[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1731 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 96
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1731
To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to
develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the
People's Republic of China.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 13, 2025
Mr. Coons (for himself, Mr. Ricketts, Mr. Kaine, Mr. Cornyn, and Ms.
Slotkin) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
June 18, 2025
Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to
develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the
People's Republic of China.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.</DELETED>
<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Combating PRC Overseas and
Unlawful Networked Threats through Enhanced Resilience Act of 2025'' or
the ``COUNTER Act of 2025''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> According to multiple sources, including the 2024 annual
report to Congress, titled ``Military and Security Developments
Involving the People's Republic of China'' and known informally as the
``China Military Power Report''--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas
logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project
and sustain military power at greater distances;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) a global PLA logistics network could disrupt
United States military operations as the PRC's global military
objectives evolve;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened the
first overseas PLA military base near the commercial port of
Doraleh in Djibouti;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) in June 2022, the PRC and Cambodia hosted a
ceremony to mark the groundbreaking on PRC-built upgrades to
Ream Naval Base, including a joint logistics and training
center and a pier to accommodate larger ships;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) officials from Cambodia and the PRC officially
inaugurated expanded port features at the Ream Naval Base in
April 2025; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the
PRC's access to the port at the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia,
the PRC is likely pursuing access to additional military
facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection
in many countries, including Angola, Bangladesh, Burma, Cuba,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Seychelles,
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, and
the United Arab Emirates.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> While the executive branch has undertaken case-by-case
efforts to forestall the establishment of new PRC bases in several
countries, it is the sense of Congress that future efforts to counter
the PRC's global basing intentions must--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) proceed with the urgency required to address
the strategic implications of the PRC's actions;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination
with respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-of-
government approach;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) ensure that the United States Government
maintains a proactive posture rather than a reactive posture in
order to maximize strategic decision space;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions that
would be influential in shaping a partner's decision making
regarding giving the PRC military access to its sovereign
territory;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the
PRC's global basing intentions within the context of the
overall United States strategic competition with the
PRC;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) factor in the potential contributions of key
allies and partners to help respond to the PRC's pursuit of
global basing, many of which--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) have historic ties and influence in
many of the geographic areas the PRC is targeting for
potential future bases; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) rely on the same basic intelligence
picture to form our baseline understanding of the PRC's
global intentions;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing for
enduring organizational structures to effectively address the
issue of PRC global basing intentions; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) ensure that future force posture, freedom of
movement, and other interests of the United States and our
allies are not jeopardized by the continued expansion of PRC
bases.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> In this Act:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The
term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (G) the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (H) the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) PLA.--The term ``PLA'' means the People's
Liberation Army of the PRC.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's
Republic of China.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) PRC global basing.--The term ``PRC global
basing'' means the establishment of physical locations outside
the geographic boundaries of the PRC where the PRC maintains
some element of the People's Liberation Army, PRC intelligence
or security forces, or infrastructure designed to support the
presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security forces, for
the purposes of potential power projection.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 5. ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S C-PRC GLOBAL BASING
STRATEGY.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit an intelligence assessment, in classified form, if needed, to
the appropriate congressional committees. The assessment shall analyze
the risk posed by PRC global basing to the United States or to any
United States allies with respect to their ability to project power,
maintain freedom of movement, and protect other interests as a function
of the PRC's current or potential locations identified pursuant to
subsection (b)(2)(A).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Strategy.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other
appropriate senior Federal officials, shall submit a strategy
to the appropriate congressional committees that contains the
information described in paragraph (2).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Contents.--The strategy required under
paragraph (1) shall--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) identify not fewer than 5 locations of
chief concern where the PRC maintains a physical
presence, or is suspected to be seeking a physical
presence, which could ultimately transition into a PRC
global base;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) include a comprehensive listing of
executive branch entities currently involved in
addressing aspects of PRC global basing, including any
resource or personnel constraints limiting the ability
to effectively address the issue of PRC global basing
intentions;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) describe in detail all executive
branch efforts--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) to mitigate the impacts of the
locations referred to in subparagraph (A);
or</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) to prevent the PRC from
establishing new global bases; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) for each of the locations referred to
in subparagraph (A), identify the actions by the United
States or its allies that would be most effective to
enable the respective foreign governments to terminate
plans for hosting a PRC base.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Task Force.--Not later than 90 days after submitting
the strategy described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate senior
Federal officials, shall establish an interagency task force--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to implement the strategy described in section
(b) to counter the PRC's efforts at the locations of chief
concern; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to identify mitigation measures that would
prevent the PRC from establishing new bases in locations beyond
the locations of chief concern identified pursuant to
subsection (b)(2)(A).</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Quadrennial Reviews and Reports.--Not later than 4
years after the submission of the strategy required under subsection
(b), and not less frequently than once every 4 years thereafter, the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the
Director of National Intelligence, and other appropriate senior Federal
officials, shall--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) conduct a review of the Executive Branch's
strategy and overall approach in response to the PRC global
basing intentions; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) submit the results of such review, including
the information described in subsection (b)(2), to the
appropriate congressional committees.</DELETED>
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.
