[Pages H2471-H2476]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                IRAN SANCTIONS RELIEF REVIEW ACT OF 2023

  Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 1149, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 4691) to provide for congressional review of actions to 
terminate or waive sanctions imposed with respect to Iran, and ask for 
its immediate consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 1149, an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules 
Committee Print 118-30 is adopted and the bill, as amended, is 
considered read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 4691

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Sanctions Relief Review 
     Act of 2023''.

     SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATING TO 
                   SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.

       (a) Submission to Congress of Proposed Action.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees and leadership a report that describes the 
     proposed action and the reasons for that action.
       (2) Actions described.--
       (A) In general.--An action described in this paragraph is--
       (i) an action to terminate the application of any sanctions 
     described in subparagraph (B);
       (ii) with respect to sanctions described in subparagraph 
     (B) imposed by the President with respect to a person, an 
     action to waive the application of those sanctions with 
     respect to that person; or
       (iii) a licensing action that significantly alters United 
     States foreign policy with respect to Iran.
       (B) Sanctions described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subparagraph are sanctions with respect to Iran provided for 
     under--
       (i) the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 
     U.S.C. 1701 note);
       (ii) the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.);
       (iii) section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a);
       (iv) the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 
     of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq.);
       (v) the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 
     (22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.);
       (vi) the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1701 note); or
       (vii) any other statute or Executive order that requires or 
     authorizes the imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran.
       (3) Description of type of action.--Each report submitted 
     under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in 
     paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the 
     action--
       (A) is not intended to significantly alter United States 
     foreign policy with respect to Iran; or
       (B) is intended to significantly alter United States 
     foreign policy with respect to Iran.
       (4) Inclusion of additional matter.--
       (A) In general.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     that relates to an action that is intended to significantly 
     alter United States foreign policy with respect to Iran shall 
     include a description of--
       (i) the significant alteration to United States foreign 
     policy with respect to Iran;
       (ii) the anticipated effect of the action on the national 
     security interests of the United States; and
       (iii) the policy objectives for which the sanctions 
     affected by the action were initially imposed.
       (B) Requests from banking and financial services 
     committees.--The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
     Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Financial Services 
     of the House of Representatives may request the

[[Page H2472]]

