

Calendar No. 96

119TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1731

To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the People's Republic of China.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 13, 2025

Mr. COONS (for himself, Mr. RICKETTS, Mr. KAINE, Mr. CORNYN, and Ms. SLOTKIN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JUNE 18, 2025

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

A BILL

To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the People's Republic of China.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Combating PRC Over-
3 seas and Unlawful Networked Threats through Enhanced
4 Resilience Act of 2025” or the “COUNTER Act of 2025”.

5 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

6 According to multiple sources, including the 2024 an-
7 nual report to Congress, titled “Military and Security De-
8 velopments Involving the People’s Republic of China” and
9 known informally as the “China Military Power Report”—

10 (1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas
11 logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA
12 to project and sustain military power at greater dis-
13 tances;

14 (2) a global PLA logistics network could dis-
15 rupt United States military operations as the PRC’s
16 global military objectives evolve;

17 (3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened
18 the first overseas PLA military base near the com-
19 mercial port of Doraleh in Djibouti;

20 (4) in June 2022, the PRC and Cambodia
21 hosted a ceremony to mark the groundbreaking on
22 PRC-built upgrades to Ream Naval Base, including
23 a joint logistics and training center and a pier to ac-
24 commodate larger ships;

1 (5) officials from Cambodia and the PRC offi-
 2 cially inaugurated expanded port features at the
 3 Ream Naval Base in April 2025; and

4 (6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the
 5 PRC's access to the port at the Ream Naval Base
 6 in Cambodia, the PRC is likely pursuing access to
 7 additional military facilities to support naval, air,
 8 and ground forces projection in many countries, in-
 9 cluding Angola, Bangladesh, Burma, Cuba, Equa-
 10 torial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozam-
 11 bique, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New
 12 Guinea, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka,
 13 Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, and the United
 14 Arab Emirates.

15 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

16 While the executive branch has undertaken case-by-
 17 case efforts to forestall the establishment of new PRC
 18 bases in several countries, it is the sense of Congress that
 19 future efforts to counter the PRC's global basing inten-
 20 tions must—

21 (1) proceed with the urgency required to ad-
 22 dress the strategic implications of the PRC's actions;
 23 (2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination
 24 with respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-
 25 of-government approach;

1 (3) ensure that the United States Government
2 maintains a proactive posture rather than a reactive
3 posture in order to maximize strategic decision
4 space;

5 (4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions
6 that would be influential in shaping a partner's deci-
7 sion making regarding giving the PRC military ac-
8 cess to its sovereign territory;

9 (5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the
10 PRC's global basing intentions within the context of
11 the overall United States strategic competition with
12 the PRC;

13 (6) factor in the potential contributions of key
14 allies and partners to help respond to the PRC's
15 pursuit of global basing; many of which—

16 (A) have historic ties and influence in
17 many of the geographic areas the PRC is tar-
18 geting for potential future bases; and

19 (B) rely on the same basic intelligence pic-
20 ture to form our baseline understanding of the
21 PRC's global intentions;

22 (7) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing
23 for enduring organizational structures to effectively
24 address the issue of PRC global basing intentions;
25 and

1 (8) ensure that future force posture, freedom of
2 movement, and other interests of the United States
3 and our allies are not jeopardized by the continued
4 expansion of PRC bases.

5 **SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.**

6 In this Act:

7 (1) ~~APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-~~
8 ~~TEES.~~—The term “appropriate congressional com-
9 mittees” means—

10 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
11 the Senate;

12 (B) the Committee on Armed Services of
13 the Senate;

14 (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of
15 the Senate;

16 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of
17 the Senate;

18 (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
19 the House of Representatives;

20 (F) the Committee on Armed Services of
21 the House of Representatives;

22 (G) the Permanent Select Committee on
23 Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
24 and

1 (H) the Committee on Appropriations of
2 the House of Representatives.

3 (2) PLA.—The term “PLA” means the Peo-
4 ple’s Liberation Army of the PRC.

5 (3) PRC.—The term “PRC” means the Peo-
6 ple’s Republic of China.

7 (4) PRC GLOBAL BASING.—The term “PRC
8 global basing” means the establishment of physical
9 locations outside the geographic boundaries of the
10 PRC where the PRC maintains some element of the
11 People’s Liberation Army, PRC intelligence or secu-
12 rity forces, or infrastructure designed to support the
13 presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security
14 forces, for the purposes of potential power projec-
15 tion.