This Act may be cited as the ``Combating PRC Overseas and Unlawful
Networked Threats through Enhanced Resilience Act of 2025'' or the
``COUNTER Act of 2025''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
According to multiple sources, including the 2024 annual report to
Congress, titled ``Military and Security Developments Involving the
People's Republic of China'' and known informally as the ``China
Military Power Report''--
(1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and
basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain
military power at greater distances;
(2) a global PLA logistics network could give the PRC
increased capabilities to surveil or disrupt United States
military operations;
(3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened the first
overseas PLA military base near the commercial port of Doraleh
in Djibouti;
(4) in 2019, the PRC also attempted to acquire
strategically important port infrastructure at Subic Bay in the
Philippines, but was stopped by the Governments of the United
States, the Philippines, and Japan, and by private investors;
(5) in April 2025, officials from the PRC and Cambodia
officially inaugurated the China-Cambodia Ream Naval Base Joint
Support and Training Center and celebrated the expansion of
port facilities at Ream Naval Base, some of which appear to
have been reserved for the use of PRC ships that have been
continuously stationed at Ream Naval Base since December 2023;
and
(6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the PRC's
access to the port at the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, the PRC
is likely pursuing access to additional military facilities to
support naval, air, and ground forces projection in many
countries.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
While the executive branch has undertaken case-by-case efforts to
forestall the establishment of new PRC permanent military presence in
several countries, it is the sense of Congress that future efforts to
counter the PRC's global basing intentions must--
(1) proceed with the urgency required to address the
strategic implications of the PRC's actions;
(2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination with
respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-of-government
approach;
(3) ensure that the United States Government maintains a
proactive posture rather than a reactive posture in order to
maximize strategic decision space;
(4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions that would be
influential in shaping a partner's decision making regarding
giving the PRC military access to its sovereign territory;
(5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the PRC's
global basing intentions within the context of the overall
United States strategic competition with the PRC;
(6) consider how the PRC uses commercial and scientific
cooperation as a guise for establishing access for the PLA and
other PRC security forces in foreign countries;
(7) factor in the potential contributions of key allies and
partners to help respond to the PRC's pursuit of global basing,
many of which--
(A) have historic ties and influence in many of the
geographic areas the PRC is targeting for potential
future bases; and
(B) rely on the same basic intelligence picture to
form our baseline understanding of the PRC's global
intentions;
(8) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing for enduring
organizational structures and security and foreign assistance
and cooperation efforts to effectively address the issue of PRC
global basing intentions; and
(9) ensure that future force posture, freedom of movement,
and other interests of the United States and our allies are not
jeopardized by the continued expansion of PRC bases.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate;
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives;
(F) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives;
(G) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives; and
(H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) PLA.--The term ``PLA'' means the People's Liberation
Army of the PRC.
(3) PRC.--The term ``PRC'' means the People's Republic of
China.
(4) PRC global basing.--The term ``PRC global basing''
means the establishment of physical locations outside the
geographic boundaries of the PRC where the PRC maintains some
element of the People's Liberation Army, PRC intelligence or
security forces, or infrastructure designed to support the
presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security forces, for
the purposes of potential power projection.
SEC. 5. ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S C-PRC GLOBAL BASING STRATEGY.
(a) Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit an intelligence assessment, in classified form, if needed, to
the appropriate congressional committees. The assessment shall analyze
the risk posed by PRC global basing to the United States or to any
United States allies with respect to their ability to project power,
maintain freedom of movement, and protect other interests as a function
of the PRC's current or potential locations identified pursuant to
subsection (b)(2)(A).
(b) Strategy.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other
appropriate senior Federal officials, shall submit a strategy
to the appropriate congressional committees that contains the
information described in paragraph (2).
(2) Contents.--The strategy required under paragraph (1)
shall--
(A) identify not fewer than 5 locations that pose
the greatest potential risks, as identified in the
assessment required under subsection (a), where the PRC
maintains a physical presence, or is suspected to be
seeking a physical presence, which could ultimately
transition into a PRC global base;
(B) include a comprehensive listing of executive
branch entities currently involved in addressing
aspects of PRC global basing, including estimated
programmatic and personal resource requirements on an
agency-by-agency basis to effectively address the issue
of PRC global basing intentions, and any relevant
resource constraints;
(C) describe in detail all executive branch efforts
to mitigate the impacts to the national interests of
the United States and partner countries of the
locations referred to in subparagraph (A) and prevent
the PRC from establishing new global bases, including
with resources described in subparagraph (B); and
(D) for each of the locations referred to in
subparagraph (A), identify the actions by the United
States or its allies that would be most effective in
ensuring the respective foreign governments terminate
plans for hosting a PRC base.
(c) Task Force.--Not later than 90 days after submitting the
strategy described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate senior
Federal officials, shall establish an interagency task force--
(1) to implement the strategy described in section (b) to
counter the PRC's efforts at the locations of chief concern;
and
(2) to identify mitigation measures that would prevent the
PRC from establishing new bases in locations beyond the
locations of chief concern identified pursuant to subsection
(b)(2)(A).
(d) Quadrennial Reviews and Reports.--Not later than 4 years after
the submission of the strategy required under subsection (b), and not
less frequently than once every 4 years thereafter, the Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of
National Intelligence, and other appropriate senior Federal officials,
shall--
(1) conduct a review of the Executive Branch's strategy and
overall approach in response to the PRC global basing
intentions; and
(2) submit the results of such review, including the
information described in subsection (b)(2), to the appropriate
congressional committees.
Calendar No. 96
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1731
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to
develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the
People's Republic of China.
_______________________________________________________________________
June 18, 2025
Reported with an amendment