[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1883 Reported in Senate (RS)]
<DOC>
Calendar No. 99
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1883
To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government
strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of
China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost
adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the
United States.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 22, 2025
Mr. Coons (for himself, Mr. McCormick, Ms. Klobuchar, Mr. Cornyn, Mr.
Sullivan, Mr. Bennet, Mr. Mullin, and Ms. Slotkin) introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations
June 18, 2025
Reported by Mr. Risch, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government
strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of
China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost
adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the
United States.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Defending International
Security by Restricting Unacceptable Partnerships and Tactics Act'' or
``DISRUPT Act''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) The People's Republic of China, the Russian
Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea are each considered--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) a foreign adversary (as defined in
section 825(d) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat.
322; 46 U.S.C. 50309 note));</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) a country of risk (as defined in
section 6432(a) of the Servicemember Quality of Life
Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 2488;
42 U.S.C. 7144b note)) for purposes of assessing
counterintelligence risks posed by certain visitors to
National Laboratories;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) a foreign country of concern (as
defined in section 10612(a) of the Research and
Development, Competition, and Innovation Act (Public
Law 117-167; 136 Stat. 1635; 42 U.S.C. 19221
note));</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) a covered foreign country (as defined
in section 164 of the Servicemember Quality of Life
Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 1818;
10 U.S.C. 4651 note prec.)) for purposes of a
prohibition on operation, procurement, and contracting
relating to foreign-made light detection and ranging
technology; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) a covered foreign country (as defined
in section 1622 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117-81; 135 Stat.
2086; 10 U.S.C. 421 note prec.)) for purposes of a
strategy and plan to implement certain defense
intelligence reforms.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) According to the 2025 Intelligence Community
Annual Threat Assessment, the United States faces an
increasingly contested and dangerous global landscape as the
four adversaries named in paragraph (1) deepen cooperation in a
manner that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) reinforces threats posed by each such
adversary individually; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) poses new challenges to the strength
and power of the United States globally.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Much of the cooperation referred to in
paragraph (3) is occurring bilaterally, as the People's
Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic
of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
strengthen diplomatic, economic, and military ties in
accordance with bilateral agreements, which include--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation
and Mutual Assistance between China and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, signed at Beijing July 11,
1961;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Republic of
Iran and the People's Republic of China, issued on
March 27, 2021;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the Joint Statement of the Russian
Federation and the People's Republic of China on
International Relations Entering a New Era and Global
Sustainable Development, issued on February 4,
2022;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership between the Russian Federation and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed at
Pyongyang June 18, 2024;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) the Iranian-Russian Treaty on
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed at Moscow
January 17, 2025; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) traditional relations of friendship
and cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) The most concerning forms of such cooperation
with respect to the interests of the United States occur
bilaterally in the realm of defense cooperation. Examples
include the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) The transfer and sharing of weapons
and munitions. Since 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran
has supplied the Russian Federation with drones and
ballistic missiles, and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea has provided artillery ammunition and
ballistic missiles. Likewise, the Russian Federation
has agreed to provide the Islamic Republic of Iran with
Su-35 fighter jets and air defense
assistance.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) The transfer and sharing of dual-use
technologies and capabilities. Dual-use goods supplied
by the People's Republic of China have enabled the
Russian Federation to continue defense production in
the face of wide-ranging sanctions and export controls
intended to prevent the Russian Federation from
accessing the necessary components to fuel its defense
industry. In turn, reporting indicates that the Russian
Federation has provided technical expertise on
satellite technology to the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea and is working closely with the
People's Republic of China on air defense and submarine
technology.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) Joint military activities and
exercises. The military forces of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea are actively participating
in the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, and
joint military exercises between the People's Republic
of China and the Russian Federation are expanding in
scope, scale, and geographic reach, including in close
proximity to territory of the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) Coordination on disinformation and
cyber operations, including coordinated messaging aimed
at denigrating and isolating the United States
internationally.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Adversaries of the United States are also
cooperating in a manner that may circumvent United States and
multilateral economic tools. Examples include the
following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) The continued purchase by the People's
Republic of China of oil from the Islamic Republic of
Iran despite sanctions imposed by the Treasury of the
United States on oil from the Islamic Republic of
Iran.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) The veto by the Russian Federation of,
and abstention by the People's Republic of China in a
vote on, a United Nations Security Council resolution
relating to monitoring United Nations Security Council-
levied sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) Adversaries of the United States are
cooperating multilaterally in international institutions such
as the United Nations and through expanded multilateral
groupings, such as the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
group (commonly known as ``BRICS''), to isolate and erode the
influence of the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) Such increased cooperation and alignment among