     submission to the Committee of the matter described in 
     clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a 
     report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an 
     action that is not intended to significantly alter United 
     States foreign policy with respect to Iran.
       (5) Confidentiality of proprietary information.--
     Proprietary information that can be associated with a 
     particular person with respect to an action described in 
     paragraph (2) may be included in a report submitted under 
     paragraph (1) only if the appropriate congressional 
     committees and leadership provide assurances of 
     confidentiality, unless that person otherwise consents in 
     writing to such disclosure.
       (6) Rule of construction.--Paragraph (2)(A)(iii) shall not 
     be construed to require the submission of a report under 
     paragraph (1) with respect to the routine issuance of a 
     license that does not significantly alter United States 
     foreign policy with respect to Iran.
       (b) Period for Review by Congress.--
       (1) In general.--During the period of 30 calendar days 
     beginning on the date on which the President submits a report 
     under subsection (a)(1)--
       (A) in the case of a report that relates to an action that 
     is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign 
     policy with respect to Iran, the Committee on Banking, 
     Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Financial Services of the House of Representatives should, as 
     appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain 
     information in order to fully review the report; and
       (B) in the case of a report that relates to an action that 
     is intended to significantly alter United States foreign 
     policy with respect to Iran, the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
     of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold 
     hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in 
     order to fully review the report.
       (2) Exception.--The period for congressional review under 
     paragraph (1) of a report required to be submitted under 
     subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the report is 
     submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in 
     any calendar year.
       (3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional 
     review period.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     during the period for congressional review provided for under 
     paragraph (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) 
     proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), including 
     any additional period for such review as applicable under the 
     exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not 
     take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with 
     respect to that action is enacted in accordance with 
     subsection (c).
       (4) Limitation on actions during presidential consideration 
     of a joint resolution of disapproval.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval 
     relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) 
     proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes 
     both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), 
     the President may not take that action for a period of 12 
     calendar days after the date of passage of the joint 
     resolution of disapproval.
       (5) Limitation on actions during congressional 
     reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint 
     resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted 
     under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in 
     subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in 
     accordance with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the 
     joint resolution, the President may not take that action for 
     a period of 10 calendar days after the date of the 
     President's veto.
       (6) Effect of enactment of a joint resolution of 
     disapproval.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if 
     a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report 
     submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action 
     described in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with 
     subsection (c), the President may not take that action.
       (c) Joint Resolutions of Disapproval or Approval.--
       (1) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       (A) Joint resolution of approval.--The term ``joint 
     resolution of approval'' means only a joint resolution of 
     either House of Congress--
       (i) the title of which is as follows: ``A joint resolution 
     approving the President's proposal to take an action relating 
     to the application of certain sanctions with respect to 
     Iran.''; and
       (ii) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is 
     the following: ``Congress approves of the action relating to 
     the application of sanctions imposed with respect to Iran 
     proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress 
     under section 2(a)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act 
     of 2023 on _______ relating to ________.'', with the first 
     blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the 
     second blank space being filled with a short description of 
     the proposed action.
       (B) Joint resolution of disapproval.--The term ``joint 
     resolution of disapproval'' means only a joint resolution of 
     either House of Congress--
       (i) the title of which is as follows: ``A joint resolution 
     disapproving the President's proposal to take an action 
     relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect 
     to Iran.''; and
       (ii) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is 
     the following: ``Congress disapproves of the action relating 
     to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to Iran 
     proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress 
     under section 2(a)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act 
     of 2023 on _______ relating to ________.'', with the first 
     blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the 
     second blank space being filled with a short description of 
     the proposed action.
       (2) Introduction.--During the period of 30 calendar days 
     provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any 
     additional period as applicable under the exception provided 
     in subsection (b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint 
     resolution of disapproval may be introduced--
       (A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader 
     or the minority leader; and
       (B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority 
     leader's designee) or the minority leader (or the minority 
     leader's designee).
       (3) Floor consideration in house of representatives.--If a 
     committee of the House of Representatives to which a joint 
     resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has 
     been referred has not reported the joint resolution within 10 
     legislative days after the date of referral, that committee 
     shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint 
     resolution.
       (4) Consideration in the senate.--
       (A) Committee referral.--A joint resolution of approval or 
     joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate 
     shall be--
       (i) referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
     Urban Affairs if the joint resolution relates to a report 
     under subsection (a)(3)(A) that relates to an action that is 
     not intended to significantly alter United States foreign 
     policy with respect to Iran; and
       (ii) referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations if the 
     joint resolution relates to a report under subsection 
     (a)(3)(B) that relates to an action that is intended to 
     significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect 
     to Iran.
       (B) Reporting and discharge.--If the committee to which a 
     joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of 
     disapproval was referred has not reported the joint 
     resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral 
     of the joint resolution, that committee shall be discharged 
     from further consideration of the joint resolution and the 
     joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
       (C) Proceeding to consideration.--Notwithstanding Rule XXII 
     of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any 
     time after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
     Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Relations, as the case 
     may be, reports a joint resolution of approval or joint 
     resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been 
     discharged from consideration of such a joint resolution 
     (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been 
     disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the 
     joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint 
     resolution (and against consideration of the joint 
     resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not 
     debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. 
     A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed 
     to or disagreed to shall not be in order.
       (D) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals from the 
     decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the 
     rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure 
     relating to a joint resolution of approval or joint 
     resolution of disapproval shall be decided without debate.
       (E) Consideration of veto messages.--Debate in the Senate 
     of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution of 
     approval or joint resolution of disapproval, including all 
     debatable motions and appeals in connection with the joint 
     resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally 
     divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and 
     the minority leader or their designees.
       (5) Rules relating to senate and house of 
     representatives.--
       (A) Treatment of senate joint resolution in house.--In the 
     House of Representatives, the following procedures shall 
     apply to a joint resolution of approval or a joint resolution 
     of disapproval received from the Senate (unless the House has 
     already passed a joint resolution relating to the same 
     proposed action):
       (i) The joint resolution shall be referred to the 
     appropriate committees.
       (ii) If a committee to which a joint resolution has been 
     referred has not reported the joint resolution within 5 
     legislative days after the date of referral, that committee 
     shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint 
     resolution.
       (iii) Beginning on the third legislative day after each 
     committee to which a joint resolution has been referred 
     reports the joint resolution to the House or has been 
     discharged from further consideration thereof, it shall be in 
     order to move to proceed to consider the joint resolution in 
     the House. All points of order against the motion are waived. 
     Such a motion shall not be in order after the House has 
     disposed of a motion to proceed on the joint resolution. The 
     previous question shall be considered as ordered on the 
     motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion 
     shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by 
     which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.
       (iv) The joint resolution shall be considered as read. All 
     points of order against the joint resolution and against its 
     consideration are waived. The previous question shall be 
     considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final 
     passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate 
     equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint 
     resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to 
     reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall 
     not be in order.
       (B) Treatment of house joint resolution in senate.--
       (i) Receipt before passage.--If, before the passage by the 
     Senate of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution 
     of disapproval, the Senate receives an identical joint 
     resolution from the House of Representatives, the following 
     procedures shall apply:

