[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3452 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 3452
To codify the Six Assurances to Taiwan, provide congressional review of
the Six Assurances, protect Taiwan from coercion, and for other
purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 15, 2025
Mr. Krishnamoorthi (for himself, Mr. Meeks, Mr. Stanton, Mrs. Kim, Mr.
Nunn of Iowa, and Ms. Malliotakis) introduced the following bill; which
was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to
the Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by
the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall
within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To codify the Six Assurances to Taiwan, provide congressional review of
the Six Assurances, protect Taiwan from coercion, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Six Assurances to Taiwan Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Taiwan is a free and prosperous democracy of more than
23,000,000 people and an important economic partner to the
United States.
(2) The People's Republic of China (PRC) has long sought to
subjugate Taiwan and has not renounced the use of force to do
so.
(3) The United States longstanding One-China Policy, which
is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three United States-
China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, has guided
United States-Taiwan relations across successive
administrations and contributed to peace and stability in the
Indo-Pacific.
(4) From July to August 1982, before and immediately after
the release of the United States-China Joint Communique on
United States Arms Sales to Taiwan (``the 1982 Joint
Communique'') on August 17, 1982, the Reagan Administration
articulated six key foreign policy principles regarding United
States-Taiwan relations.
(5) On July 10, 1982, then-Under Secretary of State
Lawrence Eagleburger sent a cable to James Lilley, then-
director of the American Institute in Taiwan, detailing what
the United States had not agreed to in its negotiations with
the People's Republic of China over the 1982 Joint Communique.
He wrote--
(A) ``We have not agreed to set a date certain for
ending arms sales to Taiwan'';
(B) ``We have not agreed to prior consultation on
arms sales'';
(C) ``We have not agreed to any mediation role for
the U.S.'';
(D) ``We have not agreed to revise the Taiwan
Relations Act'';
(E) ``We have not agreed to take any position
regarding sovereignty over Taiwan''; and
(F) ``The PRC has at no time urged us to put
pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC; however,
we can assure you that we will never do so''.
(6) On August 17, 1982, then-Secretary of State Geroge
Shultz provided Lilley with a version of the Six Assurances for
Taiwan's government to release, stating that the United
States--
(A) ``has not agreed to set a date for ending arms
sales to Taiwan'';
(B) ``has not agreed to consult with the PRC on
arms sales to Taiwan'';
(C) ``will not play any mediation role between
Taipei and Beijing'';
(D) ``has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations
Act'';
(E) ``has not altered its position regarding
sovereignty over Taiwan''; and
(F) ``will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter
into negotiations with the PRC''.
(7) On August 17, 1982, then-Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs John H. Holdridge testified
on behalf of the executive branch before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations about the 1982 Joint Communique that--
(A) ``[W]e did not agree to set a date certain for
ending arms sales to Taiwan'';
(B) ``[The 1982 Joint Communique] should not be
read to imply that we have agreed to engage in prior
consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan'';
(C) ``[W]e see no mediation role for the United
States'';
(D) ``We have no plans to seek any such revisions
[to the Taiwan Relations Act]'';
(E) ``[T]here has been no change in our
longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over
Taiwan''; and
(F) ``[N]or will we attempt to exert pressure on
Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC''.
(8) On August 18, 1982, Holdridge testified on behalf of
the executive branch before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs about the 1982 Joint Communique that--
(A) ``[W]e did not agree to set a date certain for
ending arms sales to Taiwan'';
(B) ``[The 1982 Joint Communique] should not be
read that we have agreed to engage in prior
consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan'';
(C) ``[W]e see no mediation role for the United
States'';
(D) ``We have no plans to seek any such revisions
[to the Taiwan Relations Act]'';
(E) ``[T]here has been no change in our
longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over
Taiwan''; and
(F) ``[N]or will we attempt to exert pressure on
Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the People's
Republic of China''.
(9) These six foreign policy principles, as articulated by
Eagleburger, Shultz, and Holdridge, have collectively come to
be known as the Six Assurances.
(10) The House of Representatives and Senate passed a
concurrent resolution ``reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act
and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of United States-Taiwan
relations'' on May 16, 2016, and July 6, 2016, respectively.
(11) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public
Law 115-409) states that it is the policy of the United States
``to faithfully enforce all existing United States Government
commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act
of 1979 (Public Law 96-8), the [three Joint Communiques], and
the Six Assurances''.
(12) The National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal
Years 2019 through 2025 (Public Laws 115-232, 116-283, 116-92,
117-81, 117-263, 118-31, and 118-159) each recognized the
importance of the Six Assurances to United States-Taiwan
relations.
