[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1354 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 1354
To amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to clarify that disparate impacts
on certain populations constitute a sufficient basis for rights of
action under such Act, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
February 13, 2025
Ms. Tlaib (for herself, Mr. Cleaver, Ms. Lee of Pennsylvania, Mr.
Johnson of Georgia, Mr. Garcia of Illinois, Ms. Norton, Ms. Kamlager-
Dove, Mrs. McIver, Mr. Frost, Ms. Adams, Ms. Pressley, Mr. Jackson of
Illinois, Mrs. Ramirez, and Mr. Mfume) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition
to the Committee on Education and Workforce, for a period to be
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration
of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee
concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to clarify that disparate impacts
on certain populations constitute a sufficient basis for rights of
action under such Act, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Justice for All Act of 2025''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) This Act is made necessary by a decision of the Supreme
Court in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) that
significantly impairs statutory protections against
discrimination that Congress has erected over a period of
almost 4 decades. The Sandoval decision undermines these
statutory protections by stripping victims of discrimination
(defined under regulations that Congress required Federal
departments and agencies to promulgate to implement title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.)) of the
right to bring action in Federal court to redress the
discrimination.
(2) The Sandoval decision contradicts settled expectations
created by title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972 (also known as the ``Patsy
Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act'') (20 U.S.C.
1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C.
6101 et seq.), and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) (collectively referred to in this Act as
the ``covered civil rights provisions''). The covered civil
rights provisions were designed to establish and make effective
the rights of persons to be free from discrimination on the
part of entities that are subject to 1 or more of the covered
civil rights provisions, as appropriate (referred to in this
Act as ``covered entities''). In 1964 Congress adopted title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to ensure that Federal dollars
would not be used to subsidize or support programs or
activities that discriminated on racial, color, or national
origin grounds. In the years that followed, Congress extended
these protections by enacting laws barring discrimination in
federally funded education activities on the basis of sex in
title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and
discrimination in federally funded activities on the basis of
age in the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 and disability in
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
(3) All of the statutes cited in this section were designed
to protect persons subject to discrimination. As Congress has
consistently recognized, effective enforcement of the statutes
and protection of the rights guaranteed under the statutes
depend heavily on the efforts of private attorneys general.
Congress acknowledged that it could not secure compliance
solely through administrative efforts and enforcement actions
initiated by the Attorney General. Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
(4) The Supreme Court has made it clear that individuals
suffering discrimination under these statutes have a private
right of action in the Federal courts, and that this is
necessary for effective protection of the law, although
Congress did not make such a right of action explicit in the
statute involved. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979).
(5) Furthermore, for effective enforcement of the statutes
cited in this section, it is necessary that the private right
of action include a means to challenge all forms of
discrimination that are prohibited by the statutes, including
practices that have a disparate impact and are not justified as
necessary to achieve the legitimate goals of programs or
activities supported by Federal financial assistance.
(6) By reinstating a private right of action to challenge
disparate impact discrimination under title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) and confirming
that right for other civil rights statutes, Congress is not
acting in a manner that would expose covered entities to unfair
findings of discrimination. The legal standard for a disparate
impact claim has never been structured so that a finding of
discrimination could be based on numerical imbalance alone.
(7) In contrast, a failure to reinstate or confirm a
private right of action would leave vindication of the rights
to equality of opportunity solely to Federal agencies. Action
by Congress to specify a private right of action is necessary
to ensure that persons will have a remedy if they are denied
equal access to education, housing, health, environmental
protection, transportation, and many other programs and
services by practices of covered entities that result in
discrimination.
(8) As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in
Sandoval, courts have dismissed numerous claims brought under
the regulations promulgated pursuant to title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) that challenged
actions with an unjustified discriminatory effect. Although the
Sandoval Court did not address title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), lower courts have
similarly dismissed claims under such title.
(9) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29
U.S.C. 794) has received different treatment by the Supreme
Court. In Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), the Court
proceeded on the assumption that the statute itself prohibited
some actions that had a disparate impact on disabled
individuals--an assumption borne out by congressional
statements made during passage of the Act. In Sandoval, the
Court appeared to accept this principle of Alexander. Moreover,
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized congressional approval
of the regulations promulgated to implement section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634 (1984). Relying on the validity of
the regulations, Congress incorporated the regulations into the
statutory requirements of section 204 of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12134). Nonetheless,
Sandoval creates the potential for uncertainty in the
application of critical protections of Section 504,
particularly in the lower courts.
(10) The right to maintain a private right of action under
a provision added to a statute under this Act will be
effectuated by a waiver of sovereign immunity in the same
manner as sovereign immunity is waived under the remaining
provisions of that statute.
(11) Numerous provisions of Federal law expressly prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex, and Federal agencies and
courts have correctly interpreted these prohibitions on sex
discrimination to include discrimination based on sexual
orientation, gender identity, and sex stereotypes. In
particular, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
correctly interpreted title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
in Macy v. Holder, Baldwin v. Foxx, and Lusardi v. McHugh.
(12) In forbidding discrimination based on sex, Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment resulting from sex-related characteristics. The
Supreme Court correctly recognized in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services that among
these characteristics are sex-stereotypes, including
masculinity and femininity. Congress reaffirmed in the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 that discrimination on the
basis of ``sex'' includes but is not limited to discrimination
on the basis of ``pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions.''.
(13) The absence of explicit prohibitions of discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity under
Federal statutory law has created uncertainty for employers and
other entities covered by Federal nondiscrimination laws and
caused unnecessary hardships for LGBTQ individuals.
