| | (Original Signature of Member) |
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| 118TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. | |
| To require the Comptroller General of the with respect to outreach activities pe Assets Control, and for other purposes. | rformed by the Office of Foreign |
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| IN THE HOUSE OF RE | PRESENTATIVES |
| Mr. Lynch introduced the following bill; who on | |
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| To require the Comptroller Generator conduct a study with respectively performed by the Office of For other purposes. | pect to outreach activities |

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
- 4 This Act may be cited as the "OFAC Outreach and
- 5 Engagement Capabilities Enhancement Act".
- 6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
- 7 Congress finds the following:

| 1 | (1) The Office of Foreign Assets Control is the |
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| 2 | United States Government agency responsible for |
| 3 | administering and enforcing economic sanctions pro- |
| 4 | grams, primarily against countries and groups of in- |
| 5 | dividuals, such as terrorists and narcotics traf- |
| 6 | fickers. |
| 7 | (2) All United States persons must comply with |
| 8 | OFAC regulations, including all United States citi- |
| 9 | zens and permanent resident aliens regardless of |
| 10 | where they are located, all persons and entities with- |
| 11 | in the United States, all United States incorporated |
| 12 | entities and their foreign branches. In the cases of |
| 13 | certain programs, foreign subsidiaries owned or con- |
| 14 | trolled by United States companies also must com- |
| 15 | ply. Certain programs also require foreign persons in |
| 16 | possession of United States-origin goods to comply. |
| 17 | (3) While the sanctions announcements are |
| 18 | themselves notice of the requirements placed on all |
| 19 | United States persons, OFAC conducts additional |
| 20 | outreach through its compliance office, serving as |
| 21 | OFAC's primary liaison to the private sector and op- |
| 22 | erating OFAC's public "hotline" for sanctions-re- |
| 23 | lated questions and the conduct of civil investiga- |
| 24 | tions for potential sanctions violations. |

| 1 | (4) While many industries, such as large multi- |
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| 2 | national financial institutions and industrial firms, |
| 3 | have sophisticated sanctions departments to manage |
| 4 | compliance with the strict-liability mandates from |
| 5 | OFAC and to enact practices to defend their busi- |
| 6 | ness' sales and supply chains from abuse by sanc- |
| 7 | tions-designated bad actors, many smaller entities |
| 8 | and industries, do not. |
| 9 | (5) According to the U.S. Department of the |
| 10 | Treasury's 2021 Sanctions Review, "Sanctions are |
| 11 | only as effective as their implementation, especially |
| 12 | with regard to communication and engagement. In |
| 13 | order to better calibrate the use of this tool, Treas- |
| 14 | ury needs to communicate and coordinate more ef- |
| 15 | fectively with stakeholders affected by the use of fi- |
| 16 | nancial sanctions. Treasury can build on existing |
| 17 | outreach and engagement capabilities through en- |
| 18 | hanced communication with industry, financial insti- |
| 19 | tutions, allies, civil society, and the media, as well as |
| 20 | new constituencies, particularly in the digital assets |
| 21 | space.". |
| 22 | (6) The Assistant Secretary for Terrorism and |
| 23 | Financial Intelligence noted in a 2022 speech to a |
| 24 | private-sector audience at the American Conference |
| 25 | Institute, "We need to redouble efforts—to make |

1 sure that these networks do not pass under your 2 radar and around our laws, and that when you ob-3 tain information about them, you promptly take ac-4 tion. This is not just a matter of compliance; it is 5 a moral imperative. The choice is between permitting 6 and preventing sanctions evasion—there is no space 7 for neutral ground here.". 8 (7) Examples of successful, robust Federal Gov-9 ernment public-private sector outreach programs 10 that support the agency mission abound from the 11 law enforcement, Intelligence Community, and regu-12 latory agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of In-13 vestigation's InfraGard, the Public-Private Analytic 14 Exchange Program from the Department of Home-15 land Security and the Office of the Director of Na-16 tional Intelligence, and the Financial Crime Enforce-17 ment Network's FinCEN Exchange. 18 (8) The FinCEN Exchange, from OFAC's sis-19 ter agency within the U.S. Department of the Treas-20 ury, was mandated on January 1, 2021, when Con-21 gress enacted the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 22 2020 (AML Act). Section 6103 of the AML Act es-