(13) The Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-260)
states that ``[i]t is the policy of the United States to
reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations
Act in a manner consistent with the `Six Assurances' and in
accordance with the United States `One China' policy''.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the maintenance of peace and stability across the
Taiwan Strait is in the political, security, and economic
interests of the United States and is a matter of international
concern;
(2) any unilateral change to the status quo from either
side or negotiated settlement of the question of Taiwan's
status without the consent of both sides of the Strait is
unacceptable;
(3) the future of Taiwan must be determined by peaceful
means; and
(4) the maintenance of the Six Assurances constitutes a
stabilizing and necessary component of United States policy
toward Taiwan.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to reaffirm that, in the
context of the 1982 Joint Communique, the United States--
(1) did not agree to set a date for ending arms sales to
Taiwan;
(2) did not agree to consult with the People's Republic of
China on arms sales to Taiwan;
(3) did not and will not agree to play any mediation role;
(4) did not agree to revise the Taiwan Relations Act;
(5) did not take any position regarding the issue of
sovereignty over Taiwan; and
(6) will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into
negotiations with the People's Republic of China.
SEC. 5. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATING TO THE SIX
ASSURANCES TO TAIWAN.
(a) Submission to Congress of Proposed Action.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership a notification that describes the
proposed action and the reasons for that action.
(2) Actions described.--
(A) In general.--An action described in this
paragraph is an action--
(i) to pause or terminate the provision of
arms of a defensive character to Taiwan;
(ii) to negotiate with the People's
Republic of China about the provision of arms
of a defensive character to Taiwan;
(iii) to mediate between Taiwan and the
People's Republic of China regarding the issue
of sovereignty over Taiwan;
(iv) to change the United States
longstanding position on the issue of the
sovereignty over Taiwan; or
(v) to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter
into negotiations with the People's Republic of
China.
(3) Description of type of action.--Each notification
submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to an action
described in paragraph (2) shall include a description of
whether the action is or is not intended to significantly alter
United States foreign policy with respect to Taiwan or the
People's Republic of China.
(4) Inclusion of additional matter.--Each notification
submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is
intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy
with respect to Taiwan or the People's Republic of China shall
include a description of--
(A) the significant alteration to United States
foreign policy with respect to Taiwan or the People's
Republic of China;
(B) the anticipated effect of the action on the
economic and national security interests of the United
States; and
(C) the anticipated effect of the action on the
issue of the sovereignty over Taiwan.
(b) Period for Review by Congress.--
(1) In general.--During the period of 30 calendar days
beginning on the date on which the President submits a
notification under subsection (a)(1), the appropriate
congressional committees should hold hearings and briefings and
otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the
notification.
(2) Exception.--The period for congressional review under
paragraph (1) of a notification required to be submitted under
subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the notification
is submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7
in any calendar year.
(3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional
review period.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
during the period for congressional review provided for under
paragraph (1) of a notification submitted under subsection
(a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2),
including any additional period for such review as applicable
under the exception provided in paragraph (2), neither the
President nor any other officer or employee of the United
States may expend any appropriated funds in furtherance of that
action unless a joint resolution of approval with respect to
that action is enacted in accordance with subsection (c).
(4) Limitation on actions during presidential consideration
of a joint resolution of disapproval.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval
relating to a notification submitted under subsection (a)(1)
proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both
Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), neither
the President nor any other officer or employee of the United
States may expend any appropriated funds in furtherance of that
action for a period of 12 calendar days after the date of
passage of the joint resolution of disapproval.
(5) Limitation on actions during congressional
reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint
resolution of disapproval relating to a notification submitted
under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in
subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance
with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the joint
resolution, neither the President nor any other officer or
employee of the United States may take that action or expend
any appropriated funds in furtherance of that action for a
period of 10 calendar days after the date of the President's
veto.
(6) Effect of enactment of a joint resolution of
disapproval.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a
joint resolution of disapproval relating to a notification
submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described
in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with subsection
(c), neither the President nor any other officer or employee of
the United States may take that action or expend any
appropriated funds in furtherance of that action.
(c) Joint Resolutions of Disapproval or Approval.--
(1) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) Joint resolution of approval.--The term ``joint
resolution of approval'' means only a joint resolution
of either House of Congress--
(i) the title of which is as follows: ``A
joint resolution approving the President's
proposal to take an action relating to the Six
Assurances to Taiwan.''; and
(ii) the sole matter after the resolving
clause of which is the following: ``Congress
approves of the action relating to the action
with respect to the Six Assurances to Taiwan
proposed by the President in the notification
submitted to Congress under section 2(a)(1) of
the Six Assurances to Taiwan Act on _______
relating to ________.'', with the first blank
space being filled with the appropriate date
and the second blank space being filled with a
short description of the proposed action.
(B) Joint resolution of disapproval.--The term
``joint resolution of disapproval'' means only a joint
resolution of either House of Congress--
(i) the title of which is as follows: ``A
joint resolution disapproving the President's
proposal to take an action relating to the Six
Assurances to Taiwan.''; and
(ii) the sole matter after the resolving
clause of which is the following: ``Congress
disapproves of the action relating to the Six
Assurances to Taiwan proposed by the President
in the notification submitted to Congress under
section 2(a)(1) of the Six Assurances to Taiwan
Act on _______ relating to ________.'', with
the first blank space being filled with the
appropriate date and the second blank space
being filled with a short description of the
proposed action.