(14) The Supreme Court correctly recognized in Hobby Lobby
v. Burwell that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA) ``provides no . . . shield'' to those who ``cloak''
discrimination as ``religious practice to escape legal
sanction.'' This Act reaffirms that crucial limitation on RFRA,
that Congress did not intend for it to be used--and indeed it
cannot be used--to provide a defense against allegations of
discrimination on the basis of any protected trait.
(15) Chapter 1 of title 9, United States Code (commonly
known as the ``Federal Arbitration Act''), represented an
exercise of legislative power that required courts to recognize
private voluntary agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes
at a time when the courts were refusing to do so on grounds
that arbitration represented a usurpation of the authority of
the courts to resolve legal disputes.
(16) The Federal Arbitration Act did not, and should not
have been interpreted to, supplant or nullify the legislatively
created rights and remedies that Congress, exercising its power
under article I of the Constitution of the United States, has
granted to the people of the United States for resolving
disputes in State and Federal courts.
(17) Recent court decisions, including AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) and American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013), have
interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act to broadly preempt
rights and remedies established under substantive State and
Federal law. As a result, these decisions have enabled business
entities to avoid or nullify legal duties created by
congressional enactment, resulting in millions of people in the
United States being unable to vindicate their rights in State
and Federal courts.
(18) States have a compelling interest in enacting rights
and remedies to protect the welfare of their citizens, and the
Federal Arbitration Act should not be, and should not have
been, interpreted to preempt State legislation that enacted
rights and remedies to protect the welfare of their citizens.
(19) The Supreme Court misinterpreted title VII of the
Civil Rights Act in establishing the Faragher-Ellerth
affirmative defense in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth. This affirmative
defense often leaves victims of sexual harassment with no
remedy or recourse after incidence of sexual or other
harassment. Violations of the law, and injuries to a victim and
their rights, are not cured by the existence of an anti-
harassment policy or the lack of future harm, and in a hostile
work environment taking preventative measures is not a
requirement that falls on the victim.
(20) Bringing a lawsuit to vindicate civil rights is
financially risky, and law firms, whether large or small, are
unlikely to take such cases on. Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 in order to make
lawsuits to vindicate civil rights more accessible to potential
plaintiffs. The Supreme Court correctly recognized in City of
Riverside v. Rivera that the effectuation of congressional
intent requires viable civil rights lawsuits, which are
dependent on the availability of private enforcement mechanisms
and the corresponding availability of attorney's fees.
(21) However, the Supreme Court incorrectly held that the
``catalyst theory'' is not a permissible basis for the award of
attorney's fees in Buckhannon v. West Virginia Department of
Health & Human Resources. In doing so, the Court deprived
plaintiffs who effectively win a lawsuit through a settlement,
from receiving pre-trial attorney's fees. Congress enacted fee-
shifting provisions in civil rights laws to encourage private
enforcement of those laws, and fees must be awarded when a
lawsuit vindicates the rights Congress sought to secure. In
disapproving of the ``catalyst theory'' the Court incentivized
potential defendants to draw out the pre-trial process and
settle at the last second, making the lawsuit too expensive for
the average victim to undertake and too risky for the average
attorney to accept a civil rights case.
(22) The Civil Rights Act of 1964, and other civil rights
laws that followed it, were written, in part, to banish rampant
disparate treatment on the basis of race from American society.
Congress sought to overcome the pervasive, racist ideology that
Black traits were inferior by prohibiting discrimination, and
intended the Act to be interpreted broadly--encompassing race
and all its attributes, especially those traits historically
associated with race.
(23) ``Blackness'' and its associated physical traits, such
as dark skin and kinky and curly hair, have too often been
equated with inferiority and ``unprofessionalism.''
Professionalism was, and still is, closely linked to European
features and mannerisms, which entails that those who do not
naturally fall into Eurocentric norms must alter their
appearances, sometimes drastically and permanently, in order to
be deemed professional. Such norms are, on their face, proxies
for race.
(24) Federal courts have correctly interpreted, e.g. that
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, and thus protect
individuals from discrimination against afros. However, the
courts have yet to accept that the Act outlaws dress codes and
grooming policies that prohibit any natural presentation of
Black hair, including afros, braids, twists, and locks.
Although purportedly ``race-neutral'', these policies have a
disparate impact on Black individuals as they are more likely
to deter, burden, or punish Black individuals than any other
group. Therefore, hair discrimination targeting hairstyles
associated with race is racial discrimination.
SEC. 3. PROHIBITED DISCRIMINATION.
(a) Civil Rights Act of 1964.--Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d) is amended--
(1) by striking ``No'' and inserting ``(a) No'';
(2) by inserting ``religion, sex (as such term is defined
in section 208),'' before ``or national origin''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(b)(1)(A) Discrimination (including exclusion from participation
and denial of benefits) based on disparate impact is established under
this title only if--
``(i) a person aggrieved by discrimination on the basis of
race, color, sex (as defined in section 208), or national
origin (referred to in this title as an `person aggrieved'
demonstrates that an entity subject to this title (referred to
in this title as a `covered entity') has a policy or practice
that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, sex
(as such term is defined in section 208), or national origin
and the covered entity fails to demonstrate that the challenged
policy or practice is related to and necessary to achieve the
nondiscriminatory goals of the program or activity alleged to
have been operated in a discriminatory manner; or
``(ii) the person aggrieved demonstrates (consistent with
the demonstration required under title VII with respect to an
`alternative employment practice') that a less discriminatory
alternative policy or practice exists, and the covered entity
refuses to adopt such alternative policy or practice.