16 **SEC. 5. ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S C-PRC**
17 **GLOBAL BASING STRATEGY.**

18 (a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the
19 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
20 Intelligence shall submit an intelligence assessment, in
21 classified form, if needed, to the appropriate congressional
22 committees. The assessment shall analyze the risk posed
23 by PRC global basing to the United States or to any
24 United States allies with respect to their ability to project
25 power, maintain freedom of movement, and protect other

1 interests as a function of the PRC's current or potential
 2 locations identified pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A):

3 ~~(b) STRATEGY.—~~

4 ~~(1) IN GENERAL.—~~Not later than 180 days
 5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
 6 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
 7 Defense and other appropriate senior Federal offi-
 8 cials, shall submit a strategy to the appropriate con-
 9 gressional committees that contains the information
 10 described in paragraph (2):

11 ~~(2) CONTENTS.—~~The strategy required under
 12 paragraph (1) shall—

13 ~~(A)~~ identify not fewer than 5 locations of
 14 chief concern where the PRC maintains a phys-
 15 ical presence, or is suspected to be seeking a
 16 physical presence, which could ultimately transi-
 17 tion into a PRC global base;

18 ~~(B)~~ include a comprehensive listing of ex-
 19 ecutive branch entities currently involved in ad-
 20 dressing aspects of PRC global basing, includ-
 21 ing any resource or personnel constraints lim-
 22 iting the ability to effectively address the issue
 23 of PRC global basing intentions;

24 ~~(C)~~ describe in detail all executive branch
 25 efforts—

1 (i) to mitigate the impacts of the loca-
2 tions referred to in subparagraph (A); or

3 (ii) to prevent the PRC from estab-
4 lishing new global bases; and

5 (D) for each of the locations referred to in
6 subparagraph (A), identify the actions by the
7 United States or its allies that would be most
8 effective to enable the respective foreign govern-
9 ments to terminate plans for hosting a PRC
10 base.

11 (c) TASK FORCE.—Not later than 90 days after sub-
12 mitting the strategy described in subsection (b), the Sec-
13 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
14 fense and other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall
15 establish an interagency task force—

16 (1) to implement the strategy described in sec-
17 tion (b) to counter the PRC's efforts at the locations
18 of chief concern; and

19 (2) to identify mitigation measures that would
20 prevent the PRC from establishing new bases in lo-
21 cations beyond the locations of chief concern identi-
22 fied pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A).

23 (d) QUADRENNIAL REVIEWS AND REPORTS.—Not
24 later than 4 years after the submission of the strategy re-
25 quired under subsection (b), and not less frequently than

1 once every 4 years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in
 2 coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director
 3 of National Intelligence, and other appropriate senior Fed-
 4 eral officials, shall—

5 (1) conduct a review of the Executive Branch’s
 6 strategy and overall approach in response to the
 7 PRC global basing intentions; and

8 (2) submit the results of such review, including
 9 the information described in subsection (b)(2), to the
 10 appropriate congressional committees.

11 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.**

12 *This Act may be cited as the “Combating PRC Over-*
 13 *seas and Unlawful Networked Threats through Enhanced*
 14 *Resilience Act of 2025” or the “COUNTER Act of 2025”.*

15 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

16 *According to multiple sources, including the 2024 an-*
 17 *nual report to Congress, titled “Military and Security De-*
 18 *velopments Involving the People’s Republic of China” and*
 19 *known informally as the “China Military Power Report”—*

20 (1) *the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas lo-*
 21 *gistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to*
 22 *project and sustain military power at greater dis-*
 23 *tances;*

1 (2) a global PLA logistics network could give the
2 PRC increased capabilities to surveil or disrupt
3 United States military operations;

4 (3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened
5 the first overseas PLA military base near the commer-
6 cial port of Doraleh in Djibouti;

7 (4) in 2019, the PRC also attempted to acquire
8 strategically important port infrastructure at Subic
9 Bay in the Philippines, but was stopped by the Gov-
10 ernments of the United States, the Philippines, and
11 Japan, and by private investors;

12 (5) in April 2025, officials from the PRC and
13 Cambodia officially inaugurated the China-Cambodia
14 Ream Naval Base Joint Support and Training Cen-
15 ter and celebrated the expansion of port facilities at
16 Ream Naval Base, some of which appear to have been
17 reserved for the use of PRC ships that have been con-
18 tinuously stationed at Ream Naval Base since Decem-
19 ber 2023; and

20 (6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the
21 PRC's access to the port at the Ream Naval Base in
22 Cambodia, the PRC is likely pursuing access to addi-
23 tional military facilities to support naval, air, and
24 ground forces projection in many countries.