the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, to an unprecedented extent, poses a significant
threat to United States interests and national
security.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) Such increasing alignment--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) allows each such adversary to
modernize its military more quickly than previously
anticipated;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) enables unforeseen breakthroughs in
capabilities through the sharing among such adversaries
of critical military technologies, which could erode
the technological edge of the United States Armed
Forces;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) presents increasing challenges to
strategies of isolation or containment against such
individual adversaries, since the People's Republic of
China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of
Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea now
provide critical lifelines to each other;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) threatens the effectiveness of United
States economic tools, as such adversaries cooperate to
evade United States sanctions and export controls and
seek to establish alternative payment mechanisms that
do not require transactions in United States dollars;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) increases the chances of United States
conflict or tensions with any one of such adversaries
drawing in another, thereby posing a greater risk that
the United States will have to contend with
simultaneous threats from such adversaries in one or
more theaters.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) to disrupt or frustrate the most dangerous
aspects of cooperation between and among the People's Republic
of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran,
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including by
using the threat of sanctions and export controls, bringing
such cooperation to light, and sharing information with United
States allies and partners who may--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) share the concerns and objectives of
the United States; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) have influence over such
adversaries;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) to constrain such grouping from expanding its
footprint or capabilities across the world; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) to prepare for the increasing likelihood that
the United States could face simultaneous challenges or
conflict with multiple such adversaries in multiple theaters,
including by bolstering deterrence across all priority
theaters.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 4. TASK FORCES AND REPORTS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Task Forces on Adversary Alignment.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence,
and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
each--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) establish a task force on adversary
alignment; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) designate a point of contact on
adversary alignment, who shall serve as the head of the
task force for the applicable department, office, or
agency.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Requirements.--Each task force established
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) comprise--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) subject matter experts
covering each of--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (I) the People's Republic
of China;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (II) the Russian
Federation;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (III) the Islamic Republic
of Iran; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (IV) the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) representatives covering all
core functions of the department, office, or
agency of the Secretary or Director
establishing the task force; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) a mix of analysts,
operators, and senior management;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) ensure that the task force members
have the requisite security clearances and access to
critical compartmented information streams necessary to
assess and understand the full scope of adversary
cooperation, including how events in one theater might
trigger actions in another; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, submit to the Secretary
or Director who established the task force, and to the
appropriate committees of Congress, a report--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) evaluating the impact of
adversary alignment on the relevant operations
carried out by the individual department,
office, or agency of the task force;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) putting forth recommendations
for such organizational changes as the task
force considers necessary to ensure the
department, office, or agency of the task force
is well positioned to routinely evaluate and
respond to the rapidly evolving nature of
adversary cooperation and the attendant
risks.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Quarterly interagency meeting.--Not less
frequently than quarterly, the heads of the task forces
established under this section shall meet to discuss findings,
problems, and next steps with respect to adversary
alignment.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Report on Nature, Trajectory, and Risks of Bilateral
Cooperation Between, and Multilateral Cooperation Among, Adversaries of
the United States.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the head of any Federal
agency the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the
President, any Federal officer of Cabinet-level rank the
Director considers appropriate, and the appropriate committees
of Congress, a report on bilateral and multilateral cooperation
among adversaries of the United States and the resulting risks
of such cooperation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph
(1) shall include the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) A description of the current nature
and extent of bilateral or multilateral cooperation
among the People's Republic of China, the Russian
Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea across the
diplomatic, information, military, and economic
spheres, and an assessment of the advantages that
accrue to each such adversary from such
cooperation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) An assessment of the trajectory for
cooperation among the adversaries described in
subparagraph (A) during the 5-year period beginning on
the date on which the report is submitted.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) An outline of the risks to the United
States and allied diplomatic, military, intelligence,
and economic operations, and broader security interests
around the world, including the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) The risk of technology
transfer dramatically increasing the military
capabilities of adversaries of the United
States and its impact on the relative balance
of United States and allied capabilities as
compared to that of the adversary.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) The risk posed to the United
States by efforts made by adversaries to
establish alternate payment systems, in
particular with respect to the dominance of the
United States dollar and the effectiveness of
United States sanctions and export control
tools.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) The risk that an adversary
of the United States might assist or otherwise
enable another adversary of the United States
in the event that one or more adversaries
become party to a conflict with the United
