[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5287 Introduced in House (IH)]

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119th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 5287

To require an annual report on the advanced semiconductor manufacturing 
            capabilities of the People's Republic of China.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 10, 2025

Mr. Vindman (for himself and Mr. Moylan) introduced the following bill; 
         which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To require an annual report on the advanced semiconductor manufacturing 
            capabilities of the People's Republic of China.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``China Advanced Technology Monitoring 
Act''.

SEC. 2. ANNUAL REPORT ON ADVANCED SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING 
              CAPABILITIES OF CHINA.

    (a) Report.--Not later than May 1, 2026, and annually thereafter 
for 5 years, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads 
other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to 
the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate a report on the semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, 
including advanced and mature-node semiconductors, of the People's 
Republic of China.
    (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall also 
include the following:
            (1) A statement of key findings and assessments with 
        respect to the United States strategy to counter China and 
        specific policy recommendations to Congress regarding China's 
        goal to advance semiconductor manufacturing.
            (2) An assessment of the domestic semiconductor 
        manufacturing capabilities of China.
            (3) A detailed analysis of the industrial policies of China 
        and the outcomes of such policies on such manufacturing 
        capabilities.
            (4) A year-by-year assessment of technological development 
        efforts by China in the fields of semiconductor manufacturing 
        and artificial intelligence chipmaking, including relevant 
        government plans and initiatives, that specifically addresses 
        gains in every aspect of manufacturing, such as design, 
        intellectual property, research and development, silicon and 
        critical minerals, industrial gases, intermediaries such as 
        photomasks, equipment, tools, and software, and advanced 
        packaging techniques.
            (5) A description of engagement between China and other 
        foreign countries with respect to semiconductor manufacturing 
        equipment capabilities, including--
                    (A) coordination with other countries and markets 
                to expand semiconductor influence; and
                    (B) foreign investment, trade, and research ties 
                and partnerships with other countries.
            (6) An analysis of the extent to which there is 
        collaboration, joint ventures, or partnerships between China 
        and other foreign countries with respect to semiconductor 
        manufacturing.
            (7) An analysis of the impact of United States and allied 
        and partner export controls on covered items related to the 
        development of semiconductor manufacturing in China, 
        specifically with respect to the effectiveness of current 
        United States protections against--
                    (A) export control workarounds and loopholes;
                    (B) circumvention through foreign investments or 
                third-party acquisitions; and
                    (C) risks posed by collaborative agreements, 
                partnerships, supplier relocations, and contractual 
                relationships that may indirectly benefit China.
            (8) An assessment of whether such export controls remain 
        effective in curbing the development of semiconductor 
        manufacturing equipment capabilities in China and 
        recommendations for enhancing effectiveness of such controls.
            (9) An assessment of the implications of Chinese 
        semiconductor manufacturing dominance on--
                    (A) United States global competitiveness;
                    (B) United States national security and national 
                economic security; and
                    (C) the national economy of the United States.
    (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form and shall include a classified annex, providing 
additional details and supporting intelligence, as available. The 
unclassified portion, or an unclassified synopsis, of the report shall 
concurrently be made available on a publicly available website of the 
Federal Government and a notice to that effect shall be concurrently 
published in the Federal Register.
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