

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3452

To codify the Six Assurances to Taiwan, provide congressional review of the Six Assurances, protect Taiwan from coercion, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 15, 2025

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI (for himself, Mr. MEEKS, Mr. STANTON, Mrs. KIM, Mr. NUNN of Iowa, and Ms. MALLIOTAKIS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To codify the Six Assurances to Taiwan, provide congressional review of the Six Assurances, protect Taiwan from coercion, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Six Assurances to Tai-
5 wan Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

1 (1) Taiwan is a free and prosperous democracy
2 of more than 23,000,000 people and an important
3 economic partner to the United States.

4 (2) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has
5 long sought to subjugate Taiwan and has not re-
6 nounced the use of force to do so.

7 (3) The United States longstanding One-China
8 Policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act,
9 the three United States-China Joint Communiqués,
10 and the Six Assurances, has guided United States-
11 Taiwan relations across successive administrations
12 and contributed to peace and stability in the Indo-
13 Pacific.

14 (4) From July to August 1982, before and im-
15 mediately after the release of the United States-
16 China Joint Communiqué on United States Arms
17 Sales to Taiwan (“the 1982 Joint Communiqué”) on
18 August 17, 1982, the Reagan Administration articu-
19 lated six key foreign policy principles regarding
20 United States-Taiwan relations.

21 (5) On July 10, 1982, then-Under Secretary of
22 State Lawrence Eagleburger sent a cable to James
23 Lilley, then-director of the American Institute in
24 Taiwan, detailing what the United States had not
25 agreed to in its negotiations with the People’s Re-

1 public of China over the 1982 Joint Communiqué.

2 He wrote—

3 (A) “We have not agreed to set a date cer-
4 tain for ending arms sales to Taiwan”;

5 (B) “We have not agreed to prior consulta-
6 tion on arms sales”;

7 (C) “We have not agreed to any mediation
8 role for the U.S.”;

9 (D) “We have not agreed to revise the Tai-
10 wan Relations Act”;

11 (E) “We have not agreed to take any posi-
12 tion regarding sovereignty over Taiwan”; and

13 (F) “The PRC has at no time urged us to
14 put pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the
15 PRC; however, we can assure you that we will
16 never do so”.

17 (6) On August 17, 1982, then-Secretary of
18 State George Shultz provided Lillee with a version
19 of the Six Assurances for Taiwan’s government to
20 release, stating that the United States—

21 (A) “has not agreed to set a date for end-
22 ing arms sales to Taiwan”;

23 (B) “has not agreed to consult with the
24 PRC on arms sales to Taiwan”;

(C) “will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing”;

(D) “has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act”;

(E) “has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan”; and

(F) “will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC”.

(A) “[W]e did not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan”;

(B) “[The 1982 Joint Communiqué] should not be read to imply that we have agreed to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan”;

(C) “[W]e see no mediation role for the United States”;

(D) “We have no plans to seek any such revisions [to the Taiwan Relations Act]”;

(E) “[T]here has been no change in our longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan”; and

(F) “[N]or will we attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC”.

7 (8) On August 18, 1982, Holdridge testified on
8 behalf of the executive branch before the House
9 Committee on Foreign Affairs about the 1982 Joint
10 Communiqué that—

(A) “[W]e did not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan”;

13 (B) “[The 1982 Joint Communiqué]
14 should not be read that we have agreed to en-
15 gage in prior consultations with Beijing on
16 arms sales to Taiwan”;

17 (C) “[W]e see no mediation role for the
18 United States”;

19 (D) “We have no plans to seek any such
20 revisions [to the Taiwan Relations Act]”;

(E) “[T]here has been no change in our longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan”; and

(F) “[N]or will we attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the People’s Republic of China”.

8 (10) The House of Representatives and Senate
9 passed a concurrent resolution “reaffirming the Tai-
10 wan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as corner-
11 stones of United States-Taiwan relations” on May
12 16, 2016, and July 6, 2016, respectively.

(13) The Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-260) states that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act in a manner consistent with the ‘Six Assurances’ and in accordance with the United States ‘One China’ policy”.

7 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

8 It is the sense of Congress that—

9 (1) the maintenance of peace and stability
10 across the Taiwan Strait is in the political, security,
11 and economic interests of the United States and is
12 a matter of international concern;

22 SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

23 It is the policy of the United States to reaffirm that,
24 in the context of the 1982 Joint Communiqué, the United
25 States—

1 (1) did not agree to set a date for ending arms
2 sales to Taiwan;

3 (2) did not agree to consult with the People's
4 Republic of China on arms sales to Taiwan;

5 (3) did not and will not agree to play any medi-
6 ation role;

7 (4) did not agree to revise the Taiwan Relations
8 Act;

9 (5) did not take any position regarding the
10 issue of sovereignty over Taiwan; and

11 (6) will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter
12 into negotiations with the People's Republic of
13 China.