tablishes the FinCEN Exchange to facilitate a vol-

untary public-private information-sharing partner-

ship between law enforcement agencies, national se-

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| 1 | curity agencies, financial institutions, and FinCEN |
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| 2 | to effectively and efficiently combat money laun- |
| 3 | dering, terrorism financing, organized crime, and |
| 4 | other financial crimes, protect the financial system |
| 5 | from illicit use, and promote national security. |
| 6 | (9) The objective of FinCEN Exchange is to |
| 7 | develop, deliver, and sustain innovative public-pri- |
| 8 | vate information sharing in order to enable the pri- |
| 9 | vate sector to better identify risks and provide |
| 10 | FinCEN and law enforcement with critical informa- |
| 11 | tion to disrupt money laundering, terrorism financ- |
| 12 | ing, and other financial crimes. The program goals |
| 13 | of the exchange are to: |
| 14 | (A) Enhance communication, collaboration, |
| 15 | and partnerships among FinCEN, law enforce- |
| 16 | ment, and financial institutions. |
| 17 | (B) Support priority national security and |
| 18 | counter-illicit finance investigations and poli- |
| 19 | cies. |
| 20 | (C) Enhance the utility of suspicious activ- |
| 21 | ity reports and share feedback with the private |
| 22 | sector. |
| 23 | (D) Encourage, enable, and acknowledge a |
| 24 | focus on high-value and high-impact activities |

| 1 | (E) Conduct proactive outreach to allow |
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| 2 | industry to better prioritize efforts and utilize |
| 3 | existing resources. |
| 4 | SEC. 3. OFAC OUTREACH ASSESSMENT. |
| 5 | (a) GAO Study.— |
| 6 | (1) Outreach.—The Comptroller General of |
| 7 | the United States shall, not later than 360 days |
| 8 | after the date of the enactment of this section, carry |
| 9 | out a study with respect to the quality and efficacy |
| 10 | of outreach activities performed by OFAC in support |
| 11 | of the mission of OFAC on or before the date of the |
| 12 | enactment of this section. |
| 13 | (2) Study requirements.— |
| 14 | (A) IN GENERAL.—The Comptroller Gen- |
| 15 | eral of the United States shall, in carrying out |
| 16 | paragraph (1), examine each of the following |
| 17 | with respect to outreach activities performed by |
| 18 | OFAC: |
| 19 | (i) Goals and strategy. |
| 20 | (ii) Audiences. |
| 21 | (iii) Resources. |
| 22 | (iv) Number and type of engagements |
| 23 | with private sector entities. |
| 24 | (v) Feedback capabilities. |

| 1 | (vi) Appropriate privacy and competi- |
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| 2 | tive fairness measures for information re- |
| 3 | ceived from or shared with private sector |
| 4 | entities. |
| 5 | (vii) Compliance with the Federal Ad- |
| 6 | visory Committee Act, where required. |
| 7 | (viii) How information obtained from |
| 8 | outreach activities is used by OFAC to |
| 9 | support the mission of OFAC. |
| 10 | (ix) How, if at all, outreach activities |
| 11 | help with enforcement functions. |
| 12 | (B) Survey of Similar Programs.—In |
| 13 | carrying out the study required under this sub- |
| 14 | section, the Comptroller General of the United |
| 15 | States shall— |
| 16 | (i) examine outreach programs admin- |
| 17 | istered by agencies with similar national |
| 18 | security and regulatory missions, including |
| 19 | outreach programs administered by similar |
| 20 | agencies, including the Financial Crimes |
| 21 | Enforcement Network; and |
| 22 | (ii) identify best practices, similarities, |
| 23 | and differences to inform the evaluation of |
| 24 | existing OFAC outreach programs. |

| 1 | (b) Briefing.—OFAC shall, not later than 60 days |
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| 2 | after the date on which the Comptroller General of the |
| 3 | United States submits a study pursuant to subsection (a), |
| 4 | and after considering the results of such study, submit to |
| 5 | the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Rep- |
| 6 | resentatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and |
| 7 | Urban Affairs on the Senate a briefing that describes how |
| 8 | OFAC will improve its outreach activities going forward, |
| 9 | including, at the time of such briefing, in relation to |
| 10 | OFAC outreach activities, how OFAC— |
| 11 | (1) provides information to those who must |
| 12 | comply with OFAC sanctions, especially those in |
| 13 | communities and industries that are known to be |
| 14 | targeted by bad actors designated by sanctions; |
| 15 | (2) uses outreach activities to support to the |
| 16 | important mission of OFAC, with minimal redirec- |
| 17 | tion of staff and resources; |
| 18 | (3) ensures that the selection of private-sector |
| 19 | participants for outreach activities is free from fa- |
| 20 | voritism; |
| 21 | (4) ensures that private-sector information ob- |
| 22 | tained by OFAC during outreach activities is appro- |
| 23 | priately safeguarded; |
| 24 | (5) ensures that information shared at outreach |
| 25 | functions can be publicized in a manner that does |