       (I) That joint resolution shall not be referred to a 
     committee.
       (II) With respect to that joint resolution--

[[Page H2473]]

       (aa) the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no 
     joint resolution had been received from the House of 
     Representatives; but
       (bb) the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution 
     from the House of Representatives.
       (ii) Receipt after passage.--If, following passage of a 
     joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of 
     disapproval in the Senate, the Senate receives an identical 
     joint resolution from the House of Representatives, that 
     joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate Senate 
     calendar.
       (iii) No companion measure.--If a joint resolution of 
     approval or a joint resolution of disapproval is received 
     from the House, and no companion joint resolution has been 
     introduced in the Senate, the Senate procedures under this 
     subsection shall apply to the House joint resolution.
       (C) Application to revenue measures.--The provisions of 
     this paragraph shall not apply in the House of 
     Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint 
     resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure.
       (6) Rules of house of representatives and senate.--This 
     subsection is enacted by Congress--
       (A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate 
     and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such 
     is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, 
     and supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is 
     inconsistent with such rules; and
       (B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
     either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the 
     procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and 
     to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that 
     House.
       (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees and Leadership 
     Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees and leadership'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the majority and 
     minority leaders of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and 
     the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill, as amended, shall be debatable for 
1 hour equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority 
member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs or their respective 
designees.
  The gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCaul) and the gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Meeks) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCaul).


                             General Leave

  Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and 
include extraneous material on this measure.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, even after the Trump administration rightfully withdrew 
from the dangerous Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, the 
Biden administration entered office committed to pursuing a new nuclear 
deal with Iran.
  Throughout this administration's dealings with Iran, it was 
abundantly clear that Iran was taking advantage of the administration's 
blind commitment to negotiations just for the sake of negotiating.
  A nuclear Iran is not acceptable--full stop. However, throughout 2021 
and 2022, the Biden administration continued to push negotiations even 
as Iran escalated its nuclear provocations. Iran suspended compliance 
with the IAEA Additional Protocol. Iran installed new advanced 
centrifuges. Iran increased its uranium stockpile toward enrichment. 
Iran refused to cooperate with an IAEA investigation.
  In fact, I met with the Director General of the IAEA at his office in 
Europe, and he said that the Iranians had a cyberattack on their office 
and stole all of their documents pertaining to their investigations 
dealing with compliance from Iran on the sites.
  That is not a sign of good faith. You can't negotiate with somebody 
like that.
  Still, they are intent on getting this nuclear deal done. It became 
very clear that they are desperate to reach a deal, even if it was a 
bad deal.
  The irony, Mr. Speaker, is this: The very individual charged by 
Congress and the administration, the special envoy to Iran, Mr. Malley, 
is under FBI investigation for violations of his security clearance. 
That is our top negotiator to Iran.
  My colleagues and I have been gravely concerned that this 
administration would lift Iranian sanctions in exchange for 
insufficient limitations on Iran's nuclear program. These concerns grew 
even more severe, again, after Rob Malley came under FBI investigation, 
which the State Department failed to notify Congress. When I invited 
him to testify about the Iran deal, I was told he was not available, 
and now we know why.
  It is deeply disturbing that the United States Government no longer 
trusts the one who is spearheading our negotiations with an enemy 
regime. We can't afford any strategic miscalculations when it comes to 
Iran.
  Again, as I said in the prior debate, deterrence is key, and you only 
deter and get peace through projecting strength, including 
strengthening our economic sanctions while they have eased them.
  Every dollar that goes to the Iranian regime in any form has the 
potential to be deadly. The events of this past weekend demonstrate 
that. Iran launched over 350 missile and drone attacks on our ally, 
Israel--unprecedented in history. Israel, the United States, and other 
partners intercepted 99 percent of these weapons.
  Iran is not 10 feet tall. That is why this legislation is so 
important. Congress and the American people need an opportunity to 
review any proposed plans to lift sanctions, especially the ones that 
Congress has mandated, on this rogue regime.
  I thank my good friend, Mr. Self, on the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
who is also from the great State of Texas, for this bill. This bill 
requires the President to report to Congress on any plans to terminate 
or waive sanctions on Iran. It codifies a process for Congress to 
conduct oversight of these proposed waivers and terminations.
  We have that power under Article I of the Constitution. Yet, when 
they waive sanctions that Congress passed, they are not notifying us. 
We deserve that right. We have a responsibility to keep the American 
people safe, and that requires the executive branch and Congress to 
work together to determine the national security interests of the 
United States. Congress must have a say in any attempts to broker any 
kind of deal with Iran.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
                                         House of Representatives,