States.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iv) The risk that adversary
cooperation poses a growing threat to United
States intelligence collection
efforts.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) An evaluation of the vulnerabilities
and tension points within such adversary bilateral or
multilateral relationships, and an assessment of the
likely effect of efforts by the United States to
separate adversaries.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (c) Report on Strategic Approach.--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of
National Intelligence, and the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a report outlining the strategic approach of the
United States to adversary alignment and the necessary steps to
disrupt, frustrate, constrain, and prepare for adversary
cooperation during the two-year period beginning on the date of
the enactment of this Act.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph
(1) shall include the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) A detailed description of the methods
and tools available to the United States to disrupt the
most dangerous elements of adversary cooperation,
including the growing connectivity between the defense
industrial bases of each adversary.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) A timeline for using diplomatic
engagement and intelligence diplomacy--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) to educate allies and partners
about the increasing risk of adversary
alignment; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) to secure the support of
allies and partners in combating adversary
alignment.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) A plan for ensuring the integrity of
United States methods of economic statecraft, including
an assessment of the efficiency of the United States
sanctions and export control enforcement apparatus and
any accompanying resourcing requirements.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) A clear plan to bolster deterrence
within the priority theaters of the Indo-Pacific
region, Europe, and the Middle East by--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (i) increasing United States and
allied munitions stockpiles, particularly such
stockpiles that are most critical for
supporting frontline partners such as Israel,
Taiwan, and Ukraine in the event of aggression
by a United States adversary;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (ii) facilitating collaborative
efforts with allies for the co-production, co-
maintenance, and co-sustainment of critical
munitions and platforms required by the United
States and allies and partners of the United
States in the event of a future conflict with
the People's Republic of China, the Russian
Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (iii) more effectively using
funding through the United States Foreign
Military Financing program to support allied
and partner domestic defense production that
can contribute to deterrence in each such
priority theater.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) A plan for digitizing and updating
war-planning tools of the Department of Defense not
later than 1 year after the date on which the report is
submitted to ensure that United States war planners are
better equipped to update and modify war plans in the
face of rapidly evolving information on adversary
cooperation.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (F) An assessment of the capability gaps
and vulnerabilities the United States would face in
deterring an adversary in the event that the United
States is engaged in a conflict with another adversary,
and a plan to work with allies and partners to address
such gaps and vulnerabilities.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in classified form.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations,
the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on
Financial Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of
the House of Representatives.</DELETED>
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Defending International Security by
Restricting Unacceptable Partnerships and Tactics Act'' or ``DISRUPT
Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation,
the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea are each considered--
(A) a foreign adversary (as defined in section
825(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118-31; 137 Stat. 322; 46
U.S.C. 50309 note));
(B) a country of risk (as defined in section
6432(a) of the Servicemember Quality of Life
Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118-159; 138 Stat. 2488;
42 U.S.C. 7144b note)) for purposes of assessing
counterintelligence risks posed by certain visitors to
National Laboratories;
(C) a foreign country of concern (as defined in
section 10612(a) of the Research and Development,
Competition, and Innovation Act (Public Law 117-167;
136 Stat. 1635; 42 U.S.C. 19221 note));
(D) a covered foreign country (as defined in
section 164 of the Servicemember Quality of Life
Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118159; 138 Stat. 1818; 10
U.S.C. 4651 note prec.)) for purposes of a prohibition
on operation, procurement, and contracting relating to
foreign-made light detection and ranging technology;
and
(E) a covered foreign country (as defined in
section 1622 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 11781; 135 Stat. 2086;
10 U.S.C. 421 note prec.)) for purposes of a strategy
and plan to implement certain defense intelligence
reforms.
(2) According to the 2025 Intelligence Community Annual
Threat Assessment, the United States faces an increasingly
contested and dangerous global landscape as the four
adversaries named in paragraph (1) deepen cooperation in a
manner that--
(A) reinforces threats posed by each such adversary
individually; and
(B) poses new challenges to the strength and power
of the United States globally.
(3) Much of the cooperation referred to in paragraph (2) is
occurring bilaterally, as the People's Republic of China, the
Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea strengthen diplomatic,
economic, and military ties in accordance with bilateral
agreements, which include--
(A) the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Assistance between China and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, signed at Beijing July 11,
1961;
(B) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership between the Islamic Republic of Iran and
the People's Republic of China, issued on March 27,
2021;
(C) the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation
and the People's Republic of China on International
Relations Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable
Development, issued on February 4, 2022;
(D) the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership between the Russian Federation and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed at
Pyongyang June 18, 2024;
(E) the Iranian-Russian Treaty on Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership, signed at Moscow January 17,
2025; and
(F) traditional relations of friendship and
cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(4) The most concerning forms of such cooperation with
respect to the interests of the United States occur bilaterally
in the realm of defense cooperation. Examples include the
following:
(A) The transfer and sharing of weapons and
munitions. Since 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran has
supplied the Russian Federation with drones and
ballistic missiles, and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea has provided artillery ammunition and
ballistic missiles. Likewise, the Russian Federation
has agreed to provide the Islamic Republic of Iran with
Su-35 fighter jets and air defense assistance.
