

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1701

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 22, 2025

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

AN ACT

To require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to monitor efforts by the People's Republic of China to build or buy strategic foreign ports, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Strategic Ports Re-
3 porting Act”.

4 **SEC. 2. MAPPING AND STRATEGY REQUIRED.**

5 (a) MAPPING OF GLOBAL PORTS.—The Secretary of
6 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense,
7 shall—

8 (1) develop an updated, global mapping of for-
9 eign and domestic ports identified to be of impor-
10 tance to the United States, because of a capability
11 to provide military, diplomatic, economic, or resource
12 exploration superiority; and

13 (2) identify any efforts by the Government of
14 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or other PRC
15 entities to build, buy, or otherwise control, directly
16 or indirectly, such ports.

17 (b) SUBMISSION OF MAP.—The Secretary of State,
18 in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit
19 the mapping developed pursuant to subsection (a) to the
20 appropriate congressional committees. Such submission
21 shall be in unclassified form, but may include a classified
22 annex.

1 **SEC. 3. DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEPARTMENT OF DE-**
2 **FENSE STUDY AND REPORT ON STRATEGIC**
3 **PORTS.**

4 (a) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of State, in
5 coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct
6 a study of—

7 (1) strategic ports;

8 (2) the reasons such ports are of interest to the
9 United States;

10 (3) the activities and plans of the Government
11 of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to expand
12 its control over strategic ports outside of the Peo-
13 ple's Republic of China;

14 (4) the public and private actors, such as China
15 Ocean Shipping Company, that are executing and
16 supporting the activities and plans of the Govern-
17 ment of the PRC to expand its control over strategic
18 ports outside of the PRC;

19 (5) the activities and plans of the Government
20 of the PRC to expand its control over maritime lo-
21 gistics by promoting products, such as LOGINK,
22 and setting industry standards outside the PRC;

23 (6) how the control by the Government of the
24 PRC over strategic ports outside of the PRC could
25 harm the national security or economic interests of

1 the United States and allies and partners of the
2 United States; and

3 (7) measures the United States Government
4 could take to ensure open access and security for
5 strategic ports and offer alternatives to PRC invest-
6 ments or stakes in strategic ports.

7 (b) CONDUCT OF STUDY.—The Secretary of State
8 and the Secretary of Defense may enter into an arrange-
9 ment with a federally funded research and development
10 center under which the center shall conduct the study re-
11 quired under subsection (a).

12 (c) REPORT.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year
14 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
15 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
16 Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
17 sional committees a report on the findings of the
18 study conducted under subsection (a).

19 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
20 graph (1) shall include—

21 (A) a detailed list of all known strategic
22 ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or
23 indirectly, by the PRC or by a foreign person
24 of the PRC, and an assessment of the national

1 security and economic interests relevant to each
2 such port;

3 (B) a detailed list of all known strategic
4 ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or
5 indirectly, by the United States or United
6 States persons and an assessment of the na-
7 tional security and economic interests relevant
8 to each such port;

9 (C) an assessment of vulnerabilities of—

10 (i) ports operated, controlled, or
11 owned, directly or indirectly, by the United
12 States; and

13 (ii) strategic ports;

14 (D) an analysis of the activities and ac-
15 tions of the Government of the PRC to gain
16 control or ownership over strategic ports, in-
17 cluding promoting products, such as LOGINK,
18 and setting industry standards;

19 (E) an assessment of how the Government
20 of the PRC plans to expand its control over
21 strategic ports outside of the PRC;

22 (F) a suggested strategy, developed in con-
23 sultation with the heads of the relevant United
24 States Government offices, that suggests
25 courses of action to secure trusted investment

1 and ownership of strategic ports and maritime
2 infrastructure, protect such ports and infra-
3 structure from PRC control, and ensure open
4 access and security for such ports, that in-
5 cludes—

6 (i) a list of relevant existing authori-
7 ties that can be used to carry out the
8 strategy;

9 (ii) a list of any additional authorities
10 necessary to carry out the strategy;

11 (iii) an assessment of products owned
12 by the Government of the PRC or by an
13 entity headquartered in the PRC that are
14 used in connection with strategic ports or
15 maritime infrastructure;

16 (iv) an assessment of the costs to—

17 (I) secure such trusted invest-
18 ment and ownership;

19 (II) replace products owned by
20 the Government of the PRC or an en-
21 tity headquartered in the PRC that
22 are used in connection with such
23 ports; and

1 (III) enhance transparency
2 around the negative impacts of PRC
3 control over strategic ports; and
4 (v) a list of funding sources to secure
5 trusted investment and ownership of stra-
6 tegic ports, which shall include—
7 (I) an identification of private
8 funding sources; and
9 (II) an identification of public
10 funding sources, including loans, loan
11 guarantees, and tax incentives; and
12 (G) a suggested strategy for Federal agen-
13 cies to maintain an up-to-date list of strategic
14 ports.
15 (H) an assessment of any national security
16 threat posed by such investments or activities to
17 United States diplomatic and defense personnel
18 and facilities in the vicinity of such ports, in-
19 cluding through cyber threats, electronically en-
20 abled espionage, or other means.

21 (3) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by
22 paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified
23 form, but may include a classified annex.

24 **SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.**

25 In this Act:

1 (1) The term “appropriate congressional com-
2 mittees” means—

3 (A) the Committee on Transportation and
4 Infrastructure, the Committee on Energy and
5 Commerce, the Committee on Armed Services,
6 the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Per-
7 manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
8 House of Representatives; and

9 (B) the Committee on Commerce, Science,
10 and Transportation, the Committee on Armed
11 Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations,
12 and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
13 Senate.

14 (2) The term “relevant United States Govern-
15 ment offices” means—

16 (A) the Unified Combatant Commands;
17 (B) the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
18 (C) the Office of the Secretary of State;
19 (D) the United States International Devel-
20 opment Finance Corporation;
21 (E) the Office of the Director of National
22 Intelligence; and
23 (F) the Maritime Administration of the
24 Department of Transportation.

1 (3) The term “strategic port” means an inter-
2 national port or waterway that the heads of the rel-
3 evant United States Government offices determine is
4 critical to the national security or economic pros-
5 perity of the United States.

Passed the House of Representatives May 22 (legis-
lative day May 21), 2025.

Attest: KEVIN F. MCCUMBER,
Clerk.