``(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular policy or
practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i),
the person aggrieved shall demonstrate that each particular challenged
policy or practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the person
aggrieved demonstrates to the court that the elements of a covered
entity's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for
analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as 1 policy or
practice.
``(ii) If the covered entity demonstrates that a specific policy or
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the covered entity shall
not be required to demonstrate that such policy or practice is
necessary to achieve the goals of its program or activity.
``(2) A demonstration that a policy or practice is necessary to
achieve the goals of a program or activity may not be used as a defense
against a claim of intentional discrimination under this title.
``(3) In this subsection, the term `demonstrates' means meets the
burdens of production and persuasion.''.
(b) Education Amendments of 1972.--Section 901 of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
``(c)(1)(A) Subject to the conditions described in paragraphs (1)
through (9) of subsection (a), discrimination (including exclusion from
participation and denial of benefits) based on disparate impact is
established under this title only if--
``(i) a person aggrieved by discrimination on the basis of
sex (as such term is defined in section 208 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964) (referred to in this title as an `person
aggrieved') demonstrates that an entity subject to this title
(referred to in this title as a `covered entity') has a policy
or practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of sex
and the covered entity fails to demonstrate that the challenged
policy or practice is related to and necessary to achieve the
nondiscriminatory goals of the program or activity alleged to
have been operated in a discriminatory manner; or
``(ii) the person aggrieved demonstrates (consistent with
the demonstration required under title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) with respect to an
`alternative employment practice') that a less discriminatory
alternative policy or practice exists, and the covered entity
refuses to adopt such alternative policy or practice.
``(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular policy or
practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i),
the person aggrieved shall demonstrate that each particular challenged
policy or practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the person
aggrieved demonstrates to the court that the elements of a covered
entity's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for
analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as 1 policy or
practice.
``(ii) If the covered entity demonstrates that a specific policy or
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the covered entity shall
not be required to demonstrate that such policy or practice is
necessary to achieve the goals of its program or activity.
``(2) A demonstration that a policy or practice is necessary to
achieve the goals of a program or activity may not be used as a defense
against a claim of intentional discrimination under this title.
``(3) In this subsection, the term `demonstrates' means meets the
burdens of production and persuasion.''.
(c) Age Discrimination Act of 1975.--Section 303 of the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6102) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Pursuant'' and inserting ``(a)
Pursuant''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(b)(1)(A) Subject to the conditions described in subsections (b)
and (c) of section 304, discrimination (including exclusion from
participation and denial of benefits) based on disparate impact is
established under this title only if--
``(i) a person aggrieved by discrimination on the basis of
age (referred to in this title as a `person aggrieved')
demonstrates that an entity subject to this title (referred to
in this title as a `covered entity') has a policy or practice
that causes a disparate impact on the basis of age and the
covered entity fails to demonstrate that the challenged policy
or practice is related to and necessary to achieve the
nondiscriminatory goals of the program or activity alleged to
have been operated in a discriminatory manner; or
``(ii) the person aggrieved demonstrates (consistent with
the demonstration required under title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) with respect to an
`alternative employment practice') that a less discriminatory
alternative policy or practice exists, and the covered entity
refuses to adopt such alternative policy or practice.
``(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular policy or
practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i),
the person aggrieved shall demonstrate that each particular challenged
policy or practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the person
aggrieved demonstrates to the court that the elements of a covered
entity's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for
analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as 1 policy or
practice.
``(ii) If the covered entity demonstrates that a specific policy or
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the covered entity shall
not be required to demonstrate that such policy or practice is
necessary to achieve the goals of its program or activity.
``(2) A demonstration that a policy or practice is necessary to
achieve the goals of a program or activity may not be used as a defense
against a claim of intentional discrimination under this title.
``(3) In this subsection, the term `demonstrates' means meets the
burdens of production and persuasion.''.
(d) Fair Housing Act.--The Fair Housing Act (title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968; 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 802, by adding at the end the following:
``(p) `Sex' has the meaning given such term in section 208 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
``(q) `Source of income' includes--
``(1) any income from a profession, occupation, or job;
``(2) any form of Federal, State, or local housing
assistance provided to a family or provided to a housing owner
on behalf of a family, or private assistance, grant, loan or
rental assistance program, including low-income housing
assistance certificates, rental subsidies from nongovernmental
organizations, and vouchers issued under the United States
Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq.);
``(3) any income received during a taxable year as Social
Security benefits, as defined in section 86(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, or as supplemental security income
benefits under title XVI of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
1381 et seq.);
``(4) any gift, inheritance, pension, annuity, or other
consideration or benefit;
``(5) any income received pursuant to court order,
including spousal support and child support;
``(6) any payment from a trust, guardian, or conservator;
``(7) any income from the sale or pledge of property or an
interest in property; and
``(8) any other lawful source of income.
