikTok, and confused about the intentions of the Chinese
Communist Party.
Let me explain this very simply. TikTok is owned by ByteDance.
ByteDance is in China, and when you are in China, you have to do
whatever the Chinese Communist Party says you have to do. That is
according to the National Intelligence Law passed in 2017. If they want
you to spy for them, you will spy for them. That is how that works.
They have a board member from the Chinese Communist Party on
ByteDance. My colleagues wouldn't allow a radio tower owned by the
Chinese to be put up right in the middle of Washington, D.C., and then
allow it to put out Chinese propaganda. My colleagues would probably
complain about that.
That is exactly what TikTok can be used for because millions of
Americans are addicted to it. They see it, and the Chinese can
absolutely manipulate those algorithms.
The First Amendment does not give the Chinese Communist Party the
right to American data or the right to manipulate the minds of
Americans. That would be a really weird interpretation of the First
Amendment.
The primary counterarguments to this bill seem to be as shallow as it
doesn't do everything I want, and Facebook is really mean, and I don't
want them to make money. Does that mean we owe the Chinese access to
all of our data and access to manipulate the minds of Americans? I
don't think so.
This is a very specific bill, very specifically tailored. It does not
harm American companies or American individuals. You know it. You have
to read it. Pass this bill.
Mrs. RODGERS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of
my time.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me
in supporting H.R. 7521, the Protecting Americans from Foreign
Adversary Controlled Applications Act, a bipartisan bill introduced by
our colleagues Mike Gallagher and Raja Krishnamoorthi.
It is aimed at countering the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to
sway public opinion in its favor--especially that of the younger
generation--through the use of the social media app TikTok, as well as
to counter the use of the app to collect data on Americans.
Indeed, just this last week we saw a real time demonstration of the
insidious use of TikTok: the targeting of American children with
Communist Party propaganda--during school hours--and the recruiting of
minors to act unwittingly as foreign agents of the Chinese Communist
Party.
On March 7, members of Congress--including me--were inundated with a
phone call advocacy campaign that utilized children while we were
debating the efforts of the CCP to sabotage the American economy. And
the CCP connection with TikTok and its Chinese parent is something that
is very tangible.
TikTok's parent ByteDance, headquartered in Bejing, is compelled to
participate in a strategic partnership with the Chinese Ministry of
Public Security.
Indeed, under China's Cybersecurity Law, companies are required to
provide any information asked for to police or intelligence agencies.
One former ByteDance official, Yintao Yu, has said that the CCP has
access to all the company's data--including data stored in the U.S.
Indeed TikTok has conceded as much--just look at the company's
privacy policy, which says it can share user data with ByteDance and
various governments around the world if required: ``We may disclose any
of the Information we collect to respond to . . . government
inquires,'' as well as to ``comply with any applicable law.''

[[Page H1170]]