(B) The transfer and sharing of dual-use
technologies and capabilities. Dual-use goods supplied
by the People's Republic of China have enabled the
Russian Federation to continue defense production in
the face of wide-ranging sanctions and export controls
intended to prevent the Russian Federation from
accessing the necessary components to fuel its defense
industry. In turn, reporting indicates that the Russian
Federation has provided technical expertise on
satellite technology to the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea and is working closely with the
People's Republic of China on air defense and submarine
technology.
(C) Joint military activities and exercises. The
military forces of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea are actively participating in the Russian
Federation's invasion of Ukraine, and joint military
exercises between the People's Republic of China and
the Russian Federation are expanding in scope, scale,
and geographic reach, including in close proximity to
territory of the United States.
(D) Coordination on disinformation and cyber
operations, including coordinated messaging aimed at
denigrating and isolating the United States
internationally.
(5) Adversaries of the United States are also cooperating
in a manner that may circumvent United States and multilateral
economic tools. Examples include the following:
(A) The continued purchase by the People's Republic
of China of oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran
despite sanctions imposed by the Treasury of the United
States on oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(B) The veto by the Russian Federation of, and
abstention by the People's Republic of China in a vote
on, a United Nations Security Council resolution
relating to monitoring United Nations Security Council-
levied sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea.
(6) Adversaries of the United States are cooperating
multilaterally in international institutions such as the United
Nations and through expanded multilateral groupings, such as
the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa group (commonly
known as ``BRICS''), to isolate and erode the influence of the
United States.
(7) Such increased cooperation and alignment among the
People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, to an unprecedented extent, poses a significant threat
to United States interests and national security.
(8) Such increasing alignment--
(A) allows each such adversary to modernize its
military more quickly than previously anticipated;
(B) enables unforeseen breakthroughs in
capabilities through the sharing among such adversaries
of critical military technologies, which could erode
the technological edge of the United States Armed
Forces;
(C) presents increasing challenges to strategies of
isolation or containment against such individual
adversaries, since the People's Republic of China, the
Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea now provide
critical lifelines to each other;
(D) threatens the effectiveness of United States
economic tools, as such adversaries cooperate to evade
United States sanctions and export controls and seek to
establish alternative payment mechanisms that do not
require transactions in United States dollars; and
(E) increases the chances of United States conflict
or tensions with any one of such adversaries drawing in
another, thereby posing a greater risk that the United
States will have to contend with simultaneous threats
from such adversaries in one or more theaters.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to disrupt or frustrate the most dangerous aspects of
cooperation between and among the People's Republic of China,
the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including by using the
threat of sanctions and export controls, bringing such
cooperation to light, and sharing information with United
States allies and partners who may--
(A) share the concerns and objectives of the United
States; and
(B) have influence over such adversaries;
(2) to constrain such grouping from expanding its footprint
or capabilities across the world; and
(3) to prepare for the increasing likelihood that the
United States could face simultaneous challenges or conflict
with multiple such adversaries in multiple theaters, including
by bolstering deterrence across all priority theaters.
SEC. 4. TASK FORCES AND REPORTS.
(a) Task Forces on Adversary Alignment.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence,
and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
each--
(A) establish a task force on adversary alignment;
and
(B) designate a point of contact on adversary
alignment, who shall serve as the head of the task
force for the applicable department, office, or agency.
(2) Requirements.--Each task force established pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall--
(A) comprise--
(i) subject matter experts covering each
of--
(I) the People's Republic of China;
(II) the Russian Federation;
(III) the Islamic Republic of Iran;
and
(IV) the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea;
(ii) representatives covering all core
functions of the department, office, or agency
of the Secretary or Director establishing the
task force; and
(iii) a mix of analysts, operators, and
senior management;
(B) ensure that the task force members have the
requisite security clearances and access to critical
compartmented information streams necessary to assess
and understand the full scope of adversary cooperation,
including how events in one theater might trigger
actions in another; and
(C) not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, submit to the Secretary or
Director who established the task force, and to the
appropriate committees of Congress, a report--
(i) evaluating the impact of adversary
alignment on the relevant operations carried
out by the individual department, office, or
agency of the task force; and
(ii) putting forth recommendations for such
organizational changes as the task force
considers necessary to ensure the department,
office, or agency of the task force is well
positioned to routinely evaluate and respond to
the rapidly evolving nature of adversary
cooperation and the attendant risks.