                              Committee on Financial Services,

                                   Washington, DC, April 14, 2024.
     Hon. Michael McCaul,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
     House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman McCaul: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Committee on Financial Services regarding H.R. 4691, the Iran 
     Sanctions Relief Review Act of 2023. I agree that the 
     Committee shall be discharged from further consideration of 
     the bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House 
     Floor. The Committee takes this action with the mutual 
     understanding that, by foregoing consideration of H.R. 4691 
     at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the 
     subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, and 
     that the Committee will be appropriately consulted and 
     involved on this or similar legislation as it moves forward. 
     The Committee also reserves the right to see appointment of 
     an appropriate number of conferees to any conference with the 
     Senate involving this or similar legislation, and we request 
     your support for any such request.
       Finally, as you mentioned in your letter, I ask that a copy 
     of our exchange of letters on this bill be included in your 
     Committee's report to accompany the legislation, as well as 
     in the Congressional Record during floor consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Patrick McHenry,
     Chairman, Committee on Financial Services.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                   Washington, DC, April 14, 2024.
     Hon. Patrick McHenry,
     Chairman, Committee on Financial Services,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman McHenry: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Foreign Affairs Committee and agreeing to be discharged from 
     further consideration of H.R. 4691, the Iran Sanctions Relief 
     Review Act of 2023, so that the measure may proceed 
     expeditiously to the House floor.
       I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure 
     does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of 
     your committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives 
     on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would 
     support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate 
     number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate 
     conference on this legislation.
       I will seek to place our letters on this bill into the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration. I appreciate 
     your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward

[[Page H2474]]

     to continuing to work together as this measure moves through 
     the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                Michael T. McCaul,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                   Committee on the Judiciary,