14 **SEC. 5. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RE-**
15 **LATING TO THE SIX ASSURANCES TO TAIWAN.**

16 (a) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF PROPOSED AC-
17 TION.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other
19 provision of law, before taking any action described
20 in paragraph (2), the President shall submit to the
21 appropriate congressional committees and leadership
22 a notification that describes the proposed action and
23 the reasons for that action.

24 (2) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—An action described in this paragraph is an action—

(i) to pause or terminate the provision

of arms of a defensive character to Taiwan;

(ii) to negotiate with the People's Re-

public of China about the provision of arms of a defensive character to Taiwan;

(iii) to mediate between Taiwan and

the People's Republic of China regarding the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan;

(iv) to change the United States long-

standing position on the issue of the sovereignty over Taiwan; or

(v) to exert pressure on Taiwan to

enter into negotiations with the People's Republic of China.

(3) DESCRIPTION OF TYPE OF ACTION.—Each

notification submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the action is or is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Taiwan or the People's Republic of China.

1 (4) INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL MATTER.—Each
2 notification submitted under paragraph (1) that re-
3 lates to an action that is intended to significantly
4 alter United States foreign policy with respect to
5 Taiwan or the People's Republic of China shall in-
6 clude a description of—

7 (A) the significant alteration to United
8 States foreign policy with respect to Taiwan or
9 the People's Republic of China;

10 (B) the anticipated effect of the action on
11 the economic and national security interests of
12 the United States; and

13 (C) the anticipated effect of the action on
14 the issue of the sovereignty over Taiwan.

15 (b) PERIOD FOR REVIEW BY CONGRESS.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—During the period of 30 cal-
17 endar days beginning on the date on which the
18 President submits a notification under subsection
19 (a)(1), the appropriate congressional committees
20 should hold hearings and briefings and otherwise ob-
21 tain information in order to fully review the notifica-
22 tion.

23 (2) EXCEPTION.—The period for congressional
24 review under paragraph (1) of a notification re-
25 quired to be submitted under subsection (a)(1) shall

1 be 60 calendar days if the notification is submitted
2 on or after July 10 and on or before September 7
3 in any calendar year.

4 (3) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING INITIAL
5 CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PERIOD.—Notwithstanding
6 any other provision of law, during the period for
7 congressional review provided for under paragraph
8 (1) of a notification submitted under subsection
9 (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection
10 (a)(2), including any additional period for such re-
11 view as applicable under the exception provided in
12 paragraph (2), neither the President nor any other
13 officer or employee of the United States may expend
14 any appropriated funds in furtherance of that action
15 unless a joint resolution of approval with respect to
16 that action is enacted in accordance with subsection
17 (c).

18 (4) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING PRESI-
19 DENTIAL CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION
20 OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other pro-
21 vision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval re-
22 lating to a notification submitted under subsection
23 (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection
24 (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance
25 with subsection (c), neither the President nor any

1 other officer or employee of the United States may
2 expend any appropriated funds in furtherance of
3 that action for a period of 12 calendar days after
4 the date of passage of the joint resolution of dis-
5 approval.

6 (5) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING CONGRES-
7 SIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION
8 OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other pro-
9 vision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval re-
10 lating to a notification submitted under subsection
11 (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection
12 (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance
13 with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the
14 joint resolution, neither the President nor any other
15 officer or employee of the United States may take
16 that action or expend any appropriated funds in fur-
17 therance of that action for a period of 10 calendar
18 days after the date of the President's veto.

19 (6) EFFECT OF ENACTMENT OF A JOINT RESO-
20 LUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any
21 other provision of law, if a joint resolution of dis-
22 approval relating to a notification submitted under
23 subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in
24 subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with sub-
25 section (c), neither the President nor any other offi-

1 cer or employee of the United States may take that
2 action or expend any appropriated funds in further-
3 ance of that action.

4 (c) JOINT RESOLUTIONS OF DISAPPROVAL OR AP-
5 PROVAL.—

6 (1) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

7 (A) JOINT RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL.—
8 The term “joint resolution of approval” means
9 only a joint resolution of either House of Con-
10 gress—

11 (i) the title of which is as follows: “A
12 joint resolution approving the President’s
13 proposal to take an action relating to the
14 Six Assurances to Taiwan.”; and

15 (ii) the sole matter after the resolving
16 clause of which is the following: “Congress
17 approves of the action relating to the ac-
18 tion with respect to the Six Assurances to
19 Taiwan proposed by the President in the
20 notification submitted to Congress under
21 section 2(a)(1) of the Six Assurances to
22 Taiwan Act on _____ relating
23 to _____.”, with the first
24 blank space being filled with the appro-
25 priate date and the second blank space

1 being filled with a short description of the
2 proposed action.