1 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

2 *While the executive branch has undertaken case-by-case*
3 *efforts to forestall the establishment of new PRC permanent*
4 *military presence in several countries, it is the sense of Con-*
5 *gress that future efforts to counter the PRC's global basing*
6 *intentions must—*

7 *(1) proceed with the urgency required to address*
8 *the strategic implications of the PRC's actions;*

9 *(2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination*
10 *with respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-*
11 *of-government approach;*

12 *(3) ensure that the United States Government*
13 *maintains a proactive posture rather than a reactive*
14 *posture in order to maximize strategic decision space;*

15 *(4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions*
16 *that would be influential in shaping a partner's deci-*
17 *sion making regarding giving the PRC military ac-*
18 *cess to its sovereign territory;*

19 *(5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the*
20 *PRC's global basing intentions within the context of*
21 *the overall United States strategic competition with*
22 *the PRC;*

23 *(6) consider how the PRC uses commercial and*
24 *scientific cooperation as a guise for establishing access*
25 *for the PLA and other PRC security forces in foreign*
26 *countries;*

(7) factor in the potential contributions of key allies and partners to help respond to the PRC's pursuit of global basing, many of which—

(A) have historic ties and influence in many of the geographic areas the PRC is targeting for potential future bases; and

(B) rely on the same basic intelligence picture to form our baseline understanding of the PRC's global intentions;

(8) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing for enduring organizational structures and security and foreign assistance and cooperation efforts to effectively address the issue of PRC global basing intentions; and

(9) ensure that future force posture, freedom of movement, and other interests of the United States and our allies are not jeopardized by the continued expansion of PRC bases.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.*—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

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3 (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of
4 the Senate;

5 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the
6 Senate;

7 (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
8 House of Representatives;

9 (F) the Committee on Armed Services of the
10 House of Representatives;

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12 telligence of the House of Representatives; and

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14 House of Representatives.

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16 Liberation Army of the PRC.

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21 tions outside the geographic boundaries of the PRC
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24 forces, or infrastructure designed to support the pres-

1 *ence of PRC military, intelligence, or security forces,*
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 13 *a function of the PRC's current or potential locations iden-*
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15 *(b) STRATEGY.—*

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 17 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*
 18 *State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense*
 19 *and other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall*
 20 *submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional*
 21 *committees that contains the information described in*
 22 *paragraph (2).*

23 *(2) CONTENTS.—The strategy required under*
 24 *paragraph (1) shall—*

1 (A) identify not fewer than 5 locations that
2 pose the greatest potential risks, as identified in
3 the assessment required under subsection (a),
4 where the PRC maintains a physical presence, or
5 is suspected to be seeking a physical presence,
6 which could ultimately transition into a PRC
7 global base;

8 (B) include a comprehensive listing of exec-
9 utive branch entities currently involved in ad-
10 dressing aspects of PRC global basing, including
11 estimated programmatic and personal resource
12 requirements on an agency-by-agency basis to ef-
13 fectively address the issue of PRC global basing
14 intentions, and any relevant resource con-
15 straints;

16 (C) describe in detail all executive branch
17 efforts to mitigate the impacts to the national in-
18 terests of the United States and partner coun-
19 tries of the locations referred to in subparagraph
20 (A) and prevent the PRC from establishing new
21 global bases, including with resources described
22 in subparagraph (B); and

23 (D) for each of the locations referred to in
24 subparagraph (A), identify the actions by the
25 United States or its allies that would be most ef-

1 *fective in ensuring the respective foreign govern-*
2 *ments terminate plans for hosting a PRC base.*

3 *(c) TASK FORCE.—Not later than 90 days after sub-*
4 *mitting the strategy described in subsection (b), the Sec-*
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19 *with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National In-*
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23 *strategy and overall approach in response to the PRC*
24 *global basing intentions; and*

1 (2) *submit the results of such review, including*
2 *the information described in subsection (b)(2), to the*
3 *appropriate congressional committees.*

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