                                   Washington, DC, April 15, 2024.
     Hon. Michael McCaul,
     Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman McCaul: I write regarding H.R. 4691, the Iran 
     Sanctions Relief Review Act of 2023. Provisions of this bill 
     fall within the Judiciary Committee's Rule X jurisdiction, 
     and I appreciate that you consulted with us on those 
     provisions. The Judiciary Committee agrees that it shall be 
     discharged from further consideration of the bill so that it 
     may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.
       The Committee takes this action with the understanding that 
     forgoing further consideration of this measure does not in 
     any way alter the Committee's jurisdiction or waive any 
     future jurisdictional claim over these provisions or their 
     subject matter. We also reserve the right to seek appointment 
     of an appropriate number of conferees in the event of a 
     conference with the Senate involving this measure or similar 
     legislation.
       I ask that you please include this letter in your 
     committee's report to accompany this legislation or insert 
     this letter in the Congressional Record during consideration 
     of H.R. 4691 on the House floor. I appreciate the cooperative 
     manner in which our committees have worked on this matter, 
     and I look forward to working collaboratively in the future 
     on matters of shared jurisdiction. Thank you for your 
     attention to this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Jim Jordan,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                   Washington, DC, April 15, 2024.
     Hon. Jim Jordan,
     Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Jordan: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Foreign Affairs Committee and agreeing to be discharged from 
     further consideration of H.R. 4691, the Iran Sanctions Relief 
     Review Act, so that the measure may proceed expeditiously to 
     the House floor.
       I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure 
     does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of 
     your committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives 
     on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would 
     support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate 
     number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate 
     conference on this legislation.
       I will seek to place our letters on this bill into the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration. I appreciate 
     your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward 
     to continuing to work together as this measure moves through 
     the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                Michael T. McCaul,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and 
           Accountability,
                                   Washington, DC, April 15, 2024.
     Hon. Michael McCaul,
     Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman McCaul: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Committee on Oversight and Accountability. The Committee on 
     Oversight and Accountability agrees to be discharged from 
     further consideration of H.R. 4691, the Iran Sanctions Relief 
     Review Act of 2023, so that it may proceed expeditiously to 
     the House Floor.
       I agree that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 4691 at 
     this time, the Committee on Oversight and Accountability does 
     not waive any jurisdiction over the subject matter contained 
     in this or similar legislation. The Committee on Oversight 
     and Accountability should be appropriately consulted and 
     involved on this or similar legislation as it moves forward. 
     I support your effort to represent the House Committee on 
     Oversight and Accountability on the conference committee if a 
     conference on the bill becomes necessary.
       As discussed, I appreciate your inclusion of a copy of our 
     exchange of letters on this bill in the bill report filed by 
     the Foreign Affairs Committee and in the Congressional Record 
     during House floor consideration thereof. I appreciate your 
     cooperation regarding this bill and look forward to future 
     opportunities to work together on matters of shared 
     jurisdiction.
           Sincerely,

                                                  James Comer,

                                  Chairman, Committee on Oversight
     and Accountability.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                   Washington, DC, April 15, 2024.
     Hon. James Comer,
     Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Accountability, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Comer: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Foreign Affairs Committee and agreeing to be discharged from 
     further consideration of H.R. 4691, the Iran Sanctions Relief 
     Review Act of 2023, so that the measure may proceed 
     expeditiously to the House floor.
       I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure 
     does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of 
     your committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives 
     on this measure or similar legislation in the future. I would 
     support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate 
     number of conferees from your committee to any House-Senate 
     conference on this legislation.
       I will seek to place our letters on this bill into the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration. I appreciate 
     your cooperation regarding this legislation and look forward 
     to continuing to work together as this measure moves through 
     the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                Michael T. McCaul,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. MEEKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 4691.
  As I have explained during committee consideration, I have serious 
concerns about what this bill means to the overall practice of American 
foreign policy and, therefore, must oppose it.
  Some think that diplomacy is weak and that the only way you show 
strength is to go to war. We have heard from generals that if war was 
the only option that we had on the table, it would cost us much more in 
bullets and armor, and that diplomacy helps deter military.
  In fact, I would say it is strength. Anybody can say I am going to 
fight. It is strength in trying to negotiate, in dealing with 
diplomacy. If that should fail, going to war should be your last 
alternative.
  Diplomacy and people in the State Department who exercise it are 
absolutely essential. It brings others with us so we are not out there 
by ourselves but working in a multilateral way.

                              {time}  1400

  It is hard for any Member, particularly me as a ranking member, to be 
opposed to a bill that is meant to increase congressional oversight of 
sensitive foreign policy issues. However, in the specific case of this 
bill as drafted, were it to be signed into law, I believe it would 
damage America's ability to conduct effective diplomacy.
  Here is why. When dealing with our enemies, a strong diplomatic corps 
and a strong military are both necessary to achieve our goals. In the 
specific case of Iran, they can clearly see from our consistent joint 
military exercises, regional deployments, and last weekend's missile 
defense that we mean business.
  Our diplomatic efforts have also proven very effective. Case in point 
was the successful implementation of the JCPOA, which verifiably cut 
off all pathways to an Iranian bomb. The dangerous nuclear moment we 
now find ourselves in, where Iran has stockpiled highly enriched 
uranium and is limiting the access of inspectors is the direct result 
of the shortsighted cancellation of that diplomatic agreement. The 
Iranian nuclear threat has never been more dangerous than it is right 
now.
  Again, when we had the JCPOA, working in a multilateral way with our 
other allies, and even at that point, two who are not allies, and when 
you speak to most individuals, IAEA included, who had eyes on what was 
taking place in Iran, once we pulled out and stopped using diplomacy, 
they have no eyes now, which is why Iran is more dangerous today than 
it was when they were in this agreement.
  The United States must keep diplomacy on the table as a tool to 
address the Iranian threat. If this proposed bill is set into law, 
Iranian negotiators will know and allied negotiators will know that the 
executive branch officials in the negotiation room cannot independently 
make decisions. Our negotiators will be at an acute disadvantage. Other 
parties, friend or foe, will know any adjustment in sanctions 
implementation would become subject to a joint motion of disapproval. 
Carefully negotiated multilateral agreements risk becoming subject to 
partisanship right here in the United States House of Representatives, 
in Congress. Such an action is worrisome and also without precedent.
  I also believe that this bill directly interferes with the INARA 
process, the bipartisan agreement currently in statute to provide 
Congress the ability to approve or disapprove a negotiated nuclear 
agreement.
  Diplomatic agreements with Iran are already subject to congressional 
review as a whole. This bill goes far beyond