``(r) `Race', `color', `religion', `sex', `sexual orientation',
`gender identity', `handicap', `familial status', `source of income',
or `national origin', used with respect to an individual, includes--
``(1) the race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
gender identity, handicap, familial status, source of income,
or national origin, respectively, of another person with whom
the individual is associated or has been associated; and
``(2) a perception or belief, even if inaccurate,
concerning the race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
gender identity, handicap, familial status, source of income,
or national origin, respectively, of the individual.'';
(2) in section 804, by inserting ``(as defined in section
208 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), source of income,'' after
``sex'' each place that term appears;
(3) in section 805, by inserting ``(as defined in section
208 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), source of income,'' after
``sex'' each place that term appears;
(4) in section 806, by inserting ``(as defined in section
208 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), source of income,'' after
``sex'';
(5) in section 807 (42 U.S.C. 3607), by adding at the end
the following:
``(c) Nothing in this title shall be construed to--
``(1) prohibit an entity from providing housing assistance
under section 8(o)(19) of the United States Housing Act of 1937
(42 U.S.C. 1437f(o)(19)) in a nondiscriminatory manner; or
``(2) limit the ability of the owner of a dwelling to
determine, in a commercially reasonable and non-discriminatory
manner, the ability of a person to afford to purchase or rent
the dwelling.''; and
(6) in section 808(e)(6) (42 U.S.C. 3608(e)(6)), by
inserting ``source of income,'' after ``handicap,''.
(e) Prevention of Intimidation in Fair Housing Cases.--Section 901
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3631) is amended by
inserting ``(as such term is defined in section 208 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964), source of income (as defined in section 802),'' after
``sex'' each place that term appears.
SEC. 4. RIGHT OF RECOVERY.
(a) Civil Rights Act of 1964.--Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
602 the following:
``SEC. 602A. ACTIONS BROUGHT BY PERSONS AGGRIEVED.
``(a) Claims Based on Proof of Intentional Discrimination.--In an
action brought by a person aggrieved under this title against a covered
entity who has engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not a
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited
under this title (including its implementing regulations), the person
aggrieved may recover equitable and legal relief (including
compensatory and punitive damages), attorney's fees (including expert
fees), and costs, except that punitive damages are not available
against a government, government agency, or political subdivision.
``(b) Claims Based on the Disparate Impact Standard of Proof.--In
an action brought by a person aggrieved under this title against a
covered entity who has engaged in unlawful discrimination based on
disparate impact prohibited under this title (including its
implementing regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive damages),
attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs, except that
punitive damages are not available against a government, government
agency, or political subdivision.
``(c) Settlement.--In any settlement agreement or consent decree to
resolve an action brought or which may be brought under this title,
attorney's fees of the plaintiff shall be included.''.
(b) Education Amendments of 1972.--Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.) is amended by inserting
after section 902 the following:
``SEC. 902A. ACTIONS BROUGHT BY PERSONS AGGRIEVED.
``(a) Claims Based on Proof of Intentional Discrimination.--In an
action brought by a person aggrieved under this title against a covered
entity who has engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not a
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited
under this title (including its implementing regulations), the person
aggrieved may recover equitable and legal relief (including
compensatory and punitive damages), attorney's fees (including expert
fees), and costs, except that punitive damages are not available
against a government, government agency, or political subdivision.
``(b) Claims Based on the Disparate Impact Standard of Proof.--In
an action brought by a person aggrieved under this title against a
covered entity who has engaged in unlawful discrimination based on
disparate impact prohibited under this title (including its
implementing regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive damages),
attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs, except that
punitive damages are not available against a government, government
agency, or political subdivision.
``(c) Settlement.--In any settlement agreement or consent decree to
resolve an action brought or which may be brought under this title,
attorney's fees of the plaintiff shall be included.''.
(c) Age Discrimination Act of 1975.--
(1) In general.--Section 305 of the Age Discrimination Act
of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6104) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(g)(1) In an action brought by a person aggrieved under this
title against a covered entity who has engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination (not a practice that is unlawful because of its
disparate impact) prohibited under this title (including its
implementing regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive damages),
attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs, except that
punitive damages are not available against a government, government
agency, or political subdivision.
``(2) In an action brought by a person aggrieved under this title
against a covered entity who has engaged in unlawful discrimination
based on disparate impact prohibited under this title (including its
implementing regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive damages),
attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs, except that
punitive damages are not available against a government, government
agency, or political subdivision.
``(3) In any settlement agreement or consent decree to resolve an
action brought or which may be brought under this title, attorney's
fees of the plaintiff shall be included.''.
(2) Conformity of ada with title vi and title ix.--
(A) Eliminating waiver of right to fees if not
requested in complaint.--Section 305(e)(1) of the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6104(e)) is
amended--
(i) by striking ``to enjoin a violation''
and inserting ``to redress a violation''; and
(ii) by striking the second sentence and
inserting the following: ``The Court shall
award the costs of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee (including expert fees), to the
prevailing plaintiff.''.
(B) Eliminating unnecessary mandates: to exhaust
administrative remedies; and to delay suit longer than
180 days to obtain agency review.--Section 305(f) of
the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6104(f))
is amended by striking ``With respect to actions
brought for relief based on an alleged violation of the
provisions of this title,'' and inserting ``Actions
brought for relief based on an alleged violation of the
provisions of this title may be initiated in a court of
competent jurisdiction, pursuant to section 305(e), or
before the relevant Federal department or agency. With
respect to such actions brought initially before the
relevant Federal department or agency,''.
(C) Eliminating duplicative ``reasonableness''
requirement; clarifying that ``reasonable factors other
than age'' is defense to a disparate impact claim, not
an exception to ada coverage.--Section 304(b)(1) of the
Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6103(b)(1))
is amended by striking ``involved--'' and all that
follows through the period and inserting ``involved
such action reasonably takes into account age as a
factor necessary to the normal operation or the
achievement of any statutory objective of such program
or activity.''.
