[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1731 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
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119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1731
To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to
develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the
People's Republic of China.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 13, 2025
Mr. Coons (for himself, Mr. Ricketts, Mr. Kaine, Mr. Cornyn, and Ms.
Slotkin) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to
develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the
People's Republic of China.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.
This Act may be cited as the ``Combating PRC Overseas and Unlawful
Networked Threats through Enhanced Resilience Act of 2025'' or the
``COUNTER Act of 2025''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
According to multiple sources, including the 2024 annual report to
Congress, titled ``Military and Security Developments Involving the
People's Republic of China'' and known informally as the ``China
Military Power Report''--
(1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and
basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain
military power at greater distances;
(2) a global PLA logistics network could disrupt United
States military operations as the PRC's global military
objectives evolve;
(3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened the first
overseas PLA military base near the commercial port of Doraleh
in Djibouti;
(4) in June 2022, the PRC and Cambodia hosted a ceremony to
mark the groundbreaking on PRC-built upgrades to Ream Naval
Base, including a joint logistics and training center and a
pier to accommodate larger ships;
(5) officials from Cambodia and the PRC officially
inaugurated expanded port features at the Ream Naval Base in
April 2025; and
(6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the PRC's
access to the port at the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, the PRC
is likely pursuing access to additional military facilities to
support naval, air, and ground forces projection in many
countries, including Angola, Bangladesh, Burma, Cuba,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Seychelles,
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, and
the United Arab Emirates.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
While the executive branch has undertaken case-by-case efforts to
forestall the establishment of new PRC bases in several countries, it
is the sense of Congress that future efforts to counter the PRC's
global basing intentions must--
(1) proceed with the urgency required to address the
strategic implications of the PRC's actions;
(2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination with
respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-of-government
approach;
(3) ensure that the United States Government maintains a
proactive posture rather than a reactive posture in order to
maximize strategic decision space;
(4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions that would be
influential in shaping a partner's decision making regarding
giving the PRC military access to its sovereign territory;
(5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the PRC's
global basing intentions within the context of the overall
United States strategic competition with the PRC;
(6) factor in the potential contributions of key allies and
partners to help respond to the PRC's pursuit of global basing,
many of which--
(A) have historic ties and influence in many of the
geographic areas the PRC is targeting for potential
future bases; and
(B) rely on the same basic intelligence picture to
form our baseline understanding of the PRC's global
intentions;
(7) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing for enduring
organizational structures to effectively address the issue of
PRC global basing intentions; and
(8) ensure that future force posture, freedom of movement,
and other interests of the United States and our allies are not
jeopardized by the continued expansion of PRC bases.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate;
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives;
(F) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives;
(G) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives; and
(H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) PLA.--The term ``PLA'' means the People's Liberation
Army of the PRC.
(3) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of
China.
(4) PRC global basing.--The term ``PRC global basing''
means the establishment of physical locations outside the
geographic boundaries of the PRC where the PRC maintains some
element of the People's Liberation Army, PRC intelligence or
security forces, or infrastructure designed to support the
presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security forces, for
the purposes of potential power projection.
SEC. 5. ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S C-PRC GLOBAL BASING STRATEGY.
(a) Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit an intelligence assessment, in classified form, if needed, to
the appropriate congressional committees. The assessment shall analyze
the risk posed by PRC global basing to the United States or to any
United States allies with respect to their ability to project power,
maintain freedom of movement, and protect other interests as a function
of the PRC's current or potential locations identified pursuant to
subsection (b)(2)(A).
(b) Strategy.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other
appropriate senior Federal officials, shall submit a strategy
to the appropriate congressional committees that contains the
information described in paragraph (2).
(2) Contents.--The strategy required under paragraph (1)
shall--
(A) identify not fewer than 5 locations of chief
concern where the PRC maintains a physical presence, or
is suspected to be seeking a physical presence, which
could ultimately transition into a PRC global base;
(B) include a comprehensive listing of executive
branch entities currently involved in addressing
aspects of PRC global basing, including any resource or
personnel constraints limiting the ability to
effectively address the issue of PRC global basing
intentions;
(C) describe in detail all executive branch
efforts--
(i) to mitigate the impacts of the
locations referred to in subparagraph (A); or
(ii) to prevent the PRC from establishing
new global bases; and
(D) for each of the locations referred to in
subparagraph (A), identify the actions by the United
States or its allies that would be most effective to
enable the respective foreign governments to terminate
plans for hosting a PRC base.
(c) Task Force.--Not later than 90 days after submitting the
strategy described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate senior
Federal officials, shall establish an interagency task force--
(1) to implement the strategy described in section (b) to
counter the PRC's efforts at the locations of chief concern;
and
(2) to identify mitigation measures that would prevent the
PRC from establishing new bases in locations beyond the
locations of chief concern identified pursuant to subsection
(b)(2)(A).
(d) Quadrennial Reviews and Reports.--Not later than 4 years after
the submission of the strategy required under subsection (b), and not
less frequently than once every 4 years thereafter, the Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of
National Intelligence, and other appropriate senior Federal officials,
shall--
(1) conduct a review of the Executive Branch's strategy and
overall approach in response to the PRC global basing
intentions; and
(2) submit the results of such review, including the
information described in subsection (b)(2), to the appropriate
congressional committees.
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