We also know that the CCP has punished executives and companies that
do not tow the Party line--just ask Jack Ma, one of the richest men in
the world, what happens when you buck the Party.
Indeed, ByteDance, like many Chinese companies, has an internal
Communist Party Committee within its corporate structure, which is led
by ByteDance Vice President Zhang Fuping.
So what is TikTok's response to all this?
After being deluged with phone calls in my office, that very day, I
wrote to TikTok, at their American headquarters in Culver City,
California, asking them to provide all internal documentation relating
to the ``genesis, approval and execution of the advocacy campaign
initiated by TikTok on March 7,'' so that Congress may determine the
role of the CCP in recruiting children to lobby Congress on its behalf.
Four days later, TikTok Vice President for Public Policy Michael
Beckerman responded, with piratical defiance, claiming that
congressional interest in this issue was ``offensive'' and ``patently
false.''
Really? You don't think that this is an issue that is in the national
interest?
We shall see about that.
I will vote in favor of H.R. 7521 and urge my colleagues to do the
same.
Mr. DUNN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, a year ago, I asked TikTok CEO Shou
Zi Chew point blank if ByteDance, its parent company, has spied on
Americans on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party.
He told me: ``I don't think spying is the right way to describe it.''
Congress has overwhelming evidence that TikTok collects search and
browsing histories, keystroke patterns, biometric identifiers, draft
messages, metadata, geolocation data, and more.
We're talking an overwhelming amount of sensitive user-data.
This is not just data on adults, but the personal information of our
children.
That is the very definition of spying.
TikTok and ByteDance present a serious national security threat.
TikTok functions as a sophisticated surveillance tool--an
organization that is bound to the Chinese Communist Party and required
by their National Intelligence Law to support Chinese intelligence
services.
My esteemed colleagues and I are trying to protect Americans from
this dangerous, destructive spyware masked as a simple social media
app.
The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled
Applications Act will incentivize the divestment of TikTok so that it
is no longer controlled by a China-based entity.
This bill does not punish individual social media users, censor
speech, or impact apps or websites that sever ties with companies
controlled by foreign adversaries.
The First Amendment does not protect espionage.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak on H.R. 7521, the
Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications
Act.
This bill would prohibit the distribution, maintenance, or provision
of internet hosting services for any foreign adversary controlled
application unless they execute a qualified divestiture as determined
by the President.
More specifically, under this bill, ByteDance would be required to
divest themself from Tiktok in order for the application to remain in
operation.
As one of the most dominant social media platforms in recent history,
it currently has over 150 million active users in the United States
alone.
Much of this success could be attributed to the application's
algorithms being used to generate specifically curated content for each
user on their respective ``For You'' pages in a short-form, infinite
scroll format.
Upon the rapid success of this content format, other social media
platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, and Youtube have all followed
suit.
This has only further entrenched the massive success of the company
among its users.
This success is not without caveat, however.
Recent studies conducted by researchers at Rutgers University found a
disturbing underrepresentation of certain topics on the platform.
Though pop culture and political terms were represented roughly
proportional to other platforms, topics involving Uyghurs, Tibet,
Tiananmen Square, and the Hong Kong protests were severely
underrepresented.
In addition, many valid concerns have been raised regarding the issue
of national security and foreign government interference.
Many stakeholders argue that the vast amount of data harvested from
American users poses a threat to our data security and democracy.
With the vast amount of American users on the platform, particularly
individuals under the age of 24, I recognize the need to ensure
security in our national democracy.
I hope, moving forward, that we can join together in taking action to
protect our youth from harmful actors while also safeguarding their
freedom of thought.
More investigation must happen to decide the next steps for TikTok. I
will pursue the next steps before finalizing a complete ban. What
company will be the purchaser? All must be answered before the best
decision can be made.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentlewoman from Washington (Mrs. Rodgers) that the House suspend the
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 7521, as amended.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 352,
nays 65, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 14, as follows:

[Roll No. 86]