(d) Rehabilitation Act of 1973.--Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(e)(1) In an action brought by a person aggrieved by
discrimination on the basis of disability (referred to in this section
as an `person aggrieved') under this section against an entity subject
to this section (referred to in this section as a `covered entity') who
has engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not a practice that
is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under this
section (including its implementing regulations), the person aggrieved
may recover equitable and legal relief (including compensatory and
punitive damages), attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs,
except that punitive damages are not available against a government,
government agency, or political subdivision.
``(2) In an action brought by a person aggrieved under this section
against a covered entity who has engaged in unlawful discrimination
based on disparate impact prohibited under this section (including its
implementing regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive damages),
attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs, except that
punitive damages are not available against a government, government
agency, or political subdivision.
``(3) Equitable and legal relief (including compensatory and
punitive damages), attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs
shall be available in all cases brought for the failure to provide
reasonable accommodations or reasonable modifications, or the failure
to comply with requirements of effective communication, accessible
design, maintenance of accessible features, or program accessibility.
``(4) In any settlement agreement or consent decree to resolve an
action brought or which may be brought under this section, attorney's
fees of the plaintiff shall be included.''.
(e) Fair Housing Act.--The Fair Housing Act (title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968; 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.), as amended by this
Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 823. DISPARATE IMPACT.
``(a) In General.--
``(1) Establishment.--Discrimination (including exclusion
from participation and denial of benefits) based on disparate
impact is established under this title only if--
``(A) a person aggrieved by discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, or national origin
demonstrates that an entity subject to this title
(referred to in this title as a `covered entity') has a
policy or practice that causes a disparate impact on
the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin and
the covered entity fails to demonstrate that the
challenged policy or practice is related to and
necessary to achieve the nondiscriminatory goals of the
program or activity alleged to have been operated in a
discriminatory manner; or
``(B) the person aggrieved demonstrates that a less
discriminatory alternative policy or practice exists,
and the covered entity refuses to adopt such
alternative policy or practice.
``(2) Demonstration.--
``(A) Causation.--With respect to demonstrating that a particular
policy or practice causes a disparate impact as described in subsection
(a)(1), the person aggrieved shall demonstrate that each particular
challenged policy or practice causes a disparate impact, except that if
the person aggrieved demonstrates to the court that the elements of a
covered entity's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation
for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as 1 policy or
practice.
``(B) No Requirement To Demonstrate.--If the covered entity
demonstrates that a specific policy or practice does not cause the
disparate impact, the covered entity shall not be required to
demonstrate that such policy or practice is necessary to achieve the
goals of its program or activity.
``(b) Necessity of Intentional Discrimination To Achieve Policy
Goals Not a Defense.--A demonstration that a policy or practice is
necessary to achieve the goals of a program or activity may not be used
as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination under this
title.
``(c) Definition.--In this section, the term `demonstrates' means
meets the burdens of production and persuasion.
``SEC. 824. RELIEF FOR CLAIMS BASED ON DIFFERING STANDARDS OF PROOF.
``(a) Claims Based on Proof of Intentional Discrimination.--In an
action brought by a person aggrieved under this title against a covered
entity who has engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not a
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited
under this title (including its implementing regulations), the person
aggrieved may recover equitable and legal relief (including
compensatory and punitive damages), attorney's fees (including expert
fees), and costs, except that punitive damages are not available
against a government, government agency, or political subdivision.
``(b) Claims Based on the Disparate Impact Standard of Proof.--In
an action brought by a person aggrieved under this title against a
covered entity who has engaged in unlawful discrimination based on
disparate impact prohibited under this title (including its
implementing regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive damages),
attorney's fees (including expert fees), and costs, except that
punitive damages are not available against a government, government
agency, or political subdivision.
``(c) Relief Available.--Equitable and legal relief (including
compensatory and punitive damages), attorney's fees (including expert
fees), and costs shall be available in all cases brought for the
failure to permit reasonable accommodations, make reasonable
modifications, or design and construct accessible dwellings as required
by section 804(f)(3)(C).
``(d) Settlement.--In any settlement agreement or consent decree to
resolve an action brought or which may be brought under this title,
attorney's fees of the plaintiff shall be included.''.
SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATION BY LAW ENFORCEMENT.
(a) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) The term ``governmental body'' means any department,
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of
Federal, State, local, or Indian tribal government.
(2) The term ``Indian tribe'' has the meaning given the
term in section 102 of the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe
List Act of 1994 (25 U.S.C. 479a).
(3) The term ``law enforcement agency'' means any Federal,
State, local, or Indian tribal governmental body engaged in the
prevention, detection, or investigation of violations of
criminal, immigration, or customs laws.
(4) The term ``law enforcement agent'' means any Federal,
State, local, or Indian tribal official responsible for
enforcing criminal, immigration, or customs laws, including
police officers and other agents of a law enforcement agency.
(5) The term ``profiling'' means the practice of a law
enforcement agent or agency relying, to any degree, on actual
or perceived race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex
(as defined in section 208 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964),
gender identity, or sexual orientation in selecting which
individual to subject to routine or spontaneous investigatory
activities or in deciding upon the scope and substance of law
enforcement activity following any initial investigatory
procedure, except when there is trustworthy information,
relevant to the locality and timeframe, that links a person
with a particular characteristic described in this paragraph to
an identified criminal incident or scheme.