| 1 | not competitively disadvantage those not selected to |
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| 2 | participate in such outreach functions; |
| 3 | (6) applies Federal requirements with respect to |
| 4 | all outreach activities, including Federal Advisory |
| 5 | Committee Act requirements; |
| 6 | (7) ensures that private-sector participants not |
| 7 | use outreach activities as an opportunity to pitch |
| 8 | products or services or receive advance information |
| 9 | about OFAC or Department of the Treasury pro- |
| 10 | curement opportunities; |
| 11 | (8) maintains compliance with OFAC ethics re- |
| 12 | quirements. |
| 13 | (e) Feasibility of Voluntary Exchange Pro- |
| 14 | GRAM.—OFAC shall, after reviewing the report produced |
| 15 | by the Comptroller General of the United States pursuant |
| 16 | to subsection (a) and submitting the briefing required |
| 17 | under subsection (b), access the feasibility of the establish- |
| 18 | ment of a program by OFAC designed to— |
| 19 | (1) facilitate a voluntary public-private informa- |
| 20 | tion sharing partnership among law enforcement |
| 21 | agencies, national security agencies, financial institu- |
| 22 | tions, and OFAC to effectively and efficiently admin- |
| 23 | ister and enforce economic sanctions against tar- |
| 24 | geted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, inter- |
| 25 | national narcotics traffickers, those engaged in ac- |

| 1 | tivities related to the proliferation of weapons of |
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| 2 | mass destruction, and other threats to the national |
| 3 | security, foreign policy, or economy of the United |
| 4 | States by promoting innovation and technical ad- |
| 5 | vances in reporting; |
| 6 | (2) protect the financial system from illicit use, |
| 7 | including evasions of existing economic sanctions |
| 8 | programs; and |
| 9 | (3) facilitate two-way information exchange be- |
| 10 | tween OFAC and persons who are required to com- |
| 11 | ply with sanctions administered and enforced by |
| 12 | OFAC, including financial institutions, business sec- |
| 13 | tors frequently affected by sanctions programs, and |
| 14 | non-government organizations and humanitarian |
| 15 | groups impacted by such sanctions programs. |
| 16 | (d) Pilot Program.— |
| 17 | (1) In general.—The Secretary of the Treas- |
| 18 | ury may, after considering the results of the study |
| 19 | conducted by the Comptroller General of the United |
| 20 | States pursuant to subsection (a), the briefing pro- |
| 21 | vided by OFAC pursuant to subsection (b), and the |
| 22 | feasibility assessment conducted by OFAC pursuant |
| 23 | to subsection (c), require OFAC to establish a 3- |
| 24 | year pilot of a program designed to— |

| 1 | (A) facilitate a voluntary public-private in- |
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| 2 | formation sharing partnership among law en- |
| 3 | forcement agencies, national security agencies, |
| 4 | financial institutions, and OFAC to effectively |
| 5 | and efficiently administer and enforce economic |
| 6 | sanctions against targeted foreign countries and |
| 7 | regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traf- |
| 8 | fickers, those engaged in activities related to |
| 9 | the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc- |
| 10 | tion, and other threats to the national security, |
| 11 | foreign policy, or economy of the United States |
| 12 | by promoting innovation and technical advances |
| 13 | in reporting; |
| 14 | (B) protect the financial system from illicit |
| 15 | use, including evasions of existing economic |
| 16 | sanctions programs; and |
| 17 | (C) facilitate two-way information ex- |
| 18 | change between OFAC and persons who are re- |
| 19 | quired to comply with sanctions administered |
| 20 | and enforced by OFAC, including financial in- |
| 21 | stitutions, business sectors frequently affected |
| 22 | by sanctions programs, and non-government or- |
| 23 | ganizations and humanitarian groups impacted |
| 24 | by such sanctions programs. |
| 25 | (2) Information sharing.— |

| 1 | (A) In General.—Any information shared |
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| 2 | by a private sector entity as a part of any pro- |
| 3 | gram established under paragraph (1) shall be |
| 4 | shared— |
| 5 | (i) in compliance with all other appli- |
| 6 | cable Federal laws and regulations; and |
| 7 | (ii) in such a manner as to ensure the |
| 8 | appropriate confidentiality of personal in- |
| 9 | formation |
| 10 | (B) USE OF INFORMATION.—Information |
| 11 | received by OFAC from a private sector entity |
| 12 | as a part of any program established under |
| 13 | paragraph (1) may not be used for any purpose |
| 14 | other than identifying and reporting on activi- |
| 15 | ties that may involve the compliance with |
| 16 | United States sanctions requirements. |
| 17 | (C) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in |
| 18 | this subsection may be construed to create new |
| 19 | information sharing authorities or requirements |
| 20 | relating to sanctions laws. |
| 21 | (3) Report.—If a program is established |
| 22 | under paragraph (1), OFAC shall, annual submit a |
| 23 | report to the Committee on Financial Services of the |
| 24 | House of Representatives and the Committee on |

| 1 | Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate |
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| 2 | that describes the activities of such program. |
| 3 | (e) Definitions.—In this Act: |
| 4 | (1) OFAC.—The term "OFAC" means the Of- |
| 5 | fice of Foreign Assets Control. |
| 6 | (2) Private sector.—The term "private sec- |
| 7 | tor entity" means a business, a nonprofit organiza- |
| 8 | tion, a nongovernmental organization, a legal and or |
| 9 | advisory firm that supports such a business or orga- |
| 10 | nization, and a technology provider that supports |
| 11 | such a business or organization. |