(2) Introduction.--During the period of 30 calendar days
provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any additional
period as applicable under the exception provided in subsection
(b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of
disapproval may be introduced--
(A) in the House of Representatives, by the
majority leader or the minority leader; and
(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the
majority leader's designee) or the minority leader (or
the minority leader's designee).
(3) Floor consideration in house of representatives.--If
the appropriate congressional committee of the House of
Representatives has not reported the joint resolution within 10
legislative days after the date of referral, that committee
shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint
resolution.
(4) Consideration in the senate.--
(A) Committee referral.--A joint resolution of
approval or joint resolution of disapproval introduced
in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations.
(B) Reporting and discharge.--If the committee to
which a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval was referred has not reported
the joint resolution within 10 calendar days after the
date of referral of the joint resolution, that
committee shall be discharged from further
consideration of the joint resolution and the joint
resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
(C) Proceeding to consideration.--Notwithstanding
Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in
order at any time after the Committee on Foreign
Relations reports a joint resolution of approval or
joint resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has
been discharged from consideration of such a joint
resolution (even though a previous motion to the same
effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the
consideration of the joint resolution, and all points
of order against the joint resolution (and against
consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The
motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not
subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider
the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed
to shall not be in order.
(D) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals
from the decisions of the Chair relating to the
application of the rules of the Senate, as the case may
be, to the procedure relating to a joint resolution of
approval or joint resolution of disapproval shall be
decided without debate.
(E) Consideration of veto messages.--Debate in the
Senate of any veto message with respect to a joint
resolution of approval or joint resolution of
disapproval, including all debatable motions and
appeals in connection with the joint resolution, shall
be limited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between,
and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority
leader or their designees.
(5) Rules relating to senate and house of
representatives.--
(A) Treatment of senate joint resolution in
house.--In the House of Representatives, the following
procedures shall apply to a joint resolution of
approval or a joint resolution of disapproval received
from the Senate (unless the House has already passed a
joint resolution relating to the same proposed action):
(i) The joint resolution shall be referred
to the appropriate committee.
(ii) If a committee to which a joint
resolution has been referred has not reported
the joint resolution within 5 legislative days
after the date of referral, that committee
shall be discharged from further consideration
of the joint resolution.
(iii) Beginning on the third legislative
day after each committee to which a joint
resolution has been referred reports the joint
resolution to the House or has been discharged
from further consideration thereof, it shall be
in order to move to proceed to consider the
joint resolution in the House. All points of
order against the motion are waived. Such a
motion shall not be in order after the House
has disposed of a motion to proceed on the
joint resolution. The previous question shall
be considered as ordered on the motion to its
adoption without intervening motion. The motion
shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider
the vote by which the motion is disposed of
shall not be in order.
(iv) The joint resolution shall be
considered as read. All points of order against
the joint resolution and against its
consideration are waived. The previous question
shall be considered as ordered on the joint
resolution to final passage without intervening
motion except 2 hours of debate equally divided
and controlled by the sponsor of the joint
resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A
motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the
joint resolution shall not be in order.
(B) Treatment of house joint resolution in
senate.--
(i) Receipt before passage.--If, before the
passage by the Senate of a joint resolution of
approval or joint resolution of disapproval,
the Senate receives an identical joint
resolution from the House of Representatives,
the following procedures shall apply:
(I) That joint resolution shall not
be referred to a committee.
(II) With respect to that joint
resolution--
(aa) the procedure in the
Senate shall be the same as if
no joint resolution had been
received from the House of
Representatives; but
(bb) the vote on passage
shall be on the joint
resolution from the House of
Representatives.
(ii) Receipt after passage.--If, following
passage of a joint resolution of approval or
joint resolution of disapproval in the Senate,
the Senate receives an identical joint
resolution from the House of Representatives,
that joint resolution shall be placed on the
appropriate Senate calendar.
(iii) No companion measure.--If a joint
resolution of approval or a joint resolution of
disapproval is received from the House, and no
companion joint resolution has been introduced
in the Senate, the Senate procedures under this
subsection shall apply to the House joint
resolution.
(C) Application to revenue measures.--The
provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in the
House of Representatives to a joint resolution of
approval or joint resolution of disapproval that is a
revenue measure.
(6) Rules of house of representatives and senate.--This
subsection is enacted by Congress--
(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively,
and as such is deemed a part of the rules of each
House, respectively, and supersedes other rules only to
the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and
(B) with full recognition of the constitutional
right of either House to change the rules (so far as
relating to the procedure of that House) at any time,
in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the
case of any other rule of that House.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
SEC. 6. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof, is held
invalid, the validity of the remainder of this Act and the application
of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.
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