(6) The term ``routine or spontaneous investigatory
activities'' means the following activities by a law
enforcement agent:
(A) Interviews.
(B) Traffic stops.
(C) Pedestrian stops.
(D) Frisks and other types of body searches.
(E) Consensual or nonconsensual searches of the
persons, property, or possessions (including vehicles)
of individuals using any form of public or private
transportation, including motorists and pedestrians.
(F) Data collection, analysis, assessments, and
predicated investigations.
(G) Inspections and interviews of entrants into the
United States that are more extensive than those
customarily carried out.
(H) Immigration-related workplace investigations.
(I) Such other types of law enforcement encounters
compiled for or by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
or the Department of Justice Bureau of Justice
Statistics.
(7) The term ``State'' means each of the 50 States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any
other territory or possession of the United States.
(8) The term ``unit of local government'' means--
(A) any city, county, township, town, borough,
parish, village, or other general purpose political
subdivision of a State;
(B) any law enforcement district or judicial
enforcement district that--
(i) is established under applicable State
law; and
(ii) has the authority to, in a manner
independent of other State entities, establish
a budget and impose taxes; or
(C) any Indian tribe that performs law enforcement
functions, as determined by the Secretary of the
Interior.
(b) Prohibition of Profiling.--
(1) In general.--No law enforcement agent or law
enforcement agency shall engage in profiling.
(2) Enforcement.--
(A) Remedy.--The United States, or an individual
injured by profiling, may enforce this title in a civil
action for equitable or legal relief, filed in a State
court of general jurisdiction or in a district court of
the United States.
(B) Parties.--In any action brought under this
title, relief may be obtained against--
(i) any governmental body that employed any
law enforcement agent who engaged in profiling;
(ii) any agent of such body who engaged in
profiling; and
(iii) any person with supervisory authority
over such agent.
(C) Nature of proof.--Proof that the routine or
spontaneous investigatory activities of law enforcement
agents in a jurisdiction have had a disparate impact on
individuals with a particular characteristic described
in subsection (a)(5) shall constitute prima facie
evidence of a violation of this section.
(D) Attorney's fees.--In any action or proceeding
to enforce this section against any governmental body,
the court may allow a prevailing plaintiff, other than
the United States, reasonable attorney's fees as part
of the costs, and may include expert fees as part of
the attorney's fees.
SEC. 6. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS.
(a) Prohibition on Discrimination or Segregation in Public
Accommodations.--Section 201 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000a) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``sex,'' before ``or
national origin''; and
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``stadium'' and
all that follows and inserting ``stadium or other place
or establishment that provides exhibition,
entertainment, recreation, exercise, amusement,
gathering, or display;'';
(B) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph
(6); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
``(4) any establishment that provides a good, service, or
program, including a store, shopping center, online retailer or
service provider, salon, bank, gas station, food bank, service
or care center, shelter, travel agency, funeral parlor, or any
establishment that provides health care, accounting, or legal
services;
``(5) any train service, bus service, car service, taxi
service, airline service, station, depot, or other place of or
establishment that provides transportation service; and''.
(b) Prohibition on Discrimination or Segregation Under Law.--
Section 202 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000a-1) is amended by inserting
``sex,'' before ``or national origin''.
(c) Definitions and Rules of Construction.--Title II of such Act
(42 U.S.C. 2000a et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``SEC. 208. DEFINITIONS AND RULES.
``(a) Definitions.--
``(1) Race; color; religion; sex; sexual orientation;
gender identity; national origin.--The term `race', `color',
`religion', `sex (including sexual orientation and gender
identity)', or `national origin', used with respect to an
individual, includes--
``(A) the race, color, religion, sex (including
sexual orientation and gender identity), or national
origin, respectively, of another person with whom the
individual is associated or has been associated;
``(B) a perception or belief, even if inaccurate,
concerning the race, color, religion, sex (including
sexual orientation and gender identity), or national
origin, respectively, of the individual; and
``(C) in the case of race, traits historically
associated with race, including natural hair texture
and protective hairstyles.
``(2) Gender identity.--The term `gender identity' means
the gender-related identity, appearance, mannerisms, or other
gender-related characteristics of an individual, regardless of
the individual's designated sex at birth.
``(3) Including.--The term `including' means including, but
not limited to, consistent with the term's standard meaning in
Federal law.
``(4) Natural hairstyles.--The term `natural hair'
includes--
``(A) protective and natural hairstyles, which
includes braids, locs, weaves, twists, afros; and
``(B) natural hair texture, which includes wavy,
kinky, curl, and coily, and also the variation of
texture in between.
``(5) Sex.--The term `sex' includes--
``(A) a sex stereotype;
``(B) pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical
condition;
``(C) sexual orientation or gender identity; and
``(D) sex characteristics, including intersex
traits.
``(6) Sexual orientation.--The term `sexual orientation'
means an individual's actual or perceived romantic, physical,
or sexual attraction to other persons, or lack thereof, that
includes heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality.
``(b) Rules.--In providing a remedy under this Act:
``(1) In the case of any conduct alleged to be
discriminatory on the basis of sex, the remedy under this Act
for such conduct, to the extent it pertains to pregnancy,
childbirth, or a related medical condition may not result in a
less substantial remedy than any other remedy for
discrimination on the basis of sex.
``(2) In the case of any conduct alleged to be
discriminatory on the basis of sex (with respect to gender
identity), an individual shall not be denied access to a shared
facility, including a restroom, a locker room, and a dressing
room, that is in accordance with the individual's gender
identity.
