[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4281 Introduced in House (IH)]
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119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 4281
To authorize the President to take actions to ensure Israel is prepared
for all contingencies if Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon, and
for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
July 2, 2025
Mr. Gottheimer (for himself, Mr. Lawler, Mr. Moskowitz, Mr. Suozzi, and
Mr. Vargas) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To authorize the President to take actions to ensure Israel is prepared
for all contingencies if Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Bunker Buster Act of 2025''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines
``high-enriched uranium'' as uranium enriched to at least 20
percent uranium-235.
(2) Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran
agreed to refrain from producing enriched uranium containing
more than 3.67 percent uranium-235 for 15 years.
(3) On January 13, 2019, the head of the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi, told the Fars News
Agency, ``If we want to come out of the nuclear deal and
produce, within four days we could start our 20 percent.''.
(4) On April 16, 2021, Dr. Salehi told the state television
that Iran had begun enriching uranium to 60 percent.
(5) On July 14, 2021, the former President of Iran,
President Hassan Rouhani, said during a press conference that
Iran has the knowledge and ability to enrich weapons-grade
uranium at 90 percent.
(6) According to an International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) report, as of May 11, 2024, Iran has 142.1 kilograms
(313.2 pounds) of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, an
increase of 20.6 kilograms (45.4 pounds) since the last report
by the United Nations watchdog in February. Uranium enriched at
60 percent purity is just a short, technical step away from
weapons-grade levels of 90 percent. Iran's overall stockpile of
enriched uranium stands at 6,201.3 kilograms (1,3671.5 pounds),
which represents an increase of 675.8 kilograms (1,489.8
pounds) since the IAEA's previous report.
(7) The current stockpile is enough to make several nuclear
bombs according to the criteria the IAEA uses to make such
determinations.
(8) Reports indicate the Iran may be constructing new
facilities to help expand its nuclear program.
(9) In June 2024, the IAEA elected to censure Iran for its
violation of international responsibilities under its nuclear
agreement and demanded its cooperation, including the
readmittance of inspectors and the restoration of camera
surveillance at nuclear sites.
(10) In June the IAEA announced Iran is installing 1,400
new advanced centrifuges at its Fordow facility.
(11) Since October 7, 2023, Israel has been at war with
Hamas in the Gaza strip, which has used Iranian funding and
direction to target the Jewish state.
(12) Hamas continues to hide within civilian
infrastructure, fire rockets at humanitarian crossings, and
steal international aid and resources that are only further
hurting the Palestinian civilians. Hamas has built tunnels
under United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) buildings, including a large
data center under UNRWA's Gaza base, and stores weapons in
UNRWA schools.
(13) As of June 2024, Ansarullah, or otherwise known as the
Houthis, have launched at least 60 attacks at ships. They have
seized 1 vessel, killed 4 sailors, and sunk 2 ships since
November 2023. The Houthis have also launched drones, missiles,
and mortars toward Israel and at United States and its allies.
The Houthis operate with Iranian funds.
(14) Since October 7, 2023, Hezbollah has launched over
5,000 rockets, missiles, and drones at Israel. Iran has,
provided Hezbollah with more than 100,000 missiles and rockets.
(15) Iran is expanding its missile capacity and
weaponization program to further assist their proxies across
the region.
(16) On June 12, 2025, 60 days had lapsed without an
agreement in diplomatic negotiations to prevent Iran from
attaining a nuclear weapon.
(17) On June 12, 2025, IAEA board declared Iran in
violation of its non-proliferation obligations.
(18) On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a coordinated series
of strikes against Iranian military and government targets in
efforts to disrupt Iran's development of a nuclear weapon based
on Israeli intelligence assessment that Iran had taken steps
putting them closer to achieving nuclear latency.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States should--
(1) seek to extend the limitations on Iran's enriched
uranium, including through engagement in multilateral
diplomatic initiatives;
(2) ensure that Israel and other allies are prepared for
all contingencies if Iran pursues development of a nuclear
weapon;
(3) send a clear signal to Iran that development of a
nuclear weapon will never be tolerated; and
(4) reaffirm the United States commitment to deter Iranian
nuclear development with a credible military threat.
SEC. 4. ACTIONS TO ENSURE ISRAEL IS PREPARED FOR ALL CONTINGENCIES IF
IRAN SEEKS TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON.
(a) In General.--Subject to the preliminary conditions described in
subsection (b), the President is authorized to take the actions
described in subsection (c), upon the request of the Government of
Israel, to ensure Israel is prepared for all contingencies if Iran
seeks to develop a nuclear weapon.
(b) Preliminary Conditions.--The President may exercise the
authority of subsection (a) only if the President first determines and
certifies to Congress that it is vital to the national security
interests of the United States to do so and the conditions in
subsection (c)(2)(B) are met.
(c) Actions Described.--The actions described in this subsection
are the following:
(1) To provide for the construction of infrastructure in
Israel to accommodate large ordnance systems that are designed
to destroy underground nuclear infrastructure, including--
(A) construction of extended runways for aircraft
that carry the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP);
(B) aircraft to carry and deliver the MOP;
(C) basing options for such aircraft; and
(D) munition storage facilities.
(2)(A) To store in the territory of Israel the MOP or
related munitions described in paragraph (1), to be used by the
United States except as provided in subparagraph (B).
(B) To transfer the MOP or related munitions described in
paragraph (1) to Israeli custody if the President determines
and certifies to Congress that--
(i) Iran--
(I) is in noncompliance with the NPT
Safeguards Agreement;
(II) has modified its implementation of the
NPT Safeguards Agreement (including modified
Code 3.1); or
(III) as determined by the President, has
reduced access of inspectors of the IAEA in
such a manner so as to be prejudicial to the
IAEA's ability to provide confidence as to the
non-diversion of declared nuclear material and
absence of undeclared nuclear activities;
(ii) it is vital to the national security of the
United States to do so;
(iii) Israel has no other means to achieve a mutual
national security objective of destroying Iran's
underground nuclear infrastructure or facilities; and
(iv) a dual key control system is in place
requiring approval by the President, acting through the
Secretary of Defense (which may not be further
delegated) for deployment of the MOP or related
munitions described in paragraph (1) prior to Israeli
deployment of such munitions.
(3) To provide for training of Israeli personnel with
respect to the MOP or related munitions described in paragraph
(1).
(4) To conduct joint research and development with Israel
to--
(A) enhance United States ordnance; and
(B) develop Israeli capability for ordnance to
destroy underground infrastructure, including Hezbollah
rocket storage and manufacturing facilities and
underground Iranian nuclear facilities.
(d) NPT Safeguards Agreement Defined.--In this section, the term
``NPT Safeguards Agreement'' means the Agreement between Iran and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
which entered into force on May 15, 1974.
SEC. 5. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this Act may be construed to serve as an authorization
for the use of military force against Iran.
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