[[Page H2475]]

that statute. Even if the United States Congress cleared an Iran deal 
through a comprehensive INARA process, sanctions implementation would 
once again become subject to binding congressional review, risking the 
agreement itself.
  This legislation could also harm efforts to deescalate tensions with 
Iran shy of a comprehensive agreement. If this or a future 
administration tried to negotiate a short-term diplomatic agreement on 
nuclear or other issues, such as regional troop protection, this 
legislation would interfere with that process.
  I would also like to make a more general point about sanctions that I 
believe this Congress sometimes forgets--one I feel that I have to make 
over and over and over again nowadays in this Congress. Sanctions are 
meant to be lifted if they achieve our goals. You don't keep a sanction 
if the goal has been achieved. Our nuclear sanctions were not passed to 
foment regime change in Iran, no matter how much we hoped they were. 
They were designed to drive Iran to the table to negotiate an end to 
their nuclear weapons program. If we reach an agreement that clears 
INARA, one that verifiably cuts off pathways to a nuclear weapon, we 
have to live up to our end of the agreement.
  Legislation like this one is designed to thwart our obligations, 
damaging our diplomatic flexibility and trustworthiness if we care 
about diplomacy. Now maybe we don't care about diplomacy; I think that 
is the wrong way to go. I think that we should very much care about 
diplomacy.
  Finally, some will argue that there is precedent for such a policy 
vis-a-vis Russia. That is inaccurate. The scope of Russian sanctions in 
CAATSA is much smaller. For instance, national emergencies past and 
present are included in this proposed bill but not in CAATSA. The new 
Russia sanctions EOs aren't covered in CAATSA, and any new Iran EO 
would be. There are also many sanctions in CAATSA where there is no 
congressional review. This bill, however, would apply to the entire 
universe of Iran sanctions. Finally, CAATSA mechanisms were established 
specifically to deal with Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential 
election. It wasn't about trying to prevent legitimate diplomacy, as 
this bill will do.
  My friends and colleagues, we must look beyond Iran before going down 
this road. I have been around here 26 years, and I know that if passed 
into law, this type of policy will not stop with Iran. If this were to 
become law, it would only be a matter of time before the lifting of any 
sanction, no matter how small, would be subject to a congressional 
vote. It is our duty to provide the authority and the appropriations 
for effective foreign policy, not to undermine diplomacy in this 
manner.
  We cannot have 535 Secretaries of State in a negotiating room. It 
never happens that way. You do not negotiate that way. Diplomacy does 
not work that way. I say: Please think. Think carefully before steering 
us down this road. Think what it means if you think diplomacy is 
important. If you don't think diplomacy is important and the only thing 
that is important is going to war, then we have a difference of 
opinion.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. McCAUL. Madam Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Self), a member of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and the author of this bill.
  Mr. SELF. Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 4691, my bill. In 
response to the surprisingly bellicose comments by the ranking member, 
Madam Speaker, no one wants to go to war with Iran, but when the 
Iranian regime chants ``Death to America'' or ``Death to Israel,'' 
America's response must be swift with immediate deterrence.