``SEC. 209. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
``(a) Claims and Remedies Not Precluded.--Nothing in this title
shall be construed to limit the claims or remedies available to any
individual for an unlawful practice on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin including claims brought pursuant to
section 1979 or 1980 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985) or
any other law, including the Federal law amended by the Customer Non-
Discrimination Act, regulation, or policy.
``(b) No Negative Inference.--Nothing in this title shall be
construed to support any inference that any Federal law prohibiting a
practice on the basis of sex does not prohibit discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition, sexual
orientation, gender identity, or a sex stereotype.
``(c) Scope of an Establishment.--A reference in this title to an
establishment--
``(1) shall be construed to include an individual whose
operations affect commerce and who is a provider of a good,
service, or program; and
``(2) shall not be construed to be limited to a physical
facility or place.
``SEC. 210. CLAIMS.
``The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb
et seq.) shall not provide a claim concerning, or a defense to a claim
under this title or provide a basis for challenging the application or
enforcement of this title.''.
SEC. 7. STRICT VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY AND FARAGHER-ELLERTH
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE REMOVED.
Section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 et
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(l) An employer shall be liable for any act of discrimination
prohibited under this title (including harassment, intimidation, or
retaliation) committed by any of its employees.
``(m) It shall not be a defense to a claim under this title or
provide a basis for challenging the application or enforcement of this
title--
``(1) that an employer exercised reasonable care in
attempting to prevent or took corrective action regarding any
act of discrimination on the basis of sex (including
intimidation, harassment, or retaliation);
``(2) that adverse employment action was not taken by such
an employer; or
``(3) that an employee affected by that act did not take
advantage of preventive opportunities to avoid harm.''.
SEC. 8. ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT, CONSUMER, AND CIVIL RIGHTS DISPUTES.
(a) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are to--
(1) prohibit predispute arbitration agreements that force
arbitration of future employment, consumer, or civil rights
disputes; and
(2) prohibit agreements and practices that interfere with
the right of individuals, workers, and small businesses to
participate in a joint, class, or collective action related to
an employment, consumer, or civil rights dispute.
(b) In General.--Title 9 of the United States Code is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``CHAPTER 4--ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT, CONSUMER, AND CIVIL RIGHTS
DISPUTES
``SEC. 401. DEFINITIONS.
``In this chapter--
``(1) the term `civil rights dispute' means a dispute--
``(A) arising from an alleged violation of--
``(i) the Constitution of the United States
or the constitution of a State; and
``(ii) any Federal, State, or local law
that prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, age, gender identity, sexual
orientation, disability, religion, national
origin, or any legally protected status in
education, employment, credit, housing, public
accommodations and facilities, voting, veterans
or servicemembers, health care, or a program
funded or conducted by the Federal Government
or State government, including any law referred
to or described in section 62(e) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, including parts
of such law not explicitly referenced in such
section but that relate to protecting
individuals on any such basis; and
``(B) in which at least one party alleging a
violation described in subparagraph (A) is one or more
individuals (or their authorized representative),
including one or more individuals seeking certification
as a class under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or a comparable rule or provision of State
law;
``(2) the term `consumer dispute' means a dispute between--
``(A) one or more individuals who seek or acquire
real or personal property, services (including services
related to digital technology), securities or other
investments, money, or credit for personal, family, or
household purposes including an individual or
individuals who seek certification as a class under
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a
comparable rule or provision of State law; and
``(B)(i) the seller or provider of such property,
services, securities or other investments, money, or
credit; or
``(ii) a third party involved in the selling,
providing of, payment for, receipt or use of
information about, or other relationship to any such
property, services, securities or other investments,
money, or credit;
``(3) the term `employment dispute' means a dispute between
one or more individuals (or their authorized representative)
and a person arising out of or related to the work relationship
or prospective work relationship between them, including a
dispute regarding the terms of or payment for, advertising of,
recruiting for, referring of, arranging for, or discipline or
discharge in connection with, such work, regardless of whether
the individual is or would be classified as an employee or an
independent contractor with respect to such work, and including
a dispute arising under any law referred to or described in
section 62(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, including
parts of such law not explicitly referenced in such section but
that relate to protecting individuals on any such basis, and
including a dispute in which an individual or individuals seek
certification as a class under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or as a collective action under section 16(b)
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, or a comparable rule or
provision of State law;
``(4) the term `predispute arbitration agreement' means an
agreement to arbitrate a dispute that has not yet arisen at the
time of the making of the agreement; and
``(5) the term `predispute joint-action waiver' means an
agreement, whether or not part of a predispute arbitration
agreement, that would prohibit, or waive the right of, one of
the parties to the agreement to participate in a joint, class,
or collective action in a judicial, arbitral, administrative,
or other forum, concerning a dispute that has not yet arisen at
the time of the making of the agreement.
``SEC. 402. NO VALIDITY OR ENFORCEABILITY.
``(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this
title, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action
waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to an employment
dispute, consumer dispute, or civil rights dispute.
``(b) Applicability.--
``(1) In general.--An issue as to whether this chapter
applies with respect to a dispute shall be determined under
Federal law. The applicability of this chapter to an agreement
to arbitrate and the validity and enforceability of an
agreement to which this chapter applies shall be determined by
a court, rather than an arbitrator, irrespective of whether the
party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration
agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of
the contract containing such agreement, and irrespective of
whether the agreement purports to delegate such determinations
to an arbitrator.