YEAS--352

Adams
Aderholt
Aguilar
Alford
Allen
Allred
Amo
Amodei
Armstrong
Arrington
Auchincloss
Babin
Bacon
Baird
Balderson
Balint
Banks
Barr
Barragan
Bean (FL)
Beatty
Bentz
Bera
Bergman
Beyer
Bice
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Boebert
Bost
Brecheen
Brown
Brownley
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Budzinski
Burchett
Burgess
Burlison
Calvert
Cammack
Caraveo
Carbajal
Cardenas
Carey
Carl
Carson
Carter (GA)
Carter (LA)
Carter (TX)
Cartwright
Case
Casten
Castor (FL)
Chavez-DeRemer
Cherfilus-McCormick
Chu
Ciscomani
Clarke (NY)
Cleaver
Cline
Cloud
Clyde
Cohen
Cole
Collins
Comer
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Craig
Crane
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crow
Cuellar
Curtis
D'Esposito
Davids (KS)
Davis (NC)
De La Cruz
Dean (PA)
DeGette
DeLauro
DelBene
Deluzio
DeSaulnier
Diaz-Balart
Dingell
Doggett
Donalds
Duncan
Dunn (FL)
Edwards
Ellzey
Emmer
Escobar
Eshoo
Estes
Evans
Ezell
Fallon
Feenstra
Ferguson
Finstad
Fischbach
Fitzgerald
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fletcher
Flood
Foster
Foushee
Foxx
Franklin, Scott
Fry
Fulcher
Gallagher
Garamendi
Garbarino
Garcia (TX)
Garcia, Mike
Gimenez
Golden (ME)
Goldman (NY)
Gonzales, Tony
Gonzalez, Vicente
Good (VA)
Gooden (TX)
Gottheimer
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Green (TN)
Green, Al (TX)
Griffith
Grothman
Guest
Guthrie
Hageman
Harris
Harshbarger
Hern
Hill
Hinson
Houchin
Houlahan
Hoyer
Hudson
Huffman
Huizenga
Hunt
Issa
Ivey
Jackson (NC)
Jackson (TX)
James
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (SD)
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Joyce (PA)
Kaptur
Kean (NJ)
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
Kiggans (VA)
Kildee
Kiley
Kilmer
Kim (CA)
Krishnamoorthi
Kuster
Kustoff
LaHood
LaLota
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Landsman
Langworthy
Latta
LaTurner
Lawler
Lee (FL)
Lee (NV)
Leger Fernandez
Lesko
Letlow
Levin
Lieu
Loudermilk
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Luna
Luttrell
Lynch
Magaziner
Malliotakis
Maloy
Mann
Manning
Mast
Matsui
McBath
McCaul
McClain
McClellan
McCollum
McCormick
McHenry
Menendez
Meuser
Mfume
Miller (IL)
Miller (OH)
Miller (WV)
Miller-Meeks
Mills
Molinaro
Moolenaar
Moore (UT)
Moran
Morelle
Moskowitz
Moulton
Mrvan
Murphy
Napolitano
Neguse
Nehls
Newhouse
Nickel
Norcross
Norman
Nunn (IA)
Obernolte
Owens
Pallone
Palmer
Panetta
Pappas
Pascrell
Payne
Pelosi
Peltola
Pence
Perez
Peters
Pettersen
Pfluger
Pingree
Posey
Quigley
Raskin
Reschenthaler
Rodgers (WA)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rose
Rosendale
Ross
Rouzer
Roy
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rutherford
Ryan
Salazar
Salinas
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Scalise
Scanlon
Schiff
Schneider
Scholten
Schrier
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Self
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Sherrill
Slotkin
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Smucker
Sorensen
Soto
Spanberger
Spartz
Stansbury
Stanton
Stauber
Steel
Stefanik
Steil
Stevens
Strickland
Strong
Suozzi
Sykes
Takano
Tenney
Thanedar
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Tiffany
Timmons
Titus
Tokuda

[[Page H1171]]

Tonko
Torres (NY)
Trahan
Trone
Turner
Underwood
Valadao
Van Drew
Van Duyne
Van Orden
Vasquez
Veasey
Walberg
Waltz
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson Coleman
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Wexton
Wild
Williams (NY)
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Yakym
Zinke

NAYS--65

Biggs
Bishop (NC)
Bonamici
Bowman
Boyle (PA)
Bush
Casar
Castro (TX)
Clark (MA)
Clyburn
Davidson
Duarte
Espaillat
Frost
Gaetz
Gallego
Garcia (IL)
Garcia, Robert
Gomez
Greene (GA)
Hayes
Higgins (LA)
Himes
Horsford
Hoyle (OR)
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee
Jacobs
Jayapal
Kamlager-Dove
Khanna
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee (CA)
Lee (PA)
Lofgren
Mace
Massie
McClintock
McGarvey
McGovern
Meeks
Meng
Mooney
Moore (AL)
Moore (WI)
Mullin
Nadler
Neal
Ocasio-Cortez
Omar
Perry
Phillips
Pocan
Porter
Pressley
Ramirez
Schakowsky
Schweikert
Steube
Swalwell
Torres (CA)
Vargas
Velazquez
Williams (GA)

ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1

Crockett

NOT VOTING--14

Connolly
Davis (IL)
DesJarlais
Frankel, Lois
Gosar
Granger
Grijalva
Harder (CA)
Kim (NJ)
Ogles
Simpson
Tlaib
Wagner
Williams (TX)

{time} 1033

Mr. LARSON of Connecticut changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Messrs. WENSTRUP, CLEAVER, Ms. BALINT, Mr. CARSON, Mses. BOEBERT, and
BROWNLEY changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
Ms. CROCKETT changed her vote from ``yea'' to ``present.''
So (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and
the bill, as amended, was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Ms. GRANGER. Madam Speaker, I missed today's votes due to
circumstances beyond my control. Had I been present, I would have voted
``yea'' on rollcall no. 86.
Mr. OGLES. Madam Speaker, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been
present, I would have voted ``yea'' on rollcall No. 86.
Stated against:
Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Speaker, I was absent from the vote today due to
illness. Had I been present, I would have voted ``nay'' on rollcall No.
86.

____________________