  While I cannot compare to the chairman and the ranking member's years 
in this body, I did spend many years as a military planner, and I will 
tell you, I agree with President Reagan: ``We know only too well that 
war comes not when the forces of freedom are strong, but when they are 
weak.'' Case in point, Iran's massive attack on Israel just days ago.
  Make no mistake, the Biden administration has covertly fueled Iran's 
global sponsorship of terrorism. Three times in the last year, the 
administration signed off on a sanctions waiver to Iran, unlocking $10 
billion that were previously frozen.
  Then, in September, the President agreed to give $6 billion to Iran 
in exchange for hostages. Lifting sanctions freed up billions of 
dollars that Iran used to support terrorist proxies, such as Hezbollah, 
the Houthi rebels, and Hamas.
  Shockingly, after Hamas terrorists savagely murdered 1,200 innocent 
Israelis on October 7, the White House refused to correct course.
  Before President Biden was sworn into office, Iran had $4 billion in 
foreign reserves. That number today is $70 billion. Again, $4 billion 
before, $70 billion today. Congress was never involved in these 
decisions, and this is only the most recent tip of the iceberg.
  Let's not forget Obama's Iran deal, which most agree was a disaster. 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, otherwise known as the JCPOA, 
was a plan of action to benefit Iran. The JCPOA did not end Iran's 
nuclear weapon production but lifted sanctions, including access to at 
least $50 billion in liquid assets.
  Later, in 2017, Congress passed a sanctions bill against the areas 
overlooked in the Iran deal on an overwhelmingly bipartisan basis. 
There is no reason to allow the White House to override Congress by 
providing sanctions relief to the number one donor to Hezbollah, the 
Houthi rebels, and Hamas.
  My bill, the Iran Sanctions Relief Review Act, will prevent just 
that. This legislation establishes a detailed procedure for Congress to 
review any action by the President to terminate, waive, or modify 
sanctions on Iran. Under the bill, the President must report to 
Congress on any proposed sanctions relief and the reasons for the 
change in policy.
  Congress must not allow the world's leading state sponsor of 
terrorism to get a payday as it continues to spread its malign 
influence on a global scale.
  Madam Speaker, Congress must rein in the actions of a lawless 
President. Congress must reassert Article I authority.
  Mr. MEEKS. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. McCAUL. Madam Speaker, I have no further speakers, and I am 
prepared to close.
  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MEEKS. Madam Speaker, I think everyone has heard by now how 
important diplomacy is. I think that we should show it in our budget. I 
am a firm believer in diplomacy. The fact of the matter, the direct 
quote from General Mattis was: ``If you don't fund the State Department 
fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately.''
  I guess my friends and colleagues from the other side of the aisle 
just want to buy ammunition, and that is why the State Department is 
continually being cut, because they don't really focus on or put 
diplomacy on the same level, and that is what is happening here with 
this bill.
  This bill would significantly impede America's ability to conduct 
effective diplomacy with Iran. By requiring that any adjustment in 
sanctions implementation be subject to a joint motion of disapproval, 
the bill would undermine diplomacy and U.S. negotiators, and makes that 
clear to anyone sitting across from them at the table. That is the 
negotiating table, not the battlefield, where we hope we don't have to 
go, but we are prepared and have shown that we are ready to do it if we 
must, and that is discussed first at a negotiating table.

                              {time}  1415

  This would also let them know when we are at the table--those that 
are sitting across that table--that they have no authority to relax or 
adjust sanctions. It would subject any negotiations to undue 
congressional partisanship.
  Can anyone deny that what we see happening on this floor--and what is 
happening in this 118th Congress--partisanship plays a huge role? In 
fact, we can't get anything done because of partisanship. Iran would 
know this. In fact, our allies would know this.
  We are tied up in partisanship. This would only weaken our position. 
This only compromises the agility required

[[Page H2476]]