``(2) Collective bargaining agreements.--Nothing in this
chapter shall apply to any arbitration provision in a contract
between an employer and a labor organization or between labor
organizations, except that no such arbitration provision shall
have the effect of waiving the right of a worker to seek
judicial enforcement of a right arising under a provision of
the Constitution of the United States, a State constitution, or
a Federal or State statute, or public policy arising
therefrom.''.
(c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
(1) In general.--Title 9 of the United States Code is
amended--
(A) in section 1 by striking ``of seamen,'' and all
that follows through ``interstate commerce,'' and
inserting in its place ``of individuals, regardless of
whether such individuals are designated as employees or
independent contractors for other purposes'';
(B) in section 2 by inserting ``or as otherwise
provided in chapter 4'' before the period at the end;
(C) in section 208--
(i) in the section heading by striking
``chapter 1; residual application'' and
inserting ``application''; and
(ii) by adding at the end the following:
``This chapter applies to the extent that this
chapter is not in conflict with chapter 4.'';
and
(D) in section 307--
(i) in the section heading by striking
``chapter 1; residual application'' and
inserting ``application''; and
(ii) by adding at the end the following:
``This chapter applies to the extent that this
chapter is not in conflict with chapter 4.''.
(2) Table of sections.--
(A) Chapter 2.--The table of sections of chapter 2
of title 9, United States Code, is amended by striking
the item relating to section 208 and inserting the
following:
``208. Application.''.
(B) Chapter 3.--The table of sections of chapter 3
of title 9, United States Code, is amended by striking
the item relating to section 307 and inserting the
following:
``307. Application.''.
(3) Table of chapters.--The table of chapters of title 9,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``4. Arbitration of employment, consumer, antitrust, and civil rights
disputes''.
SEC. 9. LIABILITY OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.
(a) Amendment.--Revised Statute 1979 (42 U.S.C. 1983) is amended by
inserting ``of the United States or'' before ``of any State''.
(b) Rules for Application.--In any action under Revised Statute
1979, the following shall apply:
(1) Definition of state.--The term ``State'' includes any
person or entity that undertakes action under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia.
(2) Action under color of law.--A private person or entity
undertakes action under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of the United States or of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, when--
(A) undertaking a public function delegated by the
United States or by a State or local government;
(B) voluntarily undertaking a public function;
(C) acting in concert with the United States or a
State or local government or acting in concert with an
individual officer, agent, or entity of the United
States or a State or local government;
(D) engaging in joint action towards a common goal
or plan with the United States or a State or local
government or engaging in joint action towards a common
goal or plan with an individual officer, agent, or
entity of the United States or of a State or local
government;
(E) engaged in a conspiracy with the United States
or a State or local government or engaged in a
conspiracy with an individual officer, agent, or entity
of the United States or of a State or local government;
(F) a close nexus exists between the private person
or entity and the United States or a State or local
government or a close nexus exists between an
individual officer, agent, or entity of the United
States or a State or local government;
(G) the activities of the private person or entity
is so entwined with the United States or a State or
local government or an individual officer, agent, or
entity of the United States or of a State or local
government such that the private person or entity is
fairly considered to be acting under color of law; or
(H) otherwise exercises powers traditionally
reserved to the United States or to State or local
government.
(3) Presumption.--A private person or entity is presumed to
be acting under color of law when, pursuant to a contract or
other legally binding agreement with the United States or with
a State or local government, the private person or entity
exercises any power of the United States or of that State or
local government or the private person or entity otherwise
undertakes the administration, operations, or other activities
of: the judiciary, law enforcement, public education, jails or
prisons, elections, municipal water services, municipal waste
removal, evictions, public parks, or public benefits programs.
(4) No defense of qualified immunity.--Qualified immunity
is not a defense in an action brought against any person who
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of the United States or of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.
(5) Respondeat superior.--In the case of any official of
any political subdivision of the United States or of a State,
if that official, acting under color of law, violates any
provision of this Act, that official shall be amenable to any
suit under this Act, and the political subdivision may be held
liable for the acts of that official, whether acting in his or
her official or individual capacity.
SEC. 10. EXPLICIT INCLUSION OF RULEMAKINGS.
Section 1003(a)(1) of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 (42
U.S.C. 2000d-7(a)(1)) is amended by inserting before the period at the
end the following: ``(including the provisions of any rule made to
implement any of the foregoing statutes)''.
SEC. 11. CONSTRUCTION.
(a) Relief.--Nothing in this Act, including any amendment made by
this Act, shall be construed to limit the scope of, or the relief
available under, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29
U.S.C. 794), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12101 et seq.), or any other provision of law.
(b) Defendants.--Nothing in this Act, including any amendment made
by this Act, shall be construed to limit the scope of the class of
persons who may be subjected to civil actions under the covered civil
rights provisions.
(c) Severability.--If any provision of this Act, or the application
of such a provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be
unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and the application of the
remaining provisions of this Act to any person or circumstance shall
not be affected thereby.
(d) Arbitration.--Nothing in this Act, or the amendments made by
this Act, shall be construed to prohibit the use of arbitration on a
voluntary basis after a dispute arises.
SEC. 12. EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) In General.--This Act, and the amendments made by this Act,
take effect on the date of enactment of this Act.
(b) Application.--This Act, and the amendments made by this Act,
apply to all actions or proceedings pending on or after the date of
enactment of this Act, and, in the case of section 8 and the amendments
made thereby, shall apply with respect to any dispute or claim that
arises or accrues on or after such date.
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