3 (B) JOINT RESOLUTION OF DIS-
4 APPROVAL.—The term “joint resolution of dis-
5 approval” means only a joint resolution of ei-
6 ther House of Congress—

7 (i) the title of which is as follows: “A
8 joint resolution disapproving the Presi-
9 dent’s proposal to take an action relating
10 to the Six Assurances to Taiwan.”; and

11 (ii) the sole matter after the resolving
12 clause of which is the following: “Congress
13 disapproves of the action relating to the
14 Six Assurances to Taiwan proposed by the
15 President in the notification submitted to
16 Congress under section 2(a)(1) of the Six
17 Assurances to Taiwan Act on
18 _____ relating to
19 _____.”, with the first blank
20 space being filled with the appropriate date
21 and the second blank space being filled
22 with a short description of the proposed
23 action.

24 (2) INTRODUCTION.—During the period of 30
25 calendar days provided for under subsection (b)(1),

1 including any additional period as applicable under
2 the exception provided in subsection (b)(2), a joint
3 resolution of approval or joint resolution of dis-
4 approval may be introduced—

5 (A) in the House of Representatives, by
6 the majority leader or the minority leader; and
7 (B) in the Senate, by the majority leader
8 (or the majority leader's designee) or the mi-
9 nority leader (or the minority leader's des-
10 ignee).

11 (3) FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REP-
12 RESENTATIVES.—If the appropriate congressional
13 committee of the House of Representatives has not
14 reported the joint resolution within 10 legislative
15 days after the date of referral, that committee shall
16 be discharged from further consideration of the joint
17 resolution.

18 (4) CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.—

19 (A) COMMITTEE REFERRAL.—A joint reso-
20 lution of approval or joint resolution of dis-
21 approval introduced in the Senate shall be re-
22 ferred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

23 (B) REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.—If the
24 committee to which a joint resolution of ap-
25 probation or joint resolution of disapproval was re-

1 ferred has not reported the joint resolution
2 within 10 calendar days after the date of refer-
3 ral of the joint resolution, that committee shall
4 be discharged from further consideration of the
5 joint resolution and the joint resolution shall be
6 placed on the appropriate calendar.

7 (C) PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.—
8 Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing
9 Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time
10 after the Committee on Foreign Relations re-
11 ports a joint resolution of approval or joint res-
12 olution of disapproval to the Senate or has been
13 discharged from consideration of such a joint
14 resolution (even though a previous motion to
15 the same effect has been disagreed to) to move
16 to proceed to the consideration of the joint reso-
17 lution, and all points of order against the joint
18 resolution (and against consideration of the
19 joint resolution) are waived. The motion to pro-
20 ceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject
21 to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider
22 the vote by which the motion is agreed to or
23 disagreed to shall not be in order.

24 (D) RULINGS OF THE CHAIR ON PROCE-
25 DURE.—Appeals from the decisions of the Chair

1 relating to the application of the rules of the
2 Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure re-
3 lating to a joint resolution of approval or joint
4 resolution of disapproval shall be decided with-
5 out debate.

6 (E) CONSIDERATION OF VETO MES-
7 SAGES.—Debate in the Senate of any veto mes-
8 sage with respect to a joint resolution of ap-
9 proval or joint resolution of disapproval, includ-
10 ing all debatable motions and appeals in con-
11 nection with the joint resolution, shall be lim-
12 ited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between,
13 and controlled by, the majority leader and the
14 minority leader or their designees.

15 (5) RULES RELATING TO SENATE AND HOUSE
16 OF REPRESENTATIVES.—

17 (A) TREATMENT OF SENATE JOINT RESO-
18 LUTION IN HOUSE.—In the House of Rep-
19 resentatives, the following procedures shall
20 apply to a joint resolution of approval or a joint
21 resolution of disapproval received from the Sen-
22 ate (unless the House has already passed a
23 joint resolution relating to the same proposed
24 action):

(i) The joint resolution shall be referred to the appropriate committee.

6 (6) RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
7 AND SENATE.—This subsection is enacted by Con-
8 gress—

21 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
22 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
23 gressional committees” means—

1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
2 Senate.

3 **SEC. 6. SEVERABILITY.**

4 If any provision of this Act, or the application there-
5 of, is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this
6 Act and the application of such provision to other persons
7 and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

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