to address urgent international threats and opportunities.
  Moreover, the stipulations of this bill undermine the very purpose of 
sanctions which are intended as tools to bring nations like Iran to the 
negotiating table--not as a permanent punitive measure. But if they do 
something where they are disregarding, and we are not working together 
and are aggressive at that negotiating table, we also are letting them 
know that we are ready or what we have the capability of doing.
  This bill hurts diplomacy. It hurts trying to make sure that we are 
driving others to the negotiating table. As General Mattis said, he 
doesn't have to buy more bullets. Let's fund the State Department. 
Let's promote and speak good will of diplomacy. It is the best way to 
move forward in a multilateral way with our allies.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. McCAUL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  I agree with some of the things my good friend has said. Diplomacy is 
extremely important. We deal with it on the committee all the time. It 
is called soft power. Then we have hard power. We sign off on foreign 
military weapons sales. Diplomacy at all costs needs to be tried, but 
when the diplomats fail, often we go to war or we have conflict.
  The question before us is twofold. One, has Iran negotiated in good 
faith such that we would both waive or not enforce or let expire 
sanctions, many of them passed by Congress?
  The second question is, are Article I authorities under the 
Constitution?
  All we are simply asking for is when we pass a sanction--or the 
administration does so--that they notify Congress.
  And I will tell you why this is important.
  For months I tried to get Robert Malley, our special envoy to Iran, 
into the committee to testify on this Iran deal, but guess what? He 
refused to come testify. Why? Because we then find out he was under 
investigation by the FBI for potential violation of his security 
clearance.
  This great Iran deal that they talk about has only brought Iran 
closer to a nuclear bomb, closer to weapons-grade uranium. They can go 
to 90 percent in days. If they get a nuclear warhead from Russia or 
North Korea, they have full capability, and they will become a nuclear 
state. We cannot let that happen.
  They failed to declare nuclear sites in Iran. They kicked out 
investigators from the IAEA. Then in one of the most horrific displays 
of bad faith in negotiations, Mr. Speaker, do you know what they did? 
They launched a cyberattack on the IAEA to steal their documents 
related to their investigations on the very sites that the JCPOA was 
supposed to allow them in to examine. Then they blocked the inspectors 
from having access to these sites.
  Now, I am all for negotiating. I am all for diplomacy. I don't think 
the Ayatollah is a good faith partner here, and I don't think he has 
our best interests at heart. They chant ``death to America,'' and 
``death to Israel'' and call us ``Great Satan,'' and they call Israel 
``Little Satan.'' They are closer to a bomb than they have ever been.
  All we are saying, Mr. Speaker, is before you waive sanctions that 
Congress passed, or not enforce sanctions, just let us know. I don't 
think that is a big deal. I mean, Malley wouldn't testify before 
Congress. We didn't know why because they were hiding it from us. They 
didn't want us to know about the FBI investigation until the press 
reported it. We found out from the press--not from the administration, 
but from the press.
  Let's look at some of the sanctions that they let expire and they 
have waived, and you tell me if that makes sense. The sanctions on 
energy, exporting energy to China, the majority going to China; we are 
allowing this axis of evil--the Ayatollah, Putin, and China--to work 
together with Iran exporting energy.
  Mr. Speaker, $80 billion from China went into Iran to fund the very 
missiles and rockets and drones that we saw last Saturday night. It was 
the first attack from Iran into Israel in history.
  Then they let the U.N. sanctions on exports to other countries for 
their missiles and drones to expire. Now, we have a bill to reinstate 
those sanctions. The very same drones and missiles were used to attack 
Israel last Saturday night, the very same drones and missiles that have 
been bought by Russia to kill Ukrainians. It is all interconnected. 
China is in this, the Ayatollah is in it, Putin is in it, and they are 
all profiting from Iran, who they provide technical expertise. Iran 
makes the stuff and the energy that they then buy from them to put the 
money in Iran to reign terror.
  I think it only fair that the American people through their 
Representatives under Article I have the opportunity to even know when 
they are doing this and not operate behind a veil of secrecy. When a 
Republican President gets into office, what will the Democrats say then 
if they are hiding things on sanctions and investigations? I think we 
will hear the same argument that we are making on this side.
  That is why this is not a partisan issue. This is about this 
institution under Article I. We have every right to know this, 
especially the sanctions that we pass in Congress. We always put a 
Presidential waiver in these things. Remember Nord Stream 2, we put a 
Presidential waiver. Nobody thought that a President would waive 
sanctions on a pipeline to put Europe in a state of dependency on 
Russian energy. Look how that one worked out. Did we know about it in 
advance? No. That didn't work out so well, did it?

  Right after Afghanistan, guess what happens? Putin, the Russian 
Federation went into Ukraine. Chairman Xi is watching it. He is looking 
at Taiwan.
  No. We have tried. We have tried acting in good faith with them. They 
are not acting in good faith with us, and the American people through 
its Representatives and the Congress, I say, have a right to know.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gimenez). All time for debate has 
expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 1149, the previous question is ordered 
on the bill, as amended.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on 
this question will be postponed.

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