(3) Quarterly interagency meeting.--Not less frequently
than quarterly, the heads of the task forces established under
this section shall meet to discuss findings, problems, and next
steps with respect to adversary alignment.
(b) Report on Nature, Trajectory, and Risks of Bilateral
Cooperation Between, and Multilateral Cooperation Among, Adversaries of
the United States.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the head of any Federal
agency the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the
President, any Federal officer of Cabinet-level rank the
Director considers appropriate, and the appropriate committees
of Congress, a report on bilateral and multilateral cooperation
among adversaries of the United States and the resulting risks
of such cooperation.
(2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A description of the current nature and extent
of bilateral or multilateral cooperation among the
People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea across the diplomatic, information,
military, and economic spheres, and an assessment of
the advantages that accrue to each adversary from such
cooperation.
(B) An assessment of the trajectory for cooperation
among the adversaries described in subparagraph (A)
during the 5-year period beginning on the date on which
the report is submitted.
(C) An outline of the risks to the United States
and allied diplomatic, military, intelligence, and
economic operations, and broader security interests
around the world, including the following:
(i) The risk of technology transfers
dramatically increasing the military
capabilities of adversaries of the United
States and the impact on the relative balance
of United States and allied capabilities as
compared to that of the adversary.
(ii) The risk posed to the United States by
efforts made by adversaries to establish
alternate payment systems, in particular with
respect to the dominance of the United States
dollar and the effectiveness of United States
sanctions and export control tools.
(iii) The risk that an adversary of the
United States might assist or otherwise enable
another adversary of the United States in the
event that one or more adversaries become party
to a conflict with the United States.
(iv) The risk that adversary cooperation
poses a growing threat to United States
intelligence collection efforts.
(D) An evaluation of the vulnerabilities and
tension points within such adversary bilateral or
multilateral relationships, and an assessment of the
likely effect of efforts by the United States to
separate adversaries.
(3) Form.--The report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in classified form.
(c) Report on Strategic Approach.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
a report outlining the strategic approach of the United States
to adversary alignment and the necessary steps to disrupt,
frustrate, constrain, and prepare for adversary cooperation
during the two-year period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A detailed description of the methods and tools
available to the United States to disrupt the most
dangerous elements of adversary cooperation, including
the growing connectivity between the defense industrial
bases of each adversary.
(B) A timeline for using diplomatic engagement,
intelligence diplomacy, security cooperation, and
foreign assistance, as appropriate--
(i) to educate allies and partners about
the increasing risk of adversary alignment;
(ii) to secure the support of allies and
partners in combating adversary alignment; and
(iii) to assess and help address, as
appropriate, the vulnerabilities and capability
gaps of allies and partners to counter threats
from adversary alignment.
(C) A plan for ensuring the integrity of United
States methods of economic statecraft, including an
assessment of the efficiency of the United States
sanctions and export control enforcement apparatus and
any accompanying resourcing requirements.
(D) A clear plan to bolster deterrence within the
priority theaters of the Indo-Pacific region, Europe,
and the Middle East by--
(i) increasing United States and allied
munitions stockpiles, particularly such
stockpiles that are most critical for
supporting frontline partners such as Israel,
Taiwan, and Ukraine in the event of aggression
by a United States adversary;
(ii) facilitating collaborative efforts
with allies for the co-production, co-
maintenance, and co-sustainment of critical
munitions and platforms required by the United
States and allies and partners of the United
States in the event of a future conflict with
the People's Republic of China, the Russian
Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and
(iii) more effectively using funding
through the United States Foreign Military
Financing program to support allied and partner
domestic defense production that can contribute
to deterrence in each such priority theater.
(E) A plan for digitizing and updating war-planning
tools of the Department of Defense not later than 1
year after the date on which the report is submitted to
ensure that United States war planners are better
equipped to update and modify war plans in the face of
rapidly evolving information on adversary cooperation.
(F) An assessment of the capability gaps and
vulnerabilities the United States would face in
deterring an adversary in the event that the United
States is engaged in a conflict with another adversary,
and a plan to work with allies and partners to address
such gaps and vulnerabilities.
(3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in classified form.
(d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee
on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Financial
Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House
of Representatives.
Calendar No. 99
119th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1883
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A BILL
To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government
strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the People's Republic of
China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which are the foremost
adversaries of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the
United States.
_______________________________________________________________________
June 18, 2025
Reported with an amendment